ll g J This document consists of pages Copy#_ of 9 Copies Series A l WHY THE POLITICAL PROGRAM SHOULD BE IN THE SPEECH Military action by 's with respect to Cuba will aise worldwide fears of a nuclear war our full objectives It will also raise quescions about The world will be watching us closely to see whether we combine our military might and determination with political acumen Inclusion of a political program in the irl tial speech will drive home the essential point that the United States wants a political settlement not an escalated military ilmBB involvement In the absence of such an offer at the very outset we risk being in the world position the UK was in at the time of Suez 0-hould tw ther military action be necessary after the speech we would be credited with having tried to avoid the necessityd The offer would not sound soft if properly worded it would sound wise An o£fer in a subse- quent speech such as in the SC would not create the necessary initial impact on world opinion It might even give the appearance of a retreat from our initial position • 2 WHAT NEUTRALIZATION WOULD MEAN The political program needs a catch word which will strike imaginations as portra3fng a fair offer Neutralizationtt is the best that comes to mind ndemilitarization 11 a se·coni best By neutralization ··-··· i - 2 - neutralizattion we would mean a result along the Austriar type The main content of the rogram would in fact be derlilitErization i e removal of Soviet military installations equipment and personnel under UN observation Such neutralization and demilitarization would immediately and drastically reduce the troublemaking capability of the Cuban regime and would probably result in its early overthrow In the initial proposal a tight- rope needs tt be walked between sking Khrushchev directly to agree to replace the present Cuban Government with a noncommunist one which would make it almost impossible tor him to talk and any implication that we would settle for the present government The crux of the problem is getting the USSR out militarily and putting as much nautral e g UN influence in as possible in order to bring about consequential political change 3 WHY GUANTANAMO IN AND ITALY AND TUREl OUT Within the scope of vigorous US military action to de end our security an offer to exchange Guantanamo for removal of Soviet installations in Cuba would be regarded both worldwide and domestically as a gesture showing our wisdom and good faith It is the element of concession of little real importance which would gi1re a propaBl for neutralization of Cuba - 3 Cuba i e withdrawal of Soviet military support balance The entire political context in which the offer would be made in other words would be different than the one now prevailing An offer un effect to exchange Guantanamo for the Soviet sites in the absence of US military response to the Soviet moves would be weak In conjunction with such steps it would be regarded as a far-reaching step by us to grasp peace out of the brink of war Italy Turkey and tfwat7 should not be included in the initial offer Their inclusion would divert attention from the Cuban threat to the general problem of foreign bases Turkey and Italy should be consulted in advance Furthermore The inclusion of bases in these countries in an inspection arrangement in zxai response to the USSR 1 s broadening of the issue would at a later stage be a powerful move •