RAHVUSVAHELINE KAITSEUURINGUTE KESKUS May 2022 INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY EESTI • ESTONIA Brief The Kremlin’s aims and assumptions K alev Stoicescu Russia’s War in Ukraine Series No 1 Despite the political economic and military pressure that Russia applied to Ukraine from March 2014 Kyiv demonstrated no willingness to give up its territory sovereignty and Western orientation and return to Moscow’s orbit  Russia’s demands – neutrality i e giving up the quest for NATO membership reintegration of occupied territories in the Donbas only as Russia’s Trojan horse and recognition of Crimea as part of Russia – were totally unacceptable to Ukraine Putin’s regime thus made the extensive preparations for decisive action that materialised in the unprovoked and brutal invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 the US on 17 December 2021 which Russia packaged as an agreement on security measures and a treaty on security guarantees clearly indicate Moscow’s actual objectives 2 These aims could be summed up roughly as a return to the security situation that existed in Europe in 1997 They would leave Europe’s eastern half at the Kremlin’s non-existent mercy   Russia also made several key assumptions at the outset of the invasion that most likely indicated very good chances of success and manageable risks However some critical judgements and estimates rapidly proved to be false or largely inadequate 3 Others continue to hold – to varying degrees but enough for Russia to be able to continue its ‘special military operation’ and to bear its economic and social consequences   Russia had since 2009 spent colossal sums to modernise its military and made a range of non-military preparations domestically as well as those needed to deal with Ukraine and third countries 1 Putin and Russia’s ambition is by no means limited to the his closest advisors were convinced annihilation of Ukraine that Russia would quickly overwhelm Ukraine overcoming both relatively weak Ukrainian resistance and limited Western reaction   Russia’s initial aim was to install a Russia’s aims pro-Kremlin puppet government and to carry out the ‘demilitarisation’ and ‘denazification’ Russia began in April 2021 to amass large of the country   This course of action failed and forces around Ukraine along a front of about the goal transformed after late February 2022 4 000 kilometres from Belarus to Crimea and into one of the total obliteration of Ukraine’s the Black Sea Given the insufficient number statehood and of the Ukrainian people and of troops their uncoordinated actions poor culture – as demonstrated by massive barbaric logistical support and other indicators Russia and indiscriminate destruction killing arrests probably had no plans to wage a lengthy all-out and deportations and by preparations to further war of conquest and the occupation of much of conquer and annex Ukrainian territory   Ukraine 4 Instead Putin and a small number of cronies plotted and launched on 24 February Russia’s ambition is by no means limited to the what was meant to be a swift decapitation attack annihilation of Ukraine The list of demands against Kyiv betting on the dispersal of Ukrainian presented by the Kremlin to NATO and to forces around the entire perimeter and the 1 RAHVUSVAHELINE KAITSEUURINGUTE KESKUS INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY EESTI • ESTONIA Moscow seeks not only to circumvent sanctions but also to create domestic and to find foreign alternatives for banned goods and commodities and to attract foreign direct investments Europe’s reliance on Russian gas oil and coal – projected to have been even further increased by the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipelines in September 2021 – ensured both Europe’s economic vulnerability and huge cash flows to the Kremlin’s war coffers These cash flows will continue until Europe – having declared its willingness to do so – will finally be able to terminate its imports of energy from Russia element of surprise A combined air assault and ground attack was considered more likely in the Donbas region Russia’s long-term goal – the destruction of Ukraine – will not change while Putin remains in power but its short-term objectives have been reshaped by the poor performance of its armed forces Plan A taking control of the Hostomel airfield and Kyiv in a matter of hours or days with about 7 000 paratroopers and special forces accompanied by air and missile strikes throughout Ukraine failed Plan B the deployment of huge armoured columns to encircle and defeat Russia’s long-term goal – the destruction of Kyiv and Kharkiv in parallel with Ukraine – will not change while Putin remains invasion from other directions around the perimeter was also unsuccessful in power Plan C the conquest and likely annexation A third important aspect of Russia’s domestic of the so-called Novorossiya Ukrainian lands from preparations was the build up and modernisation the Donbas to Transnistria is at the time of of its armed forces Foreign and Russian experts writing under way 5 The Kremlin’s immediate concerns are to gain the initiative in military assumed that Russia would learn lessons from operations both on the Donbas front and in the its rather poor performance against Georgia in direction of Odesa and Transnistria to replenish 2008 and also in the Donbas region since 2014 its financial reserves and to mitigate the effects and not be blinded by the unopposed takeover of of Western economic sanctions i e to preserve Crimea Putin made the financing of the military the impression of ‘normalcy’ in Russia sector Russia’s undisputed top priority with an aggregate spending officially exceeding 900 billion US dollars from 2009 to 2021 estimated Domestic prepar ations by some experts to be far bigger in terms of purchasing power parity 7 Russia’s operational experience and weapons testing in Syria were Domestically the Putin regime has over many years and particularly since 2014 created an supposed to add important value as were the increasingly hysterical atmosphere of war fuelled annual large-scale strategic military exercises by anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western propaganda and more tactical snap exercises and disinformation It has cemented false narratives based on the multiple conspiracy theories and lies that the Kremlin uses to justify Ukraine the West and others its aggression The state’s total control over Russia’s media its surveillance of social media Ukraine Moscow’s primary target has the banishment of ‘foreign agents’ and the harsh been subject to Russia’s mounting political punishment for spreading information deemed informational economic and military pressure false by the state are meant to brainwash and since 2014 The obvious aims were to weaken intimidate the population limit its access to other Ukraine discredit its democratic order elected sources of information and suppress dissent and leaders and institutions and demonstrate that opposition The National Guard Rosgvardiya it has no other choice but to give up Western a riot police force about 340 000 strong stands values and aspirations and like Belarus ready to crush anti-war protests in Russia but become Russia’s ally The Kremlin bet on proalso to operate in occupied territories in Ukraine Russian political forces and certain leaders and oligarchs such as Putin’s close associate Viktor Russia started a process in 2014 that would allow Medvedchuk former co-chairman together it to adapt to Western economic sanctions 6 with Yuri Boiko another pro-Moscow politician 2 RAHVUSVAHELINE KAITSEUURINGUTE KESKUS INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY EESTI • ESTONIA Russia’s Scorecard of the ‘Opposition Platform – For Life’ party and chairman of ‘Ukrainian Choice’ a Russian sponsored NGO Russia’s agents of influence were active all over Ukraine physically and in the information space seeking to split society foment dissent and conflict and cultivate the Kremlin’s narratives 8 The Kremlin estimated correctly that Russia’s population and ruling elites would be under sufficiently tight mental and physical control so as not to seriously challenge the regime and Putin’s special military operation’ The collective Putin has worked hard to preserve normalcy in Russia particularly by preventing shortages of goods and massive unemployment and poverty as Putin’s high ratings of support depend on the preservation of domestic stability Russia also spared no efforts to convince the West to either offer only symbolic face-saving support or to stop helping Ukraine altogether The Kremlin did everything it could to test and undermine Western unity in NATO and the EU and to exacerbate political discords between and within Western nations Putin’s undeniable goal is a West unable to mobilise in solidarity to stand up for Ukraine and ultimately for itself Supporting Brexit and Donald Trump’s election laundering massive amounts of money in Western banks buying top European politicians trolling on social media opening new gas pipelines even threatening nuclear holocaust have all been used in the service of this goal Russia wants a weakened vulnerable and intimidated West that would be both unwilling and unable to stand against the Kremlin Moscow also counted rightly on China’s political support Beijing initially unwilling to openly take sides has gradually moved towards the Kremlin’s rhetoric blaming the West for provoking the conflict and even opposing NATO’s open-door policy in Europe It cannot be excluded that it was China that emboldened Russia to take military action against Ukraine assuming – as Putin and his small circle of plotters did – that the conflict would be quickly won and would administer a serious blow to the US and the entire West Putin was also correct in assuming that NATO and the US in particular would not – as Putin’s undeniable goal is a West unable to mobilise they themselves have persistently made in solidarity to stand up for Ukraine and ultimately clear – intervene directly in Ukraine’s defence for fear of starting a war for itself between Russia and the Alliance Russian forces have been countered in Ukraine At the same time Moscow built a strategic by local forces only albeit partly equipped partnership with China its most important with Western weapons and other materiel partner in the confrontation against the West The weapons provided to Ukraine by the West crowned by a joint political declaration adopted before the invasion started were qualitatively on 4 February 2022 9 China has vested political and quantitatively not much different from those and economic interests in Russia including the provided to the mujahedeen in Afghanistan in Kremlin’s political support for the integration of the 1980s – but this was for guerrilla warfare Taiwan and the supply of energy and natural not conventional warfare resources Russia has also been very active in its relations with the other countries of the so-called Russia failed totally however in its estimation BRICS format Brazil India and South-Africa of the willingness and capacity of Ukraine’s and has taken every opportunity to influence leadership armed forces and people to resist and anti-American and anti-Western governments in fight Russia had made extensive preparations Asia Africa and South America since 2014 but so with Western support had Ukraine The Kremlin also failed to assess the West’s reaction to the invasion particularly as Russia’s armed forces moved speedily to atrocities war crimes and indiscriminate destruction Putin must have been sure that Europe would not risk losing Russian gas oil 3 RAHVUSVAHELINE KAITSEUURINGUTE KESKUS INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY EESTI • ESTONIA and coal supplies and would be paralysed by his nuclear threats Meanwhile Russia grossly overestimated the fighting capacity and spirit of its own armed forces whose performance cannot solely be attributed to poor planning and political miscalculation of making major miscalculations that would result in catastrophe both for itself and others His latest military adventure has not yet directly affected the NATO and EU member states but it might His willingness to take revenge on the Allies for the defence support that allows Ukraine to stand against the aggression should Russia has proved effective at exploiting opportunities not be underestimated Furthermore but poor at learning lessons from the past his regime has an inclination for miscalculation and apparently an Russia has proved effective at exploiting appetite for future adventures The risks are far from over opportunities but poor at learning lessons from the past 10 Putin’s regime is still capable Endnotes Siemon T Wezeman “Russia’s military spending Frequently asked questions” SIPRI 27 April 2020 “Treaty between The United States of America and the Russian Federation on security guarantees” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 17 December 2021 “Agreement on measures to ensure the security of The Russian Federation and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 17 December 2021 3 Mykola Kapitonenko “Russia’s war in Ukraine How it started and where it could lead” European Leadership Network 4 April 2022 4 Zack Beauchamp “Why the first few days of war in Ukraine went badly for Russia” Vox 28 February 2022 5 “Why Putin needs a landing force in Transnistria” IStories 2 May 2022 6 Richard Connolly “Russia’s Response to Sanctions How Western Sanctions Reshaped Political Economy in Russia” Valdai Club Papers November 2018 7 “Russia Military Spending Defense Budget 1993-2022” Macrotrends accessed on 1 May 2022 Michael Kofman “Russian defense spending is much larger and more sustainable than it seems” DefenseNews 3 May 2019 8 Dmitri Teperik Dmytro Dubov Oleh Pokalchuk Ilia Miroshkin Oksana Iliuk Anastasiia Apetyk Larisa Snihur and Grigori Senkiv “Resilient Ukraine – a Delicate Mosaic Society Media Security and Future Prospects” ICDS 8 November 2021 9 “Joint Statement by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development” Administration of the President of the Russian Federation 4 February 2022 10 Tracey German “Analysis Is Russia repeating mistakes of past wars in Ukraine ” Al Jazeera 5 March 2022 1 2 ICDS Tallinn About the Author Kalev Stoicescu @ICDS _ Tallinn ICDS-Tallinn www icds ee Kalev Stoicescu is a Research Fellow at the ICDS Disclaimer The views and opinions contained in this paper are solely those of its author s and do not necessarily represent the official position of the International Centre for Defence and Security or any other organisation International Centre for Defence and Security 63 4 Narva Rd 10120 Tallinn Estonia info@icds ee ISSN 2228-2076