• November 21 1J62 'l'OP 'lECRET I attach a copy of tho Top Secret note of the ''rime l 1n1ster's talk with the Foreign 3ecretary and General Strong on Monday You can get 1n touch 111th General Stroog who is Director of the Jo1nt Intoll1gence Bureau LUn1stry of Defence at WHitehall 8474 extension 400 L1eutenant-- olonel ' 'he il' t Hon C 1r lichael Adeane G C V O K C B - • l 'j01'E FOR THE RECORD The Prime Minister saw the Foreign Secretary and General Strong at 3 00 p m on Monday November 19 I was present General Strong had been in the United States for the period October 13 25 i e the period immediately before and during the first part of the Cuban crisis General Strong said that it became clear to the authorities from intelligence sources and refugees that there was a build- up on Cuba of rockets from Russia Whether these rockets were surface-to-air missiles or whether they were ground-to-ground it seemed desirable to try and seek more information by aerial reconnaissance A large number of meetings were held over the weekend at levels up to Rusk and Macnamara and it was decided to tell the President when he returned to Washington on Tuesday October 16 The immediate point then necessary for decision was whether to step up aerial reconnaissance General Strong said that the President had a number of discussions with about fourteen or fifteen people present These included Dillon McCone R Kennedy Taylor Nitze Rusk McG Bundy Bill Bundy Cline amongst others The intellectuals that is to say Nitze Rusk the two Bundys and Cline argued against the existence of the Russian rockets in Cuba and cast doubt on such photographic evidence as was then available They thought iti d ikely that the rockets were there since they all seemed to hold preconceived ideas that Russia would never put offensive missiles into Cuba • - 2 - General strong added that constant reference was made during these discussions to the article which I cG Bundy had written for the magazine Foreign Affai rs Vol 41 No 1 October 1962 Time and time again the general argument put forward in this article was used to illustrate some point or othe r The intellectuals tended to twist facts to meet the article ' s hypothesis said that be this as it may the meetings was McG Bundy General Strong the moving spirit behind all He seemed to initiate them and to decide what matters should be discussed at them and seemed to be acting much more like a senior adviser on foreign affairs than like a super private secretary But as a result of these meetings it was decided to step up the ae rial reconnaissance largely as a result of pressure to do so from the scientists On Friday October 19 the President was out of iashington but he returned on the morning of Saturday October 20 and was presented with a great deal more material which was then eenerally accepted as demonstrating that there were offensive missiles in Cuoa It was then necessary for the Americans to decide what they should do Here again it did not seem to be a matter of great importance to the U S Administration how many missiles were in Cuba where they were sited whether the nuclear warheads were already there or on the way or whether the missiles would ever be used The main point as the President and his advisers saw it was did the existence of the offensive missiles in Cuba mean evidence of a change in Russian policy issuing a challenge 'las Khruschev Discussion on this question l ed them • - 3 - to believe that Khruschev was indeed changing his policy All their thinking about Cuba was therefore really related to what Khruschev was planning to do elsewhere as part of this change of policy especially in Berlin The President was faced with three possible courses of action a to do nothing b to invade Cuba c to demand the withdrawal of the Russian missiles and take such steps as he could to bring pressure to bear e g the quarantine It was difficult to say whether anyone was advising the President to do anything Dillon and McCone argued for the strong line - an invasion R Kennedy and Taylor were General Strong known to have favoured the moderate line did not know what view Rusk had taken or indeed whether anyone cared whether he had a view or not The American military authorities advised the President that they were doubtful whether they could carry out a quick and successful invasion of Cuba This point said the Foreign Secretary seemed to be of great significance If the Americans were not confident of an immediate military success in Cuba how much less confident were they likely to be of operations a long way f rom their homeland ThlL_Prim t inister thought it likely that Taylor remembered the difficulties of amphibious operations from the Second World War The President had concluded that if he adopted either course b or c above the Russians were likely to react in Berlin The Americans were prepared to go it alone • - 4 - either without consulting their allies or irrespective of what their allies said had the Russians reacted against any action in Cuba by moving against Berlin Gener _ £QDg thought that the American Government were prepared for their action in Cuba to escalate into the nuclear It seemed to him that the U S Administration was overconfident that they had pinpointed the position of all the main sites of inter-continental ballistic missi les in the Soviet Union and they hoped they would be able to take these out with a pre- emptive attack by their bombers This point seemed to the Prime Ministe r and the Foreign Secretfil' to be of the utmost importance and would be a suitable subject for the Prime Minister to discuss at his next meeting with President Kennedy He would warn the President of the dangers that would flow from overconfidence on this score not know for certain where In the first place they could the I C B M sites were and even if they did it was extremely rash to suppose that with bombers they would be able to get through in sufficient numbers to take out the I C F l s The situation would of course be different with Polaris and Minuteman The Prime Minister asked General strong if he knew or had heard of any channel of communication between 'lashineton and Moscow other than the diplomatic channel General strong said that he had no knowledge on this but there seemed to be a general feeling that there were a number of channels between the two capitals November 19 1962