CENTRAL INIEWGENCE AGENCY CIA Documents on the CuBAN Mrs SILE 1962 i 4 Editor ' Mary S McAuliffe l I CIA History Staff October 1992 - -■ CRis1s CENfRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CIA Documents on the CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 1962 Editor Mary S McAuliffe History Staff Central Intelligence Agency Washington DC October 1992 These documems ha-ve been approved for release through the Historical Re- ie- c Program ofthe Central lnu lligence Agenty September 16 1992 H RP 92-9 CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 Foreword The Central Intelligence Agency is pleased to declassify and publish this collection of documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis as the First Intelligence History Symposium marks the thirtieth anniversary of that event We hope that both the Symposium and this volume will help fill the large gaps in information previously available on the role of intelligence in this crisis The volume and Symposium are both products of CIA's new program of openness which Robert Gates Director of Central Intelligence DCI announced in his speech to the Oklahoma Press Association last February To help carry out this openness program the Center for the Study of Intelligence CIA's focal point for research and publication on intelligence since 1975 has been reorganized expanded in size and mission and placed in the Office of the DCI The Center now includes the CIA History Staff first formed in 1951 and a new Historical Review Group which has increased both the scope and pace of the program to declassify historical records that DCI William Casey established in 1985 Dr Mary S McAuliffe Deputy Chief of the History Staff has located and compiled the documents in this collection Dr McAuliffe who has recently completed a study of John A McCone's tenure as DCI graduated from Principia College took a Ph D in history from the University of Maryland and taught at Iowa State University before joining CIA and the History Staff in 1986 She is the author of Crisis on the Left Cold War Politics and American Liberals 1947-1954 Amherst MA University of Massachusetts Press 1978 The Historical Review Group declassified the documents that Dr McAuliffe selected using new guidelines prepared by a special CIA task force and approved by the DCI last spring We are especially grateful to the principal reviewer who handled this difficult process- including coordination with other departments and agencies-with great skill and dispatch We should also acknowledge the invaluable help of our History Assistant Ms Diane Marvin and of the members of the Directorate of Intelligence's Design Center and Publication Center and of the Directorate of Administration's Printing and Photography Group who prepared and produced this book with remarkable speed and virtuosity iii A number of documents in this collection have been excerpted some to reduce their length and others to speed the declassification of missile crisis information by omitting irrelevant material When the Historical Review Group systematically reviews these and other missile crisis records for declassification and release to the National Archives we expect that most of the material omitted for reasons of length or relevance in our published excerpts will be declassified and made available to the public J Kenneth McDonald Chief History Staff 11 September 1992 iv CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 Preface The collection in this volume includes many of CIA's most important documents on the Cuban missile crisis It contains the honeymoon cables that Director of Central Intelligence DCI John A McCone sent to Headquarters from France a month before the missile crisis as well as McCone's notes taken during the National Security Council Executive Committee meetings at the height of the crisis It also includes intelligence memorandums and estimates briefing papers Cuban refugee rePorts and memorandums on Operation MONGOOSE the clandestine program aimed at destabilizing the Castro regime Many of the evaluations of the missile threat contained here draw UPon IRONBARK material whose source was Soviet Col Oleg Penkovsky To the degree possible the documents in this volume are organized according to the date of subject matter so that a February 1963 document discussing a September 1962 event will appear among September 1962 documents In general support documents follow documents that summarize a sequence of events To conserve space and speed declassification excerpts have been taken from some of the lengthier entries In some cases the summary or conclusion section of a document has been excerpted while in others material on topics unrelated to Cuba or the missile crisis has been omitted All such instances have been noted in the Contents list and in the documents' headings All the documents in this volume have been subject to declassification review and portions of some have been deleted for security reasons In the weeks immediately preceding the missile crisis DCI McCone was frequently out of town During these times his Deputy Director of Central Intelligence DDCI Lt Gen Marshall S Carter served as Acting Director McCone was away from Washington on his honeymoon in France from the evening of 23 August through 23 September 1962 He left for Los Angeles on business on the evening of 11 October 1962 corning back late on 14 October He returned to the West Coast on the afternoon of 15 October immediately following news of the death of his stepson The discovery of missiles in Cuba brought him back to Washington on the evening of 16 October where he remained for the rest of the crisis V -- _ It should be noted that these documents many of them written hastily during a time of national emergency contain occasional errors McCone's 19 October 1962 memorandum for the file Document 63 for example confuses the days of the week although not the dates of the first crisis meetings that he attended Much has been written on the missile crisis during the 30 years that have elapsed since those 13 days in October but the unavailability of classified material has left many questions still unanswered The CIA History Staff hopes that the publication of this volume and the further releases that follow will make possible a more complete understanding of this complex and deeply troubling event · Mary S McAuliffe Deputy Chief History Stcif vi Persons Mentioned Brief Titles and Descriptions as of October 1962 Acheson Dean Former Secretary of State Alsop Joseph Columnist Alsop Stewart Columnist Anderson Adm George W Jr USN Chief of Naval Operations Ball George W Under Secretary of State Bohlen Charles E Newly appointed Ambassador to France former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Bowles Chester President's Special Representative and Adviser on African Asian and Latin American Affairs Bundy McGeorge Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Cannon Representative Clarence D-MO Chairman House Appropriations Committee Carroll Lt Gen Joseph F USAF Director Defense Intelligence Agency Carter Lt Gen Marshall S USA Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Castro Fidel Prime Minister of Cuba Charyk Joseph V Under Secretary of the Air Force Cline Ray S Deputy Director for Intelligence CIA vu • • Dillon C Douglas Secretary of the Treasury Dirksen Senator Everett M R-IL Senate Minority Leader Donovan James B New York lawyer representing the Cuban Families Committee in efforts to release prisoners captured at the Bay of Pigs invasion 1961 Eisenhower Gen Dwight D Former President of the United States Elder Walter Executive Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence Forrestal Michael V National Security Council staff member Fulbright Senator J William D-AR Chairman Senate Foreign Relations Committee Gilpatric Roswell L Deputy Secretary of Defense Graybeal Sidney N Chief Offensive Missiles Division Office of Scientiqc Intelli ence CIA Grogan Col Stanley J USA Retired Assistant to the DCI for Public Affairs Gromyko Andrei A Soviet Foreign Minister Halleck Representative Charles A R-IN House Minority Leader Harvey William K Chief Task Force W CIA unit tasked with carrying out Operation MONGOOSE Hayden Senator Carl President Pro Tempore of the Senate and Chairman Senate Appropriations Committee D-AZ viii Helms Richard M Deputy Director for Plans CIA HickenJooper Senator Bourke B R-IA Chairman Senate Republican Policy Committee Hitsman Roger Jr Director Bureau of Intelligence and Research Department of State Johnson Clarence Kelly Chief aircraft designer Lockheed Aircraft Johnson Lyndon B Vice President of the United States Johnson U Alexis Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Karamessines Thomas H Assistant Deputy Director for Plans CIA Kaysen Carl Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Keating Senator Kenneth B R-NY S nator who warned of missiles in Cuba Kennedy John F President of the United States Kennedy Robert F Attorney General Kent Sherman Chairman Board of National Estimates CIA Khrushchev Nikita S First Secretary Central Committee CPSU and Soviet Premier Killian James R Jr President of MIT and Chairman President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Kirkpatrick Lyman B Executive Director CIA Knoche E Henry Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence ix • • Knox William E President Westinghouse International Krock Arthur Columnist The New York Times Lansdale Brig Gen Edward G USAF Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense and head of Operation MONGOOSE Lawrence David Editor and columnist U S News World Report Lemnitzer Gen Lyman L USA Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff until I October 1962 Lovett Robert A Former Secretary of Defense Lundahl Arthur C Director National Photographic Interpretation Center Mansfield Senator Mike D-MT Senate Majority Leader Martin Edwin M Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs McCloy John J Coordinator of US disarmament activities and member of the US Delegation to the United Nations during the missile crisis McCone John A Director of Central Intelligence McNamara Robert S Secretary of Defense Miskovsky M C Assistant General Counsel CIA Norstad Gen Lauris USAF Supreme Altied Commander Europe SACEUR and Commander in Chief US European Command Parker Col David Stewart USA Deputy Director National Photographic Interpretation Center X Parrott Thomas A Executive Secretary NSC Special Group Reber James Q Chairman Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance Rostow Walt W Counselor and Chairman of Policy Planning Council State Department Rusk Dean Secretary of State Russell Bertrand British philosopher and author Russell Senator '13-ichard B D-GA Chairman Senate Armed Services Committee Saltonstall Senator Leverett R-MA Chairman Senate Republican Conference Scott Paul Columnist Scoville Herbert Deputy Director for Research CIA Pete Jr George A D-FL Secretary Senate Democratic Conference Sorensen Theodore Special Counsel to the President Stevenson Adlai E US Representative to the UN and Representative in the Security Council Sweeney Gen Walter Commander in Chief Tactical Air Command Smathers Senator C Jr USAF Taylor Gen Maxwell D USA President's Military Representative until 1 October 1962 thereafter Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Thompson Llewellyn Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union E Jr xi • TidwelJ William A Assistant to Deputy Director for Intelligence Planning CIA U Thant Secretary-General of the United Nations Vinson Representative Carl D-GA Chairman House Armed Services Committee Warner John S Legislative Counsel CIA Wheelon Albert D Chairman Guided Missile Astronautics Intelligence Committee Wiesner Jerome B Science Adviser to the President Wilson Don Deputy Director USIA xii Acronyms and Abbreviations AG Attorney General ALPHA-66 Cuban exile group BNE Board of l ational Estimates CIA ClilCKADEE Special information handling channel for nondocumentary material generated by Col Oleg Penkovsky CINCARIB Commander in Chief Caribbean CINCEUR Commander in Chief Europe CL lCLANT Commander in Chief Atlantic COMINT Communications Intelligence COMOR Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance cos Chief of Station DCI Director of Central Intelligence DDCI Deputy Director of Central Intelligence DD I Deputy Director for Intelligence DD P Deputy Director for Plans DD R Deputy Director for Research DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DOD Department of Defense DRE Cuban Student Directorate Cuban student exile group ELU T Electronic Intelligence FI Foreign Intelligence 5412 Committee Oversight committee of the National Security Council also referred to as the Special Group Xlll GCI Ground Control Intercept GMAIC Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile IL 28 Soviet jet light bomber IRBM Intermediate-range ballistic missile IRONBARK Special information handling channel for documentary material generated by Col Oleg Penkovsky JAEIC Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff MiG 21 Soviet jet fighter MONGOOSE Operation MONGOOSE MRBM Medium-range ballistic missile MT Megatons NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NIE National Intelligence Estimate NORAD North American Air Defense Command NPIC National Photographic Interpretation Center NSA National Security Agency NSAM National Security Action Memorandum NSC National Security Council OAS Organization of American States OCI Office of Current Intelligence CIA OD Operating Directive ONE Office of National Estimates CIA xiv OSI Office of Scientific Intelligence CIA PFIAB President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board PI Photointerpreter POL Petroleum oil and lubricants PSALM Special information handling channel for material related to presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba RF-101 Low altitude reconnaissance aircraft US SA-2 See SAM SAC Strategic Air Command SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe SA ' f Surface-to-air missile SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe S 'IE Special National Intelligence Estimate SS-4 SeeMRBM SS-5 See IRBM SecDef Secretary of Defense Special Group National Security Council committee with oversight over Operation MONGOOSE Augmented Special Group Oversight committee of the National Security Council also referred to as the 5412 Committee TFW Task Force W special CIA unit tasked with carrying out Operation MOi GOOSE U-2 High-altitude reconnaissance aircraft US UN United ations USL United States Information Agency usm United States Intelligence Board Re erse Blank xv Contents Page Foreword 111 Preface V Persons Mentioned vii Acronyms and Abbreviations Xlll Part I Prelude to Crisis 1 Maps of Cuban overflights August-October 1962 1 2 Timetable of Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba July-October 1962 7 3 National Intelligence Estimate 85-2-62 The Situation and Prospects in Cuba 1 August 1962 Excerpt 9 4 John A McCone Memorandum Soviet MRBMs in Cuba 31 October 1962 13 5 McCone1 Memorandum on Cuba · 20 August 1962 19 6 McCone Memorandum for the File Discussion in Secretary Rusk's Office at 12 o'clock 21 August 1962 21 7 McCone Memorandum of the Meeting with the President at 6 00 p m on August 22 1962 25 8 McCone Memorandum of Meeting with the President 23 August 1962 27 9 J A M McCone1 Memorandum Proposed Plan of Action for 31 Cuba '' 21 August 1962 originally attached to Document 8 10 William A Tidwell Memorandum for the Record Instructions Concerning the Handling of Certain Information Concerning Cuba '' 1 September 1962 33 11 Ray S Cline Memorandum for Acting Director of Central Intelligence Recent Soviet Military Activities in Cuba 3 September 1962 35 12 Lyman 8 Kirkpatrick Memorandum for the Director Action Generated by DCI Cables from ice Concerning Cuban Low-Le ·el Photography and Offensive Weapons n d 39 13 Lt Gen arshall S Carter to McCone Cable 4 September 1962 Excerpt 45 14 Carter to McCone Cable 5 September 1962 Excerpt 47 15 Carter to McCone Cable 6 September 1962 Excerpt 49 xvii Page 16 McCone to Carter Cable 7 September 1962 51 17 Carter to McCone Cable 7 September 1962 Excerpt 53 18 Carter to McCone Cable 8 September I 962 Excerpt 55 19 Carter to McCone Cable 10 September 1962 Excerpt 57 20 McCone to Carter and Elder 10 September 1962 59 21 Kirkpatrick Memorandum for the Director White House Meeting on 10 September 1962 on Cuban Overflights 1 March 1963 61 22 Carter to McCone Cable 11 September 1962 Excerpt 63 23 Carter to McCone Cable 12 September 1962 Excerpt 65 24 McCone to Carter Cable 13 September 1962 67 25 Carter to McCone Cable 13 September 1962 Excerpt 69 26 Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence Current Intelligence Memorandum Analysis of the Suspect Missile Site at Banes Cuba 13 September 1962 71 27 Carter to McCone Cable 14 September 1962 Excerpt 75 28 McCone to Carter Cable with attached note from MSC Carter 16 September 1962 77 29 Carter to McCone Cable 17 September 1962 Excerpt 81 30 Carter to McCone Cable 18 September 1962 83 31 Carter to McCone Cable 18 September 1962 Excerpt 85 32 Carter to McCone Cable 19 September 1962 Excerpt 87 33 Special National Intelligence Estimate 85-3-62 The Military Buildup in Cuba 19 September 1962 Excerpt 91 34 McCone to Carter Cable 20 September 1962 95 35 Carter to McCone Cable 21 September 1962 Excerpt 97 36 Richard Lehman Excerpt from Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence CIA Handling of the Soviet Buildup in Cuba 14 November 1962 Excerpt 99 37 CIA Information Report 18 September 1962 103 38 CIA Information Report 20 September 1962 105 39 CIA Information Report 27 September 1962 40 CIA Information Report 1 October 1962 107 109 41 McCone Memorandum of MONGOOSE Meeting Held on Thursday October 4 1962 111 42 McCone Memorandum of Discussion with Mr McGeorge Bundy Friday October 5 1962 5 15 p m 115 xviii Page 43 Sherman Kent Memorandum for the Director Implications of an Announcement by the President that the CS would Conduct Overhead Reconnaissance of Cuba 8 October 1962 119 44 McCone Memorandum on Donovan Project 11 October 1962 123 45 Memorandum U-2 Overflights of Cuba 29 August through 14 October 1962 27 February 1963 127 Part II Crisis 16-28 October 1962 46 CIA emorandum Probable Soviet IRB Sites in Cuba 16 October I 962 139 47 Carter Memorandum for the Record 17 October 1962 145 48 Cline Memorandum for the Record Notification of NSC Officials of Intelligence on Missile Bases in Cuba 27 October 1962 149 49 Richard Helms Memorandum for the Record ONGOOSE Meeting with the Attorney General ' 16 October 1962 153 50 Arthur C Lundahl Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence and Director Defense Intelligence Agency Additional Information-Mission 3101 16 October 1962 155 5 I McCone meeting schedule I 7-23 October l 962 157 52 McCone1 Memorandum of Meeting attended in Secretary Ball's Conference Room at 0830 17 October 159 53 McCone Memorandum for Discussion Today October 17 1962 The Cuban Situation 161 54 McCone memorandum 17 October 1962 163 55 McCone memorandum Brief Discussion with the President9 30 a m -i7 October 1962 165 56 McCone Memorandum for the File Conversation with General Eisenhower-Wednesday 17 October 1962 167 57 1 cCone Memorandum for the File emorandum of 1 eeting Wednesday October 17th at 8 30 a m and again at 4 00 p m 19 October 1962 l 69 58 Albert D Wheelan 1 emorandum for Chairman United States Intelligence Board faaluation of Offensive 1 issile Threat in Cuba 17 October 1962 I 75 59 Lundahl 1 emorandum for Director of Central Intelligence and Director Defense Intelligence Agency Additional Information- ission 3102 18 October 1962 I 81 60 '- 1 cCone '- 1 emorandum for File 19 October 1962 183 ----------- XIX 61 Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba 18 October 1962 Excerpt 187 62 McCone Memorandum to USIB Members 19 October 1962 193 63 LET Llewellyn E Thompson Memorandum 19 October 1962 195 64 Special National Intelligence Estimate 11-18-62 Soviet Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action on Cuba 19 October 1962 Excerpt 197 65 Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba 19 October 1962 Excerpt 203 66 Lundahl Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence and Director Defense Intelligence Agency Additional Information-Mission 3107 19 October 1962 209 67 Special National Intelligence Estimate 11-19-62 Major Consequences of Certain US Courses of Action on Cuba 20 October 1962 -211 68 Cline DD I Briefing White House 20 October 1962 221 69 Supplement l to Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba 20 October 1962 Excerpt 227 70 Intelligence Memorandum Evaluation of Offensive Threat in Cuba with cover memorandum Carter to Members of United States Intelligence Board 21 October I 962 235 71 McCone Memorandum of Meeting with the President Attorney General Secretary McNamara General Taylor and Mr McCone 10 00 a m -10 21 62 241 72 McCone Memorandum of Discussion with the President 243 Alone 21 October 1962 73 McCone Memorandum for the File Meeting with the Vice President on 21 October 1962 22 October 1962 245 74 Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba 21 October 1962 briefing notes for Heads of Government 247 75 Supplement 2 to Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba 21 October 1962 Excerpt 261 76 Lundahl Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence and Director Defense Intelligence Agency Additional Information-Missions 3111 and 31 13 • 21 October 1962 263 77 THK Thomas H Karamessines to Walter Elder 265 22 October 1962 with copies of two cables sent to all Chiefs of Station 78 Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence Current Intelligence Memorandum Timing of the Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba 22 October 1962 xx 269 79 Cline1 DDI notes for DCI for l SC Briefing at 3 PM in Cabinet Room 22 October 1962 271 80 McCone Memorandum for the File Leadership Meeting on October 22nd at 5 00 p m 24 October 1962 275 81 Supplement 3 to Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba 22 October 1962 Excerpt 281 82 McCone Memorandum of Meeting of Executive Committee of the NSC 10 00 a m October 23 1962 283 83 McCone Memorandum for the File Meetings with Mr Krock Mr David Lawrence and Mr Se-0tt 23 October 1962 287 84 cCone Memorandum for the File Meetings with Senator Russell Senator Hickenlooper and Chairman Vinson 23 October 1962 289 85 McCone Memorandum for the File Executive Committee Meeting on 23 October 1962 6 00 p m 291 86 Supplement 4 to Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba 24 October 1962 Excerpt 293 87 Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum The Crisis USSR Cuba 24 October 1962 Excerpt 295 88 McCone Memorandum for the File Notes on Leadership Meeting on October 24th 1962 at 5 00 p m 25 October 1962 297 89 Supplement 5 to Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba 24 October 1962 Excerpt 299 90 Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum The Crisis USSR Cuba 25 October 1962 Excerpt 303 91 McCone Memorandum for the File Executive Committee Meeting 10 25 62-10 00 a m 305 92 McCone Memorandum for the File Meeting of the NSC Executive Committee 25 October 5 00 p m 26 October 1962 309 93 MSC Carter1 Memorandum for the Director MONGOOSE Operations and General lansdale's Problems 25 October 1962 31 I 94 Supplement 6 to Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba 26 October I 962 Excerpt 313 95 Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum The Crisis uSSR Cuba 26 October 1962 Excerpt 315 96 Cone Memorandum for the File Meeting of the NSC Executive Committee 26 October 1962 10 00 a m 317 97 McCone Memorandum of MO GOOSE Meeting in the JCS Operations Room October 26 1962 at 2 30 p m 29 October 1962 319 xxi 98 Supplement 7 to Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba 27 October 1962 Excerpt 323 99 Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum The Crisis USSR Cuba 27 October 1962 Excerpt 327 100 McCone notes from 10 00 a m NSC Executive Committee meeting 27 October 1962 331 101 McCone notes from 4 00 p m NSC Executive Committee meeting 27 October 1962 333 102 McCone notes from 9 00 p m NSC Executive Committee meeting 27 October 1962 335 103 Supplement 8 to Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba 28 October 1962 Excerpt 337 104 Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum The Crisis USSR Cuba 28 October 1962 Excerpt 341 105 McCone notes National Security Council MeetingExecutive Committee October 28-11 00 a m 345 106 Walter Elder Memorandum of Executive Committee of NSC Meeting on Sunday 28 October 1962 Dictated by the Undersigned based on Debriefing of DCI 347 107 Supplement 9 to Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba 28 October 1962 Excerpt 349 Part Ill The Aftermath 108 Memorandum Soviet Offensive Weapons in Cuba 29 October 1962 with attachment Table of Special Purpose Missile System Equipment 351 109 Memorandum for the Director Your Briefings of the NSC Executive Committee 3 November 1962 353 110 Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum Deployment and Withdrawal of Soviet Missiles and Other Significant Weapons in Cuba 29 November 1962 357 111 President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board James R Killian Jr Chairman Memorandum for the President and report 4 February 1963 361 112 McCone Memorandum for the President 28 February 1963 and Conclusions attached 373 xxii PART I PRELUDE TO CRISIS Sudden surge in supply ofSoviet materiel and personnel to Cuba McCone warns high administration officials including t he President t hat the Soviets may be placing medium-range ballistic missiles there CIA U-2 overflights discover surface-to-air missile sites in Cuba McCone warns t hat SAMs may seroe to protect a later emplacement ofmedium-range missiles Efforts continue to win release ofBay ofPigs prisoners Discovery of medium-range ballistic missile sites in Cuba I ■ I --1 · · I ' ·- I I CUBA u z OVER F_DR AUGUST Fl IGfITS • 196Z I I ' • 'i J • - -l i I ' as•w 75•w D ' -- _ - - -- -- -- -- ---------- -- -- - p 3093 rd · CUBA·U-Z OVERFLIGHTS FOR SEPTEMB 1962 3089 5 SEPT -- -- 8S'W 75'W I ¾ ll 'f 3100 7 OC' 1' - -- -- -- -- _ Miami 4 '1 •' • _ I D ' I ti t- J l v· · 3098 5 OCT CUBA U-Z O VERFLIGHTS 1 62 FOR OCTOBER --- 1 Continued · · - WARNING AREA _· 'lt_ - G u 0 R8n 8' l ii' SANTA Ft CAMPO C OLUMBIA A$ r C yc ' '' e S to l•EI G11e5i' l · - _ - - ·ss1 s's• fpiiiAP OH ' - 4 ------------------------------------- -----·- -I I VI L I· I • ' ·l· ' ' i I ' ' I • I ' · 1 I j • ' J I ·' I - I I I I I I ··• ' ' ' 1 I • 1 ' · · · · ' •• • • ' I • • ' ' '• ' t 2 Timetable of Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba July-October 1962 r - TAB A SECTION II TIMETABLE OF SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP IN CUBA July - October 1962 All dates approximate Date Western Cuba Central Cuba 25-31 July Upsurge of Soviet arms shipments begins arriving in western Cuban ports 1-5 August Construction begins on SAM sites at Mata nzas Havana Mariel Bahia Honda Santa Lucia San Julian La _Coloma Eastern Cuba 5-10 August 10-15 August 15-20 August Upsurge of Soviet Soviet armored groups arms shipments arrive at Santiago de las Vegas and Artemis a begins arriving in central Cuban ports 20-25 August Construction begins on SAM site at Cienfuegos 25-31 August 1-5 September Construction begins on Guanajay IRBM sites 7 Construction begins on S_- 1 sites at Sagua la Gra nde C a iba r i en Sancti Spiritus 2 Continued -6'13--ORE' P Date Central Cuba Western Cuba Eastern Cuba Soviet armored group arrives at Remedios 5-10 September· 10-15 September 15-20 September Construction begins at San Cristobal MRBM sites Construction begins at Remedios IRBM site Upsurge of Soviet arms shipments begins arriving in eastern Cuban ports Soviet armored gl'oup al'l'ives at Holguin 20-25 September Construction begins on SAM sites at Los Angeles Chaparra and Jiguani Construction begins at Sagua la Grande MRBM sites 25-30 September Construction begins on SAM sites at Manati Senado and Manzanillo NOT E Construction of the remaining SAM sites which apparently were considered less vital than those listed above to the protection of offensive missile bases in Cuba began in late September or early October Work probably began on the SAM site at Siguanea on the Isle of Pines in the last week of September and on the sites at Esmeralda Chambas Maldonado Santiago de Cuba Ciego de Avila and Deleite during the first half of October lll ' -EC RE ' li' 8 3 National Intelligence Estimate 85-2-62 The Situation and Prospects in Cuba• I August 962 Excerpt NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 85-2-62 The Situation and Prospects in Cuba 1 August 1962 9 3 Continued THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA l THE PROBLEM To analyze the situation in Cuba and to estimate the prospects over the next year or so with particular reference to Castro's relations with the Communists and to the potential for resistance to his regime CONCLUSIONS A Fidel Castro has asserted his primacy in Cuban conununism the old Communists have had to accommodate themselves to this fact as has the USSR Further strains may develop in these relationships but they are unlikely to break the ties of mutual interest between Castro and the old Communists and between Cuba and the USSR Paras 1-10 B By force of circumstances the USSR is becoming ever more deeply committed to preserve and strengthen the Castro regime The USSR however has avoided any formal commitment to protect and defend the regime in all contingencies Para 11 __ C The Cuban armed forces are loyal to the personal leadership of the Castro brothers Their capabilities have been and are being greatly enhanced by the Soviet Bloc's provision of military equipment and instruction Cuban military capabilities however are essentially defensive We believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with the capability to undertake major independent military operations • This estimate Is designed to bring up-to-date NIE 8 2 The Situation and Prospects In Cuba dated 21 March 1962 Tbe background Information contauied h1 that document remalm generally valid 3 Continued o v We also believe it unlikely that the Bloc will station in Cuba Bloc combat units of any description at least for the period of this estimate Paras 12-29 D The Cuban armed forces are well able to intimidate the general population and to suppress any popular insurrection likely to develop in present circumstances They are probably capable of containing and controlling any threat to the regime through guerrilla action and of repelling any invasion short of a direct US military intervention in strength Paras 22-23 E The Cuban economy is in deep trouble in pa rt because of the US embargo and a consequent shortage of convertible foreign exchange in part because of agricultural and industrial roismanagpment Despite remedial measures it is unlikely that agricultural and industrial production can be significantly increased within the next year or so The expected increase in capital imports from the Bloc is unlikely to produce a net growth of the economy before the end of 1963 Paras 30-35 F The Castro regime retains the positive support of about 20 percent of the population but disaffection is increasing This trend is manifested in growing passive resistance and in occasional open demonstrations of resentment Few however dare to accept the risks of organized active resistance in present circumstances for fear of the regime's ID a Sfil e apparatus for SUTVemance and repression Paras 36-41 G If arms and supplies became availa Jle and if con idence were created in the likelihood of outside support for a major Cuban uprising resistance activity and potential would increase Even so it is unlikely that the regime could be overthrown unless events had already shaken the regime and brought into doubt its capacity for survival and unless substantial outside support for the insurgents were forthcoming Paras 42-51 H The Castro regime still seeks to lead the inevitable revolution throughout La tin America but its preoccupation with domestic problems tends to limit its activity in this 2 -5ECRE _ 11 3 Continued -oi Ckfi ·respect In Latin Alllerica there is widespread disillusionment regarding the Cuban revolution Nevertheless militant pro-Castro groups exist in several countries and Cuban subversive activity could prove effective in certain unstable situations e g in Guatemala or Venezuela The appeal of the Cuban example will increase in Latin America if reform lags there and hopes and promises remain unfulfilled Paras 52-59 IECRET 12 3 4 John A JfcCone Jfemorandum Soviet MRBMs in Cuba 31 October 1962 31 October 1962 MEMORANDUM SO BJ ECT So•iet MRB •b in Cllb l On Aa1Qat 10th at a me•tiDJ in Secretary Ru alt'• Ccmarenc• Room attended by Ru•k Johnaoa McNamara Gilpatric Bundy Gen Taylor Cd a immber of othera or ch a pupon of db • General L nadal•'• l l actiYWe• McColl• reported cm the ndde impon Uon of mateml -- u that tim• the ch a rac teriatic of which WU anidentifled - ad Sovt t per•oanel ud at that meetmg •peculated that thi• could be elecu u equipment or UH qaiut C a navarel and or military equipmem 1Aclud1JI mediu r n nna• b lllatic mia ■ llu 2 On Auaaat 2 ut at a mo Una in S cr•tary Ru■k'• a fice attellded by the • me 1roup McCOM a1 1D reviewed the situation u it developed ■ince AIOll1Ut 10th reported doli a1te inforzn tion o n ■urlace to air mis ■ U • and hi speculated on the probability o medi l n range b llut c mia U • 3 On Auguet 2 2Dd Mc Ccme aan the aame m ormation to the President addmg certam d iaia conc•rnin the number o So-riet d Chine• peraonnel wllo had ntly entered Cuba•• reported by who had jut retunMtd from Hav • 4 On Aquat 23rd ma meetiq with th• PrHident Rnak McNamara Gilpatric General Taylor Bandy and others Mc Cone again reviewed the •itaatlon and •tioiMd the need tor the otenaive SAM installations mueu they ••r• to make poHibla th• concealment o MB BM 5 The aame reuoning wa• applied m di acuuiooa with Senator Ru■ hll'• Subc ommitte••• Chairman Vwon'• Sabcommittee and in private talk with Chai rman C Jman prior to M c Cone'• deparf U e cm Aiaiuat 23rd 6 On Satuzd ay Augu■t 25th McCone uraed Cienenl Carter Ac tini DCI to propoH low l•v•l R 101 flights over certain Soviet-Cuban i n ■ t Uatioaa in order to obc a in detailed technical in ormation f67 SESRET 13 4 Continued -lGP SE Rff 1 On September 7th McCone wir•d G•neral Ca rter •• followa1 Oueation very much if C-pacbg• will be helpful Cuba and u'l'ge fuquent repeat mi••iona of recent recozmabaance operati which Gilpatric a4viaea informative Abo 1 aupport uee o R-101 it neceHary My hunch ia we mi1ht ace prospect ot Soviet ahorirange aumco-to-aur ace miHilea of portable type in Cuba which could co rnmNld important targets ol aoutheaat United Stale• and poHibly Latin American Caribbean areas You might aqa••t to Ruak twit we develop joint policiH lor action in Cuba with Hlocted Caribbe A South• A •d l l atatea •• an lte rnadve to Hektna unanimoua OAS actioll which moat certainly will be an ineffective comproml■e solution U p at hiatory ia any indicator 8 On S ptamber 10th McCone wired C a r t e r • ollowa Dillicult for me to rationalbse extenaive costly dolenaea being Htabliahed in Cuba aa such extreme coatly measure• to accomplbh security and ••crecy not consistent with other policiea such•• re ugeea legal travel etc Appeua to me quite poa•ible meaaui-ea now being taken ai-e for purpoae ol inaurin •ecrecy of aome oflenaive capability such a• MRBM• to be installed by Soviet• after preaent phaae completed m ld co mtry aecured from overflights Suga••t SNE 9'Jdy motives behind the•• defenalve ineaaurea which even aeem to exceed thoae provided moat ntellit••• 11 9 On September 13th M Cone received commW1ication from Carter aut lng that the BNE continued to feel that the lnatallation ot SA Za i• mo•t reasonably explained by othe th n a duire to hide MRBM build-up To tbia McCone n•pcmded on September 13th aa tollowa Abo I continue to be concerned that the Htabliahment of defenaive equipment and installation• la m'erely a prelude to th• location of an olleuiva weapon capability and onc e tha i• done the implementation of 14 4 Continued tBP SECRtt our poUcy a ■ reporwd in th pr••• mi iht be extremely dif lcult and involve unacceptable dangers I would lib to talk with you o n from Nor -tad'• headquarter■ to the W h i t • or Pemagcni altua ti0J1 l'oom toniaht 13 Sept betwHn 1700 and 1800 you tim• UnleH I hear to th c onuary from you by twelve noon today your tim9 I will pro eed Pa1'ia thi■ eveIUng and make arrange i it• for this call 10 On September 16th McCcme cabled Carter a■ followa Auo believe we must refally tudy th• pro ■poct of Hcret importation and placement of Hver l Soviet M RBMa which could iiot be detected by u■ if Cuban defenH ■ deny overflight In reflecting on my obHn-ationa of Thor matalla tlou in Brita in and JupU r ■ in Iuly I can envisaae a Soviet plan to pacbge mi Hile control lUld operating equipi nent in aueh a way that • unit could be made operational a few houra aftelt' a alte c 1 red and a mode ■t concrete pad poured Do not wiah to be ovol'ly alumina thia matte r but h llev• CIA and community must keep govenune nt informed o danger o a ■urpd ae am al■o that detec ucm of preparatory ■top• po ■ eibly beyond our capabWty mce Cuban de enae ■ y■tu n operative Tm 111t of pr••• report■ reac hini me i■ that there en• a clear damu-cation between defenaive and often live p1'apan tiona aad 1 que ■tion l •• can be aue ol thia I recognl- Cuban policy dedaion■ zno ■t delicate and beyond Aaency 02' my competence However believe we mu ■t give tho•• maldna deci■ lon our be•t e ■tim te af poHible developmai it• alMi alteniatlve ■ ituation which might evolve and miexpectedly comt'oiit ua 11 ll On 19 September Carter c om mWlic ted the aummary o the concluaio n of C lban o that date pa raaraph D atatlng that in the opinion of BN utabluhm -nt of MRBM• in Cuba would be iBP Sf8RE'f 15 4 Continued l4tP SEB 9 El · incompatible with Soviet policy •- nd indicate a gnatu willingneH to liu na • ri•k ill US Soviet relationa thaD the SoYiot Uni011 ha■ diapl yed •o ar-- 12 On September 2 Qth McCone rHponded u ollowe lle f DIB l72Z8s Suage■t moat cam 11 conaideration to concluaion la•t aentenc • paragraph d Aa an alternative I can • - that u oflenaiYe Soviet Cuban • will provide Soviet■ with moat importut and Ueciive tradin1 po•ition in conneaicm with all other c rlUc al areu and hence they might take an imespectod ri■k in orde to eatal llah ■ ICh a po•ition 11 13 It la reported t during Mccoue•• absence Acting t Cl at a -•ting h•ld in Mi- Baady a olfk• cm 10 September proposed an 1 ovel'fliiht which would cover the entu-e north and ao Uh pe'l'imeter of Cuba ea t ol Havana and Ollt to the ea■tern tip of Oriente Province except I or an area ill the immediate vicinity ol Santa Clara where four S AM aite• wen known to exut nd had been photographed The p'IU'poH of this flight wa• to make a final determmatl cll as to bow many SAM aitea exiatecl or were under consiructlon It ts reported that because of llwsk'• cODCern for the aafoty of th• U-2 in riew ol the Sakolin 'riolaUon on 7 September and the ChiNat loH on 10 September the aenae ol the meethi particularly that of S creta ry Ruak that CIA be pumitted to make 4 1 Ughta agalmrt Cuba two pedpheral and two oyerflighta o llmlted penetration blclwUng the Ia le of Pule• Theae fiight• were ex•cuted between 26 September and 7 October On the l•th of September th• meetiD ol tho Special Group JCS repreMntatlve outlined ·c apabil1Uea for low level coverage Secretary of De eue indicated b dlcl not wbh thi■ operatl011 con id ered until tu reaw t ■ we re obtained from CIA reccmnaiaaance a approved on September 11th - 1 · On Octobei- 4th McCone noted to the SpecW Oroizp _that there had been no coverage ol the center of Cuba and mai-e particularly the enUH westen oad ol the Ia land or over a month IUld aB Wght• S Septombol' bad been either peripheral or llm itlld aDd therefore CIA did not know nor could adYue 'Whether an of enalve capability was being created DCI objected atrenuou ly to the Umitationa which had been placed on overillghta and there aroae a COD•ide'l able cllac ••ion with some heat aa to wbther limitation had or bad not been placed on ClA by the SpecW Group were requested •inc• - 4 - 16 ··- 4 Continued -feP SEC lttl to pr9paro a c omprehenaive plan for aerlal au rvey ol Cuba and to aulmut plan at a me■tini achedu1-d Dr Tue■day October 9th __ j • On 9 October Speci l Graup Augmented met Reviewed - - J C S propoaal• and It waa qraed that a U-Z 11 ipt flying f r aouth to north acrau the western part o Cuba where at least two SAM aite• were known to exist ahould be imdetrt kan promptly and that a number o£ ■imilar ■ortiH i iii ht be c wunted if this flight did not activate 1 rcnmd•air fire Hiaher authority approved thia one miuion and left coua derat1on ol fllrlber minion■ until the ruulu oJ tho pProTed mi■ slcn 11N1re datari a hicd 16 Thia mi■■iOA wa■ fiown en October 14th It - a a aucceu al and -cco red no ruuiance On Octobtlr 15th at a SpecW Meeting and prior to receipt o the result a of the October 14th flight two addition al U- i niadcna to co-Yer 11 o Cuba ware approved and this wa• concurred in by higher authority JoHN A 11 kCONE Director - 5 - -f6P SECRET Re• -erse Blank 17 5 McCone Memorandum on Cuba ·· 20 August 1962 August 20 1962 MEMORANDUM ON CUBA The Soviet -- and probably bloc -- support oi Cuba was stepped up in July and August 21 ships docked in July and 17 have docked or are en route in August 5 oi which are passenger ships CIA has received approximately 60 reports on this increased activity 40 out oi Opa Locka and the balance from controlled sources considered dependable It appears that between 4000 and 6000 Soviet Bloc personnel have arrived in Cuba since l July Many are known to be technicians some are suspected to be military personnel there is no evidence of organized Soviet military units as such being included A great any of the arriving Soviet Bloc personnel are isolated from the Cuban population The unloading of most ships takes place under maximum security with the Cuban population excluded from the port areas Large equipment is noticeable large crates have been observed which could contain airplane fuselages or Drissile components 19 5 Continued Sophisticated electronic and radar gear has been identified In some instances trucks or trailers have been lowered into ships holds loaded covered with tarpaulins and removed bodily The implications are a Increased technical assistance to Cuban industry and agx-iculture and or the Cuban Armed Forces b Possible establishment of surface to air SAM missile sites c Po ssible establishment of Soviet COMINT-ELINT facilitie targetted against Canaveral and other important U S installations The timing of this buildup coincides with Raoul Castro's trip to Moscow and this may in itself be significant JAM at ji 20 6 JcCone• femorandumfor the File ' Discussion in Secretary Rl sk 's Office at I 2 o'clock 2 I August I 962 21 August 1962 M OR -1 DUM FOR THE FILE Discussion in Secretary Rusk's office at 12 o'clock 21 August 1962 In a tenciance Sec -etary Rusk Secretary McNa a ra Alexis Johnson the Anorney General DCI General Taylor General Lemnitzer anci M cGeorge Bundy Subject Cuba cCone stated that the purpose of the meeting was to again review the s uation in Cuba in light of the most recent intelligence findings DCI -ecalleci that i n the August 10th Meeting he had reported such in orr ' a on as was then available on the accelerated Soviet supply of personnel and materiel to Cuba However information available to the Agency since August lOt 11 indicated that the extent of the Soviet supply operat ons was much greater than had been reported on August 10th iurthe more there were indications that construction work was undertaken by Soviet personnel technicians with newly delivered Soviet equipment and while the nature of the construction was not known it was p -obably either highly sophisticated electronic installations or COM INT and LINT and possible electro-counter measure efforts or missile sites probably ground-to-air DCI then stated that on August 10th in discussing the arguments for and against the so-called stepped up Plan B or alternatively the mod i ied Plan B he had stated that if it was decided to accept the modilied Plan B a z d such a course is pursued it is the opinion of the DCI that contil iuillg Soviet aid and technical assistance will present the Ucited States with a more formidable problem in the future than it now codronts or has confronted in the past McCone then stated that conclusive evidence indicated such a stepped-up Soviet efiort DCI then read 21 August paper entitled Recent Soviet Military - id to Cuba as prepared by DD L He then referred to 21 August paper o the oi ce of ationa l Esti a tes subject Soviet View of the Cuban Economy emphasizing the conclusion that under energetic Soviet direction ti e potential of the Cuban agricultural industrial and natural resources coulci be so developed that the econom y would be reasonably viable and over a decade light even earn sufficiently from export surpluses to re iay c -e iits and advances already made to Cuba by the Soviet Union The -e o -e t i e CL ' s conclusion that Soviet economists in analyzing Cuba 21 6 Continued wo lld conclude that in supporting Cuba the So'ri ts were not uivolvi g' themselves with a permanent liability furthermore there was an opportunity o £ creating a viable and reasonably prosperous economy which while not a showcase would always be an annoyan e to the United States and a model for all dissident groups in Latin _ f merica · oi DCI then referred to the 15th August paper of the Board National Estimates subject The Soviet Stake in Cuba and read the summary of this paper which is in numbered paragraph 7 page 3 In s_upport f the abo v e DCI then briefly reviewed a chronology of unevaluated reports on recent Soviet military aid to Cuba 2 1 August and noted my reference to maps location of the reported activities There was general agreement that the situation was_ critical_ and that the most dynamic action was indicated There was discussion of various courses of action open to us in case the Soviets place MRBM missiles on Cuban territory There was also discussion of blockades _of Soviet and Bloc shipping into Cuba or alternatively a total blockade of Cuba · Throughout these discu sions it was abundantly clear that in the minds o £ State and Mr Bundy speaking for the Whhe Hc use there is a very definite inter-relationship betw en Cuba and other trouble spots such as Be rlin It was felt that a blockade of Cuba wo lld automatically bring about a blockade of Berlin that drastic action on a missile site or other military installation of the Soviets in Cuba wo lld bring about similar action by the Soviets with respect to our bases and numer ous missile sites particularly Turkey and southern italy Also there is a reluctance as previously to the commitment of military forces· because of the task involved and· also beca se of retaliatory actionllJ of the Soyiets elsewhere throughout the wo dd · · · ' McNamara expressed strong feelings that we should take every possible aggressive actiorl in the fields of intelligence sabotage and guerrilla warfare utili i ing Cubans and do such other things as might be indicated to divide the Castro regime McCone pointed out that all of these things could be done Effl rts to date with agent teams had been disappointing Sabotage activities were planned on a priority basis and in all probability we would witness more failures than successes To date we had experienced a very tight internal security situation and probably this would become more so in the future - 2 - 22 6 Ccnlinued The Attorney General queried the m eeting as to what other aggressive steps could be taken questio c ing the feasibility of provoking a c action against Guantanamo which would pennit us to retaliate or inwlving a third country in some way It was Mr Bundy's opinion that all overt actions would involve serious consequences throughout the wo rld and the refo re ou r operations must be covert at this tune although we should expect a high degree of attribution The meeting was inconclusive with respect to a c y particular course of action It was felt that the President should be informed on the evolving situation a c d the DCI agreed to brief him at the Meeting on Wednesday August ZZnd at 6 o'clock We further agreed that the entire m atter should be reviewed with the F resident by Rusk McNamara Bundy a c d McCone Mr Bundy undertook to arrange for this m eeting following the Special Meeting scheduled for ten o'clock on Thursday August 23rd Following this discussion there was a brief discussion of the Donovan matter as covered in DCI' s mem ora c dum to Rusk and the Attorney General copy of which is attached It was ag reed that Mr Hurwitz would meet with Mr Donovan on Thursday together with the Attorney General and determine the extent of the co itm ent we would m ake for the govel Xlment which would perm it Mr Donovan to engage in the prisoner release negotiations DCI made it abundantly clear that the existing comn tltm ents to Coznro ittees of the Congress prevented CIA from using covert resources for this purpose McCone stated that in view of these commitments to the Congress he did not feel that he should m eet with Mr Donovan Furthermore that McCone stated that he felt that if a reasonable deal could be made for the release of the prisoners the Conunittees of Congress would change the view expressed a year ago at the tim e of the tractor negotiation J A '-1 ji Reverse Blank 23 1 McCone emorandum of 1he feeling wi1h 1he Presidenr al 6 00 p m on August 22 1962 22 Acgus t l 9o2 MOR A 'rnUM O THE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT a t o 00 p tn on August 22 1962 - tenda ice General Taylor The following points were covered 25 • 1 Continued 3 DCI briefly reviewed the briefing on the Cuban situation The President obviously was quite fam iliar with the situation McCone reviewed all-of the substance of the August 2 lst briefing of the Secretary of State Defense and others as reported and r e c o· r d · ·- d e lained in considera le detail the personal report concerning his personal observa ions an o servations o his confidantes during a recent trip to Cuba ·as recorded in the attached memorandlllll The President expressed concern but agreed with General Taylor and· DCI that any policy matters would be disc'uss d at the forthcoming meeting of the Principals to be held at White House on August 23rd the 4 The President acknowledged receipt of McCone' s personal letter concerning his personal plans indicated approval thereof and stated that he had responded in writing to the letter John A McCone Director JAM mfb ji St8Rtl EYES ONLY 26 8 _' fcCone femorandum of l e1ing 1• irh rhe President 13 August 1962 A e c ecl by Sec e a es sic c a a a Gilpatric General Taylor t B dy cCone S'L hjec C ba 1 c or e ac v sec u a esic ent had been briefed on the Cuban l Rt s ac voca ec o rr ing Canadians and all NATO allies of I l g owing se ou s ne ss of si 'L ation also advocated removal of restrictions on Se oi G'L a ntana r o by the Lan sdale gro'L p ACTION This point not cleared and should be pursued as strongly opposed by Chiefs 2 The esident requeste d a continuing analysis oi the number and t' e o Sovie and Oriental pe so el nported into Cuba quantity and type of eq'L p ent and its p obable use all construction - particularly an xious to know whether construct on involved SAM sites might differ from the g -o nd sites vtc Cone stated we probably co- ld not differenti ate between surface-to-air and 350 mile ground-to-ground offensive missile McNamara observed portable ground missiles could not be _ 8 Continued SE6R£f EYFS 0 3 President r quested analysis of the danger to the United States and the effect on Latin America of missile installations ACTION DDCI should arrange for preparation of such estimates 4 President raised the question of whether we should make a statement in advance of our position should the Soviets install m issiles and the alternative actions open to us in such event In the course of the discussio n apparent many in the room related action in Cuba to Soviet actions in Turkey Greece Berlin Far East and elsewhere McCone questioned value of Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy McNamara agreed they were useless but difficult politically to remove them 5 ACTION He agreed to study this possibility President raised question of what we could do against Soviet missile sites in Cuba Could we take them out by air or w ould a ground offensive be necessary or alternatively could they be destroyed by a substantial guerrilla effort 6 President raised question of what we should do in Cuba if Soviets precipated a Berlin crisis what Soviets would do 7 in This is the alternative t o the proposition of Berlin if we moved in Cuba During the conve rsation I raised substance of my plan of action as outlined 1n the attached paper c _ _ solve the problem There was no disag reement that we must However we should not start the political action and propaganda effort no w until we had decided on the policy of following t hrough to the complete solutio n of the Cuban problem SEBR f - 2 - 28 8 fContinuedJ 8 A ter i' e eeting in a private conversation with Robert Kennedy I stated hat I felt Cuba was our most serious roble t also added in my opinion Cuba was the ke_y to At all of LatL l America if Cuba succeeds we can expect - rl'i of Latin America to fall John A McCone Director JAM ji Attachment Aug 21 62 paper - Memorandum Proposed plan of action for Cuba in the light of - 3 - Reverse Blank 29 9 J A M fcConej femorandum Proposed Plan of Action for Cuba 21 August 1962 originally auached to Docwnem 8 _ • - r - ·- - ···- i ' · ' 1 • •-0 August 21 1962 MEMORANDU -h P -op s ed plan o ac ion fo - Cuba r tr e light of a Tr e ar - va o ou - to ve t lousand Sov e Bloc tecl nidans and possibly nilita_ -y pe -so o el du -ing July-August b Ar - val of nany sl- ip loads of equip T er t and rr a eriel curing Jul · ar d August c The conclusion that stepped up plan b will not in the opinion of the National Board oi Estimates accomplish the stated purpose of overthrowing Castro from within and no -eover will be attributable to the United States and cause loss of face by the United States and d fodified plan b will cont -ibute importantly to our intelligence gathering ar d will impede Castro -egime's economic progress but will not be sufficient to frustrate the regime's _progress in view of the evidences of substantial 'soviet technical assistance The above a l lead to the conclusion that with the passage of time it is possible there will evolve in Cuba a stronger rather than a weake r Castro dominated communist s t a te fully oriented to Moscow to serve on the one hand as a model for similar actions by disciplined groups throughout Latin Americ a and on the otl er as a bridgehead for Soviet subversive activities in Central and South America Being dominated by Moscow such a Cuba would also serve a s a possible location for MRBMs for COMINT and ELINT facilities targetted against United St-a tes activities most particularly Canave ral and finally a s an EC i station which might a dversely a iect ol - space ar d - iss e v ·o - C The -efo -e it See s to ne a - ore agg -essive actiot is inC icated fr ar a y he -e oiore c o nsiC e -eci ar ci s o ld e patter -ieci alc g e oi ow g 1 es 31 9 Continued -· _ i 'j r ·c '9 · 1 An immediate continuing aggressive political action designed to awaken and alarm all of Latin America and all of the free world as to the extreme dangers inherent in the present Cuban situation Appropriate actions should be taken through domestic and foreign press media to inform and alarm the people through the United Nations through the Organization of American States - and its subcommittees by contact with each free world country at the level of head 9f state foreign minister and ambassador and through semi-public or private o·rganizations such as labor church farm cooperatives youth groups et cetera 3 The instanteous commitment of sufficient armed forces to occupy the country destroy the regime free the people and establish in Cuba a peaceful country which will be a member of the community of American states ' It is possible though in my opinion improbable that actions taken under 1 above would in themselves be sufficient to cause destruction o the Castro regime from dissension and disaffections within the regime itself which would obviate steps 2 or 3 Alternatively actions under 1 above might cause internal strife of sufficient proportion to prompt the action outlined under 3 above with no further provocation Concurrently with this plan we should go forward with all possible activities called for wi aer plan b J A M JAM at 2 • '4 - t · - --· Ji -- w - -' •· · ' ' S U1 L • 3 iff _ · - - 32 10 William A Tidwell Memorandum for the Record Instructions umcerning the Handling of Certain Information Concerning c r---- -·· 1 Septe ber 1962 MEMJRAmlH FOR 'mB 1'0 0RD SUBJECT Instructions Concernitlg the EaodUng or Certain Information Concernitlg Cuba General Carter called Mr Cline to say that he had just completed a telephone conversation Yi th the President and that accord ing to the Presiden t' s instructions the cl amps vere to re nain on the re1ease of certain 1D1'ormaticn concerning Cuba except for the barest miniDtum access on a need-to-ltnov basis for the purpose at preparing a comprehensive briefing for the President Tuesday morning 4 Septeinber s instruct ton vas interpreted to el'lllit the siJ lgl e capy of the report concernillg CCI · for them to use in preparing the b a u IU l i ut 4 September and a sillgle caw to state Aruq Navy Air and DIA All NCipien ts of these copies to be ad used that there is to be no f'urther d i sseminatic n except on a m1n imum need -to•knOW' basis to those people vho lllisht need to beccme involved in the l repa ration of the briefingtbr the President ' hey vere al so to be advised that no actions vere to be taken on the basis of the info rma tion t -t l - WILLIAM A TIDWELL Assistant to DD I Planning ere- - - f Reverse Blank 33 11 Ray S Cline Memorandumfor Acting Director of Central Intelligence Recent Soviet Military Acti ities in Cuba 3 September 1962 1 - J •' r - · - ·•- · · i SC-08458-62 3 l 962 eow l _ or i'Cll Acting Dtrector or Centl al P ecent Soviet Milltar y A ctiv 1 t ea in SlJBJECT l 0-2 1 0 7 or 29 ccm1 4- extensive Soviet ml 1tar y delln ries to Clili6 in recent - Stzrhce -to-a 1 r cissile SAX sites gn ided ci1 saile boats azn dd1 t1c l l land s 'ftre obser'l'ed 2 le P l Y sho' rs e1gl tt SAM sites be1I g set u p Ooe probable asSCllhJ y area hM been 1del t lfiad and SAM equi i aent he s been l oc8ted at cme add1t anal site A 13 n ie s ml l lml1mt o r canstruction at these sites and the speed or the wrk illdicate the prograa is proceedillg on a craah buis 8Qme or these aites could be operatiOll l Y1th 1n a nekor two c A m ln1m' ' rs 125 technically trained persormel Y1ll be required to operate ea ch site f'1g lre excl udmJ llt CI Xrl ty and support personnel l 2 ro indicut ions that CUbsns are trained tor SAMs SQviet J er80mld doUlltless Y1lJ mn the sites tar at l east the 9 to l 2 months 'While Cu bans are being trained 3 Addi tional SAM sites ltr'O 'Will be set up in the near tuture A All sites DOV are 1 n the Western one-third or thP isJm d 1 'l11e a res or probehl7 v1ll a ac t1v1t r 1 0r-1ente 3 rOVince 'be tol l aved by 8fferal others 1 n the v 1 dnity 2 De f'eetor and clAndest1De r e 'rc i I as v l lrO'l1llce 1lldicste tmt at J eaat tvo sites - r1 l1 be J oart ed there 1 Nt co 1 or n1te J ocsti thUS u t 1 Ecr21 a w i 35 11 Continued so-OSli-5 e -62 Page 2 B 1be pe ttern llCIW' emerging S lggests aa many as 24 sites 1 'fJB J' event1l lly be set up •· enough to blanket the entire ial w ld 4 At least 8 c l a s s missile boats have been dellvered to CUba 1n recant veeks A 'lhese Pr-like boats carry two missile launchers each with the radB L- guided missile e£1'ective against sur f'e ce target• to l'811ges at between 15 and 17 miles The missile can-ies a 2 000 lb HE 'W'8 'rhea d B Some CUb n naval persomi el ha VG received tra l n1ng 1n the USSR but it is not known it this included Ko mr tra1n lllg c 'lhese boats are 1n addition to 13 or more torpedo boa ts and 6 submarine chasers delivered by the USSR earlier this year 5 nie photogra piy shows that currettt deliveries to Cuba also contain land armaments including t8DkB and possibly self-propelled guns A Reports 1ndicate other shi pllellts have ccmtained artillery- tanks and possibly combat a 1rcraft but these are not confirmed B he photogra phy of 29 August turned up the highest number of MIG aircraft yet noted sane '57 1 We believe Cuba I s inventory 1ncl udes ap prox l matel y 6o MIG jet fighters includil g at l east a do%en MIG-l 9s 2 No MIG-2ls or aey type of bomber have been noted 6 Soviet shi jllleIXts of military equipnent and persomi el to Cuba show no sign of letting up A About l 6 Sov 1 et dry•cargo shi PS a re now en route to Cuba of which a t l ee st 10 probably are c rrying military equipnent 36 11 Continued 13 l im iber n l l ar mlltary-relsted s h i S -to C lha the current dellveries began ill iid-Jw y ray be aa b1gl1 e a 65 2 cut1n e SOrtet venes ar eccm 1e 1d and trade goods are beir-6 de largely 011 'Western ahlps At 1 esn 2 •700 Soviet nlltary technicl lma srrived 1n Cuba 1n lAte July am ec-1Y AugWJt 1n c cimi t1Qll vith - nllta r r activittea l these Sovi etS appear to be involved in settiDg up SA ' rac ilities but thus tar ve cazmot at conclude that this is their onlY object t ve c At leest l 300 mare Soviets are arriv1Dg unmmounced th1a veek no rep irts on their sctirttiea so ar l Still 8d dit1onal bloc personnel probably have arrived an scx ie at the cargo ships Bil s CLlNE Dep ity D lred0r IJitelllgence Ar 1JI % A Sur tace-to-Air 1o ls81le Dep l cy'lrJent in CUba Alm ex 13 Description at Ki J DB r -Cla as Missile Boat Aml ex C Cuba's Air Deten se Cal abllitiea J tJux D Callec ion Am ex E -Ccl -a c mi que Of' 2 Sel7' e be r Reverse Blank 37 12 Lyman B Kirkpatrick femorandumfor the Direcror 'Action Generated by DC Cables Concerning Cuban Lo ·-Le ·el Photography and Offensive Weapons fn d t lvit 10RA i DUM FOR THE DIRECTOR SUBJECT Action Generated by DCI Cable Cuban Low-Level Photography • once ning Weapons • 1 Based upon your proposal of Saturday 25 August that RF-10l's be used over Cuba General Carter asked General Le itzer on 2 l August about the possibility of low-level photography using RF-101 or FSU aircraft At that ti e General Le itzer indicated that som ething probably could be dug up General Carter informed USIB at the 29 August meeting of his conversation with General Lem nitzer At the Special Group Meeting the following day General Le itzer raised the issue and said that use o E RF -101 or FSU aircraft flown by US pilots would be feasible from the military point of view General Carter pressed the point by ind cating that other types of photography did not give sufficient detail and precise identification of certain types of equipment After some discussion the Group agreed to take cognizance of this matter and requested it be reopened at an appropriate time when specific targets and information needs could be identified 2 On 31August after General Carter informed I Lr McGeorge Bundy and General Lemnitzer of the readout of U flights showing SA -2 sites the President called General Carter at l300 asked how many people had this informatio and told General Carter that he wished it put back in the box and nailed tight This freeze continued until Saturday 1 September when the information was extended slightly further to the working analysts General Carter informed Secretary Gilpatric on 1 September that the General and arl Kaysen agreed a full readout was necessary and that some low-altitude flights were needed to pinpoint the sites -z 3 Not until Tuesday 4 September did the President announce the presence of a missile defense system in Cuba That day General Carter apprO'l -ed COMOR reco - -i rr er d ations in view of SA l sites on t lie western e id of fae isla - d it v ·as particularly i portant that the next authorized issio i should cover faose areas of the island which were not photogrzp ed becal se weatr e - or ra - ge di d - o pe - it and that the complex eastern e - c o the island shoulc be photographed again 39 12 Continued 4 Gener• •asked DD Ron 5 September to initiate steps for fixing to cover Cuba 5 The President' and Sec i etaries of State and Defense were briefed by General Carter late 6 September of a more detailed readout of the 29 August mission which led our analysts to suspect the presence of another kind of missile site--possibly surfac e-to-surface--at Banes The White House put a complete freeze on this information however Btmdy 'gave an OK to· put the analysts to work on provi'ding information to the policymakers on a need-to-kn ow basis but without nor·mal 'dis hibution 6 USIB was brought up to date in executive session at its 7 September meeting on information concerning the SA-2 sites the new unknown site at Banes and also the freezing atmosphere of the White House General Carter requested all members to advise their principals and asked also to be alerted immediately if NSA came up with further information 7 This was the climate in the Community in early September when a U -2 had just violated the Soviet Far East when anothet U -2 was lost on 8 September over the Chinese mainland and when your first cable of 7 September arrived · 11 Question very much if C-package will be helpful Cuba and urge frequent repeat missions of recent- reconnais sanc e operations which Ciiipatric advises informative Also I support use of RF-101's if necessary My hunch is we might face prospect of Soviet short-range surfaceto-surface missiles of portable types in Cuba which could command important targets in Southeast U ·s and possibly Latin America and the Caribbean ·areas 8 General Carter as related above and follows had·already urged use of RF-101 1 s relative to your hunch about missiles General Carter recollects showing your cable to Mr Bundy the following day Saturday afternoon There is no evidence that the information was passed outside of the Agency presumably because it was a reaffirmation· of a position you had already taken before Secretaries Rusk and M cNamara General Taylor and Messrs Johnson Gilpatric and Bundy on 10 21 and 23 August 40 l 12 Contimud ' 9 On 8 Septernber upon learning COMOR made Cuba targets available to JRC for possible RF-101 coverage General Carter instructed Mr Reber to check with Colonel Steakley to determine when JRC would seek Special Group approval · 10 On 10 September you cabled following Difficult for rne to rationalize extensive cosily deCenses being established in Cuba as such extreme cosily measures to accomplish security and secrecy not consistent with other policies such as refugees legal travel etc Appears to me quite possible measures now being taken are for purpose of ensuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as MRBM 1 s to be installed by Soviets after present phase completed and country secured from over-flights Suggest BNE study motives behind these defensive measures which even seem to exceed those provided moat satellites General Carter sent an action memorandwn on 10 September to the DD I quoting this passage and asked the BNE to undertake the necessary analysis BNE 1 s response was sent to you in an 11 September cable The response said that BNE still persuaded that costly crash operation to install SA-2's reasonably expb ined by other than desire to hide later build-up and the Soviets likely to regard advantage of major offensive build-up not equal to dangers of U S · intervention 11 11 The events of 10 September have already been chronicled in my separate memorandum However it was also this date that General Carter sent a memorandUID to the Secretary of Defense calling further need to conduct tactical reconnaissance of Cuba particularly the facility near Banes indicating that the site would require in the nea ' future photography of a larger scale than acquired by a U-2 and recommending that SecDef initiate necessary action to provide for employn1ent of this tactical-type reconnaissance -3- 41 · • • 12 Continued rn l UJJ 12 On 13 September you cabledlayour views of the importance of going ahead with securi Z of Cuban prisoners Included in this cable was the following Also I continue to be concerned that the establishment of defensive equipment and installations is merely a prelude to the location of an offensive weapons capability and once this is done the implementation of our policy as reported in the press might be extremely difficult and involve unacceptable dangers 11 13 The following day 14 September at the Special Group Augmented meeting Colonel Steakley outlined capabilities for low-level coverage of certain targets in Cuba It was noted that the Secretary of Defense did not wish this operation considered further until the results of Agency reconnaissance in the same area were available Further conclusion was thus deferred until the next week•·s ·meeting although Elder' s memorandum for the record reveals that General Carter pushed hard to keep the Group disposed toward a favorable consideration later 14 On 16 September you again cabled extensive comments on the Cuban situation making the point that we must carefully study the prospect of MRBM 1 s in Cuba General Carter directed that a copy of this cable be given to the DD I and assigned action responsibility to the DD I The DD l's response contained in a cable to you on 18 September stated that an introduction of MRBM1 s was unlikely because of the risk of U S intervention is At the USIB meeting of 19 September General Carter in discussing terms of what would be necessary if a complete SA-2 defense would make use of the U -2 extremely hazardous if not impossible again stated a d e s i use r - tF-l0lls o over Cuba He also said that he thought use of r one over Cuba could be justified to the Special Group ng e cannot put a stop to collection otherwise the President would never know when the point of decision was reached 11 At this meeting USIB als o approved NIE 85-3 42 12 Continued1 16 At the Special Group Meeting on 20 S e p t e n b e r _ was discussed After its use over Kamchatka was disapprove • Ge c e al Carter urged its possible use against Ccl a and State appeared e ithusiastic Ba_sed upon this General Carter dispatched an action memorandum to the DD them res onsibility within CL- also CIA responsi• er aer1 reconna 1ssance operations against Cuban targets and for presentation of these CIA operatio i s to t li e Special Group Aug rne lted after appropriate Agency and Co w ity coordination 11 17 During this period poor weather resulted in no exploitable take from U-2 operations The Agency had made an operational determination that none of the four flights which evolved from the 10 S eptember meeting would be made unless weather along the flight routes was less than 25% overcast The first of the four flights was made on 26 September the last on 7 October The peripheral flights turned up additional SAM sites and coastal defense cruise-missile sites but ·that is about all 18 Conclusions of the Cuban SNIE approved by USIB on 19 September were cabled to you that day Vlhile the SNIE stated that the Soviets might be tempted to establish other weapons of a more offensive character sue as additional types of s hort-range surface-to-surface missiles and that the Soviet Union could derive considerable advantage from the establishment of medium and intermediate range ballistic mi ssiles in Cuba the estimate concluded It would indicate a far greater willingness to increas e the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the Soviet Union has displayed thus far and consequently would have important policy implications with respect to other areas and other problems i i East- West re a tio s · 11 • • • -5- 43 12 Continued ' ' 19 The following day 20 September you c a b l e d - suggesting a most careful consideration of the c o n c l u s i o introduction of offensive missiles was unlikely This paragraph paragraph one of your cable was immediately pas ed to the DD 1 However no change was made to the estimate It had already been endor•ed by the Intelligence Community and released Lyman B Kirkpatrick Executive Director 44 ' f ·- i '• _' ·· t 13 Lt Gen farshall S Carter to 'JcCone Cable 4 5enrenzber 962 'Excernt1 _ · - - _· · ol G I aiOCHE NIT 0 DCI · _ -ti•- 7805 ' EXT f SEPTEMBER 1962 0 TE 6C I · 1-2 CO-Sf _··s c 3-4 1Nf0 TO PRIORITY YF S ONL · - _ 1 - · · L · CUBAN READOUT CONFIRMS _EIGHT A i 'lD PROBABLY NINE S Ai ' i -· - -- RPT S r - - SITES UNDER CRASH CONSTRUCT ON EIGHT OF Nli'iE S TES NOTED -- - · - WILL BLA - XET ENTLRE VESTER HALF OF IS ' 1' INTH_ IS ON EAST - ·' CO AST A ' i'D WE EXPECT OTHERS WILL BE Bl JILT TO COVER ENTIRE COUNTRY · '_ COXSTRUCT ON PROCEEDmG SO QUICKLY VIE LOOK FOR SOME TO BE _ - ' ALSO SHOW ED · OPERATIOKAL VlITHL 'l NEXT WEEK OR TEN DAYS READOUT --♦ - • -- -- • • - EIGHT TORPEDO BOATS WITH DUAL RADAR-GUIDED MISSILE LA UN CHERS -· ' _- _ _ SUCH MISSILES HAVE ESTIMATED RA L GE OF ABOUT 15 MILES FOR A 2 ODO• _ _ · -POUND HI-EXPLOSIVE PAYLOAD WITH GOOD_ACCURACY · ow OF i'iEEKEND CQ - U -tu IQill _IN w· c- C t 1oscov1 EXTE D YTJ TA - tY SSJ ST• 'l CE TO CUBA · P E - tS STS -P UME YOU CL IY S R GrtT TO r ·n·-- - D - GER OF i NV 6 SIOX A LL THIS CR EAT ES NEW AT OSPF E tU PRINCIPAL5 ETL G - 'V 'ITH P IDEXT TODAY TO DJ SCUSS WHlTF ER NOW • ' °D WITH r L I- - DZ - n AT WJ·• ITE 5 Ot SZ T - S AFTZ ' tXOON - - ' 45 13 Continued 'f ' ' ' - ·1 1 1r EXT h C C • • 1•''·i - ORlG •f · TOP r' • L 'o m OIRECTOR CONF INFO ' INFO · - · · '· _ - J- ' -· - ' FROM FIDE DONOVAN IS BACK FROM HAVANA WITH NEW PRICE LIST i l LATTER WILL SETTLE ·FOR THREE MILLION CASH AND 25 _ - ·· _ _ _f_ _ ¥1LLION _IN li'OOD AND - T f ' A MEDICINE DONOVA TO CON FER I •• J ' 'f IT_ - - R ITZ ANI • -_ ' ATTY GEN BEFORE RETURNING TO HAVANA LATER THIS WEEK 1 WORD WE •'• · · • ' ·_ ' ' - · i · '°_ ' HAVE IS THAT FIDEL WANTS TO COMPLETE ALL ARRANGEMENTS QUICKEST · r ITHIN - · _ - - · · OUTLOOK IS FOR AGEl' fC-i TO B AS OUT f- i - i · · ·· WE WlliL INSURE CLEARANCE ON THE HILL PRIOR TO ANY INVOLVE MENT · · - i TEN DAYS 1 -tYr· - _ I •• 'l - • r '• •• lflEASINO PPICEI •I TO p _ _ _ 1- ----------' ' j REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE 'ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED - '••-•-- _ •• - - ' 7 • _- - 70 _ _ - - - - - ' 7 - - - i M •• 46 •• AUTH fN I C ATl O OfflC ll 1 n · · J I •i Copy No • - tr 14 Carter to fcCone Cable 5 September 1962 t£xcerp1 JNIT DCJ ITo- r TS--539 o XT CLASSIFl D ME SSA G n05 I 2 I 5 I i m 5 SF TE 3Z 1962 CNF DC I i -2 o s c 3- ·o IN '0 Sf2tO PR11'Y- E7ES O N L R O k 1 m INITIAL REACTION TO OFFICIAL US STATE MENT 4 SEPT RE Sl M SITES t 'D PT BOATS CUBAN SPOKESiv N l PHASIZI KG CLAIM TE t T u - S _ BUILDUP IS EX SRCISE OF RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE FAR MOSCOW IS - IL SNT SO CUBP- f 1 -rlLITARY FORCES FOR PA ST ' EEK OR SOL filGH ST ATE OF ALERT IT MAY BE THAT REGIME DELIBERATELY ALAR1- ING POPULACE TO JUSTIFY l ASSIVE SOVIET ASSISTJ- fCE AND TO DIVERT MINDS FROM ECONOMIC PLIGHT 2 -- ---- PETE SCOVILLE IS FIXING THE C-PACK GE TO PER1vllT COVERAG '-· IS GR 0' ' ' XG DA GER TO Tr E 3 RDS 3 lfl 1 S l ' C Jlf l - - '• · ' ' ' Reverse Blank 47 15 Caner tv fcCone Cable 6 September 1962 •Excerpt C s 21 c E H 'KNOCHE ClASSIAED MESSAG TOl»-iI1' EX ' I DAU 'E-OP Sl CR ' 0 DCI 7805 6 SEPTEMB£R 1962 FiOM D111ECTOil CCNF DC 1-2 I S C 3-4 TO lllllllliiiiill · P R l T Y - INFO EYES O • 1 ROM CAP TE - CITE 012 34520 CONTINUED READOUT NOW SHOWS TOTAL OF NINE PROBABLY TEN' SA ¼ SITES OTHER INFO FROM GROUND REPORTS POINTS STRONGLY TO AT LEAST TWO OTHERS IN MEETING WITH LATIN A ' iERlCAN AMBASSAroR HERE 5 SEPT RE CUBA SEC STATE ASKED THEM TO TOUCH BASE WITH HOME GOVTS AJ ' D REACH EARLY AGREEMENT TO GONVENE MEETING OF OAS FOREIGN MINISTERS TO DISCUSS CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS SEC STATE IN RESPONSE TO QUERY FROM MEXlC AN AMB SAID WE HAVE IMPRESSION MOSCOW DOES NOT RPT NOT DESIRE DEVELOP CUBA AS SOVIET BASE THIS HEMISPHERE HE SAID SOVIETS UNDER CUBAN PRESSURE GIVE ECON AND MILITARY HELP BUT ARE THUS FAR CAREFUL NOT TO MAKE UNLIMITED SECURITY COM '¼ITMENT AIITKfMTll ATIMO O l l l U 2Ei'11O0UCilON BY OTriEi THAN THE ISSUING OfFJCE IS nOHISrTEO Reverse Blank 49 c p 16 fcCone to Carter Cable 7 September 1962 -' 1 CF 2 - k • -s 91c ' 7 - 7£ r - 1 SEGRIT - t _ _ _ _ J· - • RCUT G • I4 l I2• Is I __ • _ TO --····-··-· fl --·-I S C 2-3 --- _ -----· - AP nEC H n YOtJR ' ESSA ac S 1 R l lRHNG AR S 21 SE TE 13ER - t ' t YILL RE -- Arn HEiE AS S IEDJ ED · '1 Il L S END l-4 SE T rn PARIS AND· WILL 2 - _ -yjt - -- f RE RCJ 7 EY SEGREI b J i ss F s c - - r i 7 7r♦ E 51 - 5 16 Continued • ·f '#% ' t·_' · '·7 l • • f' I j• DATE - · • - · ROUTING '' • - 4 5 6 TO ' FROM ACTION · INFO PAGE 2 OF' 2 liHICH C WLD C CMMAND Ul ORTANT TARGETS OF SOUTHEAST UMITED STATES AND OSSIBt Y LATIN Al IERICAN CARIBBEAN AREAS I p ' •II J ' •I d 5 YOU MIGHT SUGGEsr TO RUSK THAT WE DEVEi OP JOINT POLICIES FOR ACT CN IN CUBA WrtH SELECn D CARIBBEAN SOUTff- 'AMERICAt'l STAT S 'l · r' AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO SEEK ING UNANIMOUS ens ACTION WHICH OST C£RTA INLY WILL BE AN I EFF£CTIVE COMPRCXHSE sa urioN IF PAST ··· • t · · 'f' • I -' I - I · HISTORY rs ANY INDICATOR END OF' MESSAGE'· - _ t nfig t I 1 ---l '- Gl O F E c ad• rrc 11 iufcrna1k 01t -3 r QtJ H•s s 7 a c1 s mm11n REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROH 8 1'rEO - - - 'al 52 S Copy No • 17 Carter to fcCone Cable 7 September 1962 Excerpt H KNOCH• liNIT O DCI EXT • 7805 C • l DA TE - - • TS-921 1%2 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE I ff8P sem ·TI Fl GE 1 OF 4 ROUTING E Is I TO fiOM Ca-lf CC I 1-2 1N10 s c 3-4 DfFWEO RO JTI '-IE err 011 PIUTY · r YESONL FB OML HAVE RE PORT FROM GOOD SOt R CE QUOTING CUB AN AMB IN PP- '-GUE 'IEO IS SON OF FORNMIN RAUL ROA THAT CUBA HAS ''11 0C ET OF SMviE KIND THAT SHOT DOWN U-Z AND THAT PREPARATIONS HAYE DEEN ADE FOR C01 PLETE DESTR_UCTION OF GU iliTA J 'fAMO B ASE ll·I EVENT OF ATTACI-C ON CUBA I SSUME YOU NOTING PRESS REPORTS• SHOWING HOW • I • C0NGRESSIONAL R EPUBLICANlS PRESSING FOR A FORl- dOSA-TYPE r· y QLUTION AUTHORIZING P U SIDENT TO USE TROOPS IF NECESSARY 10 ASINCi o 11ct1 A UTHtNT1CATIHG OfflC t RE RODUGlON SY OTriER THAN THE ISSUING OmCE 1s PROHiSITED 53 eol - 17 Continued ·c '3 ' I z 2IfJp SEoREr UNIT EXT ' DAlE TO CLASSIFIED MESSAGE T -1 _P_A GE 4_0F 4 ROUTING I I 21 I I I 3I 4 5 6 I I I - -- - ' FROM · DIRECTOR IDEFERRED IROUTINE CONF INFO OUT 7 74272 WE HAVE YOUR MESSAGE AND ARE LOOKING INTO ALL MATTERS YOU RAISE VlLL ADVISE TERRY LEE I I'AICING NECESSA _-q_y ACTION RE ' YOUR HOUSE PLANS 8 ViE HAVE THE MESSAGE ASKING FOR DAILY BULLETIN TO BE SENT TO YOU EVERY DAY PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT ALL SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPivlENTS INCLUDING THOSE COVERED lN BULLETIN ARE INCLUDED IN THIS DAILY CABLE SERIES END OF W 1ESSAGE ' ' ' CP RTER •U EAS ING Off IC Et I coo r lsmietf AUTH1 NTICATING OFFICER REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED 54 Copy No 18 Carter fcCone Cable 8 September 1962 r£xcerpt 10 _ is-930 Ci E -CC us r 0 DCI EXr 7c' 05 SF PTE SE t 1962 DATI CLASSIFIED MESSAGE I1Wt- '--§-e_ q 1cTi I -- -- - C P G Cf 5 l OtmNG I 2 I s 3 6 I I -ro I PICMs CIKECiOR CC 'IF CC l-2 rs o s c 3-4 OVERRED iOIJTINE -OUT 74' j PRIORl'J Y - · ROM -- UT cm 012 llvO l OJT745 7 35013 READOUT OF LATEST 5 SEPTElv' BER TA ill SHOV S TH REE o ru S At S THESE IN LAS VlLLAS PROVINCE IN CENTRAL CUBA TOTAL S ' - -IS -l'OVi TWELVE PROB ft DLY T - TEE I TC BLA i 'ITa T ISLAl lD ' CE LOOK FO l EVZNTUAL TOTAL OF _ BOUT 25 ALSO SPOTTED ONE i G-21 AT SP TA CLAR A AL-U-IZLD NIN STEEN C q ATES SEEN PROBABLY HOUSE - ilG-21 ' 'I' --ilCii Y OULD TOTAL 20 TOTAL NU1 ffiER MIG-15 17 AND 19 IS CA-u-u ED AT ABOUT 60 NilG-21 lS 1 000 MPH JET V ITH_ALT IT E -CA 'ABILITY 60 000 FEET EQUI PED WITH TWO AIR-AIR INFRARED YJ SSILES AS ' ELL AS STk DA ii D ROC AETS A 'ID CA 'INONS l HAVE TALKED WITH USI 'WHO ·1 •f AS OST APPRECIATIVE FOR - YOUR SUGGESTION RE JOINT ACTION PL 'INING WITH SELECTED LATINO - AUTH NT C AflHC O J P I C REF O GON oY O7 -i Tr AN 7 -i ISSUlNG OFFIC IS ROHl31TED 55 Copy No 18 Continued __ UNJr •· EXT · · DATE TO - · CLASSIFIED MESSAGE ROUTING l 2 3 14 15 16 DEFERRED I E DIRECTOR C ROUTINE E D CONF INFO L fJ#-15ile ei3 I fltOM E N C E I INITIAlS PRIORITY OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS DIR 3501 OUT 745 7 _ · 6 AS RESULT OF U•2 VIOLATION OF SAKHALIN AND PRESIDENT'S PUBLIC PROMISE TO REvn W PROCED SPECIAL GROUP HAS '••·· AP PROVED AIR FORCE PROPOSAL TO STANJ DOWN A IR FORCE U 2 · • · --· _ REPRODUCTION SY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE JS PROHiBITSD 56 • · eo'11YN0 19 Carter to fcCone Cable JO September 1962 1£xcerpt1 Oa G S H-4 KNOCHE l INIT ' O DCJ - EXT I TS 7605 -i - ' 9Ji8 - ER 196Z- ' TO OIRECTOR CONF CCI 1-2 -1 ° s c 3-4 TO 101 1T1Ne OUT 1- l - PRITY 35rt6 INFO L 7 30 PRlORlTY 35116 STILL UNABLE TO CONCUJDE ON FATE OF LOST U-2 CONFIR ¥ _ _ THERE IS NOTHING TO lWmi lKZ K V t Ec HANICAL MALFUNCTION AND ' On A DUAL OR SUDDEN LOSS ·oF ALTITUDE 2-1 IGS THERE WERE CHICOM - rn THE AREA BUT NOT AT U•2 ALTITUDE so FAR A WE CAN TELL NO KNOWLEDGE RE FATE OF PILOT ' SOVIETS PLAYING INCIDENT lN°LOW KEY THUS FAR _ CHICO iS ACCUSING UNITED STATES OF· BEmG INSTIGATOR AND LINKING ·· MAXWELL TAYLOR PRESENCE IN T AIP ·WITH DISPATCH OF SPY PLANE _ _ I tlllA -INO OHIC tt • C O Q IOllitATINO PPl tl1i I · ·· AUT 1 t TIC TIN0° Of f l C t l -0 P S E- R J T _ W ODUCJlON BY Orr-t THAN THE ISSUING OffiCE IS PROHIBITED 57 • · CoPT No 19 Continued o JO· UNll' · EXT • DATE 1 TO I fllOM I DIRECTOR · CONF INFO loeFERRED - • l ROUTINE ' • _ • • • • I 1 CITE 01R INFO TO 3 OUR EMBASSY Dll' MEXICO CITY 35116 HAS RELIABLE INFO THAT MEXICO AND BRAZIL WHO HAVE BEEN IN VANGUARD OF THOSE OPPOSING TOUGH POUCY RE CASTR O NOW 301NTLY DISCUSSING POSSIBILITY OF w- a DIPLOMATIC BREAK WI ra·cuBA ASoN· IS NOT RPT NOT NEW SOVIET llra OADS BUT THAT MEXICAN AND l3RAZILIAN GOVTS NOW THINK WE WILL INVADE ERASE CASTRO ' AND WANT TO BE SPA RED DO TIC E MENT BY BREAKING_' · _ BE FOREHAND 4 THANKS FOR youa THOUGHTS RE CUBA ' BNE HAS TH¢ r iJ rn IS CONSIDERING _ ENVY THE • EAUTIFUL ENVIRONMENT_ YOU DESCRIBE HAVEN'T SEEN SPEClAL-PROJECT · ANY HERE FOR A WHILE SHOULD BE READY IN APRIL EVEN WITH CR ASH PROGRAM T CO LD OT -D - RE ADY BEFORE JANUARY OR FEBRUARY CDOI0IHATtNO o PfC IS •utASIHO O ICU llf e p 5 l 'l C ft B fl r 0 AUfl fHTICATIHO OHIC 11 REPRO0UC lON BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED · · c py No 58 20 McCone to Carter and Elder JO September 1962 l OIRECTCR _ FROM _ ACTION _OCI 1 CO Y ISSUED TO DCI 0725 10 SEP INFO · - I I 21 4 5 3 61 · SE 10 110112 62 62 _ _-_- _- c ----------_7 t- PR 1 CR l TY ------- s c 2 3 - - rn c I-tio- -__-__-____ C J t e Ci2U 0 - - j·• - · 1 g J r j C IN 19372 r i iru D -·-- -- _· DIR EYES AND ELDER FR ll xTER _ · 1 tJlft · VERY A PRtcJATIVE YOUR DETAILED Dln Y REPORrS · CHL'liA I c OElT rnsr DISTRESSING BUT NOT SUR RISmG AND R CAll THAT CN · S V L CCCASIOOS I POINTED ruT TO SPECIAL GROUP PAC AND liIG' U - AUTHORITY THAT AN INC I T VAS INEVITABLE 2 ·- DIF'F ICULT FOR l' t TO RATICNALIZE ECttNSlVE C0Sfl Y DEFZISES B ' rnG ESTAS ISHE o 'rn CUeA AS SUCH EXTREME COS Il Y iEASURES 10· - ACC 0 - L SH SECURITY ANO SECRtCY Nor C rusrsrsrr VITH OTHER Pa IC SUCH AS REFUGEE LE TRAVEL ETC · APPEARS TO ME QUITE P0SSI3LE MEI SJR S NO'i B ING TAKEN ARE FOR PURPOSE CF INSuRm G SS R' CY rY SCXi E CFFENSIVE CA A_BIL ITY SUCH AS MR31 'S ·1 O INSTALLED BY - SW IETS AFTER PRESENT PHASE CCMPLETED AND CCUNT Y SECUR D FRCM ·01EWLIGHTS sri sr B 1£ STJ TD'i OTN_Es B£HINO HES DEFE srv ' EASJR £S WHICH EVE N·srt li ro· EXCEED TH l3E PRO IDED Mesi _-- SA TEI LITES 3 SUG ST YOJ RElJ IEV STATUS KELLY JOHNSCN PRO ECT rn l 59 20 Continued CLASSIFIED MESSAGE C •'I · •• ROUTING • 'I • ' 1 4 2 5 3 6 - • -- PAGE· 2 IN 19372 ·_·- · -- - _ - -p os s - -1 - sL- Y - - lNIT IATE CRASK PROGRAM TO GIVE EAfa IEST POSSJ BLE J • _ - ·- · · - - -· · t' ·' CAPABILITY AS THIS ' fI-Gft BE MOST USEFUL IN DETER ltilHNG CUBA • i f '- 0 • • • ' • · ' ·_ ·ACTIVITIES ·' t ♦-1 ·· • • · · - -- 4 · HE ABOlE BITS CF VISDCM - - - - 0 1 • 0 • v -· 0 • 0 0 O •• • • · I • • RESULT FRCl- CO l Pl E' l' £ RELAXATION 0 - ··· ' IN_THIS I-NC R DIS Y BEAUTIFUL ENV IROOMENT -RE ROS _ ' t K tY · · f -g • • •• · _ _ _Jt ' ·•··• ' ·· · ' • - ' · - · - · · · -· r • • •• • • rrJt ·· r ·- Cc y Ne 60 ·- 21 Kirkpacrick Jfemorandumfor the Director White House feeting on JO September J 962 on Cuban Overflights I JIarch 1963 ME OR AJ lj'DUM FOR THE DIRECTOR SU'BJECT W'llite House Meetmg on l O Septe ier 1962 on Cuban Overflights 1 The following is a reconstruction of b e reaso i s o - i e mee IJ g at the Vtb ite House in r IcC-eorge knc y's c ice o 10 September 1962 at appraxi lately 5 5 p i a c i a e c - c i • 7c a t transpixed at that meeting This memor ci i s basec c c sc s s o s with i- fr Parrott of the White House General Car er Dr F e -ce Scoville and Messrs ■■■rlland Rebe c Dr Sco 2 le 1 s o ce who also attended the meeting records that at approximately 10 00 on the no g of lO ep e - ber he received a telephone call fro n Mr Par or pass g on a es_- es made by Mr Bundy on behal of ti e Secretary o S ate Accorc g o Mr Parrott the Secretary of State had exp essec the ope fa c e e would i 't be a ny incidents this week anci Mr Bu ic y as ec c a e following questions posed by the Secreta y o State be a s e ec a How important is it to our 6-tel l ge ce c jec ives -- 2 we overfly Cuban soil b How much would our telligen ce s-ilie • e E te c reconnaissance to peripheral activities nt'J'zkg obl e '-Oto 6 - -o c ls there anyone i i the pla irg c tl ese ss c s who ight wish to provoke an incident 3 U' Parrott indicate tl at Bi 1C Ce s re d a a sw e withi l a half hour fr - ic 'vfahon i -- 1ec ately cc tactec i e C a oi GO - OR which was i J se ssio a t a t 1or e and t e · c g -e ed o provide a response as quickly as possible - u P -o - c C ec a seco - c ti e to advis e Mr McY aho i tha' u- R o ge - E ls c ci c · · s e c ha -- e 61 21 Continued would accept the responsibility for providing the answers to the Secretary of State and that he had scheduled a meeting that afternoon with Mr J'ames Reber the Chairman of COMOR in order to obtain the answers 4 With the above background to the meeting it is apparent that the primary concern was to insure that there would be no incidents involving a U -2 in the overhead reconnaissance of Cuba You will recall that it was at this time that there had been two U-2 incidents--one over China and one over Sakhalin-- hich had caused considerable noise level The meeting opened with an analysis of the risk of incidents involved in the Agency 1 s proposal for two extended overflights covering the remainder of Cuba which had not been covered in the 29 August and 5 September missions Mr Rusk asserted that although the information was needed everything should be done to minimize the risk element and avoid a third incident He urged that the routes be so designed as to have the U-2 1 s over the Island the minin um possible time and there was general discussion on the desirability of avoiding the SAM sites The Secretary of State also made the point that he did not wish to have overflights mixed with peripheral flights as he wished to maintain the right to fly over international waters with peripheral flights He raised the question as to whether some of the needed coverage couldn 1t be obtained from peripheral flights with oblique photography 5 The CIA representatives showed the members of the group a map of Cuba and the planned routes The SAM sites which had already been identified were pointed out and it was noted that the routes planned would avoid these sites It was noted however that there could be new sites which had not yet been identified along the planned routes The CIA representatives also stressed the importance of the intelligence requirements Messrs Bundy and Rusk indicated that the group would not object to the overflights provided there were no incidents and that the routes taken over the land mass of Cuba were the shortest possible and avoided the surface-to-air missile sites 6 The minutes of this meeting were prepared on the next day by Mr Tom Parrott who did not atte rrl the meeting Lyman B Kirkpatrick Executive Director 62 22 Carter to fcCone Cable I I September 1962 Excerpt · · u fl o nci · 1 • 7605 EXT OATI CLASSIFIED MESSAGE I · 1s 964 'l' o P · s· E c·R E T ' E H ·KKoCHE 021c · PAGE·ONE 6 l • TO CIR ECTOR FROM CONF - 0C I 1-2 INFO • 5 C 34 TO ·· tOUR·PAGES s 7 3 I Of ROIJTING Ot JTT534J PiiUT INfO OUT 75341 PRIORITY CITE DII ·-- · -·EYES ONLY FRO L HAVANA RADIO CHARGES THAT TWO CARGO SHIPS OUTWARD BOUND FROM CUBA ONE ·CUBAN AND THE OTHER BRITISH WERE-ATTACKED ll SEPT OFF NORTHERN COAST OF CUBA ' 'IE HAVE INFO T dAT AN·ExiiE R PROBABLY GROUP cAl LED ALPHA -66' llASED IN PUER TC° DID THE JOB STUDENT EXILE GROUP IN 1 IAlvil LAST WEEKEND PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED INTENTION TO ATTACK BLOC ·- - - SHIPS MOVING IN AND OUT OF Cln A - -- THERE IS GROWL 'iG MOOD OF FRUSTRATION-AMONG REFUGEES AND DANGER OF UNILATERAL - - OPER AnONS AND INCIDENTS 1S·· LIKEWISE GROWING AssUME YOU NOTING nf PRES THE SOVIET STATEMENT ISSUED 11 SEPT M AKING- SW EPlNG - GES THAT • - -_ •- - US PREPARING 1 CUBA INVASION k'VD W 'uNG THAT 1 'IF THIS ATTACK IS MADE THIS · - - -- · - ·- - -_· THE 4 000-WORD STATE 1IBr- T UNDER STUDY s · WILL ADVISE YOU FURTHER COOIDIN l tJNO 01•rc1 1 s lflOASIICO O f r c u fMflCAflNO ·c Ml i•ClilF• REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THANiHE ISSUING OFflCE IS PROHIBITED 63 l 1101 Copy No 22 Continued · ciAss1i 1 I ORIG• es c ' t ' - ····_ ___ _P __ - l l P ·e P s E wr exr c ft z T _ J 01'TE TO 1- -·---- --- ---2 3 I fROM1 · DIRECTOR DEFERRED CONF ROUTINE INFO I TO CITE DIR INFO I • Z REF YOUR REQUEST THAT BNE EXAMINE IWLPLICATIONS 0 OF DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT FOLLOWING IS PR ELIM BNE STATElvIBNT WHOLE QUESTION SOV MQTIVAT tONS INCLUDING POSSmLE REASONS WHY SOVS MIGHT CONSIDER INSTALLATION lvllUlMS BEING EXAW INED lN SNIE BEING DRAFTED FOR usm NEXT WEEK BNE · ' STILL PERSUADED THAT COSTLY CRASH OPERATION TO INSTALL SA-25 IS MORE REASONABLY EXPLAINED BY OT$R THAN DESIRE TO m E _-- ' LATER BUILDUP AND THAT SOYS LIKELY TO REGARD ADVANTAGES OF ' MA JOR OFFENSIVE BUILDUP NOT EQUAL TO DANGERS OF US INTE R VENTIOJ CUBA LEAKING LIKE SIEVE FROM GROUND OBSERVATION ALONE SUDDEN CRACKDOWN ON REFUGEE THUS FUYW AND LEGAL TRAFFIC WOULD ' BE STRONG INDICATOR OF POSSIBLE DF SmE-TO UNDER TAKE FURTHER MILITARY BUILDUP IN S CRET REPRODUCTION av OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No - ----- ---- --64 23 Carter to McCone Cable 12 September 1962 Excerptj UNIT ■ E · H DOCBE O DCI EXT 7805 ORIO I • CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 1668 PAGE ONE CF f' X IR PAGCS ROUTING c TOP SEEilt l i'i' · 5 6 2 DA ti 3 - _---1 TO no» DIRECTOR C CONJ' DCI ·1-2 INFO s c 3-1 - 1--1--- - - r r e i i - i F ' - - - - r PilORITY _ r-0- e-u_t_1o_NA1 _ h rn r---IM MEDIATE i CrTEDll TO 1 OUT7 3 'J5 357h S' CASTRO HAS LAID DOWN STRICT CENSORSHIP FROM CUBA WESTERN PRESS AND ll ADIO SERVICES HAVE BEpi OUT OF TOO'C - WITH COlUtESPONI ENTS SINCE ABOUT· MID-DAY 11 REtrTERS MAN - OTBEaS MISSING Ji NJ MAY BE Dl ctTSTODY - 2 BEREWlTH EXTRACTS OM AGENCY ASSESSMENT OF MOSC W STATEMENT 11 SEPTi MlS lllC CµBA STATEMl NTDESIONEt ·TO THER VARIETY OF SOVIET OBJEC TIVES J'OREMOS T BEING TO DETE a tJS FR M ACTIVE INTER VENTION _ STATEMENT DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER NATtTRE OF SOVIET COMMIT• MElNT DEFEND CASTRO• MOSCOW RAS ONCE AGAIN USED VAGUE AND AMBIGuous LANGUAGE TOAvom CLEAR-CUT OBLIGATION OF MILITARY - SOPPORT m EVENT OF ATTACK STATEMENT· ALSO CALCULATED TO ENABLE MOSCOW TO CLAIM FOLL · · CREDIT FOR PROTECTIN i cimA IF NO INVASION OCCURS · • • · _ • - -- __ u Lu II H o _-oH • · · · c - --- · C-0 0 I 0 I H AT I HO O P P I C_ I S · I 0 p · 6 3 · It D ii- - · I- _-· n rH_iu AtlH o • REPRODUCTION I' OlliEK THAN THE ISSUING Offl Cl IS PROHIBITED 65 1- CopyNo 23 Continued CLASSIFIED MESSAGE RIG TGP SECRB'f' JNl'r' XT I ATE I 10 HOM '2 DIRECTOR OEfERRE D ROUTINE INFO OUToJ INFO 10 -Z- CITE DIR f 't_ f j5 357 IN ADDITION TO DETERRENT EFFECT ·STATJiM ENT S E E M S TO CHECK GROWING ALARM RE SOVIET INTENTIONS IT STRESSES DEFENSIVE NATURE OF SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND DENIES INTENTION TO ES_TAB- ' LISH SOVIET BASE IN CUBA ·AT TIME MOSCOW EMPHASIZES RIGHT TO PROVIDE HELP TO CUBA CITING EXISTENCE OF US ALLIANCES ANO·BASES ALL 41 0NG PERIPHERY OF SINO-·SOVIET BLOC STATEMENT BRUSQUE AND STlWNG RE CUBA B MODERATE ON BERLIN IT NOTES PAUSE NOW HAS BEEN REACHED IN BERLIN TALKS AND ' 11 SAYS T IS DIFJ'1CULT FOR THE US ·TO NEGOTIATE DURING ELECTION CA P AIGNS IT 8 COOI0INATING · ·uEASING Q I CII p OfflCl RS _s i c ' R'Ji r AUTHINTICATING OPflCU REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED 66 Copy No 24 JfcCone to Carter Cable 13 September 1962 67 24 Continued CLASSIFIED MESSAGE P E 2 OF 2 ROUTING 4 l 2 5 3 6 IN 3'_ ' ·· · • 21493 7 - • · · · - G ' f 1 l I I c · rlk 1 1 -------------- - _ R' o r _wnr r 1-------' l --'v fl 't t l____ _ 1 i 1ilC Hc11 Copy No REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH 6-N THE ISSUING OFFICE IS ROHIBITED · _ · · - · 68 25 Carter to fcCone Cable 13 September 1962 Excerpt ◊- _ - -Or -c - - - _- -_ _G_JF __· _ _ c • -· 'l E lJZ 5 • t -- 0 DCI CLASSIFIED ESS G E_ · · · _ - _ _ _cc I o r s E e s 'J -r- ----- r - --1- - - - - - - - 3 ·- I 6 Oz - ·tijTTb3 l8 · TY- 1 - FO '1 iiuoRITY • EY SSOfil OMlllllililil I 36026 AT L I ST TWENTY SIX MORE SOVIET SHIPS CURRENTLY EN CuT 2 TO CUB A- REFiJGEE SOUB CE REPORTS EQUIPMENT FOR SAM SITE ' 03 ELY 1 0-vED TO IS LE OF PINES IN' LATE AUGUST A i l'OTHER SOu RCE YI ' '1-i C J a AN NAvY coi- --rACTS REPORTS MORE TORPEDO BOATS Ai IID TWO ' T -PZS A 1 Vr -SU'B SF S EXPECTED TO A1UUVE IN CUE A FROM SOVIET UNION L ATE 1962 AND E ARLY 1963 I e-e coo1 01sA'rU•i1G • i p 0 J I C I - OfflC l i S E C B e '9 ' 1 hlfn nu' a S-1 1 '-- t f'IC 1 1 t 1 -l C t CiCN SY Ofo R THA iHE ISSUING OF ICE IS ROr SlTED Reverse Blank 69 - AUTk N'ilCA1'1 iC ·ornci i 26 Central lmelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence Current Intelligence Jfemorandum 'Analysis of the Suspect fissile Site 01 Banes Cuba 13 September 1962 CESTRAL INTELLIGE CE AGESCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGE CE 13 September 1962 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ORA 'iDUH SUBJECT Analysis of the Suspect lissile Site at Banes Cuba 1 A review of all available evidence leads us to conclude it is highly likely that tho su 5pect missile site near Banes Cuba is a facility for launching cruise missiles against ship targets at fairly close ranges 2 The site which is located about 300 feet above sea level and 3 5 h fros the sea is oriented in a general easterly seaward direction It consists of o 30 foot rail launchers in revet ents 1 each connected by cable to a Soviet hiff tracking radar Ground support equipcent consists of eight canvas•covered cissile•type trailers two probable generators and electronic vans and other general purpose vehicles The area is being fenced and the personnel are housed in tents The site configuration and the equipnent observed are co patible vith a cruise cissile system and not co patible with surface-to-air or ballistic systel S - 3 Although our knowledge of Soviet cruise missiles is incomplete we know of three systems which could fit those facilities observed at Banes We have eliminated other operational Soviet cruise issile syste s with ranges from 1000 to 4000 nc because their missiles prob• ably would be too large for the Banes facility A 600 no cruise cissile has had a test range firing in the USSR but it too would be too large for the Banes site 71 26 Continued fP J ·4 The three remaining possibilities are a SS•N•l·• a destroyer-launched cruise anti• 1 ·ship homing missile launched r°rom· 30 foot inclined rails With · · destroyer radar the effective· sys tem range is 20 to 30 nm With the assistance of an air controller the system range can be extended to 130· nm This system could be installed at a shore site b SS•N•2•• a Komar class patrol craft-launched eruise anti-ship homing missile launched from inclined rails 2S to 30 feet long With the Komar radar the effective system range i's 10 to 15 nm This system could aJso be installed at a shore site Eight KOMARS have been transferred to Cuba c ss-c-1-- the missile•in•a-bottle first shown in tho -1961 Moscow 7 November parade This missile is launched from an inclined ramp ·within a tube mounted on a largo four axle truck We know nothing of its guidance system The missile probably has a range of about 150 nm but pos• sibly it could be as much as 300 nm This system could be installed at a fixed site s • Although none of the known Soviet cruise missile systems precisely fit the facility at Banes we believe it is more likely that the site is for a short range ZS-30 NM •missilo syste111 The Whiff radar 'seen at the · site- has not been noted with known cruise·missile systems but could be used for target acquisition in this instal• lation If the missile has an inertial guidance system and a means of target acquisition the range of the mis• sile at the Bane s site could be ·extended to a range of a bout 130 nm -z- 72 26 Conlinued •-ncx rrr arr dit'l'E zemtltMTGS 6 There are several iteu of circumstantial evidence which tend to support the conclusion that the Banes site is for rolatively short range coastal defense cruise aissiles The fact that the site is near the coast sug• gests that tho range of its missile is short otherwise it could be located inland in a less vulnerable area It is located where short•nnge aissiles could defend against seaborne assault on deep water ports in Nipe Bay south of Banes • nu · far tho Soviets apparently have not aiven Cub any weapons which provide the a long range striking capability suggesting that their policy is to provide for Cuba's defense only Because neither the SS•N•l or the SS•C•l has sufficient range to hit any target in the United States such missiles would fit this policy pat• tern 7 If the analysis that the Banes missile site is a coas al defense installation is correct it would follow that siailar facilities may be set up at a number of other locations favorable for protecting beaches against amphibious attack s We doubt that Cubans have been iiven sufficient training in the me of such missiles to allo them to have -operational control over the sites It seems likely that Soviet technical training personnel would be needed for s011e tii ae to come and would be available for operating the installation in ti e of crisis • Cuba's two nickel plants are in this general area • Their output is bein sent to the Soviet Sloe and is equivalent to %0 percent of Soviet production The aore important of these two plants is on the bay protected by the Banes site Reverse Blank 73 I 27 Carter to fcConc Cable 1 September 1962 rExcerptJ r· -· _ - ·· · - -- ciil W ELDER · usrr' -0 DCJ _ m 7805 _· · • · O 'TE -14 SEPTEMBER 1 62 I 2 ' 3 _ r - -- ·• t 9 - 6- - _ _ -Y i • CO 'if OCI t-2 • · - •a· •· · • • ZJ · • sf3-4_ • it i L I I I S G CE I J 0UT76847 36344 - ·- t --- - _ · · · · 1 _ FIRST SOVIET CO V MENT ON 13 SEPTEM BE R PRES DE NTI AL ·· - · _ - C IU rt T - ALLEGATION TliAT KENNE DY QUOTE ACTUALLY · - '- -- ·_ DiaT± c n PR EP ARA TIONS ARE UNDERWAY m - ·- _ - · ra Ov' ERTHROWING ·cUBAN GOVERNMENT UNQUOTE · · UNITED STATES FOR THIS ALLEGATION _· - · EJNGES ON PR E_S IDENT'S STATEMENT THAT W E WILL cm - rINUE TO 'WORK - · · · -- - · ' -··· f WITH EXILES -· SOVIET DOMESTIC MEDIA GIVING BE A VY PLAY TO QUOTE ai lA$1HCi 011 c tt · ·- · Reverse Blank 75 28• fcCone to Carter Cable with attached note from MSC Carter 6 September 1962 ✓_ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY - - - C -- orncE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR Ct '1- L lei ct '1i2 77 28 Continued CLASSIF ED MESSAGE PAGE 1 Of 2 PAGES ____ ____ t s 16 o4 i SEP 62 · - - - - _ _ Tjf S fO DCt- -- l-f ---R-ou T1 NG I i sro i 1 4 _ _ _r DIRECTOR 2 5 3 6 M SEP 16 15512 62 C L b 1 zs c 3-4 b P P 1 Nt - 11 l- ION O i'N 23209 QJitDI EYES o· t F PR INCIPAl s V_HEN VE Fm sr REPORTED ' - S01 IET CUBAN BUD DUJI I UGGEsrm BNE SI' ' ' ECONct IC PROSPECTS CF CUBA ASSUMING SOVIET· TECHNICAL ASSI STANCE AW GUIDANCE COtLD j cmRECT PllESENT' MISMANAGEMENT OF_ It usrRY At J AGR Cll TURr BY · _ CA ST1'0 RGANIZATION I THEN FELT AID SI'ATFl THAT SOVIETS VOtLD 0 REASON THAT PR 0PER MANAGEMENT ·cotLD BUn D CUBA INTO A VIABLE ECONQlfY V ITH SUFFICIENT EXPCRr OF Aaf ICtLT lRAL AID 1'1ANUFACTURED PRCDUCT AID OTHER NATtRAL RESOtRCES TO COVER NEEDS FOR IMptCRT· AND PROVIDE SOME EXCESS Fm ·socIAt BEl'TERMENT' IN VIEW OF VERY EXTENSIVE PRESS CQIIMENT ON DETER ICRAT ION OF CUBAN · ECONOMY·LEAV ING IMPRESSION SITtlAT ION· CAN NEV £1' BE REVERSFl AND POSSIBll ITY OF SUCH REASONING INFLUENCING U S Pct ICY IMPCft ANTL Y _I BELIEVE THE STlD_Y fft OPIOSFl V n L BE REVEAL ING AND USEFtL · _ 2 ' AL SO B l EVE ·wE MUST CAREFtLL Y ·srlD Y THE ffi OSPECT OF SECF ET Jll POOTAT ION At a A ACEMENI' OF SEVFJfAL SOVIET MRBMS WHICH COtLD NO BE DETECI ED BY US IF• CUBAN DEFENSES DENY OJUFL IGHT IN REFLECT ING ON NY OBSERVATIONS OF TH R INSTAl LAT ION IN BRITA IN AND JU ITERS · • • • 4 f ' r nnv Nr _ 78 28 Cominued - I CLASSIF ED MESSAGE u10 ·P sEe R£I -r I l l RC JTING I 21 Is I JI 'ION PAGE 2 Or 2 PAGES IN 23209-0019 m ITAL y I CAN ENVISAGE A SOVIET JIL iN TO PACK AG'E ussn E CON RQ AND OPERATING EQUIF'm NI' IN ·SUCH A VAY TP AT A UNIT COU D ' M E OPERATIONAL A FEV HOI RS AFTER A SITE a EARED MD A MG EST CONO EI'E PAD POI RED DO NO ¥ISH TO BE OJERL Y·ALARlHNG THIS MATTER Bur E El n YE CIA AND CafflUND'Y rrnsr KEEP' GOVERm'J f 7 mFarnED OF DANGER Ci A stRPRISE AID ALSO THAT DEn CI'IOO OF FREPARATCRY STE S POSSiaY BEYOND 5 om CAPAS n ITY ONCE CUBAN DEFENSE SYSTEM OPE RAT IVE Tl-RUST OF 'RESS REPCRTS REACHING Mt IS THAT THFJ E EXISiS A a EAR DEMAR CAT ION Bµl EEN DEFENSIVE AW OFFENSIVE ffiEP AT IONS AW I QUESI'ION IF WE CAN BE st RE OF THIS I RECOGNIZE CUBAN Pa ICY DECISIONS NOST DELICATE AID BEYOID AGENCY CR y CC 'lPETENCE HCWEVER Bil WJ VE MUST GIVE THOSE MAKING DECISI 0 BEST EST DfATE OF OSSIE f DEVD omENT s AID ALT JtNAT IVE SITUATIONS WHICH l' IGHI' a VE Al' D I UITT XP'EC EDL Y CON FR ONT US - - - - - - - - - -_- _' ' '· ---- - Re1 erse Blank 79 29 Carter to McCone Cable 17 September 1962 ExcerplJ Oi G r H KNOCHE EXT -0 DCl 7805 DATE 17 SEPT 1962 UNIT - TS 056 TO FROM DIRECTOR CONF DC I 1-2 1NK s c 3-4 lO OUT77481 PRIORITY crre PRITY i 01i 36649 ROM- l SOVIET PASSENGER SHIPS HAVE ADE NINE U l PUBLICIZF D TRIPS TO CUBA SINCE LA TE J'ULY TWO MORE BEIFVED EN ROUTE NOW THE TWO WILL BR lNG ESTIMATED TOTAL ilLlTA Y TECHNICIANS ARRIVING SINCE MID-JULY TO ABOUT FORTY-TViO HUNDRED UNDER AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED RECEI-i TLY BY BRITISH GUIANA TRADE MINISTER ON VI SIT TO HAVA BRITISH GUIANA Vlll L SEND UP TO ONE THOUS AND EXPE- CED CA i IB CUTTERS TO HELP WITH NEXT YEARS HA RVEST 2 CBICOl f S HA VE ASKED FOR SRGENCY MEETING OF WANG AND OT lli W AJlSAW DATE SET IS 21 SEPT NO HINT OF SOBJ'ECT BUT WE SUSPEC T IT WILL BE CHICOM CH AR GE OF AGGRESSIVE INTENT m WAKE OF U-2 INCIDENT CHICO - PRESS BENDING EVE tY EFFORT TO TAG US WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE U-2 OPERATIONS OVER MAINL A NP A ' D WE ARE AJ BO GETTING COl P LATNTS FROM PEIPING ABO UT US I We ' SEBHEtr I • CO 0 t lflfA$1h OfllC l 1 _ A I _ G T Of' i f I T REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING Reverse Blank 81 u- - J • o c IS PROi-- SITED AUTHCNTlCATI MG o icc 30 Carter to 'tfcCone Cable 18 September 1962 SEP 62 2 Dt aa e l 1 0 ·· · ····- - - - - - - - - - tc e • Cbss C 0 Oe cans - -- i N 00 1 - _ · _ OODlll ltm R _-Ott ·---- AD NE NO 'b __ · s c 2 Jlil 70•3 IOC ITN al•· ·--·-••·•--·-- OOTT787I 36854- TO m mm ama JCal'OaC mscmas CAPABLE a mm r aHl ft G%Va Br l'1SB JWl'A GIMKST Al iD sttn'ICIBft CllTrAL 1 _ _ _ mvmmmr r S IIB 85-3 m'0lm tmIB 1' KIBlbt BECOi IUS mIS AB I PBOBAW E S0vmr ♦ • -D-lii il Jr A1ID rBB c hiBCHYE IB u Lml' JBBI A Jq eem m • - mJllt A B MN lii st l'Ot I'l'ICAL J CnC f NJ 5m'ED m 55 2 u Am mv ·Pm SBS r· · ST AD OP CUSU JCaiUI« IS UHr BAD Al iD SDB8'fAB'fDL tlP1'UB J liILL S rm mm 1J1m AJ'DR1963 or li±BCDJ i I O 'r OF Hm3Ms 2 811D 8 -3 JlISCUf§'§ IH PIE58• gj Xff Ilffl caBAt BJ'% JUDGBS ms '1'0 PURL m um rsr mst a u s nm a E8 ' 1 IITQ I I IVm llD llmlSS I B A BADICAL CBA iGB D SOi'D' er R1rP ' 1UoWMT fLf_ DDICA'l'ID '- llB DOil SOCB ACHAD warm BAVX D l'LTCATTOlm tx e 1111HU 7AB BKram CUBA 1 nm JlitWailiiw mi- tiZ9'J I' RBALI'ZZS 1 IOSSIBU I'l'l' c lJ 91t JEW fts 7BCIII ll iiL1 Idl CIICS 2• s _ • SllIE 85-3 Mi BSSBS fBl t 'm a lS A HIDIILE GBCCm D DICE lWBBSlik Cll ornss tvB Ir BUIImP IS A 1fAi mB O WWWA i6T Jf L s s- e · coo1 ouc t t1Nc 01r1C ll S lllUSIWC ou cn BB I _ REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN M 83 VABIOOS I t I ·- m 1 u • 'cc TIWC ISSUl l' 'G Offic E- JS l'ROHIBITED · e cv No 30 Continued ►• r r C p 1uo UNIT · EXT OA rt ' · 7• TO DIRECTOR FROM CONf INFO ' - OTE Dlt ' • i· cg ' 2 '-c lC'A ' ' w • n TO -- Y- t ' N tiI- i Lvi t t1 f ' iit i 1 BIPLOIID ASAD llB DOlr AMBXm 0 Oii lV -liDWlVB C i r · • • i1 · • _ - t- ir•t wt -tLJY •·V - - t -f '- · 3 · · rr r W _ m · OP LB'1J1 Bl' l ICII Blfmll rmtilC IIPAFA ILi JIClllllLlBD · k j ii · · - • • _ l• t ·iJdt ijfll m - ·• J j c s · • ea • • • •t • • ' • r • - f - - 1 t9 · ·- t · - 1 -i 1 t -' ·· · ' · · · r '· •- ·• • • ' • il jt' - t· • 1 -1· ' ' · • • • '° •tJ -H 1 1i- --· • '·r• r t- r•ft'·• • - F-t b • •• t· ''' ' '- '' ' ' · tf'•· iJ • ·w J' ' COt t 1ENT DISSEMINATION SAME AS R ERENCE Cable from· Soviet buildup 0£ Cuba _ l f- 1 _ _· -- - i•' - -'i- 4 c - t _ f • t- t l - fit 1l lt i iiilitt· lHfASINO OfflCH ·l· COOlltlNATINC· O ICUS •••· e ' · · • -- ·• t' e •f ClOOP I '- Jlr S' ' I · ' • ' • ·· - ·' - - • • J '•' · ' •·• • ' · i 'arnunicAf l NO ' Of ICU · REPRODUCTION ·sy OTHER · TiiAN - ISSUING OfflCE IS PROHIBITED ' -- · No 84 31 Career co fcCone Cable 18 September 1962 f£xcerpc I H KNOCHE 0 DCl TS 078 7805 18 SEPTEM BER 1962 -A DIRECTOR 1 s c 3- I PAGE 1 Cf 2 CLASSIFIED ·MESSAGE '¼' O ¥ · 6 E G R E Tl · 20 t - - --- - - --- - - · ----1 1 _JBP SEOHET I I 36974 3 WE -HAVE NO WORD OF A '-'Y W- dITE HOUSE DECISION ON DONOVAN MISSION A 'm CAN ONLY ADVlSE YOU AT TEIS POINT TO HOLD TO YOUR PLA i 'm D ITINERlJtY llll $1NG o ct ■ - I coo If PJ£BBRl n J __ - _ _ 'l' 0 ' E G AT _ R nODUCTION BY OTHER TrlAN THE iSSUi -SG OFi' CE IS PR0 -- 31 ED Reverse Blank 85 UTKUH ATINC or i rt Copy No 32 Carter to fcCone Cable 19 September 1962 Excerpt i • • ORIGW I EL'OER • UNITO DCI EXT DATE 7805 ¥ e P s s s R E I iOUTlNG I I JI l 2 6 3 i 'j' 20M d DIRECTOR DEFEIRED ' ONf i« - I s TO TO 7 _ G 1 CF CLASSIFIED MESSAGE s c 3-4 --· o ' J · 11 I'--• PlUTY IiOUTlNE OUT 7848o · PRIORITY CITT DI INFO 37228 -EYES O N L Y M L HEREWITH CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL NATIONAL mTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE APPROVED BY USIB ON 19 SEPTEMBER WE BELIEVE THAT SOVIET UNION VALUES ITS POSI ON A m CUBA PRIMARILY FOR THE POLITICAL ADVANTAGES TO BE DERIVED FROM IT• AND CONSEQUENTLY THAT THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE PRESENT MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA lS TO STRENGTHEN THE COMMUNlST REGIME THERE AGAINST WHAT THE C AND THE SOVIETS CONCEIVE TO BE A -DANGER THAT THE 1JS MAY Arl'EMPT BY ONE MEANS OR ANOTHER TO OVERTHROW IT THE SOVIETS EVIDENTLY HOPE TO DETER ANY SUCH ATTEMPT BY ENHANCING CASTRO'S DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES AND BY nm EATE UNG SOVIET MILO AaY B ETAL ATION AT THE SAME TIME THEY EVIDENTLY RECOGNlZE TRAX THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN OFFENSIVE MII tTARY BASE Di CUBA MIGHT PROVOKE US MILITAltY INTERVENTION AND TiroS DEFEAT TBEIR PRESENT PllRPOSE COOIOlNATINC o 1tCl tS • GOfflCEI I e-P--s-- - § OP 6EC F S I U e1'l -- ic REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS J RQHIBITED 87 AUTHt 1'TfCAT1 NG Of'flC Ca 32 Continued UNIT i XT CLASSIFIED MESSAGE · j Pef' ORIO ECl Er j I 1 PAGE 2 OF••• ROUTING I PATE ro 3 I I I sI 6 I DIRECTOR loEFERRED IROUTINE INFO OUT CITE DIR INFO TO 78480 37228 B IN TERMS OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE THE CURRENT SOVIET DELIVERIES ARE SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVING AIR DEFENSE AND COASTAL DEFENSE CAPABILITlES IN CUBA THEIR POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE IS THAT IN CONJ'tJNCTION WITH THE SOVIET STATEMENT OF 11 SEPTEMBER THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE REGAllDEI ENSURING THE CONTINUATION OF THE CASTRO REGIME IN POWER WITH CONSEQUENT DISCOURAGEMENT TO THE OPPOSITION AT HOME AND IN EXILE THE THREAT INHERENT IN TH ESE DEVELOPMENTS IS TI-IAT TO THE EXTENT THAT THE CAST RO REGIME TI-IZ EBY GAINS A SENSE OF SECURITY AT HOME IT WILL BE EMBOLDENJ1 D TO B l CO ME i 10RE AGGR ESSIVE IN FOMENTil fG REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY IN LATIN AM ERICA C AS THE BUILDUP CONTINUES THE SOVlET UNION MAY BE TEMPTED TO ESTABLISH IN CUBA OTHER WEAPONS REPRESENTED TO BE DEFENSIVE IN PURPOSE BUT OF A MORE OFFENSIVE CHARACTER E G LIGHT BOMBERS SUBlv ARINES AND ADDITIONAL TYPES OF SHORT-RANGE SURF ACE-TO-SURF ACE lv W SSILES A DECISION TO COOIDINATING OfflCERS ltEltASING OFFICE I I 8 p 6 B £ Q E I - - ·rcH WEAPONS tw•• uou a _ u - 4 REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED 88 'UTH EF TINO O Copy No 32 tContinued CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CilG OF Ui'llT EXT Bl CRZYI r I iO JTlNG l 14 sI I6 I I ' DATE TO F20M DIRECTOR IROUTINE O'JT 734 INFO TO CITE OIR -3- 37228 WILL CONTINUE TO DEPEND HEAVILY Olli THE SOVIET E 5TD LU'E TO WHE'l HER THEY COUI 1 BE INTB ODUCED WITHOUT PROVOKING A US MILITAR Y REACTION D THE SOVIET tJNION COULD DERIVE CX NSID ER ABLE Mll J T ARY ADVANTAGE FIWM THE EST ABLI5HMENT OF SOVIET MEDIUM AND INTEIUdEDIA TE RANGE BAIJ JSTIC MlSSILES IN CtraA OR FR OM THE E 5TABLLSRM ENT OF A SOVIET JIBMARINE RASE THERE AS BETWEEN TB J ZE TWO THE ESTAB 1SFJMEliT OF Stm BASE COULD BE MORE LIKELY EITHER DEVELOPMENT BOWEv £1 WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE 'WITH SOVIET PRACTICE TO DATE AND WITH SOY tET POLICY WE PR E 5ENTLY E 5TIMATE IT IT WOULD m DICATE A FAR GREATER WlLLINGNESS TO INCREASE THE LEVEL OF RISK IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS TRAN THE SOVIET UNION HAS DISPLAYED THUS FAR AND CONSEQUENTLY WOULD HAVE IMPORTA 'l fT POLICY IMPLICATIONS Wl'l'H RD i PEC l' TO OTHER AREAS AND OTHER PB OB I Eb $ IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS CoOt0lNAi t NG o rcErS •Hl o c __ J r o p s ca iii CJO PJ REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFflCE IS PROHl31TED 89 AUTMl MTICATI NO o e a Cc y No 32 Continued _ ORIG Ul'llT EXT DATE ' TO CLASSIFIED MESSAGE I P P ii B ET I ' · ROUTI NG l I - q ii I5I 3 I l6I ' FROM ' 4 OF 7•· •• PAGE -- DIRECTOR DEFERRED C'A ' l ROUTINE JNFO 784 OUT INFO TO CirE DIR 37228 E THE LATIN AMEIUCAN REACTION WILL BE TO THE EVIDENCE OF AN INCREASED SOVIET COMMITMENT 'l'0 CUBA RATHER THAN TO THE TECBNICAL IMPUCATION5 OF THE MlLITAaY BUILDUP MANY LATIN AMERICANS WI LL FEAR AND RESENT A SOVIET MILITARY INTRUSION lNTO THE BEMJSPHEa E ' BUT WILL REGARD THE PROBLEM J E ONE TO BE MET BY THE TJS AND NOT THEIR· RF SPONSmll ITY WE ESTIMATE THE CHANCES ARE BETTEB NOW THAN THEY WERE AT PUNTA -- ' DEL ESTE TO OBTAIN 2 3 OAS MA lOl UTY FOR SANCTIONS AND OTHER STEPS SHORT OF MI LIT ARY ACTION AIMED AT CUBA lT BECAME CLEAR TIIA T THE SOVIET UNION W AS ESTABlJSHING AN OFFENSIVE BASE IN CUB MOST LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNM NTS WOULD EXPECT THE US TO EI tM INATEIT BY WHATEVER MEANS WERE NECESSARY BUT MANY OF THEM WOULD STILL SEEK TO AVOID DIRECT INVOLVEMENT C0 0 1 0 1NA 1' 1NG OFJ' ICEIS u l E A S ING O ff I C et 1 J ·-5 E Eill D 3 L----- ----' REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED 90 A U TH i NTI C ATI NO - O f'f CE 1l • Co'py No 33 Special Xational Intelligence Estimate 85-3--62 The Mi irary Buildup in Cuba 9 September 1962 Excerpt SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 85-3-62 The Military Buildup in Cuba 19 September 1962 91 33 Continued l' CrtEi' THE MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA THE PROBLEM To assess the strategic and political significance of the recent military buildup in Cuba and of the possible future development of additional military capabilities there CONCLUSIONS A We believe that the USSR values its position in Cuba primarily for the political advantages to be derived from it and consequently that the main purpose of the present military buildup in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that the US may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it The Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by enhancing Castro's defensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet military retaliation At the same time they evidently recognize that the development of an offensive military base in Cuba might provoke US military intervention and thus defeat their present purpose Paras 1-11 B In terms of military significance the current Soviet deliveries are substantially improving air defense and coastal defense capabilities in Cuba Their political significance is that in conjunction with the Soviet statement of 11 September they are likely to be regarded as ensuring the continuation of the Castro regime in power with consequent discouragement to the opposition at home and in exile The threat inherent in these developments is that to the extent that the Castro regime thereby gains a sense of security at home 92 33 Continued it will be emboldened to become more aggre ssi e in fomenting revolutionary activity in Latin - merica Paras 18-21 C As the buildup continues the USSR may be tempted to establish in Cuba other weapons represented to be defensive in purpose but of a more offensive character e g light bombers submarines and additional types of shortrange surface-to-surface missiles SSMs A decision to provide such weapons will continue to depend heavily on the Soviet estimate as to whether they could be introduced without pro oking a US military reaction Paras 22-28 D The USSR could derive considerable military advan- tage from the establishment of Soviet medium and i '1ter- ' mediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba or from the establishment of a Soviet submarine base there As between these two the establishment of a submarine base would be the more likely Either de elopment however would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and With So iet policy as we presently estimate it It would indicate a far gre ter willingness to inc A l level of in U'S SOviet_relations 1 than the USSR has disp _y ¢ thus iar1-and consequen ly __ 1 ould ha e important oolicv impEcatieas with- respect te other areas and oth p mblgms in East-West relations ·1 Paras 29-33 E The Latin American reaction will be to the evidence of an increased Soviet commitment to Cuba rather than to the technical implications of the military buildup Many Latin Americans will fear and resent a Soviet military intrusion into the Hemisphere but will regard the problem as one to be met by the US and not their responsibility We estimate the chances are better now than they were at Punta del Este to obtain the necessary two-thirds OAS majority for sanctions and other steps short of direct military action aimed at Cuba If it became clear that the USSR was establishing an offensi e base in Cuba most Latin American go ernments would expect the US to eliminate it by whatever means were necessary but many of them would still seek to avoid direct involYement Paras 3 -37 2 eECR Re ·erse Blank 93 34 JfcCone to Carter Cable 20 September 1962 - · - ·- - • j - · · _ • • r• -- - G f' _ - - - ·· · 1 Ot · j un t - J - 7° '° 3y_ r T N - -IC _ _ _ 't lr- 95 - 34 Continued • · 1ro • ' • ' · c • '_ _ _ __r ___ _ ---- IN 25591 ·· • _ · - · _ ·_·3 • _- -··rah · ·wn L FOR t3tJNI Y LOO FORWARD TO SEEING YCU 'IRIS AND HO £ S HEO'JI 'E IU Pf R'IIT AV ISIT THIS CCX'IWG i'EEXESD• - ·· 4 -· - F'OR E OE IF Y U · - · rn Fm 'IPORTANT TO DO so POU n SELECT ED -- - - ·n u E S INCLUDING RECENT CUBAN NU 'S MEMORANJ er rnrr - · · ' - · DE A°R'TMESTAl MEtTINGS • • • •_ 9 ••• -_ ROOT E ' HO 'EV- R - FO STUDY EN ••• D-0 'nai REPEAT NOT DO THIS If S E8 lt L COURIER IS · · s · · - · -- j -· ·• - · · - --·· -·· IW otVED C S Conunents_ 'The ponibl e bllahm iu of Soviet ciur 1 nd intermediate · range b lliatic zni•ailea in Cub or the eata bli•hment of a Soviet ■ ubmariue b ae there wo d indicate f a r gre•te r willingne•• to r inc reaac the level of rblc in U S -Soviet rclatio s tha t tbe Soviet Union laa dil played thu• r and C0r 8 que - y wcold ve fn poru rt policy irn lica tioci■ with reapect to oth - r i-a 1 a'l d otbe r problem in 'E 1 at-W eat rela Hon ' 96 35 Car1er to JfcCone Cable 21 September 1962 f£xcerpt 'i' r I T·0 TllP SEffl Fr I SF ifO • iJ TS-135 21 SEPT 1 6Z ' C Y ·O Df l 7805 2 I 3 I I5 6 07z I - · e DIRECTOR c itOUID E t- f-'-- ---Fr 1----- S C ROUTING 4 I - OF 4 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE · · E H KNOCHE X I 3 J • PillOifTY Oi'E Ur ONAI LY YEIATE _ _ _ _- l __ Q _ i- - Q ------- -- '_ _ _-__ -C ' - -f p · __ o»__ • - _- _·_ '- I _ -n _ - - -- _ PRlTY - _ _ _ · -__ · INFO M- OEC i 37803 - - EYESONLY- ONE OF OUR BEST SOURCES A DIPLOMAT IN HAVANA REPORTS 1 A RESURGENCE CE- AUGUST OF OLD-LlNE CO TS BLAS ROCA ESP 'ECULLY CASTRO SAID TO BE UNHAFPY OVER DOMINA NT RO WITH SOVIET BACKING THE OLD COMMUNISTS PLATING ONCE AGAIN SOURCE _ REPORTS A IN_ECON FIELD THIS IS THE PRD All Y PRESERVE OF THE - CZECHS - - - - BLOC C I A N S WORKING CLOSELY wrm CUBA NS AT PLANT AND PltOD'lTC'l'ION B AT MINis-l'RY POLIT A 1'6 POLICY LEVELS SOVIETS EXERTING IN FLUENCE TBRU OLD AND TRUSTED COMRADES _ ROCA RODRIGUEZ AND PENA C IN MILITARY FIELD SOVIETS PROVIDING ADVISERS AND CONVENTIONAL EQUIPMENT TO Ctr RAN ARMY BUT ARE KEEPING 97 36 Richard Lehmanj Excerpt from JIemorandum_for D recro of Central Intelligence ··c1A Handling of the Soner Bwldup m Cuba 14 SO ·ember 1962 iExcerp11 K The Targeting of San cristobal 40 Although the sites thee selves were closed to ground observation the oove ent of equip ent to the fro the ports was in fact seen by CIA agents and by a nu ilier of individuals ho later fled to the US The agents reported this iDformation as soon as they were able but in ost cases had to depend on secret n-iting for co 1 nmication Eence there was a lag of several days at least before their infor i ation beca e available Refugee reports were delayed considerably longer for other and uncontrollable reasons--the tme of the in dividual's decision to leave c- ba his discovery of ceans for rloing so and his delivery to an illterrogation center Y any of the reports so received dealt with unidentifiable construction activity Many of the because of the ti e-lags noted above did not arrive in Washington until after 14 October · and some are still coming in 41 Nevertheless by about l October the San Gristobal area had been pinpointed as a suspect YRB site and photographic confirmation had been requested This represents a considerable technical acniever 1en t To underst2nd why it is again necessary to back-track in time Since the mo ent of C2stro's triumphal march into Havana the Intelligence Co unity h d been flooded w-ith reports of Soviet weapons shipcents and mi§sile installations in Cuba There were several hundred such reports claiming the presence of everything fro -small arms to ICB 'JS before August 1960 i e pefore the USSR had supplied Cuba with any weapons at all Yore specifically CIA's files contain 211 intelligence reports this does not include pr ss items on missile and missile-associated activity in Cuba before Jan 1962 All of these were either totally _false or misinterpretations by the observer of other kinds of activity CI -a nalysts had naturally _come to view all such reports with a high degree of suspicion 42 · ·0n 15 February 1962 an l ntera·ge ncy· •inter rogation ·c i mter was established by CIA at Opa Locka near Miami to handle Cuban rafugees- and ·improv ethe quality of intelligence collected from them It was manned by trained bi linguaJ · interr9gato r·s fro the aroed services and CL The establis ent ox Opa L-0cka coincided with a sharp drop in reports of issile activity·received in nashington iihen the efensive phase of the Soviet b ildup began the volll le of Opa Lcc a reporting rose very rapiclly cl p ovided good for ation o the types of equip- ent coping in on the l Se of Soviet perso el anc on thesecurity prec2utions i□posed by the So iets o this operation Such reports ·ere the basis or tlle c ec list ite ii cited in para 9 99 36 Continued 43 For the better part of two years CIA had been checking information obtained from refugee defector and agent sources with NPIC whenever it was apparent that the information was of a kind that could be verified or negated by aerial reconnaissance In lMay 1962 NPIC began publishing a series of formal listings Photographic Evaluation of Information on Cuba in which these reports were evaluated in the light of photographic coverage In the 7 issues of this publication between 31 May and 5 October NPIC examined 138 raw reports referred to it for co lllllent Of this total only three cited missile activity which could not be linked directly to the SA-2 and cruise missile deployments NPlC's evidence negated those three 44 When the first indications of build-up began to come in in August these procedures were further tightened CIA current intelligence was ordered orally by the DD I's office on about 14 August not to publish any information on the co struction of missile bases in Cuba until they had been checked out with NPIC This instruction was in the field of intelligence technique rather than of policy it had no relation to later restrictions see para 50 Between 14 August and midOctober this office sent NPIC 13 memoranda asking for a check on 25 separate reports containing information which was thought to raise the possibility of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba A great many more such reports were checked with NPIC tnformally by telephone In ail cases NPIC either lacked the necessary coverage or made a negative finding · 45 On 20 August the COMOE Targeting Working Group chaired and staffed largely by CIA set up the first comprehensive card file system for Cuban targets An example of its procedures is the handling of targets in the Sagua La Grande area Based on refugee reporting the COMOR Targeting Working Grou on 27 August pinpointed four farms in this area as suspect' missile sites Readout of the 29 August coverage sn9wed an SA-2 site nea i - Sagua La Grande which apparently was the ··basis for the reported activity there and the target card was changed to show a confirmed SA-2 site It should be noted that knowledge that this site was in the area could have led analysts to misinterpret any subsequent reports of MRBM activity as pa t of the SAM development but in fact no such reports were received 46 By September the volume of agent and refugee reporting had become very large indeed During the month 882 reports on internal activities in Cuba were disseminated exclusive of telegraphic dissemination The CIA clandestine collectors report that their output represented only the small publishable fraction of the raw material collected A substantial -24- 100 36 Continued proportion of these dealt with the deploy ent of defensive missiles and related activities Knowledge ·on the part of the analysts that such a deployr 1ent vas in fact going on plus the nort1al difficulties encoUDtered by untrained obse vers in telling an offensive issile froc a· defensive one tended to thro'li a sort of s oke-screen aroUDd the Soviet offensive deploycent vhen 1t finally began T ae CIA analytic·apparatus however recognized nd correlated the first authentic repo ts of YRBM equipment ever to be received in nashington and took action upon the It targeted the San Cristobal area not as another location where alleged missile activity should be negated by photography but as a s c t SS-4 site 4 7 This process took abo ut three 'lieeks fro i the date when the first observation was made on the ground in Cuba to the preparation of the target card The t o reports fro Opa Locka which triggered it ere i a An observation in Havana on 12 Seote ber of a convoy carryi·ng long canvas-covered objects b lc i the source identified under interrogation as r eobling SS-4s T ais report which was disseoinated by CIA on 21 Septe mer contained sufficient accurate detail to alert intelligence analysts_ l b n observation on 17 Septe ber oi a c9nvoy moving toward the San Cristobal area This infor- ation· received on 27 Septe lber dovetailed in I 1any respects with the earlier re ' lort 48 The arrival of the second report led CIA analysts to a tentative conclusion that the two observers had in fact seen the _sace convoy · and that there was a possibility of the Ss-4 dentillcati-cin_ being genuine A day or so earlier a ·· target card on San Cris·toba l oaa been preparea on the bas·1s of a vague report of Russians building a rocket base Now this card was removed and with the two reports cited above and other less specific inform ation on activity in this area which was beginning to trickle in a·new card as prepared between 1 and 3 October which was in effect a priority requirement £or photographic coverage This card nas used in the targeting of the 14 October flight see para 63 It read-as follo s Collateral reports indicate the existe n ce of a restricted area in Pinar del Rio Province hich is susnected o f including an SS site under construction particul riy SS-4 Shyster The area is bounded by a line co ecting the following four town Consolacion del Xorte 8332X 2244n San Diego del Los Banos 8325 2235n San Cristobal 8301 2243W and Las Pozos 8317X 2250n Require ent Sea ch the area delineated for possible surface issile const uction with particular attention to SS-4 Shyster -25- 36 Continued 49 Ar ither report too general to be used in the process described aJove is nevertheless of interest as the first good informatio u distr ibuted on the f e n s i v e build-up On 20 September CIA disseminated report that Castro's· personal pilot Claudio Morinas a s-a d on 9 --September ''We have 40-mile range guided missiles both surface-to-surface and surface-to-air and we have a radar system which ·eovers sector by_ ·sector all of the CUban air space and beyond as far as Florida There are also many mobile ramps for inter1 mediate range rockets ' ·• • t -26'fOF SeOR B'J 102 37 CIA In formarion Report 8 September 1962 crn t L INi L IG SCE AGENCY r• • c 11 1 1 e - 1M • u t 1 f • H i ••-4 1 1 •1 - ' u 1 w · • f - C ■ •w ••1 cf l ■ 1 41 c- •4 · •u __ _ r - - e 1 1- '-'••• - •4 11 e • - i _ o •• • t -1 r • n_ v c c lJ 1 d r I ' CCCNTr Y Ct Ro· n CE J J D fC SS- ' T' XISSII 3 Vl L C _ LA J it CAHO ISi'O ruCE1 CATE ACQ A F A SA CU3 - • n 15 SE ' ' ' R 1962 · • h r t ' - - o _ •- ' c -- - 4_ _ c _ - INF ORlv ATION 103 37 Continued CWSl ICATIOII- 0ISSEMIHAIIOH COHllOLS TOCS - 3 5'22 702 S-il 8 R E' l IH - 238 PAGli C 2 N 22-44 55 il' 63-33 15 AMS E 723 CONSOLACION DEL NORTZ SHEET 3484 II t1rM l7Q XR377177 D LAS POZAS N 22-52 02 ll' 83-17 58 AMS E 723 SI E E 'r 3584 IV UTM GRID l 7QK R642305 • 2 SECURITY IS ENFO CED TO PRMNr ACCESS TO THE OF DR CORTINA AT LA GUIRA WERE VERt' SECRET AND lMPORTANT TO BE Cill CERNED WITH MISSILES TO DR CORTlNA Kt womc' IS Di PROGRF SS m AmUARTE RS CCl-lMEtl C LA'GUIRA IS PROBABLY THE CORTINA THE llELIEVED BELONGING 1E °AT N·22-37 05 ll 83-2t 20 AMS·E 723 SBEET 3583 J V U'IM GRID 17Qlffi527o49 LA GUIRA IS AT N 22-37 56 'W 83-24 00 AMS E 723 SHEET 3583 IT 3 F D18SEH CINCLANT cnm ARIB ·1 l END OF MESSAGE l Cl ASSl ICATl N - DISSE 'IHATION CONT OLS f3B8RB'1l 104 UTM GRID l 7QKR533 6 38 CIA Ir1formarion Report 20 September 1961 REP Rt •4 c-1 J f _ _ CENi L INTcLllGc CE AGENCY -·••d' • ' l'-il _ rru •1 l e N 1 e • J C '••w t- f •• 1H l 1 111 a 1 - C ••r 1• • _ •• 1 uilll t 4 _ _ t w iOCS co i7 3 SU Jcct RZS r C r u s c s t ta W-t -3 522 948 c-- - 'IL r cv Gi HISSii S S lI Ario tUUo-'- ll I IS 9 5 1962 IL AC · ATC ACQ 11u1s l1 C J° A 15 S 3 1962 SE r r 1 IN Nl- -01258 25303 ----------- -· - -- _ · __ - · - S'uxACZ- 0-SU- tG C J D F c -' i 0- E U'iD w3 EAVE A RJ DAR co·y FLOrullA wiiICR SECTOR BY SEC'i'CR O TEE C u'Elu AIR SP ACE MD EZYO w _ AS FAR AS TiiERE Am ALSO MA 'Y MOBILE RA v PS FOR I A T B RANm ROCKm'S • i'm D DISSDI ElID OF MESSAGE ci -ss r c a - SSEMISATICN CONT- OLS • - · • ·-w- L - O O O - - INFORMATION Reverse Blank 105 •-' · S CINCIJ 1 en-CARIB r · ' i c i DON'T KNOW 'ifflAT IS AWJ J TmG THEM 2 5YS'm 0 39 CIA leformarion Reporr 27 Seprember 1962 cou w -1 A c l J2 S'7 I - • e ls°t al J J J Ea a c I ceser e i co - ei s ct -t - u tc ru 20 la t rnilcrG go r g 't Cl 1 ' 23 ' zc -t -- Co c i e d by a Jee c c o ill is i e 'bj Sc vi e 1 i cinl 1 c i e a - 112 s lee' ed s 1 '8r cQlc -3 1' a c est - iQ e a tho c il 1 Jee - -and ctr e d t2ie Sc-dct t r a d t 'aile -a i o ce3 cd 1lito Ce o t1bc -ta i 2 Ar tr elt ca cy 3• c t2-ucl' a - - a to be t2ic 6i6 z 157 210-- -- - -covered• •§ tified t2ie i fi-a rn the e Cko c ca o Ya io is 111ze11 I do lcno t -mat · these 'boxes contained ha c trll ilcr i the lOll eGt I ever 5 1n Clll n 1 -ero tvo-oxl o f'ou r- iice1cd lhey WX'8 abco t 65 to 10 teet 1n len stli alld el rut eil 22t 1'cct 1A vidth S• I bcllcve the tronsport e r i re C D l lr c i nsilfu 80 ta l t2 a t tl c tc il end er-- e e i e I v ll d eueae t e r cailc P e a ' e- r e c - - e - - s l 11 e a 'a-c -e cc c _ ' t i - ca - t - 1 c - a o t ' c - 1 De lc t 1 as c c - l e C C G c i e n3 o c ti a il e - - C ae u -eau er d et ee s X' - e7vCe t' j o c -ro a t silo t C tl e - z s - s c tall e c to 0 tt o cd 5 1t t ·c tu 1 e - _ 39 Continued QV · e e ti F ee E N e I t -L O °w-K-3 219 040 -2 m1aa1lc1 but it curely looked ·the t vo y ° c descr tbcd then drcv roueb oketchca or the missile eilh -ictte nlld te il fin oilhruette l4ter fro zi photogrupho he 1dent1f1cd Guided M1cnUe Surt'o c • o co ss-4 Sby tcr me Soviet CIJ l'gO llhips l ltml CB unJtn a a Flota lllnnca piers o round l l or l l Sep 62 Ile told me th -t c ll Cubllll dock-workers 0lld other CublUIS wo vorked 1n th t re'1 vere forbidden to be 1n the o rca duri Dg the unl oe dillg of tbe llh1pa Cllld that the unlCX d itlg lw iled by- Sovl l oc per cmnel lle cud the cugo unl OM ed c t tho not lll a docks aons1s1 ed of m isaile11 · I do not knw were he got h1s 1nf ati011 but he is W l p rett y rcl1 i l 1e ••i · · •end• • ·• · • ••• t ' • ' ' • · I J#• I I 1· · t 1• ·'·· 108 40 CIA Information Report J Ocrc ber 962 suarecr i o t10 a1 2 -- --- -- c Jl' 4-a -c ec C l 1 1 '- 3 t et -C ye o ccbool l c 3 $7 r · cU c - - c illGe c sl er- - ££ #a- r - - ·- l§ 4 - iei t CC T f o 10 oto -cyclc5 16 °t i O t e -s - G o- ·-· s c i the Ccntnu ri 1 - - to - - ' r C c l o Si I · · ·tli 1 l tl C ' direction a th' co i -o -· p sc-- • -e 't st t ot t l eo -O l n tr cnt -e iee t o Zi2ff c- Y - - ff c orc 00 i - t ' - c I l a - l t o t 'te cc Tc r c--ll - ktc c t Pi C el o § c - lsr' 235 S' II Setlc m2f t - t c · _clc · -- -e c t -e oYcr e ts e I c o 01 1 nioo 'th '·e -c ell p - o t co r cy Serice c - t 1 i 2 ·· Ti c lc i di clc ot o t e co ··• -oy ' -c o -cyclcc a -1 vcn b ea · R 'bel for- col dicrc 'oce etio i p e c-ed to be cle -1ca the c1 ilian t c ol end Th to cyclcs h ro i'ollo· 9C'C by d x l 'iZ-502 tn lCI c 1ch cc rryinc nbout Rebcl k - · solt icrs '1 •'1th 9 it chin ccn-o lr S nnd rineo Since it 1 - 3 I could cec - ho the drivers of th t'l'UC i o llcrc not c tr i _ tat lQO ed lil o f 3• Tnc truck rQ follo- d by cicht So ie 1 - tll no tbCC ty t Ue - cppro i tcly 32 feet lo i ccvcn o •• ch 1 · e l c tubes - Jtt - c o• c th c iti re ler th of the n a tbed c id ca r letcl covered dth C l lYns I could not disti sh -wt t the c ight b ttuilcr LO cc rr 1 n oincc it ' ms ca pl tcly covcrec 1 1 th can c l o ever I did notice 'hnt loo1 ed llkc lnrcc e to l -O s 1 - n 3 out f'ra 1 i Ddcr th CC n Z at t c - r r or t t -zi c - t z- I Lo 't - too eh abc -4 1 -1 oc - - _ C- C' l C - - - - e · · - -- - • - -c · - 2 - ' t cc c - ··y' a'x ' 3 - - i bc1 A - t olc c e - c • - -- ce- 1 i o t '- L-1 •c -s o a ' -e cl e - -- j C--C 4 • -- --- ----- - - Reverse Blank 109 d1 '-'to 41 McCone femorandum of 0 GOOSE leering Held on Thursday October 4 962 October 4 1962 iE MORl 1'1 u OF MONGOOSE rEET NG nELD 0 -i T w' R SDAY OCTOBER - 1 962 Chai ed by he Atto ey Gene -al At ended by Gilpatric Johnson Gene al Taylor General Carter fcCon e Scoville Gene a 1 scale and Colonel Stea -dey part of ilie timel The 1' tto ey Ge eral reported on discussions with the President on Cuba dissatisfied with la ck of action i i the sabotage field W nt on to stress that otl ri l g wa s moving forward co e J ted that one effort attempted had failed e q ressed general conce o- er developing sit iation General Lansdale reviewed operations poii ing out that no sabotage had been a tte r pted a id gave general •-pressio' l that things were all tlght McCo e then stated that phase one was pr ncipally intelligence gatheri lg organizing a id training that no sabotage wa s authorized that one operation against a powerhouse had bee l contet ipl ated but was discouraged by group that b e had called a meeti g to review matters t 'iis rnor ting and that he had observed a lac le of forward motion dne principally to hesitancy in government circles to engage in any activities which would involve attribution to the United States AG took sharp exception stating the Special Group had not withheld approval on any specified actions to his knowledge but to the contrary had urged and insisted upon action by the Lansdale opera ting organiza tion There ollowed a sha rp exch ge which ii la lly was clari i g ina sr iuc1 a s it -esul ed i i a -ea ffir at'o o a c ete r -• iation to ove forward In eifec i see ed to be the co se s that phase two 111 41 Continued as approved on September 6 was now outmoded that more dyna m ic action was indicated that hesitancy about overflights must be reconsidered this to be commented on later in this memorandum that actions· which could be attributed to indigenous Cubans would not be important or very effective and that a very considerable amount of attribution and noise must be expected As a result General Lansdale was instructed to give consideration to new and more dynamic approaches the specific items of sabotage should be brought forward immediately and new ones conceived that a plan for mining harbors should be developed and presented and the possibility of capturing Castro forces for interrogation should be studied 2 t h respect to overflights were instructed to prepare and present to the Special Group on next Tuesday at a special meeting alternate recommendations for overflights These to include the use of U-Zs on complete sweeps as contrasted with peripheral or limited missions the use of firefly drones the use of 101s or other reconnaissance planes on z low level intertnediate level and high level missions and other possible reconnaissance operations Consideration was given to stating publicly that-we propose to overfly Cuba in the interest of our own security ind the security of the Western Hemisphere and the n to proceed even though doing so involved risk It was the consensus that we could not accept restrictions w hich would foreclose gaining all reasonable knowledge of military instal lations in Cuba During the meeting McCone reviewed the earlier meeting with General Lansdale and pointed out to the group that this meeting cla rified General Lansdale's authority over the entire MONGOOSE operation and that the CIA organization was responsive to his policy and operational guidance and this was thoroughly understood -z- 112 41 ConJinuedJ Consideration was given to the eXisting guidelines and it was the consensus that the August 1st guidelines for phase two were inadequate d new guidelines must be considered John A McCone Director -3- Reverse Blank 1I3 42 JcCone femorandum of Discussion -ith fr fcGeorge Bundy Friday October 5 I 962 5 I 5 p m Mtunarardum of Dlacu aaion with Mr Mc Geor3e Btaidy Frld y October S 1S6Z 5 15 p m 1 McCo• rniewecl detaUa o 1 tll e Dom-van lWJOt wona di a aiona with tlM PrHtdai t Attornsy aa n t El Mzlhawu tbs '4acistou DCt w ppro ch Coqr•••ioD l the cllacuai ot uh mat or Javita and tl i e fiZl l report rom Dano-n R apru■-4 Glual agnemat Z At the October -4th m ecstma of tbs Specil Gl-oup Mml ooH waa diarnaaed hl aome deA il a a waa tba maetma wU L Caner IanSl l- et al hl DCI' • ome on thai da y McC- stated thar• waa a lD ClA De £- e that the activbt policy whkh fmmded tbe Mongoo o waa iOM DCi that whil• DO specific opuat aml Ctivi tiu bad bMz1 rofuaed the I lOmJt cf 10i H11 rom mhlor i nridc t■ aa the supr tha fflldant1 on the Havana Hotel a ad other maUera am th a a tnma caadoii e sp ruaod by Stat e bad lecl to du a c o Mon lmportamiy1 bow Yer the d ci ■ 1' ma to r utrlct U-2 1llpu ad p1ace cl the Umted state a Imelll1enco Commvntty 1n a po WOil where 11 COQld JIOt r t with UlllnZl« the cf offcn alve capuiJ tlia m Cua McCana autsd he ell il moat prob ble that Son t-C auo would Cid up wub an ntahlhlled o c aiv• capabillty ill Qab IDcl- acllq MRBl u M c Ccme ab led he tboqht thia a probahillty rather tbaA a mere poHllrWty B dy toolt iline atat1ng that he felt th a Sovt au IV'OUld not p that far ha ufi1fled that no of e n sive c aplbility would be m 0all l ecaae of ua world-wide of ecta nd thara oH aaamed N1aMd OTU' the act that Im•JHiCC Comm•mity ca anot produce ha rd mlonn tioa oJUba imponam wbj McCone aaid that B'llnlir 1 -newpomt waa liy many in the hit lU1i1111ce Comm mity perhap• a maJorUy 'ba l u Jut dhl J 10t air•• and furthermore did not tbilJk the United StatH cowcl al ord to auch riak 3 Bmidy then pbiloaophizecl on 0aba aiauns t1s 1 u felt that our policy waa not cleai- OU2' o'bJ•ctivas DOt aD4 t here ore our cdforta wen not productive He d ac uHed both the operation a and the R oatow Track Two BuDciy waa not crillc al ot e Sber or o the X ansdale operatlou· It w- obrioua th l _ not ill sympalhy wttb a more a ctivo N1a Reh aa thoH diacussed at 5'12 on 'l'lDarN y u lie alt DDlM ol the WO'Gld Drin Cutro down oor wolW they pa rtic -al rly a wace 'O S poaltlon of worl 4 le ade nhip B'Wlliy H■ med inclined 1D rqport cha T rac k ho id a and alao incl ln8d though he not apecUi c 1D pla ydm th a more Cti Ian l• 115 42 Continued operation B lJMly had aot talJuid to I uadale 1 l obriouly W Hceivecl •om ol th• •tatic11 that la bemg pU•ed UOUN ia Wulwaawo 2-lore McCone m nponhia on the 4iacuatoaa a Tlnu'9daY'• H12 meetm repeated the view• ol tbe PJ- ldat aacl -pr ed by tu AUo y O Unl 1t was asNed that th• wbol• aov•nmiat pollq wUll refuace to CUM im uit be reaolved promptly a buio to mnJaQ actiou Oil our put lXl 1eural Bandy'• Yiowa weH tut we 9hould eltbn JMke a J11dpa that w would bav to go ia militarily w dda 9ffl'QM to JdJU in oluul41 or altemaUvely we woald ha to 1 -n to lift with ca uo ud bla Cuba and adJuat our pollclH acc ol'dtngly •• McCone then elaborated on h1e views of Ille -oluUon of Soviet• C •tro mUitary capability etatiq he fAIU atenae 'WU Jut pbue OMa phase two would be followed by vuio11• ol feul capabllltto• and Weed the Clld•tmg deleulve capabilW a lCh aa 11w MIO 21a a nry dalnite o Uenaive capability apiut De rby Amerlcaa c Ute• aad IP•taJJP tf McCone atated tbai he tboupt that the HtuJ S hmem of a ffrf apeuln iU ln mech mam could not l e tho ultimate objectlft ol tJM Son ta or Cutro u4 tJMre ore the objoctlYe wu a to Htabluh a oUa•ln NM or b to bsaart auffldeiu Soviet •peclalia1• amt leader• to tau CUM my rom C atro aDd oatahlllh U u tl' la Sovwt coab'Olled AlaWte McCone •t Ud that be l-1t there wuo ollly two cou s Opell •• OH WU to tu mUita ry actioZl at tha appropriate ttm or HCODIUJ' to para-u aa elfort to aplit Castro off from th• Commsani•t• and or thia ra oa u Mc Cou had Yigorouly aupportod tha DoDOY D mlHioll u it 1a GIily link Mt to tbe Castro hierarchy C th• pJ Ct time Note ia tMa lt mlpt be ••11 to anidy the evolution of the Toan lace ia Ouinaa wuia the CornnmnJ•t11 mond ia aJ2d captured all elsrnenta 9' tJle Gov• allCi economy aDd forced Toure to l cha Ambundol' Ud try to rel Wy the aituatf on n re may be a parallel her• mmtarr 5 McCou rm wed tb• Eiaalaowor dtacuHiou lhmdy read tb• me moramwn rina tbHe cluc u•Sou Bundy atated that Adenauer did not uprou the coAC n of tJa e u S policy ntlectec1 by El•ubower ud Nporled 1A the mom orudum 6 BWM ly rejected th• idea o repla r MSC me tin • •tathla that enry PrHidem baa to or1ams• kl• Coffmmat u a de•lr•• ad tb tu Elaenbower pattern wa not neeeHa rUy adaptable to the Kemsedy typo of adminiatradon Mc Con• •tated th ti dl1a 1- tba us• he mtended to J'•qu e•t 116 42 Continued1 occuicmal NSC mntin1• to rrriew apecUlc ut l malea or othff tntelU1iaac• •ituationa and the Dc t CM would N report azid cilac uaid oA a£ tM o SoTict air de la zue ca pabfUttH lSmldy ap-Md 7 B ady nJ•eted th• lde eemn da e rai pedal p a 5'12 CIA MoqooM and North Viamam 1 Dp6ff feelln it WU t o them upa ra ted He alao rejected 1be id- dlat 1M 'riaitf q eotm'Nad ou uch a aw Byroad e T am am tJi a Drap - Tam w report 'b ck ta Sped l Group Cl £ u q it wu appropriate dm they npcirt to tu PrHidem throup tJi a S c r of State w i t h with tu Spacl al C roup CI It wu apffCl has woaJ d ban a fanbe2' dlacuuum over the wcekc Dd J'OHN A McCONE Director JAM lucy W 3 Reverse Blank 117 43 Sherman Kent femorandumfor the Director ' Implications of an Announcement by the Presidem that the c s i ·ould Conduct O -erhead Reconnaissance of Cuba 8 October 1962 Ci j CENT'RAL · · y INT'ELLIGENCE OFFICE Of NATIONAL ESTIMATES AGENCY · --- p' _ YV _ -- _ MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR SUBJECT Iznplications of an A nnouncement by the President that the US would Conduct Overhead Reco maissa nce of Cuba and of the Actual Recomiaissa nce Thereafter NOTE The following are the conclusions reached by a panel of i n emhers of the Board of National Esti J nates and of the 01 'E Staff 1 The President1s a nncnmce i n ent would be vigorously cOll de ed by the Soviets and the Ccba as evinci ig an intentfo11 to commit acts of internaticmal aggression 2 The weight of publicly expressed opinion in the free world would probably condenm the announcement as threatening a marked increase in international tensions Many Latin A i n ericans would probably look upon it as incompatible with the principle of non-intervention On the other hand '5-eCR T 119 Gt I j t cr - _ 9 ----1' c ct - ' 43 Continued Sf REr those few which desire the US to take decisive action against Cuba would probably consider the announcement as a disappointingly weal mamfestation 3 The Cubans or some other country would probably bring the matter before the UN shortly after the announcement They would be virtually certain to do so ii a reconnaissance vehicle were shot down Having international law on their side they would hope to achieve a UN condemnation of the US for a ets threatening peace The UN situation would be complicated and it is possible that in one way or another the US could avert a formal resolut i 0 11 Nevertheless it is highly unlikely that the US would find much support aniong the as·sembled nations It might £ind itself or the first time in virtual isolation 4 The Soviets and the Cubans would probably ·be unpressed by the evident willingness of the US government to raise still further the level of tension ove r Cuba and to commit itself to further risks We do not believe however - 2 - 120 43 Ccmzinued that this Caba would lead to any change in Soviet policy toward The USSR would not consider that the US announce- ment created such a dangerous situation as to requue it to reduce its aupport of Castro Moreover it would judge that in political terms i1 could ill afford to make any reduction a t such a tune On th e other hand we do not believe that th e announcement or succeeding over flights would cause the USSR to alter its Cuban policy in a d ue ction which increased the provocation offered to the US e g the provision of medium -range missile bases In reacting pgblicly the Soviets would probably reaffirm their commitment to Caba's defense though they would probably not make the commitment xnore specific or binding 5 We thillk it unlikely that the Soviets would retaliate directly with any major ves against the Western position in Berlin In con fronting the Allies with local crises which raise the level of risk in Berlin they generally prefer to choose a tim e when OS opinion is not highly agitated over other Ea st-West issues While the announcexnent would - 3 - 121 43 Continued EOREf create new strains in Soviet-American relations this effect' would not be so strong or so long-lasting as to influence basic Soviet choices with respect to Berlin 6 The Soviets and Cubans would make every effort to shoot down any reconna issance vehicle that came over Cuba If they succeeded in doing so the tensions would be som ewbat increased though the international political effects of the shootdown would not in themselves be as great as if it bad occurred without the prior Presidential amwuncem ent The denionstration of military capability which such an incident would provide would alm ost certainly im press m any Latin Americans --L SHERMAN KENT Chairman Board of National Estim ates 122 AfcCone ' fenwrandum on Donovan Project 11 October 1962 - - ' ' _ ' -- _ Octobor 11 196Z MEMOlUNDUM ON DONOVAN PROJECT lmmed J ately ter my di acuaaion with the Cannon Committee inc lodin Taber Ford and Mahoi i I wont to the White Houae am explaln od to th• President and McGeorge Bundy the poaition a taken by Ford and Mahon as covered in ■ eparate m emm-andum prepared by Yr Wan ier The Preaidell m gde the judgment that we ■hould proceed with the negotiatioi ia recognising there would be some political conaoquance ■ and criticiem■ but h• the Proaldtmt waa willing to cc ept thi ■ aa a act I then ■bowed the Pruidem photograph ■ cf the cratoa which preaam bly would carry or ere car-ryin IL ZSa Soviet mediu m bomber■• Dd were declt loaded ou a ship which had arrived in Havana in the early d a ya a October The Preaidem requa ■ted that auch information ba witbheld at least miW a ter election■ a■ if the l n ormation ot into the pre ■ a a naw nd more violent Cuball laaue would be injected into the campaign and thi■ would Nrioualy af ect Jrla lndependoi ice a action McCone ■tated that these particular photographs could not be restricted a they had been diueminated to the mtelligence Co D lmun ity and ■everal Joint and apacified cornrn•nda _■ uch aa CINCUNT SAC NORAD and other■ and would be reported in the CIA Bulletin on Thuuday morning The Pl'e ■ ident then requested that the report be worded to indicate a probability rather than an actuality bec awie in the final analyab we- only s w crate•• not the bomber■ them•elvea I Cl agreed The President further requ e■ted that all futln'e in ormati on be ■uppre••ed DCI atated that thia wa e rtreznely dangoroua It - then agreed that future mform ticn would h diuemin ated to mombera ot usm with appropriate inattuctioli ■ that only thou responsible for giving the Prc ■ ident advice be given the mformati 123 44 Continued _ - - ' Furthermon that within CIA clrclea a minimum D Unb•r of 9XJM1rta be informed McCoue 1tated th ere••• no p obl•m in CIA that it waa secure It waa the relore agreed tut the USlD m•mh•ra would bo inatructed to rutric t the in ormaUon to their pei-aoll l office• and ully and cm-rently inform the Cbtda of Staff the Chairman the Service S cretariu and the Secretary ol Del mae Slmflar re• 1trictive action would be taken in State Then fore all tho in• volved in aivina advice to the PHlident wo 1d be tully Wormed However operational diviaiona and the Joibt and •pec ilied cammanda would not bo Wormed at thi• time except t the dil'ection of the above people who are receiving tho information • At thb point th• President mentio d that •e'U have to do something dn■ tic about Cuba and I am azsxio1 ialy lookina forRard to the JCS operational plan which ls to be preaented to me next week McCone eflected the above luatnctiaa• 'by c lling Ml' Cline who waa unavailable aJld then Mr S u ldon who a1reed to Pl'epal'e a procedure or review 011 Thureday mornina McCone then called tho Atto y G enl and advi•ed him of hia tal k with the Cannon Con unittee The Attorney Oo eral had no particular comment At aix •clock McCone received a report from Houaton that Donovan had gone into a meeting at five o'clock At eleven o'clock Houaton reported tho meeting waa •till in pl'oare••• At aeven o'clock on Thuuday i nornin Donova n atill had no report At 11115 General Eiaenbowet- called McCone atating be waa ■ orry a meeting could not be arranaed lae waa leaving very early the following morning or Ciettyabur1 McCon reported that ne10Uatlona were in proareu am he also reported objection• atated by Hveral members of Congreu Eiaenhower advi1ed that tbe negotiation■ b• puraued indicating bis aupport ot it and furthermore atat d that if the negotiatioua were aatiafactorily couclud•d the c oznplaint1 and objectiona 1 0 lld in ht words d aap ar 124 44 Continued Mc C011e told General Eiaenb ower tlwre were aoma de endable evidences o ahiptnenta o£ twin-eDgined light Jet bomben Elae nhowor responded th situation m iat be w very e re tilly Po1itive action might be mdic ated Dd then ha Hid tii re had la u two inatancea where actlon waa warr ted birt had not beeA taken 1 1 aez ih ower did not elaborate however I laww rom preriou di lcu alona ho eei th at when Caatto e braced Communum publicly Dd a zm o1mced publicly hia allegiance to Moac ow we had then a reu011 to act milit rlly alX1 if we h d chosen to ao act au ch acticm would have been defeDd ble On Thursday morning McCone reported by telephone to Mr Kennedy reviewing the E iaenhower di lcuuion nd ata g that he McCone waa concerned over D lovan'a 1 ety in view ol the rub of publicity IJ IQat particularly tu Herald TrihmJ O rtiele and that he had instructed tha t c onta ct be mad• with Donovan am that if thing a ere not proceodln1 a tia actorily Dd a conc huicm to the negotiations alot1g the Un ea a1reed in aiaht then l on oT D ahowd coma out The Attorney General atated th at he had DO cone om over Donovan•• pe uanal aafety th at they will not do an 'thils i to him McCone atated he waa not 10 a1tte and lb at he therefore concluded to bring Donovau out unless thing• were 1oing wall With reference to the political implle tions McCone recalled that he b d told the Preai dtsnt nd tlw AG that ha wowd take all or hi• lull 1hare of ruponaihility th t h wished th• AG to bear this in alind •• th• poaition taken in this reapt1ct by M r MeCons in the irat couve uation after hi• return from Europ •till •tood AG expi-eaaed apprecl tiou for thia atatemeut • Tohn A McCoue Di rec tor 1 AM at - 3 - Reverse Blank 125 45 Memorandum U-2 1 e tlights of Cuba 29 August through 14 October 1962 •· 27 February 1963 27 February 1963 MEMORANDUM SUBJECT U-2 Overflights of Cuba 29 August through 14 October 1962 The August 29th flight flew over most of the island and photographed much of it The photography revealed that ei ght SAM sites were under construction in the western half of the island The flight also discovered an installation at Banes in the e astern end of the island that was not familiar to the photo interpreters Subs equent research by the interpreters i omparing the August 29th photography with that of two similar i n stallations re ently noted elsewhere had by September 14th enabled them to identi fy the i nstallation as a c rui se missile site The finding o SA-2' s in Cuba on the August 29th flight p rese nted u s with a n e w problem rn planning U-2 fl•ghts over Cuba Today there is general acceptance o the fact that we are carrying out overhead re onna1ssan- e of Cuba and that we will continue to do so as long as our national s ecu rity require s i t This almost universal approval of U-2 flights over Cuba is an atti tude that has existed onlr since the m i ddle of last October Pr •or to the fi nding of offensive b allistic missil es n Cuba qu i te a c iffe -e nt public attitude existed SE€R E r 127 45 Continued In planning for any U -2 operations over well-defended denied territory we were always aware of criticism that attended the U-2 incident over the USSR in May of 1960 The two incidents involving the straying of a U 2 over Sakhalin on August 30th and the loss of a Chinese Nationalist U-2 over the China mainland on September 8th served to sharpen the already existing apprehensions Within the intelligence community there was always at the backs of our minds the knowledge that in the event of a mishap we would have to be able to explain convincingly and in detail the justification--in terms of the highest priority intelligence needs-for having undertaken the mission Elsewhere in Government and among persons whose stated views strongly in luen e public opinion there were serious reservations regarding the use of the U-2 There were expressions of extreme concern from some publ c leaders over the increase in tension that might result from overflights and other s voiced the opinion that such fl ghts were illegal or immoral Although many public figures conceded the necessity of the United States securing intelligence by whatever means requi red they were quick to caution that the use of the U -2 was quite diffe rent matter from the classical use of spies and agents - 2 - 128 45 Continued The vulnerability of the U-2 to Soviet SA-2 systems and the discovery of those systems in Cuba contributed further complicating factors in weighing risks against the need for hard intelligence The situation as of September 1962 must be viewed against this bac ' ground of universal repugnance or at the very least extreme uneasiness regarding overflights Because of the widespread apprehension over use of the U-2 we took particular care to ensure that each flight produced the maximwn of information of value to the entire intelligence community Each track was drawn to cover high prior ty targets agreed upon by an inter-agency group known as the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance a committee of the Un ted States Intelligence Board We were also concerned w th the conservation of the asset The U-2 is not a sturdily-built aircraft It 1s designed £or one purpose--long flights at very high altitudes and at relatively low speeds We had very few of these planes Therefore before we committed one to a m1ss1on we wanted to be absolutely certa111 that the intelligence need was great enough to JUsttfy the risk of loss of the pilot a 1d aircraft The Comm ttce on Q ·erhead Reconnaissance was the i te ligenc e c ommunity's vehi•_ e for making the target studies All CL ove -flights we -e programr - ed th -01 gh the r - eciur - of t e CIA - onthly Forecast A the time the Soviet ar -ns build-up - 3 - 129 45 Continued began in Cuba flights over Cuba were being forecast and flown at the rate of two per month Because of the need to husband our resources and to ensure that highest quality photography was obtained from each U-2 flight it was the practice not to launch a mission unless weather over most of the critical targets was predicted to be less than 25per cent overcast After reviewing the result of the August 29th mission the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance in undeniably good judgment recommended that the next mission should cover those areas of the island which were not pho tographed on the August 29th flight and that particular attention should be paid to the then unidentified site at Banes It was impo rtant to learn whether the So viet s had made a limited deploy- ment of SA-2' s to Cuba or whether an island-wide defense was berng built The next mission was suc c essfully flo wn on schedule on September 5th over the easte rn and central portions of the island Three additional SAM sites were detected m the central portion of the island Unfortunately the flight encounter e d heavy cloud c over over eastern Guba Late in August Mr McCone suggested to General Carter who was acting a s DC during Mr Mc Gone' s absence that low-level - 4 - 130 45 fContinued1 reconnaissance of Cuba be pro osed General Carte - requestec the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance to consider the kind o information that could be obtai i ed thus The Committee met on September first and third and reported its views on what might be accomplished through low-level flights As a result of the Committee's deliberations and because of the heavy cloud cover encountered over eastern Cuba on the September 5th mission General Carter on September l0tt- 1962 addressed a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense recommending that the Secretary initiate the necessary action to provide for employment of tactical-type rec onnaissance against Banes which was still unidentified or other targets identified by the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance as being suitable for ow-level re onnaissance The Secretary of Defense felt 1t preferable not to mount a low-level reconnaissance of Banes until the results of CIA high-level reconnaissance became available As noted in the first paragraph continuing research had by September 14th 1dent1fied the Banes rnstallat1on as a cruise missile site - ow let us -etur to the matter of the Sep e -nber U-2 flights One r s sion had alreacy been lown on September 5th -e - - a ec yet to he lown in Septe -nbe One fhght A S ecial meeting u ·as held on Se e -nber 10 h to ons de - e s e Ee trac or hat second flight - 5 'f 131 45 Continued -s-E C LB T General Carter presented a CIA proposal for a single high-level flight designed specifically to photograph the Banes area where earlier photography had not been conclusive and generally to search for SAM sites in those areas of central and eastern Cuba that had not been covered since the September 5th flight This meeting followed closely on the heels of the two U-2 incidents previously mentioned the straying of a U-2 over Sakhalin on August 30th and the loss of a Chinese Nationalist U-2 over the China mainland on September 8th The Secretary of State expressed concern at CIA's planned coverage of Cuba involving extensive peripheral coverage as well as two legs directly over Cuban air space all in one flight He said that he had no objection to the peripheral parts and in fact thought it useful to continue to establish our right to fly over international waters On the other hand he recognized the neces- sity of obtaining vertical cove rage of the Isle of Pines and the eastern portion of Cuba He felt however that it was unwise to combine extensive overflying of international waters with actual overflights He pointed out that the long peripheral flight would draw undue attention to the mission and further that should the aircraft fall into enemy hands after an overflight had occurred this would put the United States in a very poor position for standing on its rights to overfly international waters - 6 SEERE l 132 45 fConcinued1 5BCRET Ta 1 iog these views into account the plan was changed and four flights were substituted £or the one Two flights were to be wholly peripheral involving no land overflight One was to cove r the Isle of Pines and the other was to overfly the eastern end_of the island targeted against Banes and Guantanamo There was a three-week period from the 5th to the 26th of September during which only one flight was flown on September 17th and it yielded no useable photography We finally acquired a rrod- erately complete mosaic of the SA-2 defense of Cuba by piece -meal photography search carried out in late September and early October The delay in completing the photographic coverage was due solely to the unfavorable weather predicted dur ng this period - 7 - 133 45 Continued e-D G RE T Much of Cuba was under heavy cloud cover throughout most of September and the cloud patterns were rapidly and continually changing The few periods of acceptable weather were so fleeting that they_ had passed before flights could be mounted The weather was checked for a possible mission every day beginning on September 6th There was a one- or two- day period around the middle of the month when the forecasts were moderately favorable It A flight to the northeast was scheduled for the 16th went to the final briefing on the 15th but was delayed for 24 hours because of weather and was cancelled when the weather continued unfavorable Planning for a flight ever the Isle of Pines was under way on September 15th At the final briefing on the 16th the forecast remained favorable The mission was flown on September 17th but by then the weather had turned sour and no useable photography was acquired Another mission was under consideration between September 18th and 21st but the weather was bad and the mission was cancelled The mission to cover the Guantanamo and Banes areas was under consideration beginning 22 September It went to alert daily but weather was not acceptable until the 26th On that date the mission was successfully flown and three SAM sites were discovered This was the first of the four flights agreed upon on September 10th and - 8 Ee R S-T 134 45 ConrinuedJ S-i C T it was the first day on which -eather pe 'rni ted a success ul flight One of the four tracks was originally approved to cover only the Isle of Pines Mr McCone called Mr U Alexis Johnson on September 28th a ld got approval to include coverage of the Bay of Pigs area The flight was successfully flown on September 29th The SAM and the cruise missile sites at Siguanea on the Isle of Pines were discovered Two of the three remaining missions for September were considered during the period September 29th through October 2nd Both w e re cancelled because of bad weather The next flight under consideration was that al ong the periphery of the southeastern coast October 3rd It was delayed becaus e of weather on It was briefed on October 4th and successful y flew the mission on the 5th One additional SAM site was discov e red There was good weather along the n o rtheastern coast on October 6th A flight was launched but it aborted because of aircraft fuel problems The iigh along e no -theaste -n ccast was successfully flown e ex cay Oc o' er 7 h Fo1 r mo -e SA sites were discovered Tne r iiss on o Octo ie - 7fr co ' lp e ec foe Se tern e - fl i ght progra - 9 - 135 45 Continued SF C R T As the September overflight program progressed identifying additional SAM sites it became apparent that an island-wide SA-2 defense was being constructed The next step was to discover how far advanced the earlier SAM sites were I This information could be obtained only by taking the risk of overflying an SA-2 site that might be operational At an interdepartmental group meeting on October 4th the DCI made a strong representation for extensive overflights of Cuba The group requested-JCS and CIA to examine all alternative means of conducting aerial reconnaissance and to report back as soon as possible A meeting was called on October 9th to hear this report and at this meeting the flight was planned which was actually flown on the 14th of October Additionally from September 18th through October 2nd agent and refugee reports dovetailed sufficiently to create a suspicion that there was something of unusual importance going on in a definite area west of Havana and that this unusual activity might be concerned with MRBM's These reports however were not of sufficient credibility to warrant their being used in intelligence publications Accordingly the track of the flight planned at the October 9th meeting to test the operational readiness of the known SAM sites was drawn to cover the area in which MRBM's were suspected - lO il iGRK- X 136 45 Contfnued1 The weather was checked daily on October l0t 11th and 12th but the forecasts were unfavorable On October 12th operational control of U-2 overflights of Cuba was transferred to the Strategic Air Com and of the U S Air Force continued unfavorable on October 13th The weather forecast The mission was success- fully flown by SAC on October 14th over the suspect area west of Havana and near the SAM site thought most likely to be operational The flight was the first to discover the presence of MRBM's As of October 16th blanket authority was given fo unrestricted overflights of Cuba Attached at Tab A is a summary of weather forecasts and the status of missions 5 September through 14 October 1962 - l - Reverse Blank 137 P A R T I I CRISIS OCTOBER 16-28 1962 Notification ofhigh US officials Formation of National Security Council Executive Committee Ex Comm Policy debate over appropriate US response to missile threat Continuation of Operation MONGOOSE Discovery ofintermediate-range ballistic missile sites in Cuba Notification ofAllied heads ofgovernment The President's speech Quarantine Construction ofmissile bases continues at rapid pace U-2 shootdawn Resolution of Crisis 46 CIA femorandum Probable Sol·ier IRB f Sires in Cuba 16 Ocrober 1962 O FIC I RECEIVED REF'ERREO TO r ' ELEASEO II SEEN BT I CATE I ' '111£ I CJ ATE I Tl £ U MAME 6 OFF'tCE SYMBOL S JG IATUAE I I I l I I I ' I I I I I I I I II II I I I I I I I l OAT£ l T I I T OVEA l Handle Via Indicated Controls r CV ••·••••••···•·············· r - • 4' _ - - WARNING This t c oa r il'IS So r a OII r -i d riry of r • l - i-red S 4U 'W lrilift i ' ISI cf ea ono rO'W'$ U S Cod Title 1 S Cien1 '93 cr C 14_ ne 1 c -w p ro l i t• - iir• tr a iu i¢ 6e of i fs c ieT -sts i cr T DQl r IZ I J o z s ie cs 11 c 1a is• - O lT lcr w-• p-- tic id rl--A se e' y o o s f U- itN Si'e-■s ' - ef r of cr7 f •• 90T«-t _ t _ r e c-t'r-- ol l Jair d Stc ■ a IJ •• 'k 1 - - - ■l • ■ ly •• - o - - Oris J -a _ i - icn O sicr •H c► O¥ els ta se-c---ri y -m is •c i- e-c h oc cMd r ce 6 re a %0 oe to i A LENT Cc e r I Sys et -- on 139 46 Continued mmIJ IGZ r£ l t l i obabla Sites la Cdboi l · l P'hOt ®l 17 cf 14 October 1$62 bas 41 sc t'ilO ·· as tn tbl l $ 4DJ lio o taim J about n m 'll li t ·soutir-est 0-t Ire ilhith 'J Oa i to c IJ viot wmliJ tn tho eor titaec11 i ir t op - A third era 4b0ut five nnA '-ten miles oast err tho tn-st wo rc ipl' Ctively n to be · a ldl ttar r firllt n1w nclu i@ 14 ltl rse tentii· 15 8tlmllrat tc rl a and 15 $ at a t4 ditta -ont tJPeS• lfhc llll st 111£pl1fic iant -ve d J ea et thu site or m cmvt1 1cove red t s ot 00 t In -ovorall h vtdch ato t a l ate snit 00l 1f1euratiou o-t those w scu to· o r t «' O'lliet ss- 700 JWA• ba1Uatic mru 1Ue and ss Ji l l 00 n m bolll tio' m1UBil e tr41 l or 3y o r im l ch eigl 1 W X'C U'e l ' c i ted tt• ccctr 14 iolte m -a 'believed to l 11 rger tllm'1 uircd t o i3cvict SS •2 J50 m liGtia 1Sit tdl e • ' ' wae · e oeoond u1tl't ia n -in 4 the titst 1ll1J4 in wld ltioD to tbn eo a1 z I tOTJr c p coi t vebicles Ot' 1 1oce11 o e i t wti h -c tlUld be t mutlilc CJ 'o ction tn· a ficJ4 cnvh•om mt At thG time oZ pliotogutrpey one t t t1 1¢ er3 ws Sn uition with OllO of thcl#C PQ1 0 Q -01 0C't g ct nite aJ sn· COnta i w 17 lerae t o a m all tenta lO l lrSr t ·tl Uclta l6 6lXJ Qll l2l l l2 uni nttt1td 1 1 as o GO equi nt no otba 1 9 J 11i 11dlo n u ocio tC li eq a a t i O D w · ll 81 m Gtor• vc been detcot lb f eilit r -to XI WlC-Br 1t'heclla t1t1 ba tUicd at ers ' Uu ff tlu 'eoi1nat iona - 140 -46 Continued - -- - l rJ • M enD ia i a of' tba t l i m eitber SS 3 ar SS J c rl sslle imol ' 'Cd t sc are ne Dbilo ru d cc be 4c Pl -1th 3 lm h etc ll th 'tbc a -3 ml $64 are tt licler v 1ll a 3 000 Jll t o mrn n o r 700 n z i m il 1100 n n -- val T- Z-3qst eGliqtl 1d asmi • m 1dent u1la t a t - YJ o - - • - ad - A i o J J t b e - ' _ '·· to t2 as 34 to· · __ ·_ • · i Ve 4o DOt -btn-'c· 1 ro t Gh Lppi ef CJYer GOar -to f 11 1 1 3 i ·tJ other arr1-ve1·1n tllo - e t o t·tha pre t «uutt - Jo g a tt ut cqu 'llilrJ hi v J l ll to 8rn'nt 4 t-iJlo Der - At that - -r4 the l Oe o p b r i s a col1D1 ot d - e _on rot d 'lli CJ 1Q t h e -_A'LtlloU$1le be fl rt j t · cee is too bt lk or 'tbe egJ 11 s1d pped roi i WSI aa m1 roa iobnc uii1t - i ai blo ·rw f'1el 4 4 e p nJe· tma to l'Cl2Ch 10%10l 't'C'ti'HUG S9 tlllJ4 bef· q-a1t t zn1 · J I D ' tb® tba rmy Zoollns n g ia e tba t i P a t 1 aro il u tnll¢1 tlmt Wl'hemG iiro 1n C-Jbll ot en·route ·- iollal -- ab cOlil4 · md at Cul a i hcllll t£w S• 41'ho viet 1aion to @ iJ a t llal l 1stk J lisGiles to Cuba u tilies to to 4ate lrlrj c 'tivo US int 1on owrlh mr tl a W1eh -a a m 1ne ct • $ ISt 1 ccta li- l a titt '1-t ll · lZh1oh w med tap t c e n Wtll4 lcnd -toa m chle r p -tbst t h9 i in cs eo those m- iislle f - 'it 11ch tl e'J t 'IIOul4 b aim to the tlS er v r n t v1ll 61ellii c tbai ostaam·nDt s wr rtaectio i tllil ly_ rci rarce tm c llcl l3arl m i i ieh r n IQllc i' 1a 1 m· ll Scff c 5Q7ict Et ltcamt ·J ld i l 'Utlt W X at'SU cla l l'l_r 1a c i cktrg to - _ey lcr ll l e i l'r -_·_ • ' __ -- - - 141 ·· ◄ • - _ _ ___ -· I 46 Continued • • 1 • f 1 _• -· - _ _ · ·•· i · ·· _ _ · · 142 · 46 Continued ANSSX Strategic Consiceratior s - · 1 In vei ing their decision to install ballistic issiles i Cuba tho Soviet le cors ust have considQrod the xtllit -ry utility of these ea ons with d without nuclear arheads the taT iets in the US llld else here which they coald roach an · tho strategic value·of oeploying · •issile forces oi various si es in Cuoa or 2 Bocauso of their typo guid3nca nu rela ive icaccurncy ballistic issilos h vc utility gAinst fucd targets of known loc tion and not against such taricts u convoys or naval forces at sea The Soviet 700 and 1- 00 n m missiles those CEP' s o estimlted to be in a · _· · _ the_l to l S n ranio ould conceivably be e ployed vith IIE warheads against large dlitary cor crs and UTban · aroas It is highly unlikely that Ute Soviets would see ·any advantage in deployment for this purpose but they sight'rGgard this threat as contribution to tha dvterrence gf Latin Alllerican support for US or Cuban rcfuiGO operations against t e C stro regiEie _ ·· 3 Deployed 70SJ and 1 100 u missiles with nuclear warheads would augment Soviet strategic striking power by virtue of their bility to reach a nllll ber of Al lcrican tar• g ts with warheads ·having yields which arc not significantly • si aller than tllose of current Soviot ICEHs Fron r tho · present bnso area in Cuba 700 n a- 1 1issiles with llUClear war11eads could reach east Tn US targots 111i thin nn 4TC includiDg Savannah a11d Now OrleaRs• includinE 7 SAC bo ber and tankor bases and at l ast one i portant av l base _ · The 3S0 n isslles could roach bo bor bases i Flori l »0£ which thorc are only t o The 1 100 n issil oula threaten a ouch more significant nU13bcr of critical ili- i t ry targi ts including 18 SAC boahor and t inker bases · an ICBM baso and three ajor naval basc3 n addition · su targots lS t 'te Pana111a C mal aad _us bases as· far east - · as Puerto Rico could bo reached Bo h of these missiles ' have ran es sufficiont to reach any US popul tioa in• - dustrial and a inistrativo center -including in tho case of the 1 100 n issil Y ashinston D C lnstallation3 0£ iaporunc to the_ US tCJ lic on rzy md S Co prograr is also vould be i hill r go of Cub n-bascd 700 and l 100 n a issiles - · 143 46 Continued salt Lake City Omaha• ATLANTIC OCEAN f uc no ' C 'l C _ SANTO DOMING '• •' r I •' ' VRNi ' ZIJELA · l cot mmu a 5r - ' _ 3272'1 - - - r 144 on ZiL i 3 47 Carter emorandumfor the Record 17 Ocrober 1962 17 Odober 1962 MJ MORANDUM FOR THE RECORD l OD Moad y eveDiq 15 October J u I wu inf o rm ed that th• latest ru doat ll'Cffl1 Qian tJ-2 photop indicated initial d eployni eni ol Medimn • Ba1lutic Miuilu Iimmadiately Utho2'iaed the di■e mln•tlo11 of thi■ Worm tion on v ry limited n ■ K-to-Jm ow buia to USIB - amben mi ibau immediate commander ■• On Tuuday m01'1UllK at 11 U I attendM an NSC Mfftin l at the White Howie rbich lne l dK the Pruid eat S c Tetary lbak Secr i ry Ball Secretary Mutin Secn tary McN S c ratary Oilp tric Gen eral Taylor the Vlc Pruideat hr retary Dillon the Attorney Genaral Mr McCi or1• WMly and my U I made a pr Jtminary briefint to the sroup u to what we tboqht wa aaw and Mr Lundahl and Mr aybq expanded th -reon At the end of the imellla•nc• portion of the 'briefina th• poup W9Ilt into 1■neral dbcuHion 2 Secretary Ruak wu peatly cil■turbed about thi■ new development but pointed out that Mr McCone had predicted such a ponihility back in mid-Au u■t a said that ha had been thinldng about couz ■e■ of action and thaa ha bad a numbel' ol co nt• to make alona the followina lines a b ••• A 4uick-4trike eU1'priH att ck by au to wipe out these b Consideration to expand tbi• into total invasion to t lte OT111' the ial nd1 c We muet noi operate in a va cwm bat mn■t ol cour■e pi-e-inform our alliu at laa•t in pull d We ■hould conei dar m•Jdns an annCJllllCem - - ry and to datermina riiather or not to c up the rvee ae - - ••n i _ r - tY · - ' 's c ft 70-J ll i • 145 T - · - V i L ahortly 47 Continued •• Perbapa we •howd get in toac h with Caatro thl'ou1h a third party and tell him it waa now or never and that ha wa• Cub down the river by 1•ttinl involved with Soviet miHile baHa ••lllna f We should try to create rnaximnm confusion and not worry too much about the noiH level Here he was referriat to infiltration and sabotage efforts I• We should review 0111' policy on a provisional 1overn• ment and try to get all the various factiou worldog together In any n-ent we must kHp Cuba iaolatad from the Frc e World altbou1b in doJ na so we muat '10t isolate ouraelvea 3 In the final analylis Mr Rualt felt that we bad to either make a quick aurprtae attack and knock out the•• bases or to lay on a heavy propq Zlda barraa• in all areu wblch might cau a a withdrawal Rusk at ted that we could not in our thtok Sna parate Berlin and other trouble area■ in the world He seemed deeply troubleo and did not 1eem fil'ln in any of bis p roposale but appe11red to have been boxinJ the c ompaas u to colU'ees of action 4 Mr McNamara pointsd out that if we al'e going to take overt military action it must at all coaU be done on a 100 1 laais and befors any o the miuiles become operational O neral Taylor pointed out tbat the -1 rne ut of •urpriae would be ea■ential but slDce thi• woulc1 then be a one-■hot operation wa should eatabUeh an immediate blockade and then look toward invasion althoqh thia latter proapect did not enthuse blm He •tated that the decbion to invade woulcl be tbe hardest one to make because of long time involvement• and the lack of any nb•Utute for the Caatro regime Mr Bundy pointed out that the So'l'iet decbion mu•t have been made early in the aummer and that theH mint le• probably arrived in Cuba at about the Ume the PrHident wa# making bi• polic y statement•• Bundy thought tbre waa a real po ibility thu Khru•hchev may be confu•ed or mieled u to the temper o the American people and the intimate concern we all have over Cuba 5 The President pointed out that the miHilH certainly had to be remo' fed one way or another• and 11tated that ha would meet again at SEGIIEFJ 146 41 Continued •ix o'clocJr t h a t '1th hi• adviser■• m the ma lltime there wa• much m ormatiou to b9 gathered aDd much analyab to be done a a to pro• and c ona al all the va riou■ cou r ■u of action He au thoriud u many tJ'-2 4i hu u naad e-d to et full c ompl ete 100 - CO'Vn' K• of the i He aak d for a report on the latHt anal yd• of jut wha t the th1nldn1 toward Cuba i ■ n Laun Alnerican countriu a a well u NATO u to any action the U S might tak-9 some r e d qaea ions ou wlwther or not 1l0 ■urfac• tha fact that we '1 H maJdns 8 U'nilla nce 4i hu nd whether or not to au dace this JUW information abo whether to prec 111 1- any military action by aom e fonn of political pn■■lU'e action what would be the eUact of milita1'y ■trike■ how lona W0Uld it take to organize how many soniea would be required etc Reverse Blank 147 48 Cline femorandumfor zhe Record So1ifica1ion of SSC Officials of JnzeJ igence on fissile Bases in Cuba 27 Ocrober 1962 27 ecu ber l 962 SL3 icti icaticn of SC Officials Eases i ' C- ba Tntell ige 1ce O l 5 ss-1 l e 1 t a t 21 C•J c tee e e ti g of 25 Cctooer the Preside lt called e c i t e ' o e at a dr_- er pa ty- I ras d t tE 1di g at the a art ent of rs ·r·•a C le -- ult ricicll' of z e late C_ e at 4101 Cathedral avenue e said he had ea -d sto -ies that CIA officers lfere all egi cg that i n tel ligence on offensive rissile bases in Cclla had been available £or several lcys oefo -e it s called to the attention of the President Ee asked ie to con fi ' l t i a_t I vas responsible or the s i s of this kind of intcl 1 4 ence and appropriate dissemination of it to higher authorities and to tell hb the facts in the case 2 I told the President that I was responsible in Cll for substantive anal ysis of intelligence and the dissemination of current intelligence to the President and the lational Security Council I said I could state cate orical 1 y that the stories he had heard were untrue since I was sure the mission with the first photography of the URBU offensive bases was no on lli October and it took approximately 24 hours for the fil ll to be returned processed delivered to tile National Photographic Interpretation Center and scanned by PI analysts I said I was S1ll'e the technical analysis did not turn up the evidence until late afternoon or ear evening of 15 Cctober that I n yself heard of it first at that time and that ve Ca leted the analysis before passing me information f o to the ' Jlite ouse on t 10 morning of 16 October The President seemed content - - _th this ex lanation J In view of concern over this period of intelligence handling of this sensitive information I have tried to reconstruct Tihat I knavl' of t e events of the evening of 15 October and morning of 16 october as follows 4 Under direct orders frcci the President given to me and C-eneral Carle ' at e ·r ite Eo e seve weeks earlie - e the possibility that e es c - e 'e se s j e ras a lo ge ---r-- ge -irea I had issued - t cns to t e Y ector IC to see that i tel 1igeice on new afi'ensive 11'ea S ' a c c e e as so as s i s ' a ic e itilied the type o£ nea a - t ' a t a bso tely co di sse at c i t s i Irwelligence should e a C e 'lrit c t s pp -c7al en 15 Qctc' Je I spe rt all a 'ter oco at the 0 11 i---s sessic c t e C c re 21 t - S Ir t 2lli e e let CC S Cc iferen e 149 48 Continued When I returned to my office at 1730 I found a delegation of PI and military intelligence analysts awaiting me I do not know how· long they had been waiting to see me but it could not have been many minutes or they would have passed a inessage to me at the Conference Room They were all agreed that they had just identified a missile base for missiles of a range upwards of 350 miles I revie ved their evidence and w2 s obliged to concur 5 The DCI had gone to the ffest Coast and General Carter was then at an informal reception for the Colill omrealth conferees in the Executive Dining Room at the Headquarters building in 1 cLean I was the host but delayed my arrival until 181$ to study this intelligence Upon arrival I called General Carter aside and advised him in broad terms of the intelligence I said it vrould take several hours to v rap UP a definitive reoort with fully considered analysis General Carter s id-he was going to dinner with General Taylor and General Carroll DIA and m uld let them know I asked il he would notii'y rr cGeorge Bundy for the i'lhite House and he said he thought he might be at the dinner and would notify him there 6 About 2130 that even izig my intelligence officers checking out the evidence on the site reported somewhat CI'Y tically by phone that they had agreed on a report identifying offensive missile systems probably in ·the 700-mile and possibly in the 1 000-mile range I instructed them to canplete a written report and stand by for action early the next morning 7 A fevr minutes later I decided it was a mistake to wait until morning to alert the key officers at the White House and State Department s- _they oul d insure early attention to the problem on the next day I assumed General Carter would have alerted the Pentagon adequately via JCS and DIA but that he might have missed the White House Accordingly I called Ur llcGeorge Bundy found he had not seen General Carter and double-talked the information to him in broad terms He was ver-J clear as to the import despite being short on facts due to the problem of security over the phone This vras about 2200 I then called Roger ilsman of the State Department and conveyed the same information to him I had more difficulty indicating securely to him that I really meant llRBM' s rather than aircraft or other equipment we had anticipated but the lig li t finally dawned and he as he later informed me called the Secretary of State to pass on the word 8 Early the next morning 16 October at about 08 30 I talked again on the phone to x • aundy I forget Yihether he called me or vice versa I had by then reviewed a brief memorandum on the subject and calculated the ranges of possible missiles by then we had settled on 700 to llOO miles and crudely indicated them on a map At Ur Bundy1 s invitation I went immediately to his office having cleared this with General Carter Vlho had another engagement and instructed me to follow through on the Vaiite House formal notification Sid Graybeal my missiles expert from OSI accompanied me In Bundy 1 s office I told him the story He shortly h --- r• ·- - -' _ • - 150 48 Continued b -ou g ' tee tt o r- ey G 1eral 1Clcc al so brief'ed is im ti al ca r ent - ras c e four-letter lJ'O -d off tbe -eco -d f I r e - co - -ectl 7 Alex Jc o also ca e in to get tbe brie£ing At a rq -ate r 3 id r said that be i ad ar -a lged a i 11 CO eeting llitb the Preside lt to fill bi i 1 am co i sice r t - e rrs oli y prob e s i r7ol -ed At 0930 C ral Car- e r ar 1 ved I S 1c wed hb t ie ecorand ll'e hGli p -epared discussed the er dence and ac -' sed hi G a -' ea l co lc s- lp ort hi i f'UJ J y irith a iaqtical back-u I said I e1t t 'le l cti lg X I s ctld dl e t c- e brie 'i lg of e ' -esident iritn ' Clic± i ertl Ca r er ag -eed ti- at he coabq did not ieed e irith 11 licil he sa er-a t reluc t13 ag -eed and t l at sa ebod better get back to see th at the JCI tbe trest Coast got the rrord and ccnti lue research -a J'sis oz the c i issile pro 1eo - m all of 'llhich C enera1 Carver i ea -t agreed 9 I presU le General Carter did suri'ace the inforcation at llOO the DCI returned later that afternoon and a mirl lr i nd o£ intelligence reporting and policy for uulation on Guba set in frO i ffllich we have not yet recovered _lrJ J i RAY s ct nra Deputy Dir r Intelligence Reverse Blank 151 49 Richard Helms• femorandum for the Record fOSGOOSE Meeting ith the Attorney General 16 October 962 1'3i 3J liDJH ta T 3 F Ero -D SlilJECT MJ «OS3 Y i -etil g d th the A tt l 'I ey C'11le ral l At 2 30 this aft ooI tbe A ttorney C-e lera1 convened in hi o a eet mg on Operation K-O l lOOSB co uai st i ng of General Lansdale and Colmlel Patcbell General Johnso ' o the Joint Sta r Robert Hurwitch of State vi Ed ' art in 1o-ro a 5 tmable to attend Hewon Ryan o t USIA 8lld the undersigned r I 2 The Attorney General opened the meeting by expressing the ngeneral dissatisfaction of the President with Operation mlmOSE He pointed out that the Operation had been under or a year that the results lrel'e discouragjng that there had been no acts of sabotage and that even the one which had been att8 10ted bad tailed twice Be indicated that there had been noticeable bBprovment durmg the year in the collection of intelligence but that other aci ions bad failed to inf'lllence significantly the course of events in Cuba Be spoke of the weekl r meetings of top officials on this problem and ag dn noted the small accomplishments despite the act that Secretaries Rusk and McNamara General Taylor HcGeorge B-andy and he personal J r bad all been charged by the President with finding a a ilntion Be traced the history of General Lansdale I s personal appoin ent by the President a year ago • The Attorney General then stated that in view of this lack of progress he ms going to give Operation WNOOOSE more personal attention In order to do this be will bold a meeting every morning at 0930 in th the MO mOSE operational respresentatives from the various agencies Lansdale Harvey Hurwitch Ryan and General Johnson 3 The Attorney General spoke i'avorab y- of tbe sabotage paper wbich bad been presented by General Carter this morning to the meeting of the Special Group Augmented He obvi ous y- d1d not JjJce the eerlle r i iEDOrandl li i since he i'elt it sb -ed no 11pash0 in gett ing on vi th the act oi' sabotage 4 1 1 en asked for r y co a its I stated tr at we were prepared to get on 1o-it l t he new action progra md that ve 'WOt1l d a mcate it aggressively I poil ted out hoYeYer that the objective of Operation c e t at e point smce tbe Cobans K l E would have to be 153 49 Continued with whom we have to work were seeking a reason for risldllg their lives Ill these operations I retailed rrry- oonversatioll with the ' young CUban trom the DRE who po inted out that they were willing to oomlllit their people oru_y on operations which they regarded as sensible I defined 11sensibleu in Cuban tel'IDinology these days as meaning an action 1fhich would contribute to the lJberation of their country another way o say ing that the United States perhaps Ill conjWlction with other Latin countries wuld baU them out militari cy- point was speci ically echoed by Heweon R an The Attome r General• s rejoinder was a plea for new ideas of things tbat could be c bne against Cuba In paee mg he made rei'erenoe to the change in atmosphere in the United States Gove1 1llllent during the last twenty-four hours and asked some questions about tbe percentage of Cubans whom we thought would fight for the regime it the co'IIJltry were invaded 5 The meet ng concluded with the reattirmat ion by- the A ttorru y General of hi a desire to hold a meeting each day begimting tomor1'011 He said tba t these ll18etings might later be changed to ever y other day when and if he find a da L cy get-together is not necessar y The meetings are to last no more than one-half hour C I Richard HeJms Deputy Director Plans Distribution 1 Original - Mr Elder or the DCI and DDCI l cc - Chief T FW 1 co - DD P 154 SO Anhur C Lundahl Memorandum for Director of Central lnJel igence and Director Defense Intelligence Agency 'Additional Information-Mission 3101 16 October 1962 16 October 1962 D i- - I RANDOM FOR Director of Ce 11tral Intelligence Director Defense L11telligence Agency SUBJECT dditior al Infor ation - Mission 3101 1 An e cam Ln ation of photography i'ro i 1 filssion 3101 dated 14 October 1962 has revealed an MRBM Launch Site and two new military encampments located along the southern edge of the Sierra Del Rosario in west central Cuba • 2 The Launch Site and one or the encampments contains a total of at least 14 canvas-covered missile trailers measuring approx1 mately 67 feet in length and 9 feet in width The overall length of the trailers including the tow bar is approximately 80 feet 3 The other encampment contains vehicles and tents with no missile trailers observed in search to date 4 Detail and equipment for each area is as follows a • Area 1 - MRBM Launch Site located in a wooded area at 22-40-05N 83-l7-55W 4 0 NM ENE of Ban Diego de los Banos Site contains at least 8 canvas-covered missile trailers and 4 deployed probable missile erector launchers unrevetted The probable launch positions generally in-line are separated by approx1 mately 850 feet 700 feet and 450 feet for a total distance of 2000 feet The westernmost position has a missile tractor trailer aligned with the erector Other equipment includes 18 trailers vans approximately 60 miscellaneous vehicles 18 large tents 22 small tents 4 buildings under construction and open storage b Area 2 - Military Encampment miale located 5 8 NH north of os Palacios Eau in ent i lcluces at least 6 ca lvascovered J l issile tra iers appro ct ately 75 vehicles and 18 tents in a wooded area at 22-40-50N 83-15-00if c Area 3 - -' d li- -acy ca p ent lo catee in a a odarea at 22-42-40N 83-08-1511' 4 2 1rn West o San Cristobal Equi p ent i cludes 35 ve U c es 15 large ed 155 SO Continued tente 8 small tents 7 buildings possibly new and l bu11d1ng under construction Ci1- w-C Lw JJW ARTHUR C LUNDAHL Director National Ehotographic Interpr etation Center 156 SI McCone meeting schedule 17-23 October 1962 17 October 1962 - Wednesday 8 30 a m Meeting of study group DCI Secty Rusk Secty McNamara Gen Taylor Secty Gilpatric Mr McGeorge Bundy Amb Bohlen Amb Thompson Amb Acl ieson Secty Ball Mr Sorenson Mr Martin Mr J'ohnson 9 30 a m DCI met with the President 11 30 a m DCI went to Gettysburg - brief Gen Eisenhower 4 00 p m Meeting of study group 10 00 p m Meeting of study group 18 October 1962 - Thursday 10 45 a m Mr McGeorge Bundy 11 00 a m The President and others 4 00 p m Meeting at State Departm ent with study group 7 30 p m Meeting at State Departm ent with study group 9 00 p m Meeting at State Departm ent with study group 19 October 1962 - Friday 11 00 a m Meeting at State Departm ent with study group 4 00 p m Meeting at State Department with study group SECRET 157 51 Continued 20 October 1962 - Saturday 8 30 a m USIB Meeting 10 30 a m Meeting of study group 1 30 p m Meeting of study group 2 00 p m Meeting at White House 21 October 1962 - Sunday 8 30 a m USIB Meeting 9 00 a m Meeting with Gen Eisenhower 10 00 a · Meeting at White House 2 30 p m Special NSC Meeting 8 30 p m Brief the Vice President 22 October 1962 - Monday 8 30 a m 10 30 a m USIB Meeting Meeting with The President 3 00 p m NSC Meeting 5 00 p m Meeting with Congressional Leaders 23 October 1962 - Tuesday 10 00 a m Executive Committee of the NSC 1 30 p m Arthur Krock 2 00 p m Chairman Vinson 5 00 p m David Lawre ncta 2 30 p m Se nator Hickenlooper 6 00 p m Executive Co of the NSC 3 30 p m S e nator Russ ell 158 52 Mcumej Memorandum of Jfeeting allended in Secretary Hairs Conference Room al 0830 17 Ocrober I J J -- ---· ' -l SLcs -- - - •• - • - f -- - _-j- _ __ 4 Mmnorandwn of Meeting attended in Secretary Ball'• Conference Room by Secretary MeN n Bundy Genei-al Ta yloi- Robert Kennedy Manin a nd McCone o t •730 7 ' 9 - ' 1 Meet ui g involved an lnclullive exploi-a tion a alternative• open to ua in connection with the Cuba n matter Ball ■ een ed to eel m ilitary action would throw the NATO a llle ■ in di■a rray and permit Brit a in ancl France to 1epara te fro u a OD Berlin policy Stated Kohler dillcuHiona with Khnuihchev did not fit in with Soviet action in Cuba Sugge ■ t ed Cuban llitua tion might be b inadvertance Sugge•t ed we m ight give Khrushchev a n out on the gromd• that he doc• not know wha t ta going on in Cuba nd di1cu11sed varlau■ type ■ o action ranging ro n a limited m iliury ■ trike to minimize lo•••• to xz the calling of a Swnmit conference Z During the discusaion Tayloi- and Ball apeculated aa to whether this whole thing wa ■ not a mock up de1signed to draw out action by us and that the war heads were not there Thia vie1w was not ■upported 3· McNamara urged avoiding taking a position co11■ idering all altenia tivea with meetings this after11oon and this evening in preparation· of final di1cu1 ■ ion with the President tomorrow 4 Urged esploraUon of all facts and li11ted the following About 50 or 60 MIG 171 and 1911 now in Cuba and these apparently have no offen■ive capability One MIG Zl ha a been seen and a nUITtber of auspicious crates also seen indicating some MIG Zl capability and we do not know whether the MIG Zl ha a an offensive capability IL 28'• have been delivered Three MR BM sites under conatruction and can be ready in two weeks Warhead locatfoDB unknown also Ullknown whethe1r MRBM' ■ arl I nuclear or conv ntional Aho feels that if nuclear wa rh• • supplied them Soviet will alao 111 1pply nuclear bombs for bombers with offenaive a pability --- -· ·- a 159 c i a 52 Continued 28 Soviet •hips en route to Cuba at the preaent time Sited at Havana my1teriou• excavation• revetment covered building• railroad track• through tuDDela etc might be nuclear •torage eite Other facta ebould be developed today Note McCone rHponded by reading numbered paragraph• 2 3 and 4 of attached memorant um dated October 17th 5 General Taylor and Thompaon diaCU9Hd political nature of problem including poHibility of forcing eettlement in Berlin 11 d et ewhere Khruehehev wiehed •how down on Berlin and thl• sivee a ·ahow down iHue Believu Khrushchev would be aurpriaed to find we Jmow about MRBMlj j Thompeon empha Jiiled Khruahchev wants Bed lh settlement but on hi• terme And will probably deny knowledge of Cuban situation but at any event would · I juati y action• becauee o our mieeilH in Italy and Turkey Also Khruehchev recocuJ ••• that action by u'i would be deneive among our alli••· 6 McCone emphaeized hi• view• on political objective• a■ 1tated in paragraph 5 of the att caed memorandum am alao repeated paragraph Z-C Alao made the point in paragraph 6 7 McNamara dbcu••ed many operational question■ concerning the uae of Soviet nuclear warhead■ in Cuba how communication■ could be arr D1ed what authority wa• in the field Thompeon believe• Soviet nuclear warhead■ was under very tight control McCone reviswed recent Chicadee report■ indicated con1lderable automony in hands of field commander• much mo re ao than we have 8 Bundy and McCone left for meeting with the Pre ■ldent t6' · - - - - - · 10P - u J • • 160 53 JfcCone femorandum for Discussion Today October -_ 962 The Cuban Situation October 17 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR DISCUSSION TODAY OCTOBER 17 1962 SUBJECT The Cuban Situation I • The establishment of medium range strike ca 3-bility in Cuba by the Soviets was predicted by me in at least a dozen reports ainc e the Soviet buildup was noted in early August z Purposes a re to a Provide Cuba with an offensive or retaliatory power for use lf attacked b Enhance Soviet strike capability against the United States c Establish a hall mark of accomplishment by other Latin American countries nost particularly Mexico and other Central American countries within strike range of the United States 3 The MRBM capability we have witnessed will expand and the defensive establishments to protect this capability likewise will be expanded There appears to ne to be no other explanation for the extensive and elaborate air defense establishment 4 In my oputlon the missiles are Soviet they will re nain under Soviet operational control as do ours they will be equipped with nuclear warheads under Soviet control because conventional warheads would be absolutely ine fective Cubans will supply most of the ma npower needs with the Soviets permanently exercising operational command and control Nevertheless there will be a substantial number o Soviets on site at all ti es 161 53 Continued 5 Soviet political objectives appear to me to be a The eetablishrnent of a trading position to force removal of U S overseas bases«-0 · b To satisfy their ambitions in Latin America by this show of determination and courage against the American Imperialist 6 Consequences of action by the United States will be the inevitable •pilling o blood of Soviet military personnel This will increase tension everywhere and undoubtedly bring retaliation in t U S £ i tall ti h b ta tial U S ·m 7 The situation cannot be tolerated However the United States should not act witllout warning and thus be forced to live with a Pearl Ha rbor indictment for the indefinite future I would therefore a Notify Gromyko and Castro that we know all about this · b Give them Z4 hours to commence dismantling and removal of MRBMs coastal defense missiles surface to air missiles IL z Is and all other aircraft which have a dual defensive-offensive capability including MIG 21s c Notify the American public and the world of the situation created by the Soviets d If Khrushchev and Castro fail to act at once we should make a massive surprise strike at air fields MRBM sites and SAM sites concurrently John A McCone Director 162 54 McCone memorandum 17 October 1962 Oc tober 17• I 96l Several alternative a indic ted below were poaed for conaideration at the cloae of -neeting covered by nemorandmn ted October 7th · All de lt with the specific actions U S Covenuneut should u tltl• u e Tho diacuaaions centered d talt againff Cu ba a 'Nhether 1ilitary action ahould be taken prior to a warning to or diacusaiona with Khrushchev and Castro b Notification to or consultation with our allioe including NATO OAS and others c Referral to the United Nations d Effect on the bal nce of nuclear powor equation of the MRBM installations in Cuba Three principal couraea of action a re open to ua and of courae there are variations of each 1 Do nothing and live with the situation It was pointed out clearly that w·eatern Europe Greece Turkey and other countriea bad lived under the Soviet MR BMa for years therefore why ahould the United States be 10 concerned Z Reaort to an all-out blockade which would probably require a declaration of war and to be effective would m ean the interruption of all i n co - ling shipping Thia was di11cuned a■ a ■low atraniQI tion process but it wa a stated that intelligence ror----u indicated that • blockade would bring C ■tro down in four nontha • l • - • I have seen n - h ellti -nato Q EBRET fYCS ON ¥ 163 54 Continued U Military action which was coneidered t Hver l levela The following alternative• an a Straflni identl fied MRBM inetallationa b Straflni MR BM lnet llationa and air field• with MlCia c a ud b plo• ll SAM aitea and coaat l rniHil• d a b and c above plua all other •lpillcant military in ltallatiou · none of whi ch were identified DiacuHion• ol alt of th• above were lnconcluaive and it wa• aaked that the group reaeMrnble and develop their view• on the advantas•• alld diaadvantagoa and the Uec ta of the followlng 1 Warning to Khnaahchev and Caatro a If the reaponH ia unaatl■fa c tory pursuing a cour of military action b If the ruponae l■ unaada actory t'alerrln1 to the OAS and the United Nation• prior to taltin military ac Uon 2 Warning to Khruahc hev and Castro and if the rHp011H i• tu1 aatiafactory convenlna Congreaa aeekblg a daclaratlon of war and proceeding with an all out blockade 3 Strike aiilltarily with no 1 Y rning th• level o the military Uort being dependent upon evol ving clrcurn•t nc ea In all probability thia type of action would escalate lnto lnvaalon -- a -cup tion althouah the meeting wa• not agreed 011 thl• point 4 Blockade with no warnl ng and no advance notice auch a• a declaration of war with the P reeldent dependina upO existing C ongre ■■iou l re■olutlons for authority John A McCone Director £''ES QIJLV I J • 164 I 55 McCone memorandum Brief Discussion with the President-9 30 a m -17 October 1962 Brief Di■c unio11 with tha Pre ■ident - 9 30 a m - 17 October 1962 Cosiflrmed the ■itua tion' a ld esplored ponible actions McCone r erred to bat c ld not recommend wanwiga as outlined in paragraph 7 Tb u paragnph wa• not dl11cua ■ ed in the earlier meeting in Ball'• office Pre ■ ident seemed inclined to act promptly if at all without 'lln rJling targetting on MRBM's and po ■ -ibly airfields Stated Congre- ■ ion l Reaolution gave him all authority he needed and thi• _ confirmed by Bundy anc therefore seemed inclined to act Pre ■ident uked McCone to see Ebenhawer promptly J'OHN A cCONE Director 3AM Jl 1 cc - DDCI Reverse Blank 165 S6 McCone femorandumfor the File Conversalion -i1h General Eisenhou-er-Wednesday 17 October 1962 17 October l 962 -dEMOR 'IDUM FOR THE FILE SUBJECT Conversation with General Eisenhower - Wednesday 17 October 1962 At President Kennedy's request I called on General Eisenhower today at 12 00 o'clock Reviewed the Cuban developments President Kennedy had asked that I ca refully avoid indicating any particular line of action as none had been agreed upon and this was observed I briefed Eisenhower on all aspects of the recent Cuban-Soviet build-up and showed him the U-2 pictures of three MaBM missile sites under development Eisellllower expressed no particular surprise indicating that he felt this oiiensive build-up would probably occur He then expressed criticism of the Bay of Pigs failure and also the fact that we did not respond more energetically when Castro publicly embraced Co unism With respect ta the current situation Eisenhower felt that it would prove to be intole table that its purposes can not be clea rly defined and that• discussions adamant demands to either Khrushchev or Castro or both would be of no avail In discussing blockades he mentioned the difficulty of type of action we would take if and when a Soviet ship laden with military hardwa1 e and personnel is stopped on the high seas The question be raised as do I is What would we do with the ship then Eisenhower questioned lhn ited JD i Utary action as being indecisive irritating world opinion creating fear in all areas where the Soviets could retaliate with limited action and therefore would be irdae·s e nadv eo l He recalled that when President Truman ordered limited air support in the first two or t ee days of the Korean wa r he Eisenhower told the President that from a ilitary standpoint this would not work and mo1 e decisi -e action was required -s£DRf l -- - --- l- --• V - _ • 167 56 Continued Throughout the convel'sation Eisenhower seemed to lean toward but did not specifically l'ecommend military action which would cut off Havana and therefore take over the heart of the government He thought this might be done by airborne divisions but was not familial with the size of the Cuban forces in the immediate al ea nor the equipment Eisenhower seemed to feel that such a plan would be more decisive would mean less bloodshed could be accomplished more quickly than a landing and· a conventional type of slow invasion I told General Eisenhower that I did not expect a n answer but both the President and I wished him to be fully informed and that I would like to consult with him from time to time He a greed to be available personally or by telephone at any time JOHN A McCONE Directol - £YES ONLY 168 57 JcCone Memorandum for the File Jfemorandum of Meeting Wednesday October 17th at 8 30 a m and again at 4 00 p m 9 October 962 Octoher 19 1962 MEMORA J DUM FOR THE FILE Memorandwn of Meeting V 'ednesday October 17th at 8 30 a m and again at 4 00 p m attended by Rusk Ball each part of the time Martin Johnson McNamara Gilpatric Taylor McCone Bohlen Thompson Bundy Sorenson Dean Acheson for a short time • Note The 4 00 o'clod meeting adjourned at about 7 00 and reassembled at 10 00 p m in Secretary Ball's conference room adjourning at 11 45 p m _ cd Note At 9 30 a m DCI went to see the President then went to Gettysburg to see General Eisenhower The purpose of the discussion was to develop a pla 1 of action in connection with Cuba and the alternatives are sum marized in m y znemoranduzn of October 18th addressed to USIB copy of which is attached This memorandum will record views as they were expressed and developed throughout the meetings Am bassador Bohlen warned against any action against Cuba particularly an air strike without warning stating such would be divisive with all Alli es and subject us to criticism throughout the world He advocated writing both Khrushchev and Castro if their response was negative or unsatisfactory then we should plan action advise our principal allie s seek a two-thirds vote from the OAS and then act The Attorney General and Bohlen exchanged views as to just what type of an answer we could expect from Khrushchev and what he might do if we threatened an atta During this discussion Secretary Rusk seemed to favor a s king Congress for a de claration of a state of war against Cuba and then proceed with OAS NATO etc but always preserve lexibility as to the type of action Bohlen consistently warned th at world opinion would be against us if we carried out a military st -' e Secretary Ball emphasized the i portance of time stating that if action was over quic 1 ly the repercus sions would not be too serious I 11 ·c 'J c·· ·s 1 h _ • · __J Jo · J s• Jzj ss r r-4 to T s· ifut it D t t • 169 0 c - - - - - - - - - 57 Continued The Attorney General raised the question of the attitude of Turkey Italy Western European countries• all of which have been under the gun for years and would take the position that now that the U S has a few missiles in their backyard they become hysterical This point was discussed back and forth by various people throughout both days of discussion Secretary McNamara made the point that missiles in Cuba had no great military consequence because of the stalemate mentioned in my October 18th memorandum General Taylor supported this view in the early parts of the discussion but in the later meetings expressed increasing concern over the importance of the missile threat from Cuba Gilpatric supported McNamara's position McCone doubted it stating that McNamara's facts were not new as they had appeared in estunates months a go which McNamara questioned Nevertheless he and McCone felt that a complex of MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba would have very jmportant military significance McNamara took issue claining that the military equation would not be changed by the appearance of these missiles Bohlen and Thompson questioned the real purpose of the Soviet's actions in Cuba and seemed to feel that their acts may be in preparation for a confrontation with President Kennedy at which time they would seek to settle the entire subject of overseas bases as well as the Berlin question McCone indicated this might be one of several objectives and undoubtedly would be the subject of discussion at the tune of confrontation however McCone doubted that this was the prune purpose of such an elaborate and expensive installation as the Soviets were going forward with in Cuba Bohlen seemed to favor precipitating talks and was supported by Thompson SecDef and Taylor both objected to political talks because it would give tune for threatening missiles to become operational and also give the Soviets an opportunity to camouflage the missiles McCone presented most recent photographs and indicated CIA opinion that the first missiles will be operational wi1liln one or two weeks Bohlen again raised the question of opening up discussions McNamara agreed that a this would be desirable but ·· emphasized the ilnportance of developing sequence of events which would lead to military action - 2 - 170 51 Continued There followed an extensive discussion of the adv tages and disadvantages of a military blockade total or partial It was at this point that McNamara and Taylor presented t eir schedule of alternative military strikes copy of which is attached and which was the subject of continual discussion in the ensuing meetings Dean Acheson then expressed his views as follows We should proceed at once with the necessary ilitary ac ions and should do no talking The Soviets will react so ne place We must expect this take the consequences and manage the sit- iations as they evolve We should have no consultations with Khrushchev Castro or our allies but should fully alert our allies in the nest persuasive manner by high level people This would i clude all NATO partners and the OAS The Presidezit should forget a ou the elections and should cancel all future campaign speeches As an alternate to military action a plan was discussed involving a declaration of war and the creation of an all-out blockade Thompson spoke strongly in favor of a blockade General Taylor at this point indicated that he favored a blockade although in subsequent meetings he seen i ed inclined towards a military str- e MeCone gave an intelligence estimate on the effects of a blockade indicati i g its seriousness would depend upon how hard a blockade it turned out to be and finally stated that the main objective of ta lung Cuba awa y from Castro had been lost and we have been overly consu -ned with the mis sile problem McCone stated that we must all bear in mind that we have two objeotives one disposing of the missile sites and the other getting rid of Castro's communism in the Western Hemisphere The meeting adjourned for dinner and in the evening Secretary Rnsk came forward with the following plan The United States cannot accept operational Ms Cuba There is not much profit in preli ninary exchanges with Khrushchev and Castro because the President has said that the establish ent of - 3 - 171 51 Continued Soviet bases and offensive weapons in the Weste t n Hemisphere would raise sedous problems and therefore on September 5th and 13th the President has in effect warned both Khrushchev and Castro would result Rusk continued that more talks with Khrushchev in extended padays and therefore he recommended against such an approach Rusk then proposed that we hold until the middle of next week and then follow the OD course No 1 52 sorties against MRBMs Prior we inform key allies probably on Tuesday Macmillan de Gaulle Adenauer possibly the Turks and a few Latin American Presidents On Wednesday we strike with missiles and simultaneously send a message to Khrushchev NATO OAS etc We should be alert for an attack on Turkey and be prepared for the consequences in Berlin Quemoy Matsu Korea etc Rusk made the estimate that world opinion would go along 42 allies would go along and some neutrals would be favorable Latin Americans must be told that we are acting in the interests of the Western Hemisphere Rusk advocated that the first step -- we take out the missiles and thus remove the immediate problem of the establishment of an offensive capability but that we be prepat'ed for subsequent steps He emphasized the United States cannot accept missiles in out' security interests and in view of statements made by the President and others and our various policy declat'ations Bohlen continued to persist for diplomatic approach but Rusk and sevet'al others were not at this point persuaded McNamara raised innumerable questions concerning military operations the manner in which the strike could be properly covered with protective air and how it might be restricted and also the advisability of case one as contrasted with case one two and or three Both Ambassador Thompson and Sec i -etary Martin in discussing the Rusk proposal favored a blockade coupled with a declaration of war General Taylor at this point spoke in favor of a military strike taking out the MRBMs and the planes as well and was supported by McCone who took the opportunity to cover the points set forth in talking paper for principals October 17 1962 attached Also during the course of these meetings McCone reported to the group and later to the President the results of his discussions with General Eisenhower as covered in the attached memorandwn of October ·17th this subject - 4 - 172 S7 Cominued In addition to the attached papers State tabled during the day's meetings the following a Possible course of action undated in 14 pages b Possible world consequences in military action undated 5 pages c Political actions undated 4 pages d Political actions in support of major military action lundatedl 3 pages These were all referred to as State papers d t aft and some were revised the following day Also ate tabled the following papers Lil nited one-til ne strike against M M sites undated 6 pages Plan of blockade undated 4 pages Paper labeled Attack Three - Invasion 5 pages with an attached scenario of 4 pages Possible Soviet Reactions to the following alter 12 tives C E Bohlen October 17th Z pages Also proposed letter to Khrushchev was tabled paper dealing with probable Castro response to U S appeal and a proposed letter to Fidel Castro marked To Mr F C all included in State papers At the conclusion of the meetings which served the put pose of airing the views of all parties responsible for giving advice to the President the alteJ natives open to us were su mm arized by the Attorney General and are covered in my memorandum to USIB dated October 18th John A McCone Director J A ' i ji at - 5 ·-·- -· -- -SE8Rfl Reverse Blank 173 58 Alben D Whee on Memorandum or Chairman Cnited States Intelligence Board Evaluation of Offensi ·e Wissile Threat in Cuba 17 October 1962 · z R- N J v F · · L z- car l Si 3JECT 175 c a es Ic 2 58 Continued 11 ' i Hf lc- cnc-1· 111 • • qi 1 ' r l i ' · i• 1 ·n - 176 J' 1 and no misaites 58 Continued Gt C •• • rRONEARK there is rot-al-lr r i_ • Soviet inv ntor r of 6 -U to l 50 such missiles 'fh3re ba e 00 1 r rail ing iil'ings of the 630 nm missile since October 961 already thi $ - - -- l S r- -H· l irty 1020 nm mis ilcs have been launched f 62 Cc i3idcring these aspec s we b lieve the 630 Dm u t l prog am is rclati 1ely in c tive and that the more 5 T r i ·c 2rc na _ two confirmed MR BM 12 unch sites in y _ o f _ cys ps u - - 177 58 Continued of this unit 6 ' ' c ' a rc eiigl-t rpissHes and four lP unchers visible at the mo$t ad a• d Bite l an Diego de Los Banos It is probeible that i'i hl rn· s3ile11 will be deplt yed to each such site apparently fo1• a 'nfire ca pt1bHHJ1 The total for- e structure of n foui h sit t· Th b3 t nl' rcmt eatimate ia thaf at least 16 and possibly a J rmmr as 3 mi 3aileo w 11 be cperational in Cuba in 7 - 1 h ' es lminl cfoplo ed in Cuba ar field type li iuncher3 uMdl l •ly n m •bile t roc ion checkout and support equipm nt 1he f •ui-••in-litte deplll ymen1 of laun-s hera at sites which a · t hl' l Hs• l • s fi e nileo apart i1a reprcesontative oI MRBM e ' ·• ·''•l h - ving difficulty in distinguishing between t11e 630 ancl 10 O i m n tema 01 t ie h 11 sii of oite cbn racterisUcs 178 58 Cominued ait s in a a r it r n_f S 1 l n k J tr nsit tim ' The ponsibility i'l c· -ident on ' 10 - c nrl day and subst lial prograss is being oto ibl-2 p p- L-- s and ae-J- n ined ine rt l guiclanca the -5- 179 58 Continued U d £ the 30 nm iiss ile ia being deployed 12 Je would · • h - 1 icbn e Xava l's he 1020 nm mietile system and clays f' A J JB ERT D WI- E ELON Chair mun Guided M issile Ast -onautics In elli3ence Ccmmittee 180 59 Lundahl Memorandum for Director of Central lntellige11ce and Director Defense Intelligence Agency Additional Information- fission 3102 18 October 962 lfP I flllDf P al sm n r KftUGal Iatczatfa - XSUlffl 3Ul2 I Omtn1 r n 11 tpPM i r 2 JIIUI Dlll I aac2t l a ftlSSi'' Ua d we ia s at d liee HuUt1ft J I S _ l7 21 - llnazae • lAaQ 9 1 n I n ma - t d 7 2 s a - ul a an u ts da i w • a nat-t na au 1o 1 1a 1m W a a ea 2 • o ' ttcmi d Oc •W U la tlia i u U a l a l tG'JO aea fflfflft at 315 ••m c a t ' r i o r n llaaa' -60lQ'SO tN 1a a t JS4a o1 aa sr '19 1a SCU'toa e • lu ator '4 1211111 nw 1s 1D a eulJ' 111M l• • i aei 9'1 11 - ruce % alZk lit So I 19 loa W cl a- r es ai-31 u4 3 • 'he ze ' ll1IJ l eazQ s1W i M9 I bl1J e - lla4 st ens Jd uw SnUc«t ns a 1'G1a'Q d tJlt J a i l d -U a be1r ' 'W_t2 l _ an u uau sei t d -t111nnta -m• J 7 Wtfta 1 a l 1S W e i hDes ftol agrlif Q' at 29 lsl a 1962 diaic iaiUal c eutrcU 1114 llec- a 81te Jfo 111 a l 'u t Slta Jfo 2 tia - ' n1n UaliUto1 ba UaiCP 3lalt a tli ff cne4Glllua SAutoll na1 a UteSOl •Bm titel oeaW •2Hd$aalliap i 8 1 - ' e N A 1 a T U - - Ill 1asi1t bl cl tak OM tt tl'ca lES H1-a 3101 bl - ' 1M l Q 9ta ffc t c am •3l 01 3 laz'illt a ¥141111 • v 19 ca d b C u c s 181 59 Continued · 11w So a • u •st•• a _ x a1ett u a 11 UUa17 • J 1111 • _ _ _ ot U 1 2 Ptnltta tiia _ 1o • canm « 1-sar iw- __ tdaeit um tMhle U nut-uca • _ _ Sa• - JUa11N pas1Ded - • wnu a • •• ltv • '° 1-1 · la 3 - • a 11U1 '° e '-•1'1 10►t•i - - aail u loeataa' - ot - ett tJJa- ••aoaUa U d_ q _ lo_lNt ' 1 - u Dl lr i _ u •1-ena• a ••n• a u u u n t I Ola 111-1 l eu•s- __ ta-edt to·- 3' l1i- e 1aet1« _ 19 JO _ _ • __ • •'-• CDPftli«-tltlJ' _ U n a - Wldd•• at uaot --tll lD _ _ _ 111 i tees wt a 4Wftte 0 al AU it1Clllll M7 Jill1lilll - - - - tne - ··- • -- ' 'SAia 182 lkU4u 60 McCone Jfemorandumfor File 9 October 962 · __ MEMOR k ' 'DUY FOR FILE Early in the morning of October 18th Secretary McNamara called Mr McCo e at his residence expressing great concern over the reports ror 1 N C as a result of their examination of the two flights run on October Lundahl was at the house wit ls the enlargements which indicated that in addition to the three mobile MRBM sites detected on ilight October 14th there appeared to be now two IRBM sites with fixed launchers zeroed in on the Eastern United States McNamara felt that this cie elopment demanded more prompt and decisiv·e action _ - r -r _rr _£ t ti JZ 1 - 14 r _r •• • ' Tne group which h 3-_ - 'en meeting on Tuesday met in the Cabinet 0 Jc- 7 Room at 11 00 a m on Wednes iav with the President State tabled z - revisions in their papers on covering a limited Olle-time strike and blockade most of which are dated l 0 18 - 11 00 a m At the opening of the meeting McCone gave a brief resume of current intelligence and Lundahl presented the most recent photography resident questioned Lundahl further if the uninitiated could be persuaded that the photographs presented offensive - 1 RBM missiles ·Lundahl stated probably not and that we must have low-level photography or public consumption Secretary Rusk then stated that developments in the la 6t 24 hours had substantially changed his thinking He first questioned whether if it is necessary to move against Cuba and then concluded t 1-tat it was because Cuba can become ·a rmidable military threat He also referred to the President's recent public statements and indicated a feeling that if lo action was taken we would free the Soviets to act a ny place they wished and at their own will 11 lso Rusk stated the failure on our part to act would make our situation unmanageable elsewhere in the world He furthermore indicated that this wauld be an indication of wea ness which would have serious effect on our Allies Secretary pointed out to the President that action would involve risks We could expect counter action and the cost may be heavy The President must expect action in Berlill Korea and possibly against the United States itself Rusk felt a quick stri e would minimize the risk of counter ction He raised the question of solidarity o the Alliance and seemed to dia iss this question feeling that the Alliance would hold together Rus stated that if we enter upon positive action we can not say for su -e w 2 t t l-ie final Soviet respor se ''ill be and therefore what the final outco e will le However he felt that the American people wi_ll accept cla lger ar d sui ering ii they are convinced doing so is necessary and that they ha ·e a clear conscie lce The Secretary re -iewed the circumstances surrounding t e outbreak of World War I ' ' orld War II and the Korean war Tr ese actors rr ilit ated in favor of consulting with Khrushchev 183 60 Continued r- · l This ·· F f-Zt he -Ri' ·and depending on i is' Rio pa ct indicated 1ight have the possibility of prevention of action and settlement by political means The other course open was the declaration of war Rusk expressed himself in favor of leaning upon the Rio pact but does not dismiss the alternative of a unilateral declaration of war as the ultimate action we must take The alternate is a quick strike Ambassador Bohlen was not present but his views were expressed in a message which was read in which he strongly advocated diplomatic effort and stated that military action prior to this would be wrong He urged against action first and then decisive value of discussion He also stated that limited quick military action was an illusion and that any military action would rapidly escalate into an invasion McNamara at this point presented the alternatives referred to the previous day stating that alternatives one and two were not conclusive and that we would have to resort to alternative 3 and in fact this would lead us ultimately into an invasion General Taylor generally reviewed the situation stating that the Chiefs looked upon Cuba as a forward base of serious proportions that it cannot be taken out totally by air that the military operation would be sizeable nevertheless necessary Ambassador Thompson urged that any action be preceeded by a declaration of war he strongly advocated that we institute a blockade and not resort to military action unless and until it is determined that Castro and Khrushchev refuse to reverse their activities and actually remove the missiles which are now in place '· Secretary Dillon questioned what would be accomplished by talking to Khrushchev He pointed out that we would probably become engaged in discussions from which we could not extract ourselves and therefore our freedom of action would be frustrated Dillon was very ·positive that whatd ver action we take should be done without consultation with Khrushchev Rusk seemed to disagree indicating there was a possibility that Khrushchev might be persuaded to reduce his efforts but he admitt d also that he might step them up as a result of discussions president Kennedy was non committal however he seemed to continually raise questions of reactions· of our allies NATO South America public opinion and others Raised the question whether we ·should not move the missiles out of Turkey All readily agreed they were not' much use but a political question was involved Buridy thought this a good idea either under conditions of a strike or during a preliminary talk z f il i ' '' °l •- 184 I J 60 Continued McNamara diecuesed in some detail the effects of a strike indicating that we could expect several hundred Soviet citizens to be killed he pointed out that all of the Sa m sites wet-e manned exclusively by Soviets and a great many Soviet technicians were working on the MRBMs and at the air fields He agreed that we could move out o Turkey and Italy pointed out the political complications At this point McNamara seemed to be reconsidering his prior position of advocating military action and laid special emphasis on the fact that the price of Soviet retaliation whether in Berlin or elsewhere would be very high a d we would not be able to control it Secretary Ball throughout the conversation maintained the position that strike without warning was not acceptable and that we should not proceed without discussion with Khru shch·ev President Kennedy then said that he thought at some point Khrushchev would say that i£ we made a move against Cuba he would take Berlin McNamara surmised perhaps that was the price we must pay and perhaps we'd lose Berlin anyway There followed an exchange of view on the possibility of the Soviets ta king Berlin and our prospect of retaining it President Kennedy rather summed up the dilemma stating that action of a type contemplated would be opposed by the alliance - on the other hand lack of action will create disunity lack of confidence and disintegration of our several alliances and friendly relations with countries who have confidence in us AB a result of discussions of the price of a strike there followed a long discussion of the possibilities of a blockade the advantages of it and manner in which it would be carried out etc There seemed to be differences of opinion as to whether the bloc kade should be total or should only involve military equipment which would rnean blockading Soviet ships Alao there were continued references to blockading ships carrying offensive weapons and there seemed to be a differentiation in the minds of some in the policy of blockading o fensive weapons as contrasted ta blockading all weapons There followed discussion as to policies the President sbould follow with respect to calling Congress into session asking or a declaration of war advising the country and authorizing action Thompson continued to insist that we must communicate with Khrushchev There wae a discussion concerning the President's meeting with Ciromyko and the position he should take ahould the Cuban question come up The President was advised to draw Gromyko out and it was indicated he probably would receive a flat denial that there were any ofiensive weapons in Cuba 185 60 Continued Meeting adjourned with the President requesting that we organize into two groups One to study the advantages of what might be called a slow course of action which would involve a blockade to be followed by such further actions as appeared · necessary as the situation evolved Second would be referred to as a fast dynamic action which would involve the strike of substantial proportions with or without notice JOHN A McCONE Director JAM mfb 4· 186 61 Joinl Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba 18 October 1962 Excerpt fOP SECP FT JOINT EVALUATION OF SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA PREPARED BY Gvided Missile ond Astronavtics Intelligence Committee Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee National Photographic Interpretation Center 2100 HOURS 18 OCTOBER 1962 This report is bosc-d On reloti -ely COl 'JIPIHe photo t tcr• p - 1 - of U-2 pl o'°9 'Plr ode on U Octo 1962 KluiOft 3101 15 Octo ff 1962 Klulon• 3102 3103 v t' preli•llKl Y ond incompleie rec i x t of r affrog-t of ttl e sis U · 2 Mis simu Rown on 17 Octohe-r 1962 ore olso reflectit la 11 Js_ t PSALM TOP SECRH 187 ffiP SECl f r PS Uv CONCLUSIONS IN BRIEF Offensive Missiles l At least one Soviet regiment consisting of eight launchers anQ sixteen 1020-nm SS-4 medium range ballistic missiles is now deployed in western Cuba at two launch sites These sites presently contain unrevetted field-type launchers which rely on mobile erection checkout and support equipment These missiles are probably those r eported moving into this area during September Although there is continuing improvement of these sites these mobile missiles must be considered operational now and could be launched within 18 hours after the decision to launch A r etire from each launcher could be accomplished within 5 hours after the initial firing 2 Fixed soft sites which could achieve initial operational capability during December 1962 are now being developed near Havana We believe that the 2200-nm SS-5 intermediate range ballistic missile is probably intended for these sites Photographyofthesesites show eight fixed launch pads under construction which probably equate to an additional missile regiment with eight ready missiles and eight for refire 3 All of these offensive missile systems are Soviet manned and controlled We believe that offensive action by these s ystems would be commanded from the Soviet Union but have not yet found the command and control communication links Nuclear Warheads for Offensive Missiles 4 There is no positive evidence of the presence of nuclear warheads in Cuba nor have weapons storage facilities of the standard highly secure Soviet type been identified However there are seven large Cuban - l - PSALM 188 61 Continued PSi Li -1 munitions' storage areas south of Havana which could be converted to Soviet needs in a relatively short time Temporary storage could be provided in ships or field sites which might not be identified 5 Nevertheless one must assume that nuclear warheads could now be available in Cuba to support the offensive missile capability as it becomes operational The warheads expected for these missiles weigh approximately 3 000 pounds and have yields in the 1ow megaton range Coastal Defense Missiles 6 Three coastal defense missile sites have now been identified in Cuba two of which must now be considered operational Banes and Santa Cruz del Norte In an alert status these cruise missiles can be fired in about 10 minutes with subsequent firings from each launcher at S minute intervals Air Defense Missiles 7 There are now 22 surface-to-air missiles SA-2 sites located in Cuba nine ofwhicharebelievedtobeindividually operational at the present time The remaining SA-2sitescouldbeoperation_ in two to three weeks Each site contains six missiles with six additional missiles in an adjacent hold area The initial firing can take place anytime after an alert providing the site has reached readiness Refire from a single launcher will take approximately 3 to S minutes - 2 - PSAL 1 FeP SECRf 189 61 Continued - EJ SECRF r I IRONBARK l'S ' t 1 l Force Levels 9 There are now at least sixteen 1020-nm Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba which are in such a state of readiness that they could be fired within 18 hours of a decision to launch It is likely that o ther installations now being examined in photography will raise the number to 32 all of which could be ready in the next week Furthermore 8 launchers with sixteen 2200-nm missiles will probably be operational in Cuba during December 1962 We must emphasize that this is the visible threat and that additional missiles may be discovered as additional photography is analyzed Support and Supply 10 Offensive missiles systems are being introduced into Cuba primarily through the Port of Mariel Possible central missile checkout storage and repair bases have been tentatively located at Soroa near the western deployment sites and at Managua southofHavana It is significant that all three of the Soviet missiles now being deployed in Cuba SS-4 SS-5 SA-2 probably use red fuming nitric acid as an oxidizer so that a common propellant supply and storage could be used Significance 11 The magnitude of the total Soviet missile force being deployed_ indicates that the USSR intends to develop Cuba into a prime strategic base rather than as a token show of strength 12 A mixed force of 1020 and 2200-nm missiles would give the USSR a significant strategic strike capability against almost all targets in the U S see map By deploying stockpiled shorter range ballistic missiles at overseas bases against which we have no BMEWS warning capability the - 3- TOP SECRl l PSALM 190 61 ConzinuedJ PSAl v --- i C S S K Soviet l inion will supplement its lCBM home force in a significant way This overseas str ategic force is protected by an extensive S -2 deployme nt in Cuba 13 This same offensive force also posesa common threat to the U S and a large portion of Latin America for the first time 14 TheUSSRismakingamajor military investment in Cuba with some of their most effective guided missile s ystems The planning for this operation must have started at least one year ago and put into motion last spring ADDfu'- DUM Two additional launch sites have just been found north of Santa Clara Mission 3107 Neither sitewaspresenton5 September 1962 Analysis is still underway only preliminary views can be express ed One site is similar to the fixed soft site described in paragraph 2 This site is in a more advanced state of readiness and could have the essential features for an _operational capability within one month The othe r site is similar to the field-type installation described in paragraph 1 These new s ites are not included in the numbers appearing elsewhere in this paper PSALM TOP SECRET Re ·erse Blank 191 62 lfcCone Jfemorandum to USIB J fembers 19 October 1962 October 1 9 1962 MEMORANDUM TO USTB MEMBERS A discussion among the principals on October 18th indicated a probable decision i any action 1 s taken·against Cuba _ to initiate a limited blockade designed to prevent th·e importation into· Cuba of acditional arms To do this the United States would nake such state ments concerning a condition of war as is necessary to meet the legal requirements of such a blockade but a formal declaration of war against Cuba would be avoided if possible a ad resorted to only if absolutely necessary The blockade could be exfended at our discretion to include POL and possibly a total' blockade· if Castro persisted in the offensive build-up Continued surveillance would go orward so that we would know of the siutation within Cuba as it evo ved The blockade would start pos11i1 ly· on Monday following a public announcement by the President which would include a display photographic intdligence persuasive notification to our Allies among the Soviets and the Cubans ·but with no prior consultations with our Allies or any Latin Americans unless it proved necessary for legal reasons to assemble the OAS and secure the necessary approval to invoke the Rio Pact · · o More extreme steps such as limited air strike comprehensive air strike or military invasion would be withheld awaiting developments The possibility of more extreme actions has not been dismissed however initiating such actions was considered unwise 193 62 Continued r Th · argument in favor of the blockade was principally that it initiated a positive action which could be intensified at our will or could be relaxed depencling upon evolving circumstances Soviet reactions are expectcc to be cievere and very probably involve a blockade of Berlin ancl a widespread propaga rl_a effort however it was considered that w- could have some control over the extent of Soviet reaction and in the event of a confrontation would be negotiating from a position of pc siti ·e action which would be inl E1nsi ied at our own direction ' The obvious disadvantages are the protracted nature of the operation the difficulties of sustaining our position in world opinion because of our own complex of foreign bases and our deployment of offensive m1ssil -s and nuclear weapons and inally th€ action does not reverse the present trend of building an' offen ive capability within Cuba nor does it dispose of the existing missiles planes and nuclear weapons if th • latter now exist there ' · un Positive military action initiated now appeared desirable because oi the impact of current and future world opini n the spectacle of a powerful nation attacking by surprise attack a weak and insignificant neighbor enga ement by the Umted State$ i-d a 1 eurpr'ise attack thus giving licens ' to others to c lo the B '-me th e i ndefE ndabie po_sition we would be in with our allies and finally the p'rice'to us of extreme actions of which the Soviets appear capable'of executing 0 • ·'I •• • The al ov« course of action is by no meljlne·urianimous The opinions range from doing nothing on the one h and to immediate military action on the oth -r There e xist differences of _opinion as _to· the handling of Khrushchev Castro NATO the OAS an Latin American states and finally a question of the declaration or war await legal opinion also c ifferences exist concennng the intensity the blockade with some 1 advocating a mere comprehensive bfockade 'whi ch would include POL at the very start ' of ··' ' ' l would I ike guidance from USIB members for my use ·in further discussions which are to take place commencing ·at 11 00 a m O c tober l' th and will probably continue threughout the ' 'eek _end I '' •John A McCone ' TIP SECl J 194 64 Special Vational Intelligence Estimate I 1-18-62 Soviet Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action on Cuba 19 October 1962 Excerpt PSAIM CENTRAL IBTELLICERCE AGERCY 19 Cctcl er 1562 SUBJECr SNIE ll-1 8-62 SevlR r RBACTICN TO Zu'AIIl ts CQ i ' IBFS CF t L crl CT CuI3A TE3 FBCBIZM To estt ate prcbable Soviet ree ctiOI S to cer ail l US CC - S of acticn Vi th reSpP ct to Cuba 1 A t ajor Soviet objective 1n t1 e1r mlitary bui ldup in Cuba 1s to deconstrate th at tbe vorld balaDce o£ forces bas shifted so far in tbeir favor that tl e U3 can llO l cJl6er prevent tbe advaDce o£ Soviet o£fensive pc er even illto its C Il l e 1si ere In tbi s ccc ectico they essut e at ccurse tl at se deploy ient s scorer or later vi ll eeccoe p lbliczy c - m GrtC J l Excl ded free eutCQltic dc- n gre e d declessificaticn 197 64 Continued PSALM 2 It is possible that the USSR is installing these missiles primari in order to use them in bargaining for us concessions elsewhere We think this unlikely however The public withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba vou1d create serio1 1s i oblems in the USSR's relations with Castro it would cast doubt on the f'irmness of the Soviet intention to prote t the Castro regime and perhaps on their commitments elsewhere 3 If the US accepts the strategic missile b' rl ldup in Cuba the Sov l ets would continue the bu ild Up of' strategic weapons in Cuba We have no basis for e stimating the force level which they vould wish to reach but it seems clear already that they intellll to go beyood a token capability m1 s il e f'o- - $ n C ibe to '1 Bke They vould probably expect their Sl l e strategic capability vis-a-vis the ontr1but on to their total us We consider in AI mex B the possible effects of a missile bull du in Cuba UJ OD the overall re- lationship of strategic military power 4 US acceptance of the strategic missile buildup wouJ d pro- vide strong encouragement to Commum sts pro-Commun sts and the more anti-American sectors of opinion in Latin America snd elsewhere Conversezy anti-Communists and those who relate their own interests - 2 - ' T-0-P w yq- y -E-C-R-E-T ' PSALM i t· ·' '1te -S' J 198 64 1Con1inued to tl ese cf tl e t s vcu ld be stro gly discca-e ged It see s clear tb st esp cially er er tl e lcng r m there vculd l e a less cf confidei ce in t s c--er eI d c eterr-' a-t icn aoci a sericus declll e of IB iIIfl ce ge -4 r J T CF W PrniG 5 If tt e t cc lf'rccts Ehrus'hcl ev vith its kno rledc -e of tl e - deploycent a d eases f a v ltl drawal lo-e do Soviets vould halt t C e loyn ent In r ee d tiiey c ot believe tbe VO Jld propose c egotiations on the general question of foreign bases claimi Dg equal right to establish Soviet b5ses and assuril lg the US of ti£ht cont rol over the missiles They vould probably llilk Cuba vith the Berlin situation and en p lasize their patience and preference fo Ilegot1ations i m p that Ber vas held hostage to US actions 1n Cuba 6 r e 1s soire slight cllence that a varn i ng to Castro C gbt ake a di f'ferer ce si I ce the Soviets could regard this as a chance to ste i d as1 de but it also vCllld give tice for offers to negot ate cc t t l ed hu i up e d c 4 -essures t e erd _ oul d be tl e sa ie - 3 - 199 ■-e tbh•k tl e resul t in 64 Continued PSAI M 7 Any warniDg ould of' course degrade the eletcent ot sur- prise in a subsequent US attack EFFECT OF BLCCKADE 8 Wbile the effectiveness ot Castro's military machine might be impaired by a total US blockade Castro would be certain to tighten internal security and would take ruthless action against any atte1I1 Pts at revolt There is no reason to believe that a blockade of itse1£ would brlng down the Castro regime The Soviets would almost certainly exert strong dlrect pressures elsewhere to end the blockade The attitudes of other states toward a blockade action are not considered in this pspera It is obvious that tbe lo-v1 ets w mld h i 1vD · cxpl it all adverse reactions sovmr llEACrION TO USE OF MIUTARY FORcJl 9• If the US takes direct milita cy- action against CUba the Soviets would be 1 laced automat l cally under great pressure to res pond in ways 1 bicb 1 t' they could not save Cuba would inflict Y For a further cement on differences between reaction to a blockade and to US measures of force against Cuba see Annex A - 4 - PSALM 200 64 Continued an c fsetti lg izj'ury to i lte ests tee e cticn 'k-as -I-tad This · 1cul c 't e tri e vl etter to en e 'fc rt to rei tre llze tl e strategic t i ssiles er t ese clssiles plus e irfielc s surf'ace-tc-air trl ssile sites er cruise clssile sites er in feet en outright i Ir asicn d e s to destroy tl e Castro regi e In reacticn to 10 any cf tl e ve rl cus fc- _s cf US ec cn the Soviets cuJ d 't e e le r ed ru d e gi tatec sil ce t ey l e -a to date esti e ted tl at the l 'S •■-cul d r ot take ctlita -y actico in tl e fece of Soviet ercll gs cf tl e d e Ilge - cf ll lear - ar 'Il ey vcul d reccgDlle that US cllitary ecticn posed a i ajor challe to tl e prestige cf tl e USSR We z ust cf ccurse reccgoize t t e possibility tl e t the' Sovi ts uci er pressure to respom voul d again cls lculate e i d respcr l in a - ·e y hicb thrcugb a se riea of actions and ren tio i could escalate to general war ll 0 1 the other band the SoViets have no public treaty rlth CUba and have not ackncvledged that Sov et bases are on tl e isle Di This situation provides them rlth e pretext for treatiDg US t 1lltary actict1 agai st Ccl a as an effeir 1Jh ch does i ot directly 1 rr ol - e t e erd tl ereby avcid u g tte risks 'i e c o or a strc g respc se believe t st tbe lESR • cul a ette ck tl e t'S eitc er fr - 5 - 201 64 Continued PSALM SOViet bases or with its missiles in Cuba even if the latter were operational and not put out or action before they could be readied tor firing 12 Sitlce t'be USSR would not dare to resort to general var aJ 1d could not hope to pnr ail locallyI the Soviets would almost certainly consider retaliatory actions outside Cm a Tl le timing aild selection of such moves would depend heavily t 'l on the ima ediate context of events and the tJSSR's appreciation of US attitudes T le most likel Y location for broad retal t e tion Cl' tstde Ma appears to be Berlin They might react here with major harassments inter- ruptiollS ot access to the city or even a olockade with or ithout the signing ot a sel al 'ate eace treaty 13 We believe that vhatever course or retaliation the USSR e cted the Soviet leaders 'li'Ould not deliberately im tiate general war or take military measures which in their calculation would run the gravest risks of genera war - 6 - PSALM 202 6S Joint £ a uation of Soviet fissile Threat in Cuba 19 October 962 Excerpt JOINT EVALUATION OF SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA PREPARED BY Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee National Photographic Interpretation Center 2000 HOURS 19 OCTEBER 1962 This rr ort is ' csed Oft telcfr ely coo lcte pMto tnre - prere1ion of U·2 pho 7 e on 1 C Ocl'OXr 1962 Niu iQn 3101 5 Ore 1962 Missie • 3102 3103 17 Ooto 1952 Miuio • 3104 3105 3106 31C9 and port of 3107 o 3108 f'S1 I I 203 65 Continued U l I t- U I 1 t least one Sovi _ t regiment of 1020-nm lSS- 4 lllL'dium 1-ange ballistic missiles is now deployed in western Cuba at two launch sites near San Cristobal Each of these site_s presently contains eight missiles and four unrevetted field-type launchers which rely on mobile erection checkout and support equipment These missiles are probably those reported moving into this area during September Although there is continuing improvement of these sites this regiment must be considered operational now The presence of eight missiles at each site indicates a refire capability from each of the four launchers Refire could be accomplished in 4 to 6 hours after the initial firing A third facility in this area previously identified as Launch Site 3 could be either a technical support area for this regiment or a third launch site however the early stage of development precludes a positive identification of this activity 2 An additional regiment of Soviet 1020-nm tSS-4 missiles is now deployed at two sites east of Havana in the Sagua La Grande area nine miles apart These sites closely resemble the sites at San Cristobal but appear to be more permanent in nature Terrain features have dictated considerable clearing and grading for deployment of the system Also there are permanent structures at the launch pad areas which are not found at the San Cristobal sites There are four launch positions at each site and we estimate an operational capability for each site within one week The sizes of the missiles associated equipment and buildings found at the San Cristobal and Sagua La Grande sites are almost identical and are compatible with the 1020-nm MRBM system 3 Two fixed sites are under construction in the Guanajay area near Havana Four launchers two blockhouses and underground propellant storage are being built at each site We believe that the 2200-nm SS-5 See Figures 1-9 - 1- 204 65 Continued 1-0P IRB 1 is probably imended fa ' these sites because tl ey closely resemble Soviet sites belie• -ed rn be associated wici tesclng and deployment of this missile system Site 1 is cons dered w be in a mid- co late-stage of construction and should be operational within s x weeks S ce 2 is in an earlier stage of const 'uccion and couid be operational between 15 and 30 December 1%2 There are no missiles or support equipment detectable within the Guanajay Area at the present time Command and Control 4 All of the offensi ·e missile systems in Cuba are Soviet manned and controlled We belie ·e that offensive action by these systems would be commanded from the Soviet Cnion but have not yet identified the communication link Nuclear Warheads for Offensive Missiles 5 'e believe that a nuclear warhead storage site is under construction adjacent to the most complete of the fixed missile laurich sites near Guanajay see Figure 6 This sice could become operational at about the same time as the associated Launch Site l Construction of similar facilities has not yet been identified at other sites 6 An especially secure port facility locatedat Punta Gerardo may be used for nuclear weapons offloading see Figure 10 7 There is still no evidence of currently operational nuclear scorage facilities in Cuba Nevertheless one muse assume that nuclear weapons could now be in Cuba to support the operational missile capability as it becomes available 8 Tne 1020-nm missiles would probably be equipped with nuclear wa -heads yieldLTJg 2 to 3 megatons TI e 2200-nm IRBMs could have 3- to - 2 - 205 65 Continued IRONBARK Ei-megaton warht ads if our planning estimate for the payload weight is correct Offensive Force Levels 9 We believe that there are now at least two regiments equipped with 1020-nm MRBM's in Cuba Oneislocatedin the San Cristobal area and the other in the Sagua La Grande area In addition we believe a regiment equipped with 2200-nm lRBM's is being deployed to the Guanajay area When operational present MRBM and IRBM units will have an aggregate total of 24 launchers An estimated schedule of site activation is presented in Table 1 Each launcher will have a refire capability A summary of the MRBM and IRBM threat including the projected number of operational ready missiles for each site is presented in Table 2 The corresponding nuclear yield deliverable from each site is shown in Table 3 The technical characteristics of the two offensive missile weapons systems are summarized in Table 4 Support and Supply 10 Offensive missile systems are being introduced into Cuba probably through the Port of Mariel A new Soviet ship the Poltava possibly designed as a ballistic missile transport has been noted making frequent trips between the USSR and Cuba This ship has made two trips to Cuba since 17 July and is next estimated to arrive in Cuba on or about 2 November 1962 See Figures 11 and 12 11 Possible central missile checkout storage and repair bases have been located at Soroa between the two estern deployment areas and at Managua south f Havana - 3- PSALM 206 65 Omrittued 12 It is sigr ficam that three of the So• iet missiles now being deployed ir Cuba SS-4 SS-5 SA-2 probably use red fuming n tric acid as the oxidize permin ng exploitation of a common system for propellant suppl ' and smrage Coastal Defense Missiles 13 Three coastal defense missile sites have now been identified in Cuba two of which must now be considered operational Banes and Santa Cruz del Norte These cruise missiles have a range of 35 co 40 miles and are probably derived fro the AS-1 They can be fired in about 10 minutes in an alert status with subsequent firings from each launcher at 5 minute intervals Air Defense Missiles 14 There are now 26 surface-to-air missile SA-2 sites located in Cuba two of which appear to be alternate sites See Figure 13 Of these 16 are ·believed to be individually operational at the present time The remaining SA-2 sites could be operational in two to three weeks The list of sites considered to be ope rational is presented in Table 5 15 Such SA-2 sites provide for six launchers with missiles and an additional six missiles in an adjacent hold area The initial firing can take place anytime after an alert providing the site has reached readiness status Reload and refire from a single launcher will ta e approximately 3 to 5 minutes I a •· 207 65 Continued T-0P IRONBARK ·1 actical l 1issilc s l 7 The re arc scver il rC'fugee reports indicating the pr scnce of rnccical FROG missiles in Cuba although there is no photographic confirmation rhus far Significance 18 The magnitude of the total Soviet missile force being deployed indicates that the USSR intends to develop Cuba into a prime strategic base rather than as a token show of strength Some of the deployment characteristics include permanent elements which suggests that provision is being made for Soviet presence of long duration 19 The rate of deployment to date as well as the speed and variety of construction indicates that the Soviet military build up in Cuba is being carried out on an urgent basis This build-up has proceeded by deploying defensive weapons first followed by deployment of offensive weapons The pattern of missile deployment appears calculated co achieve quick operational status and then to complete site construction 20 A mixed force of 1020- and 2200-nm missiles would give the USSR a significant strategic strike capability against almost all targets in the U S see Figure 2 By deploying stockpiled MRBM 'lRBMs at overseas bases the Soviet Union will supplement its ICBM home force in a significant way 21 This same offensive force also poses a common threat to the U S and a large portion of Latin America for the first time 22 The USSR is making a major military investment in Cuba with some of their most effective guided missile systems The planning for this operation must have started at least one year ago and the operation itself begun last spring - 5 - rer PSALM 208 66 Lundahl femorandum for Direc1or of Cemral nrelligence and Director Defense In1el igence Agency 'Additional In orma1ion- fission 3107 9 Ocrober 1962 imlOUm 10ll U i t Cectn l I i w l l l Ol ft t or eet ue I iteJ u - Auml 1 l • --- ·- ·--·· ·- · ·h - · -- '- Reverse Blank 209 61 Special Sational Intelligence Estimate 11-19-62 fajor umsequences of Certain S Courses of Action on Cuba 20 October 962 - PSAL ' CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 20 October 1962 SUBJ3Cl' SNIE 11-19-62 Y AJCR CO lmiCES CF CZ l'Aili US C00 15 S CF ACTIOH Cll CUBA TEE FROBLEM To estimate the major consequences of certain US courses of action rlth respect to Cuba THE ESTIMATE srATUS CF SOVIET MILITARY BUIIDUP Di CUBA 1 Fino evidence 1Diicates tbe presence in Cuba of four ✓ IBM azid --- -- - - --- t-■o IRBM launch sites in various stages of con struction aild organized into at least three regiments Of these tvo regimei ilis·ofeight launchers each are mobile and designed to launch MlBMs vitb a range of ··----------- about 1 _ m vhil e one regicent of eight fixed laUD F 2 lY desig ed for raa v s Vi th a range of about 2 200 n c GRCUP 1 ' l Q P 8 3 - - - T xclu ed frc a1 - ti' c-- -ng -ading a i declassification PSill 211 67 Continued PSAI M -E-T 2 The 16 launchers for 1 100 n m MRBMs must be considered opera- tio • _ __ ' '-probably Four of the fixed la he _ - or the 2 200 n m IRBMs could _o rat_ l Q I¥ 1 l nthin_ le next would become operational in 8 to 10 weeks _s_i weeks The other four We have no direct evidence that nuclear weapons are now present in Cuba and it is unlikely that we would be able to obtain such evidence However the construction of at least one probable nuclear storage facility is a strong indication of the Soviet intent to provide nuclear warheads In any case it is prudent to assume that when the missiles are otherwise operational nuclear warheads will be available These could be brought in by air submarine or surface ship 3 We estimate that operational MRBM missiles can be fired in eight hours or less after a decision to l auiicli - · n dition of readiness ------------•·------··--- -------·• ' ---· After the IRBM sites are completed and' Dissiles are on launcher a state of readiness of five hours may be maintained Both systems are believed to be provided with two missiles per launcher providing a refire capability from each launcher after about four to six additional hours for the MRBMs and six to eight hours for the IRBMs 4 It is possible that further evidence will uncover additional launch sites which are presently undetected but the extent of our coverage leads us to believe that such evidence would not drastically - 2 - PSALM 212 67 Continued PSAL i11C -ease the total lllY deployed en tbe otter ha oi ne c eplo-_r- ents could be started at 8JIY tii e 5 Cl u a 'Ibe inventory ot otb- --r cajor Soviet veapon s ncu identified in includes I a 22 IL-28 jet light bcciiers o vhich Cl le is asse bled am three others ha7e been uncrated b 39 MIG-21 jet fighters of vhich 35 are assez bled eild four - ---- are still crates allri 62 other Jet fighters of less advanced types c 24 SA-2 sites of vhich 16 are believed to be in11vidually operatio cal Yith some missiles on launcher s s i l e sites for coastal defense of vhich 2 are now operational ---12 Komr e cruise missile patrol boats all probably opera- ---- tio cal or nearly so 6 CUban-based MRBMs and IRBMs with nuclear varheads vould aug nent the present limited Soviet ICBM capability by Virtue of their ability to strike at similar types of targets vith varheads of generally similar yields In the near future therefore Soviet gross capabilities for lnitial attack on US t 1 lltary alld civilian targets can be increased ccusiderably b Cub l-basec t d ssiles Eo■-ever the deplej- ellt of t ese t issHes in Cuba · ·1 ll p cbably not in the So-net judg etrt insure des'trt 'Ctio i o ' the U3 secoi d st _' 1 ke capability to a degree • hl ch vould - 3 - • s r s • e - a T 213 §M##4fi¥1M SAL 67 Continued PSALM eliminate an unacceptably heavy retaliatory attack on the USSR It the missile buildup in Cuba continues the Soviet capability to blUllt a retaliatory attack will be progressively enhanced PURPOOE OF SOVIE ' BUILDUP 7 A major soviet objective in their military buil dup in CUba is to demonstrate that the world balance of forces has shifted so far in their favor that the us can no l onger prevent the advance of Soviet of- - fensive power even into its own hemisphere In this connection they assume of course that these deployments sooner or later will become publicly known At the same time they expect their missile forces in _________ --·· ·- -- Cuba to make an important contribution their - -to - total strategic capability vis-a-vis the us 8 Consequently it is unlikely that the USSR is installing these lllissiles primarily in order to use them in bargaining for US concessions elsewhere Moreover the public withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba would create serious problems in the USSR's relations vi th Castro it vould cast doubt on the firmness of the Soviet intention to protect the Castro regime and perhaps on their commitments elsewhere - 4- 9 P 8 rl 9 R E-T 214 PSALM 67 Continued PSALM US A UI SCRliCB Di TE BUIIDUP 9 I1' tbe US acquiesces to the presence of strategic cissiles in Cuba -e believe tbat the Soviets vill conturue the buildup le bave no basis for esticatill8 the force leve1 vbich tbey vould Yisb to reach but it seecs entirely c1ear no that they are g01D8 ell beyODi a taken capibility 10 This com-se of US action voul d prOVide stroog eJ lCcuragecient to C X Illllilists pro-COl lllUl'l ists and the more anti- American sectors of opinion in Iatin America We believe that especial 1 y over the long run there voul d be loss of coDfidence ill US pmrer and determillation and a serious declitie of US inf'luence particUlarly in Iatin Al lerica Sboul d aD Y add1 - t1onal Iatin American government fall to tbe Communists the Soviets voul d feel free to establish bases in the country in question if' they chose A major immediate consequence voulJi be that the Soviets voul d probably estimate l011er risks in pressing the US bard in other confrot tions such as Berlin EFFECT CF 'WARNING 11 I1' tbe US conf'ronts Khrusbcbev Vitb its kl1011ledge of the MIBM deployment a ld presses for a v 1 thdraval ve do not believe tbe Soviets · rould halt tee deplo ent Instead tbey · -culd propose negotiations on tl e general question of foreign bases da c ng eql ll right to establish Soviet bases em as ing the IB of tight control o er the cissiles - 5 - C 5- C-R-3-T 215 PSAL 67 Continued lll- 9 F 5-E-C-R-E-' £ - - They would probably link Cuba with the Berlin situation and emphasize their patience and preference for negotiations implying that Berlin was held hostage to US actions in Cuba l2 There is some slight chance that a warning to Castro might make a difference since the Soviets could regard this as a chance to stand aside but it also would give time for offers to negotiate continued buildup and counterpressures and we think the result in the end would be the same 13 Any warning would of cours degrade the element of surprise in a subsequent US attack • A US BLOCKADE 14 Two basic modes of blockade could be considered total and selective We believe that even under a total blockade individual air- craft and submarines might get th rough to deliver vital military items e g nuclear warheads Even the most severe blockade would not deprive the Soviets of the use of missiles already in Cuba for a nuclear strike on the us 15 Under any form of blockade the Soviets would concentrate on political exploitation especially in the UN They might risk violent encounters in attempts to penetrate the blockade but they would not resort to major force in the area of Cuba or forceful retaliatioti elsewhere - 6 - 216 67 tCominued at least initial i'o -ce by tee us IT US el lf orce ent o ' ' ti e bloc ade involved use of tl e SoViets cight -espco i C l aD equi· alent le el but · -cul d seek to a cid escalation 16 'ihu s e cy blocke 1 e siti aticn • c lc place tl e Soviets UO l er no i ediste ressu -e to cl ocse a -espc l Se - -1th force Tcey cculd rely on political O ans -to cccpel tl e US to desist a d -eser -e a resort to force until the US had actually used ' 'o -ce 'Il ey - -ould esticate that tl e in- c erent di f'ficulties of enf'orciDg the blockade and tee generally adverse reactions iccluilng those of IB allies to it voul d result in enori ous pressures on the US to desist They could heighten these pressures by tbreatemng retaliation in Berlin or actua Uildertak 1 JJg cajor harasst -ents on t'l e access routes • bich could beco ie tantamount to a blockade and vould probably do so at some stage 17 we do not believe that even a severe blockade cf 1_ tself vould bring do- -n t t e Cuban regime Castro vould tighten intern el security aoo unless action against the regii e subsequently devel oped en C' lban soil the Cuban population would be increasingly reluctant to oppose the regime Direct action would still be required to bring do- -n the Castro regime SOY Li REACTION TO USE CE MI LITA FOO CE 18 In t e case o US use of oree against C' ban te ritor- t tbe ellhc c c a So· et es nse by fo ce either locally or fo -- -etalia- t c else ere ·•c Ce g -ester t i l t e case c blockaC e - 7 - Ji C - i - 217 U e 67 Continued PSALM Q F 5-E-C-R-B-T Soviets would be placed automatically under great pressure to respond in ways which if they could not save Cuba would inflict an offsetting in- Jury to US interests This would be true whether the action was limited to an effort to neutralize the stro c missiles or these missiles plus airfields surface-to-air missile sites or cruise missile sites or in fact an utright invasion designed to destroy the Castro regime 19 In reaction to any of the various forms of US action the Soviets would be surprised and probably alarmed since they appear to have estimated that tbe US would probably not take military action in the face of Soviet warniDe s of the danger of nuclear war They would recognize that US military action posed a major challenge to the prestige of the USSR _We must of course recognize the possibility that the Soviets under pressure to respond would again miscalculate and respond in a way which through a series of actions and reactions could escalat to'general war 20 On the other hand the Soviets have no public treaty with Cuba and have not acknowledged that Soviet bases are on the island This situation provides them with a pretext for treating US military action against CUba as an affair which does not directly involve them and thereby avoiding the risks of a strong response We do not believe that the USSR would attack the US either from Soviet bases or with its missiles in Cuba even if the latter were operational and not put out of action before they could be readied for firiog - 8 5- ' -C RB T 218 61 ConrinuedJ 21 Since tte USSR · -oul c akost certaiI ly not resort to ge ral var end could not l ope to p_ e -ail loca ve believe that tbe Soviets vould consider retaliatory actio is C Itside c - The ti cing and selection of i Qedi ate cC ltext of events aDd sl Ch loves -ould depend l eavily u i tbe USSR's appreciation of US·attiti The cost likely location for bread retaliatic i cutside Cuba ep ears to be Berlin They ·■ould probabzy react l ere ith ajor harasSt 1eots iIIterrliptiOllS of access to the city or even a blockade itb or 'idtbout the signing of a separate peace treaty Retaliation against s US installation overseas is possible but in our vie• unlikely 22 we believe that there vould probe bl be a differeDCe betveen Soviet reaction to all-out invasion aild Sortet reaction to 1 1ore limited US use of force against selected objectives in Cuba Ye believe that the Soviets would be somewhat less like to retaliate vith military force in areas outside Cuba in response to speedy effective invasion than in response to more lilnit ed ferns of milit r r action against Cuba 1 fe recognize that such an estimate cannot be made vith very great assurance ard do not rule out tbe possibility of Soviet retaliation outside Cuba in case of invasion But ve believe that a rapid occupation of Cuba vould be more likely to tnake the Soviets pause in openiilg nev theaters o ' coti'llc-t than li dted actic i or acti _ hich drags 23 out 1 ly - ·e ·c elieve that · hatever course of retaliation the i -ss elect Cl -t le Seti et 1-eae ers _ ould not deliberately initiate gei eral - 9 - 219 67 Continued PSALM war or take military measures which in their calculation would run grave risks of general war - 10 - PSALM 220 68 Cline DD I Briefing White House 20 October 1962 C- Mr - President b -i - '-- Ve We wa nt to bring you up to d ateion the deployment of Soviet military weapons systems to Cuba You have been b rie ed many times on the major buildup of equipment in Cuba prior to rnid-Octobe r • In the past week in -Jl •r •J · • C inf WR' r stp inrenl tve photo i econnais11anc J Q ' e rage begin - i g J4 October we have discovered unmistakable evidence of the deployment to Cuba of medium range ballistic missiles i e l0Z0 NM range and intermediate range ballistic missiles i e ZZ00 NM range Th se ranges imply coverage of tngets u tate -f l° n a re- T 1JPDi' g 12 Sill' £ 'fDallas through - - c I l i y Cincinnati and Washington D C on tl 11 pa i t oL MRBMs alld I I practically all of the continental United States oa •b __ J el ✓ ---1 IR_BM_s_ _ _ _ _ __ __ _ __ 221 _ _ _ _ _ I 68 Continued ' l h site a t eac TWo of these sit s probably are in a state of at least • limited operational readiness at this time p h P l f y tba g i not o a - t 7 1 h e - 'ff the sites are in a st_at of continuous construction and improvement d we would expect the remaining 222 68 Conrinued1 nci permanent storage facilities at each sit 1 are bei - g constructed near Havana One of these Jri-tes appears to be in a stage oi construction t h a t - lea o an estimate of operational readiness s i x weeks from now i e about l December anci the other in a stage indicating operational readiness • between 15 December and frte end of the year We have not seen nuclear warheads for any oi these missiles but we do not rely on ever seeing them in our photography We have found what appears to be a nuclear warhead storage facility at one of the IRBM sites at Guanajay near Havana It will probably be completed about 1 December along with the missile site itself 68 Continued are or will be availabie They could be in temporary storage prior to completion of the storage facility we have seen The Poltava a Soviet ship which-we fhinJf1s the most likely carrier of security- ' sensitive military cargoes into the tightly guarded port of Mari J has made two trips to Cuba and is due back in about ten days I In summary we believe the evidence indicates the probability that eight MRBM missiles can be ired from Cuba today Naturally operational readiness is likely to be degraded by many factors but if all eight missiles could be launched with nuclear warheads they could deliver a total load of 16-Z4 Megatons Z to 3 MT per warhead · If able to refire they could theoretically de iver the same load approximately five hours later 224 68 Continued -sv -1 en the ull installation oi missile sites we now see unde r construction is completed at the end of the year the initial salvo J • 225 68 Continued -- - - -· ·- - -- ·--· -- - -- ·· · ·· · ·· · - - --- - rt - - - --0« -- - - • _ _ -• I • - • • • - • --· • -' • • •• • • o • • •• Uf __ - - ---N f -- ' - - __ · _ fl _· fy -- - ·- - - ·-· ¢- · S_ -- ·- - -' ' ' fk· ui r · - • Y R - - ---· --- N fe -t - • • •• •·r- ··· 'f f i · ui · - - - j · - • · · - ··• · · ·1#1 - i L i -·•- · ·_ · o _ ' _· ' -- · - V · ·- · u- - --- ' 226 -· - · · · -- 69 Supplemen1 I to Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba 20 October 1962 Excerpt •J SUPPLEMENT 1 TO JOINT EVALUATION OF SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA PREPARED BY Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee · Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee National Photographic Interpretation Center 2200 HOURS 20 OCTOBER 1962 Tl is P t Ol'f is l cu ed CCI te lati-rely pttiotlon ol U•2 pl otov y con CCE pl•tt to lnHr• U Oc to 19$2 W iss 3101 1S Oe1o c 1962 Missions 3102 3103 17 Octo c 19$2 ll iuions 310 3105 3106 3107 3108 end 3109 c - d Freli e in - c ' clysi oF 18 Oc10 C'1' 1962 Mission 3111 227 69 Continued NOTICE This supplem nt up-dates and amplifies dated 2000 hours 19 October 1962 Emphasis is on the READINESS status of the offensive missiles in Cuba Offensive Missile Readiness General 1 Analysis of the comparative photographic coverage of the offensivemissile sites in Cuba now leads us to conclude that the Soviets did not have as their main objective an immediate operational capability at any of the identified sites An emergency operationalcapabilitytolaunch some of the missiles on hand within about 8 hours could now exist at the four MRBM sites They appear to be pursuing an urgent but systematic plan to achieve an operational capability which will maximize the effectiveness of the missile regiments Within the sites the steps necessary to achieve an immediate operational capability have not occurred For example at San Cristobal Site 2 the three launchers and five missiles present continue to be bunched together in a field Were an immediate launch capability intended one would expect deployment of the launcher to the vicinity of the intended launch positions San Cristobal Area 2 Activity in Site l and Site 2 continues to indicate an urgent effort to achieve full operational readiness The launch crews missiles and associated equipment are in the immediate area From the status of the sites as of our last coverage Mission 3111 on 18 October we estimate that Site l could now have full operational readiness and that Site 2 could achieve - l - 228 69 Cmuinued this status by 25 October By full operational reaJir ess we m an the ability to launch in salvo four missiles per site with a refire capability of four missiles per site within 4 to 6 hours Sagua La Grande Area 3 The MRBM sites at Sagua La Grande were first identified on 17 October and were covered by photography twice that day The lase previous coverage was on 7 July and showed no evidence of missile activity The status of preparation at the two sites on 17 October was approximately the same It is believed that the missile regiment was moving into the area on 17 October inasmuch as 35 vehicles arrived in a support area at Site 1 within the 1 3 4 hour periOd between two photographic coverages 4 Construction activity and random location of missile support equip- ment indicate that development of the area was not complete The presence of missiles and launchers indicates that the sites have an emergency operational capability However the regiment could reach full operational readiness at these sites by 1 November Guanajay Area 5 A detailed reexamination of the evidence available at this time indicates that the operational date for these launch sites may be somewhat earlier than our previous estimate Construction activity appears to be progressing at a more rapid pace than that observed in the USSR at similar facilities Several features of_ the sites sud1 as the control bunkers excavations for fuel tanks and blast walls for comrx nem protection are several days more advanced than previously determined lission 3111 on 18 October indicates that concrete is being ins alled at all four pads at Site l 229 69 Contintfed 6 we are unable to determine a precise date for an operational capability we believe these sites may be n ady to launch missiles between l December and 15 December ft -f PSAL v1 230 69 Continued uclear Warheads for Offensive Missiles 9 At the probable nuclear scorage site under construction adjacent co the Guana jay lRBM fixed missile launch Site 1 earth-moving activity at the 114 by 60 foot ive-through building continues at an appa -ent high rate 10 A curved-roof building similar to that at Guanajay Site 1 but only about 35 by 67 feet has been observed at the newly identified possible missile site near Remedios 11 Foundations of structures approximately 60 by 35 feet which might be intended to be future nuclear warhead storage facilities have been observed at the San Cristobal Sites l and 3 and at Sagua La Grande Site 1 The appearance of concrete arches nearby indicates that these buildings will be earth-covered 12 The tank trailers observed· in the quay area of the Punta Gerardo port facility are similar to those seen in 22 May 1962 photography taken before security fences were erected This strongly suggests that these trucks have no nuclear association 13 Search of the major airfields in Cuba has not as yet revealed any structu·res that can be identified as intended for nuclear storage Offensive Force Levels See Table 2 Support and Supply No cha 'lge PSALN1 231 69 Continued Coastal Defense Missiles No change Air Defense Missiles 14 There are now 24 primary surface-to-air missile SA-2 sites located in Cuba see Figure 2 Two of these sites Santa Lucia and Deleite each have an alternate site located 3 to 5 nm from the primary site These alternate sites are pre-surveyed have no equipment and could possibly be used for mobility training exercises Of the 24 primary sites 20 are individually operational at the present time The remaining primary SA-2 sites could be operational sites in approximately one week 15 There are 6 surface-to-air missile assembly and support areas Photography shows large quantities of surface-to-air missile cannisters and missile transporters See Table 3 for a list of surface-to-air missile sites missile assembly areas and associated equipment Guided Missile Patrol Craft 17 There are now a total of 12 KOMAR class patrol craft in Cuba Each KOMAR craft carries two homing missiles which have an effective range of 10 to 15 nm and carry 2000 pound HE warheads The KOMARs -s- 232 69 1Continued - etu ·n ro l Jas o - to a tende for reloadLi S r - · - -s for t ese craft a· e not yet been identified in Cuba All KO - iARs ir c oo are considered o J operationai At least six are based at Havana and fo•Jr at 3anes Tne -er 1aini1 g two have beenobservedoperating_in the Ma -ie area but it is not nown v het er they are based there or were operating from the Havana i8 The K01' ·I ARs ha ·e all been ransporred to Cuba as dec e ca -go on So iet ships two and four per shipload The first shipment arrived in Ha ·ana on 14 August 1962 Whereas it probably took several weeks to establish base and logistic support for the first KOMARs to become integrated folly operational units additional units can probably recome operational within one week after offloading Tactical lissiles o change Significance 19 The apparent Soviet objective to rapidly achieve full operational srat' S ___ for their lv1RBM and IRBM regiments rather than to achieve an i l b ational capability at each site as the missiles and equipment arrive may be very significant to the planners judging various Soviet courses of action 233 69 Continued Addendum Preliminary analysis of photography of 18 October reveals an unidentified secured installation in an early stage of construction 5 nm southwest of the town of REMEDIOS lt consists of 4 large excavations in a symmetrical pattern however their function cannot_be determined at this time This installation is however conside -ed to be a suspected surface-to-surface missile site - 7 - HW · PSALM 234 10 Intelligence Memorandum Evaluation of Offensive Threat in Cuba with cover memorandum Caner to Members of United States Intelligence Board 21 October 1962 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 21 October 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR The Members of the Ucited States Intelligence Board SUBJECT Evaluation of O' fensive Threat in Cuba 1 The attached copy of the subject intelligence me ora z cum is forwarded for your information guidance and appropriate action As agreed by the USIB it is to be used as background material for oral briefings to authorized personnel only Reproduction is not authorfaed 2 It is believed that sufiicient copies have been forwarded to you to meet the immediate operational requirement for preparation of briefings Requests for additional copies or for initial distribution f rom offices not under your i ediate control but in your departtnent of the Governnient will be referred to you for action hQ 11 Cu i -- Marshall S Carter Lieutenant General USA Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 235 70 Continued EVALUATION OF OFFENSIVE THREAT IN CUBA Significance 1 A significant deployment of guided missiles to Cuba is already well advanced and has proceeded by first deploying a large force of defensive weapons followed quickly by long-range offensive guided missiles and aircraft See Figure l A mixed force of 1000- and 2200-nm ballistic missiles in Cuba· provides for the first time a significant strategic strike capability against almost all targets in the U S and against a large portion of Canada and Latin America See Figure 2 The planning for this operation must have started at least one year ago and the actual deployment tself began last spring Offensive Deployment 2 The equipment for 1000-nm ballistic missiles is now being deployed in Western Cuba at four launch sites near San Cristobal See Figures 3-5 Two of these are now operational and the other two are proceeding to this status OJl an accelerated basis The missiles are probably those reported moving into this area during September Each of the _four sites contains eight missiles and four unrevetted field type launchers which rely on mobile erection checkout and support equipment This implies a refire capability from each unit 3 Other 1000-nm ballistic missiles are also deployed at two sites nine miles apart eastofHavanaintheSagua La Grande area See Figures 8-9 These sites· closely resemble the sites at San Cristobal but appear to be more permanent in nature Terrain features have dictated considerable clearing and grading for deployment of the system Also there are permanent structures at the launch positions at each site and we estimate an operational capability for each site within one week The sizes of the missiles associated equipment and buildings found at the San Cristobal and Sagua La Grande sites are almost identical and are compatible with the 1000-nm missile system - 1- ECREf IJUISV _1111 236 70 Continued f eCf i 1 I G i 4 Two fixed sites for 2200-nm ballistic missiles are under construction in the Guanajay area near Havana See Figures 6-7 Four launchers two blockhouses and underground propellant storage are being built at each site Site 1 is considered to be in a mid-to-late stage of construction and should be operational within six weeks Site 2 is in an earlier stage of construction and could be operational between 15 and 30 December 1962 There are no missiles or support equipment detectable within the Guanajay Area at the present time 5 An additional fixed site has been observed at Remedios in Eastern Cuba which is similar to those at Guanajay Tnis is probably a valid indicator of deployment of a secondgroupingof2200-nm ballistic missiles 6 In addition to missiles IL-28 light bomber aircraft with a combat radius of about 750 miles are also arriving in Cuba Approximately 22 of these bombers most still in crates are now present These are in addition to the force of about 40 MIG-21 fighters there Nuclear Warheads 7 We believe that a nuclear warhead storage site is under construction adjacent to the more complete of the fixed missile launch sites near Guanajay See Figure 6 Construction is proceeding at a high rate This site could become operational at about the same time as the associated Launch Site 1 8 A curved-roof building similar to that at Guanajay Site 1 but only about 35 by 67 feet has been observed at the newly identified possible missile site near Remedios · 9 Foundations of structures approximately 60 by 35 feet which may be intended to be future nuclear warhead storage facilities have been observed at the San Cristobal Sites 1 and 3 and at Sagua La Grande Site 1 The appearance of concrete arches nearby indicates that these buildings v ill be earth-covered - 2 - 237 70 Continued ' • -· -- 0- - - ' 10 Search of the major airfields in Cuba has not as yet revealed any structures that can be identified as intended for nuclear storage li There is still noevidenceofcurrently operational nuclear storage facilities in Cuba Nevertheless one must assume that nuclear weapons could now be in Cuba to support the operational missile capability as it becomes available The missiles would probably be equipped with thermonuclear warheads Support and Supply 12 Offensive missile systems are being introducedinto Cuba through the Port of Mariel and perhaps other ports A new Soviet ship the Poltava possibly designed as a ballistic missile transport has been noted making frequent trips between the USSR and Cuba See Figure 11 This ship has made two trips to Cuba since 17 July and is next estimated to arrive in Cuba on or about 2 November 1962 13 Possible central missile checkout storage and repair bases have been located at Soroa between the two eastern deployment areas and at Managua south of Havana 14 It is significant that all of the ballistic and air defense missiles now being deployed in Cuba probably use a common oxidizer permitting exploitation of a common system for propellant supply and storage Coastal Defense Missiles 15 Three coastal defense missile sites have now been identified in Cuba two of which must now be considered operational Banes and Santa Cruz del Norte See Figure 10 These cruise missiles have a range of 35 to 40 miles Air Defense Missiles 16 There are now 24 primary surface-to-air missile sites located in Cuba See Figure 10 Two of these sites Santa Lucia and Deleite -3- EGReT 1t••·-·•-•11 238 • 70 CominuedJ _ EERE r ar each have an alternate site located 3 to 5 nm from the primary site These alternate sites are pre-surveyed have no equipment and could possibly be used for mobility training exercises Of the 24 primary sites 20 are individually operational at the present time The remaining primary surface-to-air missile sites could beoperationalinapproximately one week 17 There are 6 surface-to-air lll5Sile assembly and support areas Photography shows large quantities of surface-to-air missile cannisters and missile transporters Guided Missile Patrol Craft 18 There are now a total of 12 missile-launching patrol craft in Cuba Each craft carries_ two homing missiles which have an effective range of 10 to 15 nm and carry 2000-pound high-explosive warheads They must return to base or to a tender for reloading although tenders for these craft have not yet been identified in Cuba All of these missile launching patrol craft in Cuba are considered to be operational All have been recently observed operating in the Mariel area but it is not known whether they are based there or were operating from other bases 19 These craft have all been transported to Cuba as deck cargo on Soviet ships two and four per shipload The first shipment arrived in Havana on 14 August 1962 Whereas it probably took several weeks to establish base and logistic support for the first craft to become integrated fully operational units additional units can probably become operational within one week after offloading • - 4 Reverse Blank 239 71 McCone Jfemorandum of lfeeting ith the Presidenr Attorney General Secretary fcXamara General Taylor and Mr McCone 10 00 a m -10 21 62 October Zl l 96Z MEMORANDUM OF MEETING KITH THE PRESIDENT ATTOR 'JEY GENERAL SECRETARY McNAMARA GFiNERAL TAYLOR AND MR McCONE 0 oe lfl 1 1 t l General Sween y re t ewed in conllide rable detail the plan a for an ir atrilte against the nissile bases the air fields a ew SAM 1ite ■ in critical locaticnc and finally the plan• for inva aion Z It was dec ided that at a minimum an air strike must include both the nia ■ile ■itea and the air field• and such SAM site• aa are nece11ary and General Taylor was instructed to plan accordingly 3 There wa ■ complete agreement that military action must include an invasion and occupation o Cuba 4 Secretary McNamara and General Taylor told the President that an air strike could not provide abaolute a s11Ura nce that all missiles were deatroyed they indicated a 90 per cent probability They allo stated that any warning would very poaaibly cau1e the movement of rniaaile• to obscure unknown location• from which they could become operational General Taylor therefore recomrnended on the basia of military grounds that the air 1trike be conducted inunediately suggesting to- norrow rnorning and that it be without warning Secretary McNamara confirmed the military appraisal expressed above but m a de no recommendation aa to policy 5 In response to direct queationing from the President the Attorney General and McCone adviaed against surprise ttaclt for the reason• discuaaed at previous meeting ■• The Attorney Genera l failed to make D absolute reco nrnend tion with respect to future military action■ indicating this question could be decided as the aitu ation developed from day to day i nd that only preparatory fOP IEGIEI 241 71 Continued etep• ehould be taken now McCone ur1•d cm the other hand that the P eeident in public atatement uullcate an intention to rernove the miaaile• and other potenti l weapon• by meana and at a tirne of hi■ own chooeing if nn-eillance did not prove conclueively th t the So eta and the Cubana were removin1 thern 6 The meeting adjourned to be reconvened at 2 30 with additional principal ■ in attend nc a John A McCone I lrector JAM at -z• 242 12 McCone Memorandum of Discussion with the President Alone October 21 1962 October 2 1 1962 MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION W1TH THE PRESIDENT ALONE OCTOBER 21 1962 Approx 4 30 p m On my report of my discussion with General Eisenhower at my residence this morning the following information was given later to the Attorney General It is not to be given to anyone else After briefing by Lundahl General Eisenhower and I engaged in a long discussion concerning the proper procedure to be follow d- Eisenhower's conclusions are as follows l Any military action would be inconclusive and therefore inadvisable unless it employed invasion and occupation of Cuba Eisenhower gave this opinion on a basis of his experience in war in countless examples of air strikes which though most effective were never completely conclusive 2 From a military point of view a surprise attack would be most effective and most desirable if followed in a minimum time by invasion 3 However from a broader point of view he opposed surprise attack because of the indictment the resulting tensions and the fact that such action by the United States would license other countries to resort to violent military action without notice 4 Therefore Eisenhower would accept the handicaps from a military point of view of warning or notice and therefore would follow the suggested plan of initiating a blockade conducting intense surveillance and announcing the intention of ta 'lting military action if the Soviets and the Cubans either naintained the status quo of their inissile installations or continued the construction of theil missile bases The military action he envisaged would be air stri lces and invasion 243 72 Continued 5 General Eisenhower emphasized he was giving his opinion based solely on intelligence and without the benefit of a study of the war plans or the most recent diplomatic exchanges with Castro Khrushchev our allies etc It seemed fair to conclude that his views as expressed above i -epresent a flash judgment rather than a considered judgment arrived at with all facets of the problem laid before him John A McCone Director - 2 - 244 73 AfcCone Jfemorandumfor 1he File Jfeeting 1• ith ihe V c President on 21 October 1962 12 October 1962 Z2 October 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE SUBJ'ECT Meeting with the Vice Pnaf dent o Zl October 1962 On Sa da y Dight Oc to r 2l t 8 30 I brle fec Vic e Prnic eut Lyndon J olmaan at the requut o the Preaidem c onvey8-C through M George Bundy The bt1e involved a revi w af photography by Lundahl parallelins briefing• given to Ce•ral E u r and others by the We then diaetUHd policy and detail• o tbs propoaed 1peec h in comiderable detail Pre ■ ident The thruat o the Vice Pr-■ideDt1 ■ thiDkili wa ■ that he favored an unannotmced ■trike • r than the qreed plan which involved blocb de nd ■trike and invuio l late · if COllditicn t wa rn nted He e xprHaed diapleuure u 1' t e l e oar punch d also commented the blockade wgoald 'be inellactive • • we in effect re ''locking the barn after hone waa Oh9 11 • I followed the poeiUon and the u-pmenta iised in my brie lni paper o ZO October The Yice Pre■ident fhl lly qreed reluctantly but only after lea mini aznong otha r thizlp the support uwilcated by Cenaral Ebenhower J'OHN A McCONE TMLee mfb Reverse Blank 245 I 74 'Soriet ilitary Build tp in Cuba 21 October 1962 briefing notes for Heads of Goi·ernment - f · -- • I 2 -- · 247 'fOP SBeftET o 21 Oct 62 SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP IN CUBA I Now clear to US that Khrushchev last spring made foreign policy decision on Cuba which involved unprecedented risks and which made it undeniable that Soviets are playing for very high stakes indeed A Soviets believed decisive action necessary because 1 Cuban economy was deteriorating 2 There seemed to be mounting pressure in the US for intervention B Soviets also saw opportunity to 1 Demonstrate that the US can no longer prevent advance of Soviet offensive power even in its own hemisphere 2 Significantly expand Soviet capabilities for initial attack on US targets 3 Thus weaken western resolve and unity in countering Soviet moves in the East-West global contest particularly over Berlin and Germany II The Soviet decision bas since been implemented in two phases A First the build-up during the summer of defensive capabilities 248 14 Continued lDP SWMT B '-'400 21 Oct 62 Second the establisbcent this fall of a cajor Soviet base in Cuba for strategic attack on the US III What we know about what the Soviets u-e actually doing in Cuba is based on hard intelligence from many sources A Repeated aerial photography of Cuba which bas been compared with a z iass of aerial photography of the USSR B Photography of Soviet ships en route to Cuba from low-altitude aircraft and by surface observers in various locations c A firm knowledge developed from any sources over the years of Soviet military doctrine and practice D Interrogation in detail of the 1 500-2 000 refugees a wee coming into Florida from Cuba E IV Agent operations nie first indication that the USSR had taken a decision on Cuba came in late July A At that time 4 Soviet passenger ships after a voyage under secrecy conditions arrived at the western Cuban naval base llariel As of 20 October fifteen such unpublicized passenger voyages have been counted - 2 - 249 74 Continued 040 1 Oct 62 B In early August dry cargo vessels began arriving in unprecedented numbers 1 Since then about 140 voyages--including the largest and newest of the Soviet merchant fleet--have been made or are in progress 2 Of these only about 15 were clearly not involved in delivering military cargo About 100 have carried military equipment and the cargoes of the other twenty-five have not yet been established Soviet vessels carrying arms normally make false declarations of destination when passing the Bosporus 3 Most of the Bloc cargoes supporting the Cuban civilian economy--which now requires assistance ranging from baby food and grain to machinery parts--is now moving in Western flag vessels C The earlier deliveries up to about 1 September appeared to consist largely of military construction transportation and electronics equipment and led to speculation that the Soviets might be deploying a SAM system - 3 'P9P SECRET 250 74 Continued 8 Beflff 1 - '-'430 21 Oct 62 Photography of 29 August and 5 September confirmed that a SA H system was being deployed Twelve sites were identified One JilG-21 ras seen as were eight Komarclass missile boats and one land-based antishipping cruise missile site During September the known nWDber of each of these systems increased D In early September consequently we had ample evidence of a significant buildup All con- firmed deliveries however fitted into a pattern of weapons which are essentially defensive in design and in normal operational employment On basis of such evidence President issued his statements of 4 and 13 September that Soviet activity in Cuba was defensive in nature v Our present knowledge of the state of these weapons in Cuba is as follows A SAM sites These are the standard Soviet sixlauncher second-generation-type called in NATO terminology GUIDELINE 1 At least 24 sites with alternate positions for several island These sites cover most of the Three or four more vill cover the entire island - 4 - s R I ' 251 74 Continued V 2 V iOP SB8ftff 0400 21 Oct 62 Support sites--six presently identified still field-type but signs of permanenttype installation appearing 3 Readiness--as of 17 October 17 sites appeared-in photography--to have both missiles on launchers and the essential radar in position Only one however has emplaced around it the radar-controlled guns which normally are installed to provide some defense against lowflying aircraft Known radar emissions have thus far been very few However at least one site has the C-band radar--the latest Soviet model now being widely deployed in the USSR and East Germany installed with haste The sites were Revetments were built at most sites only after setting up B There are now about 100 MIG fighters in Cuba About 60 15 1 s 17's and 19 1 s arrived prior to l January '62 and there are now at least 39 MIG-21s 1 Standard Soviet GCI units one identified this far through photography will control these fighters 2 While there is no direct evidence of air-toair missiles in Cuba such equipment is - 5 T8P SZCft T 252 14 ConJinuedi '- 430 21 Oct 62 P bLCRZl' being supplied to Indonesia Egypt and probably to Iraq We think it likely that Cuba will get at least equal treatcent 3 The IG-2l's have only recently become available OD 5 Septeober we know that only one had been asseI l bled By 17 October 35 had been asselllbled c Coastal Defense 1 We have identified 12 Komar-class patrol craft Each carries two homing missiles with a range of 10-15 n m and carrying 2 000-pound HE warheads in mid-August 2 The first arrived All are now operational There are three coastal defense missile sites--two now operational These anti- shipping missiles have a range of 35-40 miles and carry HE warheads VI soviet diplomacy and pronouncements have been carefully geared to military build-up amounts to well-thought-out deception plan A soviets wanted to keep international tensions do until build-up co pleted - 6 - roP---Sf CREI 253 74 Continued -118P l LR ff B 11430 21 Oct 62 Have tried to keep attention focussed on Berlin - but with emphasis on lull till after US elections c Emphasized defensive nature of Soviet support for Cuba as justified by provocative US threat D Made connection between Berlin and Cuba as part of effort to demonstrate seriousness of Soviet commitment to Castro but discreetly enough to avoid Western counteraction VII In early October we obtained our first hard information on the delivery of soviet offensive weapons to Cuba A We photographed 10 crates on a ship bound for Cuba of a kind especially designed to contain the fuselage of an IL-28 jet light bomber B 21 of these crates were later photographed at San Julian airfield in the extreme west of Cuba C As of 17 October four aircraft had been uncrated of which one is partially assembled 254 14 Conrinued _ I VIII • 1-Q 21 Oct 62 The observation of IL-28 crates led us to mount an intensive reconnaissance effort beginning on 15 October The photography showed for the first time the deployment of surface-to-surface ballistic missile systems A We have identified four and possibly six sites for the 1 100-n n missile and two fixed sites for the 2 200-n m nissile IX 1 100-n m issile A Two launch sites are near San Cristobal in Western Cuba Bach site normally has four launchers of which we have seen seven Bach launcher in turn normally has two missiles assigned it all sixteen of which we have identified at the site B Another two sites are near Sagua La Grande just east of Havana We have identified six of the eight launchers and seven of the sixteen missiles C There is preliminary evidence of two additional sites near San Cristobal They are either launch sites or a service facility D The keys to these identifications are the size of the missile body the unique erector-launcher equip ent and the position and spacing of equipment 1 The missile corresponds exactly in length to those observed in parades in Moscow - 8 - 255 14 Continued IF8P SBeRE'f 2 The handling equipment is similar to that photographed in the USSR 3 The spacing of launchers corresponds to that discussed in secret Soviet military documents and to that observed in known missile sites in the USSR E The 1 020-mile-range missile is a single-stage ballistic •missile using storable liquid fuels 1 It has an autonomous i e all-inertial guidance system giving a CEP of 1 to 1 1 2 nautical miles It carries a warhead of 2 500-3 1 500 pounds yielding 2-3 megatons F Photography alone cannot permit us to be very precise about the operational readiness of these missiles 1 The sites at San Cristobal are the nearest to completion We are inclined to believe that one of them could now have full operational readiness -- i e an ability to launch four missiles with a refire capability within 4 to 6 hours --and that the other could achieve tpis status in about two days 2 The sites at Sagua La Grande will probably not achieve the same stage of construction until 1 November or later - 9 - 'fQP SBCRE'I' 256 14 C Oruinued uo x 21 Oct 62 2 200-n m Kissile A These sites are located at Guanajay just west of Havana They are fixed sites and we have identified the eight launching pads normally associated with similar sites in the USSR 11'e have not yet seen the missiles B These sites are still in fairly early stage of construction which we do not expect to be coJllpleted until some time in December c We know less about the 2 200-mile missile but believe it to be also single-stage using storable liquid fuels and with an autonomous guidance system We estimate CEP at 1 1 2 nautical miles Warhead will probably yield 3-5 megatons D There is new evidence of the beginning of construction of what may be a new fixed four-pad MRBM or IRBM missile site at Remedias East of Havana XI We have no direct evidence that nuclear weapons are now in Cuba -- and -e are not likely to get any A However we are pretty sure that a facility being constructed near the IRBH site at Guanajay is a nuclear storage facility - 10 - 'f8P F PCP s 1 257 74 Continued Uo B 21 Oct 62 In any case it is prudent to asswne that when the missiles are otherwise operational nuclear warheads will be available XU Based on known voyages of ships we believe at least 8 000 Soviet military and about 3 000 nonmilitary personnel are now in Cuba A This matches fairly well with our estimate that the Soviets would need about 10 000 military for the assembly activity now going on B we think this total will rise to about 14 000 when all weapons systems now in Cuba are operational c In addition there are upward of 500 Soviet military advisers and technicians with the Cuban armed forces XIII In swnmary Cuban-based missiles give the USSR a significantly increased capability for attack on targets in the A u s For retaliatory or second-strike purposes Cuban-based missiles suffer by virtue of their soft configUl ation being easily targeted and being easily eliminated without reducing US forces now programmed against the USSR B For pre-emptive or first strike purposes Cuban missiles have an advantage over Soviet- 11 'F9P R RE t 258 14 Continued FOP 8ileKET Ji3o 21 oct 62 based ICBK's -- shorter flight times and no BKE1JS detection C Sites now identified will when completed give Soviets total of 36 launchers and 72 missiles This compares vith 60-65 ICBH launchers we now estimate to be operational in the USSR - 12 - Reverse Blank 259 15 Supplement 2 10 Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba 21 October 1962 Excerpt f f-' ' - L · • - · I a · SUPPLEMENT 2 TO JOINT EVALUATION OF SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA PREPARED BY Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee National Photographic Interpretation Center 2200 HOURS 21 OCTOBER 1962 TI ia rt-p 0rt Is hosed oa Joti ly coc lct photo lnte _ - o ron of U·2 p o1osrc hy --'• on 14 Oct 1962 Ml ssl° 3101 IS Oero e 1962 17 O to 1962 3107 3108 18 Oci er 1962 Miuions 3102 3103 Missions 3104 3105 3106 3109 Mission 3111 19 Octobu 1962 Mlss on 3113 · - - •• • • -• - ' • r - _ -· ·_ · --i 261 PSAL v1 75 Continued I ♦ t - ' j ' NOTICE This supplement up-dates and amplifie previous reports Emphasis is on the READINESS status of the offensive missiles in Cuba DEFINITIONS An Emergency Operational Capability exists when a site could launch some missiles should a decision be made to do so A Full Operational Capability is achieved when a site has reached a steady state of readiness with the ability to salvo its first missile load within about 6 to 8 hours and with the ability to refire within 4 to 6 hours CONCLUSIONS 1 The comparative photographic coverage indicates that while an emergency operational capability could exist at several offensive missile sites the· Soviet objective in Cuba is to attain full operational capability at all sites as soon as possible rather than to prepare each site for an emergency laurich capability as soon as the missiles and equipment arrive in the area See Figure 1 • 2 Thereareclearindicationsthatatleast five Soviet offensive missile regiments each with eight launchers and at least sixteen missiles will become operational in Cuba See Table 1 This will represent a first salvo potential of 40 missiles with a refire capability of an additional 40 missiles lt should be noted that this threat against the U S is approximately one-half the currently estimated ICBM missile threat from the USSR - 1- 'f Jf' PSALM 262 16 Lundahl J emorandum for Director of Central Jncelligence and Director Defense Intelligence Agency Additional Jnformation- fissions 31 lJ and 31J3 21 October 1962 21 October Cop _ _ li' E ORAXDUM FOR D rectcr of Cent -al Intelligence Direc or Def e i se In- elligence Agency SUBJECT Additional Ini'or nation - Missions 3111 and 3113 1 A newly identified possible launch site five previously reported MRBM launch sites and two IRBM launch sites were observed on Mission 3111 A newly identified confirmed MRBM launch site was located on Mission 3113 2 The newly identified unimproved field type MRBM launch site is located 2 7 nm NNW of Candelaria at 22°47 1 45 N 82°58 1 40 11W in the San Cristobal area The site contains two tent areas totalling 26 tents and at least 60 vehicles Seven missile trailers and two missile erectors were identified at the site 3 The possible launch site under construction is located It consists of paired trench-like excavations 450 feet apart clearing for a possible control bunker an arched building a tent camp and motor pool and a concrete batch plant At three of the four excavations there are 10 to 12 precast hollow concrete objects 5 nm SW of Remedios at 22°25 1 N 79°35 1 E 4 A description of the three MR site areas in the San Cristobal area follows MR Site 1 - The seven canvas covered missiles are now draped with netting and three of the four erectors are canvas covered MR Site 2 - The six missiles and th -ee erectors are uarked in a common area MR Site 3 - Cloud co· -er 9 -e· ents a co 1plete analys s however one erecto ' and possibly wo othe s are obseZ ed 5 T r e Sa ga la Grande a ea MR Site 4 consists of four a- - c positions tno ccntaining ere o s and six ca vas cc· e ed issi2es 'l t aile s a -rld 1'rR Site 5 onsists of our erec ors on pads and our canvas covered missiles on trailers 263 I • I 76 Continued 62 6 Construction activity continues on IR sites 1 and 2 in the Guanajay area ARTHUR C LUNDAHL Director National Photographic Interpretation Center 264 11 THK Thomas H Karamessines to Walter Elder 22 October 1962 · -ith copies of two cables sent to all Chiefs of Station C I _ 22 October 1962 - · -· ' r i I I l I l I PH r '- ' I ' i' I Mr Elder Attached are copies of the cables Mr Karamessines discussed with you yesterday They have been sent to all Chiefs of Stations with some minor variations to cover local conditions • 265 77 Continued - -----·- m I COMMECTION WITH CERTAIN IMST iiU1CTt0MS WBICB lllliil CBlltl OF MISSlCN YOUa AllEA MAY UCSITX SVNDA1' 21 OCTOUB oa SKO 't LY 11UalLUTZa YOU ARE JIEC UES'l'l D TO mt ff AMl INQ BY AS 01 THAT TJME CANCEL ART OTHER PLA f5 roll JSEJNG A BSENT no 2mON· NATUU AICD D T All i O lffff UCTJON KOT TJa AYAJLA' 81 E BUT OBVIOUSLY WOUU DEAL W1TB MATT Ell OF WlGEMCY THUJUOR E DO NOT DISCUSS nus ilEC tlltST WITH ARYON B OTHER TH Allt TOtnt CBIE F 0'8 alSSION ' 266 77 rconrinued1 - F O R C 'lilEF OF STATION ONLY REF l FURTEEa TC REl ERENCi' IT IS I XPECTED THAT a • Clill F CF l ISSlCN YOlJR AREAlWll L RECEIVE CR HAS tECEIV'ED - - COl lMUNIC ATION F R O HOS PEllTAINING TO RECENT CRITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA AND SETTING FOltTH OUTLIN V £Si T _ OF ACTIONS CONTEla LATED B T - EXPECT THAT u PCN -s Mt RECEIPT nus CC MMtJNICATION - C l U E F OF Ml SSION WILL FAMILlARIZE YOU WITH ITS CCNTENT AND WITH ANY ACTIONS HE l iAY BE INSTRUCTED TO TAKE YOU ARE TC OFP-R ALL POSSIBLE AS51ST ANCE ADVISE CHlE F OF Tetra LOCAL N APPROPIUATELT AFTER GETTINC CONCURRENCE CHIEr TOOR A REA - 2 UNLESS-CHIEF OF MlSSICN RAISES-WITH ou DO NOT TAKE JNlTIATIVE IN SEEING HIM UNTIL FOUR HO'OJtS PBlOR TO SPEECH BY PRESIDENT CtJRRENTLY SCHEDULED FOR i C 00 HRS EASTERN DAYLIGHT TIME 3 TO ANTICIPATE EVERY CONTINGENCY RECtraST 'IHAT YOU Wl E DU TELY AND Ct IETLY TAKE NECESSARY ACTION PLACE YOUB STATION IN PCSITICN FOll POSSIBLE EMERGltNCT SITUATION n LPERATIVE ACTION YOU TAKE NOT CAUSE UN COE ATTENTION ORE SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS WILL FOLLOW AS APPROPRIATE 267 18 Cemral Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence Curreru Intelligence Memorandum Timing of the Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba 22 October 1962 Cfili''IRAL I TELLIGESCZ AG CY Office of C- irrent Intelligence 22 October 1962 CuRRENT INTELLIG C S MEli ORA1 1 tn SUBJECT Timing of the Soviet Yilitary Buildup in Cuba 1 The Soviet decision to e bark on the current military buildup in Cuba probably as □ade in April 1962 The decision paralleled polltical and economic moves which greatly strengthened the SovietCUban relationship The program probably was planned and set in motion during the period April through June In the second week of July the first ship ents of materiel began to leave Soviet ports accompanied by passenger ships carrying military personnel These units arrived in Cuba during the last week iri July and by l August work had begun at several locations in Cuba 2 Prior to April 1962 the USSR's policy toward Castro's self-proclaimed adherence to Com t1unism was still unclear and its ·support of Cuba was within the bounds of normal Soviet trade and aid policy i e ties governed by long-term credit agre ments and Cuba's ability to pay In early April however Moscow chose to acquiesce in Castro's assertion of his authority over the so- called old Communists and to acknowledge the socialist character of the Cuban regime Shortly thereafter negotiations for the bloc to come to the aid of Cuba's faltering economy were initiated and in e arly May agree me nts ere signed for the bloc to provide additional a ounts of foodstuffs consu er goods ra aterials and other badly n eed e d icports A d e cision to underta e the current cilitary buildup probably ftas ade along ftith these econo ic and politi cal ove s In return agree ent evidently as reached for stationing Soviet strate gic forces on the island PSALl 'ffl 269 6 78 Continued 3 The buildup in ·cuba has been taking place in stages which can be distinguished reasonably well The first deliveries of men and equipment arrived in late July and through most of August they appear to have been primarily of equipment for SAM and coastal defense missile nstallations Work started first in western Cub - nd gradually spread throughout the isl nd Eight of the 12 Komar guided-missile buats Y ar delivered in August as well as some land armam ··· i-t -l We cannot determine precisely whe the first e uipment for MRBM IRBM installations arrived but available information suggests work on the first site began about 29 August and the first missiles of this kind probably arrived in the first half of September Two top-level meetings between the Cubans and Khrushchev were held in this period one when Raul Castro visited Moscow in July at the start of the shipments and one in late August - early September when Che Guevara traveled to the USSR 4 Since early September military shipments probably have included equipment for all the missile installations as well as aircraft and land armaments Most of the 39 or more MIG-2ls arrived during the first week of September Two shipments of IL-28 bombers--22 aircraft in all--appear to have arrived in late September and a third shipment may be en route There is no sign of a slowdown in the military shipments about 20 Soviet vessels are en route with probable military cargoes and one or two are leaving Soviet ports almost daily -2- PSALM 'fOP 270 19 Cline DD notes for DCI for XSC Briefing at 3 P f in Cabinet Room 22 October 1962 SFC r E7 S c - P -esident i e ha- -e -• rea i out t l e i'i 'f'rc a1J sio s 'lc -n o- er C- i ba S a 20 October this e s 17 i ssioi s cet- --een 14 a cl 20 October There is n o evideI ce of I e°• issil e sites in Cfta si ice t l e eport giveI to you at 2 30 p n yesterday Thus vha t - -e have see l 24 Jmrnc er positions i'or to date cc pleted or ur d er- -a · is still Range Ball i stic siles 1 020 i 11 e range located at six base co -plexes a d 12 laU ch pe ds for Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles 21 200 l il e r ge located at tbree bases - a total of separate bases 271 36 launchers at nine 79 Continued 91 iil s w ffls viitr As explained we expect deployment of 2 missiles per launch position but to date what we have actually seen are 30 and possibly 32 Medium Range Missiles We have not yet seen any Intermediate Range Missiles although they may be in Cuba under cover· or on· the Soviet ship roLTAVA· which is due to arrive in Cuba in a bout five days a nd is peculiarly arranged to carry long cylindrical items af cargo The sites a re in varying degrees of operational readiness On the basis of la test evidence we now believe 4 MRBM sites containing 16 launchers a re in full operational readiness as of today · 22 October We now estimate the remaining 2 MRBM sites containing 8 additional launchers will come into tull and 29 October operational readiness on 25 October respectively These MRBM's considered mobile they are fired from a trailer bed type of launcher and their location as now established - 2 - 272 19 Continued su - ce e 3 IRI M s tes c ta1 g l2 ch pads still seeo l ik to -each 'u1l ope atio ia 1 readiness in Dece ber Eo- -ever e erge icy ope a io ia l ree di I ess of sc ce of the s eight be rea chec scce- hat earlier Of the 24 prl 2 ry surface-to-air missile sites i l Cuba ve believe 22 are lO-• ope ' aticnal 'The Soviet fleet support vessel 'lEREK is no- - in the AtJ antic on a bigb -speed nm from the Kol a Inlet Northern Fleet Base near Muroansk in Russia It could reach Cuba in four or five days - 3 - Rewrse Blank 273 Its mission is tmknovn 80 fcCone Jfemorandumfor the File Leadership Meeting on October 22nd at 5 00 p m ·· 24 October 1962 Ji - -- r-_ - « • _ -- -- · • MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE' SUBJECT Lea d er1bip meetin 0i1 Oc tooer 22Dd at 5 00 p m ATTEND ED BY The Lu d11r1hip ezc ept for Sana tor Ha yd en The Prelident Rusk McN m r McCoue aud A ttlbauador Thomp1011 McCone read a 1wnmary o£ the •itaa Jon c opy o£ which ii tta ched This sta temant had been d •cuued with the Preaident Attorney General a nd Blllldy n cl had been mod fiecl to conform to their view There were a few que1ti01U o £ •ab1tantive nature Hicltenlooper asking whell m u ■ U a would be bl operational sl ta l McCone replied with the exi•tin fiaurea u reported m the morning report Hic teulooper then asked U the Cubasi aituation is tied iD to the Cbi na Indi con£ront tlon McCone replied that we have no l n orrnatlon one wa y or the other Thompson e o r a probable that Cub may force a ■howdown on Berlin Secret a ry Ru ak then reviewed bu c urrent appr iaal o£ the Soviet Union indicating there had been• radical moTH within the tTSSR which were iDd catiD tou her im It appea red the ha rd-liners arc com iJli Jn to a cendency and the 1o t co-exutent line ueins to be dilappearms Peip aomewb t more aa tl1£ied with MQacow now R11 stated that he did not wish to underestimate the sra vity o the 1ib1 timl the Soriets ware taking very 1eriou1 ria 11 but this iD bu opmion repre•ents the philoaophy of the ha rd-liners Rua•ell que•tioned the Sec ret ry a 1 to whether thms• will get better Jn the ut e whether we will bve a ore propit loua time to a ct than now the thruat o £ hi a que•tioning being Why wa it Ruak anawered tllat he saw a o opportunity for improvement •-- - The President th en reviewed the chronaloff of the aituation • tini on T11e•day October 16th whell the firat infonnatimi received Crom the photographic flight of October 14th He c - q - · - EYES ONL¥- 275 W 1 ■ tat ed 80 Continued th t he immediately OJ' dered a teulve overfllahta that McCone briefed President Eiaenhower1 that we mut i-ecopbe that theae miuilee miaht be operational au l therelore military action on our part might ca uae the firin1 of many ol them with seriou consequences to the United Stai••• vtherznore the ac tiona taken and further action a which mi1ht be required mi1ht cau■e the Soviet• to react iD variou• areu moat puticul rly Berlin which they could euiiy 1rab nd lf they clo0 OU' Eul'opeu Allies would la y the blame in our l p The Preaident cnclu d whatever we do involves a riak however we mut make careful calculations and take a chance To do nothing woulcl be a great miata ke The blockade of Cuba on the importation ol offen dve weapons was to be undertaken all ship• would be atopped and thoae containing of enaive weapon• would not be permitted to proceed We ha ve no idea how the Bloc will react but the indlcationa are from unconfirmed aourcea they will attempt to run the blockade Initially the blockade would a ot extend to petrolewn Thia might· be a further step We are takina all mWtary preparationa for either an air strike or an inn aioa It waa the President'• considered judgment tha t lf we ha veto re1ort to active military actions then this would involve an invasion Ruak then •tated tbat our propoaed action gave the other aide a chance to pa UH They may pull back or they may rapidly intensify the entire ■ituatlon exi•ting between the Soviet Union and the United States Senator Rwuell then demanded sci-onger 1tepa 0 atated ho dld not think we needed time to pause The President had warned them in September and no further warlling wu uc eHary We must not take a gamble and must not temporize Xbrushchev b 1 once again rattled his miHilea he can become firmer and lrmer and we must react If we delay if we give notification if we telegraph our punches tho re1ult will be more a difficult military action and more American lives will be sacrifieed The thrut o Senator Russell'• rem l ka were to demand military action He did a ot specifically say by surprise attack however ho did not advocate warning - 2 - 276 80 Continued McNa m ra then deacr bed the b k d e ind ie tin th t thu might le d to aome form a mllitazy action that there would be many alternatlve cour•e• open to u The Praddant then -z m acme detail time required Vinson then ulr ed if the Joint Chief• of Stall a ctu 1 Uy approved or the inva ■ ion McNaxna r answered Ye Tho plans bad been developed over a 10-month period and bad been submitted to the President by the JCS on number o occaaions tho pl a n ■ NOTE Thia que ■ tion did not refer to whether the JCS did or did not approve the propoud a ction11 of bloc lr da agam t Cuba The Pre ■ ident then reviewed m tter• a g read an intelligence note from a United Nation• source which indicated Soviet intention to gra b Berlin Rua sell promptly replied th t larlln will a lwa ya be a ho ■ tago He then critici lsed the decision at ted we ahould go now and not wa it H llteck questioned whether we were baolutely ■ure theae were o en■ ive The President an■ wered a tively McNa znar a then made a most unuaual st t- -ut Ha a id One night question whether the isdlea re or re not o ensive However t' ere is no question a bout IL ZS ■ NOT E Thia wa a th o first ti e any·one ho a raised doubt a a to whether the MRBMli a nd the IRBMs • offensive missile ■ weapon■ 277 80 Continued Que•tion• were then raiaed concerninl the·attitude oJ our Alllee The Proaident advised atop• taken to ln orm our major Allies He then read the meuage received from the Prime Miniater which in effect agreed to support WI in the United Nations and then raised many warnings includin1 the dangers to Belin Turkey Pakistan Iran etc etc Sena tor Saltonstall brou1b1 u p the question of the legality of the blockade A great many Sena tors expi'ea•ed concern over the proposed action with the OAS indicating that they felt the OAS would delay rather than act Saltonstall then aakod whether a blockade would be legal 1 the OAS did not support it The President answered that it probably would not however we would proceed anyway Fulbright then stated that in hu opinion the blockade was the worst oJ the alternatives open to UII and it was definite allront to Ruaeia and that the moment that we had to damage or sink a Soviet ship bec uH af their failure to recognise or i-eapect the blockade we would be at war with Rusda and the war would be caused beca use of our own initiative The Pre•ident diaa1reed with thia thinking Fulbright then repeated bu position and •tated in hie opinion it would be fa r better to launc h an attack and to take out the buea from Cuba Mc Namara stated that this would involve the spilling of Russian blood since thllre were •o many thouaand Russians manning these bases Fulbright responded that this made no di ferenco because they were there l n Cuba to help on Cuban bases These were not Soviet buea There was no mutual defense pact between the USSR and Cuba Cuba was not a member 0£ the Warsaw Pact Therefore he felt the Soviet would not react if some Russians iot killed in Cuba The Ruasi n s in the final analysis placed little value on human life The time baa come for an inva•ion under the President'• •tatement of February 13th Fulbright rep·e a ted that an act on Russian ahi'pa is an a ct of war against Ru•aia and on the other band an att ck or a n invasion of Cuba waa an act again•t Cuba not Ruuia Fulbright also expressed reservations concerning the pouiblo OAS a c tion The Pr ident took iuue with Fulbright stating that ho felt that an attack on these bases which we knew were manned by Soviet personnel would involve large number• of Soviet caaualitiea and this would be more provocative than a c onfrontation with a Soviet ship - 4 - Tep ESIET t V S GNL-V 278 80 Continued Vwon tU'iK that f •trike ltrib with maximum force and wind the mau r up quickly a a th1a would involve the minh num o American loue• and uuur• the- maximum 11uppo rt by the Cuban people at 1ar1e 'lll'bo he r_ onac1 would very quickly 10 over to tho aide o the wbmer The m t1n1 wa 1 concl JQd at 6 35 60 permit the Preaf d ent to prepare for hi■ 7 00 o'clock talk to the natioD It wa 1 decided to hold a maetiz ia an Wedaeaday October 24th Du ring thi■ meeting Sen tor Hi k auoopff expreu hiznael u oppo■ ed to tba action and in favor af cllrec t milStary action He au ted that in hu oplnicn ships whlch wu• accoatecl on the high sea and turned back would be a more humiUatiq blow to the Soviets and more serious involvement to thaiz pride than the losing af u tnany a a 5 000 Soviet military peHomiel iU plly and Hcretly atationed in C JOHN A McCONE Director m b - 5 - fep ECIET -EYES ONLY Re1 erse Blank 279 81 Supplemenr 3 to Joinr Evaluation of Soviet Jfissi e Threat in Cuba 22 October 1962 Excerpt or SECRCT mllll Iii PSALM SUPPLEMENT 3 TO JOINT EVALUATION OF SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA PREPARED BY Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee National Photographic Interpretation Center 2200 HOURS 22 OCTOBER 1962 This re ort s h- s e-c c 1 rc-l-cti ely c dete p o o in er r t ti - o U-2 o - r-yhy - e en l C Oc o r 1952 1' issic ii 3101 15 Oc w -cr 19 2 Mission s 31C'2 llOJ 7 O c er i'z52 J li uio 'ls 3iC C 31CS C S 3107 2lC5 3 C 13 OG o cer 1 52 11 s Scn 3 11 19 0 1952 ' iu ic- 31i3 31 t l 0 Oc o 1 52 ssi i 3 il 3116 31i7 -T-EW PSALA 281 81 Continued fOP SECttIRONBARK PSALM I NOTICE This supplement up-dates and amplifies previous reports Emphasis ·continues to be placed on the READINESS status of the offensive missiles in Cuba This report is basedonpbotographiccove age through Mission 3117 of 20 October 1962 See Figure 1 SUMMARY l There are no changes in the estimates of operational readiness for the nine offensive missile sites See Figure 2 2 No new missile sites have been identified 3 The observed missile and launcher count is increasing as estimated Three addition MRBMs and four additional MRBM launchers raise the totals to 33 missiles and 23 launchers No lRBMs have been identified See Table l 4 One additional SAM site is now considered operational bringing the total indi idually operational sites to 23 of the 24 active sites so far identified See Table 2 5 No new intelligence in o rmation has been r eceived which modifies the nuclear storage situation since the last joint supplement - 1- PSALM 282 82 McCone Memorandum of Meeting of Executive Commitlee of the NSC 10 00 a m October 23 1962 -- re · · - •· - • - · - • -· l MEMORANDUM or MEETINC OJ 10 00 a m •• October 23 1962 COMMITTEE OF THE NSC PRESENT The Pra•ident Vice Pnaidam Secty McMama ra S cty Ci Upu rlc C- Taylor Mr B1miy S Cty 15 11 Secty J'ohmon Amlt T lompeoa Anoraey Gmwral t a 1 McCone aa-ve brief bal8ll t1msce nport U COT■red by ihe attached document Deacripti aota ttadl JCftld1hl dlapl -ed the n toat Ncnit photographa and a map • bowizla per ce nt covera1e o the island 1 2 Robert Kemledy atated 111at tu cputloa Md bee11 i-wed u why tha aituation was ut repori c earlier what wroas with our to 1Dtalll1•J1C• lt wu qNed ihat the npWlty with which Ute MlU3M site comitnsction took place and oth«7 neta took place accom ited for th• suddenneH of th• f Ddlng• and daal the laderahlp and •deeud preH ahoald be contacted priY tcly Actions I Cl wu reqaa1tad to comac t J albrtght Ru sell Vwon Hall Dlrkeen Dd HiCMJllooper ud for tlw pre••• Aleop luock and David La wreace l McNamara r lHd qaatiOSlS of wba block ad• prodamatiOD will be issued become effective and dleC lSSN plan a for the Intercept ol the f'lnt ehlp which woald be tile ChnOY8k It acided that if OAS acted on Tuesday the proc temetfoa oald be laa- ed ■ffectf•• Wednnd y inornln October 24 the flHt miereept would be mad• Gin tb t day •• The Pr-■ldent dlacuaeed the pro1nm dafaidln1 the atepe taken stated -rlier action woald Dot haTII been npportec and woald not ha ve abut oH tha pouibllity ol m1Hil empbaalsed thu mobile m1HilH ca came hi t any ti - aad be Nt ap rapidly 5 McN m n dl■ •ed ■ -ra1 mOftary et loas tnclucillls N 'Y ' Dd Marina Corpe panonn l and a xt 8nsion o toara o duty o nra appravec th••• -- 283 82 Continued 6 McNamar• then rat • qu•tlola of reaction to fbln1 on a u-2 wilcated pilou ln•tnacted t o take actloll• It wu dec ld•d that we would be lmmedlattiy Worm-' tbroup ICS to the Secretary of elenH and a prompt decwloo for retaltatioau WOlJld then be made by tbe Preaident Taylor nported elaht tu ck aircra t are maintained in hot alert ud can de■troy SAM site• within two houn or approzhnately the tlme that tke u 2 would et back if the attack on it £ailed McNamara contlnned that alr••• r cue wu continuin1 It wu decided that if tb• Preat•en t not avaulabl• McNamara would have pthorSty to act Acticnu C•aeral Taylor qroed that he would take up and c ontlrm todayCL reque•t that OIU' representatlvH be ■tatlonttd with rcs plamun1 at lf and ln the naa Plot and in tb• JCS War Room If there i• any delay on tha pl•u• lntorm me ao that 1 can asahl coinmunic ate with Taylor 7 McNamara noted that tbey had no air intercept capability and would not attempt at thi• time to dndop tbelr plu of air intercept Action It wu requ■ted that C1A and De anae urefully analyse air 'intirc and report currently so that 1 tbere la a marked build-up the CommlU • will be ach-l■ed and appropriate actlcm can be taken a McNamara then preaented tha ued for ■blpplng ndlcatlng between 125 and 130 Merchant ahlpa - re 11 ded to ■upport an lnvaalon and that few had been chartered u of ye■terday He felt perhaps 2 0 more could be Hcured promptly but thle - c llld leave about 100 abort and thl• would invohe oxtanaiva requiaitionlng McCou pointed out tho •erioua co equuee to Amaric an uutH lntercout l and coa1t•wi1e ·•hipping the Northwe•t lllmber induatry et cetera et CfStera McCone •ut1uted coulcleratlon be aiven to t king oreian fla1 ■hip• on a bare boat hula Defense waa asked to explore th• poulbllity of tempol'U'Y waiYH' ol la reaulating o ratio1 1 of foreign flag ahipa et cetera et cetera 9 McCone and McNamara ral••d the ipe•tion of low level flights Action Six fil1ht• won appro ed ud General Taylol' ordered the of immedlately It wu pre■umed that they will return not later than 1 00 o'clock today I - - - 0 ' ' 'f H -- ' I J- -1 i -2- 284 82 Continued It u very lmportalll tba1 NPlC Uld DCit• oflice recei -e prints at •a rU t m mnent DDCI to follow Al■o important th at if the photography ill prodactiq af uw ad znore coimacu g in orm ation print■ •hould aad to CioYerDOr o a a t once 10 The Pr ldant -atioa of Mcuit - ol OIU' OWD ir lie Id• 1A norid ctcuiq aupriM 111r fiDc nc kNaman and Oilpatric ur med rupoulhllitr 11 After a 'brief diac uaiaa of commiudcatloaa S mdy atated th t subject Ul Jer •tudy 'by Dr Wi aer aad ur ed State Delea a• and CIA com numicatiou ■ pecialiata w eoJltaet Wiasur A ctloa Followillg mfftiq McCone wi n r Smith and Mtward• m • rmnred the CIA Latin Americ an comr name ticm ey■tam Subject left or funher dlac uaaioll today · A ctlon Thi■ whole comn nmle tioa pNblem u to 119 followed up wqetlcally by CIA with Wiuur and all appropriate action a taken 12 Secretary Ball reported OoYernor Steveu■on and Mr McCoy elt th•y did not hav• onou1h imormatlcm to make a cocvindD caa• before th• UN Security Council They reqvHtecl 1 a lara• map aia rked in color ■howini the ac tual locatioas of a few of tbe aitoa pouibly one MR BM •It a one lRBM aite ud ona or two air fie Ida 2 plctaree of th• alt•• •howina proereuive comit%UCtioa with-d tu indicated 3 lndic aticm bat not nece■ -arU y tbe msxnben of all-o the ■ltea 4 a pre-May 1 1960 U-2 picture o tba Soviet MRBM IRBM aite to ■bow ■imilarity Action The Committee left matcer of 1adosure to McCone daepaici of Lun dabl and Clta to New Tork for ducusaiona and Hi■tanc e in developing SteYa aoa'• acenario McCoae authorb ed item• one two a ml three bov• but refued Uem 4 Alao a1rHd tran•nut low-level product to St T-■ if aam• ueful 13 Bo ndy espl incd idea of cn tiq a ataff to support the Committee l Ddicatini each mmnher abGald h Te a workinz at U member detail■ to be 'llf'Orked out lat tr Action DDCI •bOQld comidar appropriate a n i a ter confening 'lrithStata and o ten■ e and termimas tbeb nomin■ H Thu will be niore or l••• full aDd thi9 atafl m ll C z1 handl e Aa repre ■ enta tion and alao napport m e 1o m A McCone - 3 - R l l ·erse Blank 285 Di r 83 McC-One Memorandumfor the File Meetings with Mr Krock Mr D n id Lawrence and Mr Scott 23 October 1962 October 3 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE SUBJECT Meet1naa with Mr Krock Mr D vid Lawrence and Mr Scott At 12 40 Mr Arthur Krock c lled at my oflic• at my iaritation I reviewed the aita ation generally nth hiin answeriZlE qiieation• c oncerning the background of the deciaions the arguments in aTOr ol th• courae of action verau• a blockade coupled with the political debate cm the one hazi d 4'nd surprlae military Ct1ou on the other Krock aeeined in gen e 'al •greement with the c e ol action At 5 00 o 1c loclt t my invitation Mr D vid La wrence and Mr Scott c alled at my office and I rrriewed the altu tion with thef Thay qaHtioned me cODCenu n the mdaDee Dd I ahawed them several picturea •hich they eceptad 11 evidence They cpeatioued me in considerable detail u to why we did t know thia aooner how Keating got hi• IJl onnation and the panetratiou of intelli genc e activities dtllina the month a af a t mid September I explained the •ltuation subatautialJy •• outlined to the luder■hip at their meeting l elt that neither wu couvinc ed and that both attached aome other motive to the timi l 1a• However they did rec ogni e tb t RBM aitea e n be inatalled quickly and with very little adv DCed preparation which can be detected Botll geutre c qu ationed me at con aiderable length u to dmtnia a ticm apokHmeu ■poke ao cateiiorically that the build-tip was pa rely de e ulve and that no o fenlive capability waa being lnatalhd They nre coucerned about repeated ■tat ement• by th• Pre■ide at Cheater Bcwiea the Vice FrHldeut and other Adininbtratlon apokesm8ll biit m oat particularly the State I'ep rtnumt briefing held oa Thursday October 18th which wu two or three d y■ after the ori in l data wa a in cmr at which time ti briefer• again repeated the •tatemenl that the b-alld-up involved de sn■ ive ud no offensive weapon a They aaid they thoaaht tbia 'brle inz - a deceptive miatake and wondered why the brle ing wa a e rried OQ why hand• 287 83 Continued I inadvertently met with Mr Scotto the Scott Allen combin tion who acco•ted me a• I headed Senate Oflice Build in Ho u id McCone I we're goma to have to blow you out o thi• wat•ra or not reorganbin1 your ••timating proce1H• mo•t particularly your Board of National Eatirnater In answer to my cpe•tion a■ to why he 1a id On October the 4th the Board put out a National E1timate which ha• Hrved to guide our government in ita policy and thla Estimate atated that the Soviet• would not install of en■ive miaaile1 in Cuba aa doing 10 would con• 1titute a change in policy on th- r part and would confront them with problem• all over the world which Ui y the Soviet• did not wiah to face at thia tune Scott said that he felt that such an Estimate waa reckl•••• it did not eerve the Government in e ■tablbhing pollcy and it wae a frightful diuervice to the people of the United State ■• He nid this was ju11t another e x mple of how the CIA ••tim ting proceHea were not objective and served special intereste Hence he iiaid they were going to prepare an article and expose the whole situation to the public I merely atated I knew nothing about any such • stirnate gu••• ACTION Scott apP arently ha• read the la teat Cuban • atirnate published about· September 20th which contain• wording a a quoted above Source ol hi• information un• known I feel Grogan ehould talk with hini and perhapa I 1hould talk with him al 10 • u NOTE In my dbcuseions with all the above people Congreeaional an i•Pre••• I have been forced to defend the Executive Branch of the Govenunent and CIA again■t the queetions l why did we not know about thi• aooner and 2 did we not ••ti -nate or forecaet thia eventuality JOHN A MC CONE 288 84 fcCone femorandumfor the File ·' feelings ·ith Senator Russell Senaror Hickenlooper and Chairman Vinson 23 October 1962 _ _ - _ - t I _ · ' - -_· ---- ----- --· - ---r O obe 23 c 962 SUBJECT l eet gs ·i6 Se a o 3 - sse Se a o - - c 'e o e and C iair ar Ybso 1 At e P -esident's -ec r est co tac eC se• ·e -al e be -s o e leade shio o ±e Congress w h he ollo· · z es 2 ts i - a S enator R• sse 'l nc Catec - a _ess · · · 1 r ee ing on - - 3 re c - t cai attitude toward Aci ministration policy than was e ·ice t at the leadership meeting the night be o e -se 1 ge e -al app -o ·ec t e plan of actions indicating st ong eservatio ' s co ce - g - e effectiveness and the utility of the bloc ac e expressed serious concern over the Soviet U S confrontation which would result from the blockade and accepted the course of action only because it would lead to the next phase which would be t ½at of taking the missiles and offensive weapons out of Cuba at a t -le and by means of our own determination Russell favored more positive action against Cuba which woulci involve not only air strike but invasion In the initial part of the discussion he elt the President's speech had not establisheci a clear-cut right for military action however by careful reference to the speech a copy of which I had with me he agreed that the wording ciid give the President right of action without fu rther notification In general Russell's attitude was consicierably different than the leadership meeting and might be summed up as reservec approval •· °' 4 •s't During the conversation I outlined nY eelings fr at ou purposes must be to remove the missiles and also to re ove Castro as is outlined in a separate mernoranclu 'Tl Z Senator Hickenlooper approved the speech foe action a 1C the anticipated urt 1- er action without -ese - ·atio - He ex iressed con dence in tr e P -es ce - as c c Sena or 3 usse b 't se -io s -ese - ·ations co 1ce -ning so - - e o t e F -es c e 's ac· - sors ho he 'elt r ·o C i - e ce 1 e P es C e - t o 'cl lo _ a · e- - • 1 · ea ar C CO o ' si g l e Ho 01 e· ·e t a eareC to e -- a - e -- loope was greatly eEevec lY t e speec ar - - o -e sat s ec w o ir Cuba l Oli cy a i · i ·as eviCe t a b e leaCe -s p - eet g 289 84 Continued 3 Chairman Vinson stated that he thought the speech was good He approved it but he had concluded that military action would be necessary and this he heartily approved Vinson feels that we must dispose of the Castro problem as well as the missiles In this regard I outlined my feelings as covered by separate memorandum Vinson tended to review the activities of the Navy with Admiral Anderson and others insisting that we must be sure that we are going to do enough that our blockade is going to be effective and that if we invade we must invade with great force an assured victory quick victo ry otherwise Cuban resistance will be rallied and our casualties will be great He stated that 250 000 men wouldc 1le not enough that it would take 500 000 men that we should land at least 10 or more points in Cuba at one time and if we did this the entire Cuban population would come to our side Note Both Vinson and Russell were very inquisitive as to the position of the Joint Chiefs I explained this as expressed by Taylor pointing out that their position of a sudden unannounced military strike was reasonable in view of their responsibilities however it must also b e recognized that civilians with broader responsibilities i e military and political as well mcessarily had to moderate the JCS view I state d that l felt the JCS view would insure the most successful military operations with the least American losses but that I opposed it and felt that the military handicaps resulting from our course of action in military operations must be reve rted to can be overcome by increase in the weight of the military operation None of the three felt that we should have undertaken a surprise attack however Rus s ell in particular felt that a warning and a following military operation might have been preferable to the blockade I pointed out that the warning now had been given and action could be taken now at a tune of our own choosing and by m e ans of our own determination and after again reviewing the wording of the speech Russell agreed this was correct JOHN A MC CONE JAM mfb 290 85 McCone Memorandum for the File Executive Committee Meeting on 23 October 1962 6 00 p m HP SECltT r-· • -_ ---· 7 23 October l MEMORANDUM roR THE FlLE SOB1ECT Executive ColnmlUa• ting on 23 October 19 6 00 p m All member• pre act plu• Co1m ael for Dc mue Departme m 1 ComrntUee reviewed the b l procl mation and approud U It wu 1ip ed by tu Freaident at 6 00 p c 2 The Pn•tdait instructed McNamara to rrriew all details o hl strac Uoua to the ileet Comm Ddera rap rd itlg proceduna to followed in the blockade There was an eJCtanded d lacuaaton of act1o a to be taken Ullder varlou• aaaumed Sariet resbtance actiYitl heh u a failing to atop b refualna riaht to bo rd c shlpa tunung around heading in anoth r direction etc 3 Di•c ualion of the effect on U S lndutry by chartering and preem ptlng the uae o 20 or 30 American ahipa Gilpatric reported that thi• would have little or no effect 011 the Americ an economy McCone qaeaUo ned lheae finding■ however Cill tric said that thi• had been thoroughly atudled 1 d McCone'• con c erns u expreHed 1 the morning meeting were umounded The Attormiy General etated that it was within the law to UH foreip bottoma however decision waa made lO preempt U S botto na and not worry about the come1111ence• becauH they would not be serioua -4 'l'he PNaidem urged that Noratad be retalncd at SHAPE durmg the pedod cl criei• perhaps until 1 February 63 Ha JncUcated Lemmtser ini ht be used u CINCEUR with Noratad remafftfn u SACEUR Bundy atated that W• la compUcated u the two poets ue ao co-mingled that thay really must be held by on a man Taylor niaed que•tion that i thia was doae it W'OQld 1mrt Lemmtser1 • prestige The President a aid that he felt that Kontad _ •o risnced and so capable aJJd bu Ju d ment ao IJOIIUX u rride nced by tod y'• cable copy af which I h Te nat seen that 1- wowd take the riak of NATO country critid ama lie did not th1alt that t s a r woald be hurt he wuhcd Noutad ta remain Defense to take lmder advuemeJ 1 t and report withln 24 hours '6 In the prolonged discussion of report on Civil Oefeiuie problem• Preeidant seemed p rti ly c erned over the altnat1on if we •bawd 1annch att aeu which might reault m lour or fly• misailea being delivered cu the United Stat ee DOD ■ pok earnen atated th at the uea covered by the 1100 mile miaeilea ll r volved 92 million peo lle They elt that fall-out wu a 'nllabl• though •P3-C• -Qf 3E6iET 291 85 Continued -l9P JEGIH -EYES_QNLY· not equipped for about 40 million The Preaidem asked what em rgency etepa could be taken Replied that many urangementa could be made without too much publicity such as repoaitioning food actwuly obtaining space putting up shelter signa etc l cot the concluion that not very much could or would be done1 that whatever was done would involve 1' great deal cf publicity and public alarm Prior to the departure of Secretary McNamara at approximately 7 00 o 1cloclc McCone who had not been called upon £or an intelligence apprai1al •tated to th• President that he felt certain int lligenc e should be reported to the meeting prior to the departure of Secretary McNamara u aome item• obeerved by the Intelllgence Comm Urlty might prove of great aignific4%1Ce JOHN A McCONE Director JAM m b fiif SECRET EYES ONL¥- 292 86 Supplement 4 to Joint £ a uation of Soviet fissile Threat in Cuba 24 October 1962 Excerpt SUPPLEMENT 4 TO JOINT EVALUATION OF SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA PREPARED BY Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee National Photographic Interpretation Center·· OlC-0 HOURS 24 OCTOBER 1962 ir is r-E Ort is b s on n icfr 'e -y c e Ictc ho i er ret ie 'll o_f l · 2 c s r 7 - c c - - ll O ' u· i 2 JJ iss O I 3101 S Oc o' et i 2 MissJ s J'lC2 3 03 i7 o Sc - l'i 2 kis - u 21 3iCS 1C 5 3101 cs 21c a Oc e l'S 52 1 lis s c - 2 l i9 0 u 1 52 °'j-s s cn 3ii3 2 i ic Oc - er i 52 Y iss' i i5 n 5 17 _ 22 C o cr 5'62 l u c 'l na 3 'i9 t i 23 C -o 0 t c i c sis of jssicx 2 293 1 86 Continued I IRONBARK -NOTICE Th is supplem ent updates and amplifies previous reports Emphasis cc mtinues to be placed on the READINESS status of the offensive missiles in · Cuba This report is based on U-2photographic coverage ¢rough Mission 3119 of 22 October 1962 see Figure 1 Some_ of Mission 5002 the io _ al itude photographic coverage of 23 October 1962 arrived_ during the preparation of this report and preliminary comments have been incorporated in the discussion of the Guanajay IRBM sites Analysis has· jus started and will require many hours for completion ' SUMMARY 1 There are two changes in the estimated dates of full operational capability San Cristobal MRBM Site· 2 and Sagua La Grande MRBM Site 1 are now estimated to achieve this status on 25 October instead of·22 Octo- ber as previously estimated 2 Np new missile sites haye been identified See Table· l 3 No IRBMs per se have _yet beeri identified · 4 Seven Soviet ships with cargo hatch-openings of 75 feet or longer have now been identified as possible ballistic missile c rriers They have made 13 trips to Cuba 'to date and three are·currently enroute to Cuba 5 No new intelligence information has been received which modifies the nuclear storage situation · -- - 1- 294 87 Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum The Crisis USSR Cuba 24 October 1962 Excerpt ·-• 1G-PSBeHBr · • • AGENCY _ t ·· · f · · -_-- - -· THE CRISIS USSR CUBA 24 Octo er 1962 THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL JFOPSECREX 295 87 Continued ·· -iOP SECRET - SUMMARY CONTENTS -- 24 October 1962 1 We do not believe the measures to achieve a higher degree of action readiness for Soviet and bloc forces are being taken· on a crash basis Communist reaction to the US quarantine action against Cuba has not gone beyond the highly critical but uncommitting statement issued yesterday by the Soviet government 2 Surveillance of Cuba indicates continued rapid progress in completion of IRBM and MRBM missile sites No new sites have been di3covered Buildings believed to afford·nuclear storage are being assembled with great rapidity Cuban naval units have been ordered to blocking positions at Banes and Santiago Bays 3 Survey of Soviet shipping shows 16 dry cargo nd 6 tanker ships en route to Cuba Of these 22 nine are in positions which would permit arrival by the end of October Three shi shave hatches suitable for missile handling 4 Official world reaction shows a generally favorable response to the US action particularly in Latin America The OAS representatives approved a resolution endorsing the quarantine without opposition one abstention was due to lack of instructions 5 There are no indications of any Soviet aircraft movements to Cuba 296 88 fcCone femorandumfor the File ·sotes on Leadership feeting on October 24th 1962 at 5 00 p m 15 October i962 Oc tobor ZS 1962 MEMCR NDOM i'OR THE i'l I E SUBJECT Notu on Leadership W atlng on Octeber 2-ith 1962 at 5 00 p m At ended b l Congnuional _L deuhip u c spt Sen Ator Hayden th• President Ru alt McNamaza McCcn e a nd Robert Lovett Secretary Rusk reportod on the lJmted Nationa at ted there ia no c onfirmed Soviet -eaction or atatemtmt of i 1 tentlona but dac11ued oxch ange with Bertrand llu ■ell am cilamiuod thi11 1 uncfilc W Tha Pnaldent c ategorically stated on ••ve -al oc caaion• th 'ough tho a1eetlng the ro waa no o rmal o r ln ormal dlreet approach or a Kennedy Kh ruahchev meeting and no negoti tiou a toward that end McN m ra reported on military operatiolu atated that as of thia hour thors bad been no intercepUana er Soviet ahipa ncme were nece11 ■ary McNamara very ca-re ully avoided ny atatom ct1 that ship• bad turned around Notet McNama -a•• atat ms nta were n ot co nautent with reporta that an iDtercept had b9em attempted at 10 35 a m with the KIMOVSK and th t the 1hip had turned aro Uld when con ronted by a Navy vesael M nafield apok e o the unporta nce o con ldent1al nature o the meetina re orring to Roland Evana' article in th• Herald Triban• which aummarised in accurate detail view• o all who attended the prior meeting It waa the consensa that the ducuaaion• t leaderahip neetin • mu1t be kept moat ccm tdantlal Rusaell complirnemeci S cntazy Ruik on the ana nimou t OAS ac tio 1 al d hi a w usually compUrna tary remarks wen atrongly aupported by Dirben Hiclte nlooper llld Man afield Rusk tlusn rep r -d th at Secretary General O Tbal l t would hs'l e a statement cal ling or a two-•e·u montorln There waa 10 coucluaiOD aa to the United StaUt• JUwer 297 88 Continued Oirk#c thn bs-ouaht up tu •tloll cl a S Ullmlt m •thla •tatma that he lelt auch a comroat atiOll betwfftl leu 1•bcbe• and KeDnedy at thi• moment wol ld i ue1eaa arOlmd r111•• were blbhecl Uldicating that coaat ructi're n• U woaW develop Tbe Preaidezu asl'eeds •tated that •• maat now waU atU Jae confrcm tation ol ■hip aSld that the De xt 14 hou• will brbl1 out lmportant develop• m•11ta ••• McCone wa a tbell quoatiolled c011eembl1 c•nafA imeWgonce - - -· · · • i -- '- ' ' tlon d about Hport4d Cllb n ordel'a not to shoot attacked McCcme atated that thi• Wo-rmattoo had come 1hrough lnteW1ouo chaDnela aDd Hamed to b• col'H_c t Smatun then ulcri regarif Ag C11ba c lteown miaail• alt••• M Coq ftpliecl Cub m • ucludod xc ept lor camp con atruction 1ld tb4t11 lt waa •pol'tecl t lay were kept undor careful auveWance imle•• Fulbright q aHtioned McNamua at •om• teqth concerning hia prepar ticm e lor iilvaaion ncl apecUically •la ether aU •teps •ore taken ao tan invasion colald b ildtiat44 1n a minimum tune ••keel McNamara atated t h t all pi-elimmary •t•P• ••r• beinJ takeii outl uung •o ol the details but aot IDAAY ol th em Uaat l'e ration• 1 4tln made so th t an iilvaat co id be ecompUahed with the 7-d y lead time diacua d at pH-riou me•tinl•• ••re MeetinJ adjoul'Ued the PrHid e Heldn aas-eea MUt that the leaderalup would remaiil 011 8-hwl' alert Job A McCone Dlnctol' J AM mfb at I et KGIET · f¥ES ·ONLY-- 298 89 Supp emenl 5 to Joinl Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba 24 October 962 Excerpt SUPPLEMENT 5 TO JOINT EVALUATION OF SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA PREPARED BY Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee National Photographic Interpretation Center·· 2200 HOURS 24 OCTOBER 1962 Th1s report I• based on r-eiatively complete photo rnterp citlon of U•2 pl otogtophy made on 1-C O to 4 1962 JoUss 3101 15 Oc1o cr 19o2 l Uui-• 3102 3103 17 Odobtt 1962 lUuion• 31Ci 3105 31C6 ll07 Jlct 3109 18 Oct- 1962 J l ssian Jlli 19 Oct- 1962 lUssi0 3113 311-420 Oc 4 1962 M ss on 311S 3116 3117 22 Odo u 1962 l llsslan 3118 3119 a d Of' t'£lati - fy t n • photo int -tion of low c-vel l o- c- y of lliss an 5001 5006 of 23 Octo» 1962 299 89 Continued t-iOTICE This supplement updates and amplifies previous reports Emphasis continues co be placed on the EADINESS status or changes therein of the offensive missiles in Cuba This report is base _i on photographic coverage through Mission 5005 of Tuesday 23 October 1962 see Figure 1 The quality of the recent low-altitude photography permits positive identification of many types of missile associated equipment SUM 1ARY 1 As ye there is no evidence of change in the pace of construction acrivities 2 There are no changes in the estimated dates of operational capability for the MRBM and IRBM sites see Figure 2 3 No additional missiles missile transporters or erectors have been identified see Table 1 4 No new missile sites have been identified 6 sites There is increasing evidence of the use of camouflage at several 7 Thr ee of the Soviet ships suspected of b ing possible ballistic missile carriers enrouce to Cuba are reportedly altering their course - 1- 300 89 Continued 8 We have analyzed the capability of the Soviets to tra sporc nuclear warhea s for these missiles from the liSSR w Cuba using suhn iarines and aircrafL Vhile submarine transport is possible au- transport is more IU ely A TU-114 can fly non- sr op fromOlenya L ct e Soviet Union to Cuba wir up to 10 nuclear warheads on an approx inate great circle route which would not pass over any other country 9 New low-altitude photography of 23 October confirms previous estimates of the general characteristics and rate of construction of the Probable nuclear warhead bunkers at several s_ites We are at this time unable to determine whether these bunkers are for storage or checkout of nuclear warheads or for both of these functions -Reverse Blank 301 90 Ceniral Intelligence Agency Memorandum 'The Crisis USSR Cuba 25 October 1962 Excerpt _ G E • T R ·A L·- r N T E L L f G E N CE A G E N C Y _ 0 f 1 fr •_ 7r - · - - 5 'JC THE CRISIS USSR CUBA Information as of 0600 250ctccer1962 n EPARED FOil ntt EXECl1I1VE COMMlTTU OF THE NATIONAL SEOJUTY COtJNCIL r u t m m l D nao MAnoN · C O N T A IS NOT A 11THOllIZED HIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERlaj ·r 303 90 Continued 25 October 1962 SUMMARY CONTENTS I No change has been noted in the scope or pace of the construction at the IRBM and MRBM missile sites in Cuba Cuban armed forces continue their alert with military aircraft on standdown since the morning of 23 October There are indications that known and suspected dissidents are being rounded up II As of 0600 EDT at least 14 of the 22 Soviet ships which were known to be en route to Cuba had turned back Five of the remaining eight are tankers Two of the dry cargo ships not known to have reversed c o u r s - e ma be carr in n but the BE LOVODSK has 12 HOUND helicopanges n cours appear o ave been executed in midday on 23 October before the President signed the proclamation establishing the quarantine III _We still see no signs of any crash procedure in measures to increase the readiness of Soviet armed forces Bloc media are playing up Khrushchev's 24 October statement that he would consider a top-level meeting useful IV · There is as yet no reaction to the turn-around of Soviet shipping which had not become publicly apparent Attention remains centered on neutralist efforts in the UN to find machinery for easing tension Canada bas searched a Cubana airliner flying from Prague to Havana Latin American countries are beginning to offer military units for the quarantine and there is generally little adverse reaction in the hemisphere 304 91 fcCone femorandumfor the File Executive Commizcee Meeting 10 25 62-10 00 a m October 25 196Z MEMOR A IDUM FOR THE FILE SUBJECT Executive Co ittee Meeting 10 25 62 -- 10 CO a m All Members present McCone reported on intelligence reviewir g su ary of ZS October including penciled memorandn s a■ indicated plua Cline i nei norandmn of LS October on talks with Sir 3 enn eth StroJ1g and the Na tch port of same date I ca lied ■pecW attention to the BELOVODS ' and reported on Pago ll-5 and the searching of the Cubana airplane by C dia n■ _a s reported on page IV -Z Also the shipping schedule McNamara reported that at 7 00 o'clock a destroyer intercepted the tanker BUCHAREST which responded destination was Havana cargo wa a petroleum and the BUCHAREST was permitted to proceed under surveillance He stated that no United States Navy ahip• had orders to boa rd He recommended orde ra be iss xed to immediately board Bloc ships and then the BUCH ARES be boarded Decision was reached that Navy be instructed to boa rd the next Soviet ship contacted which would be the GROZNY a tanker but which was carrying a deck load which might be missile field tanks Later in the eeting decision was reached not to board the BUCF AREST Contact waa to be made with the GROZNY as early as possible and tha t wa ■ e11timated to be about 8 00 o'clock in the evening Friday October 26th -f Qr SECRET · 305 91 Continued McCone then noted he number o ships in the Eastern Atlantic and in the Baltic and Mediterranean which had turned baclc Dillon a sked about ahips in the Pacific The President asked whether Soviet ahips bound elsewhere than Cuba had changed course McCone said he would report on this in the afternoon There was a further discussion o the policy o stopping or hailing non-Bloc ships It was decided that all ships must be hailed Rnak raised the question o d iacuuiona with the United Nationa Draft of U S • reply to the U Thant letter waa approved with modifications It was agreed at the meeting that we must insist upon the removal ol missiles from Cuba in addition to demands that construction be stopped and that UN iDspectors be per -nitted at once Bundy reviewed Khrushchev letter to the President o the 4th o October and the Kennedy reply McNamara raised the c peation o acceleratiDg or raising the eacalation o the actions ve have so ar taken expressing concern over the plateau indicating determination to meet our ulti nate objective o taking out the miai ile aitea 306 91 Continued Ruak then aaked certain actions on the part of CIA a a followa l An an awer to qnestiona of the effect on Cuba becauae hip• were tu med about aa ind i ted in recent report• 2 What had happened to Soviet which were boand elsewhere than Cuba 3 The ieneral Caban reaction to our actions to date •hip• a Do they lc low about Soviet missiles b Have they heard the Pre aidtn it I s speech c What ia the morale in Cuba McCone promised answers John A McCone Director JAM mfb a t - - Reverse Blank 307 92 fcCone femorandum for ihe File '' leering oj the SSC Executive Commiuee 25 October 5 00 p m 26 October 962 T 26 October 196 Z ME OR ANDUM FOR THE FILE SUEJECT Meetiq al the -SC Executive Committee 25 October 5 00 P M ALL MEMBERS PRESD- 'T McCone gave ltdll1m ca brle iD covenc by SltuaUon Report ol 10 25 followed with resume cf Bloc ahippina- SC ll064 62 dued 10 ZS and 1wnmarlzed anawen to •i-c iCic que ■ti01U u in i c tec on the third e bo re orrecl bri•lly tc-roa c tion to the Soviet gOYermnent statcment There followed long diacuaaicn o policy m Uars note• of which ra covered in the attached The meating conaider•d tlue1 1 dza t oi 1csnarloa of three poaaible cour■e cf action that ia air atrike the politic path a nd proireaaive economic blocltadG all o which re a tta ched J'OHN A McCONE rector Attached Two pages o notes on a nall White House zt0te paper Sltaation Report 10 25 - 3 pages SC U0M 62 Cana dlan Reaction OCI 356 3 62 Draft Scenario or Ai uuik• Political Path ProgreHh·e Economic Blockade JA ¼ b -l 11 SECRET Re erse Blank 309 93 SC Carter femorandumfor the Director ' fO GOOSE Operations and Gt neral Lansdale 's Problems 25 Oczober 1962 25 Octobe - 1962 Y E - iOR ' DU i FOR THE DIRECTOR SUIHECT 1ONGOOSE Operations anc General Lansc ale's P -oble s l You asked me to give you a pa er by 5 00 p · today on tee San Roman Atto rney General Harvey Lansdale ' fONC-OOSE oble n in co ection with submarines and the 50-Cuban p roject I have talked only to Bill Ha rvey but in the light of my p -ior k i owl·edge of Special Group MONGOOSE La asdale voice level etc it is my clear opinion that this whole problem is centered a ro ci jurisdictional bureaucracy not unlike the tangle I had v - th Gilpatr c and the Air Forces 2 Lansdale feels badly cut out of the picture am appears to be seeking to reco stitute the MONGOOSE Special G r oup operations during this period of impending crisis I need not tell you that Lansdale's o r ganization and the MONGOOSE concept of clearing actions through Special Group is an impossible procedure under current circumstances 3 The delibe r ative MONGOOSE system was not utilized for this particular project Ha i vey rightly realized that intelligence collection was essential and that it should be geared to a turnover of the assets to the military in place in the event military operations took place It wa s this requirement that generated the need for submarines and the need for the 50-odd Cubans General Johnson of the JCS Staff was knowledgeable and General Lansdale was subsequently informed and assisted in obtaining the submarines The detailed planning is still going on but cannot be firm until the submarine commanders are available The Cubans are net ov ned by S Roman but have been recruited ar d checked out by CIA and in a u be - of cases have bee i CL- agen s or a lo ig ti e t for ately s 3 o i_ e othe -- exile group lea C e- -s is look g out o e · 1tu -e c San Ro 311 93 Continued C· - 2 - 4 The targets planned for this operation as have been previously indicated to you are to include the MRBM and IRBM sites This is p re intelligence collection and the establishment of intelligence assets in place It is being closely coordinated with the JCS Planning Staff and Lansdale knows about it It obviously cannot be planned controlled and operated through the cumbersome procedures of MONGOOSE and therefore it is not in MONGOOSE channels 5 I am convinced that if we are to have military operations in Cuba and even now during this doubtful period of heavy military involvement in planning for such operations the direct CIA-JCS coordinated liaison and control must be effected -- the time has long since passed for MONGOOSE-type Special Group-type consideration 312 94 Supp emem 6 to Joinc Emlua1ion of Sm·iet fissile Threat in Cuba 26 October 1962 Excerpt - · - · - i tt ti • ·-- - • A - r - · _ · - - SUPPLEMENT 6 TO JOINT EVALUATION OF SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA PREPARED BY Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee National Photographic Interpretation Center 0200 HOURS 26 OCTOBER 1962 Thi s re port is based on relotively c om let e oto inter• pr tcrlon of U-2 pl-iotog c hy cede on 1 C Oc1c -r 1%2 W is sic i 101 15 Oe c ' -e- 1%2 M issiee s 3la2 31 J 17 Oc o be 1 2 SJ i s s ic - s Jl nos 3 C6 3107 31C 31Gl la Octic ct 1%2 M issi- 3 111 19 Oe cW 1 2 Wiss o s 3113 3 3i e 200 o 1 52 M ui s311S 3115 117 22 O e i 2 -1 issic s 3i1S nv 312 23 O r - 1t S 2 J li ssiOC 's 3 121 3 2-2 ll -02 G 5- C C C 5 2S Oct cr i lif2 il i ss o - 3125 c - p rt i -i•c y e- lysis o i -• i i p½ • -g y f ssion s S J7 SCCo C 9 Oll 12 $Ci3 l4 15 016 - --- ' -- ' _-- _ ---- u· - a 7 _ - ••_ •· - _ i •• 313 94 Continued 'FOP NOTICE This supplement updates and amplifies previous reports Emphasis is · placed on the READINESS status construction pace and any significant changes at the offensive issile sites in Cuba This report is based primarily on preliminary analysis of the 2s··october low-altitude photography portions of which arrived during the preparation of this report see Figure 1 SUMMARY 1 The 25 October photography of four MRBM sites shows continued rapid construction activity at each site This activity apparently continues to be directed toward achieving a full operational capability as· soon as possible Camouflage and canvas covering of critical equil 'ment is also continuing As yet there is evidence indicating any intention to move or dismantle these sites '- 2 There· is one change in the estimated dates of operational capability San Cristobal MRBM Site 2 is estimated to achieve a full operat onal cap bility on 26 October insteadof25 October probably as a result of the heavy rain that has recentlr hit this site see Figure 2 3 No additional missiles missile transporters or erectors have been identified see Table 1 4 No new missile sites have been identified although continued analysis of previous photography has revealed some road improvement · activity in the emedios area which ·is co 1rsidered indicative of plans for the second IRBM site estimated for this area 5 The three Soviet ships suspectedofbeing possible ballistic missile carriers continue their eastward course towards the USSR - 1- 314 95 Cerural Iruelligence Agency Memorandum 'The Crisis USSR Cuba 26 October 1962 Excerpt ·--• CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY THE CRISIS USSR CUBA Information as of 0600 26 October 1962 PRD'AAED FOR TiiE EXECtmVE CXlMMll l l OF THE NATIONAL SEOJRITT com-CL Pevvi □ arsra r2·1 a1· eetPP tE IIB E t s ar _lfOMtbL'l' et t CSYXOlnOk ZW THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL POP SECRET 315 95 Continued 26 October 1962 SUMMARY CONTENTS I Surveillance of 25 October shows that the construction of IRBM and HRBM bases in Cuba ls proceeding largely on schedule now level photography confirms that the MRBM bases will use the 1 020-nautical-mile SS-4 missile No additional sites launchers or missiles have been iocated but there is road construction around Remedios which suggests the fourth IRBM site we have been expecting there We estimate that it would cost the USSR more than twice as much and take considerably longer to add to its ICBM strike capability from the USSR as great an increment as the potential salvo from Cuban launching sites II Only two Soviet freighters--and five tankers one of them already past the quarantine line--still are headed for Cuba The BELOVODSK with twelve MI-4 helicopters is inthe North Atlantic the PUGACHEV appears to have slowed or stopped several days west of the Panama Canal A total of 16 dry cargo ships now are carried as having turned back toward the USSR on 23 October Two Soviet civil air flights are scheduled for Havana with passengers cargo if any is not known One may be turned back by Guinea today A TU-114 is scheduled via Senegal to reach Havana 1 November III There are further indications that some Soviet and satellite elements particularly air and ground elements in Eastern Europe and European Russia are on an alert or readiness sta ence that adr r have been placed on five-minute alert in East Germany where two areas along the West German border have been closed off for exercises Moscow highlights Khrushchev's acceptance of U Thant's appeal in a bid to start US-Soviet negotiations Peiping however is irritated that the Soviet response to US action is not stronger The Communists still deny there are any offensive weapons in Cuba IV There is no major change or significant new development in non-bloc reaction to the crisis Most·of the OAS nations have offered to participate in some form in the quarantine and NATO me bers have agreed with minor reservations to deny landing and overflight rights to Soviet planes bound for Cuba · 316 96 fcCone femorandum for the File leering of the SSC Executive Commiuee 26 October 1962 10 00 a m ·· -' u l -tOT 2 6 October 1962 ME -A OR '4'IDUM E'OR THE FILE SUBJECT Meeting of the NSC Executive Co ittee 26 October 1962 10 00 A IN ATTE1 D A '1CE All mercbers plus Governor Steveeson and Mr McCloy McCone gave an b telligence briefiDg which inclt ded reading the Watch Comm it ee report of 10 26 distribtl ting and highlighting an btelligence Agency Memora crlum of I0 2 6 copy oi which was distributed reviewing summary conclusions of G AIC JAEIC NPIC Supplement 6 su a- marv ing Miskovsky's report on the risoner exchange OGC 62-2 597 su aunarizeci CIA report on non-Bloc ships enroute to Cuba 10 2 6 and pointed out that non-Bloc ships could quite possibly carry So-vi et arms and they would be just as secure as Soviet or Bloc ships if engaged on bare-boat charter reviewed briefly Cuban internal reaction to the U S quarantine as contained in report of 10 26 McCone then posed two operational problems One the CIA plan to have ten teams go into Cuba by submarine to gather intelligence on missile bases and other points of interest McCone stated that CIA was prepared to use its assets to support MONGOOSE operations under Lansdale 1 s direction that the objective was to take Cuba from Castro and turn it over to the Cubaxi people or alternatively to secure intelligence in support 0£ possible military activities and in this instance the requirement should be established by SecDef and JCS McCone stated there was an organizational problem with Lansdale under current conditions and a meeting had been called for this afternoon to resolve this problem and to establish a course of action on the Lansdale MONGOOSE organization The President stated that he felt the Lansdale organization should be used and suggested it might serve as a Subcorrunittee of the NSC Executive Co ittee kGone also acvised the Presicle it that plan fo - political orgat ization of Cci a in ever to an invasion was w de ' study ar ci would be consicered at the 2 30 mee illg 317 96 Continued There followed an extended discussion of operational matters details of which a re covered in the attached notes JOHN A McCONE Director Attaclunent to original DCI's notes - 3 small sheets on White House note paper JAM mf b 318 91 McCone Jfemorandum of fO VGOOSE Meeting in the JCS Operations Room October 26 1962 at 2 30 p m 29 October 1962 I October 29 1962 ME QR A 'iDUM OF MONGOOSE MEETING IN THE JCS OPERATIONS ROOM OCTOBER 26 1962 AT 2 30 p m Attended by McNamara Gilpatric General Taylor Johnson Ed Martin Don Wilson the Attorney General McCone Lansdale Harvey and Parrott The purpose of the meeting was to give guidance to operation MONGOOSE It became immediately apparent that Lansdale felt himself lacking in authority and not in channel of either operations or information with JCS or SecDef's office There was considerable criticism by innuendo of the CIA Lansdale relationship McCone stated that he understood the MONGOOSE goal was to encourage the Cuban people to take Cuba away from Castro and to set up a proper form of government He said CIA had and would continue to support Lansdale whom we recognized as the director of this operation He felt that any indication that CIA was not affording such support to Lansdale was completely erroneous On the other band CIA by long - standing arrangements details of which were most recently confirmed are obligated to support the military to the extent desired by the JCS in any combat theatre and therefore probably some CIA moves made for the purpose of meeting this objective had been misunderstood by Lansdale Lansdale had distributed the attached paper headed Main Points to be Considered 10 26 • _ ____ 319 97 Continued Item ZN was approved and Mr Gilpatric undertook to expe e construction Erk ne cessary to establish the 50 KW radio transmitters in the Florida Keys DonWilson has charge of this project Item Z_L was removed from MONGOOSE responsibility It was decided that a new Cuban political office to plan for the postinvasion govermnent _o f Cuba would be secretly set up by the State Department · A11 other items in the Lansdale paper were h e ld in abeyance The group reaffirmed that Lansdale is to be in charge of the MONGOOSE operations which will cover all covert activities of any department of government including State CIJ USIA etc The infiltration of agents is•to be held up pending a determination by the Department of Defense through General Carroll as to just what military informa tion is desired and determination by Sta te through - 2 - · ·· ·· ' •· ' • • '· 20 91 Cominued1 - I' Alexis Johnson as to just what political itmormat i on is desired General Lansdale is then to determine issets available in the government all of which rest in CIA can produce the information desired by Defense and State and then program a procedure to be followed It is expected that Lansdale will make these determinations at the earliest moment and confer further with the committee or individual representatives thereof John A McCone Director JAM at - 3 - Re -erse Blank 321 98 Supplement 7 10 Joint Evaluation of Soviet fissile Threat in Cuba 27 October 1962 Excerpt -' SUPPLEMENT 7 TO JOINT EVALUATION OF SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA PREPARED BY Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee National Photographic Interpretation Center· 0200 HOURS 27 OCTOBER 1962 This report is bose cl on relot1vely complt te photo inUr• pretotlon of p'ho1ogrophy made on 14 Octol cr 1962 Misslon 3101 IS Octokr 1962 Missions 3102 3103 17 October 1962 Miulons 3104 3105 3106 3107 3108 3109 18 Octol c 1962 lllssion 3111 19 Octo • 1962 Miss o s 3113 3114 20 Octo- 1962 Missions 3115 3116 3117 22 Octo 1962 lllssions 3118 3119 3120 2l Oc o e 1962 IJliuions 3121 3122 3123 sooi 5004 5005 5 06 2S Octo r 1962 Minion• 3125 S007 SOOS 5009 5011 5012 5013 SOU SOIS · 5016 et'd preli il l ry cnc lysis of photos rcp r of 26 OctOO r 1962 Jussi0ns 2622 2623 2624 2625 2626 323 98 Continued NOTICE Emphasis continues to be placed on the READINESS status pace of construction and any significarit changes at the offensive missile sites in Cuba This report is based primarily upon detailed analysis of the 25 October low-altitude coverage see Figure 1 · SUMMARY 1 Detailed analysis confirms the rapid pace of construction reported in our last supplement As of 25 October there was ev dence indicating any intention to halt construction dismantle or move these sites 2 There are no changes in the dates of estimated operational capability for the MRBM and IRBM sites Five of the six MRBM sites are now believed to have a full operational capability and the sixth is estimated to achieve this status tomorrow--28 October see Figure 2 'This means a capability to launch up to 24 MRBM 1020 nm missiles within 6 to 8 hours of a decision to do so and a refire capability of up to 24 additional MRBMs Within 4 to 6 hours see Table 1 within 3 No additional MRBM _missiles missile transporters or erectors have been identified see Table 1 To date we have bserved a total of 33 MRBM missiles 4 No IRBM missiles missile transporters erectors or associated equipment have been observed to date 5 No new missile sites have been identified there has been no highaltitude coverage suitable for searching the Remedios area for the suspect second IRBM site since Mission 3118 of 22 October see Table 1 and Figure 1 - l - op 324 98 Con1inued1 7 Photography lission 5012 of 25 October confirmed the presence of a FROG missile launcher in a vehicle park nea r Remedios The FROG is a cacti cal unguided racket of 40 000 co 50 000 yard range and is similar to the U S Honest John 8 There has been no - e v i d e n c e of attempts at interdiction of U S reconnaissance a1rcra 9 Despite Krushchev 1s statement co Mr Knox of 24 October we still lack positive evidence that nuclear weapons are deployed in Cuba 10 The probable nuclear bunkers adjacent not yet ready for storage assembly or checkout to the MRBM sites are - 2hlf Reverse Blank 325 ----------------------------------------------- 99 Central Intelligence Agency femorandum ·'The Crisis USSR Cuba 27 October 1962 Excerptj TOR SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY THE CRISIS USSR CUBA Information as of 0600 27 October 1962 Rl A - tED o _ 7 - E EXECUTIVE CCY M OF T -ffi 7 Cl- AL s EC JTY CCv C L -TOP SECRET 327 99 Continued 27 October 1962 SUMMARY CONTENTS I Based on the latest low-level reconnissance mission three of the four MRBM sites at San Cristobal and the two sites at Sagua La Grande appear to be fully operational No further sites or missiles have been identified The mobilization of Cuban military forces continues at a high rate However they remain under orders not to take any hostile action unless attacked · Steps toward establishing an integrated air defense system are under way On the diplomatic front Cuban representatives are trying to plant the idea that Havana would be receptive to UN mediation They indicate however that a prerequisite must be proof that the US does not intend to attack Cuba II Despite Khrushchev's declaration to U Thant that Soviet ships would temporarily avoid the quarantine area we have no information as yet that the six Soviet and three satellite ships en route have changed course A Swedish vessel believed to be under charter to the USSR refused to stop yesterday when intercepted by a US destroyer and was allowed to continue to Havana III No significant redeployment of Soviet ground air or naval forces have been noted However there are continuing indications of increased readiness among some units Three-Fclass submarines have been identified on the surface inside or near the quarantine line IV There has been no distinct shift in the pattern of reaction In Western Europe further support for the US has come from several quarters and unfavorable reactions are decidedly in the minority Official London seems intent on checking premature op bnism which is showing up in widely scattered parts of the world particularly among the neutrals French support for the US is hardening There are reports that anti-US demonstrations have broken out in several Latin American capitals including Buenos Aires Caracas and La Paz 328 99 C-OntinuedJ SA 1 STO AL GUANAJAY HllM COO UX Ill ' CCMPlEX LOCA i ICSS Cf Cfl'a - 51 Mi SfLE Sl o IN Q A SAGUA LA Gi ANC HllM CO Y i'UX REMEDIOS IR3M s n ·'•'• SECRET TJ Sa-'4' 6210 2S Re• erse Blank 329 I 00 cConej nores from 10 00 a m YSC Execurhe Committee meering 27 October 1962 331 --------------------------------- 100 Continued ---- -----·- 332 - - - --- - --··-- 101 f fcCone notes from 4 00 p m SSC Execurii·e Commiuee meeting 27 October 1962 333 101 Continued 334 102 f fcCone notes from 9 - 0 p m SC Execuzi e Commiuee meeting 27 October 1962 ExCom 10 27 62 9 00 p m - No other info No M R Re ·erse Blank 335 103 Supplemen 8 to Joim £ a uarion of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba 28 October 1962 E TcerprJ · · • -·· •• SUPPLEMENT 8 TO JOINT EVALUATION OF SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA PREPARED BY Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee National Photographic Interpretation Center· 0200 HOURS 28 OCTOBER 1962 337 •• I 103 Continued NOTICE This report is based primarily on detailed analysis of low altitude photography taken on Friday 26 October as well as preliminary evaluation of the results of similar missions from Saturday 27 October 1962 Figure 1 The primary emphasis is placed here on a technical evaluation of force readiness pace of construction and changes in the deployment program Table 1 This report does not attempt to estimate Soviet intent to attack the United States SUMMARY 1 We still have no direct knowledge of thermonuclear warheads in Cuba but believe it prudent to assume that the Soviet missile force there is so armed 2 We estimate that all 24 MRBMlaunchers are now fully operational representing a capability to salvo 24 1000-mile missiles within 6 to 8 hours of a decision to launch 3 The present and estimated operational capability of all Soviet defi nsive missiles in Cuba is summarized in Figure 2 4 No new MRBM or IRBM sites have been detected in the past day although we have not had high-altitude coverage appropriate for search since 23 October 1962 5 Construction at the Soviet IRBM sites in Cuba continues at a rapid pace and missile support equipment is now being moved to the vicinity of · Guanajay Site 1 No IRBM's per se have yet been observed 6 The entire missile-launching force at the Soviet MRBM sites in Cuba is being check d out on a rapid basis This provides an increasing integrated operational readiness posture - 1- 338 103 Conrinued 7 Automatic anti-aircraft weapons and personnel trenches for protection against air attack are now evident at many of the MRBM sites These weapons have been introduced in the last few days and probably account for the ground fire now being noted on the low-level photographic missions 8 Camouflage agai st aerial photography is being extended at the missile sites and is becoming more effective Force dispersion is also evident 9 A missile propellant offloading and transhipping facility has now been identified at the double-fenced area at Punta Gerada in Bahia Honda This was suspected formerly of being a port of entry for nuclear weapons 10 We now estimate an integrated operational capability for the SA-2 air defense network m Q uba - -• - f - l U 12 The loss of the U-2 over Banes was probably caused by intercept by an SA-2 from the Banes site or pilot hypoxia with the former appearing more likely on the basis of present information 13 Microwave relay towers have been noted at some of the MRBM and IRB site areas covered on 27 October indicating that an integrated mic owave command and control communication system will be utilized in Cuba However the use of high frequency radio is also indicated by the presence of high frequency antennae at Sagua La Grande sites 1 and 2 _ 2 - · - · - ·· - -·- · ·-- -- _____ _ - · - -- -· · 339 103 Continued 14 Construction of probable nuclear storage facilities was continuing on 26 and 27 October None of the bunkers observed at probable nuclear storage sites are yet believed to be in operation although that at Guanajay IRBM Site No 1 is essentia ly complete 15 A new probable nucl r storage f _cility has been identified at Sagua La Grande MRBM Site No 2 Construction materials were being moved into this area on 27 October The existence of a second probable nuclear storage area at the Sagua La Grande launch complex indicates that each launch site is probably intended to have individual permanent nuclear storage - 3- 340 104 Cen1ral lnlelligence Agency Memorandum 'The Crisis USSR Cuba 28 October 1962 Excerpt • • CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY JC THE CRISIS USSR CUBA Information cu of 0600 28 October 1962 i'REPA tm FOR nfE EXECUTIVE cow uTTEE Of THE NATION - L SEar uTY cotlNCIL Rf l'f l t etGCiil a·• 1-1eu er s R-Q i 1 10N - ce ffitr ce _e es lOTsrW VO WP pop SECRET 341 1 4 ontinued TOP SEGRE SUMMARY CONTENTS I Surveillance of 26 October and preliminary analysis of yesterday 1 s coverage shows that the development of both IRBM and MRBM sites in Cuba is continuing its rapid pace All 24 MRBM launchers now appear to have reached full operational readiness One nuclear storage facility is essentially complete but none of the bunkers obs rved ·s et e ·e be in operation There are some indications that the U-2 lost yesterday the SA-2 system Cuban military units remain at a high state of alert and the Castro regime is making a maximum effort to whip up troop and public morale II As of 0700 EST two or possibly three more Soviet s ips are heading for Cuba in addition to the two dry cargo ship and four tankers we have been watching The tanker GROZNY should have reached the quarantine line early this morning One Soviet transport aircraft which reached Brazil is there to pick up the body of the Soviet ambassador Another scheduled for Cuba via North Africa and Brazil turned back at Morocco III No significant redeployment of major Soviet ground air or naval forces has been noted The general posture of Soviet ground forces in forward areas is one of precautionary defensive readiness The overall total of Soviet submarines on extended operations is somewhat greater than normal and a fourth F-class submarine may be in the area of the Cuban quarantine line In non-military developments Khrushchev's bid for re- ciprocal withdrawal of offensive weapons from Cuba and Turkey looks like the first step in a series of moves to demonstrate the USSR's readiness for a negotiated solution Soviet spokesmen continue to play down the possibility that the Cuban crisis could lead to general war 342 104 fCominued T'OP SECRET IV U Thant is thinking seriously of accepting Castro's invitation to visit C- ba and ight go as early as T esday There is thus far only frag le tary mixed reaction to the President's rejection of Kbrushc •s Cuba-TU key proposal - 'Fefl SEC ftE f- · 343 104 Continued SAN CRISTOBAL GUANAJAY IRBM COMPLEX MRSM COMPLEX LOCATIONS OF OFFENSIVE Ml SILE SITES JN CUBA SAGUA LA GRANDE MRSM COMPLEX REMEDIOS IRSM NAUTICA MI IS 32'135 6210 25 LOCATION OF MRBM AND IRBM SITES IN CUBA A MRBM SITES 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 SAN CRISTOBAL SITE #1 N22-40-05 W83-l7-55 SAN CRISTOBAL SJTE #z N22-40-50 W83-15-00 SAN CRISTOBAL sml3 N22-42-40 W83-08-25 SAN tRISTOBAL sne#4 N22-46-55 W82-58-50 $AGUA LA GRANDE sml1 N22-43 44 WS0-01-40 SAGUA LA GRANDE sm'2 N22-39-I0 W79-51-55 IRBM SITES l GUANAJAY SITE 1 1 N22-56-50 W82-39-20 2 GUANAJAY SITE 112 N22-57-25 W82-36-55 3 REMEDIOS SITE I 1 N22-25-00 W79-35-20 C PROBABLE NUCLEAR STORAGE INSTALLATIONS 1 2 GUANAJAY N22-56-50 W82-39-20 PUNTA GERARDO Secured Port Facility N22-56-00 W83-l J-00 6 10 25 344 105 JfcConej notes National Security Council MeetingExecutive Commirree October 28-11 00 a m National Security Council eeting - Executive Com ittee October 28 - ll 00 a m - All present Rusk Rec no plane surveillance McNamara Noted difference in Chiefs - Personally agree with Rusk recommendations Nitze UN ask what we wa nt to prove inoperable of weapons McNamara Have as our objectives a UN recon plane on Monday President Secy not go today - but let's go on assumption either we or UN will go on Monday Decision made to release a brief statement welcoming the K message McCone Reverse Blank 345 106 Walter Elder Memorandum of Executive Commiuee of NSC feeling on Sunday 28 October 1962 Dictated by the Undersigned based on Debriefing of DC S1 6 E OML1 fh E''ES l MEMORANDUM OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF NSC MEETING ON SUNDAY 28 OCTOBER 1962 DICTATED BY THE UNDERSIGNED BASED ON DEBRIEFING OF DCI L No reconnaissat1ce flights today despite a recoDlmendation of the Secretary of State supparted by the Secretary of Defense It w u decided to use RB-66 1s which are now in Florida with UN observers aboard if arrange ents can be made by the UN in ti Ine 2 Ii not the US will fly our own reconnaissance 3 The DCI has been authorized to release to General Rickhye all pertinent information on the buildup in Cuba protecting only intelligence sources ■■■■■■I Therefore the portfolios can be released Competent people are to go with Charyk and Forrestal to New York to support General Rickhye on this operation 4 Action Bill Tidwell and Colonel Parker were dispatched to New York by Ray Cline This action is underway 5 A draft reply to Khrushchev is to be written by Ambassador Llewellyn Thonipson in Alexis J ohnson's office 6 Action DD I is to insure that the CIA input is taken account of Cline was instructed to support the DCI's position that the rem oval of the missiles should not end by giving Castro's a sanctuary and thus sustain bis subversive threat to other Latin American nations 7 Action Action was taken by Ray Cline ------- Walte r Elder S Drar EYES GNL¥ Re ·erse Blank 347 107 Supplement 9 to Joint E -a uation of Soviet fissile Threat in Cuba 28 October 1962 Excerpt SUPPLEMENT 9 TO JOINT EVALUATION -OF SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA PREPARED BY Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee Joint Atomic En rgy Intelligence Committee National Photographic Interpretation Center 2200 HOURS 28 OCTOBER 1%2 349 107 Continued NOTICE This r_eport is based primarily on detailed analysis of low-altitude photography taken on Saturday 27 October 1962 See Figure 4 for tracks The primary emphasis is placed here on a technical evaluation of force readiness pace of construction and changes in the deployment program Table 1 This report does not attempt to estimate Soviet intent to attack the United States SUMMARY All 24 MR BM launchers are believed to be fully operational See Figure 2 1 2 Activity was continuing at all the MRBM and IRBM missile sites covered on Saturday 27 October See Figures 1 and 2 Camouflage and covering with canvas and natural concealment was continuing at the MRBM sites and is becoming more effective 3 No IRBM missiles missile transports or erectors have been identified However we have identified oxidizer trailers and possible fuel transporters among the support equipment near Guanajay IRBM Site 1 These fuel transporters are larger in size than similar fuel transporters at MRBM sites 4 No new MRBMorIRBMsiteshavebeendetected however we have had no high altitude coverage appropriate for search since 23 October 1962 6 There is more evidence of the intent to have nuclear warhead bunkers at each launch site - 1- 350 PART III THE AFTERMATH Withdrawal ofSoviet offensive weapons from Cuba Postcri sis reviews and assessments 108• femorandum Soviet Offensive Weapons in Cuba 29 October 962 with attachment 'Table of Special Purpose fissile System Equipment _ · ___ · _f 29 October 1962 su JLCT Soviet UffensiYe Weapons in Cuba l The enclosed table includes a list oi Soviot offensive aissile weapons and as3ociated equiyaent in Cuoa z Very little equipment has beon observed at the three RSM sites in Cuba The only ectuii ment identified in addition to structures under construction has been two possiblB fuel trw ks anci two possible oxiJant trucks If the IRB s and other associate equip•ent are in Cuba they are Tobably in n unlocatsd facility between the port of Mariel and th sites A study of Soviet sea ship•ents to Cuba however indicates that it is unlikely that aany IRB s had reached Cuba yrior to tho institution of · th• Quarantine 3 Mo nuclear weapons or ■issile nosecones nave boen identified in Cuba There ar•• ovever nuclear wea on storase bunkers under construction at each of the RB and IR8 sites These builaings are about 35 feet in width and are about 80 feet in lenith at the RBM sites and 112 feet in length at the IRBM sites If nuclear weapons are in Cuba they are probably in an unlouted facility between the eAtry ort of Mariel and the sites •• All IL-28 aircraft are t Ss n Juli ui in wcstorn Cuba three or fouT appear to be assemblec An additional 25 or z• aircraft in cr tes have also boen observed at this airfield Each disassecbled aircr3ft consists of l fusel• • cr te 60l8Xl0 feet 2 win cratos 9X40X8 feet 11d 2 engine crates 9X30X8 feot closure Table of Special Purpose 4issilo Systea Equipaent 351 O i s · I 'I TABLE OF SPmJ' AL FURFOSE MISSILE SYSTEM EQUIFME l'r Wheeled Site Name and Number Missiles and Tracked Prime Movers 'for Missile Traus 20rts Trano12orts Medium-Range Bal l istic Missile Sites Im 8 8 · Prime Movers Erector Fuel Tank For Fuel Trailers Vebicl ea Trailers Seen Im Seen Tracked Oxidizer Prime Movers For Oxidizer Trailer1J Trailers Tank Seen Im Ieuncbs Pover Generators Seen Im Seen El ectronica Vans l O 7 10 Theodolites OU Pede t-e Seen Site Name and Number w San Cristobal #l 20040'05 N-83°17' 50''11 San Cristobal #2 2204J 'OO n-83015•00''11 Ban Cristobal #3 22042 '40 J-830o8 '25 W San Cristobal 1 4 22042 '40 N-830o8 '25 W Baqua La Grande #1 22043 44 11-80001 •40''11 Baque La Grande #2 22°39'10 11-79 51' 55 W 4 8 8 8 J 6 16 16 4 4 6 1 6 4 4 6 8 4 4 4 7 8 8 16 16 16 4 l 7 6 0 7 10 4 2 8 4 4 4 0 8 8 0 16 16 4 4 2 7 6 7 l O 4 4 8 8 7 16 16 4 4 0 1 6 0 10 0 4 4 4 4 8 4 4 4 8 8 8 16 16 16 4 4 0 1 6 3 10 4 4 8 4 4 4 8 8 8 16 16 16 3 4 5 7 6 3 10 3 4 1 24° 24 24 48 'II % 1 % 23° 24° u - 13b u - 7bO 19 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 4 4 4 4 0 8 7 0 I I 7 E Q_ NA NA 8 6 4 33 i g Guanajay l 0 8 Gue naJay 2 0 0 0 Q_ NA TCTALS 4 4 7 u N 4 0 3l Ii 1 4 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 7 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 7 0 0 4 4 4 0 1 4 4 4 0 §_ Q_ §_ L g_ L Q_ L g_ 1f Q_ L Q_ L Q_ NA NA NA 2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA A NA NA 40 24 Intermedia te Range Ballistic Miss1le Sites S1te Name and Number co- ordinates Remedios l Remedios 2 unlocated TCTALS 0 Q_ L NA A 4 4 4 4 I Equipment at Logistical Support Points Punta Gerardo Propellant Loading Point JIil 80 40 10 NA 73 NA 35 40 GRAND TC7I'ALS 35 33 Footnote l There are also numerous general purpose support equtpnent associated Yith MRBM IRBM units such as trucks vehicles etc Implied muuberu are those ve eotimate to be organic vith Soviet MRBM IRBM units or represent tbe h igbest numbe-r observed 1 -8E8RU 109 femorandum for the Director Your Briefings of the SSC Executive Committee 3 Sol·ember 1962 E O a_ mu M FOR THE DIRECTOR -···t ·--·-· v O ·-a cu '-' _ 1J - di -• t Ll ·r • sc v-e· c L On 23 October you gave a brief iDtelligence report saying that co 1St 1 ction at ilie sites was continuing Lundahl briefed on the most rece 1 photographs It was at this eet ng that it was left o your disc etion to consicie - the matter of disclosures of photos a ntl you aent Lund a hl and Clin e to Ne York to assist StevensoI At an evening eeting that da y you briefed on military develop ents within the W AJ SAW ct countries1 des ihing an increased level of Soviet military comm unications z Gn 24 October you briefed on the contimted rapid progress in the completion of the missile sites and of the fact that 22 Soviet missile ships were en route to Cuba 3 On 25 October you told the Group there had been no e in the construction pace you covered the Watch Com i e 'ort s_ that Soviet ar ed forces were increasing i 7 l state of readiness you described the Soviet ships oute to Cuba carrying h elicopte rs --•Y · covered the departure of a Cubana plane from Canada to Havana and also briefed on the turn-armmd of l5 of the 2 2 Soviet ships 1 C f ' At an evening eeting ou briefed in detail on the status of Soviet shipping Ire - 4 On 26 October which was attended by Stevenson you covered the Watch Go mittee report which concluded that Soviet ar ed forces had co pleted m easures for an alert _that b re were no significant deployments You e e gyi l i e l 1 DO 9U f · 1■ continued construction at the issile bases esti m ating that it had cost the Soviet less than one _ as ucl to put ±ese in Cci a rather than builc ICB1' t's i i the USSR Yo1 s a ' zeci the s tatus 0£ shipping and m a cie ti e point t a t a e_ blg'7J ·-cie - e - s s cocl ci Soviet a -- s am Jori reviewed b icly Castro_ app reh ensive ea c o to t e US qt a a- - 1'k tt r vfr '1 Rut 353 109 Continued 5 On 27 October you told the Group that three of the four MR BM sites at Sam C ii'isto»al and two sites at Sag rande appeared fully operational and covered the latest Watch Committee report on Soviet military developments 6 On 28 October you ag i eed to lend all appropriate support to the effort to brief General Ritkhye at the UN You directed that Ray Cline participate in the draft reply to Kbru s_ hcjiev's letter You asked that Cline insure supporting your positio the rem oval of the missiles should not end by giving Castro a sanctuary 7 On 2 9 October you covered the following a Construction continues-i b c d e £ The Watch Com m ittee report was noted There was no sign of change in Soviet military prepareness You mentioned the poini that press stories based on special intelligence m ust be prevented After the meeting you talked with the President and Secretary Rusk emphasizing that Castro' rem aiD in Cuba with a greater security and this is the situation we must be careful of 8 On 30 October you told the Group available data does not indicate preparation for dis mantling and noted continued construction of nuclear storage bunkers Many of the missile erectors had been removed and are no longer visible You covered the shipping situation and pointed to the 354 109 rconrinuedJ -3danger of sabotage in Latin American countries urging that all Embass and consulates be alerted You also covered the Watch Committee Report which concluded that Soviet anned forces re m ain on alert and you reviewed briefly current developments in Laos South Vietn un and India Soviet nuclear subs and Soviet nuclear tests and you pointed out that ou' r ability to analyze these tests had been i mpa red by DOD withdrawal of collection vehicles 9 On 31 October you told the Group that there was continued evidence of construction and concealment but noted that evidence that some of the launchers had been moved from the MR BM sites might De co ued the first step at dismantling You further inted out that photos compared with those taken on Saturday and orde to cease were probably not issued until Sunday night or Monday morning There was discussion of the intelligence gap and you re i ' 'ed the Cuban SNIE of 1 September noting that it failed to fully appraise eports available 10 On 1 November you briefed ou details concerning U Thant 1s mission to Havana You pointed out that Cuba _fr obably would engage in reconnaissance with anti aircraft fire since they had a jjl'a that they had developed a pattern of reconnaissance Evidence indicates Soviets in command and control of SAM system You noted there had been no reconnaissance in Eastern Cuba since 23 October Decision was made at this meeting to c o v e r JL-J 'i µ_ _ Julian and MR BM sites 11 On 2 November you told the Group there was evidence that the Soviets were dismantling missiles but the assembly of I Jte-zg bombers was continuing Reverse Blank 355 lf 110 Central Intelligence Agency femorandum ' Deployment and Withdrm• -a of Soviet fissi es and Orher Significanr Weapons in Cuba 29 Soi·ember 962 j -OP SECRET- No 11173 62 29 Novecber 1962 CE 'TRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENcY HE ORA 'ulUY Deployoent and iiithdra al of Soviet Yissiles and Cther Significant Weapons in Cuba This memorandum assesses our evidence concerning the number of Soviet missiles deployed to and subsequently withdrawn from Cuba the chances that Soviet missiles remain in Cuba and the situation and outlook with respect to rates of withdrawal of IL-28s and other significant Soviet weapons in Cuba CONCLUSION The soviet claim to have delivered only 42 missiles to Cuba and to have now withdrawn these is consistent with our evidence We cannot exclude the possibility that more actually arrivet l · and that some therefore remain bµt we think that any such number would be small Available evidence also warrants the conclusion that the Soviets are preparing to withdraw the IL-28s 1 The Soviets almost certainly intended to deploy substantially more than the 42 missiles which they acknowledged and have withdrawn We reach this conclusion from the following factors a Nine sites with four launchers each have been identified in Cuba The Soviet s normally provide two missiles for every URBM and IRB launcher and since several of the launchers already bad tr o ue believe that they intended to provide two each for the others or a total of 72 for the 36 launchers ide tified Of these 48 oul-0 be 3 £ of ich we identified 33 and the rer aind r ould--oe I 31 5 of which we have no evid nce that any had reached Cuba by 22 Cctober b The patte rn of the ni e id ntifiz d site5 strongly sug ests that at least one ore as planned to for a pa±r with the ninth In addition there is soce e idence suggesting that the Soviets plan ed a third deplo i ent are a in e astern Cuba to follo upon those in the estern and central parts of the country OP SECRET- 357 110 Continued U OP SECft T 0 c Among the Soviet ships which turned back from the Cuba run upon announcement of the US quarantine were five of the seven which we know to _have been capable of carrying missiles Thus the buildup was still in progress on 22 October 2 It remains to ask whether the Soviets did in fact succeed in bringing more than 42 missiles to Cuba A review of our information from all sources presented in detail in Annex A leads us to believe that they probably did not This estimate is based on the following factors · a Our ana ysis indicates the missiles were shipped in one piece--less only warheads--on the transporter in a package about 68 feet long as hold cargo b Of the Soviet dry cargo ships involved in the Cuban arms buildup only seven ships have hatches which would allow stowage of this missile package We have reasonably good data on the size of these ships Because of the time in p rt for both the loading and unloading apparent Soviet loading practice in deliveries to Cuba and the size of the ships we believe the most probable load was six to seven missiles per ship More would have required extensive shoring between decks and this does not appear to have occurred c These ships made 13 voyages to Cuba during the July-October buildup The information concerning six of the voyages indicates that they almost certainly must have carried strategic missiles The other seven because of their arrival times and evidence of non-missile cargoes cannot be so identified but one or more of them may have delivered missiles d Reconstruction of the apparent timetable of the buildup correlation of photography both over Cuba and of a number of the ships en route with all other sources and analysis of reporting by ground observers all argue against our having wholly missed likely ships other than the seven identified or other voyages than the thirteen 3 We can in this way account for at least 36 missiles--six on each of six voyages The Soviet claim of 42 is consistent with our evidence but we -2- rt'OP SECRET - 358 110 Continued cannot rule out a soaewhat higher nuaber pricarily because of the possibility that two or ore of tbe seven other voyages delivered cissiles The analysis of these thirteen voyages in Annex B inclines us to accept a figure not much higher th an the 36 we can account for 4 Sources inside Cuba have provided numerous reports in recent weeks claicing that strategic cissiles have been retained in Cuba and concealed froc aerial reconnaissance Yost of these sources are untested and some of their reports are manifestly erroneous -Checks by other cethods including photographic intelligence have failed to produce clear confirmation of any of these reports but we are not able to disprove some of them Specifically at Hayari Arriba--about 40 miles northwest of Guantanamo-we have identified both from photography and ground sources a Soviet installation which may be missileassociated We have not however identified any equipment which can·be associated with strategic missiles 5 Since the foregoing evidence is not fully conclusive we must also consider whether the Soviets would wish to secrete strategic missiles in Cuba It is doubtful in our view that they would do so for strictly military reasons In the first place our shipping analysis leaves little room for a number of remaining missiles large enough to be strategically significant at some later date Such missiles could not participate in an all-out Soviet surprise attack without great risk that preparations would be detected by the US and the entire strategic plan compromised Neither could the Soviets count on being able to use them in a retaliatory second strike 6 In contemplating concealment the Soviets would be aware of great risk They would foresee that if the US found out a second Cuban crisis would ensue which ould be unlikely to leave the Castro regime intact Such a renewed crisis - ould find the Soviets in an even ore disadvantageous position than before to protect their interests or avoid hu liliation •A su -ary revie of these reports including the identification of certain areas which re in suspicious is presented in Annex C -3-- 1-0P SECfcE' f - 359 110 Continued U FOP SECRET Jet Bombers 7 We have confidence in our estimate based on repeated high- and low-altitude photography over Cuba and photography of deck cargo en route to Cuba that no more than 42 IL-28s were delivered before the quarantine began Photography of 25 November indicates that 20 IL-28 fuselage crates remained unopened at San Julian air base and some of the remaining 13 which had previously bee vartially or fully assembled were being dismantled Photography indicates that the other nine crates located at Holguin airfield were still unopened on 25 November and had been removed to an undetermined location on 27 November 8 The Soviets could easily ship out all these aircraft by mid-December Shipping suitable for this purpose is continually available and almost any four of the Soviet dry-cargo ·vessels in the Cuban trade could carry the entire number Those still in crates could be moved to ports in a day or two and the remainder could be disassembled and moved to ports by the agreed date Other Soviet Forces 9 Other Soviet weapon systems in Cuba include surface-to-air missiles coastal defense missiles Komar missile boats and fighter aircraft In addition the equipment for four armored combat groups including possibly 6-10 000 men remains on the island We have no evidence of any preparations in Cuba to withdraw these elements At least four months and on the order of 100 voyages by Soviet ships were required to move these forces to Cuba and their removal would require an equally large effort The SA-2 system and the armored combat groups are the bulkiest of these elements and might require several months for return to the USSR -4- 360 111 President's Foreign Intelligence Adi·isory Board James R Killian Jr Chairman femorandum for the President and report 4 February 1963 - - ' · · -- - o- J c - e 5 _ 3 t e 'e c - 4' _• _ o --c sr - c e - ce c oa i t 2 s c c · -e· cf t llise ce c· -- - s e t - d 'e eir s o - s 1 te er c - c - s Cc ' e ns t 1 Gvie - ili - b ld-ur 111 C Curir 2 · c vn s precec g Ocr cb- 22 lS 62 Ir- as ut h GS he mcst urg nt recc ic t r da- ioHs s rc · i 15 C lt cf ou 7 · ev e - of the Cuba si t la tion ave o lre£•5y beer ub · itteC to yo __ l in th- E0 --d 1 s inte -i 'eport dated r e 0a · 2S 1962 -1- e · r-e ot subni tins furt ' e recc i1 i end tion 3 · this i e h0n the Bvard n xt ·r 1eet r e - ill co 1 l te consid r tion 1 1 c -f' ·c'n m n -r- l 1- - c r 1 -e no·· ' - 'i r e e ved f- C _V_'w•t - -• ' J c -l - V€ s --c_ -n- _na o_ _e t i- - _ • - i- '- • _• f'Y'r' ''l Y - '11 - •• _ l _- 1 t C L ce 1-e ' - -c 7 3 _ - - _ J • _ wit ·resp ict to ne r' C·- r tsnd2tj_cne of o ir t7-e 1i - epo ta _ ' th t t e I a 'lticipste th t t 'ie 5oard nay 1 is ·1 to tr-e nt to OU udd tic 111 reco - -nenCaticn en irr _po --rt aspects cf r- ntellisenc p o rc In · tinderta ng its rev•ie -I tt e Ec r-C requested and received a cor p ehen ive report by the intelligence corr rr tn-i ity · _ ·• rnfs rcc-ort 2 ddressed to ti1e Bca1'6 is av ilaole n ti1e EO rd ts - 6f fi ce · • In Annex · E · to cur report He list ti e pri c-ipal sc L»ces into cr mtion co sidered 1n our rzv·ie - le c - press ot _r deep· a Pp •e i tcn of tt e cccp r tion ar d assist ce which tras ' eel a d pron r t-ly i _ e or i- fCii1e t 1e Bo had the ber efit of helpful bac groun·a_ 1 ' ori E- ioil th 2-oard rs observat io i 1e 1 conclusicr s ara · holly · ii ts m·m '· 361 111 Continued THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON PR ES DE Ir r 3 POR - IO J INTZLLIGENCE t DVISOBY BOARD 1 HE1· o u 1mm-1 FOR THE PRESIDZ TT Yoc11• Por·elgn Intelligonc A ·1i sory Board has ompleted a rev e1-1 of' action 'lhich were 1 2 en by- the foreign l n elligence agencte i of ou - Go ernment to discharge their re ip msibili ty fp 1· intell5 g- n e covero gc as - ssment and repor v i ng O l th e Sc-Ji$t r 1ilit2 1·y buJ l 1-up in C 1b8 d U ing the r 1 'Jnth-J p ced lng yo t 1 eport to t11e H ticn o O tvbe i 22 1962 onC-2' 'ning th e US SS 1 s e Jtablish rri e lt of offensive ml3s t le sites in Cu 1 a In the course of our re ri m e sought to dete ine whether th 2re t- e 2 - J - Qn _t Q 1 J r_ - 3 - --- _ __ob je _ J- 2 rai 3al of ha z rert st 1 G _ ¥ l__ 1- tn --Qf_ tr1 ___tJ --9 -- 0 1 s n nt eJ l i3sn e effcftt ·-· p 1 g _o s ed - b _ 1_1 _ Q i i9- --- 9 f1ence e di rec tied part 1 ctil-2 1 attention to thv e 2 r e s of the ntell ' f en e process • 1hi h o r con- ierned 1ith such 1atters o s 1 sche ' ' quisition or ntelligcnce 2 the l'nal ·sis of' inte lliger e a '1d 3 _1 he prc lu t i cn ai d dics - rn nat ton of intelligence rcp0rts a 1 d cstimat s in up o -t or ational poli y fo ' 11ulatio1' o nd ope -·atiorn 1 requil'er v nts rn ou · reconstruction of intelligence co' rage of Soviet 2ctiv1ties on the islc1 nd of Cii1 n it is not d that t---10 principal conoe ut ve phases · ere in· olved The fir•st p se co·lered ·the perioct prior to October 11 1siG2 The second pl ' se consisted of a r uch brie er pe lod beginnlri g en o tobe c· 1 2 i- d culminating with the Presidenti2 l anr 01 1t1cement on Octobe2' 22 ccnc3 'ning m laS r c3 for meeting the _ Soviet oi'fensi ve threat in Cuba T'ne event or cou ·sa -rnich pr-' JvidGd a demarcc tion of these t • o phases 1· 2 a the acq_uioition on October l t OJ ' U-2 photoi raphic videncG th t the Soviet Ur ion had taken steus to establish a strat gi-i nuclear ·missile com lex in Cuba · _0 THZ POST-OC' B R J 4 PHASE· le note that the definitive photographic e· i denc0 obt ined a 3 a xie vtlt of' the O tobcr 11 e n- GUbsequ-ent cv rfl i ghts ot Cuba _ '1 S t-io npt y proc0ssed and S - bmi tted to the Frt 3id nc i l time for 362 111 Continued - e- s · c G' t c -1 --2 - 2 S i - - - s C 2 5 ·$- _- s - 1 - - · c c l s l 3 - t -1 s - - •3 ·• - - i - z- -- t s - -r- - -- -- ' - • s- •- - - - c z ' --· - - -- i -_ r - 7 c _ - - t ' r - 1 't ' - ' - _ - _ _1- J- ·- _ · 1 • - t e '2Si•_ t Z- -_ - - -- _ -- __ _ --- • - -n ' - · - -- - _ '° es t 1 - -- J- · e -- - -- s c C et '2 · 2 y· - - e o ' s · s -- £tt i ' - r 2 2 so - - i - c o c o s c- -· - -s 2 _3 c s c i - d 2 and 3 the use o int llig revio sly ta tn · l con erning strc tegic i1issile r d c ir efe 1s3 1s all tions r i thi tfle Soviet Ln on n det - in ng the tt e c 1C ex' e n- cf si - 3 c 9aO li ties in Cube In no ntin to th hi g 1 - 'forru2-l1ce 11 c l i• as a h eved t r cu • forei gi1 1ntelligen e ag n ies dt · 2 r g the post-C· to et 14 e led • a e c2 n lze - - s t t c-uJ d C d £ f'ici· 1 t fo le int-allig r cc r rn ni ty to opr ra te -Ii th tr e s e in ten - r y f_ i l ef · tci-E ncy U J -el ' less 'i ti cl co 1d2 tions 'ili S cne • ' vu ' r aj•Jl p le n3 r·e ma s the 2ch e· er - nt o _ e --y hi 1 rfor7 ' e b at e crisc s · As tc th D -0 to' o r- 1 c rlc i - e -r ludc a t OU ' h r __Q ' ' e 2 t •g _it l obtaini ng ac qu£ t a d i ely in1 el2ig n- 3S t o the na1 ur rar2i € 'U _ _ l ig i1 e fr - t st 'an ope o the Soviat ' ' ili tery· bt ild- p s -· o -' ' - n f ·-- ·yr p_r_oa On tr s - -- U --- -0 • c v- l gcn e cs a bu Si$ for est c i z $cv et c ieveloped o' e - tt _ - · i- ' - 1 - 111_ - ___ _ 1 1 i _ _ _ n Gu c a - s a in- e rt ' S I 1 view or th fact t l t tl1e Sv•_ -fet o· e ca e dc r gerot sly clc•S'2 to suc -e s in c_ c ree less th • inety rr iles fron o l 1' sho es t e c sen ·e o r 1- ei' tl early - ning o the e - y I s i te t o r st · -e st -s s C J - rt 'i l 2' _ g t -- i s -- t ' - '·e •as 1 t r - -- tt t7 - -- r 363 0 I - 111 Continued Cl221d stine agent 01 e -1c g a i Jittlin Cuba s _ 1 'i deouc t2 • AJ t h ugh tr c l Lrr lteU ng -it ss tG of th e Central- IntS lligance l7 1 1r - _ 1d of Ar ny Int- lligene did produ e sor e aluc Cle reI orts en° de '1eloprr ent in CubD -• C b elie IG thc t the 2 bsenc of more effee ti ve clc 1dcstina asent cove e ge as a 1 essentic l Edjunct to othe int- lligen e collecti0n ope ations cor - 1 bu-ced substa 1tially to tha Lnallility of our Gov· 'nment to l' ' O ni e 8 t an Gerl er data the denser o ' the So· iat r o c in Cube It ·1ould ti ovcs tha-c ov·er th a year3 the ' h2 s bee a l c cf foresight itl- · h0 long-term plc n i tne for the insto llation of these age ts 1 1 l' a find also that full use 10 s not mctde ol' aeri2 l photograr hic surveillance p2 rticu 2 rly during Septe -iito c 11d October hen the in i'lux of Sovi t military personnel f'J ld arms ments had rea hsd 171ajor pl' 'Oportiono I recognize that n September inclei nt - ather delayed some of ' the schadulad l -2 missicns Ro · ever 1 C note that fr om eptember 8 to Sente1' be • U-2 r iis· e ons os er Sub we •e auspended appare 1tly bacc 1 3 of tha loss of a Chinese Hationalist U-2 O'ff l' the China m2 inland on Septk'mber 8 e alao not t·1ith conce 'n that during the pe i0- l of' increasin3 ' emar· ency as pointed up oy intellige 1ce in Jic a tors there - as not a eorrespond1r g inter sif'ication of the sche lul Lns of U-2 missions over the island lo r 1 · rith rega c d to proposals for- aerL il photographic surveilla 1ce of' Cuba ·1e mr ke the following additional observat ons 1 'l'he Pres Ucnt granted authorization for all U-2 fl l 1- hto rhi h - erG recor i lende cl to him by his policy ad·1isers ·on the Special Gi oup having respom ib 1 - ty for such matters 2 The Spe ial Group e pp1•oved in one instance with modif cations a11 U-2 o rerflig its recor unended to it We surr iise that on its o m the Special Group could h3ve initinted · ov r fl 1 zht 1•eco mnendo tions · ' 3 Until October 3 • rh n th3 Def mse Intclli 5ence Agency urgtild that suspicicus ar eas of Cuba be covered l y U-2 photographic missions it appears that there · s a failure on the part of the · inte1ligen9_e 2 i t- t -5_ _ _ i J _j Q_ fil Q Oose to th c i l Group Q -J____ -- _e_co 12_ is_£€' - S _f l io_ 1s_ 2_1 _ 1i_S cal e c o ens 1r s t e i i i tFi 7 ne··11A_-e-ure and_ intens 'Ey ef t v1et activit z in Cuba The need for more · r·req_uont a Jd ext ensive aerial 9hotog ' pn1c · survenl mce · du -ing th2 sut -e1' -- nd fall w s e• cn more prezsing in vie · ot' the inadequacy of cla 1 destine agent l'G30U 'ces i d the limited effe tivcnes3 of I 'rOP 364 C2ET 111 Continued c't e ccllec1 i l 1 e hc s su l a lesal 't ' velc t ird o - cy J le e t re 1 e intcrroc r 10 a d si -- ir t ll _ e · - -- ' -' I- - - 1 a 01 y · hich · nted oYe fly n6 a a o r Cuba re st face- tv- i ' issile inst llsticns er p ' ' sent t e Ce 'l al Int llige -i e - - y 2 d o he -ss C liev d thet such a tt ' t tion Cid in cct pre i · i n - i i tr is r £ r th2 t i ' hi e t r •e 5 -cp rt f t he i t • - - 1 - - 1 n 0 c n 21 Tntc1 1 1 c it s te l C • c the ' '•• -' _ • a - -l - w_-c or not o _ --c CC c s S - _ _ _ 9- _ _c __ to eve- 11-tn u_ thcr-e - s su h a r stri-ztion it is · rert eles cl-3 2 r th2 t ouera tioY al l2 e 1ts were 1-L I er the 1p - ssi n th t su i 1 ri inj n- ticn as in eff '2t f l 5 Apparently the Sp cio l Grou 1 no t fa f1 lly Si·tare o t e d le 1in effects on the n qtt1s1tion c 1 -e i l intellig nca · 1 £ lj 01-U l E 1f_' ' reJ ll J _f_E m 1a iges in CI p o csal _ ' r the · cond ' c t e of a U-2 rai sion On Scpte l r 10 th CIA p -op sed that th Special· Group appro· e a '1d r c ' nt he s h dul i ng or a U-2 fligl1t to provide e tensi re 'i-O eral cover o b l as 1· ell 1 as t· o legs d rectl eve Cubm 2 r s ac T ne S cretc ry cf State oo ect d to this co binint of n actu l 0•1 l '1' G 1t - 1th the overf'lyin of inte national -1ctaL S He l' t at the lon p n 1er_al flight 1- ould ll a· - · itt nt cn md - ' he tti riaft er to fit l int eneT ly h ds afte o sn ove - lis t of Cu a th s -rou d put the United St tes in poor position _to st ' u on 1 ts rii it i to overfly inte onatic -ial · 3 ters A co ' ingly the Secreta oy i State proposzci 1 that ha Septe ber flights be broZe into fo ep te missions t · ·o cf the1 1 periph ral d _t _bt iri tly ove Cub J the CIA mad 9lc2 ls tc do so H0 ·1ev r CIA 1Z de it c n operc tional pr3 ctice -not to overfly if ther · as more them 25 er cent overcast and the Di 'ector of Centra Intelligence points out in his December·26 rep rt that the poor 1• eathe ' in September plus the ne essity for f'l - ng fo- ir separate lissions ins tec d o t one 1·es il tee in p r olcnging· t 113 time required to get the desired cover2 ge 01' cu· E L' l fact the· ne t successful U-2 mis ion as not flo ·1 1 v ntil Saote bar 26 f'e l that u ·K1e ' thes cir- l F St n es the Spe ial Groc should h '-le be n in or ned of the fac o s ope t1ng to del y t e iour-flii - t co'lere ge anc give 1 an op c ttmity t reconsid- r th o dvisa'bil ty of a n1ss ion ov_ezt t le cri tic3 l tc rget rc s ur-ge tly q1 iri·r1g sui - · •✓ ei la ce 1ra lso r- el t at the s e i l G ct p shcul Ce possessed £ r e har is hic 1 i OUltl E t C lti tlly iCk up s h o iS i s of 'S o t g 365 111 Continued r aee 'lliT 6 rt 2 opca 's th t · · ithj n the Sp- i · sl G ··oup further cons i e1•0 tion should have been gi•1en to propo w ls 'c - he Acting D ector cf C n - a l Intel i encc In Au2 1 l t 'l'i Sep-ce l er fo i loHlevel pho og tlphic r • O 'lnaisso nc o-t cer-ta n t 'gets in Cuba i·ihe t -1c Goecia' i G oi p took up the m2 tter on 3eptenbe lll note ras tcl c-3n that the Secl 'e tury of efense did' not · ioh the lowleviel oper tions to ba onsid 'ed u 'l'l' il result of J-2 covera£e of ti1e S e e r a bece J- 1e avail bl Grt ntin c 1e obvious appro- -pr e tar Bss of tr ►3 recO w n n J tion of the Dec1 'etc L y of' Defense i'l8 must point out that • hen the U- 2 f'lif hts ·rei·c - l elay'a d the -e should t hav0 be n lt ' ri diate 1 e-e1te mination ot 'che pro o3al f·or lo -leval fliehts Ho 10· -le' s l recor n '3san e mi sions 1· ers flo -m over I Cu1 t until Oc tob• r 23 · _ • J We find th need fo - improvcr icnt of th processes used in malc ng na tione l intellii ence e ti tes and the p roc sses used in rna ing curl • nt tnt ll e i c c nalysea nd el JO in t -ie -- ch iqu_ s for elatir g the3c·t110 ft nct ons The President nd policy-e dviso - y oc' 'fi· l 13 ·w re ill served· by t i1' 0 r eeiil · Nc tf t i l ·Intel iqnc - ina' e i3s1 ed by th int lligence ·cor •mmity on ' ept mb r 1'9 on '' n- _r- Uit 'y Buildup in Cub2 • This estim te conclud- d th t the establisn llent of So· iet · i ied ura and inter iediate re n6 'o llistie missiles in G b 1 irould be inconsistent with 3ov1at practic to elate an- l • th Soviet p licy as t he ommtt '1i ty then t rnessed it This rnista en jstdgment made at the very tiae when the So• rie ts ware in3talli 1g ll R Bi-ls nd IRB ts in Cuba we attribute to 1 the lack of adequc te nt lligence ·· cqverage of Cub 1 2 the rigor Nith · hich the ' 'ie '1 1as held that the E oviet Union would not a 1 stL'lle the r1s s antailed in establishing nucl ar strildng forces on Cub 2n so l and 3 the absence of a imaginat ve appraisal of the intelligence indicators 'lhich although' lirni ted in number e -e contained in r ports disse nlnated by our · intell1gen e ag ncies c reach this oncl ision even though ue recog Ylize the absence t the tl -s of ' any con 1t1sive photographic intelligence · The Estin ate of Se9tember 1 9 pointed a1·1 y 'rom the likelihood of the este blishr ient cf oviet nuclear rai5sile systems in Cuba An important c 'l i1t ior1c ry st m- nt 2 pp - raci in t' di Jcuss fon pa srapn nG nely th3t t 1 J conting- ncy o s ch a development should be e amincd care fully even tr ougc it 110 ild -tm counter to c rrent So I1et policy £his cc- u lon r-y st ta nent ho · e •e -' tas not carried fo1 - ard into the con' lit t sions of the 2 timate 3 - 366 111 Con1inued1 c P -'l as tf 0 1 ' h - i - f r e 'i2 a -s d r th ro _u- tic n of cu 1' 1- 1- -ll s e po -ts t e i ll g e c -_- ' t r lcC to g t ac ' 5 o ey C--o· r·r e 1t l · t - s t • r 1 1°' it r e · r fts P- -- ---•- _ o __ - • df _ ' s ed t t e fa z t r C t is e 3 eri to 2 ply th -r r res - i - ir 3 1 ' # U -1 0 _ C-Oc _ --w -·- --·-·• - -S · - - e - o a 1ce ' f t ' s ccncl n s 'C -- c • l - _ _ ' • • t t r __ J C V- -1c r - r -c u_c_ nd_ e ' v -1 l 1 _ ' 'r _ C _ - - - t- -··- 1 '1 c - 0 - · epor s an ilacle for r tell m ' E nal sis l 1·l- beli eve that the n r-total intellig nl' e s L--p 'i se e pe 'i• nced· by th United Ste e ·rith 1• spect to the ' nt cdu- ' tion ' 'ld deployr ent of' $0 ' et strr gic r ssiles in CubB 'e 1 l ted ir J e rse pa t frc a m lf n tion cf the n l t1c ocess by li h intr llig nce i nji tors are ssesse-d 2nd r·e o -- - d S l'n s _t13 lii ir1ct1 on dL ' '-DiS -- d the f ectiveness o ' policy t d 1ise --s ° C - io e-1 lntalli-· g 1ce est LrtH tors and civili a _---i i 1ilitary oi'lic ers h2 v 1 1g co and 1 1 rc3 nsib lities · ·ie b lleve that- the mon 'lei · in -zh cn i 1 telli er e indicators • ere h ldl d - n e Cuba situation ay well b t 1e 1 os t se icus rJ a - in cur intell £en -3 s tem oQ 9 ng_ ·•h5 i -S r r_ccted g_c1 J__s1 § _g_t_o th -J r _vest ccns q1 e 1 s In th s in3 t2 '1c e t 'le r a jor conseqt eno s we n --rorim - 1 ng 2 Ot r Governr 1ent -1 s net provided - ith -' he degree of early - a -ning of ho3tile intenticns a d c pa bili ties · hich should ha·te Qeen derived - i'ro l ·the indic ltors contained in tr incoming intel igence _ 2 Ueither you nor yo r p -incipal -poli y ad •ise -s ·1ere provided at -PP 'opriate in- e ls •1i th r ea '1i 6 f'ul c' l ' ula tive I intelligence col '_ 1tmity sy t ' uati- slly c nd pe iodic lly p - s- 1ted co pili tions o ccU -r flate dicators this 1·1c1 ild have re-pared ussess nts of the avail ble intelligen e indicator Had th l f e r t f 1 t f s 0 -sa - e cll e the c 4Si t- - t c 1 of c· -i Z s i te ' l Se 367 111 Continued s t L' r e1 1 et'S ulth some of th-3 rau indicator r' ' ports uas not an t c cn-ca bl i ru t lt' te for I Eofes ional analytical 'aporting on a de •Clop rift- c r·isiS SfiUation- -7n-ne raw nt l1 S3ti7 e-r p01 'ts ei e·useT-efI'et tF1e f y in t2 rgeting tha Octob r l U-2 mission •ihich led to the discovery of offens1 e missile$ in Cuba the significance of the inoortant indicators involved · 1 s not comr t '_Y i ate l to the Presi ent - ---- - -- --·------ -· ·-·----·- ------- ·-- 3 Despite the intellJ gence indicators 1·1hic were accttinulacing even before the U-2 di covery on October 1 the intel- ligence co mnunity did not pro luc for the benefit of policy-level consumers a revision of its errcneous Nation l Intelli cn c · 2stira3 t' of Septembe ' 19 'rie believe· a 'urther a ' ld eY-h rnstive ex u 1 n2tion not ·· 1 mi ted to Cuba should be rie d i by tl e intelEsen e io1 nu '1ity of the omplex i n lytic process employed thro £ 'lout the con' munity in the aosess ient of intelligence indicators le b se this beJ i f on the nature of the nclic tor-type cia' 1 - bi h our reYie11t -discloses was avail ble u 'ing the period 'r'ot 1 i 1 ty to October 1962 - ·-- ·-·--- Thirty five exe nples of such av ilable ind c tors a 'e set foz•th in Annex A to this reoort In cataloging such e -rnmples we app --eciate fully that 1·1e ha e the benefit of a perspective which was not then possessed b ' ' the inte llig-an e c O l iun1 ty ' le are a 1130 anare that the illustr•aticns listed are but a s n2 ll number ta rnn fron th gre2 t volume of -eports which • e 'e received and which included some der 1onstri bly erroneous ini'ornw tion i·ie urge ·that the z nn xed lh stre tions be rc d not onl - r fo t 1eir individual content but aJ so 'or the pm•pose of notins the c1 u iulative significance of the information ·oeing received T'nese indicators ➔ -P · ty o ntalligcnce sources such as refugees cl2ndeotine a 6 ents and frieno y oreign · p_om£ s The · dealt wii h V rio1 s aspects of the $oviet r 1ilit2r build-up in Cuba j_ncluding the introduction of high-rankj_ng Soviet mili tnry pel'f onolitie i uho 1er•· specialists in the fields of militar·y const •uction en cncering electronics jet pilot train ng su 'face-to-air missile defanses and So• iet long-r nge c ir a l ld stratcc ic striking ore es the asGignr ient to Cuba of Soviet specialist in 'oc' cetry and o tor l'ic ams the sto te ents r iade cy persons hi3hly placed in the Castro regime concerning expectations that nucle r deliver· - o po bility would be established in Cuba the s g tings by gro r 1 o 3e 've '3 or oi'fcnsi - mis Jiles being deployed un-ier strkt Soviet control - 7 - 368 111 Con1in11ed u- i '1 - r· o d --• s o · e se e y -i tt- i 't ' · l' J t o - 0 1 f Z e i ·e - i 'l· ' '- Sl l 2 sc e o r· $0 -ie-t troc s ' ' s ari - - - e t -f l _ l f r 1 c t - ' r c' e 'rv- oth -- ' 2 t-e •1 ls - h i 1 l·l- · • tie ed th t - - te ' of So· i- 5l- shi s - • ·1 tn i C· _ - · r ·• · s 0 d f c - 1 £ ·le - -v a of 3C a c 1t i - c f'i S s - ·e c - 15 o ' 2 9-S2 tv a µc of 7 ar 1 ls i l Sc te3' je ' 0 '1 -e·tieH or th intellfgen e re ort g oc ass -eveals t at i itations t·1h ch - e e placed o t the p hlicr ticn a cl disse i-- 1 inc t icn of reports 3 d 'o tion ccnc2 'ning t e sit u t on 1 C- 1bz · 1 -e either nisintcrp et d or mis p liea T'nis inhibited the f or of significa Y t dat One rnch linitation was imposed by the Director of' Central nteliigence in M c y 1962 Bccau ie o ' the Di 'ec or's reservations con ez ning estL ates on Cubn o der of battle he inst ucted CIA analysts to check out ith th Hation2l Photographic Interpretatio Center UPIC any report that was susceptible of photographic verification 711e purpo e was to establish by 2 ll avail lble · ee Ils the aut 1enticity of refugee a d 2gent reports Eo • ever acco -ding o tt Director of Centr l Intelligence it operated as limitation en publication because th instruction was interpreted by CIA analysts as a restriction against publishing anytbing that ·could not be verified by the TPIC One conseq_uence was that duri 1g the pre-October ll period a i inf'o 'lll ' 'Ltion becc ne available o the offer sive build-up Cvba it was net published by the CL' e• en in the President 1 s Intelligence Checklist in On Al lg lst 31 anothe - limitation was i i osed T'11e Presid- nt placed li -nitations on the publlcetion of repor s on weapons which might be 01 fensive pending receipt of further information cen_cerning suspected n ss ile in itallation a t Ennes On Octobc - 9 these instructions were reit8 rated by the Pra ident 1ho emphc siz'ed the i ilp 'ta ce or maintainins tne tightest po3sible control o all info nat i on relating to o fensi· e · aapons Tne President r l de clea ' that he ·1ish d to imoose no li -r itatio 1 - -1hatever en i he ollection and analysis of intellii ence r lati g to ofier sive ueapons a d h e -nphasizc- i thnt he 1 Y - ted all s t f'orr 12 icn colle te- C 'l yze1 end p c l ly e or-te to cf ic ls c - ng a -eal _ e d o 10 1 Iio- ' e the iJn te ' 369 Ill Continued 3te_ s IntellJ genc £ - r 2 P -- 1- t1 t _Jj - c J b_ - l_ hl _ c tl0n$ 2 s-- 1-·1 1 fJLi •To - c 1 tq__ pr2-rtJ__sny__ D t '1l t_ ' q - f _t J-i e ' e·z _ J irr- 1 r ·-ri1 C1Y lt J J Sf n c e n uQlic e t ion A t v11oug 1 tne D f rec· v· --0 -c in1·ru1 In te llige 1 e exc pted CIA I s Pres dc 1tial Int- lli encc Ch3clclist from this injunction the Checklist issues preuo red nu r 0cuent to th J President's in t uotlons failed to in 1 1de in 'oi•mition from '1Y of the 'afug e or a ent r epo •ts on the sie htings of oi'fe 'lsive mi 3lles in Cuba '7ne President 1 s directive restricting the publication of intellig-' nce on off msi·1e reapons Has cle rly 1' ise n ecessary and e sent al to the nation 1 interest ' he nisinterpretations of this directive endz nge ed the necessary flo r of infor nn ticn and S' JC'iG as a warning th - t in rutm e si tuatio 'ls requ ing such r st i t1ons o ttr ntlon rr ust be g1 en to estatllsh ng · secure channels for tran iission of vito l in f'orr ation to officic ls ha'l1ing a clear ne d to no •r Tha Cuba experien0e points up the ne0d fo ' ' advance planning to ensure that our hl llna 'l end r w ter al intelligen e resources are suffic 1 ant and are adeqt1ately orgmiz ed to r Ce t the demands or a er arg mcy such as that 1 thich confronted our Goverrunent in this instance · 1 rrten th President found it necessary to res·tric t the publioation of informa tion on oi'fensive missiles in Cuba tt ld to confine such inrormation to designated categories of recipients t he intelligence cor mmnity did not c ave in r1 adiness i ple i to meet the i •e o •ting •equl1'el l0nts o f sue till e r ergen y t s a r esult sig lificant information did not re ach sose elements of the Go· ern n nt both in ' ·Jushington and the military c ot IJ1a _ ds end in s ome instances 1mport nt intelligen- e was not brought to the 3 tte ntion of the President and so1 1e o_ther high officia l- T ·10 e ample s of th e c onseque 1ces i·1 hich f olJ ov ed were l offtc ials · ho che cked in normal places conce rning such matters as the October 10 s peech of Senator Keating· 1- ere t old that there i•1as n o e vidence of offens ive weapons although in f act r aw intelligen- e h ad 2 l re E dy l e d to the t argeting of the San Cristobal o r-aa where offensive missile insta llations 1-re r a · subsequently found through U-2 pho tography on October f-11 and 2 for a brief' period the l imit tion on pu licntion operated in such f ashion as t o preGlude the Defense Intelligence Agenc y fr0m · ct sss nc t Lng outs de • the ashington c 'ea intelligence pub1icat i ons on the d e veloping Cuba s ituc tion As a cons equence it 1· 1as necessary t o c a ll in ·certain mil i t r y commonders fro · t he field i'OP 3E 'ft5 T 370 111 Coniinued r d 3 1 •e t _c 1 o t ·•- · '1' ' n s --v-a to i pa t 1 - -- - le- ' s ri tion 1 o ossible ili- ta_ a t on i - ·o 16 -- • 1e note 1e2- t r1 t · en D-2 o· e - lif 1 'ts c t - CegcU c 'l a C 3le at d b sis c Cctot 2 o a 10-Cay supply eF1 i t r aiG r c c e 2 1o ' 3 tg i et t ge c Glt e • or 07 - in ' e c ' i e c c ' t -al c ssing f c lity fo d el p Jtoz hic fil Ji qu tity 1e propr a e s 2 ty sc feg c ds t s e ssc -y to r ial-- use o f i b l bo o ies t s att e lo atfc s ccnside ably 'e o· frc as in¢ 'E1 rouf hout our review - e he ve been nindf- 1 o public · ch2 rges to the effect hat du ing t period of th Sovifrt tili t3 ry bu i ld-up in c foa the U S intelligence p -c ess -1as in scme m mner manipulated for partisan pol itic l U 'POSe$ i- e f1nd no evi ence i 1s tsoe·1er to support such ci 2 'ges d y -j @- Jc '7 e3 R illia Jr Chairma '1 President's oreign Int lligence Advisory 3oa cc • illiz l' l 0 Sa er Clo 'k Clifford Js 'le Doolittle I-la ' be ' II II Gordon Gray EdHin H Land • illiam L Langer II Robert D Murphy Fra lk Pace Jr II - lJ - Reverse Blank 371 II II 112 fcCone• femorandumfor the President 28 February 963 and Conclusions lattached1 ZS February 1963 C M ORANDUM FOB The Preaidem l'he White HouM I a m returning tho report of tho Prerident 1 • Foreign lntelllgen c e Ac viaory Boa rd dated ½bru a t am1D4rdfog on the imelllgen c e c onununity' • action ■ in coE1D ctcticm with the Cuban c risia I will JlOt attempt to comm on the apeclfica o the report It la my underat nding that the Board will make reccmunendation■ to you for corrective measure ■ which they eel ahould be taken within the intelligence co unity When the ■e rec ommendad 01111 are received l would hope for an opportunity to comment upon the m a I did on the recommendations co ed Lil their interim report o December 28th When I appeared be ore the Board on November 7th December 9th and December 28th I stated tha t the-re waa an underatandablo reluctance or timidity ln Frogramrning U-Z overflight• over Cuba a ter w had di11covered the prueuc e of surface-to-tr mluUe inatallatiollB This caution wa ■ uncl er ■tluldable not cnly becauae of the e letremely severe criticiam of U-2 lnddenta da iing b ck to tho Powers• incident on May I 1960 but a lao because of the moro recent of a Chinat U-2 and a U-2 i ntruaion over SakbaUn in early ptetnber Thia same attitude appu-elUly dictated tha Secretary o Stato•a action ln reviai ng a CL •propo■ od flight at the Special Group meeting held in Mr Bundy'• o ice on September 10th It wa• I believe the same attitude that cauaed the Special Group in con■idaring my requeat on October 4th £or e zienaive Cuban recozm is■aiic• to a11k JCS and CIA to atudy all alternative means of C mldu ctlni aerial reconJlaiUance and to report ba c k on October 9th In retrospect it might bo contended that there was a f il e to e urcuo su ficient urgency in proposing U-Z i-eccmnaieaance m iaal however I nl in c lined to believe that any one rea c hlng iruch a con c lwiic m muat first carefully weigh the aerlO' U conaidera tic ma tlal enter lmo a decision to ovei-fly daniec territory lo•• I farther advi ■ed the Board that 1 elt tho ana Iyata both in the 1 n Ulllgence co Wlity and els where in Go 1ernme it including the 373 112 Continued Htf7H iii t J State Department were so c onvlnc ed that the Soviet• would not accept t he inevitable eonfrontatlon resulting f'rom placement of ollen■ive mi■■Uea in Cuba that they were lnc lined to diemi•• ■uch evidence a■ there was to the contrary Thi■ I flnd la one of the diUic ultios of dealing with the imponderable ■ of what the other fellow will or will not do With puticular reference to the Cuban eltuation lt should be noted that for two yean the intelligence community had been surfeited with report• of mluil•• ln Cuba all of whlc h proved to be incorrect prior to thoee which we recelwd on or about September 20th Neverthel•••• one can now readily conclude that greater emphasis should have been placed by the e■timator11 on certain of' the 11Intelllgenca Indicators attached a1 Annex A to the Board report About 3 500 jent and refugee reports were analyzed ln the preparation of my report to the Killian Board and of this number only eight ln retro■pect were c on■ ldered a a reasonably valid indlcatora of the deployment of offeneive miHlles to Cuba I continue to feel that the intelllgenc e community performed well I have examined thie performance peraoaally and ln depth and lncidentally with a critical eye Ae you know my own viewa differed from thoH of the community I believe that the concluaiona reached from my study made for the Board at your requeat reflect a more reasonable judgment of the performance of the intelllsence community in the slx months' period prior to the Oc tober criala A copy of these conclualon• la attached John A McCone Director Attachment JAM mfb bd 28 Feb 6 3 Orig • Addressee 1 - DCI White House 1 - DCI Chrono 1 - IG 1-WE I I 374 112 rconrinued WPSEt aJR-- CONCLUSIONS L Al though the int lllpi ca • into it• action a diirlna th• C W ll crisis n'9'9 1 sd cenain ueu where ahortcoming■ e xuted and whare impranmenta ■hauld be made ln V1rlou areu 1 melllpnc a collectlon and proce■-­ tna the int elllien c• cozmmmity opuated • f t l y md wall ln connection with Cuba Every ma for wupcm a ■yaunn Intro• dw ed into Cuba by the Soviet a wu detacted ldeDWled and reported with rupec t to munbeHt 1oc tlon a z d operatloa al ch r etarl1tic1 before D y of then sya attained an operational capability - A relatively eort period ol time U Wd between ■tra tepc weapona into C lba panicul arly ■tratepc miuilu and the COU'U%Wncement ol the flow although me iH o ta nalble report• of their preaance datection of their pOHible pre n ce and t rietlng ol the ■wipeet HU of thef Jo location waa accompllahed in a CompYeHed tlme framei and the lntelllaenca cycle did move with emao -dlnuy rapidlty throuah the ■tage ■ o collection nalyid 1 t l'1etlng or veri• fic tion and positive identlflc a tion Z th• introduction o 3 The very subatantlal effort dil'ected toward Cuba wu originated by an earlier conc ■rn with the eltu tion in Cub and th• ellort · already •ell wider way comribut sd to the detection lld analyala o the Soviet bulld•11p 4 moan ■ Inform tiOD wa■ d l H • d and used Aerial photoaraphy waa very effective and our be1t o oat bliehu1g hard Welll1enca 6 The procedure• ad opted in September del yed photop-aphlc intelligence but tlw delay wa■ Q0t crittc l becauH photop-aphy o'bQ lnad prior to a boat 17 Oc taber would cr ot ha ve been su flci ent to wa n- i cdono • typewhlchwauld require support roin We a urn Hamupbere NA TO • · 375 112 Continued XOR SECBET - 7 A1ent reports helped mated lly however none giving •lgniflcant information OD offenalve m1 u•• reached the tntem1- nc• conununity or pollcy•mak•n until alter mld •Septembei- When recetv ct they were used in dlrecttns urial photography 8 Some reatriction• were placed on dlHeminatlon of information but there la no lndlcatlon that rutrlctlona necHauUy fleeted analytical work or action• by pollcy•maken the•• 9 Th• 19 September estimate while liidlca tlng the lmprob b1llty that the Soviet Union would place MRBM1 a and IRBM1 a ln Cuba dld state that thi• contingency muat be e xamlned ca refwl y even though it would run counter to current Soviet policy th• eatimatore in preparing the 19 September eatbnate gave great weight to tho phtlo1ophical argument concerning Soviet intentions aod thua did not fully wel1h the many indlcatora 10 The eatbnate of 19 October on probable Soviet reactions waa correct I I 376