TO THROUGH The Secretary FROM INR SUBJECT Western European Reactions to the Cuban Situation Through October 27 1 1962 S S Roger Hilsman V - -· Western European reaction to the US blockade•of Cuba has undergone some changes during ··the first three days since its announcement but has resulted in a general recognition that the situation warranted or even demanded vigorous US action and in acquiescense in or outright approval of the action taken The degree in which this broad support by government and press was given of course varied from country to country nevertheless on the whole the response has been one of understanding and support Certain facets of the reaction are however worth noting 1 Considerable note was taken both in the press and in some official reactions of the lack of prior consultation De Gaulle was presumably miffed by this lack and some Italians seemed seriously annoyed while some of the press made quite a point of it This was also emphasized by the British Laborites However in general the absence of consultation was accepted as necessary and at least in the short run the negative reactions do not appear of serious consequence 2 A number of countries supporting the US as a matter of priDciple iD this showdown with the Soviet Union nonetheless avoided specific endorsemeDt of the kind of action taken · r cLASS u•'i' as _ _ _ _ _ _ __ DOTINGRADE TS tQ ' _ G _ S SJE ca __________ -· TS avtr - r •• J lGi 1 r2 -2- 4 Considerable doubt was expressed initially notably in the British and Italian and to a lesser extent in the French press as to the facts in the situation but there 11 now quite general acceptance of both the facts and their significance as set forth by the us 5 Although the degree of support of the US action varied predictably from one Western European coUDtry to another the failure of Italy and Norway to give clear support to the action was conspicuous - · 6 There was naturally much speculation as to the possible upshot of the US action There was widespread fear that the Russians might counter with action elsewhere notably in Berlin and or that there might be a clash in the Caribbean either of which might lead to war in Europe There were con• trary voices that only by such firm action could the Soviets be halted And there were frequently expressed hopes that by negotiation or UN action or a Sum nit meeting the matter might somehow be peacefully resolved But thus far there was no concerted push in any direction As the week ended there was a tendeDcy in Western Europe to see tension somewhat eased as the quarmtine failed to produce fireworks United Kingdom Official UK reaction to the US Cuban action has been increasingly favorable The first government statement issued on October 23 expressed deep concern at the provocative action of the Soviet Union in placing offensive nuclear weapons in Cubaand accused it of deception and of opening up a new area of instability Prime Minister MacmillmJ made a strong statement to Commons on October 25 condemning the Soviet action as a deliberate provocation designed to test the determination of the US and supported the US decision not to accept this Soviet move He accepted the US characterization of the missiles as undoubtedly offensive in type He emphasized the moderate nature of the limited US blockade· He stressed the need to avoid appeasement which would lead the West into greater da Jger and for allied cr ity He expressed the hope that if there were some alleviation oi the present state of tension it might be possible to move into 21 I I O Ir J l'c -3- a wider field of negotiation but stated that recent events show that in these matters the West cannot rely on mere word • and promises The British Ambassador in Washington however let it be kxlown that the UK would oppose the inclusioo of oil among those strategic items we will not let pass to Cuba Al Jd there are reportedly some British officials who do not understand why we should be less ready to live in the shadow of Sovi_et missiles in Cuba than they have been to accept the presence of Soviet missiles pointed toward them from the USSR Labor Party leader Gaitskell expressed in ComDOns sympathy for the US but also considerable anxiety and apprehen• sions as to consequences of the steps already taken by the us He criticized the US for acting without consultation with directly affected allies in rebuttal Macmill cited prior US notification to the UK and his belief that this matter the Preside11t was forced to act rapidly Gait e ' performance in Commons was ever unusually restra 2· t 'm-earl t t qf'ivate briefin Ga· skell had xpressed doubts a ut US proof of the nature of the missiles - nd the likelihood of Soviet hostile intentions against· the US ' ainland He implied that the US is playing just about the Jame game of power as USSR and for not much different motives 'E n r e t r has expressed strong support of the us Brown urged that 2 consideration be given to any bargain inwlving Turkish bases This same negative view of any association between US bases in Turkey and the Cuban missile bases was conveyed by a British official source in an imnediate raj action 88 irrevelant of the IChrushchev proposal on the subject A statement issued by the Labor Party esecutive on October 24 expressed grave concern about the US action which was described a8 being of doubtful legality The statement did not accept it 88 proved that long-range missile bases had been 1et up in Cuba and called for an on•the•spot examination by the UN Despite its concern about the US action the carefully phrased stateaMmt called on both the US and the USSR to act with the ut• most restraint m 1d urged that British diplomacy be concentrated on bringing the dispute to the conference table and creased the urgency of reaching agreement on cliaarmament SIIMi-OA Q -4- Whil official UK reaction has been favorable the specific U action taken has not been specifically approved nor has any British readiness to participate beyond the request by the government on October 23 of British shipowners that they be as cooperative as possible with US authorities in the Caribbean insmctions against the USSR or Cuba been expressed Before President Kennedy's speech the British press was almost unanimously opposed to the expected US_ec nomic counter• measures against Cuba Despite the change in the situation resulting from the evidence of Soviet missiles nly one of the major papers the right wing conservative Daily Express at first unreservedly supported the US limited blockade announced October 22 Many other papers expressed doubts about the accuracy of the US evaluation of the missile site photographs or saw the US action in BDY event as dangerous and unwise Second day editor• ials were somewhat more sympathetic but still displayed reserve regarding the hazardous US counter-action All papers radio SDd television gave extensive coverage to the Cuba story and the US aerial photographs of the missile sites proved invaluable in convincing Britons that there was justification for US action A swing to editorial understanding and sympathy for the US move appears to be continuing as the implications of the Soviet gambit sink in Embassy London believes that the majority of the British public accepts and supports the US action It feels that the demonstrations against the US have been organized by Communists and the often active ban-the-bomb group A strong neutralist note is beginning to be heard in the propaganda of BanBombers which emphasizes that there are American bases in Britain too The same note was sounded by independent Labor MP Konni Zilliacus who called for the removal of US bases from the UK and the withdrawal of British forces from West Germany and BerliD A poll published on October 25 by the Daily 1 l London iDdicated that 58 percent of Britons iDterviewed thought-that the US actions were justified while 66 percent thought that BritaiD should support the US and only 30 percent were opposed 3 -s- - I According to a paper given to the Department by a British V Embassy-spokesman on October 25 the UK Government stated that it was not satisfied as to the legality of the blockade in inteniational law but it was anxious to play down the legal aspects The UK hopes therefore that the US would interdic British ships with the utmost restraint and discrimination __ Both official and public opinion in the Fed ral Republic of Germany and West Berlin firmly supported the US decision to interdict further delivery of strategic weapons materials to Cuban ports and to demand dismantling of Soviet missile installa• tions in Cuba Chancellor Adenauer was particularly emphatic in welcoming the US decision to intervene and defended the announced measures as both appropriate and necessary he was especially gratified at having been informed of the decision in advance and neither he nor any other West German official gave any evidence of pique at not having been consulted rather than simply iDformed Goveniing Mayor Brandt of West Berlin reflecting the general satisfaction in that city over the President' special assurances to the Berliners called the President's statement earnest courageous decisive 81ld temperate All three of the parties represented in the West German Bundestag likewise expressed full understanding and sympathy for the US decision and pledged their support for any action considered necessary by the US for the satisfactory elimination of the imDediate threat to US security in Cuba This attitude was only partially tempered by concern for a possible Soviet retaliation against West Berlin there was some tendency to speculate that US firmness applied to the Cuban threat might actually serve to deter Soviet moves against West Berlin and there was no indica• tion of fear that US concern to resolve the Cuban problem might undermille ·effective resistance to Soviet pressures elsewhere The press which was equally forthright in support of the US positioD was beginDing to discern an easiDg of tension as no serious trouble developed in the Caribbean •· ilS M 19A t illR2I -6- The Netherlands OD October 23 the Dutch Government officially stated it fully recognizes the fact that the United States finds itself in a situation in which action must be taken It expressed pleasure in the fact that the UDited States has clearly defined its policy so that all parties know precisely the situation they are facing This prompt and unequivocal public support remains UDchanged In the North tlantic Council however the Dutch representative expressed personal conce rn as to the effects on the image of the Alliance that would be produced by the stopping of ships of NATO countries aDd suggested several possible solutiODs to the problem The Dutch oppositioD Labor Party also supported the US position and the extreme left SDd the pacifists had not by October 26 succeeded in generating much steam behiDd their protests In general Dutch editorial coament continues predominantly favorable with minor exceptions and has not varied much from its initial firm support for the President's stand on Cuba Belgium Initial Belgian Government reaction was in support of the President's stand Official Belgian reaction continues to publicly support the United States but one suspects without great mithusiasm The Belgian Government was Ullhappy over the lack of prior consultation and has stressed the need for coDsultation through NAC and bilaterally particularly with regard to the problem of Berli IJ Belgian official circles are expressing surprise at the failure of the United States to press for inclusion of Cuba on the COCOM list which they say is a · prerequisite to effective BelgiSD action to control exports to Cuba Initial Belgian press reaction was generally less sympathetic with the US decision and more given to legalistic interpretations iESaF SEO t T or DR -7of the blockade and to cynical interpretations of the US decisions in terms of US partisan politics We lack recent press comments in order to determine any change of attitude Luxembourg On October 24 the Luxembourg Government officially endorsed the actions of the President and specifically approved the firmness of the decision While e 90 not have any reports on press reaction there is no reason to believe that the government's statement runs cont ary to public opinion Canada Prime Minister Diefenbaker made a statement in the House of Commons on October 22 welcoming the intention of the US to bring the Cuban matter before the UN He accepted without demurrer the facts as cited by the President but did not specifically approve of the course of action chosen · SiDce no Canadian flag ships are engaged in the CUban trade the blockade would have little direct effect on Canada On October 25 Diefenbaker said that Canada intends to support the US in the Cuban crisis and while the dangers would not be ignored Canada would stand by its allies Diefenbaker dismissed arguments about the legality of the US partial blockade as largely sterile and refused to equate the defensive US overseas bases with the USSR missile bases iD Cuba One manifestation of positive support for the US was the governmmlt decision to grant no more transit rights to Soviet aircraft and to search and refuse transit to Bloc aircraft en route to Cuba if they are carrying offensive weapons Cuban aircraft would be subject to the same procedure Opposition Liberal Party leader Pearson expressed sympathy and UDderstanding of the US position and called on Canada to give all possible support He indicated that he might however have some reservations about the kind of action taken by the US and apprehensions about the dangers of the action He called for removal of the bases SZSNI o fl I -8- Canadian press reaction to the US Cuban action was generally favorable although some newspapers questioned whether in this dangerous matter the US had the right to act unilaterally Most papers felt that Canada could not be neutral in this matter and had to stand with the us The Montreal Gazette Conservative editorial on October 24 conceded that the US could not have ignored the Soviet buildup but suggested that the US might first have presented ·the USSR with the ultimatum in private • Canadian public opinion which strongly backs the US was a major factor in forcing the government to go on record with an unequivocal expression of support for the US after its earlier fuzziness France President De Gaulle signified support for the US action and France has given us its support· at the UN Couve was quoted more than once as saying that France could hardly have expected the US to consult it in detail on the matter but it seems clear from other sources that De Gaulle's support is limited by a to-be-expected pique or resentment at not being consulted on a matter whose immediate aspects deal with an area which he concedes is mainly of interest to the US but whose later consequences may well involve areas of direct interest·to France e g Berlin Opposition party leaders Moderates Socialists MRP told us of their support of our action but also mentioned public uneasiness at speed of the decision which perhaps reminded them of what they considered the precipitancy of the Bay of Pigs operation and the possible consequences They believed the USSR would back down but were glad the door to negotiations was open The Quai d'Orsay and apparently the cabinet also apparently decided quite early October 23 for the former that war was unlikely because of the prudent Soviet attitude • 'Xhe Comm mist press of course denounces the US action Initially other French papers tended either to 1 et1dorse the action 2 chide the US for not coDsulting with France SBOl'tft -9- and the other allies and or 3 explain the action in terms of domestic US political considerations Later however the Paris press 24th emphasized · 1 support for the US and 2 hope and expectation that war will be avoided by negotiation On the 25th Figaro and Aurore ·explained why the US could not yield in the Cuban matter--because of Berlin and the actual danger that the weapons in Cuba pose to US security Paris-Jour looks for negotiations but is uneasy at the prospect that Khrushchev may be able to raise the question of US bases abroad in this new context By October 26 the French press manifestly relieved that hostilities had not occurred was by and large stressing that the US must remain firm in its in· sistence on the removal of the missile bases and showing increased understanding of and sympathy for the American position Some papers saw qs overseas bases as a weakness in any debate in the UNGA Italy Reaction by the Italian Government appears to be influenced and motivated primarily by two factors l genuine Italimi concern over the risk of escalation of the crisis into a thermonuclear war involving the whole Western Alliance and 2 fear of the domestic political effects that the crisis might have Consequently the immediate reaction of the Italian Govern• ment and of the political forces that support it in parliament was one of extreme concern over the possible escalation of the crisis into a full-fledged war accompanied by hopes of a negotiat d solution of controversy During this first period there was little support or understanding for the US action as such Nevertheless both the government and the government's parties with the exception of the Socialists gave assurances of their solidarity and every possible assistance in the United Nations The Socialists condemned the unilateral US action and questioned both its wisdom and necessity since they were skeptical of US contention that there was incontrovertible proof'' of a Soviet buildup on Cuban territory of an MRBM and IRBM nuclear weapons delivery system So strong was this Socialist skepticism that Embassy Rome requested that photographic and iiCDE ill lM I O A lJ __ -10- other proof of Soviet military build-up in Cuba be shown to Nenni himself iD an effort to allay his and his party I a suspicion of the validity of the US intelligence information Even such a stSUDch pro-US and pro-western leader as Social Democratic Secretary Giuseppe Saragat questioned the legality of the US action In addition there were a number of fairly reliable reports indicating a certaiD amoU11t of pigue on the part of Fanfani and other government leaders at not being consulted by the US Christian Democratic Secretary Aldo Moro expressed both sympathy and understandi Dg of the US action accompanied by regrets that Italy had pot been con• sulted in advance thus depriving Italian leaders of the chance of prepari Dg the psychological grounds for an explanation or justification of the US action before Italian public opinion As the crisis abated somewhat following the various diplomatic initiatives and the changed course of Soviet ships steaming toward Cuba there was an increasi Dg Italian under• standing and sympathy at least over the i J Jevitability of the US action accompanied by the general hope that a sense of responsibility would prevail on both sides Typical of this new mood and appreciation of the US position and action was an editorial on October 25 of the PRI daily Voce Repubblicana which defends the grave but understandable US decision on the groUIJds that by their military build-up in Cuba the Soviets have upset the balance of power on which peace rests Luigi Salvatorelli noted Italian historian and respected and in• fluetltial editorialist writes in Turin's La Stampa center• left Fiat-controlled daily What would Russia say if during a moment of tension between itself and FiDland any western power were to even send COtJventioDal arms reinforceme11ta to that country The Italian leadership can be expected to steer a cautious course in its support of the military phase of the US action in the Caribbean There is little doubt however that in a sh down the present government will give whatever assistance may be required either _in a diplomatic or military field Even the Socialists have reassured Embassy Rome that there ··would be no question as to where the PSI would stand in case of conflict • J C -11- Noteworthy so far has been the inability of the Italian Commuoist Party to organize impressive demonstrations any• where in Italy and the lack of any demonstration whatsoever before the US Embassy Scandinavia Scandinavian reaction excepting the Icelandic not yet available and the Finnish nonconmittal according to accepted public policy has so far chiefly reflected alarm over the danger of general war and a desire for negotiations between the US and the USSR to ease·· the tension ·· Statements of the governments and top officials so far reported have been limited to expressions of concern coupled with assurances that the situation does not call for panic and to hopes that the matter will be settled through the UN Danish Foreign Minister Haekkerup has expressed ccmviction that President Kennedy based his decisions on definite infomation about threatening military installations on Cuba Subsequently however the Danes intro• duced a quibble into the North Atlantic Council by asking us to explain the difference between a quarantine and a blockade suggesting they may still have legal reservations to express Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange has confined himself to explaix I• ing the US position and giving support only to part of the action calling for direct negotiations between the US and the USS sic The SWedish Government on October 26 announced its official position the US guarantine was not iD accord with accepted illternational law and Sweden reserved all rights insofar as the US measures affected SWedish shipping Indications were that the Swedes had their eyes primarily on the position of their ship• ping in the Baltic ·· and would in fact encourage Swedish shipping to comply with US pro·cedures The Government statement also supported U Thant in his search for a negotiated solution Private conversations between US diplomatic officers and officialE of the Norwegian l anish and Swedish Governments however reveaj a greater understanding of the US position than the public state• ments indicated Statements of ·private coDIDentators indicate that Scandinavim opinion is swiDging from a critical attitude toward the US action to understanding and support of the US position The major news SB1 l• I ' _ li CKEI -12papers have for the most part cast themselves in the role of countering criticisms of the US pointing out the aggressive nature of Soviet policies and warning that failure on the part of Western Europe to support the US could lead to dangerous unilateral US action in Cuba and disunity that might jeopardize defense of West Berlin The Swedish press has shown the greatest swing the leading Social Democratic paper under a left-wing editor continues to question whether the US Govern• ment actually has proof of the presence of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba but has toned down criticisms ot the US while the other major papers now defend the US position The principal Conservative paper and Liberal Dagens Nyheter the largest paper in Scand1navia have taken nearly identical positions the latter has stated it 1s so easy to sit here and condemc the American blockade •••• but the current worries might have become something more serious if Kennedy had remained inactive Swedish public opinion particularly that of the business world appeared favorable to the US stand The DBDish press has been more cautious in criticisms of the US from the beginning but editorials indicated Danish editors also feel obliged to defend the US Social Democratic Aktuellt close to the government typified press opinion when it maintained that the US action was of a defensive character and that ''Kennedy's government has been exceptionally careful to avoid any step which could be described as premature It especially praised the fact that the US immediately brought the matter before the UN There are too few reports from Norway to analyze Norwegian opinion but it is usually similar to that in Denmark Portugal The reactions of Portuguese officials aDd of the controlled press are generally favorable to the policies set forth in the President• s speech Many official and news commentators however 1 sounded two sour notes l the action was belated and 2 NATO solidarity essential in the Cuban crisis should also be created for Portugal's benefit with respect to Portuguese Africa Reportedly some amoug the well-informed minority of Portuguese have coDfidentially· expressed fear coDcerniDg the possibility of war Cilll l o A n ' -13- The single most important official reaction presently available is contained in instructions to the Portuguese delegation at the NAC to express an opinion that NATO countries should state their solidarity with the measures taken by the US Government because in any attack on positions where the defense interests of the West are at stake such solidarity should be indivisible Spain · The day after the President's speech the Spanish Foreign Ministry issued a coamunique that contained faint praise and lofty generalities concerning the course of action proposed Spain viewed with preoccupation the progress of Soviet intervention in Cuba with serious risks for a part of the world with which it feels so linked by historic and present ties aDd understood that peace liberty and respect for the juridical order are indivisible Spanish officials in individual declarations have been more open in their praise for the President's message several of them declaring that earlier action would have been desirable One official in the Foreign Ministry estimated that the USSR might take action in the Berlin area but that hostilities·in Cuba were most unlikely Lukewarm Spanish official support was succeeded on October 26 following an emergency session of the Spanish Cabinet by the issuance of an official declaration of Spanish position on the matter The Spaniards expressed complete solidarity with the action of the American Government in line with our attitude of always fighting against international · commmism •••• 'l'he most critical official reaction came from regime newspaperman Gomez Aparicio who simply termed the President's course of action too little and too late This is in line with ·a tendency in the past · among Spanish officials to criticize the US for not rolling back the Iron Curtain e g Hungary in 1956 and to advocate quixotic action On the other hand in ·the present crisis some Spaniards have privately indicated· apprehension that war was 1DD1n mt According to one report some Barcelona workers expressed sympathy for Cuba as a weak underdog Such a reaction even if it did occur is not of great significance in an authoritarian state like Spain ftdml 0 A '1 L