- --- I - ----' REDAC TED COPY • • vl ' • '1 Ac • J f ' I_ S C-4830 WD NUCLE U WEAPO II SAFETY Title ta unclass lfled RS 3413 71'I I MC •DIC tTt PUN I Sandia Corpora tion with the Coo era tjon of LASL • LRL r ' 9 ' • October 1981 UG 9 ' • 342 1-l This report examtn a nuclear weapon • ataty aa lntluenc ed by the introduc tion of widely deploye d maximu m readines a weapon ayatema The report complel llenta SC-4241 TR a similar repot t publlahe d in Februar y 1959 Recommendati ue for Improve ments ln safety are present ed with the goal of malntain ina a satisfac tory balance between peacetim e nuclear safety and operaUo nal use requirem ents The problem areas associat ed with delibera te unautho rized detonati ons are emphasl z ed --- • ' - _d - '' I • • I - • - hi documen t consists o 35 - f TABLE OF CONTEMTS • A BSTRACT IIC' I SUMMARY 3 Introduction ' s Safat y General Design pproacbea Safet yRe w• • 5 s Nuclear Safety Huard• Sponta neoua Equipment Malfunctlona Bnvlronmentall y Induced Equipment Malflmctlana Accidental Human AcUon• Deliberate Unauthorized Buman Acttaa• 9 10 Recommendations 13 APPENDIX A -- BRIEi' BISTOBYO I TBB BVOLUTIOH A1fl DEPLOYMEN1' OF NUCLBAR WBAPONS 1T APPENDIX B -- NUCLEAR SAFETY STUDY SEQUENCE 19 8 8 • - A PPENDIX C -- RECORDED ACCmENT HISTORY FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS 23 APPENl'DC D -- CONTENT OF MANUAi Ji FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS 28 APPENDIX E -- SAFETY REQUIREMENTS IN MILITARY CHARACTERISTICS 31 •_ •_ j A1Jf cv QfjiJ _ ' · I 1J I • I i e SUIIM UY t The purpoa e ol tlda report la to analyze nuclea r weapon safety u influen ced by poealb le new weapon dealp8 and carnn t trend• ID aperatl oa concep t• Particu lar empba ala ha• been pftll to tbe NfetJ ramlflc atlGM naultf nc from the preeen t and planne d wide dlaper •al weapcma and quick reactta a alert poatur e• now beiq 11 d · Nuclea r aafet7 baurd • wlalcb need furtllar atud7 am or Improv ement are dlacua aed in the follow inl order 1 2 3 Spoma neou eqlllpm ent malfan attou Ermro nment ady tadaoed equipm ent malfun ctloaa Accide ntal human acU_ Delibe rate 1111 utborlHd Junnan actlw Recoau nendat iona are made for apeoift c bnpran ment• In nuclea r aatety ln order to malnta m a aattafa ctory beJ•nc • bet'ne1 1 peacet ime nuclea r • afety requtre ment1 and operat lanal uae requln aent1 To aclaleve tlda balanc e contro l and safety muat reoelw lacreu ln • • u import ant criteri a alona with other operat lanal reqalre ment•• in naluat tn future weapon daatp •mph• concept•• A brief biatory of the ewhatl on and deplOJm•llt of nuclea r weapoaa the ABC DOD formal aafety atud7 qatem · nuclea r weapon accident biator7 the pre• ent • tatua ot 1Veapon manua l conten t and clta•m inatlon and the aafety requirem ent• given in llWtae y Charac terlatic• are dlacu• 1ed Ill the appendlcea• • iiFCRR· re 3 '6E 1iJ 1PAI •I a • • i NUCLBU WEAPONS SAFETY Introd11ctton In February 1959 the AEC weapon laboratcrle• publi1b1d a document SC-4241 TR whlchdiacua• edthe then current atatua of nuclear weapon• from the standpoint of peacetime nuclear aafety and l ff ommetJded aneral poe11ble tmprove ••• At that time the weapon laboratorle• had been partlclpatlna la formal and Informal weapon s atem Alety rntewa fOI' approxtmately two yeara The report wu written primarily from tlda bacqround of ezpertence Several m83or cbanp1 In weapon operational cc mcepte haw occurred • ince that report primarily becau•e of the lntrocluctlol ol wldeq depl019d mutmum readine•• weapon •1atema Example• al mextmann reacHn••• eyateme Include bomb• on SAC au-borne alert bombs on around alert ltrateatc and tactical mls• Uea on alert statu• and air defeaae weapons The lut three e xamplea apply o weapon• wblch are deployed with both US and non-US force •• Th••• new con• cept1 of wide diaperaal and quick reaction haw modified many ot the characterlattca of tbe over-all nuclear weapon safety structure ID parttcular the exposure of weapona to altuatlona In which accklental or deliberate unauthorised detonations could result baa been reaUy tncnaaed -· • • Thia report examine• the 1ubject al nuclear weapon • afety from the standpoint ot the lnfluenoe of these recent chanpa an weapon deatp and operatiaaal capabilltlea Special attention ls liven to the problem of preventtna deliberate unauthorized detonations The ree ommendatione pre1ented are aimed at weapon ayatem feature • and procedural chanpa whieh will maintain an adequate level of nuclear aafety wlthln our understanding of present mllltar7 operaUonal concepts and our expectations of future concepts •- ·9 · 4 -----------------···- --- -· iE@RL 1 R - Safety General Safety has always been an important conslcleratton in nuclear weapon deslp Thia consideration cannot be static The continual changa in stockpile compositicn and operational concepts requfres a contlnuln1 re'Vlew of the adequacy of nuclear safet7 In the ideal altuation complete operational capability would be coexistent with maximum safety It has been reasoned In some quarters that increased safety can be achieved only at the espenae of dearadlnl operatia al capability The reallzatlon of a high degree of safety 11 not necessarily contrary to the achievement of required operational capability Thu• while It la comparatively easy and straightforward to 1at n additional safety at the expense ol dep-adlnt certain other operational requirements readiness for example It may alao be possible throup judicloua deaip and implementation ot safety teataJree to achieve a high degree of aafety with neaHaible effect upon other operational requirements In some caaea certain operational reqaJlrementa mll1' actually be enhanced by increased safety a higher dep-ee of safety tor example may make a higher degree of readiness tenable - • The 11doptlon of an approach by which operational requirements are determined first and adequately safe weapona then developed to meet those needa baa permitted the appltcatfon of adYancea In nuclear weapon dealp• to changin1 de• ployment needs Appendlz A treats the blatory ot weapon• and deployment concepts from the separable capallle and ·•eapona-ln-the-lcloo approach of the late 1940 11 to the aealed•pit weapons in an alert atatua approach of today Design pproaches One of the ·gl als in the deaip of nuclear weapon a7atema ls that the com binatlon of failures or prematures blch may result from the enrironments experienced In an abnormal situation wW have a low probabilit of resulting in significant nuclear yiel ' 'his la for nample the intent behind the requirement for at least two Independently derived arming functions •two-point arming• The two-point arming criterion has heretofore been primarily applied to the derivation of signals necessary for complete electrical arming of inherently onepoint safa 1 1ystems# 1 e no algnitlcant nuclear yield U the high explosive system ls initiated at a single poin -· -·- In the case of inherently one-point safe weapons the prevention of electrical arming atfords adequate proteetfon against any slgn lffcant nuclellr yield Under the guidelines of the past significant nuclear yield has been taken to me11-n any nuclear yleld greater than ft'lur pounds HE equivalent iifilll if - ·•' rn £EERE jpl b The advent of nuclear weapons which utllt-ae mechanical sating devices to • assure either one or multi-point nuclear safety has led to some redirection in emphasis in certain system desi n aad analysis approaches In the case of weapons which assure one-point nuclear safety through the use of mechanical aat tn1 devices it ls no longer sufficient to prevent only electrical arming Premature actuation of the mechanical sating device would create a situation ln which unacceptable nuclear yield could result if the weapon were involved in -an accident or incident and subjected to a one-point detonation l 1oth premature electrical arming and premature operation of the mechanical saflng device must be prevented The •two-point arming• criterfon applled in this ca• -would require expanalon to assure protection 1n both preas a • Similar considerations of nuclear safety ln the case of weapons which assure multi-point safety through the use of mechanical aaflng devicea indicate - n the other hand that lt ta sufficient to protect only the aaftna device from premature operation to avoid significant nuclear yield 11 premature operation of the safing device ia prevented aipUtcant nuclear yield will not e u1t U the weapon la subjected to a one potnt detanatlon or even a simultaneous multl-po1nt detonation due to complete and proper operation of the electrical arming and flrln1 syatem The two-point armtna• criterion would in this case be moat effectively applied to the derivation of signals necessar1 for operation ol the saflng device The type of aafinl technique utilized In a given weapon system the -efore determines to a large extent the functions and components which are worthy of the greater safety emphasis and also the most et ectiYe approaches toward minimizing the probability of stanUtcant nuclear yield in the event the weapon is involved in an accident or Incident If monitoring ia required these same con• slderations must be taken into a ccount • Many techniques and general guides have been developed tor designing and analyzing nuclear weapon systems to assure adequate nuclear safety These techniques contribute toward nuclear safety through utilization of one or a combination of the following basic principles 1 Energy aoux·ces are isolated from critical components such as the detonators or the mechanical sating material by interposing several components which respond to different and independent conditions In an abnormal situation these components are designed to provide either passive or active isolation Artn sare switches and therrnal-sensitlve fuse links are respective examples of passive and active isolation elements which are used During the ormal arming tuzing and firing sequence these r omponents perform active or passive ti·ansfer or transform f'unct ons · Bl @1 £ IJl_Jl • t - 2 Energy la atored in auch a state that it must be transformed to soma other atate ln order to be utilised for the operaUan ol critical component•• Energy atored at 28 volta in a battery for example must be tranaformed to a hip voltap atate In order to fire the weapon detonators 3 Energy of a magnitude sl cn1ftcantq creater than that of moat anticipated apurioua atpals la required for operation of critical components The use al hip ener17 detonators la an uample of the use of tbla prlnclp1e 4 Energy la derived from certain envtraamenta which tend to be unique to the weapon•• normal mode al delhery for u• e either 11 a the primary enera for operation ol critl cal compmenta or tor control ol other componenta which aerve to tranaler or traneform stared ener a for operatloa ot crlUcal components Inertial pneratora and acceleration awltchea are esamplea ol some of the devleea whtch are used 5 Time Interdependence la required between armln1 functlona For example a requlr11tment ma y exlat that certain armln1 al1nala be received In a particular •quence or concurrently with other alpala thus reducln1 tbe poaalbllit7 ol armln1 from other than the Intended 1ourcea 8 The 11 faU-aate• dea gn approach la uaed to aaa11re that compo nent or 1ubayatem failures envisioned•• 11pontaneoua envtranmentall Induced or aa resultln from accidental human actiona w111 serve to safe the weapon rather than to arm it Safety Reviews Formal nuclear weapon safety review procrams have now been e • tabltahed by the Departn1ent of Defense and haw been implemented b7 each of the services to study weapon designs and deployment plans In general theae studies provide a good independent check of weapon safety features and use concept• at several points in the design and stockpile life of each weapon system Appendix B describes how these reviews are accompllahed Formal tuclear weapon acciclent lncldent reporting systems have been eatabltshe- 1 by each of the services The invostigation of causes and t esulta of these aceidcnts and incidents is an Important tool in the design and analysis of st •e nuclear w apona A summary ot the accidents to date is given in Appendix C I • ·- Tht current numbe1· of weapons and their numerous exposures make a statistical apprcach more meaningful than it once was Furthr rmo1·e the diversity of us- r g --oups and weapon system conf gu ratlons makes a ystematic approach 411MEiit I T ·1 L 'l eiu entin l Increase d attentio n should therefo N be ctven to procedu res tor the centrali zed collectlo n and publicat ion of •ucb data In articu lar attention should be devoted to accumulatlnJJ relevan t expoaur e dab The nature and extent of the da a to be reported on individu al acciden ts or incident s alao merit continued co - - A 'W' sideratl on Nuclear Safet7 Hazard Nuclear safety hazards can be cOllftni ently cateaorl zed into roar p-oups for further study 1 Spontaneous equipme nt malfwlc tion• Environ1 1entall7 induced equlpmellt malfunc ttona 3 Acciden tal human actlona 4 Deliber ate unautho rized h1otman action• Spontan eous Equipm ent Malfunc tiona Thia type of nuclear safety hazard includes the type ot acciden t wherein the various aafln1 and armln1 device• in a given weapon apontan eoualy operate in such a way as to cause a nuclear • loato n Conaide ratloa of tbia problem muat include all of the weapon delivery vehicle and support eqllipme nt which can either contribu te to a detonati on ln place or can oontribu te to an accident al miaalle launch or bomb rele••e An example of this type ot dealp cweraip t or malfunc tion ia the •sneak• circuit problem wherein lndlvldu al element s of compon ents or systems each indepen dently sare may interact wltb each other to produce unexpec ted unsafe conditio ns Thls problem is aaravat ed b7 the lncreasi n1 difficult y encount ered by any one group in the attempt to grasp or analyze the total weapon system in detail from the a iafety standpoi nt Thia type of safety hazard has been of c t rn since early weapon days Design approac hes which require several slpals t l arm and fire weapons and review procedu res which look at over-all weapon systems are effective in reducing this risk relative to the other hazard areas Careful ly lnatrum ented weapon systems tests using war reserve quality weapons materie l and operatio nal aircraft or- missile s can be ussd to detect ayatem lncoinpa ttbilitles or malfunc tions The current proposa ls fo'l instrum enting weapon systems for use in OperaUo ruu Suitabil ity Tests are example s of AEC DO D efforts in this type of teHting Hecause of these design approac hes and review proced1 Jres the probabi lity of a weapc n prematu re from spontane ous componP nt prematu res within the weap- n ts rel ltive to other hazards extreme ly low 3 6ifiHE·r1 r 9 iiiRElif- i b L ·· Envlronmentallz Induced Equipment Malfunctions Thia type of nuclear safety hazard includes any situation In which the external environment causes one or more components 1n a weapon system to function prematurely The type environments which muat be considered can be grouped into three categories 1 Single environments resulting from varloua accident situations such as fire or shock 2 Multiple environments resultllll from more severe accident situations aircraft crashea weapon jettison mlaatle ezploaion etc such aa combination of shock deceleratlon crushing and fire 3 Eztransoua environments such u RF field stray ground currents or acoustical noise Although the environments of concern a -e not always predictable considerable information ls being accumulated on environments llk1 1l7 to be encountered in typical nuclear weapon accidents or incidents The approaches used to minimize safety hazards in these instances include 1 the uae of armin1 components which are either lrisensltlve to or fall safe when subjected to particular environments and 2 the design ol systems such that the combination d failures or prematures which may result from environments experienced ln a given accident or lncldent will have a low probabllit7 of reaulttn1 in algniflcant nuclear yield Because of the multiple environments such·as high shock and deceleration fire and crushing which are often aaaociated with severe accidents the design approaches which are likely to be more effective than a aeries of isolation elements are those which prevent armlnl either b7 precluding generation of energy that ls compatible with the requiremeuts of critical components or by dissipating stored energy in a controlled manner through the use t f components which are self-disabling when subjected to an abnormal environment Because of the absence of complete information on present and future unusual environments the probability of a weapon premature from environmentally induced equipment malfunctions can never be assumed to be negligible However the present level o' knowledge coupled with the effort being expended on obtaining better information on unusual environments and designing with these environments in mind make this probability relatively smnll Accidental Human i ctions ··- This type of nuclear safety hazard illcludes ny situation in which human errors cause a weapon to receive sufficient input signals electrical and or environmental to cause i puclear detonation These errors can range from - - D improper prooedures such as trouble •shooting defective weapon• with improvised equlpment to inadvertent acts such as improper cable connectiona or operating switches on test or control equipment by brushing aptnst them Since the 1 dvent of sealed-pit weapons and ready-alert conditions thia area of nuclear safety concern has become increasingly Important and has received much design and analytical attention Thia attention must continue since the field of human behavior ls presently the least understood major factor bearing on nuclear safety - The deployment oC maximum readiness nuclear weapons with non-US forces a new set of problems The lanpap barrier both tn verbal and written form can lead to mlaunderatandlnp In tratnin1 outerences 1n backgrounds of the non-US forces may lead to response • ln unusual situations which might be completely unexpected to the U S way of thinking has created To date many design and procedural technique• have been developed to minimize the safety risks associated with human errors Handling safety devices such as environmental senalng devices In warhead• and trajectory arming systems ln bomb and missile fuzlng system• are e ffective 1n moat storage transportation testing and handling altuatlona since they provide a aeries link which ls less vulnerable to human error Administrative procedures such as the two-man rule no single individual allowed access to a weapon use of safety-wires and seals on critical switches use of authentication procedures lnvolvln1 more than one man before weapon commitment and strict regulations reprdtng maintenance and handling allowed are effective throughout weapon Ufe However the lack of predictability of human behavior and the ever•chanalnl interplay between the weapons and the humans controlling them will require a continuous effort ln searching for and correcting weak spots which may develop • De liberate Unauthorized Human ctlons This type of nur ear safety hazard includes any situation tn which weapons are deliberately detonated without proper authorization Thia could 1·esult from the unauthorized use of weapons by the crews based Jn faulty local intelligence or improper assessment or a nearby nuclear accident Crom enemy sabotage from psychotic action or from the take-over and use of nuclear weapons deployed with non-US forces The nature of this hazard area and Its recogni lon has changed considerably during the past year due to changes In operational concepts which require that large numbers of weapons be maintained in an alert posture ready for use within minutes of authorizatio11 The design and procedural techniques presently 1n effect to protect against this hazard are basically those discussed previously under Accidental Human A ctions However they are not nec s arily as efff 'ctive against deliberate I j· I sfiEirlil 'f n·1J - C t v ft actlomi sinco the concern D' W ia wiUi cases here the individual th a 1_n pon to be detqu @d e -- r u1 wakis · I DaDID l - -o'' ffil -· s detaiieu Triroi-matlon onc · -neecrea tor- repair and rebuildinl orwe·1 pon components ln the field ls not needed undec today' n practice of retrofit by component substitution -· _ ___ - - _ __ _ _ · _J Changes ln deployment conce ° I have r -ecently highlighted this problem and the increasing number of weapons on • le1·t hence Increased exposures make this an important area of nuclear saf ty CQ cern today which rnqulrea a great deal of design and analytical attention The increased interest In command control during the past year and the rather intensive study of feaalble qatema have indicated that concepts may be developed by which the hazards of deliberate unauthorized acts may be signiflcantly- reduced Because these systems are treated in conatderable detail in a recent document SC•458'1 WD dated ·July 1961 which had similar distribution they will not be discussed at length ln this report The referenced document should be considered as a companion report n particular the use of remotely operated coded switches installed in critical circuits within the warhead or bomb would provide more positive control of the commitment of nuclear weapons and provide considerable protection against unauthorized acts In the event of unauthorized commitment the coded command control system could in general prevent arming in the case or bombs or in the case of missiles could prevent arming and provide ror automatic destruction soon after launch Assessments of the over-all desirability or the broad value or any command control system must of course take account of other aspects such as the reliability and vulnerability of the associated comrnunlcatlon systems CauUon ts also indi ated to insure that the incorporation of poaltlve command cJntrol does not in·· advertently create means by which a slgnlftcant portion of our nuclea r capability can be di sabled by enemy actions including enemy sL1bve1·slve actions -- --··-Memo Uertford ALO To Distribution dated 10 27 60 MS I CK Uncl ST60-47 l Atomk Weapons Design and M1 interJ u e Philosophy MnS-4 ·' • -tt _ •4 t F IJI • f 'PiP • _ I -· W- SE@II E IIJII f Techniques for lncreaain1 nuclear weapon resistance to tampering also hold promise in reducing these hazarda SChemea for increasing tamper resistance should bave u their purpose one or a combination of the following - a To dela or den success In a paaaive manner by requiring special equipment knowledp and skills In order to gain entr7 and to perrorm the intended modification• without dl R bllnl the weapon b To delay- or deny success in an active manner by confronting the would-be-tamperer with a •tamper consequence• through the incorporation of an actJve device wbtch destroys or permanently disables the weapon In the event of 1 nauthortzed entry c To make evident or at least make difficult the concealment of the ract of entry in order to enhance detection and allow for cor- rective action Although u ive tamper realatance baa been lnoreased tor some newer weapons aealeJ case warhead• for example more effective anti-tamper schemes would require some revision in the present teat and maintenance philosophies Some logical compromise should certainly be possible The antitamper features could for example control acceaa to only the BE nuclear aasembl7 and the firing set Although active anti-tamper techniques tor nuclear weapona have to date been lnveatt1ated only brteny this approach appears to have the 1reateat potential ln particular the combination of an anti-tamper Jatem with a command control system would provide effective protection aplnst moat hazard• attributable to deliberate unauthorized acts An ideal ayatem of tble type wowd prevent useful application of the weapon in an unauthorized manner even it unlimited information equipment skill etc with the exception of the proper code were available While this ideal is probabl7 not attainable it ta feasible to make circumv tntlon of the system sufficiently difficult by requlrlnl an undue amount of time skill equipment etc that the unauthorized act will either not be attempted or lr attempted will require a length ol time which will allow for corrective action I • Although a firm design for an active tamper-resistant system la not yet available the basic buildln1 blocks are rather clear An effective anti-tamper system could consist of these basic elements 1 The protected envelope or vol1Jme - the re1ton of the weapon to which entry ts to be denied 2 The monitor - that device or technique •Nhich senses that P ntry has been gained or attempted 8tt 1'Ellt J -· - 3 SE@Rllf ti The action transducer • the component which ae ·erely disable • the weapon ln auch a way u to prevent It• 11nauthorized use Source of enero stored or derived - neceaaary to translate the monitor's aipal Into the neceaaar7 action and to power the monitor • 5 A command ontrol device - although not a truly basic requirement for tamper-proofing thia device a coded switch for example seem an inherent part of any such scheme to allow for authorized accesa Recommendattona The recommendationa which follow are p-ouped tn the same order • the information 1n the preceding Potion the order d presentation la not necessarily ln degree of Importance A factOl wbtcb should be considered when reviewtn1 the recommendations is the bulc approach to the aoluttm Soma recommendations can be accomplished throup strictly non-technical or administrative techniques either by the DOD or the AEC Others fall Into a well-defined technical area and the ability to solve the basic problem rest• with the designer Still other recommendations represent a combination of these two approaches• • Spontaneous Equipment Malfunctions 1 Design practice• and • afetJ review procedures which consider the weapon system u a whole muat receive areater emphasis For example multiple carriage at mixed weapons bombs and or warheads 1n Air Force and or NayY aircraft must be conaldered as a potential source of sneak clrculta Before any such carrla e ls attempted the complete system should be reviewed Envlronmento 117 Induced Equipment MaJfUJJCtions 2 Stadlea of present and future unusual environments such aa RF and acoustic noise and the probable effects or these environments on weapon components which affect safety sho11ld be contuuied Better definition al these environments ls esaontlal f Rf1' -·r _ 1 ' • ts iiAiJ11 Iti 3 The use ln critical safety circuit• of components known to be sensitive to one or more anticipated environment auch as squib switch susceptlbtlity to RF and fire should be avoided 4 Active aelf-diaablina techniques should be further investigated with an aim toward enhanctn1 nuclear aafet7 in severe accident e situations Accidental H11man 4ctiona 5 Th• need for and the extent ot elec rical monitorln of nuclear weapon system should be continually anaqzed to balance the pin agalnat the potential coat The act ot or the provision for electrical monitoring dearadea safety to some dell'•• becauae each electrical otrcutt which paaaea into the weapon offers a possible path for spurious or unwanted slpala such aa RF nolae ctrcwattng ground currents or unlimited teeter power to be carried into the electrical system The risk of thta causing tr011ble can be made quite small but not zero Therefore the need for monitoring in any 111peciftc case ah uld be weighed against this risk Wh re a definite gain c ui be realized such as monitoring of mechanical saflng devices used to assure one-polrt or multi-point safety care muat be taken to minimize potential safety- hazards that could result from electrical monitoring In souie situations the beat solution ta to not monitor Other monitoring tec'lniques visual methods for ezample can where practical provide an Indication of a weapon's safety status while avoiding the af01•ementtoned electrical hazards Deliberate Unauthorized Human Actlona In general the recommendations in this section although aimed primarily at deliberate actions will also be effective against accidental actions 6 Improved command control systems such as coded control systems should be seriously considered tor all weapons deployed under ready alert concepts and for all weapons deployed with non-US forces · 7 The amount of lnfor matlon describing internal weapon functions contabied in manuals and trainlna cnuraes shou td b- restricted moro thllll is presently the case S SiB'ii Jl _RI e Manuals and training are needed to prepare for possible futuJ'e retroflts• However• with mc dern weapon syateme retrofits are by component replacement rather than by -repairinl at the weapon site The extreme detail of some presentday manuals is unnecessary In the field and may well serve to help the unauthorized user to detonate weapons in place or on a target Appendix D presents examples of this problem 8 Techniques for maldna nuclear weapons more tamper-resistant should be investigated 9 Consideration should be given to tecbnlquea which would allow quick non-nuclear destruction or severe disablement of weapons which would otherwise tall into unfriendly bands Other Safety Considerations 1o 'j •• ' Procedures for use by EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel should be carefully reviewed on a continuing basis for nuclear safety ramlficatlona A nuclear weapon which require• EOD action because of an accident represents a serious nuclear safety- hazard since some of the safeguards ma y have been rendered ineffective b7 the accident such weapons may have in effect lost some of their inherent nuclear safety Procedures to be used in such st u• ations should be reviewed from a nuclear safety viewpoint by safety study groups To be meaningful however these procec lurea must be derived and reviewed with the cooperation and technical guidance of the copizant AEC laboratories 11 Exposure information along with more detailed nuclear accident incident data ahould be compiled and indexed at a centralized location This would provide basis tor better hazard anal ysls and allow for proper orientation of design effort aimed at reducing the more significant hazards 12 MC's should present safety requirements in terms of desired protection rather th-in in terms of design approaches Specific design requirements tend to limit the freedom of the designs in achfo tng the proper baJance among the various design objectives Usuall Y design approaches specU'ied in MC's are baaed on the prevlo11s generation of weapon designs and as such may unnecessarily restrict future designs The joint Sandia LA SL LRL posttlon on this subject was stated in a CRD memo - e cfi@RE' fCf Un 15 - Bradbury Teller and Molnar to Stet' blrd OMA dated 8 22 59 with apecUlc - omment a recommen dations and model• set• of Excerpts from this memo pertaining to safety are lnchaded· as Appendix E MC'•• 13 Safety criteria tor low yield nuclear weapon systems should be st11died to 100 U n1Jeting philosoph y la overl7 restrictiv e I I Dal1'1D • 1Tliiadd1tlal ·ot a coded cmitrol I ayateJJl----1 ··to th• sfngte-manl iecl' Wcrm iYitlm ma 'teato re the Intent of the two-man concept __ -1 - ' I - - APPE NDIX A BRIEi ' HISTORY OP THE EVOLUTION AND DEPLOYMENT OP MUCL BAB WEAPONS For purpo ses of this discus sion the evolut ion of nuc ea r weapo ns c n be related to three eras earq interm edlate and presen t The followtnc ••ctio na discus s the interr elated factor s of weapo n deadp operat ional conce pts_ and macle ar sateq during each of these area Early Weapo ns Durin g the late 19401a the weapo u availa ble were quite limite d i» q11ant it7 vaey compl icated and destin ed for a ain le type of operat ional uae stn te atc bombi ng Highq traine d crews were needed to perfor m norma l malnt e mee al1d to prepa re weapo ns for actual use Strike prepa ration requir ed man y haw-a of compl icated operat ions ·• Nucle ar safety durin peace time waa assure d by' keepin g the nucle •r mater ial compl etely separa ted from the rest ol the weapo n Warti me safety waa prorid ed by maint ainin this separa tion until the delive ry bomb er was on the way to dl e rget The compl exity and the lolist lc difficu lties aaaoc lated with these 1'18 p were compa tible with the operat ional conce pts of that era adequa te warr lz 0M g of • need to use nuclea r weapo ns was expec ted the weapons were indivi duallf able that reliab ility over the target was of param ount conce rn and peace ao valu-time nuclear safety was essent ially guaran teed Interm ediate Weapons Durin the early 19501s the compo sition of the stockp ile gradua llJr ·T he numbe rs and types ot weapo ns areatl y increa sed The t elatlve worthchang ed of a singla weapo n decrea sed consid erabq allowing attenti on to be focuse d c ira linpi-o ving the operat ional featur es of the weapo ns Exten sive mainte nance was Btill requfred but strike prepar atton tbne was reduce d to a few hourR or less Nucle ar safety during peace time was still assure d by physic al sepQl a tion of the nuclea r mater ial from the rest of the weapon Wartim e saf ty wes prcvid ed 'by the use of autom atic tnfllgh t-ins rtior D I system s which pe ·m ittad c elaying the insert ion of the nuclea r mater ial into the pit until shortl y helore the 1n 1ended dctc na lton -time M 'Git T I _ Again these weapons were compatible with the operatlvnal concepts of the time since adequate warning was expected since wartime nuclear safety and reliability were reasonably balanced and since peacetime nuclear safetJ was still essentially guaranteed Present Weapons During the middle 19501s the stockplle and the operational requirements continued to change For reasons of nuclear efflcleney• new weapon designs utilized the sealed-pit concept • The contl-nualq increa1ing number of weapons and weapon types in stockpile began to impose oppressive loafstlc requirements on the users in terms of manpower training equipment and tacllttiea This led to the concept of wooden bombs weapons designed for minimum or no maintenance or strike preparation activity Concurrently pro iress in enemy deliveey systE ms greatly reduced the warning time which could be expected This led to the alert weapon concept now being used wherein a significant portion of the stockpile is constantq- kept in an alert position ready for commitment within minutes These three concepts sealed pit weapou ''wooden weapons and alert we_a pona although developed for different reasons have meshed together to allow present-day nuclear weapons to be compatible with the operational requirements of today 'and the foreseeable future However tbia radically changed the nuclear safety picture With the nuclear m iterial permar entq installed in weapons nu• clear safety considerations had to be expanded to include mmv- new situations Current Status Peacetime nuclear safety must now bo assured by two se onda ry methods design of nuclear HE systems wh-f ch are one-point-safe and design o1 arming and fuzflli systems which provide adequate safety aa nst premature operation This latter factor can only be achieved by careful design and continuing review ot the systems themselves and the continu changing conditions under which these weapons will be used An anomaly in the present stockpile compounds today1 s sa1'ety problem Many older weapons designed during the Intermediate era are still in use today These weapons while very safe under the operational concepta of their day• are not as safe as modern weapons under today's oper1tional concepts Their basic safety tee turr lhe separation of the nuclear material from the rest of the weapon is not consistent with a re dy alert P· Stttre because of the complete 11fltr l e readiness -requirement 9 · - e • I APPENDIXB NUCLEAR SAl'BTY STUDY SEQUENCE The DOD on June 'l0 1980 published Directive 5030 15 wldch eatabllahecl a formal basis for·safety studle• and standard• aplnst which peacetime nuclear is to be Jud1ed Each of the serricea subsequently pw llahed replatlona implementing the provisions ot the DOD directive Althoqh the aemce replatlom differ In details the aallent provisions al the DOD directive are incorporated in each Some of the more important features are •at•v Membership a To the extent practicable individuals partictpatlnc as members in atudlea and reviews should be other than those reaponatble f r deaip development or production• b The DASA and the AEC will participate in atudlea as members Safety Standards The standards below are stated in the DOD Directive and repeated in eaC a ol the service regulations a There will be positive measures to prevent weapons involved ln accidents incidents or jettisoned weapons from producing a nuclear yield b There will be pesitive measures to prevent deliberate armbJC• launching firing or releasing except upon execution of emergency war orders or when directed b y competent authority c There will be positive measures to prevent inadvertent arming launching firing or rel aslng d There will be positive measure to im1ure adequate security Safety Study and R ew Procedures -·• a As earq in the development ot a weapon system as significant data are available an Initial Sateey Study will be conduc ted to identify design deftclencies and provide guidance for further development • b Approximately 90 days prior to the system operational date a Preopera• tlonal Stud7 shall be conducted to determine the adequacy of safety features and to provide a basls for the development ot safety rules c Within one year after the operational date of a weapon system an Operational Review shall be conducted to r e-examine the adequacy of safety features procedures and safety rules - ' In Rddition provisions are made for Special Reviews or Studies as necessary based on the operational experience of a weapon system or modifications which may affect safety Safety Rules In conjunction with Preoperatlonal Studies Safety Rules are established 1-- pt•ovide maximum safety consistent with operational requirements during all phases ol peacetime operation of the weapon system RepO _ Formal reports of each safety study or review are submitted for approval ot the appropriate service headquarters Provisions are made for the inclusion of minority reports In conducting safet studies the procedure ls generally as follows The technical design agencies present to the study group detailect information on component and system design including monitor• contl'ol and test considerations Where possible hardware la made available for examination The operating command presents a service-approved Plan of System Operation and Stockpile to Target Sequence which detail the planned utilization of the weapon system The study group then analyzes this information and evaluates the adequacy or the system safety i'eatures During the conduct of Preoperational Studies a tJ'ip to a field location a test unit or an operational unit is made to ex·· amine the system hardware and proposed operational procedurP s At the conclusion of the study reconimendattons where appropriate are macle to impr ve the overall nuclear safety of the system When approved by the service headquartel'S 1 these recommendations beccm1 j directive upon the appropriate agency Aftei- Safety Rules have been drafted and approved by the study grOUil• the t Ulf S are forwa1·dec to the set' rice headquarters c oncerned for approval Alter service approval the rules a -e forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for DOD approval The rules ire then forwarded to D1 I A for AEC approval Personnel from OMA with r presentatives of ALO and Satldfa Co1·1 mratfon make t field hip to the unit in the moRt advanced s· ate of r•f- dine a to review the rulea • • · •i - operational concepts and facilttlea with which the rules will be emplo yed After thi• review the AEC Commtssloaers approve the rules and they are returned to the Secretaey of Defense for final approval and publication When considered nece•••l Y' the Secretary of Defense can rant interim approval to proposed safety rules at the time at transmission to DMA for AEC approval In the event the Plan of System Operation permits peacetime fl1ina the rules are not final until approved by the President• • •• S ICRE1 · ' '- -APPENDIXC RECORDED ACCIDENT IDSTORY FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS DASA has prorided definitions ot accident and incident in TP 5-'1 which permit our experience with weapons to be placed in perspective for an analysis of the safety implications Accident An unexpecter1 event bwolring a nuclear weapon or component resulting in any · of the following 1 Loss of or serious damage to the weapon or compor ent 2 Nuclear or nonnuclear detonaUon of the weapon 3 • Radioactive contamination 4 Public hazard Incident Arr unexpected event involving a mtclear weapon or component resulting in any- of the following but which does not constitute an accident as defined above l Incidents whereby the possibility of detonation or radioactive contamination la J ncreaaed 2 Ind5 v1 dual err'Jt•s committed in the assembly testing loading or transporting of equipment and or the malfunctioning of equipment and materiel whfolt could lead to an unintentional c peration of all or part of the weapon armfog and or tiring sequence 3 I lcllvldual erro •s committed in the assembly testing 1oad1ng 11 or transl Orting of equipment and 01• the malfunctioning ot equipment a nd materiel which c uJ d lead to substantiallJ' reduce yield or in reased dud probabili'l y • 4 Any act of God natural phenomenon over which man has no control r-esultlng in damage ·t o the weapon or component ···- ·-···---··---- · - - - - - - - - ·---·--------------• l LR jf_R -• --1 • 5 Arq unfavorable environment or condition which cause• damage to the weapon or component DASA and the services established procedures ln 1958 undeT which accidents or incidents as defined above a an reported and con-ctctiw action design or procedural changes initiated Prior to 1958 there were no formal reporting or documenting procedures The followina table summarizes those accidents involving WR quality weapons ot which Sandia Corporation has had c fficb l notlffcation• --··j-unbsht u l J f WR QUAL ITY NUCL EAR WEAP O S INVOL VED IN ACCID ENTS Wr r pc · -· ·- ···- ·-- - Pate 1-' 1' l 050 _ i fl oan m 1 ··r 1 t ··o A r 4 July 1950 Type Accid ent Locati on Cause and Rema rks Delib erate jettiso n Puget Sound Wash Unkno wn • Aircra ft crash Albuqu erque N M B-29 c a ·aah Weapo n detona tion Deton ators not instal led Aircra ft crash Leban on Ohio B-50 crash HE deton ation Aircra ft crash Travis AFB B-29 crash on takeo ff HE detona tion• 1'T 1 0 -u 1 - J - - 4 i··✓ ·----- i--- ---------------------------------------f l - ' ' -DIL l1IID l 'Ia 1952 nadv ertent releas e t Alask a Comp onent failur e in air ' _7 ' ' 1 craft releas e mecha nism j - f'OTA L IN 195 2 - 1 • ' - ·-·-- ---- ·--·----·- --_ __ _______________________________ Inadvc rtent releae e Lortn AFB did not burn or deton ate Six deton ators smash ed • l B-36 nefect ive aircra ft wirhlg Weapo n dropp ed durinC run-u p Weap on 1u1 r 1esa Aircra ft crash Overs eas Location B•4'l crash ed into storag e · bunk r No weapo n burn- ing or detona tion - -·- --- -·- ·--····--- --- --- --- --- - - l t t_ • ' I - · a _ - - Y JJ • • •- •• - - - •• • • - •• • I I l e I I · TYJlt • • t or Accid ent · I Location Caus e 1lnd Rem arks Mr r 1957 Inad· rel te nt relea se Kirtl and AFB Hum an erro r Crew mem ber of B-36 conta cted expo sed r-elea ae cable in bomb bay HE deton ation • Oc 1957 Airc1 •sft crash Hom estea d AFB B-47 crash ed ou t Jc eoff 'I'Wo•low orde r HE deto na• ' tiona Weap on burn ed four hour s Pit melt ed De- 195'1 1 _ Inadv erten t relea se Cast le AFB - ·• ·- • ·-- - - - - - - - - - · - - - - - - - - -- faa 1958 Airc raft crash F- b 1 58 Delib erate jettis on Inadv erten t relea se durin g down -load ing No deton ation or burnlna ------·-------------- Over seas Loca tion B•4 gear failu re whil e taxlinc Weapo n burn ed No deton ation Caps ule in lFI melt ed • Hunt er AFB B-_4'1 tnvol r -J t in IJlid -air ·c ollis ion 11e1 ona u-oii ' · r ·e · 959 1r- advertent relea se SOlith Carolin - No --· c Hum an e1·ro r HE deton a• tioa Civil ian prop erty -U dt maae Js•4'l ab·cr aft • Dyes s AFB -S--47 crash ed from 1500 it alti do after co tching fir d l inc takeo ff HE dcton a• tod Juih orde r ··- -------- --· -·- ·-·- -- - -·· ·-·- - •· ·- J i --- --- -· ------ - • fJ _' n -· i • - - - of Accld' - Locati ou 1'-i t 11 tt fire Chenn ault AFl3 Cause aud Rema1 ·ks J a TO uni1 in dve rte11tl y firec on B-4'1 Urcr aft and woap lQ burne d No detona tion• -- - - ··- ·-- ·--- - _______Jat l 5l ·- - - - - - - - -·- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - r 'ke iu storag e Unkno wn Faulty heate r in storag e buildi ngs ca Se d fire BE burne d No detona tion Ai 1· aft fire Overs ea• Locat ion Thl4ee fuel tanks inadv err·· ently jettiso ned f '°1 a parked fiahter a 1·cra t Aircra ft b- rne d Wl#apon dunag ad b t fire No detona tion Ai rc1·aft crash Barks dale AFB C-124 suffer ad power fail- ur or tueot t aucl c he d we pon burne d 01n No det lna ncn_ Ah-cr- Jt cruh Hardin burg» Ky B-52 cre ah eJ a tar mia- r collis ion with KC··l S br we po us burr e S No deto ation v -·---·- -·- ·-· ' 4 - - -- - · - - - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - · - - - - - - -- Dl t n aO McGuh -e AFB - - · · · - - - ·- · - · · - - - - · · 1 ••• i i ' · ' ' 1 Ul it iti 1 rJ 11- f f tur -ia 1· ltl a l rr n i ts 1 ' t•-e -- - l r• f-1 Jri d i J•- i No ic ·u t·h ih 1• ··-·------·-----•-·-- ---- - --- --- --- --- --- --- --·- --·- -- - • 0 -' I - • --- ---·- I I I I i t II l Date D'J E Accident Aircn ft crash 1 Locat ion Golds boro N C ' • Caus e and Rema rks B-52 crash ed follow ing ruptu re of wing tan Weap ons separ ated from aircr aft duriD break up at 2000 -10 o oott altitu de • One weapon para c hute de- ploye d - weap on survi ved One weap on ''tre -fell and was cleeatroyed No d toa a• tion ' arc h t9e 1 Aircr aft crash Yuba City• Cul B-52 ci-ash ed retur ning from ''Cov er-all missi on Wee pona left aircr aft at or after impa ct and were destr oyed No deton ation or burni ng ·- ---· --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- - ' 'f TAL ii CCI DBNT 3 Il'T 7OLVll fG WR QUAL ITY NUCL EAR WEA PO 1950 TO SEPT EMB ER 1061 • 22 I 1 - --· ' - ' _• · ·-- - ·-·• - --·- ·· APPE NDIXD CONT ENT OF MANUALS POK NUCL EAR WEAP ONS The interp retatio n of requir ement s on mar Ual conten t has receiv ed able attenti on in the last few years The presen t AEC D OD aereem ent consid erregard ing this proble m is stated In the Atomi c Weapa ns Deaip and Maint enance Philoaoph y docum ent dated Augus t 18 1860 Parag raph 5 of this agreem ent stmtes Conte nts c4 Techn lr al Publlc atlona which appq to the newer weapo ns and are given wide distrib ution wW be limite d to aener al inform ation as a safety -secur iw measu re howev er critica l detaile d weapo n lnform ail n will be made availa ble tor restric ted distrib ution gener ally at the milita ry depot level For each new weapo n enteri na the stockp ile the Techn ical Public ation will specif y what mainte nance will be accom plishe d by the Milita ry This will be determ inedjo intlyb y the AEC and the DOD •· To determ ine the effect ivenes s al this agreem ent conten ts and distrib ution oi manua ls for two recen t bombs the B41-0 and the B43- 0 were studie d Table I gives the manua ls publis hed the coples in the origin al distrib ution and the sensit ive mater ial in the conten ts tor the B4l•O Table 2 gives' the distrib ution of the •1 and -3 ma rmals to the milita ry Table 1 No at A Manua l B4J-0 ---- --- -Title Weapor Summ ary Series Copi _ 555 Sensiti ve Mater ial Princi pla€ of or1e1·ati on compo nenta to preve nt sabota ge name - 1d de sc-rlbeci B l ··l 1-ssembly T - st Stor- ge anrt Main m ar ce Pt'o1 edure- with lllustr ated Parts Breakdu·1111 600 Pr nci p ea oi opera tlon • • ' Jli -' IV' I • •- 1 • • • - IIIN ' • I •- Ir • - • --- • • - - - •• - • ' - - - - Table 1 cont No ot A Series Ma11ual B41-3 B41-3A Title Copes Sensltivf M terJal Maintenance Instructions with llllAstrated Parts Breakdown 860 Pr incipleas of operation Maintenance Instructions 200 Componerr location 555 None 510 Principlec of operation co mplct schematics l atton oi component with Illustrated Parts Breakdown Supplement B41A-3 Maintenance PJ'OCedures with musti•ated Parts Breakdown B41-'1 Fuze-Setttnr Procedures Table 2 ·• i Numbe1· to DASA SAAMA Manual --- B4t- A '15 450 B41 3 A 200 '150 B 100 B RevlAion l 400 Distribution Series ---· Tables 3 and 4 give the san1-e i nfornmtion foir the 1 J • I I' · ·9 f ·- ' ' I i J • •G f RfT • • J' Btls o 400 - - - - - ------------- £1i@llll i RS Table 3 No of A Series 1'j tle Manual Weapon Summary B43-0 B43-1 Assembly Test Storage Coples Se itive Material 1205 Principles of operaUora 945 Principles of operation - and Maintenance ow cedures with Illustrated Parts Breakdown Ma nte1111nce Jnstn1ctiom 843-3 1080 Principles of operation complete schematics location of components with Illustrated Parts - Breakdown Maintenance Procedures with Illustrated Parta B43A-3 495 None 940 Principles of ope t•ation Breakdown Fuze-Setting Procedures i Table 4 IManual B43-l B 3-3 Distribution Serles •· DASA Number to SAAMA A 850 400 A Revision 1 '150 400 A Revision 2 soo 375 B 650 3'13 u · underat lndlng fa hat foe •· 1 mar ua b i h t g naral rnrorn·1s -t fon mano lal glven wiJ diP- r-thution aurt the -J mann l ts foe uef alled intorma t on n1a1 ual giv·en i -estrictE cl distrHmticm - •om ch E -c tuiil dis aibu iocs ma e on h l two 11 1 · es or manual th fo ent i t' the 3tft 'il ' ll n doe no' appe ' lr t- be metA 'l'he r a i-Cn tl t ce1nntH·r Is e ve l more evident 'Hheu eoD sider t n ls ghe n to t 1 iRct t h a cnly 100 B41-· O af mhs n s h -tkA-r d to he manu ac-t tred 'S5t7f11iiT · 2 r I · - I i I -eceRL IFR• a APP END IX E SAF ETY REQ UIRE MEN TS IN MILITARY CHA RAC TER ISTI CS ·rtte follo wing discu esion is extra cted from a CRD Mem m·andum Brad bury Tell er and Moln ar to Starb ird DMA dated June 23 1959 Reas ons tor Reco mme ndlu a MC lldv1 sion for Sat l_ £_onalderntioaw ·•• We have obae rved that - fet y 'requ irem ents ' grow frnm a ain1 le para p·ap h in the ICBM warh ead MC' • R t 2 1- to eigh t avbp araa raph a in the l lC' a for the XW- 47 and latel y to sixte en subp ara r apha in tbP MC's for the SUB ROC war ead Ref 3 We prot est that this mor e and mor e spec ific 'requ irem ent' appr oach is not in the best inter ests of safe ty We belie ve that a rece nt revie w of form al AEC 00D agre eme nts cond ucted by DMA staff illus trate s that the AEC hold a join t resp onsi bilit y with the DOD for any nucl ear accid ent whic h migh t occu r The refore we belie ve that the AEC mus t retai n reap oNtl for the tech nkal deta ils ot the desig n requ ired to achi eve the desi red aat tybility goal a ln ita warh eads Eva luatio n of the degr ee of safet y prov ided and the effic acy of the mea na of prov iding it is some thing that is and shou ld be a matt er of Joint AEC •DO D conc ern 11iia ls of cour se prop erly done in the vario us mili taey safe ty evalu ation grou ps whic h mus t retai n freed om for atudy and reco mme ndat ions In safet y the attem pt will alwa ys be to do the beat that can be done cona feten t with oper ation al char acte r ati ca of the weap on syst em and the relia bilit y one wish s to achia re Arit hme tical anal ysis base d upon assu mpti ons and lesa than adeq uate data o what the syste m is estim ated to be c ipa ble of affor ding has been seen to be open to many misl eadi ng inter preta tion resu lting in 'abso lute' inter prflt ation or calcu late d i afe ty and relia bilit y leve ls ·--- t erer c 'or thes e quotatif lS 3re Ref 2 SRD Mili tary Chal c te rlstic s MLC to Oiat ribut lon d·t 2 28 36 Suhj ect Appro ·e J Mili tary Cha r ar terlstlc1 1 for a Hi h Y 'iel Wa r beMd tc be used in the ATL I S Inter cont inen tal Balil ut lc Mt i e •' -5 l34 • Ref 3 SRD Mlli tary Char Rcte r istl cu MLC to Diatt•ib tion u'ttl 2 n tm Subj ect Miltt a ry Ch r t ristics fox- a Nuc lear ' V tr he 1 d fo r t he StiBF OC Stth- Surf ace-t o- Sub-Su1•fa ce Miss ile Q-81 222 -J • ·-· • i ' - aaE@RE · ·i2 J 1 •From the start ol the atomic weapona pro -a m flfteen years ago the A EC Md the DOD have been strivin l to achiev e the hiaheet degree of reliabi lity that the t1tate of technic al knowledge would suppor t During this period two things of prime import ance to the reliabi lity proble m have taken place ·- we have gained some actual kno•Nle dp 'f the effects of pueap of time on weapon comJ o nente and materf als and we have gathere d an increaa ing amowat of data on tM operat ing behavi or of many type• of compo nents qnder a variety of environ mental ondltlona It must be empha sized howev er that tbfa i11creo aed knowle dae covers a nonhomog eneous and ever hangl n1 st Ckpile lnvolvl na w lde y differe nt dfleicn practices so much so th a t tm•re b very little ·data that is unquea t analy compa rttole Almos t all compa risone ·• predlct iona involve import ant aaaump ttona that m·• easy to overloo k Despite thla apOQff founda tion both we and the DOD ha ·e seen an unmist akable improv ement and have ap-eed that lt wu not rldlculo ua to rlve f Qr- reUabt HUee as hiah aa o 995 in moat weapan a - •it is clear that lt la econom ically infeaal ble to accom plish enouah testing to evvr prove such a high reliabi lity It la also clear that the time that would be require d to accomp lish that tarp teat progra m ls comple tel7 mcomp atlble with the nation• • 1tt d1 for new weapon system s Both tbeae 1tatem enta can be made for all ordn ln ce materi al atomic or otherw ise Recop isln1 theae tacts we have worked toward the 0 996 fi1ura •• a knowtn 1 that w could never prove that it had been achieve d •Since it is impoae ible to prove that the pal hu b- en achlevu d it aeema sensel sa to l •cUy such numb• r• •• requtre m•nt• In Militar y Charac teristic•• We therefo re believe tbat the Intent of the DOD In phruln a MWtar y Cbarac teristlca can be very adequa tely covere d with a differe nt aet of words -- words wbtch will permit a more quantit ative measu re of deatp worth The attache d •Mode l MC' s illu•tra te the point 'l 'he aam tt statem ents can be made about 1 Safety Bequire n1 nts 11 As stated before safety and reliabi lity often work apihst each other Suitabl e trade-o fts betwa n them should be arrived at and recomm ended through norn1al Uaison with I ASA and the Joint Service Workin g Groupe • § lfety Co11si de1·atl s Se tion s of Model Warhe ad Boinb MUit_ 'LCha_ act _ istic Th nuclen1 systel' l sh ll produc e no more tha fmtr po•m 3 H P equiva lent nudec l ' yield in the eyent ot detonat ion ot the liE by any 1nc11nR othe1· th m tht intended ri ring sy ctem 11 prac Hc r 1 measur 8 sh il t dn 11 in the wa ehe d 1 omJ rliasiia tu · nin•· ir 1h c the i salbi HtiP s vf a nu ' lear ac iden t as n r su'-t of humait ei· ·• r or unauth oniecl or lmpr ipel proced uk'es • L - SE@RtJlt«b I I I · • ·• • • It shall be a design pl to be evalua ted by the beat calcula tional techniq ues availab le that the probab ility of a warhea d bomb nuclea r premat ure owing to sy1tem maltun ctiona in the previou sly una e d warhea d bomb and exclus ive of human error be predict ably leas than 10- and in conaon ance with other operat ional require ments of the weapon system applica tiona 11 NOTE Separat11 model MC'a one for bombs and one for warhea ds are given in the referen ce Parent heaea in the quotati ons above indicat e the differe nces 3 c REi JFRD L DJSTRm UTION 1-10 75 A - Libraria n Division of Military Applicat ion AEC Washing ton D Attn Develop ment Branch 11-12 7 5A - K F Hertford ALO AE C 13-14 7 5A - USAEC San Francfa co Operatio ns ortice 2111 Bancrof t Way Berkele y 4 Calif Attn Manage r 15-17 7 5A Dr N E Bradbur y LASL 18-20 7 A - Johns Foster Directo r LRI -Li vermore 21 75A - s P Schwart z 1 22 75A - R W Henders on 100 23 75A • E H Draper 1000 24 75A - L D Smith 1300 25 75A R L Peur foy Jr 1310 28 75A - J P Cody 1J20 27 75A - G J Hildebr andt 1330 28 75A - J H Findlay 1400 29 75A - J McLay Jr •• 1420 30 75A - W E Boyes 1440 31 75A - R A Bice 2000 32 75A - A B Machen 2300 33 75A - L A Hopkins 2500 34 SA - G C McDona ld 2530 35 75A - B E Arthur Jr 2540 36 75A • L J Hellman 2800 37 75A - a c Dacey 5000 38 75A - R S Claasse n 5100 39 75A - T B Cook 5110 40 75A - F W Neilson 5130 41 75A - F P Hudson 5150 42 75A - M J Norris 5420 43 75A - J W Easley 5430 44 5A - G A Fowler 7000 45 75A - H ·E Lenancl er 7100 46 'l5A - V E Blake Jr '1110 47 75A - J w Jones 7120 4rJ 75A - R S Wilson 7140 49 75A • IJ H Patterso n 7180 50 75A • W L Stevens n ' SA - S A Mo lx-e 718tl 5 'l5A - D B Shuster 7i00 53 75A - W A Gardner 7300 54 75A ·• J E • Lamkin 7500 55 75A - B s Biggs eooo 36 75A - W T Roward 8100 34 fsE CRET 1 IJ • c - · • -· - · ' DISTRmUTION conttmaed 57 '15A - L Gutierrez 8140 58 75A - c R Barncord 0150 59 75A - R L Brin 8180 60 15A - D R Cotter 9100 61 75A - M G Randle 3421·2 62 75A - R K Smeltzer • 3421-3 63 75A - W F Carsteu 3423 64-75 75A - R C Smellch 3448•·1 l ' B 31 S 1t -f 3 - l l I - f $1 o 1 e A6- J t J - J- '£ 'I 1 E 3-t-Lv I S2 ' °'-a £ i 1A 1 lF • Org 5613 1 10 - or 5531 lf SerLe1 l 2 1 0rl• 1712 2 2H • c H s nul• -21- J Series l lJ • Jerir- Wallaoe 11 416 • ·' - ' t i ' · • o 1Efilit T 1 I tb • i• ii