• ' • f h ' • 11 VJ• 10 • m w ' ht Hl ill mi l Cl p eo I 0 my th ft ' 0 I'm •• go 8 ' I • ·twt tn y ve-n• t the f c l ·t ' t t h i wa it vl1 lly cl n e tir • Kl11-iu l1cl1 v YBS' w y wo u ld hav e left u I ovember n pl nning to come o ve r - he kept sa 1ng s w iting till after the elec t ions but obviously he h t l i t 1ng to s o substantially increase his military power w that ' it tould bave we think Just unhinged all of Latin Am e r1ca and • I hro n into question a • y of our statements ab ou t Berlin Prilne 1nister Yes I quite s ea that see the var out of this blocka de Vhat' s worrying me is now do you Vhat are you goi·c g to do with the Are you go1ag to occup Cuba a nd have done with it or is 1 t going to· just drag on · residet1t K enn edy • Ve could not occupy Cub a for some days and we a re preparing a potential for that kind o f action if it 1 s oaoessary but v a didn't start off with that actio n for t 10 reasons • I First because there has to be a gap of some da ys to assambl e the forces v1 · ioh 0f course will always be public information And secondly because we want to see a little where we begin to go on _ _ ___ J • ---- - 2 - this road We don't know what's going to happeo in Berlin - we don't lcnow what's going to happen any place else '£his seemed to be the action we could take which would lessen the chance of an immediate escalation into war though of course it could bring that result Prime Minister Yes that ' s quite true Is your blockade goibg to extend beyond the military and arms into things like oil and all the rest of it in order to bring down ·the Castro a•overrllilent President Kennedy At the beginning we're going o confine ours lves 'to offensive weapons of W lr in order not ' to give him a ·complete justification f or Berlin In other words we•re not shipping offensive weapons of war into Berlin so we're just confining it to that But it may be trat within the next few days we may need to move it to petroleum oils lubricants and other things' but we don't want to do that just now because it gives him arr obvious tit for tat in Berlin Prime Minister What do you think Khrushchev's action will be In the United Nations to start with or some action of a· positive kind President Kennedy He may do what you suggest and make us stop one of his ships by force and then take some action in Berlin He could seize Berlin or he could put on a blockade there ·and there are any number of things he could do We just have to expect that what ever it's going to be it's going to be unple sant But I don't think anybody is able to predict with certainty what he will do right now but I would suspect tbat he will do something unpleasant to us in Berlin which I think he is going to do anyway PU8L IC RECORD O FI CE - ' _ ' t'·' - - 3 - • Prime Minister I Well then what do you thinlc the next step will have to be I to 11nve somo le ind or con reronoe with him or not 7 I resident Kenne Q ¥ What wo wunt to do is get those weapons out of Cuba Cn tro regime is not tho issuo or the Communists The We have hnd n l phm to invnde Oubll in fuot ns you know I have taken the p1r1t ion tlmL we should not lJut we w nt to get these missiles Now I tlon't know what kind of a negotiation r e ont l' Cuba coulcl go on which would permit some exchange on that but tlwt of course should be the object of our policy I rime Minister Yes What worries me - I'll be quite franlc with you - having a sort of dragging-on position that's one thing If you occupied Cuba In my long experience we've always found that our weakness has been when we've not acted with sufficient strength to start with However we've got to wait now and see what the Russian rnactions are close touch Then we must get into very They may react in words by arguing at the United Nations and all the points that I made in my message to you or they may react in deeds - either in the Caribbean area or in Berlin or elsewhere But we must be ready to decide whether we' re going to meet that by demanding a Conference and settle the whole thing up or whether we re going to force the issue by warlike measures And I hope that we can keep in very close touch as to what the next stage is the moment we see the Russian reaction President Kenned Well I'm aware Prime Minister that the action we're taking is not complete force and does not immediately solve the problem but the alternative which is the series of air- I I I I • l • stril es and a11 inV S l p 0 Ctlll'1 WhiOll WO may have ·to clo j st101ns t o 11lo plaoi11a uoli b11 roon on us a11d l nvi•t as h m so I dj rou·tl y into lkl1 1·t11 1'il 1n -t we eluoront to do trlllt t11less 1 ' 11ooossttl ¥ 11tir·t t 01lJ a t111y whon we oa n •·t do 1t fo v at Jonl1t tl J O i1 n thex w0ok boolttiso wo 111 VO 'LcJ 1- r 1a0xnblo our i ve13c3eJ s· tl1 lt if we obviat1sly 11 l t f o r o rco on M m Dind oouJ d st1j ' t tc1ent I t t1l·o Cuba tonigllt ll1n·t wo1lld bo vary nice but we don •·t f i ave lJtat t'o 1 e Now we 11v 1 y 001no t o th1s invasion bf tho end of 1 tl1a Vv lOl but wo n ro ass01nbl nt our• t 'o roor 1 in p riopa ration fo r it Bttt wliat wo ' 1 0 attempting to do is t o begin this 1 oscalation in a way tha·t lessens t he cMlloe of a seizure ot Jralf I1e rlin o r 'vVo t ld 'vVar III Now we l not be able to p revent eitl1e r but at least Ve have served not 1oe on him that we cannot accept the procedure and the ct ons wh±oh tie carried out Prime tfinister I Yes I very much app reciate that and I bave just got a n1essage f ro1n David who has expl'ained to me his talk with you and this is ver y va luabl e i r think all we c a n do ' I I •I now i s r just to wai t for the reactions and i f you would get in direct ' touch with me or th ro1 1gh pavid · GorE J ' so tnat we a re actually wor ki ng tqgethe r al 1 the time i i Y's vePy imp0 rtant I I ' Mear1whil e may I ask 'you - have y04 been in ·dt r ct touch with I i I I Khrushchev - baye ' o u bad a telephone talk with him o anything I l ike that •' • I I I I • •· re_s_id e nt Ke nne dy ' No I haven't I sent hi1n a lette r 'about an hour ago II telling him what we we re going to do · ·- 1 I 1 ' As I •s aid in rey- speech I I I about his assurances he played a do1r1ble game You remember that I '' • ' he kept saying he was coming 0ver here afte r tbe election ahd would do nothing t o disturb the situation until afte r the elect1 ' He said t hat the weapons were defensive that they weren't moving 'I ••-·• • -• • I' •• -- •• -' • • Jy I missiles I l II • I • w ' i A l • Ill 'v ' y u 1 til ow O ' I oh I lTI 1 I I ' l I thi what I'm 0 o r you eel ' l · h Z l I _ e d' W0 1 s om -elves V e ven 't yet heard f rom de Gaul e and ue r have you t Kenned ' No I haven't hea rd f om eithe r one of them We didn't get in touch with them until this afternoon so they mvan•t ' had much chance t 'b get back to me - IJ • One of the points which ' I I think is impo rtant about t his 'build-up he re 1s that this l ' I • r ' • of nussiles which the • Soviet Uni9n could bring to bea r upon the 1 I __ 1 I I 110 sy stems It would also ove rcome our warni _ C United States l I I because they come from the South ' 1 I build-up if completed o r wtien completed will double the number • t I I • • I-' I I and we don't hav e an adequate warning and it comes f rom so close by that there's always a • • • • • I I I temptation f o r them to engage in a first strike or to face us 1 I with such a dangerous situation ove r Berlin that we would have had to quit vtby That's obviously his pUPpose we feel tbat we have to take some action And that's Now our action is moderated by the raalisation that we could move very 1 ' quickly into a World War ova this o r to a nuclear war or to lose Berlin and that's wby wa•ve taken the course we· e taken Even thoµgh as I say it doesn I t ' 1 rep resent • IO o _- ·- if' r • • • • - 6 repr sent any final answer The invasion itself as I said re uires seven days for us to mobilise our forces which we c i nnct do under any cloal of secrecy We may find we have to come to tl1at but we are preparing for that in the meanwhile but I won't do anytl1ing about that until I've discussed this with you again ut what we•re attempting to do is to warn Khrushcl1ev that this action he I s tal en constitutes a very hazanious threat v1hich may lead to a great number of courses which would be unpleasant for us but awful unpleasant for him Prime Minister Well I quite understand that and as you know we' 11 do all we can to help in the lJnited Nations a·nd all that But the actual realities are quite serious and you quite understand them What worries me is again I say that if we are forced to a conference all the earns are in this man's hand But however you e xplain d to me wl1at are the possible developments you may have to talce and if we do have to talk to him and meet him in the last resort the more cards in our hands ttie better in my view You may say that's rqther tough and perhaps rather cynical but I thin the more cards in our hands the better and I would be very happy to ste them in your hands President Kenne y Fine Well we're going to be in a position to execute that if it appears wise at the end of the week but I'll talk to you about that Prime Minister You must have had a very hard time I feel very sorry for you and all the troubles I've been through them I only want to tell you how much we feel for you but if ou' 11 ' ' ' keep in touch with rnvid and me the best we can do now is just ·· '' J l • -- J ' I •I I - 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