48 Cline Memorandum for zhe Record Sozi icazion of SSC Officials of Ime igence on fissile Bases in Cuba 27 October 1962 ' October 1962 St 3 i ioti icati n oi ' SC C i ' icials Eases i l C- a l Itel l ige 1ce O l i ss- l e l lt a t Zl c J o tt e e e ii g of 25 Cctcbe - the Preside lt ca Ued e c i t e cce at a --- er pa rt ras a tte idbg at the a t ot s l la C le -- 1aul - rj_d r oz ze late c le at UOJ Cat ledral venue e sa ici he had ' eard sto -ies that CIA officers were allegii g that in telli ence on of fensi7 rissile bases in Ccba had been avai lz le for several k s efore it ras cal led to the attention of the President Ee asked oe to confi ' I tha _t I 11'as responsll le for the ana l sis o t this ki ld of intal l ence and appropriate dissemination 0£ it to higher authorities and to tell hi I the facts in the case • 2 I told the President that I ras responsible in Cll for substantive analysis of intelligence and the dissenination of current intelligence to the President and the lational Security- Council I said I could state cate orical ly that the stories he had heard were untrue since I was sure the mi ssion with the first photography 0£ the 1 RBU offensive bases was no-nn on ili October and it took approximately 24 hours for the film to be returned processed delivered to the National Photographic Interpretation Center and scanned by PI analysts I said I was sure the technical s i s did not turn up the evidence until late afternoon or ear cy evening 0£ 15 October that I myself heard of it first at that time and that re COC leted the analysis before passing me infoniation £ormal l y to the nite ouse on t 1e morning of 16 October The President seemed content 1-rith this explanation J In view of concern over this period of intelligence handling 0£ this sensitive information I have tried to reconstruct llhat I lmO'lt' of t '1e events of the evening of 15' October and morning o t l 6 October as f'ollows 4 1Jnder direct orders frco the Presi dent given to me and C -eneral Ca -te - at t e ite o e several re earlie ' 'Ce tbe possibility that e a es ccas e se i Ssi 1 e 'll'2 S a la ge -r-c ge 1 '83 0 1 I bad issued i s' -- t cns tte -ector IC to see t aa t intel1i geice on n e r oi'£ensive e as so as al rsi3 ha id t i fied ze type o£ t at abso t - o di ss t c i 0 t '- s intelligence should ' le a c e 'll it ' c it - 3Pp -c al lS octcb r I spe it all 't oon at the c e - g sessic c t e Cx c - 't - s I 't2lli e t C C S Cc erence ir c ba e we a a r- -• ·' _ 149 - - - - 48 Continued When I returned to my office at 1730 I found a delegation of PI and military intelligence analysts awaiting me I do not mow how· long they had been waiting to see cie but it could not have been many minutes or they would have passed a message to me at the Conference Room They iTere all agreed that they had just identified a missile base for missiles of a range upwards of 350 miles I revie red their evidence and w2 s obliged to concur 5 The DCI had gone to the 'fest Coast and General Carter was then at an informal reception for the Commonwealth conferees in the Executive Dining Room at the Headquarters building in i icLean I was the host but delayed Ill ' arrival until 1815 to study this intelligence Upon arrival I called General Carter aside and advised him in broad terms of the intelligence I said it would take several hours to - rap up a de finitive report with fully considered analysis General Carter said he was going to dinner with General Taylor and General Carroll DL and would let them know I asked if he would notii'y rr cGeorge Bundy for the White House and he said he thought he might be at the dinner and would notify him there 6 About 2130 that eveni lg my intelligence officers checking out the evidence on the site reported somewhat c tically by phone that they had agreed on a report identifying offensive missile systems probably in 'the 700-mile and possibly in the l Ooo-mile range I instructed them to complete a written report and stand by for action early the next morning 7 A few minutes later I decided it was a mistake to wait until morning to alert the key officers at the White House and State Department s _they ould insure early attention to the problem on the next day I assumed General Carter wouJ d have alerted the Pentagon adequately via JCS and DIA but that he might have missed t e White House Accordingly I ca1led Ur l cGeorge Bundy found he had not seen General Carter and double-talked the in formation to him in broad terms lie was very clear as to the import despite being short on facts due to the problem of security over the phone This Y1as about 2200 I then called Roger ilsman of the State Department and conveyed the same in formation to him I had more difficulty indicating securely to him that I really meant IRBM1s rather than aircraft or other equipment we had anticipated but the lig lJ t finally dal' Iled and he as he later informed me called the Secretary of State to pass on the word 8 Early the next morning 16 October at about 0830 I talked again on the phone to Ia- oundy I forget 'llhether he called m e or vice versa I had by then reviewed a brief memorandum on the subject and calculated the ranges of possible missiles by then we had settled on 700 to 1100 miles and crudely indicated them on a rnap At Ur Bund y-•s invitation I went immediately to his office having cleared this with General Carter mio had another engagement and instructed me to follow through on the V hite House formal notification Sid Graybeal my missiles expert from OSI accompanied me In Bundy 1 s office I told hilll the story He shortly r - q u_ - _- '- ·' 150 48 Continued bro ' ' t e ttor ey Ga i eral llhcc also brief'ed lis i citi u co c ent l'a5 c e fo ir-lett er 'll'O -d o £ e -eco -d If r e - co - -ect 17 AJ ez jc c also c a e to get t le 'brie£in6 • A t m - e r 3c d 7 said that le had ar -a 'lged a i ll CO eet wit the Preside lt t o fill hi i l am ce ts c er t ' e 'JS policy proo ea i n ol ed At 09 30 C al carver ar -ived I S 1C'lf'eC hb t ie e o -and we lad p -epared dise used the denee and ac ' sed hi G --a ea l co lc s- -t hi 1 full7 llitb a lalJt ical back- u I said elt t e ct -ig D I ccld ' a ldl e i h e 'bri i lg of tb e Presid e rt ll'ith icl -ene Carter ag -eed ti- at he J 'C02DlJ' did not i eed lfi tb 16 c1l he sa er at reluc t lJ a g -eed and th2 t stI bc cy lad better get back to see t u ie lCI the trest t got tile 'll'Ol d a ld ccnti lue research az a s sis on the C iJ issile prool - i t 1 all of 1dri ch C-ei ieral Car e ' hea -til7 agreed 9 I preslll le General Carter did surl'ace the inf'orcation at llOO the DCI returned later that afternoon and a whirlil illd of intelligence reporting and policy for nulation on Cuba set in frO I which we have not yet recovered _IJIJ RAY S CLINE Deputy Dir r Intelligence Reverse Blank 151 - 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