1 HEARING ON ANNUAL WORLDWIDE THREATS Tuesday March 8 2022 U S House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Washington D C The committee met pursuant to call at 10 03 a m in Room 2175 Rayburn House Office Building the Honorable Adam Schiff chairman of the committee presiding Present Representatives Schiff Himes Carson Speier Quigley Swalwell Castro Maloney Demings Krishnamoorthi Cooper Crow Turner Wenstrup Stewart Crawford Stefanik Mullin Kelly of Mississippi LaHood Fitzpatrick and Gallagher 2 The Chairman The committee will come to order Thank you all for joining us today Without objection the chair may declare a recess at any time Before we begin I want to address some housekeeping matters First today's open portion is being broadcast live and streamed on the committee's website be conducted entirely on an unclassified basis It will All participants are reminded to refrain from discussing classified or other information protected from public disclosure We will reconvene for the classified portion of the hearing this afternoon I will now recognize myself for an opening statement worldwide threats hearing amid an international crisis We are holding this As we sit here today Russia is continuing an unprovoked war against Ukraine that has resulted in thousands of casualties millions of refugees and a conflict that seems to be only escalating in severity In the past 2 weeks the administration has led a massive international campaign to ensure Putin and his oligarchs feel the cost of this horrific brutal war As Democrats and Republicans as Americans we stand in solidarity with the people of Ukraine in their heroic struggle As we work to help Ukraine defend itself and to make Russia face the consequences of its aggression we are in a stronger position today because of the extraordinary work of the Intelligence Community The IC has provided exceptional insight into the potential of a Russian invasion over the past several months The IC has helped expose Putin's playbook for policymakers our allies our partners in Ukraine and the rest of the world And to a degree unprecedented in my time on this committee we have also made public highly sensitive intelligence to disrupt Russia's planning and malign activities Our ability to prepare the Ukrainian Government to defend itself and to rally the 3 international community around imposing unprecedented economic consequences on Russia and the military assistance to Ukraine would not have been possible without the IC's work This hearing is an opportunity for you all to highlight the threats we face in a more complex and dangerous world We are witnessing the largest military conflict in Europe since World War II The administration has made it clear we are not placing U S military forces into the conflict in Ukraine As a result we will have to rely on other capabilities and increase our cooperation with our NATO allies We also face numerous other strategic challenges from the rise of an increasingly bellicose and belligerent China to the threats posed by Iran and North Korea Among the challenges from these nation states as well as from non-state actors is the use of cyber operations that continue to target both the U S Government as well as the private sector Offensive cyber operations present a significant risk to our homeland and as the crisis in Ukraine continues we must be extremely watchful While some of these risks such as climate change or pandemic disease are framed as often as soft threats the reality is they are anything but Americans who have died from COVID-19 demonstrate that The nearly 1 million Furthermore climate change is becoming the most urgent matter that the United States and the rest of the world must address In October of last year the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released a report on climate change in which they assessed that climate change will increasingly exacerbate risks to U S national security interests as the physical impacts increase and geopolitical tensions mount about how to respond to the challenge That is putting it mildly In the midst of all these threats there was a global struggle between democracy 4 and autocracy Authoritarian governments are emboldened using force and technology to enforce their will while ignoring human rights and fundamental freedoms and spreading dangerous misinformation To meet any of the threats before us today effectively the United States must remain committed to our values and to the promotion of democracy and fundamental human rights Thank you again all of you for your service and for appearing here today I will now yield to the ranking member for any openings remarks that he would like to make The statement of The Chairman follows COMMITTEE INSERT 5 Mr Turner Well good morning Thank you all for being here and for your leadership on very incredibly important issues for our national security including leading in our Intelligence Community Usually when we have our worldwide threats hearing most of what we discuss is theoretical How can we be prepared for threats that are emerging ascertain threats that may be imminent How can we Today this hearing is much different because war has once again begun in Europe President Zelensky has called on our country to provide weapons so that he can defend his nation and his people The administration was late to provide those weapons and is just now trying to get weapons in President Zelensky openly stating that if those weapons had been there earlier they could have made a difference He is now calling for MiGs so that he can compete in the skies and once again the administration is slow to respond to that request Vladimir Putin casts a long shadow over this hearing against a validly elected country This is an unprovoked war Now President Zelensky has called for a no-fly zone over Ukraine to stop the killing of innocent people men and women who are fleeing Unfortunately we are unable to assist The administration and NATO stand aside because Vladimir Putin represents a nuclear threat And my questions to you today are going to be about the nuclear threat that we face as a Nation not just the war that is occurring in Ukraine but how it affects us as we have had open threats from Vladimir Putin both to our NATO allies and to the United States with respect to their nuclear capabilities Now President Obama in June 19 2013 in his speech in Germany called for a road to zero Unfortunately as we now know there are more nuclear weapons today in the world than there were when President Obama called for a road to zero The U S 6 capabilities however have not continued to grow It has continued to be neglected And this administration has not sought to change our policies in a way that would strengthen our deterrent Currently there is a national posture review ongoing and I am going to be asking you some questions about your involvement in that your advice to those who are undertaking that national posture review because the world is changing We know that Russia in the development of Skyfall which is a nuclear orbiting nuclear weapon Poseidon which is an undersea unmanned nuclear weapon that is supposed to pop up on the shores of a nation like the United States and attack our cities and Avangard with their hypersonic missiles which are already deployed China which has just demonstrated an orbital or suborbital hypersonic capability and China who also has been identified as expanding their ICBM missile fields are all issues that need to be taken into consideration of the threats facing the United States Now the headlines have piled up China threatens Australia with missile attack North Korea threatens nuclear attack on Washington D C North Korea threatens Japan with real ballistic missile North Korea threatens to sink Japan reduce U S to ashes and darkness Iran threatens to wipe Israel off the face of the Earth And of course now we have Putin who threats the West and his statement was that he would unleash such consequences have never been seen in history We saw in Hawaii as there was a false alarm of a possible nuclear attack Hawaii and the panic that ensued What is in common with all of these countries besides the fact they have nuclear powers They are also authoritarian regimes and they are also countries that have terrible human rights records they threaten our populous they threaten their neighbors and their nuclear capabilities are destabilizing and a threat to the United States 7 With our Nuclear Posture Review we have an opportunity to change both the investment in our nuclear capabilities so that we rise to the level of deterrent necessary as these nations threaten the United States and invest in the nuclear capabilities but also in our missile defense capabilities So I am going to begin first with the Nuclear Posture Review Are any of you involved in the current Nuclear Posture Review being undertaken by the Biden administration And also what advice would you have for those who are undertaking the Nuclear Posture Review as to what the United States needs to do differently so that we can deter these authoritarian regimes that are threatening the United States and allow Vladimir Putin to threaten Ukraine and other allies that are not part of NATO or our nuclear umbrella Oh I am sorry This is -- those are questions I am going to be asking you as we go forward Thank you The statement of Mr Turner follows COMMITTEE INSERT 8 The Chairman I thank the gentleman Director Haines and members of the IC you are recognized for your opening remarks 9 STATEMENTS OF THE HONORABLE AVRIL HAINES DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACCOMPANIED BY THE HONORABLE WILLIAM BURNS DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY LIEUTENANT GENERAL SCOTT BERRIER DIRECTOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY GENERAL PAUL NAKASONE DIRECTOR NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY AND THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER WRAY DIRECTOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE AVRIL HAINES Ms Haines Thank you Chairman Schiff Ranking Member Turner members of the committee thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today and to provide testimony alongside my wonderful colleagues from the behalf of the intelligence community on the IC's 2022 assessment of worldwide threats to U S national security Before I start I just want to take a moment to express to you how much I have appreciated your thoughtful support and partnership this last year and to publicly thank the men and women of the Intelligence Community for their extraordinary work to keep us safe I know how privileged I am to be a part of the Intelligence Community this time of extraordinarily and talented people and to be given a chance to do something useful in service to my country and I thank you for the opportunity Broadly speaking the year's assessment focuses on adversaries' and competitors' critical transnational threats and conflicts and instability These categories often overlap and one of the key challenges of this error is assessing how many various threats and trends are likely to intersect so as to identify where their interactions may result in fundamentally greater risk to our interest than one might otherwise expect or where they 10 introduce new opportunities The 2022 annual threat assessment highlights some of these connections as it provides the IC's baseline of the most pressing threats to U S national interest The assessment starts with threats from key state actors beginning with the People's Republic of China which remains an unparalleled priority for the Intelligence Community and then turns to Russia Iran and North Korea And all four governments have demonstrated the capability and intent to promote their interest in ways that cut against U S interest and allied interest The PRC is coming ever closer to being a peer competitor in areas of relevance to national security is pushing to revise global norms and institutions to its advantage and is challenging the United States in multiple arenas but particularly economically militarily and technologically China is especially effective at bringing together a coordinated whole-of-government approach to demonstrate its strength and to compel neighbors to aqueous to its preferences including its territorial and maritime claims and assertions of sovereignty over Taiwan President Xi Jinping and China's other leaders are determined to force unification with Taiwan on Beijing's terms China would prefer coerced unification that avoids armed conflict and it has been stepping up diplomatic economic military pressure on the island for years to isolate it and weaken confidence in its democratically elected leaders and at the same time Beijing is preparing to use military force if it decides this is necessary The PRC is also engaged in the largest-ever nuclear force expansion and arsenal diversification in its history is working to match or exceed U S capabilities in space and present the broadest most active and persistent cyber espionage threat to U S 11 Government and private sector networks Russia of course also remains a critical priority and is a significant focus right now in light of President Putin's recent and tragic invasion of Ukraine which has produced a shock to the geopolitical order with implications for the future that we are only beginning to understand but are sure to be consequential The IC as you know provided warning of President Putin's plans but this is a case where I think all of us wish we had been wrong The invasion has in fact proceeded consistent with the plan we assessed the Russian military would follow only they are facing significantly more resistance from the Ukrainians than they expected and encountering serious military shortcomings Russia's failure to rapidly seize Kyiv and overwhelm Ukrainian forces has deprived Moscow of the quick military victory that it probably had originally expected would prevent the United States and NATO from being able to provide meaningful military aid to Ukraine Moreover we assess Moscow underestimated the strength of Ukraine's resistance and the degree of internal military challenges we are observing which include an ill-constructed plan morale issues and considerable logistical issues What is unclear at this stage is whether Russia will continue to pursue a maximalist plan to capture all or most of Ukraine which we assess would require more resources even as the Russian military has begun to loosen its rules of engagements to achieve their military objectives And if they pursue the maximalist plan we judge it will be especially challenging for the Russians to hold and control Ukrainian territory and install a sustainable pro-Russian regime in Kyiv in the face of what we assess is likely to be a persistent and significant insurgency And of course the human toll of the conflict is already considerable and only 12 increasing Thus far the Russian and Ukrainian militaries have probably suffered thousands of casualties along with numerous civilian deaths and of course well more than 1 million people have fled Ukraine since Russia invaded Moreover Russian forces are at the very least operating with reckless disregard for the safety of noncombatants as Russian units launch artillery and air strikes into urban areas as they have done in cities across Ukraine and near-critical infrastructure such as the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant And the IC is engaged across the interagency to document and hold Russia and Russian actors accountable for their actions The reaction to the invasion from countries around the world has been severe Western unity and imposing far-reaching sanctions and export controls as well as foreign commercial decisions are having cascading effects on the Russian economy The economic crisis that Russia is experiencing is also exacerbating the domestic political opposition to Putin's decision to invade And NATO's unified response the significant resistance that the Ukrainians have demonstrated in the battlefield Europe's rapid response to Russia's invasion not just in terms of economic measures but also actions long thought to be off the table such as the provision of lethal aid to Ukraine shutting down EU airspace to Russian planes almost certainly surprised Moscow In particular while Putin probably anticipated many of the current sanctions to be imposed when we weighed the cost of the invasion we judge that he did not anticipate either the degree to which the United States and its allies and partners would take steps to undermine his capacity to mitigate Western actions or the pullback from Russia initiated by non-state actors in the private sector And nevertheless our analysts assess that Putin is unlikely to be deterred by such setbacks and instead my escalate essentially doubling down to achieve Ukrainian 13 disarmament neutrality to prevent it from further integrating with the U S and NATO if it doesn't rich some diplomatic negotiation We assess Putin feels aggrieved the West does not give him proper deference and perceives this as a war he cannot afford to lose But what he might be willing to accept is a victory may change over time given the significant costs he is incurring Putin's nuclear saber rattling is very much in line with this assessment Putin's public announcement that he ordered Russia's strategic nuclear forces to go on special alert in response to aggressive statements as he called them from NATO leaders was extremely unusual We have not seen a public announcement from the Russians regarding a heightened nuclear alert status since the 1960s but we also have not observed force-wide nuclear posture changes that go beyond what we have seen in prior moments of heightened tensions during the last few decades Our analysts assess that Putin's current posturing in this arena is probably intended to deter the West from providing additional support to Ukraine as he weighs an escalation of the conflict Putin probably still remains confident that Russia can militarily defeat Ukraine and wants to prevent Western support from tipping the balance and forcing a conflict with NATO Regardless our number-one intelligence priority is defense of the homeland and we will remain vigilant in monitoring every aspect of Russia's strategic nuclear forces With tensions this high there is always an enhanced potential for miscalculation unintended escalation which we hope our intelligence can help to mitigate Furthermore beyond its invasion of Ukraine Moscow presents a serious cyber threat a key space competitor and one of the most serious foreign influence threats to the United States Using its intelligence services proxies and wide-ranging influence tools the Russian Government seeks to not only pursue its own interest but also to divide 14 Western alliances undermine U S global standing amplify discord inside the United States and influence U S voters and decision-making And to finish with our state actor threats Iran continues to threaten U S interests as it tries to erode U S influence in the Middle East entrench its influence and project power in neighboring states and minimize threats to regime stability Meanwhile Kim Jong-un continues to steadily expand and enhance Pyongyang's nuclear and conventional capabilities targeting the United States and its allies periodically using aggressive and potentially destabilizing actions to reshape the regional security environment in his favor and to enforce his status as a de facto nuclear power The assessment focuses next on a number of key global and transnational threats including global health security transnational organized crime the rapid development of destabilizing technologies climate migration and terrorism And I raise these because they pose challenges of a fundamentally different nature in our national security than those posed by the actions of nation states even powerful ones like China We look at the Russia-Ukraine war and can imagine outcomes to resolve the crisis the steps needed to get there even though they are unpalatable and difficult And similarly we view the array of challenges Chinese actions pose and can discuss what is required in how we think about tradeoffs But transnational issues are more complex require multilateral collaboration and although we can discuss ways of managing them all of them pose a set of choices that will be more difficult to untangle and will perhaps require more sacrifice to bring about meaningful change This reflects not just the interconnected nature of the problems but also the significant impact increasingly empowered non-state actors have on the outcomes and the reality that some of the countries who are key to mitigating threats posed by nation 15 states are also the ones we will be asking to do more in the transnational space And for example the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic is putting a strain on governments and societies fueling humanitarian and economic crises political unrest geopolitical competition as countries such as China and Russia seek to exploit the crisis to their own advantage And no country has been completely spared and even when a vaccine is widely distributed globally the economic and political aftershocks will be felt for years Low-income countries with high debts face particularly challenging recoveries and the potential for cascading crises that lead to regional instability whereas others will turn inward or be distracted by other challenges These shifts will spur migration around the world including on our southern border The economic impact has set many poor and middle-income countries back years in terms of economic development and is encouraging some in Latin America Africa and Asia to look to China and Russia for quick economic and security assistance to manage their new reality We see the same complex mix of interlocking challenges stemming from climate change which is exacerbating risks to U S national security interests across the board but particularly as it intersects with environmental degradation and global health challenges And terrorism of course remains a persistent threat to U S persons and interests at home and abroad and yet the implications of the problem are evolving In Africa for example where terrorist groups are clearly gaining strength the growing overlap between terrorism criminal activity smuggling networks has undermined stability contributed to coups and an erosion of democracy and resulted in countries turning to Russian entities to help manage these problems 16 Ms Haines Global transnational criminal organizations continue to pose a direct threat to the United States through the production and trafficking of lethal illicit drugs massive theft including cyber crime human trafficking and financial crimes and money laundering schemes In particular the threat from illicit drugs is at historic levels with more than 100 000 American drug overdose deaths for the first time annually driven mainly by a robust supply of synthetic opioids from Mexican transnational criminal organizations In short the interconnected global security environment is marked by the growing spectre of great power competition and conflict while transnational threats to all nations and actors compete not only for our attention but also our finite resources And finally the assessment turns to conflicts and instability highlighting a series of regional challenges of importance to the United States iterative violence between Israel and Iran conflicts in other areas including Africa Asia and the Middle East have the potential to escalate or spread fueling humanitarian crises and threatening U S persons Africa for example has seen six irregular transfers of power since 2020 and probably will see now bouts of conflict in the coming year as the region becomes increasingly strained by a volatile mixture of democratic backsliding intercommunal violence and the continued threat of cross-border terrorism We are also focused on our workforce and their families The IC continues to contribute to the government-wide effort to better understand potential causal mechanisms of anomalous health incidents and remains committed to ensuring afflicted individuals receive the quality care they need The safety and well-being of our workforce is our highest priority and we are grateful to members of this committee for your continued support on this issue In closing I just want to note how much effort has gone into improving our 17 capacity to share intelligence and analysis with our partners and allies across the Intelligence Community We have seen in our approach to the threat to Ukraine the sharing of intelligence and analysis has paid real dividends in helping to facilitate collective action against the renewed threat of nation state aggression And while such efforts must be done with care to ensure we are able to protect our sources and methods we are laying the groundwork to broaden our work where doing so creates the conditions for a more united focus on other emerging challenges and we appreciate your support in these efforts as well Thank you We look forward to your questions The statement of Ms Haines follows COMMITTEE INSERT 18 The Chairman Thank you very much for that sober assessment of the challenges that we face Russia is encountering greater resistance than expected in Ukraine and suffering significant setbacks in the face of a highly determined Ukrainian resistance Nevertheless there is no sign that Putin is looking for deescalation Indeed an increasingly brutal Russian campaign suggests that Putin is doubling down Director Burns you have dealt with Putin for many years First of all what is your assessment of how many Russian soldiers have thus far been killed and how many injured And based on your experience with Putin what would it take to change Putin's calculus in Ukraine Mr Burns Well thank you very much Mr Chairman I think Putin is determined to dominate and control Ukraine to shape its orientation You know this is a matter of deep personal conviction for him He has been stewing in a combustible combination of grievance and ambition for many years This personal conviction matters more than ever in the Russian system system of which his own circle of advisers is narrower and narrower that even narrower He is created a COVID has made And it is a system in which it is not proven career enhancing for people to question or challenge his judgment So he has gone to war I think on the basis Mr Chairman of a number of assumptions which led him to believe that he faced -- that Russia faced a favorable landscape for the use of force against Ukraine this winter First that Ukraine in his view was weak and easily intimidated second that the Europeans especially the French and Germans were distracted by elections in France and a leadership succession in Germany and risk averse third he believed he had sanctions-proofed his economy in the sense of creating a large war chest of foreign currency reserves and fourth he was 19 confident that he had modernized his military and they were capable of a quick decisive victory at minimal cost He has been proven wrong on every count Those assumptions have proven to be profoundly flawed over the last 12 days of conflict President Zelensky as you have mentioned Mr Chairman as the ranking member mentioned has risen to the moment and demonstrated courageous and remarkable leadership and Ukrainians have resisted fiercely Second the Europeans have demonstrated remarkable resolve especially the Germans third the economic consequences of the sanctions which have been enacted so far have proven to be devastating for Russia especially against the Russian Central Bank depriving Putin of the ability that he assumed he would have to defend the ruble and fourth his own military's performance has been largely ineffective Instead of seizing Kyiv within the first 2 days of the campaign which was what his plan was premised upon after nearly 2 weeks they still have not been able to fully encircle the city And so you know Putin has commented privately and publicly over the years that he doesn't believe Ukraine is a real country He was dead wrong about that Real countries fight back and that is what the Ukrainians have done quite heroically over the last 12 days As you said Mr Chairman I think Putin is angry and frustrated right now He is likely to double down and try to grind down the Ukrainian military with no regard for civilian casualties But the challenge that he faces -- and this is the biggest question that has hung over our analysis of his planning for months now as the director -- as Director Haines said -- is he has no sustainable political end game in the face of what is going to continue to be fierce resistance from Ukrainians So I think that is what his calculus has been and I think that is the reality of what he faces today 20 In terms of casualties I know General Berrier you may want to comment on that but they have been far in excess -- Russian military casualties killed and wounded -- far in excess of what he anticipated because his military planning and assumptions was premised on a quick decisive victory and that has not proven to be the case The Chairman Director Berrier are you able to comment on that And also this massive column heading toward Kyiv now maybe two massive columns public reports suggest that they have run out of fuel is far less competent than we imagined General Berrier Are we learning that the Russian military How do you assess their performance thus far Chairman I think the Russian Army reformed into this thing we call the new look Army and they task organize themselves into smaller battalion tactical groups and fundamentally that is not a bad construct I think they had a bad plan and I think their logistics support is not what it needs to be to develop the situation that they wanted to do And we can go into much more detail on that in the closed session The Chairman Are you able to say in open session how many Russian troops have been killed General Berrier With low confidence somewhere between 2 00 and 4 000 That number comes from some intelligence sources but also open source in how we pull that together The Chairman Director Burns whatever Putin's plan may have been on the way in if that plan involved the insulation of a puppet regime that seems highly implausible now How does this end Mr Burns Well that is the core question Mr Chairman I think Putin's assumptions as I said before have turned out to be profoundly flawed I fail to see and our analysts fail to see how he could sustain a puppet regime or a you know pro-Russian 21 leadership that he tries to install in the face of what is you know massive opposition from the Ukrainian people In many way it has been Putin's aggression going back to 2014 in Crimea that has created the strong sense of Ukrainian nationhood and sovereignty that he faces today So I fail to see how he can produce that kind of an end game and where that leads I think is for an ugly next few weeks in which he doubles down as I said before with scant regard for civilian casualties in which urban fighting can get even uglier because the one thing I am absolutely convinced of and I think our analysts across the Intelligence Community are absolutely convinced of is the Ukrainians are going to kind of continue to resist fiercely and effectively The Chairman Finally either Director Wray or Director Nakasone what do you anticipate Russia might do to lash out at the United States in the cyber realm and to what degree do you think they can use cryptocurrency to invade sanctions General Nakasone So let me start with the series of scenarios Chairman As we take a look at it we are very very focused on ransomware actors that might conduct attacks against our allies and our Nation Very very focused on some type of cyber activity that is designed for perhaps Ukraine that spreads more broadly into other countries Third is any type of attack that an adversary would conduct against an ally and then finally certainly our critical infrastructure at so carefully Those are really the areas that we look It is done with a series of partners partners that exist in the private sector It is interagency partners It is our It is with obviously a series of partners that are allied as well but those are the scenarios that we certainly walk our way through Mr Wray I would agree with that I would just add two things perhaps One is we are very concerned about the risk of spillover effect in other words even if the 22 Russians think they have carefully calibrated some form of malicious cyber activity against our critical infrastructure the reality is they have shown a history of not being able to kind of manage the effects of it as well as they intend even if you give them the benefit of the doubt which I tend not to So for example the NotPetya attack is kind of widely viewed as one of the most destructive attacks in the history of the world and that is a GRU attack that had that kind of spillover effect So that is something we are deeply concerned about And then the second General Nakasone mentioned ransomware Obviously we are concerned about cyber criminals many of whom are based in Russia either acting in support of the Russian Government as we have seen for example the declaration by the well-known ransomware gang Conti declaring its intention to act in support of the Russian Government against the Russian Government's adversaries or who are taking advantage of perhaps the more permissive operating environment that now exists in the middle of this conflict to attack us through cyber criminal means The Chairman Thank you Perhaps we can get into cryptocurrency later in the hearing Ranking Member Turner Mr Turner Thank you Mr Chairman I want to personally thank Director Haines and Director Burns for your bipartisan work the way you have done outreach the way you have assured everyone of this committee of your absolute commitment to the national security of this Nation Thank you for your service and thank you for your expertise at a time when the world is once again seeing war in Europe As I indicated in my opening statement my questions are going to relate to the nuclear threat in the worldwide threat Director Haines you mentioned the nuclear 23 threat in your opening statement So my question first to Director Haines Burns and General Berrier relates to Vladimir Putin and his statements themselves He has stated that if anyone entered the conflict that he would escalate including nuclear attacks as part of his exercises prior to entering into Ukraine He included a nuclear weapons component He has been very boisterous about his modernization of his nuclear weapons and the new capabilities that they are seeking including hypersonics and the Avangard which they now have deployed So my first question to the three of you is do you believe him Do you believe that if the United States or its NATO allies entered this conflict to protect the innocence that Vladimir Putin is killing in this unprovoked attack that it could escalate and that he would be willing to escalate this conflict to a nuclear conflict Director Haines Burns and General Berrier Ms Haines Thank you Ranking Member Turner and thank you for the way you have worked with us as well by the way I would say we can obviously go into this in further detail in closed session but as a general matter you know as I indicated his public statement about the special alert status -- which by the way is not a technical term as we understand it within their system it doesn't relate to a specific alert status within their system -- was very unusual and we obviously take it very seriously when he is signaling in this way But we do think as I indicated assess that he is effectively signaling that he is attempting to deter and that he has done that in other ways for example having the strategic nuclear forces exercise that we indicated had been postponed until February begin then as a method of effectively deterring using his nuclear forces as a way to say this could escalate and therefore NATO should not get involved and that that has been his 24 main purpose in doing so And you know again as I indicated we are watching very closely for movements anything related to strategic nuclear forces and we are not seeing something at this stage that indicates that he is doing something different than what we have seen in the past And I think that is probably as much as I could say and I will leave it to others Mr Burns The only thing I would add Congressman is that you know in response to your direct question about a scenario in which NATO and the United States were directly involved in military conflict with Russia you know Russian doctrine holds that you know you escalate to deescalate And so I think the risk would rise according to that doctrine of in extremis you know the Russian leadership considering the use of tactical nuclear weapons But I stress that that is only in that specific circumstance that you described of a direct military conflict between NATO and Russia General Berrier Just a couple of thoughts Ranking Member Putin has invested very wisely in these niche weapons and you mentioned some of them in your opening statement I believe that he thinks that gives him an asymmetric advantage and he has also invested in tactical nuclear weapons I also believe that when he says something he we should listen very very carefully and maybe take him at his word So this question is the one that analysts are pondering right now and I think we really need to do some more work on it I am happy to digest this more in the closed session Mr Turner Great Well I appreciate General Berrier your statement because that actually goes to my next question Because of the modernization that has occurred by Vladimir Putin in the nuclear infrastructure of Russia I believe as you have stated that it has emboldened him meaning that he believes he is buying himself an edge 25 The United States is currently undertaking our Nuclear Posture Review where we are going to look at our modernization programs our policies including we are doing a missile defense review which obviously is important whenever you are considering someone else's escalatory nuclear threat So I am going to ask each of the three of you you know are you directly involved in the Nuclear Posture Review And what would your advice be knowing that we now have authoritarian regimes that are making opening statements -- excuse me open statements about threatening their neighbors the use of nuclear weapons and Vladimir Putin changing you know his posture and China significantly investing in both their ICBM fields and in their hypersonics What should we be doing with our Nuclear Posture Review so that we can deter these authoritarian regimes in the future Director Haines Burns and General Berrier Ms Haines Thank you So my staff and ODNI is involved in the Nuclear Posture Review as am I in the context of principals meetings on these discussions role however is not a policy role Our So I don't provide and did not provide my advice as to whether or not to take a particular posture in the review What we do is provide essentially the intelligence communities assessments on issues that we are asked about in the context of that review Mr Turner Before we go to Director Burns would it be correct to characterize that likely your assessment is that the threat is increasing Ms Haines That the threat is increasing generally yes I think that is fair Mr Turner Director Burns Mr Burns All I would add is I absolutely agree that the threat is increasing and I think our role is to try to provide insight from the Intelligence Community into the plans the ambitions the pace at which you know adversaries whether it is China or Russia 26 can move on these issues And all I would add is that I think it is very important for us not to underestimate either the scope of those ambitions or the pace at which they can move I think China and hypersonics is one example of that General Berrier Ranking Member I do believe that the threat is increasing We are involved in the study and our role is to really provide the best foundational military intelligence we have related to these kinds of weapons facilities organizations and doctrine that we can so that policymakers can make the right decision Mr Turner Director Haines and Burns obviously people are very concerned about the negotiations ongoing with the JCPOA and the future nuclear threat from Iran Concerns relate to reentering an agreement that had some flawed provisions including missiles were not encompassed in the original terms and that some very critical terms of the agreement were expiring Can you give us any information about the ongoing negotiations from the administration as to whether or not it is just reenter the old agreement that has expiring terms and does not cover their ability to seek ICBM technology or are we undertaking actual negotiations to try to reach a better agreement Ms Haines Thank you Ranking Member We obviously again provide analysis that we hope is helpful to the policymakers in the conduct of the negotiations don't really have you know more information beyond the fact that they are obviously engaged in the negotiations and looking to do I think what the President has indicated which is to say both to deal with the nuclear file but also to deal with other issues that Iran is being a destabilizing factor in Mr Burns But I will move to others The only thing I would add sir is that you know having spent many years negotiating on these issues with the Iranians which is probably where I got most of my white hair you know my nostalgia is under control for those negotiations They are I 27 incredibly difficult And as Director Haines said you know we always have to be mindful of the fact that the threat that this Iranian regime poses is not only about the nuclear issue or even the missile issue as you rightly emphasize asked it is also you know threat to our interests across the Middle East and the interests of our partners in the Middle East as well And you know regardless of how the negotiations over the JCPOA go I think those challenges are still going to be with all of us Mr Turner Thank you The Chairman I yield back I thank the gentleman Mr Himes Mr Himes Thank you Mr Chairman And thank you all for being here and a big thank you to your people who are doing such great work all over the world I had intended to use my time this morning to explore the state of our cybersecurity which is more important today than ever but this weekend in Connecticut at rally after rally and conversation after conversation I was swept up in the tidal wave of outrage over Putin's illegal and unconscionable brutality in Ukraine And my constituents want to know just one thing which is what more can we do They understand that this is not just a fight between Russia and Ukraine They understand that this is the bleeding edge of the war between free democracies and savage authoritarianism and they also understand that we are late to this fight Under the Trump administration the world witnessed 4 years of attacks on NATO and its members 4 years of coddling and believing and supporting Vladimir Putin and 4 years of ridiculing Ukraine with a series of ever more bizarre conspiracy theories As Russia tightened its noose around Ukraine President Trump made it clear to 28 Ukrainian President Zelensky during a phone call in July of 2019 that the military aid that Zelensky so badly needed would be stopped until Zelensky did him a favor So my point is that we have got a special burden right now to make that right because we are late to this fight So Director Haines and I would also like to hear from Director Burns I know you have to answer this very carefully but it is the question my constituents have What resources what dedication what plan what strategy are you applying in your entities to help us win this fight I know it is very hard to be specific but the more you can give the American people a feel for what you were doing in this fight we would be very grateful to understand that Director Haines and I would like to hear from Director Burns as well Ms Haines Thank you on the panel on this issue I suspect you would get a lot from everybody actually And I will try to find a way to characterize things but I am sure my colleagues will be better at this We obviously first and foremost want to be able to provide as much information about what is actually happening and I think one of the challenges in the context of what has occurred is the fact that Russia and President Putin is clearly promoting a particular narrative about what they are doing And one of the values I think of the Intelligence Community during this scenario has been that we have been able to expose that narrative as false and ultimately indicate that what they are promoting is a pretext for their war of choice is in fact just that a pretext And I think as we -Mr Himes important point Director let me stop you there very quickly because I think this is an Are they done with their false flag operations What might we 29 expect to see in that regard Ms Haines Yeah I think as I was going to say I just think as this continues we are going to continue to see them essentially spinning narratives that are false and we hopefully can provide some credible voice of what is actually happening as we move forward And I think that is both for their domestic population but that is also for the international audience as well And in many respects as I indicated in my opening statement one of the things that we are focused on is ensuring that we can provide as much information as possible to hold Russians accountable for the actions they are taking right now in Ukraine doing things that I think are largely unacceptable to many So I will leave it at that and -Mr Burns No all I would add sir is that we have no higher priority as an agency right now than providing all the support that we can to the Ukrainians talk about that more in closed session Glad to In this session I would just reinforce what Avril said and that is that I think you know the work that we have done -- and it is not without risk -- as an Intelligence Community to declassify information has been very effective I sat for many years on the policymaking side of the table and I have seen us lose information wars And in this case I think by being careful about this we have stripped away the pretext that Putin in particular often uses think to Ukrainians That has been a real benefit I It has been a real investment in the kind of actions that our allies have taken The only other thing I would add is that you know we have done intensive intelligence sharing and we continue to with the Ukrainians including when I saw President Zelensky in January in Kyiv We shared with him intelligence we had at the 30 time about some of the most graphic and concerning details of Russian planning about Kyiv as well and we have continued to do that every day since then Mr Himes Thank you So one of the remarkable aspects historical aspects about the last couple of months has been the fact that the IC has in fact anticipated and shared with the world what spinning what false flag might look like time what might we expect to see In my very limited What would it look like if the Russians continued to spin or run false flag operations Mr Burns No I think as Director Haines said they are going to continue to try to spin this and create false narratives You have seen things that the Russians have said before senior Russian officials alleging that there would be chemical weapons attacks for example in the Donbass or elsewhere and I think that just gives you a flavor of the kind of things that they could easily try to fabricate or flowed in the future particularly as they get more desperate about you know their own at least up until this point relative military ineffectiveness Mr Himes Thank you very much I yield back The Chairman Dr Wenstrup Dr Wenstrup Well thank you very much You know I view our role on this committee as to serve as partners in the protection of America and her citizens Our role is to work with you on this committee as we have many experienced and talented members here and I want to thank most of you that I have been able to have one-on-one engagements with It is greatly appreciated because it has been an opportunity to allow for some very frank exchanges so I compliment you for that And it is important too as you know that the Intelligence Community across America and within this committee has trust because these agencies that you represent exist for the American people bottom line So I appreciate you being here today and 31 presenting and actually having the opportunity in this open setting to present in front of the American people You know our goal in the Intelligence Community is to gather information so that we can be able to thwart damage or harm to secure our Nation to provide for peace and to deter our enemies So I do want to take a second to praise the very excellent work that you all have done on the Ukrainian-Russian situation the predictability of what Russia was going to do I do have to take a little exception to what my friend Mr Himes had to say because under the Obama administration we provided Ukraine with blankets and MREs under the Trump administration we very much strengthened NATO and provided Javelins But our goal is for deterrence Deterrence requires action and actions -- I haven't seen actions taken that really have deterred or thwarted the Russian offensive since this all began since it became known what Russia was planning to do I see actions speak louder than words and actions require results Unfortunately I feel that recent actions by our government seemingly aided and abetted the Russians because energy and money are keys to the kinetic attacks and the capabilities of what Russia is now doing So we have had this information but in that same timeframe we have weakened our energy we have enhanced Russian's energy capabilities and their moneys In essence we paid them to become stronger Now this is sad news for Ukraine and it is sad news for the free world So again I want to applaud what you do and what you have done provided the intelligence You have If I can shift a little bit and going to the annual threat assessment and look at advances in technology that could lead to novel biological weapons there is global labs that have some of the deadliest pathogens in China and Russia and the development of a novel biological weapon could certainly complicate 32 detection attribution and treatment of such threats So the assessment notes that novel weapons could complicate detection and attribution but I would like to point out that uncooperative nations also complicate things as we have seen from Beijing when trying to investigate the origins of COVID So my questions are what have we learned over the last couple of years from our response to and preparedness or lack thereof for the COVID-19 global pandemic that could help inform our response in the future and what steps are we taking either by ourselves or with our allies to ensure that we are able to fully investigate these matters should the need arise Ms Haines Thank you very much Representative Wenstrup I will start and others may have more to add but I think -- honestly I think we have learned a lot Certainly in ODNI and in the Intelligence Community on this issue Among the things that we have learned is the fact that we did not and still do not frankly have the internal expertise that we want to have on essentially bio issues and that is something that we are working hard to promote And we have developed things like experts groups and so on that allow us to tap into expertise more easily in academia and in the private sector and otherwise but that is something that I think needs to be expanded and recruiting the right folks is a critical aspect of this You have also set up in legislation the opportunity for public private partnership talent programs and that is something that we are trying to effectively utilize and I think having an opportunity for folks to go in and out is critically important We have also established a national intelligence manager for health in this space that -- health security that helps in this area and I think part of what we have been trying to do is make sure that we are drawing from across the IC because in really an 33 extraordinary number of elements certainly everybody that you see here before you has expertise and knowledge and making sure that we can connect it together and be more effective and proficient in ultimately providing policymakers with an understanding of what is happening and also how it is that that may translate into biological warfare and other things that are obviously of great and core interest to us So I will stop there and let others say anything they have General Berrier duty to warrant Representative Wenstrup I would just say DIA's role in this is And so for the Department of Defense we must have our eyes out our ears out and be able to understand this when it happens For us and the lessons that we have learned this is a really hard intelligence problem and we have to be able to take advantage of all of the sources that are out there And certainly open-source tools to be able to get insight early has been very very effective and we are going to continue to develop those with our National Center for Medical Intelligence and continue to invest in this those kinds of tools Dr Wenstrup Thank you both I yield back Yes sir Mr Burns Mr Wenstrup all I would add as we have discussed before is you know we have created a new mission center at CIA which is focused largely on the question that you raised of emerging technologies designed both to help policymakers you know anticipate the pace at which our adversaries are moving especially on issues like synthetic biology or biotechnology and also to deepen partnership with the private sector so we better understand the pace of innovation in that area as well Dr Wenstrup Thank you very much The Chairman Mr Carson Mr Carson Thank you Chairman I yield back 34 Director Haines and Director Wray one of the struggles over the past several years has been to detect and understand the nature of foreign efforts to influence U S politics including and especially grassroots groups The Mueller report for example identified dozens of U S rallies organized by a Russian troll farm Director Haines is support to U S grassroots groups still a part of the foreign malign influence playbook and which adversaries use it And Director Wray how do we stop foreign covert influence on grassroots activist groups without silencing legitimate political speech Ms Haines Thank you I will be quick because I would say that the FBI's work in this area is obviously critical but yes in the sense that we do see with foreign malign influence efforts to support particular groups within the United States at times and those are links that we obviously focus in on and try to provide to those parts of the government that are then able to act on issues Mr Wray I think I would say that it does continue to be a phenomenon should expect it to continue to be a threat We The Russians obviously were among the first to do it very aggressively but we have seen other adversaries get increasingly interested in taking a page out of that same playbook We of course have the foreign influence task force that we set up that is designed to try to address that I think the key point to your question about balancing is that our focus is on the malign foreign influence not on the resulting speech confused about that So sometimes I think people get And I think that if we see some kind of aggressive activity here grassroots or otherwise that we are somehow reverse engineering back to figure out if it could be explained by some foreign source the Russians the Iranians whoever We actually go at it in reverse We are aggressively investigating foreign intelligence services their proxies their social media accounts things like that And 35 then if that then turns out to manifest itself in activity here then we are going after it that way We are not and we don't intend to be the speech or truth police but we are aggressively working with foreign partners to identify foreign -- malign foreign influence sources and where appropriate we are sharing information with social media companies who can then reduce the bullhorn effect of fake accounts that are actually you know part of a Russian troll farm or in some other way inauthentic accounts And we have actually done some of that in context with the current crisis with the Ukraine at the Ukrainian's request to work with social media companies to take down fake Russian accounts that are spreading Ukrainian military disinformation Mr Carson Thank you all The Chairman Mr Stewart I yield back Chairman Mr Stewart Thank you Mr Chairman To all of you again thank you for a lifetime of service I look forward to the closed session where we can go in more detail on some of these topics as I am sure you do as well people But this is an important session because we can speak to the American You can speak to the American people about the threats that we are facing It is a chance to remind them -- although I think the last few weeks has clearly done the reminding for us -- about the threats that we face around the world To talk about almost anything else seems quite tone deaf because of the focus of the American people on that And that is why although I have some questions that are unrelated to the current situation in Ukraine I think there is some other work that we need to mention as well But again it gives a chance for you to highlight your agencies and the great work you do and I am grateful to that 36 RPTR WARREN EDTR ZAMORA 11 03 a m Mr Stewart And for the benefit of the American people as well there are some other as I said other issues that I think we should talk about although briefly then I want to reserve as much of my time as I can to come back to Ukraine Director Haines and really all of you in the last year we went through this thing that made several of us on the committee very uncomfortable in the sense that there was a DHS and FBI mandate to report on domestic violent extremists or extremism Director that mandated that you or you chose to at that point on March 21 to release a standalone report which is something quite unusual for us to take an issue a single issue like that with a standalone report from the DNI talking again about domestic violent extremism And there is obviously a lot of work a lot of intense analysis which again the reason that I am concerned about is that as I have expressed to I think all of you is the sense we should never turn the awesome power of the CIA or the awesome power of the NSA on American persons And I believe that you all agree with that and it seems like we are approaching that line Interestingly in this most recent report do you know how many times DVEs are mentioned Zero not a single time which begs the question I mean there is a couple perhaps explanations One of them is that we fixed the problem which seems unlikely I have never seen an example where one report highlights something as this is a intense area of issue for us the next year it is not mentioned at all I am afraid that the work last year was a result of political pressure And I wonder if anyone of you would like to perhaps offer an explanation for why it was so important a year ago and yet doesn't make into it the report at all in this most 37 recent Director Haines separate name Sure I can start So it is mentioned it is just under a You will see we talk about racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism and that is a form of in many respects domestic violent extremism Obviously it can occur in other places but it also occurs domestically and it does remain a problem But I will turn to Director Wray to talk about how much of a problem Mr Wray Well from the FBI perspective domestic violent extremism of course is central to our mission separate and apart from authorities that others in the Intelligence Community might have And we are aggressively pursuing it And it remains a very significant high priority Mr Stewart And Director I agree with that that you should as the Director of the FBI have that responsibility What made us uncomfortable was we were doing it within the framework of many assets and the efforts of those within the Intelligence Community which once again we should have a very clear line between those two efforts If I could in the minute I have left Director according to some open source reporting the FBI purchased NSO spyware Pegasus in 2019 and evaluated the program under a name called Phantom Mr Wray Can you confirm that you know if that is true or not What I can tell you is that the FBI has not and did not use the NSO products operationally in any investigation I can confirm that we bought a limited license for testing and evaluation so not used in any investigation of anyone but rather as part of our routine responsibilities to evaluate technologies that are out there not just from a perspective of could they be used someday legally but also more importantly what are the security concerns raised by those products to investigating it So very different from using it 38 Mr Stewart So I understand that you did purchase a program and you tested it Is that accurate Mr Wray We had a limited license for testing and evaluation We have tested and evaluated and that is over Mr Stewart Did you -- Mr It hasn't been used in any investigation of anyone Wray Mr Stewart Did the FBI ever notify Congress of their intention to test this product Mr Wray That I don't know the answer to I can look into that I am not sure -Mr Stewart Please do because we are unaware of any notification And then why would we test a product such as that if you don't have the intention to use it Mr Wray Well we test -- it is a good question I am glad you asked me We test and evaluate all sorts of technologies and products that if in the wrong hands can be used against our agents for example conducting their operations So part of it is from a counterintelligence security perspective we need to know what tools are out there that the bad guys can use against our people So that is part of why we test it And by the way because that allows us to inform our own countermeasures and things like that Mr Stewart Okay And my time is expired But are you saying then that you would never intend to use that against U S persons only for counterintelligence Is that true Mr Wray We decided not to use it -- even before the current and brouhaha we decided not to use it for any purpose other than just the one I have already referred to Mr Stewart Okay Thank you I appreciate your response 39 I yield back The Chairman Mr Quigley Representative Quigley Thank you Mr Chairman I have heard reference today that we were late to the game NATO was late to the game I do want to applaud the administration and NATO particularly NATO which is moving in light years for NATO to move and change what Germany has never done before what Switzerland and others have never done before question is But I think it begs the Are we still late to the key point here I reference that because of the speech we saw Saturday by President Zelensky It reminded me of Churchill during the blitz and here is why talking about his home country as was Zelensky Churchill wasn't just He was talking about all of Europe He was talking about the ideal of sovereign democratic countries and why you cannot let autocratic fascist countries take them over But we have always had this discussion about what we should do prefaced on the notion well they are not part of NATO therefore In the final analysis Ukraine what they represent and what they have done so far represents the highest ideals personification of what we wanted NATO to be And for us to say with the greatest respect that we will fight for every inch of NATO territory when Ukraine has done the real thing and faced being wiped off the face of the Earth I think we need to think about getting to that final point and recognizing and treating Ukraine for that which they have earned And I know that that is a big move But if we are going to get there anyway because of what we are about to witness in the coming weeks do we still want to be behind the curve But as we move forward let me just ask a few points In 2019 Director Coats said that Russia and China were more aligned than at any point since the mid-1950s and 40 the relationship is likely to strengthen Director Haines let me ask you more the case before this invasion Do you believe that is still the case Has this changed that calculus Was it And do we believe that Beijing is looking at this as surprised perhaps as Putin was of the Western response Director Haines right Thank you Representative I think Director Coats was exactly I believe that it continues to be the case that they are getting closer together We see that across a range of sectors -- economic political security -- and expect it to continue I think there is a limit to which it will go but nevertheless that remains a concern And in terms of the impact of the current crisis I would say that it is not yet clear to me exactly how it will affect the trajectory of their relationship I think it is clear that China has not come out and criticized Russia for their actions clearly and yet at the same time they did abstain for example in the context of the U N Security Council resolution and in other scenarios And it does seem as if they are potentially paying a price for not criticizing Russia and that may have an impact on how this trajectory moves forward But I think in general I think it does continue to -- the two countries get closer together And others may have thoughts Mr Burns All I would add Congressman is I think Director Coats was right And I think if anything that relationship the partnership between Russia and China strengthened since 2019 I would add though that I think that President Xi and the Chinese leadership are a little bit unsettled by what they are seeing in Ukraine They did not anticipate the significant difficulties the Russians were going to run into I think they are unsettled by 41 the reputational damage that can come by their close association with President Putin second by the economic consequences at a moment when you know they are facing lower annual growth rates than they have experienced for more than three decades I think they are a little bit unsettled about the impact on the global economy And third I think they are a little bit unsettled by the way in which Vladimir Putin has driven Europeans and Americans much closer together I think they have you know valued their relationship with Europe and valued what they believe to be their capacity to try to drive wedges between us and the Europeans And so I think that is unsettling for them as well Mr Quigley Thank you all I yield back The Chairman Mr Crawford Mr Crawford Thank you Mr Chairman I will address this to anybody on the panel that wants to answer the question or discuss this But China is investing billions of dollars we know in its domestic semiconductor industry in an attempt to achieve full chip independence by 2050 I am wondering what the assessment of the likelihood of China fully indigenizing its chip industry by then what sort of security threats would you assess China's increased chip independence creates And how can the U S and its allies address those threats moving forward General Nakasone This is a very timely question And you know as we look at China increasingly become more indigenous in their production this has great concern for us In terms of the broader impact I would like to talk about this a little bit more this afternoon because I can provide a depth I think that is very important for us to cover Mr Crawford Okay Thank you Do you perceive a threat that the Chinese-made chips could also be exported 42 abroad or is this a topic that you just would rather discuss in the closed setting General Nakasone Mr Crawford If we can talk in closed setting that would be great Okay Great Thank you Let me shift gears then and we will revisit that topic in the closed setting General Berrier some experts have voiced concerns that Russia's invasion of Ukraine could embolden the PRC to pursue a full-scale invasion or military blockade to Taiwan What is your assessment of the likelihood of a copycat effect and what more can the U S do to prevent the crisis in Ukraine from being repeated in Taiwan General Berrier things completely Congressman I think Taiwan and Ukraine are two different I also believe that our deterrence posture in the Pacific puts a very different perspective on all of this We do know that the PRC watching very very carefully what happens and how this plays out throughout the entire DIME And I would address more of this in the closed session Mr Crawford Okay Is there any evidence that other adversaries are taking advantage of global tension on Ukraine to undermine the national security in the United States such as possibly cyber threats General Berrier I am sure that there is a risk out there and the gentleman to my right will no doubt want to answer that But I have not seen specific intelligence that tells me that we are under a threat or attack right now Mr Crawford Okay General Nakasone Ukraine Congressman I concur in terms of not specifically tied to the We have obviously a high degree of vigilance right now just for a number of different threat streams that are out there but they are not necessarily only predicated on what we are seeing with the Ukraine Mr Crawford Okay Let me shift gears over to Iran real quick in the time that I 43 have remaining If the Iranian regime's leadership secures greater access to cash in the coming months and years what concerns would you have with respect to Iran's capability to conduct terrorism destabilize the Middle East and threaten U S Forces or our allies and partners General Berrier Congressman I think the Iranians have done remarkably well considering the resource constraints that they are under with development of ballistic missiles unmanned aerial vehicles and destabilizing terrorist actions in the Middle East with the resources that they have If they require more -- if they get more funding I think the threat becomes even worse Mr Crawford Does Iran continue to be the leading state sponsor of terrorism And if so do you believe it would be harmful to U S national security if terrorism sanctions designations against Iranian entities are lifted or weakened while such entities continue to engage in terrorism General Berrier I think that will be a decision for policymakers We continue to see Iranian destabilizing actions Mr Crawford Thank you I am going to yield the balance of my time to Mr Stewart Mr Stewart won't I don't know if we will have time to explore this In fact we But there is this interesting dichotomy taken place in the last year or so where you had China who did very much the same thing to Hong Kong that we saw happen in Crimea and Donetsk in the eastern Ukraine and obviously with this full-scale invasion now Now I understand -- I am not equating the two I understand there is a very different process that they went through But I am wondering if you assess that China watching this and the world's reaction to this it seems to me it would give them extreme pause now when we consider 44 their plans for Taiwan I think the united response you know private companies pulling out banking et cetera et cetera do you have any analysis that would indicate that this is making China more reluctant than they would have been like 6 months ago Director Haines Yeah I am happy to start on that and I suspect others will have views But our analysts have been looking at this and quite agree with you frankly The view is both that it is likely to reinforce China's perspective on our -- the seriousness with which we would approach an infringement on Taiwan and the unity that they have seen between Europe and the United States particularly in enacting sanctions And then not just that unity but the impact of those sanctions I think are both things that are critical to their calculus and something that will be interesting for to us see how they learn those lessons Mr Burns I agree entirely Mr Stewart The Chairman Mr Swalwell And I yield back Thank you Mr Swalwell What a difference a week and a half makes I would describe Russia's actions and its consequences over the last week and a half as how to lose your status in 10 days Because of your work you have been the glue in the international community that has brought together not only NATO but other important countries to make sure that essentially if you are a Russian you are blocked from traveling Apple Pay You can't stream your favorite video game Batman movie You can't export your gas You can't use your You cannot watch the latest You are isolated from the world And I was hoping Director Haines you could just speak briefly to what effect we are seeing practically economically that the sanctions are already having knowing that it 45 is going to take a you know protracted view as far as what the long-term consequences are Director Haines Yeah you should have the Treasury Department Commerce and others before you on this question But I will tell you I mean the free fall that we have seen the ruble in has been extraordinary And one of the things as Director Burns indicated that has been very interesting about the way this is approached is that you know President Putin knew that sanctions were a likely result of an invasion of Ukraine right and tried to prepare for it by creating essentially a national wealth fund that would give them the ability to defend their currency and manage some of the sanctions And we have seen the Duma pass for example legislation that is intended to address some of the impact of sanctions And yet the secondary actions that Europe has taken with the United States and that other partners around the world have done I think really do mitigate essentially their ability to mitigate the impact that they are having on Russian citizens right now and seeing the kind of impact that you -Mr Swalwell Sure Director Haines I would also say that the other factor that we didn't spend as much time analyzing but is clearly important is the commercial piece The commercial decisions that are being made by multinational corporations to actually join in this I think is going to have a pretty significant impact on -Mr Swalwell That is right Director Haines -- the economy Mr Swalwell And Director Burns actually look there is probably a couple of generations now who did not grow up spending their time under desks of a nuclear Soviet threat And I would hope that we could unite in this country around the threat of 46 Vladimir Putin That has not necessarily been the case Some people have cheered him on here in America And I just want to go through this butcher of human rights who decapitates any opposition he has Was the Russian Government responsible for the 2006 poisoning and death of Alexander Litvinenko a former intelligence officer Mr Burns Yes to the best of our knowledge Mr Swalwell Mr Burns Yes or no Who was the President at that time of Russia Vladimir Putin Mr Swalwell 2018 the Skripal family were they victims of a Russian Government poisoning Mr Burns Yes Mr Swalwell Mr Burns Who was the President of Russia at that time Vladimir Putin Mr Swalwell 2020 Alexei Navalny opposition leader against the Russian Government was he poisoned at the hands of the Russian Government Mr Burns Yes Mr Swalwell Mr Burns Who was the President of Russia at that time President Putin Mr Swalwell Is the Russian Government responsible for the deaths of multiple journalists who have been critical of the Russian Government Mr Burns Yes sir Mr Swalwell Mr Burns Has this included the reign of Vladimir Putin Certainly during the last 20 years yes sir Mr Swalwell Outside of Russia he has also been a disruptor of democracy Did Russia interfere in the 2016 2018 and 2020 U S elections 47 Mr Burns Yes sir Mr Swalwell Mr Burns To the best of my knowledge yes sir Mr Swalwell Mr Burns Did they interfere in the 2017 French election Did they interfere in the 2017 German election That I will defer to my colleagues on that sir Mr Swalwell Is it assessed that Russia was responsible for the downing of a 2014 Malaysian airliner flight over Ukraine where 300 innocent souls were lost Mr Burns I think that is the conclusion that many people have drawn yes sir Mr Swalwell So would you describe Vladimir Putin as a savvy genius or a ruthless tyrant Mr Burns Oh I think ruthless tyrant comes much closer to the mark Mr Swalwell Thank you Director Director Wray what is your message to the business community knowing that these ransomware attacks could be coming and your field office's ability to work with them and help them if they are a victim Can you just update us on just what your posture is right now and how they can reach out to you if they are attacked Mr Wray I appreciate the question Our field offices are in a position where they can have a technically trained agent at the doorstep of any company that is victimized within about an hour anywhere in the country and time is of the essence because that is what enables us In some cases you've seen us be able to claw back and recover the cryptocurrency that is paid in a ransom It allows us to have a hot trail as investigators to be able to take action to disrupt the ransomware actors So in order to be able to protect the companies if they reach out we can -- again we can -- out in the field we can have somebody there to help within about an hour Mr Swalwell All right Thank you 48 I yield back The Chairman Ms Stefanik Representative Stefanik FBI Director Wray on October 6 2018 the families and close-knit community of Schoharie County in rural upstate New York experienced the deadliest transportation disaster in the U S in almost a decade when an illegal extended limo that shouldn't have even been on the road crashed and instantaneously killed 20 people Are you aware of this Mr Wray I know you have deep ties to upstate New York I am very generally aware of it partly because of my ties to upstate New York Ms Stefanik I am asking about this at today's worldwide threat briefing because the owner of the limo company Shahed Hussain was a longtime informant of the FBI for prominent antiterrorism cases in the war on terror who testified publicly in numerous high-profile Federal cases And it is our job in Congress to conduct proper oversight of the FBI's activities including the proper and improper use and handling of informants when it comes to addressing worldwide threats This FBI informant had multiple run-ins with the law and various State and Federal agencies that miraculously were brushed away again and again and again tax returns and immigration papers fraud He lied on He misled FBI handlers committed bankruptcy His hotel that he owned racked up code violations and tens of thousands in unpaid property taxes with no consequences And most tragically this deadly limo company falsified reports lied about the alteration of an illegal vehicle out-of-service rate for this vehicle was 80 percent And this -- the Unimaginable I believe that this deadly limo tragedy the biggest transportation tragedy in this country could have been avoided had we addressed the acts the illegal acts of this FBI informant And the FBI owes families answers There has been extensive reporting on 49 this issue So my questions for you are Once a relationship is established with an informant does the FBI allow an informant to engage in criminal behavior that is not related to the case in this case the antiterrorism cases or investigations that they are informing on Yes or no Mr Wray There are very specific and somewhat detailed and lengthy policies and guidelines that govern how we use our confidential sources Ms Stefanik Mr Wray The confidential informant unit And so -- Ms Stefanik Mr Wray Correct Yes CIPU ph So I would -- I think the answer to that question basically requires going into some depth about those policies and guidelines And in addition over the last couple of years we have made very significant changes separate and apart from anything to do with this matter involving our Confidential Human Source Program And we would be happy to have somebody brief you on some of those changes because they are quite significant As to the particular matter as I said I am generally aware of it but I am quite confident I don't know all the details And anytime we start getting into questions of who is or isn't a source and what they were or were not doing I have to really tread carefully So I think what I would suggest is let me have my staff follow up with you and see if there is more -Ms Stefanik I would expect you to follow up with me directly about 20 innocent lives We are talking And to give you a sense of the impact this has had on the families one father who lost his two sons was so destroyed by the crash that he suffered a series of strokes and now can no longer remember having children One mother lost 50 her son and her daughter-in-law and is now as a grandmother the guardian of kids age 4 and 5 who when they pass their parents' house and they see a car there they think they their parents miraculously are at home The first responders stated the carnage was so extreme that veteran paramedics attending the crash site who I have met with developed disabling mental health issues So I expect a response from you directly But just to follow up some of the questions that are important for the people of this community to learn in this case of Shahed Hussain this is the informant was the FBI aware that his company Prestige Limo repeatedly violated New York State transportation laws while he was an informant Because I know that you are required to do that as part of the confidential informant unit Mr Wray So what I would say is my heart aches for those families and I feel horrible about what has happened to them I would say as to the specifics of this particular individual partly because I don't know all the details and partly because I have to tread very carefully whenever we start talking about somebody is a source or not a source or when they were a source and what they were doing as a source and that kind of thing I really need to make sure that any information we provide with you is consistent with policy but also is accurate Ms Stefanik Great I have a litany of questions I am requesting your commitment today to turn over all the FBI's documents including the source file related to Mr Hussain his family his companies and any involvement in the investigation And as Congress while I am requesting you to work with us I will not hesitate to compel this particularly next year to subpoena to issue a congressional subpoena with support from my colleagues because these families deserve answers been yearning for answers and it has been brushed under the rug I yield back And they have 51 The Chairman Mr Castro Mr Castro Thank you Chairman Director Wray I wanted to follow up on a question that Representative Stewart asked about Pegasus You said that the FBI has tested the Pegasus software from an NSO group for counterintelligence purposes Are you aware of any incidents of the Pegasus software being used by a foreign power against the United States And if anybody else on the panel has anything to supplement on your answer that would be very much appreciated Mr Wray I have to think about whether there is anything I could share here If I could suggest let me give a little thought to that and maybe there is more I can provide on that in closed session this afternoon I mean certainly I think there has been open source reporting about different governments using the technology But whether it has been used against us you know I have to think a little bit about that And I also need to kind of keep straight in my head what I know about NSO from classified sources versus what I have heard in open sources Mr Castro Sure No I would appreciate that And just as a reminder this software has been used to target human rights activists journalists ordinary citizens by governments around the world And NSO is a company that was developed in Israel by Israelis and so Israel has been a strong friend of the United States And I want to ask you all whether you have pressured the Israeli Government to crack down on Pegasus and other -- and a cottage industry of similar groups in Israel whether you all have taken that up with the Israeli Government Director Haines Thank you Representative Castro I am not aware of any of us taking it up specifically with the Israeli Government but we can provide to you I think 52 an answer after this hearing Mr Castro Does that sound good Are you aware whether the White House has or -- I know you are not the State Department -Director Haines Mr Castro No -- but the State Department has I am surprised that we haven't especially because we have a very open line of communication with Israel that we would not have spoken up about this Director Haines Mr Castro We very well may have and I just don't have -- Sure Director Haines -- that information Mr Castro I also have a question on -- you know we value of course here classified intelligence that your agencies gather and analyze to inform policy But I want to ask a question about open source unclassified intelligence which is also important Open source intelligence is critically important to helping U S policymakers and the national security community navigate our country's role in the world and it helps us engage with the American public It informs media that can promote awareness of issues and promotes communication between different policymakers And today the reality of what is happening in Xinjiang by China and Ukraine by Russia is laid bare through open source information often through translated documents And so my question Director Burns is publishing translated documents publicly Why did the open source enterprise stop And will you push the OSC to put out more of their translations publicly Mr Burns Thanks Congressman And I know Director Haines may want to add to this because we have been working quite intensively with her and the rest of the Intelligence Community on open source issues in part to address the question that you 53 raised I mean I agree with you I think open source information is going to only become more and more important in the years ahead And then what use we make of that including making public some translations I think is only going to grow in importance Director Haines Yeah Just to add what Director Burns has indicated this is an area where we absolutely agree with the fact that it is critical to our work frankly and across the enterprise And DIA has also taken a big lead in this area And essentially we need to -- we are going through a process where we are trying to make sure that we are organized effectively so that we can leverage our resources across the community and also that we actually have devoted enough resources to open source You will see it I think in our budget submission Mr Castro Sure And I have got one last question than a minute so you won't be able to answer all of it And we only have less But as you all know the cyber threat from Russia and other nations is very real including to our critical infrastructure and our the defense systems Simply put even our most sophisticated weapons with strong effective cyber attacks can be neutralized and made ineffective And so my question is about the status of our cyber alliances around the world How strongly have we developed our cyber alliances both for defense purposes and if necessary for offensive purposes in cyberspace General Nakasone So Congressman I think that what you hit on is really the key for the future of these series of partnerships that we have partnerships And we have seen the I sit next to Director Wray who has been a tremendous partner in our ability to get after some of the cybersecurity threats here in our Nation broader than that as you had indicated But it is 54 So we have rich partnerships with obviously our FBIS partners and series of other partners within both Europe and the Pacific And as far as the work that we do full spectrum I would like to take that on this afternoon because I think that would be appropriate given the discussions we have had this morning on Russia and the Ukraine Mr Castro Mr Wray Sure I would just add -- completely agree with General Nakasone but I would add that just about every significant major takedown that we have engineered together against foreign adversaries cyber adversaries whether they be criminal or nation-state almost invariably involved a whole slew of foreign partners all acting in concert And one of the clear lessons from the last few years is that that is the most effective weapon against cyber adversaries is joint sequenced operations I like to say cyber is sort of the ultimate team sport and we do that with our foreign partners Mr Castro Thank you The Chairman Mr Mullin Mr Mullin Thank you Mr Chairman Just I guess my first question would be to Director Wray Do we feel like with cybersecurity that we are being risk averse or being proactive towards Russia and to protecting our intellectual property here inside the United States Mr Wray of both Well I think at the risk of sounding like a lawyer I think it is a little bit We are obviously being risk averse in one sense as we are trying to help manage the cyber defense side of it and trying to manage risk in that sense but proactive in a different sense which is more and more as I was just alluding to we are working together general Nakasone and we -Mr Mullin Mr Wray On being risk averse -- I am going to cut in there in just a second -Okay 55 Mr Mullin -- because you can't really be risk averse and be proactive at the same time because if you are risk averse and you are not trying you are afraid to do anything because you don't want to escalates it but yet since the threat has already came to us it seems to me that we should be changing our posture to being very proactive to saying listen we have tools Mr Wray Mr Mullin Mr Wray If you come after us we are going to punch you back So -Are we in that area So in that sense I think we are leaning further and further in all the time in our efforts to go after our adversaries through a variety of means Some of what you are getting at is more cyber offense Mr Mullin Mr Wray So we are being proactive Probably better in General Nakasone's lane and so I will defer to him on that one Mr Mullin want to get to So we are being proactive I just -- I have got other questions I I don't want to spend too much time on this General Nakasone So Congressman this is on the CYBERCOM side this is what we do with persistent engagement every day This is engaging our adversaries This is understanding where their infrastructure is understanding what they are doing and keeping tabs on them Mr Mullin Didn't actually say yes on the proactive part What about with the escalation of Russia itself Do we feel like we are being a little risk averse in responding to their threats by willing to escalate the war or are we beginning to take a proactive posture with ourselves Director Haines Happy to start From my perspective we are not being risk averse in the sense that we have 56 enacted -- obviously the United States has enacted significant sanctions And from the Intelligence Community perspective we have indicated that -Mr Mullin But sanctions are one thing importing you know 700 000 barrels of oil a day But at the same time we are still And if my -- if the reports are correct we sent individuals to Venezuela this weekend too to see if we could you know maybe work strike a deal to be able to purchase oil from them yet the President of Venezuela is one of -- it literally has the strongest ties to Putin in Latin America Is that really being proactive in that case Director Haines I guess sir I am -- there is probably an Intelligence Community question in there and I just haven't figured out what it is Mr Mullin Right Director Haines Mr Mullin In the sense that -- Well if we are posturing -- what I am saying is if we are posturing ourselves right now from the intelligence gathering -- because you guys gathered a tremendous amount of information and you guys were spot on But now the war has went to a different level Commend you on that And I am assuming we are gathering on the worst-case scenario because that is what the IC does We are looking at the worst cases Worst-case scenario is is where are we posturing ourselves telling and getting prepared for What are we Obviously in this setting not the classified setting this setting where are we moving towards Are we advising that hey listen we maybe should really start looking at bringing ourselves back in I mean Director Haines your testimony yourself you said that Russia uses oil to influence and coerce Europe right But yet are we not afraid that same thing can happen to the United States when we have seen a 40 percent increase this year alone on 57 our dependency on Putin oil to begin with Director Haines Are we not assessing that as a risk So I think it is absolutely accurate that Russia -- that we assess that Russia engages in coercion through their policies both with respect to energy and other tools that they have available to them And I think that is where we would have our -Mr Mullin Have we not assessed that that is a risk to us too Director Haines Mr Mullin Well because we have increased our dependency more on them Director Haines Mr Mullin That they would try to use that with us Yeah So if that is a national risk are we advising the President as such Director Haines I mean I think to the extent that the question is related to whether or not there are ways in which Putin can actually take action that would be a risk to us yes of course Mr Mullin So what have we been advising the President of that we should limit that that we should try to become more energy independent instead so reliant on Russia Are we making those assessments Director Haines So from an Intelligence Community perspective what we do is lay out the picture and then we let the policy community obviously decide what it is that they take action on Mr Mullin But you guys have laid that picture out Director Haines It is a yes or no Certainly energy is something that we have looked deeply at in terms of -Mr Mullin Okay The Chairman Mr Maloney I yield back Thank you Mr Maloney Well good morning -- good afternoon And -- good morning 58 And I want to just say that as someone back from Europe our allies are enormously impressed with the work that all of you have done and foremost for that And so thank you first And not only are they impressed with it but it actually formed the basis for the response we have seen The time and the space and the credibility was essential to being able to put together the sanctions and other measures that have in the space of a week blown a hole in the Russian economy So in a very real sense your work has been absolutely critical to the effort And while we are watching this tragedy unfold you know at the risk of sounding self-congratulatory I know you all don't take any pleasure in being right on this But this is the most I think consequential success of the IC since the Cuban Missile Crisis And so for all the people who have been working this problem not for 11 days but for months please know how grateful we all are in the field We have met them We have met them We have met them in some very difficult conditions and they are extraordinary So I just want to tell you all that and I know there is a lot of work to do but well done Now a couple of quick questions I am very interested in Russian oligarchs Director Wray what are we doing to get after the oligarchs in the United States we seize some yachts and send some people home Can Because we hear stories about the Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov traveling with his mistress properties she owns We hear about all the We know that these guys live large and they live in our cities and they benefit from their wealth in ways that I think would shock ordinary Americans Can you tell folks in open session what we are doing to get after that problem Mr ---Wray So So certainly the oligarchs are an important part of Putin's power base and others can speak more to that part of it What I would say is that we are working aggressively with our partners both 59 across the Intelligence Community across law enforcement with foreign partners both security services and law enforcement services to try to hold oligarchs accountable through a variety of means Where we can lay hands on them with criminal charges and prosecute them we want to do that Where we can better block the ways in which they try to circumvent sanctions to better get after their money we want to do that Where we with can seize their assets through a variety of legal tools that we have we want to do that We are on the FBI end blending not just our counterintelligence expertise but our expertise with transnational organized crime and of course our cyber expertise to kind of go after that And you may have seen recently the Justice Department announced a new task force that is specifically focused on that and we have already had some charges under that work Mr Maloney great Director are we going to see some yachts I mean that sounds Are we going to see some of this stuff taken out of their hands Mr Wray Whatever we can lawfully seize we are going to go after Mr Maloney Thank you I think you have the support of both aisles up here to be as aggressive as you can humanly be on that issue Let me just cover another quick subject So if -- some may see this catastrophic decision by the Russian Government as a storm but China is more like the climate right And it remains the persistent existential long-term threat So Director Haines how are we going to stay focused on China as we work this emergency in Ukraine Director Haines Yeah Unquestionably we are going to stay focused on China And I agree with you it is one of those things where the urgent crowds out the important on some level and we are working very hard to ensure that that does not happen 60 because we recognize the long-term priority is China for us absolutely unparalleled And I know my colleagues are -Mr Maloney classified And is it fair to say the resources of the IC -- I know a lot of that is But is it fair to say the resources of the IC will reflect that in terms of how we budget and how we prioritize Director Haines Mr Maloney Yes sir Thank you very much So with my 48 seconds remaining I was just hoping to get a commitment from all of you since I have been so nice to you up here on an issue that is a little dicier which is the President issued an executive order to declassify the 9 11 materials And we are a little late in receiving them here on the Hill So I would like the commitment from all of you to provide unredacted versions of all the 9 11 investigative materials to the committee as quickly as possible at least all those covered by the President's executive order I am hoping you can each give me an affirmative commitment to do that Director Wray Mr Wray We can certainly commit to work with you to provide as much information as we possibly can Mr Maloney And I know our staff -- Well the President issued an executive order sir appreciate -Mr Wray We will -- Mr Maloney Mr Wray -- that you will work with me We will absolutely comply with the executive order Mr Maloney That would be fantastic General Nakasone We will comply with the executive order So I 61 Mr Maloney Thank you Director Haines Mr Burns Yeah same Yes General Berrier Mr Maloney Yes Well thank you all again for your extraordinary work It has been remarkable I yield back Mr Chairman The Chairman Mr Kelly Mr Kelly Thank you And Director Burns I first want to just thank you for your assessment of Vladimir Putin It was very insightful and I think it is helpful to us to understand his decision-making process And I just want to thank you for that I think you put more clarity on that than anyone I have ever talked to For all the witnesses it has been reported open source that a Saudi detainee at Guantanamo Bay Mohammed Mani Ahmad al-Qahtani who attempted to take part in the 9 11 highjacking plot but later was detained and captured in Afghanistan is being released from Gitmo into Saudi custody Can you tell this committee why this individual is being released now and whether or not his release is part of a broader arrangement with Saudi Arabia Because I also note that I think President Biden is on his way to Saudi Arabia in the near future Director Haines Thank you sir I will start As a general matter as you know it has been the policy of the administrations several prior to continue to move forward on Guantanamo detainees to review them and then determine if they should be transferred or otherwise And I understand it to be part of a broader trend essentially of a number of detainees that have been transferred to Saudi Arabia I don't think it is a 62 new arrangement at least that I am aware of Mr Kelly And I know that is kind of a quick one I sprung on you So if we can follow up on that I would appreciate it And I want to get just a little bit I want to thank all of the IC and that is every single one of you guys up here for the exquisite intelligence and the -- that you provided to Ukraine and everyone Once again you guys all you made America proud and across the world people appreciate the work you have done Now General Nakasone I always get to pick on you HASC I am sorry because I am a I am a title 50 and a title 10 guy and so I want to ask a few questions Republicans have been requesting specific data points for nearly a year on the consequences of the dual-hat relationship between U S CYBERCOM and NSA and I am hoping you can provide some clarity today And I think that is important because the way I see this -- and it is very hard for me to distinguish between title 10 and title 50 both of those It has taken me a while to get a grasp on Generally DOD is a little more offensively oriented And title 50 is a little more defensive and intelligence related So my first question Are the operational requirements of the two organizations in decline relatively flat or are they growing General Nakasone Mr Kelly They continue to grow Congressman And have dependencies between the two agencies such as shared infracture and capabilities increased or decreased during the past several years General Nakasone Mr Kelly They have decreased And have you taken any action to decrease any such dependencies General Nakasone I have not In terms of -- and I think this is really designed for the infrastructures that we operate off of Those were decisions prior to mine I 63 think they were good decisions And we have carried out you know separate infrastructures that have been developed for both U S Cyber Command and the National Security Agency Mr Kelly And how many meetings did you hold last year related to your role as commander of USCYBERCOM General Nakasone Congressman I don't know I mean I hold a lot of meetings every single day Mr Quigley Can you follow up with specifics of how many in that role you did to this committee in writing General Nakasone Mr Kelly Director of NSA Certainly And I -- And how many -- joint question with that how many did you hold as So just the number of meetings that you held in each capacity Have you taken any action to meet the requirements of section 1642 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2017 to establish certification requirements for the termination of the dual-hat role General Nakasone operate towards them So Congressman on those conditions we have continued to We you know we have done the things that we have outlined to make sure that those get done As you probably will recall that was a part of the NDAA that was put in there not necessarily as a precursor to terminate the dual hat any kind of decision like that but it was intended if there was a decision that these had to be made Mr Kelly picking on you And I want to be really clear because sometimes it seems like I am I think you do an exceptional job in both roles So my issue is not with you personally but I do have to look at who follows and those things that follow and to make sure that we are in the right transition form that when it follows you that we have 64 the right organization and structure and command style that we can still focus because everybody is not going to be just like you And so we have to prepare for the Army standard so to speak General Nakasone Congressman I appreciate that And I appreciate your questions today Let me just say a few things on that This is a role that can be done by anyone that you know is obviously had the experience and the training and the -- it is not unique to me running both organizations What is unique is that the domain of what we are operating here in cyberspace is requiring the speed and the agility and a unity of effort that the Nation needs And we are seeing that with what we have seen in elections what we have seen with ransomware and now what we are seeing with Ukraine and Russia This is the advantage of being able to have one person that runs both organizations in my opinion Mr Kelly And final comment before I yield back I just think that dual hat may help to be more offensively capable in cyber realm as opposed to defensive With that I yield back Mr Chairman The Chairman Mr Krishnamoorthi Mr Krishnamoorthi country Thank you again for your outstanding service to our We are so honored Director Burns a lot of my constituents think that Putin is crazy or he is playing crazy In an open setting how do you assess Putin's mental state Mr Burns I think his views Congressman on Ukraine and a lot of other issues have hardened over the years I think he is far more insulated from other points of view and people who would challenge or question his views In my opinion that doesn't make him crazy but it makes him extremely difficult to deal with because of the 65 hardening of his views over time and the narrowing of his inner circle Mr Krishnamoorthi It seems like you characterize him as stewing in grievance and ambition but he is also tempered by the fear of popular unrest How do we assess in the last 12 days or 2 weeks his popular support in Russia Mr Burns eye on over time I mean I think this is something we are going to keep a very careful You know in an environment in which the Russian state media dominates what a lot of people hear about what is going on in Ukraine it is going to take time I think for people to absorb the consequences of the choices that he has made personally But -- Mr Krishnamoorthi Do we see increasing reports on social media in Russia about the deaths and the KIAs and the casualties Because obviously they are probably going to hear from the front lines through some means about the status of their relatives correct Mr Burns You do see some of that already You see funerals in Russia of you know young Russian soldiers who were killed in Ukraine coming home is going to have an impact over time And that clearly You also see in relatively small numbers but a lot of very courageous Russians out on the street protesting And something like 13 000 or 14 000 have been arrested since then which is not a small thing in a deeply repressive society like Russia Mr Krishnamoorthi Lieutenant General Berrier I and several members of this committee have introduced legislation called the SUPPORT Act basically put in law our support for Ukraine It is a bipartisan act to And if the Russians eventually overrun the government which we hope and pray and we are going to do everything we can to prevent an insurgency is likely to develop I guess one of the questions that we would ask is Have you commissioned a 66 reporter Is there an organized effort to assess what we would need to do to support such an insurgency General Berrier I think the entire IC is looking at that issue right now and I think it would be good for a discussion in a closed session Mr Krishnamoorthi Let me ask you this question With regard to Kyiv the Russians appear to be attempting to cut off food and water to the city How much food and water or how many days or weeks of food and water do the people of Kyiv have at this point General Berrier population has I don't have a specific number for days of supply that the But with supplies being cut off it will become somewhat desperate in I would say 10 days to 2 weeks Mr Krishnamoorthi Wow Director Haines what can Taiwan the government of Taiwan learn from the Ukrainian Government right now about how to prepare and stave off an invasion of Taiwan Director Haines consideration That is a great question I should give that some Let me come back to you on that Mr Krishnamoorthi Director Haines I would appreciate that Yeah Mr Krishnamoorthi You know the Chinese Government must have misjudged our resolve and our collective ability to inflict economic harm on those who would engage in malign aggression Director Burns do you think there is any opening whatsoever for us and the Chinese to have a more productive conversation about Taiwan or their malign intentions given that they may have thrown in their lot with the wrong horse the Russians at this 67 point Mr Burns Well Congressman I would just say analytically I would not underestimate President Xi and the Chinese leadership's determination with regard to Taiwan I do think as Director Haines said earlier they have been surprised and unsettled to some extent by what they have seen in Ukraine over the last 12 days everything from the strength of the Western reaction to the way in which Ukrainians have fiercely resisted to the relatively poor -Mr Krishnamoorthi Mr Burns On Taiwan Mr Krishnamoorthi Mr Burns But you don't see an opening right now for -- No Yeah I mean I think there is an impact on the Chinese calculus with regard to Taiwan which we obviously are going to continue to pay careful attention to Mr Krishnamoorthi Last question banning the import of oil from Russia The President appears to be considering What impact do we assess that would have on the Russian economy Director Haines Director Haines I am trying to think So it is roughly 8 percent I believe of our crude oil imports overall and for them I believe it is a relatively small amount on theirs But I think it will have some impact on them and certainly symbolically it is an important move if that is something that is done I will give you a more detailed answer if we can on the impact on the economy Mr Krishnamoorthi The Chairman Okay Thank you And just for the committee's benefit since we have been in the hearing for sometime the President announced the ban on Russian oil while we were in the hearing Mr Krishnamoorthi I knew it I knew it 68 The Chairman He was listening to Mr Krishnamoorthi Mr Fitzpatrick Mr Fitzpatrick Mr Chairman first to the intelligence committee -- community you were spot on in your intelligence fashion in which you did so saved lives Your decision to declassify both the form and the Sleep well and thank you for doing that I am going to pose a question which I think the answer is more suitable for the closed segment but I am going to ask it here We all have different roles to play gatherers reporters You are all investigators intelligence We are legislators but I think it is still important that we analyze this question I was on the Ukraine-Poland border We just got back yesterday On the Ukrainian side the Ukrainian men were bringing their wives and their children saying goodbye potentially for the last time were there That was a record There were 100 000 just in one day when we The record was broken the following day There is about 10 million to 12 million Ukrainian men age 18 to 60 who are not allowed to leave the country fight They don't want to leave the country And they could potentially be slaughtered in mass form They want to Vladimir Putin could be creating an entire generation of widows and orphans And this decision not to intervene is largely based on Ukraine's non-NATO status Finland is not a NATO member They have roughly 5 million people Austria 9 million people Sweden 10 million Switzerland 8 million None of them are NATO members And I think what the American people have a hard time wrapping their brain around is how is it okay -- granted we applied sanctions granted we are providing defensive support -- but to not intervene to the tune of potentially hundreds of thousands if not millions of lives lost and yet if one step is taken over the Romanian 69 border and one Romanian life is taken the full force of the military of 30 nations will come and intervene I think everybody is struggling with that particularly because we have had many many non-NATO interventions in the past Kosovo Bosnia Iraq Lebanon Libya Cameroon Yemen Korea Syria Kuwait just to name a few But the one difference is the nuclear capability So what we are getting asked a lot is are we basically creating an incentive for a nuclear proliferation Because the message we are being -- that we are sending is if you have nuclear weapons and you are crazy we are going to stand back on military intervention I think we just need to wrap our brains around that because a lot of people are really struggling And when you have Vladimir Putin bombing a children's cancer hospital willing to go that length to cross those Rubicons we have a program here in the United States Make-A-Wish Foundation that gives children dying of cancer their final wish to brighten their day at the end These children in the Ukraine who are suffering from pediatric cancer they are spending their final days having bombs dropped on their head So I would like to explore that when we get in the classified session because you are not policymakers we get that but we all have a collective role to play My question for Director Wray Senate right now There is legislation making its way through the If you could just discuss sir the importance to have cyber reporting incidents directly to the FBI and not just as a passthrough and also discuss liability protections for companies that you report to the FBI 70 11 58 a m Mr ---Wray So no one believes more in the importance of private sector reporting of cyber threat information than I do and I have been testifying calling for it you know for quite some time It is important though that that information flow realtime And as I testified earlier in this hearing you know we have agents out in the field who are responding often within an hour or so to a business that has been hit and we need to make sure -- and that is happening thousands of times a year So we need to make sure that that information flow is protected namely that the businesses that come forward like that when they talk to the agents out in the field have protection from liability for doing so and not just reporting through some longer-term means to some bureaucracy somewhere in D C So that part has to be taken care of The second thing is of course time matters in these situations Our agents are using the information that we get from businesses every day to go after the hackers to seize their cryptocurrency to take down their infrastructure work with General Nakasone and with foreign partners Just in the last little bit we have worked for example with a major healthcare facility to help disrupt an attack before it could switch over to patient care We have worked with defense contractors to block sensitive information before it got exfiltrated We have worked with financial institutions to prevent stolen customer -- sensitive customer data terabytes of it from getting out into the wild And that kind of thing is happening every day and we need more and more of that And the two things that can help do that are ensuring that the companies who come forward to our agents out in the field get the same kind of liability protection that they would for the reporting that we think they should also be doing to CISA in lieu of CISA This is not We want them to report to CISA and the more information CISA gets the 71 better but simultaneous protection for both and the ability for our agents to use that information not just to go after the bad guys and their infrastructure and their money but more importantly to be able to warn all the next victims Our ability to do that is directly tied to that flow of information Mr Fitzpatrick Ms Haines I yield back Mr Chairman Mr Chairman may I just add -- The Chairman Ms Haines Thank you sir Yes -- quickly to that Just to say that -- just as Director Wray indicated I mean I think we are extremely supportive of the cyber reporting bill essentially to CISA and in very much see that as saying I think we also disagree that there is additional reporting that might be done more generally but I just want you to understand that our support is for the legislation The Chairman Mr Cooper Mr LaHood Or Mr Cooper I am sorry Thank you Mr Chairman I would like to congratulate all the witnesses for your excellent work in your service to the country actually excellent I am sorry that Ukraine has superseded your report because it is I hope that the public will read it It is an extraordinary joint effort on your part so congratulations on that Second I just wish that the Treasury Janet Yellen and Wally Adeyemo were present because I think their work in depriving Vladimir Putin of his war chest was extraordinary and unanticipated It is one of those things overnight success that was probably 20 years in preparation but thank goodness it was done Third it is my understanding that another top Russian general has just been killed in Ukraine this one Gerasimov I don't know if any of you know about that but this would be the second one to die apparently of a sniper attack And it also has come to 72 the attention of the media that the top general in Russia Sergei Shoigu even though he is the top general has never been a professional military man which kind of shows a certain perhaps decay within the Russian armed services But my main focus I wanted to be the cyber war issues General Nakasone you do a superb job and I think we have adequately covered the duty to report which hopefully doesn't have to be enforced by legislation People will want to come forward But when small town school systems and dentist offices are being attacked then the problem is indeed you know widespread I am aware of at least one major American utility that has a day without cyber so that all of their employees can try to cope without even smart phones or cell phones Do you think that is a wise practice or is that overdoing it to try to have our utilities a hardened target more protected so that employees can cope without their usual cyber tools General Nakasone but here is what I would say So Congressman I hadn't really thought of that as a means We are committed to our critical infrastructure to look at ways upon which it must be strengthened We have done a lot of work in terms of some of the innovative things that both Director Wray and myself and Director Easterly have done with CISA to release unclassified information to be able to ensure that our partners understand it But I think it begins with just this realization that we have to get better we have to harden our infrastructure and we have to have an ability to be more resilient Mr Cooper I was just thinking of things that individual companies can do on their own to prepare for what looks like it is going to be inevitable regardless of the war in Ukraine or not because hacking and ransomware are increasingly ubiquitous I congratulate our banks because so far they have been particularly robust 73 People haven't lost money Your account has not gone to zero Is it safe to say that depositors would be protected at least up to the Federal minimum if a bank were to be hacked and suddenly their hard-earned savings were made to disappear in a cyber realm Ms Haines I believe that is the case This is not my area of expertise though so I should do it with a certain amount of -Mr Cooper So depositors under say $200 000 would not need to worry because that is a worst-case scenario But as Putin's generals are being killed in Ukraine and he is increasingly cornered you know I would anticipate he would do increasingly desperate things The Financial Times is published in London and they had a particularly interesting issue this last weekend because even in a London-based paper they talked repeatedly about Londongrad how their city that wonderful city of London had been increasingly taken over by oligarchs for decades They reported things like eleven Russian-born kids at Eden and they got to meet with Vladimir Putin before Theresa May the former prime minister got to meet just in yachts It is kind of extraordinary It is not just in jets It is not just in real estate It is not It is not just in assassinations several of which have occurred in and around London Are there any cities in the U S that have been similarly challenged like London Do we need to be alert to certain areas of our country that have been a favorite of the oligarchs a playground of the oligarchs Ms Haines Do we have a Londongrad in America I don't know the answer to that I don't know if Director Wray does Mr Wray I am not sure I could identify a specific U S city I think as a general matter partly because of the aggressive stance we are taking oligarchs are seen less and less often on U S soil 74 Mr Cooper Well now perhaps but in previous years perhaps they played more freely I see that my time is expired The Chairman I thank you Mr Chairman Thank you Mr LaHood Mr LaHood Thank you Mr Chairman I want to thank all of you for your commitment and dedication to the work that you do in service of our country Director Wray I wanted to talk to you a little bit about FISA As you are aware Section 702 of FISA is scheduled to expire in December of 2023 and I think you know that the FBI's credibility with Members of Congress when it comes to managing and executing this law is dubious at best and I would say in a bipartisan way Last year as you know ODNI declassified a FISA court opinion from here in the District of Columbia and it was Judge Boasberg as part of his judicial oversight really just criticized extensively the FBI and the FISA process And Mr Chairman just for the record I would like to ask unanimous consent that the redacted opinion be made part of the record The Chairman Mr LaHood Without objection As you know in that opinion Judge Boasberg went through and detailed the FBI breaches the illegal activity the abuse of power and the blatant failures of this process And as you know Director Wray in the opinion they specifically -- the judge highlighted a dozen of FBI queries that were quote conducted in support of predicated criminal investigations that accessed Section 702 acquired information This includes purely domestic activities like healthcare fraud bribery and public corruption that were 75 outside the norms of 702 Mr Wray Director Wray was that appropriate conduct I think the judge's opinion speaks for itself that it was not I would say that it is important that the court did not find unlawful purpose or bad faith or anything like that but that doesn't make it any less unacceptable to me I think the most important thing that I would call out here in this kind of setting and we could obviously have a longer conversation -Mr LaHood Right Mr Wray -- is that the queries at issue the compliance incidents at issue involved there all predate massive changes that have been made by my leadership team and I since then that include all sorts of changes to systems to training to safeguards to policies We created a whole new Office of Internal Audit that didn't exist before that is solely focused on FISA compliance So I could go on and on about the changes that have been made but all those incidents predate all of those fixes And I am highly optimistic that those changes will dramatically dramatically improve our compliance rate and you can bet that I am hell-bent on making sure that we do Mr LaHood And I am glad you mentioned that and I know the FBI is doing that I would also just highlight just so the public is aware in that same opinion it also showed that during a 4-month period in 2019 an FBI official conducted more than 100 background checks that returned Section 702 acquired information not in individuals with suspected foreign ties but quote business religious civic and community leaders applying to the FBI citizen academy program individuals conducting maintenance services at field offices and crime victims Again I think you would agree that is not appropriate conduct Just to follow up on the internal mechanisms that you have gone through what 76 were the consequences for FBI personnel that repeatedly violated these compliance procedures Mr Wray I am not sure that I could cite to sitting here right now specific -- exactly what happened with each specific employee Again I think it is important to recognize that the court did not find unlawful purpose or bad faith by anybody involved did find that they had not complied with the standards and the processes And so as I said we have had significant changes that involve mandatory training and counseling to all sorts of individuals We have got the new Office of Internal Audit We have built in systems changes that make it harder for people to run queries We have got additional supervisory approval et cetera Mr LaHood Well I appreciate that Director I guess as we think about coming up on December 2023 we understand many of us how important this program is to what the intent of it is But I guess in laying out your changes your reforms what you have done I am not sure we up here understand that I am not sure the FBI has done a very good job in laying out that framework that narrative of what you are going to do And how do you reassure or give confidence to the American people that civil liberties are going to be protected But that message I am not sure is permeating to the American public or to Members of Congress up here And so I guess my last point is in terms of what you are doing what are the metrics or benchmarks we ought to be looking at that you are being successful Mr Wray Well I think part of what you -- there are a number of mechanisms of oversight that exist on Section 702 and of course now we have a new one namely this Office of Internal Audit But in addition to that you have the Justice Department's National Security Division You have the court's own review processes And so my 77 strong expectation is that all of these efforts that we have undertaken over the last 18 months or so should dramatically reduce the rate of compliance incidents And I am assured by other stakeholders in the process that they too are optimistic meaning outside the FBI that they too are optimistic that these changes will have that effect I take your point about our educating both the committee and others about all these reforms and it is good advice and we will look at how we can better engage with the committee to walk you through it Of course these are changes that take a little bit of time and effort to walk people through They don't unfortunately lend themselves to you know a short exchange in an open hearing But you are absolutely right I think it is -- the burden is on us to walk you all through it because you do understand just how important a tool this is This is the tool that we use more and more these days to identify cyber victims and get out and warn them This is the tool we use to go after foreign intelligence services the MSS and the Russian intelligence services the Iranians and their increasingly brazen activity This is the tool that we are going to need more and more not less and less over the next 5 years as the terrorist landscape with the withdrawal in Afghanistan with the degeneration in Ethiopia involving Al-Shabaab I could go on and on but just about every threat that you have heard about to the extent that it affects the homeland from overseas 702 is going to be the tool that protects us So we want to make sure that we give you all and the rest of the Congress the information you need to get comfortable but I cannot stress enough how important a tool it is and how committed my leadership team and I are to making sure that the reforms that we have put in place have the effect that you rightly expect from us Mr LaHood The Chairman Thank you Representative Speier 78 Ms Speier Thank you Mr Chairman I share with all of my colleagues really bipartisan support for the extraordinary leadership you have all shown and I know you have been working long hours and we are deeply grateful to you I want to associate myself with Mr Fitzpatrick's comments American people think we need to do more I believe that the And to call this unprovoked is actually modest it is premeditated it is savage it is unconscionable brutality And we are going to watch a genocide happen in Ukraine if we don't create our own red lines So I guess I would like to start with you Director Burns because you know Vladimir Putin better than probably anyone else in this room has a red line which is the economic sanctions World War III States He has already said he That was you know the beginning of He clearly wants to recreate the Soviet Union and pick up all the Balkan Why are we somehow reluctant to recognize that he is willing to go as far as he needs to go Mr Burns Well Congresswoman I think you know Putin's actions especially in the last 2 weeks -- and they have been premeditated and they have been savage just as you describe -- I think should remove any doubt about you know the depth of his determination not just with regard to Ukraine but in terms of you know how he exercises Russian power I would however say that what he has been met with since then first and foremost by Ukrainians themselves and their courage and their heroism and the strength of their leadership has surprised and unsettled him I think he has been unsettled by the Western reaction and allied resolve particularly some of the decisions the German Government has taken military I think he has been unsettled by the performance of his own 79 Ms Speier I guess -- excuse me for interrupting but do you -- knowing as much as you know about him he is not going to stop at Ukraine correct Mr Burns Well I think that is what makes it more important than ever to demonstrate that he is not going to succeed in Ukraine And I think that is what the challenge is for all of us because what is at stake is more -- as important as Ukraine's sovereignty is what is at stake is more than that It is about an incredibly important rule in international order that big countries don't get to swallow up small countries just because they can And I think this is one of those pivotal points where we and all of our allies and partners need to act on that and I think that is what we are doing Ms Speier Okay Thank you General Nakasone they have not -- Russia has not really engaged in a lot of cyber warfare to date in Ukraine Can you indicate why not based on your estimation and should we be prepared in the United States for that to be one of his next actions against us General Nakasone Congresswoman let me start with the last part of your question which is yes definitely We have to be prepared for the Russians and any other threat that would try to put us at risk in cyberspace In terms of Russia they have conducted several attacks in the Ukraine three or four upon which we have watched and we have tracked very carefully In terms of why they haven't done more I think that that is obviously some of the work that the Ukrainians have done some of the challenges that the Russians have encountered and some of the work that others have been able to prevent their actions And so it has not been what we would anticipate when we were going into this several weeks ago Ms Speier I don't know if this should be to you General Nakasone or General Berrier but can we now say that Putin has conducted himself in a manner that he has 80 created war crimes Do we have evidence General Nakasone I am sure General Berrier can answer that much more effectively General Berrier Representative I don't know that we have direct evidence besides what we see on social media Certainly the bombing of schools and facilities that are not associated with Ukrainian military would indicate to me that he is stepping up right to the line if he hasn't done so already Ms Speier All right Thank you Director Wray have we seized any U S real estate owned by oligarchs or their family members since the President created the task force Mr Wray I am not sure that I know the answer to that I know that we have taken law enforcement action under the task force that the President created just as recently as a few days ago that involved criminal charges and there may have been some seizures associated with that Ms Speier I just apologize I don't know off the top of my head Could you provide that to the committee people want to see action I think the American And by the way both New York City and Miami are the locus of many of the oligarchs' real estate ownings General Berrier in my last 12 seconds I will ask that you take this question for the record and provide me additional information later The Wall Street Journal just did an article that was deeply troubling to me and I think to my colleagues about a toxic environment in DIA going on A whistleblower came forward There is egregious behavior At another time I would like you to provide us additional information about what you are doing to change that I yield back The Chairman Mr Gallagher 81 Mr Gallagher Director Burns at the risk of stirring up unwanted nostalgia or adding a gray hair I feel like you are in a unique position given your experience in Russia and negotiating with the Iranians to answer some of these questions Is there any evidence that the Central Bank of Iran has stopped financing terrorism Mr Burns I will have to get back to you on that Congressman as well I just want to give you a well-informed answer Mr Gallagher And happy to address that in classified session I just would -- I think it is important perhaps for the President to understand to what extent they are prior to us deciding to lift sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran and that is the intent of the question So I look forward to following up on that A related question do the Russians believe that they have leverage over us because of the ongoing negotiations over Iran's nuclear program in Vienna Mr Burns I don't think the Russians -- right now they are so preoccupied in Ukraine I don't think they exaggerate the influence or the leverage that they have I mean you know over the years -- and we will see what happens now given the depth of you know division over Ukraine But you know what has been remarkable over a number of years is the extent to which they have contributed to those negotiations Now it remains to be seen whether that is going to continue but up until this point that has been the case Mr Gallagher Sp So then do you view -- what is the lead negotiator is it Uyenov forgive me if I am mispronouncing that Mr Burns Uyenov sp yeah Mr Gallagher bluster Bragging that he swindled us in Vienna Is that just mere More to the point Lavrov demanding that no sanctions with respect to Ukraine impede their ability to do business with Iran going forward Should we view that as 82 bluster then Mr Burns No I take that seriously I mean it is something we have to take seriously as well and I don't think we can just assume that that is bluster But -- so no that is something that we can't minimize Mr Gallagher Maybe to put it a little bit differently would it be -- have the negotiations with Iran over their nuclear program been affected by any other issue such as the sudden need to backfill Russian oil supplies in the global market or the remarkable fact that one of our P5 1 partners has made the sudden decision to arm Ukraine Have the negotiations been affected in any way by those developments Mr Burns You know I am not involved directly with the negotiations Congressman but I don't think they have I think this is being done on the merits about you know whether it makes sense from the point of U S national interests to go back into the JCPOA recognizing as I said earlier that we have got lots of other problems posed by this Iranian regime quite apart from the nuclear issue as well Mr Gallagher And given that you have been one of the leading sort of envoys for this administration is the plan if there is a deal in Vienna to bring that plan to the U N Security Council for some sort of vote Mr Burns I honestly don't know sir Mr Gallagher You don't know okay I think the concern at least the concern I have heard from a lot of my constituents is that the President has gone out and made an explicit promise one that I agree with by the way to turn Vladimir Putin into an international pariah But at the same time if we have the State Department who's not represented here today saying we are going to continue to cooperate with Iran on the P5 -- I mean with Russia on the P5 1 negotiations of Iran's nuclear program well those two things don't necessarily add up 83 Now I get diplomacy is complex You have literally written the book on it and you know we have to manage multiple crises But it seems obvious to me that the Russians are at least trying in a public narrative if nothing else to connect the two issues though you have just said that they remain unconnected if that makes sense Mr Burns Well you know what I said Congressman is you know from the point of view as I understand it of our approach to the negotiations they are not connected We are doing this on the merits with regard to the Iranian nuclear issue How the Russians try to play that question of leverage that you mentioned is a genuine concern We have to pay careful attention to that Mr Gallagher And then quickly going to the question of the lessons that China might derive from the Ukraine crisis with respect to Taiwan you have both said that they -- or at least Director Burns you said -- I think Director Haines you said the same -- that they are unsettled by what they have seen in Ukraine and you laid out an argument for that But is that -- is your assessment that they are unsettled is that based on any information we have or is that just based on your experts sort of projecting Mr Burns Well I mean it is assessment based on how our experts see this but I would be glad in the other session to talk a little more about that Mr Gallagher Okay I very much look forward to that And then finally Director Haines the New York Times reported that over a 3-month period senior administration officials shared U S intelligence with the Chinese related to Russia's troop buildup in Ukraine and then the Chinese then shared that information with Moscow Have we done a damage assessment of our decision to share that intelligence with the Chinese Ms Haines I don't know about the article that you are talking about We 84 shared obviously information with NATO and with our European allies and other partners around the world What we shared to the extent we shared much with China was not something we expected would not be handed over Mr Gallagher Okay Perhaps we could follow up because I am out of time but -- so are you saying you dispute the New York Times article Ms Haines I am sorry I just haven't read the New York Times article I am just answering the question as I understand you to be posing it so -Mr Gallagher Okay I will print it out and we can look at it in classified The Chairman Representative Demings Mrs Demings I want to thank you all for what you do for us every day I have to say thanks for being the good guise because we are pretty clear-eyed on who the bad guy is -- bad guys in today's world and in today's situations I just want to thank my colleague Eric Swalwell and for Director Burns for just not letting us forget just who and what we are dealing with Ms Haines I am going to -- Director Haines I am going to direct my questions to you or anyone else can answer them if they feel better suited The Freedom House 2022 report noted that the present threat to democracy is the product of 16 consecutive years of decline in global freedom Does the IC community believe that Putin's heinous assault on democracy empowers the people of the not free countries to challenge authoritarian leaders or do you believe it empowers those leaders to double down Ms Haines So I think that from our perspective Putin's approach to cracking down essentially on dissent and on civil society in Russia certainly is looked upon by others who may wish to do the same as a kind of a model for how to do it in many respects and so I think in that sense you know it is likely that others learn from that I hope that the heroic resistance that we see in Ukraine and that our efforts to 85 really expose President Putin for who he is and for the choices that he has made help to promote and empower populations to speak up in dissent from such authoritarian efforts But I would make sure that if others would like to add to this Mrs Demings Mr Burns how this turns out Director Burns I think Congresswoman just as Director Haines said this depends on I mean I think if Ukrainians demonstrate the hollowness of what Putin then Putinism represent then I think it sends a very strong message I think if the Western resolve that we have seen in response to this helps to demonstrate to people the resilience of democracies at a time when there has been lots of speculation about them not being so strong and not so resilient I think that carries a message that goes even beyond you know what is unfolding in Ukraine today So that is really what is at stake Mrs Demings Thank you Could you also do an assessment of the threat to democracy in Latin America for example and the effectiveness of China and Russia to supplant the U S as the partner of choice to countries that have been reliable allies Ms Haines Yes we can absolutely provide to you an assessment on that Mrs Demings Great And does the IC observe the antidemocratic heads of state in Latin America amplifying Russia's malign influence messaging in the region designed to sow distrust in the U S Ms Haines Is that a part of their plan I think as your question indicates many countries in Latin America and as our assessment indicates are essentially under pressure economic pressure political pressure a variety of different forms of pressure And as a consequence of being forced to make decisions about whether or not they accept what is frequently an open hand from Russia or China but with a price tag essentially for a variety of different projects that might be useful to those leaders in the context of their work but 86 nevertheless are expected to buy influence in effect within their countries and so we do see that Mrs Demings Do you believe the use of surveillance technology is likely to increase in Latin America for the same purpose Ms Haines I think the likelihood of surveillance technology to increase around the world is likely Mrs Demings was out of the room I know -- I believe you all spoke about this earlier I am sorry I But there was a question about foreign antidemocratic groups collaborating with extreme groups in the United States If you could just touch a little bit more on that or again for me please who -- Director Wray Mr Wray What I would say is we certainly have seen foreign groups sometimes non-state actors but who have relationships of their own with foreign governments seek to amplify discord and divisiveness here to provide essentially gasoline on the fire of you know various demonstrations and things of that sort but then also potentially to have that boil over into violence if necessary And certainly we have also seen domestic violent extremists here in the U S seek to connect with like-minded groups overseas through travel in some cases training et cetera so that is another part of -- another dimension of that Mrs Demings Okay Thank you Mr Chair I yield back The Chairman Thank you I just have one followup question To what degree Director Haines or anyone are you concerned that the Russians may use cryptocurrency to evade sanctions capacity is there to do that Ms Haines Yeah we have seen obviously cryptocurrency is a concern in What 87 relation to trying to avoid sanctions and I think there may be some of that We should get you an assessment so that you get an educated perspective from the analysts But I think our assessment generally has been that it would be challenging for them to be effective at completely undermining the sanctions using cryptocurrency The Chairman Mr Turner Mr Turner No further questions The Chairman Thank you very much for your testimonies today and again I think the profound thanks of Congress but also the American people for the extraordinary work you do to keep us safe and extraordinary degree of fidelity you had in your anticipation of Putin's moves Let me just reiterate our request with respect to the 9 11 documents which are being redacted and made public We still have not been able to obtain the full unredacted documents which we would like to see to be able to evaluate and make sure that the redactions are properly based so we would like to reiterate our request to see the full unredacted 9 11 documents as well as the justification for any redactions With that I thank you and we will see you in closed session shortly adjourned Whereupon at 12 34 p m the committee was adjourned We are