alf flo' Fti1i lGf Tlill 1 Hl D t D§l $ 71 J f l 1 ·4 0 f' •hJ Gy her Oi'P ·J · • 1•' JR Itii-f Ul FJC FORSIOi O 'FICJi SliX ljKrl •ijD HITJ IIHL J J' 1Jl1' l DI TRIBUTION Jir F lJason ro 163 Cctober 22 1962 D 2 37 a m October 23 1962 R 3 11 n n lctober 23 1962 r1tl0J'' 'g ' ddressect to t'orcisn y' l'fice telegram lo 16 l of OCtJber 22 eJ ectcd for information to ashington 1 i 1 iiew ' or k inv lrul 9 'fil At n small priva te meetinC of pc l'llllllent representotives held in tile oft'ice of the cting Sccretory nerr l L'71D ediately following this afternoon's Council tx Finlett r said t ll' t he h d been instructed to ask for a special mcet1ng of the CoWJCil to be held at 10 o'clock tonight f c was not at liberty to discuss the subject ce tt er snd gave no indication that t he spolteSJ 11' n l OUld e cnycne other t hen hlraself '2 Tonight's meeting wns in f ti'e t attended bot h by T Dean Cheson rnd lJ · herman Kent of the J I os well ns by i 'r F' nletter Af· er explaining tho t he 11r s appearing ceforc the Council as an emi L ry of President i cnnooy Mr l cheson s o i d th t the Uni ted St t cs i r d very recentl Y leornt tilot the neapons nade available to Guba b the Soviet Union trhich had origlnnlly been believed t o 'iJe solely defcns i ve in chnracter hod in fr ct n serious offensive c-- c oility Tuey included Oi ss1les nth rongas of eleven tundred nd t ' 0 thousand t110 nmdrcd mles The 1 tter could cover t i1e 1'1hole of the United to tes except the extreue iorth est as mill es much of Crumda end a great pert of c entrnl and oouth merica 3 tr • chesm then rrooeeded to give the Cou oil c detc 1led ' ccount of the IIULlber locct i ons and type of 'l' Cl O rhich were· nor no m to be st ' ltioned i Cuba These included oobile r iissile l aunchers fixed missile sites twenty two IL 2 boobers forty 13 1 fighters as 17011 cs coastal defence misollcs cir defence dssileo and Jidod niss1le control crcft A search of t h ru jar Gubs n r ir f ielU s had revealed no structures for nucleor s torage Uj DRL N A T o mtt telewm No 163 to For 1Sil Of1'1oe ·- llUCleo • s torage but 1t nru n t be ft Gh'UJllC tllllt nuolcnr weapons ror in oonjunotion with tile new'ly a r qui red Tiltl now offens ive Wll porw rere bcllevod to bave been oarned to Cuba by the Soviet ob1p Poltava 'trhioh had nde frequent trips bOtwecn tho S viot Union and Cub• and 'trhich was naxt lue to an-iwe 1n Qiba an or about November 2 It ns bolleTOd that all the neir wc11ponn irould be operational b Jruru1U7 1 llan¥ of them operational ol rood 11 '-l'O no• 1n Cub• aporui syotCID II D· Aclieoon said that the firs t Jof1n1te ev-idonce of the erlstonoe of orfensiv- weapons 1n Guba hll d bccOJ lO avnl l•ble on C Utobcr 15 Slnce then · bore had been wch d1acuss1an within the lJn1 ted St tee Mm1n1strntion and scme strong opinions had been expressed Tho President had noir IDAclc his deo1sioo 80d 110v l d be announcl og it 1n a speech very shortl i S ltr Aobcsan tiler gave n ootline ot tho Pre81t1ent' s spooch w trar tweney-tour hours dtcr the speech all ships sa 111 og to Cuba were to be s topped nd searched and ships carrJing offensive w npons woold be turned back A close surveUlcnce over Cllba wns to be maintained The United St tes armed force s had been oroered to prepare Jm ·all eventualities Any missile e ttacJ on ru y part ot the Western hemisphere '110v l d be regarded as a Soviet attack an the United States 6 After describing th6 c mtent ot the Presider t' s speech L'r f cheson said that al though other courses had been urged on the President the latter hsd been annous to avoid an action wldch 11 ight have brooght drastic Soviet retaliation on America's Allies n regard to the possible Soviet reaction to what m s now intended the United States Government believed that the Soviets rouid be tempted to try to oblige the Uni tod states to go a long n y 1n tile use of force Soviet vessels might be ordered to t ke the risk of getting sunk 1n order to make t 'le Americana appear as the Bgll'essors If that were to be the Soviet tactic the United Stat es were prepared to go a long 11'8 Y dollll the SQlllC 1'0ad 'rile sm-veillo noc of Cuba irbich t ie Presidt nt hsd o dered c'anid resnl t in the u c of some of the defensive or a- fensiw weap011S D01f stationed 1n Cuba If those weapons were used 0 they would be taken out There were obviously grave possibilities ot esOb lation in the situation and of Soviet retaliation 1n other p rts of the irorld In the pall tical and propagandv field a vigorous Soviet response was to be expected The United s tates l OUld be UlQlm N A T o telegram No 163 to Fore1en ot'f1ce -3- would be alerting governments in Latin America end offering them holp 1n dealing 1th poss ible riots 'l'bere might be a trong Sortet drive for the sboliticm ot all foreign militl 1'7 bases In short Khrushchev might say thet he would leave Cuba if the United States llOUld abandon its bases elsewhere 7 itr Acbeson described the action which the United States proposod to take in the Security Council i e to call in a re30lut 1on to be introduced on the night of CX tobeT tor the withdrawal ot oftans ve ba ses trca CUba as essentially preemptive Tbe United States knew that if they did not take the m_ tter to the Seeur1 ty Council themselves sorr eone else would a In t he IIDSU1ng discussion which consisted l 2 r -el y ot llles tions pit to Hr Acheson and t r Kent a mxmber of lllnl8JICnt representatiYes exp 'Cssed sympathy nth the Unite t States poeitb lthoagh all avoided cClllmitting their governnents In nnsnr to one question ur Acheson said that the action tal -en by the SoViet Union in Caba was an importallt step to'lfl' rds readjusting the IJUCleo r balance between the SoViet Union and the Unite l states aDd therefore constituted a threat to N A T o as a whole It wns of the highest importance tbs t the Alliance should not break step at this time sane retaliatory action against Berlin seemed inevitable There were ail sorts ot plans to deal 111th the Derlln situation but everyone avoided commitment This was a situation which 111JSt be remedied 9 Both the Dutch and the Belgian representatives pressed l r f cheson to explain exacUy wbJt the United States expected her Allies to do Jr Acheson gave no expllci t reply but 1'r Finletter intervened to say that solidarity was of supreme importance and that a major step forward 1 0Uld be the approvu l ot the BercOD arcan phns 10 In answer to a fUrther question Ir Acheson said that President J ennedy's conversation with 1lr Gra yto had been disturbing in that the latter had told explloi t falsehoods about the existence ot offensive r apons in Cuba 11 At one point during the meeting the llelgian pel'IIIP nent representathe oc cplained strongly that an IUllXlllIICellleilt had been issued by SF APE to the effect thli t the N • T O air forces bad been put in a state of alert This bad been done Without 117 consultation With the Allinnce General Moore SAC El JR's Chiet of Statt ns then inVited to join the meetini and explained that what had hat ha d been lklne amounted neither to a otet of ui Jq le l len noi· to a state or Yiaila ooe General Norute d ha4 rc00nlCtlde4 to his oubordinate o ero th t thoy should take appropriate prcoautiooary military noo surcs Ill Oh 111 the 1nteno11'ioe tion ot the oollcct1on of lllilitary 1nt ell1gcnce and o review of all alert Md emoruenoy plans Thoy had been a eked to do this in an lillll'OlO lkti° ' manner and 1n as far as poooiblo Ylithont exo1t1ng l' 'lbl10 not1oe 12 'l'he Actina Seoretary-Genoral ended the meetillj by remilld1 ng tho CounoU ot the special arrangement s to eiurure i t s efficient tunctiOWJlg 1n a period or rising tension I t ns clear that 11'11 'l'DI'e now entering BUob a per1 Foreign O fice i leD se piss Washington CJ trf l I llew York 11 am l' avana s Repeated as r eques ted W Af CE COPIES Private secretary Sir H C11ccia l r Cbeeth m Head of Americim Department Head ot Head ot Nelr-s Department w o P D Resident Clerk vwvv