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William L. Stevens, The Origins and Evolution of S2C at Sandia National Laboratories: 1949 to 1996, SAND99-1308, Sandia National Laboratories, September 2001, Secret, (original classification: Official Use Only), Excised copy

-Official Use Only SAND99•l308 Internal Disuibutioo Only 8ffiu 1J' S REDACTED COPY internal memorandum • not to be dustdbuted outside Sandia National Laboratories FIUtla ei- cllaNmlnadoa authorl 84 to U S Oovwnimcnt agoaclu anti thelt caa tracton othu re1111uta ahAll be appnmad by th• orllJa ldnc lacUJty or hf Mr l OE prapammatJo aathortty Sulemcnts herein are mostly those ofrhc I Tltl r n l may not rl prcsenr thos of the l' rsuns directly involved i o he prc- ccsses described pending their n view This paper show l not be ciccd c xlr lcted or quored i l any publication withuut apprciv i l by thl Din ctor Sur ty _ sst ssmem Center 12300 S inc lb Nationnl Lnbor Horii i j • r t •I • 'I • I• • •• •·1 • o t t ' • • It - Officia -tdse On y- SRI I or II OFFICIAL USE ONt•t SAs 9-1308 9Ailfial Use Only Printed September 2001 The Origins and Evolution of S2C at Sandia National Laboratories 1949 to 1996 William L Stevens Consultant to Surety As sessm t Cenler Sandia National Laboratories PO Box 5800 Albuquerque New Mexico 8718S-0428 Abstract Tit is rcpon caplun -s in an undassified manner some of the events and conditions that account in major part for the ways that urtain disciplines associat d itb the U S nuclcnr weapons program arose The disciplines arc three nuclear weapon and weapon system safety security and use control collectively called S'C The focus is on the cultures that er i ted at the time so cumnt obscrvtrs can better understand origins and evolutions Particular attention is given to explaining why Sandia National Laboratories did certain things mostly lo male p uticular technical choices the way they did when other options either were available or would seem to ha e been 1 so OFPICIAL USE ONLY ' ---- - - · -_ _ I ' Ir S i9JtET'SM OFFICIAL USE ONLY ABOUT THE AUTHOR This repon is derived from my three-decade care r specializing as an engineer involvoo in a specific aspect of rhe U S nuclear weapons program namely prevention of accidents incidents and other unwanted events that could h ivc disastrous effects on the viability of natior al security lhis concern became termed SlC for Safety Security and Control My career interest began in 1952 when I was assigned as a commissioned officer in the U S Anny's first battalion doing lhe ordnance tasks for the nuclear artillery shells missile warheads and demolition muni ions being transitioned from R D to the nationnl stockpile of nuclear weapons After a brief postwar return to engineering for a major petroleum corporation I reentered my career interest by gaining employment al the Sandia Corporation lhe AEC facility that was 10 become the Sandia National Laboratories Early assignments were as a project engineer on development of tl e nuclear warhead for the nation's first long-range ballistic missile system during the crisis mood oflhc sputnik era and later on development of a large str t tegic bomb Gradually my assignments turned toward technical management in nuclear safety-first for the AECIDoD safety study process that rreated the entire human-machine weapon system and later for the design of the nucle ir weapon entity or tho systems Over the yeaxs 1 was dra 1m into suppon work for the staffs of several major interagency national-level studies that considered the future roles and missions of the civilian and military agencies in the nuclear weapons program focusing on the institutional infrostructural aspect of S C My principal assignment however was in leading evolution of an innovati -e de iign concept that was to provide highly significant enhancement of the level of nuclear detonation safety in the nationaJ stockpile Shortly before rl tircmcnt in 1935 was honored to rcecivc the DOE Weapons Program Award for Excellence for coctributions lo safety I have been privileged to continue my involvement in lhis program as a consultant to Sandia's principals in S C This report is one product of my vork for the last decade as a consuhanl 2 ess s f L 66- bi IIW C · 0 19 l'll llFRB -OFFICIAL USE ONLY TABLE OF CONTENTS BOUT ·tllE 1 UTHOR 1 PREF CE 9 FORE VORD 11 I INTRODUCTION -·•······ 15 1 1 Definitions 15 1 2 Tr ideotTs of S1C With Other Weapon Sysu -m Consi forations-A Pcrspt -cti 'c 19 2 THE EARLV 'E - RS 1945• l 960 21 2 1 for First Generation Capsulc•Pit Nuclear Weapons 1945-1956 21 2 2 The World Warn Bombs little Boy Fat tan BJ and 84 1945•1952 21 2 3 Safety of the High Explosive Nuclear Subsystem l 945-1954 21 2 4 AI C DoD Rcsponsibilitic s Controversies 23 2 5 Safety of the Electrical Subsystem 1945-1952 24 2 6 Safety of the Second Generation Electrical Subsystem 1954-1956 25 2 7 Security 3lld Use Control in the Early 1950s 19 2 8 Adl'ent of Systems Safety and Use Control 30 2 9 The Atomic 'eapon S 1fety Board 1957 JO 2 10 Sandia's Electrical Systems Department 3 56 to 159 30 2 11 The U S AiT Force's Nuclear We apon System Safoly Study Group 19Si-1958 31 2 12 Advent ofEnvironmentl l Sensing De •ices for Warheads ESDs 1958 32 2 13 Thi Tri•Lilb ratories' First Nuclear Safety i l mifosto 1957-1959 3-' 2 14 Sandia7 s Participation in Early Nuclear Weapon System Safety Group Sludies 195S-1960 37 2 15 Nuclear Weapons System Sat ty Study Process is fnslitulionaliz c l 1960 40 2 16 Origins of Plutoniwn Dispersal Safety 1956 42 s c 3 THE WORLDWIDE DEPLOYMENT YEARS 1960·1963 45 3 1 Fon ' trd Deployment in NATO 1960 45 3 1 Rctrofils of the Stockpile to Incurpor 1le Environmtnt31 S nsing Dt ·ices l 'J 59-1961 J J l Eml rgcncy Oi struclion Disablement or Denrnl D _l f uckar Weapons 1960s ts J I Th '·POPCOR 'f' Ph nomcnun Nu- h ar Deton itiou Conc rn J9 3 5 Advent ofPrcscnbc l Action Links PAL 1960-196 r J Formauon ofSamlia's First Syst m Saf 1y Organization 1960 5 ·rhf Goldsboro N 1rth t arolina Act irl nlT Janl ary 1961 51 J S rh Tri-Labor lloncs· Second N1u h ar - tfcly Ma nifc tu I %0-1 %1 3 Elecrroma rnctic Radiatiun 11111 l i hmin Tlm uls to Wi upon S ilc1y 1961-1963 5 i _ I1 foturity Reached in S mJia · uch ar Weapon S v li m Safrt P10 1 1111 u o • 11 p jl_Jii1-l'i63 l•i • T ' t Oc ·1 Safo1y Sll1thi s Dt rm - thc P riod o ·Xud ar Tt sU iu 1 11 tm sphc re 19h l - I J62 Sud 1r Test Safo1y Smdi l%_ j ·n5 '' -OFActAt·tJSE- ONl Y · pi I Ifl• • ibJ Le ' S i'i All'flPAD - OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3 13 3 14 3 15 3 16 Joint US UK Field Tt sts on Plutonium Dispersal 1963 66 Status of the uclca r Weapon System S ifoty Group 1963 66 Nuclear Weapon Electrical System Design Prnctires Documented 1963 66 Fonnation of Sandia's Systems Approach for Safety in Weapon Design B61 3 17 The President's National Security Action emorandum on Nuclear Weapon Safety 1961-1964 ···················································· ····· ··•·········· 67 Responsibilities S 61 68 4 THE LEVEL-OF-EFFORT YEARS 1964-1968 69 4 1 Advnnced Developments in Use Control 1962-1965 69 4 2 Nuclear Weapon System Accidents Cumberland MD and Bunker Hill AFB TN 1964 •••••••••••• •• ••••I• •••• •••••••••·••••••••••••••·•····•····•·••• ' 73 4 3 4 4 Advent of Fault Tree Anillysis Methodology Lato 1964 to Mid-1966 73 Plutonium Dispersal Safety of Nuclear Power Sources for Aerospace Systems 1965 74 4 5 4 6 4 7 4 8 4 9 4 10 4 1 l Nuclelll' Weapon System Accident BS2 Palomares Spain 1 66 75 Aftermath of Palomnres and Related Events 4 66 --t 68 76 One-Point Nuclear Detonation Safety 1967-196S 77 l n Example of··Jndependence in Weapon Systems Safely Studies 1967 78 Nuclear Weapon Design Safely Philosophy Dialogue 1966-1967 78 HE Detonation and Plutonium Dispersal Safely Concerns 1966-1975 79 State of Nuclear Weapon Design Safety in 1967 80 5 ADVENT OF ENJIANCED NUCLEAR SAFETY DESIGNS 1968-1972 81 5 1 The Thule Greenland Accident 1 68-5 68 81 5 2 AEC 00D Nuclear Materials Safeguards Committee 2 68-4 69 83 5 3 Quantitative Requirements for Nuclear Weapon Safety The Walske Lener' 1967-1968 S5 establishment of Sandia's Nuclear Wc apon Design Safety Organization 1968 86 5 4 The Tri-Laboratories' Third But Unrecognized Nuclear Safely Manifesto Spring 5 5 l 68 87 Studies to Recommend a Nuclear Wc apon Design Safely Philosophy for Sandia 5 6 Spring 196S 88 Project CRESCENT - Advanced Systems Development of a Super-Sale Bomb 5 7 1968-1970 ·········· 89 Fonnation of Sandia's Nuclear Weapon Safety DL-panmcnt l 968-1969 90 5 8 r cvfow of the State of Nuclear Wcapon Safety 1968-1969 93 5 ' 5 10 Orii rins of Piuh nium Dispersal Safety Risk Management 1969 93 5 l I lmplicalil ns of Qua ntitali -'L StandJrd5 for ucle ir Safety Risks 1969-1970 95 5 l Es1 ibl ishr 1ent or a Role tor Nuclear Weapon Design Safc1 - Specialists I 69- -n Q 5 1 Gniddincs for Dc 'elopment nf a New Nu h a Weapon Design Safi ly Su'bS St- m 5 14 5 15 5 16 5 17 • J969- 97 Firs Ianti Lli t lligl1•L vel lntra-Samli 1 D sign Safety Rc ·icw l 9G9 IO I AEC Headquarters' Rc 'icw of hs uch tr Safety Pro rlm 1969-1970 103 Radioactive Jatcrial Cont imi t ilion S1ud cs 1971-1972 l i5 Security i '1d SJfoty of --Jucl ar Vi ipons in Loi ristkal Tr msport u i m I' 7 1 97- i05 -ana rna · OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5 1 S T11c Minority Opinion Provision in Safety Studies and Re -iews 1960-1975 I 7 6 THE DECADE OF EXERCISE OF DUAL AGENGY RESPONSlBll TIES 1973-1983 109 6 1 The SAFEGUARD AntiballisticMissile System Safoay issue 1972-1973 109 6 2 P pers on Nuclear Powl r Reactor Safety 1973 111 6 3 Study o ERDNAL 's Nuclear Wt -apon Transportation Operations Probabilistic Model Positive Measures Me1hodology 1973-19i7 11 ' 6 4 Security of Fixed-Site Facilities for Nucl Jr Weapon Operations 1973 1976 113 6 5 The First Revision of the Directive for Weapon System Safety Studies 6 6 6 7 6 8 6 9 6 10 6 11 6 12 6 13 6 14 6 15 6 16 6 17 6 1S 6 19 6 20 6 21 6 22 6 23 6 24 6 25 6 ·-' · 6 17 6 1973-1974 ································•···· 114 Sandia Questions the Safety of Air-D livercd Weapons in Quick Rc- tclion Akrt the Fo ·lcr Lener • F3ll 1974 115 Nuclear Safety Concerns for the PERSHING n Weapon System Development Period 1974-1981 116 ATSD1AE Rich Vagner•s Visit 10 SNL JOtS 81 119 The ERDA DoD Stockpile Sa 1ety Study l 975-1976 19 The Joint Chiefs o StafTStockpilc lmprovemc nt Study 1975-1977 l 19 The POPCORN Issue Revisited the Study of 975-1977 120 Plutonium Mass Limit Controversies I 975-1976 120 The ERDA1D0D Transfer Study The Concept of Oual-Agcm y Responsib1lirics 1975-1976 123 Abonivc Attempts to Reinstitute a OoD DOE Agreement 1976-1978 125 Sandia's lniti llivcs for Security and Plutonium Dispersal Safety in DoD Logistical Operations Th FORWARD LOOK Study 1976-1979 126 The Sandia Stock-pile Initiative Fall 1977 127 Intra-DOE Laboratories Challenges lo SNLA Nuclear Safely Roles 1977-1981 128 Nuclear Weap Jn System Safety Rules Approval 1961- l 978 129 The B61-5 F-4 Safety Rules Episode Civilian ·s lilitary Control • 131 DoD DOE Long-Range Planning Group Starbird Srudy 1979-f9S0 13 Briefing Package on Nuch ar Weapon Sa cty 1980-81 136 Sandia Input to the Annual Report to the President on Nucle r Safety Surct · 1976-1984 137 Briefin s and Testimonies on the S1ocl pilc lmpn wcment Pm 'Tam I9SCI-P S I 1• 0 The DoD DOE Plutonium Dispersal Analysis Group 1977-1981 141 Accidcnl Rcspons Group ARG ind Nuclear Emergency Search Team f 'EST Emph 3 Sis E lfl ' 1950s 141 i' uclear Weapon Tun ponJtion for 1hc Panli x Plant Envmmm -ntal lmpJct S1atc mcn1 1981-19SJ 1- 5 Th Plutonium Disper - al Safety Prnj cl CPOSP 1981- l S•l 140 Ddiber itc l nauthonzed 1 aun h IDl ·1 1 C nccrns J ERSlll' ' i i 11 Vc ip1 1n S y lcrn D ploy u nt I' l-4 CHALLE GES TO Dl Al AGENCY RESPO ZSIIlll t nEs AGREE IF NTS 19S3-19 1 1- '1 - l Th D ilYllOE -- kmtir mdum o TuJ rst indm I1JS2· l 93 t t-l• i ·OFFICIAL USE ONLY l I • I · 1 3 Jf i RE i JI OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1 7 3 7A 7 5 7 6 7 7 7 8 7 9 7 10 7 11 7 12 7 1J 7 14 The Third Revision oflht DoD Directive on Nuclear 1 Veapon Safety Studies 1983-1984 ····· • ········ 151 ThcDOEOefensePro1 rram•ss cco1nminc-e l983-1985 15 2 Safety Health and En ·ironmental Appraisal Comminee 1983• l 984 152 Papers on AEC DoD Divisions of Responsibilities l 984 I 53 Initiation of S1 'L's Computer Code Security Program 1983-1 Q85 153 Conduct of Deliberate Un3uthorized L11UDch Studies for U S Army Nuclear Vcapon Systems 1984-1985 153 President's Blue Ribbon Task Group BRTG on Nuclear Wc ipons Program fanagcrnent 1985 154 Fonnarion of the Nuclear Weapon Cowicil 1987 156 Safety Treatise and Safety Evolution Papers 1985-1987 156 Dick Brodie 1s T realise on Nuclear Wcapon Safety Program 1987 157 Sandia's Policy Statement and Plan for NuclC3J Weapon Safety Assurance 1987-1993 i •••••••••••• •• 157 DOFJDP's Nuclear Weapon Safety M u agcmcnt Process Review The Moe Panel ' Srudy 1988 1S8 The lntern t l Review of Sandia's Practices for R usmg Nuclc ir Silfety Concerns l 9S9 t 12 The W69 SRAM-A Episode-My ·•Real They'' Story 1988-1990 162 The Panel on uclear Weapons Safety ofthe House Armed Services Co1nmittee The ''Drcll Panel 1990 166 Creaiion and Replacement of the Kuclcar Weapon Council eapon Safety Committee NWC VSC 1989-199-' 167 DoD OOE Joint Policy St itcmenl on Nuclear Weapons Surety 1991 168 Fonnation of Sandia's Nuclear Surely Dircctoralc Cenrer l 991 169 Unfetter •• Studies of the Elements ofS1C 1990-1994 170 Proposals for Rc ·isions to DOE aml OoD Nuclear Safety Standards 1990-O uc 170 Revisions of DOE Nuclear Explosi 'c Surety Standards 1995-1996 173 Nuclear Weapon Safety Files in the Nuclear Safely Information Centi r 1993 174 Use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment PRA T chniqucs in '1uclcar Weapon Safety 1994 175 SNL's Input to the Annual Report 10th President on ucl nr Weapon Surely 1994 17 The Drcll'Pcurifoy Paper on Technical Issues llf a t uclear Test 8311 1994 I 7S Sandia's Surety Heritage Rcpo 199 -1997 I iS Review rs c Secr on$ of Dratl Chapters Sandia G ncral l·hstory Projcc 1995-191 6 I i ' 4 7 IS 7 16 7 17 7 1 S 7 19 7 20 7 11 7 22 7 23 7 2-l 7 5 7 16 7 7 7 28 8 PJ FERt r CES IX 1 APPE DIX A SSL CC1mmcn1s lU SJ el u1 1l sis of · 1pon Systems ith St ik d•Pit W 1rhc u1s OUO lctt1 r 5 5 51i l 1 7 p PE 1 1X U Not usi d't 1 q -e FflCIAL U3E-eNt ¥ · 2 - I I I 4U7 1 7f set R2 ffPRb OFFICIAL use ONLY APPENDIX C AEC Policy on Research and Development Effort on Weapon Command Control Excerpt from SRO TWX 2126 61 201 APPENDIX D SNL Research Treatise The Aerospace Nuclear Safety Problem C R Carlson 3 t 65 203 APPENDIX E SNL Corwnents on Mechanical Sating W J Howard CRD Memo 3 10 67 Declassified 3 2 99 _ 21 t APPEN DlX F Not u3cd 213 -' PPENDIX G The Walske Letter 11Standards for Warhe id and Bomb Prcmalure Probability MC Paragraphs Car Walske OoD Chainnan MLC CNSl letter 3 14 68 Decl issified la1er 21 j APPENDIX H AEC Weapons Labor uories' Rcpre5encatives Paper '' Dual Judgment Roles in Safety Control and Security fNuclear Weapons M R Gustavson LLL W L Stevens SNL l2i7 5 217 APPENDIX I Press Release for the Report of the Panel on Nuclear Weapons Safety of the House Armed Services Committee The Drell Panel UNC report 12 90 - 227 APPENDIX J AEC Position on lhe Role of the AEC in Safety of Nuclear Weapon Systems letter 1 l 7 69 229 APPENDIX K Key Persons at Sandia National Lahoralories Involved in che Evolution of Nuclear Weapon Safety Security and Control S2C W L Stevens 231 APPENDIX L DOE Staff Position of Non-concurrence for Proposed Reorganization of the DOE's Weapons Safety Committee R D Hahn DP-64 1 4 94 24S APPENDIX M Compilation of Draft Working Papers on S C and Related Subjects W L S1evens 247 INDEX _ 175 DIS ffi IBUTIO 2S3 a a OFFICfAL USE ONLYI ifl 3 ·1 A 40 a 1111 ·s1 er OFFICIAL USE ONLY LIST OF FIGURES figure I Some Considerations Affecting Deployment of Nuclear Weapons in National Defense 20 Figure 2 Bomb Programs in Development Production and Stockpile 26 Figure 3 Warhead Programs in Development Production and Stockpile 27 Figwe 4 Historical Overview of Groups Considering Plutonium Weight limits 44 Figure 5 Swnmary of Early Development in NuclL-ar Weapon System Safety 1945-1975 46 Figure 6 Nucfoar Weapon System Sofcty Spccialists2t SNLA 1957-1963 55 Figure 7 Swnmary orAccidents Involving U S Nuclear Weapons 61 Figmc 8 Summary or Initial Rcsponsc s to Major Accidents and Incidents Involving Nuclear Wc ipons of the Sealed-Pit Type 63 Figure 9 Nuclear Weapon Adversary Simulation Use Control Specialists at SNLA 1961-1981 70 Figure l 0 Nuclear Weapon System Safety Specialists at SNLA 1965-1972 82 Figure 11 Nuclear Weapon Design Safety Specialists at SNLA 1968-85 92 Figure 12 Roles of Sandia Laboratories Nuclear Safety Specialists 97 Figw-e 13 Typical Electrical Insulation Material Organic Behavior in Oxygen-Free Environment 100 Figure 14 Result of a Simulated Electrical Faull that Damaged an Encapsulated Printed Circuit Board I02 Figure 15 Timeline Graphic for Prcibabilistk Risk Assessment al Sandia for Activities Other than Nuclear Fuel Cycle 104 Figme 16 Scvcrily-Llkelihood lndc x Rc -cntry Vehicle Weapon System Example 121 Figure 17 ERDA-DoD Stockpile Safety Studies CY75 Wld CY76 122 Figure IS Principal Study Participants Tr insfer Study 124 Figure 1911 Principal Study Participants Starbird Stutly Page l of2 134 Figure 19b Principal Study ParticipllJlls1 Starbird Study Page 2 of 2 135 Figure 20 Notnble Contributions for the DOE Nuclear Weapons Laboratories to the Annual Reports to the President on Nuclear Weapons Study 1976-1984 139 Figure 21 Time-Linc for Nuclear Weapon Accident and Search Team Activities 144 Figure 22 Principal Pnrtlcipants for the President's Blue Ribbon Task Group 155 Figure 13 Sandia National Laboratories Policy Statement for Weapon Nuclear Safely ' ssurancc 159 Figure 24 Principal Study Pllrticipants ' Moc Study 161 Figure 15 Timelinc ofSafcty-Rclalcd Evenls SRAM V V69 163 figure 26 Time-Linc for Evolution of the Annunl Rcp 1rt to the President on N'uckar 't apons Surety I 77 T 4 • • • 4 • • 5 · · · • • •• • • • • • • Fifi8h0als U' E i • t • l ¢ I$ • • • 4 • • · · - · OFFICIAL USE ONLY PREFACE The goal of this report is to captun in ao uncla uifi d manner some of the events and conditions that accoWlt in major pan for the ways that certain disciplines associated with the U S nuclear weapons progJDm arose The disciplines 3re three nuclear weapon and weapon system safety S Curity and USC CODtrol collecrively called S2C F ach discipline is defined in the lntraduc tiolf section oflhis report The focus is on the cultures thal existed at the rime so current observers can better understand origins and evolutions Particular anention is given to i xplwning why Sandia N11tional Laboratories did ccnaia things mostly to make particular technical choices the way they did when other options dthcr wm available or would seem to have been so This working paper is a livina document in that it is continually subject to revisions in order to reflect input from persons selected to review contents A record of these revisions will be kept in the SNL SW Cty Assessment Cenlcr The style of presentation is personal informal and condid citing specific contributions of WUDed persons A limited number of such persons arc identified as having been key to the success of Sandia's cffons in S2C and their contributions are summariud in biographical sketches asan appendix In the interests of timeliness and economy l h3vc made liberal use of extractions from other docwnents lbat 1 wrote while on-roll at Sandia or as a consultant hopefully with enough bridging pa agraphs to achieve reasonable coherence Originally I drafted this report for de dissemination within the nuclear weapons community as Official Use Only In the coime of n vicws l l J llled that the rather comprehensive level of detail called fot a higher security clossi6cation Accordingly 1he report exists in two versions a classified repon SAND99-l 803 and this pared down report For readers with appropria1e access I recommend the classified vezsion that contains more detail and the outcomes of certain contentious but classified events oz Cl QL tJee ONE I s ' ' · i u••·· x- T JdORI IJP kbOFFICIAL USE ONLY This page intcntion tlly left blank --eFFICIAL USE ONt VS Id · ·1 ' I rrr·rn• OFFIGIAI USE ONLY FOREWORD Cenain facts general beliefs and conV1c1ions guided the behavior of the Sandians who played major roles in this story • A Moral Egui vclent of War The nuclear w p 'ns program was seen as a moral cquivn1cnt ofwar1 to adapt President Lyndon Johnson's characteriz mon or the War on Poverty of the late-1960s Sandia's early leaders came mostly from military national defense contractor or Manhattan Projl 'CI service and knew well the urgency of national security They understood that lhc national policy was to substitute nuclear weapons systems for massive dcploym nts ofconvcntiona l forces long before this was apparent ro the public Their constant reminder was th Directive Schedule-a time schedule for delivery of nuclear weapons to the military scr 1ccs set by the Atomic Energy Commission and its successors This schedule e •as based on the Nuclear Weapon Stock-pile Memorandum a document prepared annually for personal approval by the President of the U S The Directh•c Schedule provided the essential link between Sandia's inti mal projects and its overriwng charge to render an exceptional scn ice in the IUlionaJ interest Ref I Frontispiece The delivery dates and rates were taken as absolute requirements and the record for meetin g them is Wlblemished to my lmowledge NOTE The record oflhe AECIERDA DOE in meeting U1e delivery date critical to the operational deployment of the applicable weapon system was challenged during one of the periodic reviews of roles i111d missions ofthal agency and the national tlcfcnse establishment Sandia's Roben L Bob Pcurifoy and Richard Dick N Brodie prepared a documented account that every slip in schedule was attributable to another agency This finding effectively ended a contcntiow situation that could have led to a change in basic responsibilities among the agencies Ref 92 Appendix C • Concinuitv of Effort The weapons R D portio 1 of the U S nuclear weapon program was funded and managed under auspices of th Joint Committee on Atomic Energy it a relatively const i nt in real doll and manpowcr le •el dunng the several decar es after the first moratorium on full-scale nuclear testing in 1958 This practice was more or les3 continuctl by succt ssor congressiomil and cxt -culjv ag ndes To most Sandians titis reinforced the 11otion that the task and tht -refore their lifetime careers were continunus There would he a Mark N I to follow th Mark N bomb or warhead that challeng d one now see Figures 2 and 3 Also you ·ould itill be on roll and be sought out sl ould stockpifo i perience cv ntually r• wc d a J si u •Jr pr duction flaw - none of y r arli r proJccts 11 wus jokingly said th 11 yau juj collllln't bu y your past mistakes deep enou h • Stewardship of the Stockpile Tite U S nuck ir Wt apons progrmn was born und re under concepts of ci 'ilian cw eody aml comrnl uf the n itio11al slockpil To most Sandians in ·oln d in rhe weapons mis ion this gcm ratcd a sense I trust md r spo uibility thai extended beyond the lby-to-d 1y rnsk of working cooperaii 'd ' with OFFICIAL USE 0NL¥ • r · 2 2 I ' 9i8R r 'FAR OFFICIAL USE ONLY the single ultimate customer the nalional defense establishment that consists of the military service s 1hat would actually deploy he weapons and the Department of Defense DoD agencies and offices that woul-i manage the overall national security posture Personnel assignments in the military and executive appointments in 1hc DoO tend to be relatively brief in tenure and high turnover is often the rule Stewardship WM enhanced by the career continuity provided in the civilian agencies • Challenges to Roles and Missions Roles and missions assignments in the U S nuclear 'l 'eapons progr im over the years may be characterized as somewhat ambiguous and impennanent While at any given time responsibilities might seem clear lhc interagency arrangements ould easily be challenged Wld changed for the tasks on the horizon when improved weaponry capabilities could be promised To most Sandians lhis mcanl roles and missions had to be earned in a competitive arena by demonstrating high performance on each task and continuing onto the next opportunity No role or mission codd be considered pennanenL • Ethos Reade interested in gaining an appreciation of the ethos of Sandia in l 985 are referred to the document Etl os Ref 172 This c cccllcnl work prepared by S mdia ·s on-roll historfan• Necah Funnan for the annu il F3II Management Conference contains sections on genesis evolution ethos lines of business image to outsiders differences among the J iboratories relationships with Bell Telephone Laboratories and destiny The document is a •ailable in the Sand_ia library • Tasks ofNational mportancc To my knowl dgc Sandia did not ha 'e an official statement of objectives until the 1980s I recall drafting one for Vice PresideRt I 000 Glenn A Fowler al his request in 1968 and I responded lo his coWJsd to produce th following To maintain advanced technological laboratories and programs which will continue to make important contributions to the nuclear weapons capability and the general welfare o th Unhell Stat s When faced with a decision as to whether or not lo pursue a prospective new R O initiati 'e the lirsl test for Sandia was thal it clearly mu t he of high national importance Certain considcrat1oru have evolved over the years to guide ex cution of the S C part of Sandia's roles and missions T it SC variously became polich s practices principles thcmc i threads ittributcs or the like r nd this report is most I • conccrn LI wi1h how lhey played in the rory The followmg listing is nol necessarily complete nor is il many particular meaningful order I I _£cialty '-luclcar weapons m con sidcrcd i-pecial rather lhan as an altcmalhc to conventional weaponry Vitncss th Amtcd l orcc s Special Weapons Project was the n tmc given successor lo the military·s group lh t succeeded a p 1rl of lhe W2 rtimc Manh illan Project The risks inherent in ht ir existence arc apart from the common _ fjj lbi'AE SSL C Iii i I I · j • a - OFFICIAL USE ONLY Attc mpcs lo compar them to other risks in hum i o experitnce are at best counterproductive For example although both nuckar weapons and civilian nuclear power n actors us certain ratlioaclivc materials the implications of a serious accident would seem to defy any mcaningiul comparison N venheless burenucrattc interests continuaJly h t 'c bc m tempted to institute such standards ·· 2 Standards for Achievement of S1C Goals Elcmcmts of nuclear weapon s c arc measun d qualitnti 'ely and quantit 1ti ·ely against an agreed-upon lhrcsholc l of acceptable risk of occunence of certain unintended events e g • accidents or loss of possession Such lhresbolds must he re iched before a weapon or weapon sy 'itc m can be deployed and aKfeemcnt as to that achie ement must cxrend to the Prcsidc nl of Liu United Slates Whereas wann feelings may be gencrntcd by char tcterization of risks by terms such as small but fi11it ·• ·•v3nishingly small or ' •irtually impossible the public must be c ucowaged to realize that risks c3nnot be zero and cannot c 'cr be really known 3 No Premium for Safer Given existence ofagrced-u1 on thresholds of acc ptable risk there should be no justifiable need 10 expend critical resources for c xcceJing lbc threshold Said mother way there should be no reward for promoting one design approach over another on the asscn1011 that one is safc r Instead bolh must reach the threshold and them competition can proceed on tht basis of other important considerations such as cost size weight etc i Conditions for S1C Assessments Within an agency luvmg responsibilities for S 1C assessments three conditions have proved to be ssential • • uns ·c -n-ing commitment uf agcnc ' managemen1 at all lc ·els a degree of indcpcm lcnce on the part of lhc staff performing and present mg the ass sment and • deep immersion of th 1t sraff in the sciences and technologies relevant Lu the cndcarnr nol just the assessmcnf mc1hollology Of these three conditioru lhe 1st n 1mcd is most imponant 5 S C is a Lim R• sponsibilitv This condititin m iy be sr lf-l vi ll nt from th ibo 'c ho C ' r a l t may help tc I llusrratc The dircclor of lhc labora tory not so m Ubordinatc i taff p rson sh uld present the s1 itcmcnls on atli quacy ofS C in naL1on 1l h · I rcnu ·n is i lone by mc-nns it d a Sj cc1tic tcst1monics aml r pons to th• Congn ss Jnd he c - 1 cuti i br u1d1 s o the fedcr il go ' mmcnt 0Ffl€1AL USE ON 6 3 · •· ' It · I 'l • ljlftl iJFRb OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1 Directness of Rcm diaJ r ction li Own•ng up to existence of deficiencies in S C that bc Come e 'ident upon rc ·iilw of new infonnation is an 1nribute to 1'e rewarded and pro iding remedial measures promptly and usually at ab orbed financial costS is expected This process CWl involve agency embarrassment but this must be done in an opi n way e g • it may he n ccs iary to redlint'' 3 we3pon type and thereby recommend standing down its deployment until retrofit h miware or other corrective measure is in place -OFFICIAL USE ONLY -1- ·1 1 ' • 1 · IIIRMViA r OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1 INTRODUCTION 1 1 Definitions The tenn Nuclear Wen ons Surety coined some fony years after the first nuclear weapons were l mployed to end World War 11 is of relatively recent ori n The elements of surety have been defined and emphasi zeo sequentially as national and world events causc d changes in the roles that nuclear weapons played Relinbility was the initial concern Since the amount of fissile m ncrial enriched uranium or plutonium metal available in the l 940s was sufficient to make only a few weapons each nuclear weapon would have to work properly in intended use war with high confidence Weapon designers at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory LASL adopted a goal that the probability of a weapon not producing the full yield for intended use should be less tht11t one in fifty thousand uses or in probability notation 2 in 100 000 or 2 c l o-i Th is low- dud rate at the time perhaps represented the extreme of technological capability and called for measures uncommon to weapon ordnance experience Designers turned to the practice of redundancy for the component parts of the weapon i e the use of duplicate components in ways that reduce the probability of system failure even if one of the two or more duplicates fails in use Redundancy was essential because some of the components used in the weapon's electrical subsystem wc re devices produced for ordinary commercial applications e g spring-powered clock timers from household ovens or for military applications e g tail-warning radar from bomber aircraft and bad relatively high•dud rates The practice of redundancy also extended to the nuclear subsystem of the weapons by making the electric detonators that began the compression process for implosion-type bombs have dual two connected in parallel bridgewircs By the early I950s the amount of fissile material available lo produce nuclear weapons was increasing and was projected to reach levels that would support a larger s1ockpile of nuclear weapons The question of il proper reliability goal was posed by LASL 's Director Norris Br ldbury in anticipation of this significant change in U S nuclear weapon posture BradbUJ ' teamed with the DoD's Chief Anncc l Forces Special v -·eapons Project Major General Kcnni th Nichols to assign the study to the existing joinl Wl apons R liability Commiuec Ref l Stuc ly participants included Dr ' orris Brddbury Dr Hendrik Bode DirectorofMathcmatics at Bell Telephone L iboratories BTLJ and a national pioneer m the disciplim that later became Svstems An ilvsis an i Dr Walter A MacNair Vice Prcsidenl for Systems Research at Sandia fom1erly al BTL as Chairm m Findings declared that nuclear weapons indt ed har i ' special d aracter in compmisvr to con cntion i l Wt apons especially t h it nuclear weapons had a fumlamcnt tl ono un woid ibk compli xit • and l rclfabili1y nOl subject w ' ritic mion short of use in war Th new rejability goal was dctcrmin c l u bl' l in I00 Itr per Wl apon•ust -a rcducrio11 of several orders of magnitude lhal woulti t r atly simp liiy certain ar tS of weapon design and producuon -0FFICIAL USE ONLY 1 r i• · 1 15 ea a11 rnr · OFFICIAL USE ONLY The Weapons Reliability Committee's report had several impacts that led to certain management practices for 1cliability and the subsequent ekmt nts of surety • Reviews by hi gh-le •el authorities in both the civilian and the military agencie5 of the national nuclear weapons community are needed as significant changes in policy practice tccbnolcgic and other events occur This report describes the series of such reviews that hsve been conducted over the years some under presidential auspices • Technological disciplines may be needed to handle tha concerns derived from surety consideratioas In 1951 Sandia began to create and sustain a reliabHity-assessment specialization concentrated in a single organizltmmll entiry configured to have a measure of independence from line organizations 0 For this report the notion of probability of occurrence of a specific unwanted event serves to define all elements of surety although the goal is nol always defined in quantitative terms Tims • Reliability the probability of success in intended use of a nuclear weapon • Delivery Crew Safe i' was the next concern to develop as the size and variety of the stockpile grew The concern was the safoty freedom from hann of the crew ifter release of a bomb from the delivery bomber aircraft uuring the traject ry to the target the bomb's status changes from a ready-to-release condition wherein a series of arming component i is still in place to interrupt the sources of eliectrical power from the bomb's fuzing and fixing components At and a Iler intended release one-after-another of the series elements becomes armed able to pass dectrical signals awaiting a signal from the fuzing components to detonate the weapon lfthe detonation were to occur prematurely at a position above the target the bomb's bh1 s1 or nuclear radiation effects could destroy or seriously disable the aircr ift--u crew safety concern • The mathematical and statistical techniques developed by Sandia were applicable to crew safety cakulations and a quDJ1titative probability goal evolved for th agencie3 of the military services that wrote the requirements documents given to weapon designers Later it was rccognitl d that tht crew safety ciiterion applied in concept to the risk o i a premature nuckar detonation on other friendly forces a Oare dud in the sense that it missed th tar3ct t • frcrn nure Dcton ttion lhc probability of a premature dc tonalton in inlcndcd use of nurir r w 111nn m h rhat the n·1mltanr tfor-1 di ihl lhe ddi •t ry system nr nlhcr fnenrily force 1- rivcn th occurrence of intentiona l relcasc-to-th -targct • The 1 omin 11 quantitati ·e goal became I prem 1turc dc tor alion pi r 1 0 10 releases o I0·· • For some spt cial situations the goal b1 -cam 10-J 1 -OFFICIAL USE ONl V- 3111n•rr1EB OFFICIAL USE ONLY • Nuclear Detonation Safety was the nexl concern to arise with the essentially concurrent events ofintroduction of a fu ndmm lltally different weopon design and ofdeployments of nuclear weapon systems from sites in the Continental U S and afloat to forward bases in European and Pacific Theaters Until the advent of the sealed-pit type ofimplosion nucl ar weapon in the mid-1950s nuclear detonation safety in pea cctime was not a consideration The fissile material was controlled by containing it in a capsul that could be placed in iide a hollow pit or projectile target assembHes thus keeping it separated from the rest of the nuclear weapon ordnance hardware This control was absolute not probabilistic for all conceivable situations e tccpt deliberate unauthorized human actions E ·cn the latter required the military to somehow obtain the fissile material 3 Ssembly from the civilian Atomic Energy Commission agcnl holding its custody in a coloc ited facility The fissile material assembly was to be insencd into the weapon only in preparation for war actually in the bomb bay of the dehvery aircraft Some later weapon designs bad a n in-flight insenion mechanism able to insert fissile material in a subcritical asscrr bly into the pit using mechanically driven screws The physical separation c •en in this high-readiness configuration provided a high degree but not absolute degree of safety As the pit assemblies came to contain more-and-more fissile material to meet military requirements for high yields the margin of safety decreased With the sealed-pit type of design that W3S attractive mainly because of a significant improvement in efficient use of fissile material the fissile material was sealed inside a 5hell of high explosive during the weapon production process The probability that this assembly ould produce a nuclear detonation spontaneously or as the result of a credible physical insult such as in a severe accident sitcation became the controlling factor As is treated later this probability was set at a threshold of acceptable risk of one nuclear detonation in one million per exposure I in 1 000 000 or l O- The definition of an acceptable detonation was one in which the contribution of the lissile matenal reacbon to the total yield would not exceed four pounds TNf · equi ·alcnt The weapon clcclrical system was designed to have a probabilistic goal commensurate with that provided· for the sealed-pit assembly OTE In 1974 jn conjunction with the controversies of the Fowler letter page 115 James Jim D Appd wrott a historical re iew of numerical nuclc ar dctonat1on ssfcty requirements spccilicd by the OoD in Military Characteristics documen1s for the earliest sealed-pit w apons 1he rl quircm nts were in the range of I in 20 000 lo I in 100 000 Ref 176 Thus definition were N cl ir Deton nfoti Saf tv 1952-l %Si the thrcshohl probability of occurrcm c of a nuclear l ton uion due lo spo111aneous or acddent ii cau ics S1 curity w s a oncem from the bc ginr inf of and throughout he U S nuclear weapons pros rnm and we focus here on physical security ·OFFICIAL USE OMtV - SiiGhE IJFR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Security lnfonnation - the probability of loss of critical design or operational use information such as to endanger national defense capability Security Physical - the probability ofloss of physical possession of a nuclear weapon to entities that could endanger national defense capability Use Control became a serious concern in the late-1950s when the realities of forward dep loymcnt of U S nuclear weapons to non-U S NATO nations came to be appreciated to contain new clements of risk of deliberate unauthorfacd use Control of the risk of such use has been considered to be threat-dependent and is treated by threat scenarios that cannot meaningfully he defined probabilistically Conceptu Jlly however Use Contra I the probability of an adversary entlty being able to produce a nuclear detonarion given failure of physical security measures Plutonium dispersal safety was a conccm upon the ad •ent of the sealed-pit design since detonation of the weapons high-explosives subsystem would aerosolize and disptrse plutonium oxide in a respirable form known to be capable of producing cancer in tho5c persons inhaling panicles of small aerodynamic size Plutonium Dispersal Safety - the probability of 11 high-explosive detonation of a nuclear we ipon of the sealed-pit type caused by an accident such that the resultant plutonium oxide particles cun be inhalc d by persons in the vicinity and downwind This issue came to public attention after the nuclear weapon accidents at Palomares Spain in 1966 and at Thule Greenland in 1968 This type of safety became an issue attendant to lhe debates on the planned deployment anlib dlistic missil ABM systen1s near maJor cities of the late 1960s Safety Security 311d Use Control sic rcfors to the process of managing the three areas of risk with Control meaning ·use Control is that tcnn is treated here s c to my Jcr owlcdgc was coined to describe 311 area of narional-levcl responsibility that is both joint and shared by two igencies the AECiERDA DOE and the DoD The first packaging of these three disciplines probably was in December 1975 in an essay that Man· Gustavson of LLL and I co-authored upon commission from the ERDAIDoD •·1ransfcr Study '' 1111 unclassified essay Dm1 Jm mc r Roles S ift tJ' Co11trol mtd s cmi J• of 1 Nuclenr IV apo11 s 1s lrcalt d in context lah r in thi$ piper The S C' high-level manng ment is ue was rc 'isitcll luring the Starbfrd StudJ-·•· comln te l by DOE DoD in 1980 Thi study led 10 a m ommcml ilim1 lQ cstablh h a DOE 'O oD ovcrsignt comniittee for S C That diJn 't happen but tht DOE DMA did stablish Wl intra-DOE s c Committee in 1983 In 987 the rok ofhighlcvd oversights ofS C was as igm J to the DOl 1DoD Nuclear Ve ipon Council created by public lilw JS ----- - - T 111 J liidi P J ll iiliifft£ OFFICIAL use ONLY Surety This tcnn has been a loptcd by lhe DOE since 19S4 when the 1i1le of the - nnual Rcp rt lo lhc Prcsidc nt on Nuch ar Weapon Sat i 1y wus changtd to rcplJce Satc ty with Surety To my knowledge Surety was first mentioned by Colond Vince De8oss1er of lhe U S Army Nucl 3J' 3nd Chemical Agency whtn he led 1he extension of the role of a p of the ' nny's original nuclear weapon agency from nuclear weapon system safety u term defined later to include appraisal of cenain opcration31 considc rations relevant to d loymcnt of nuclear wc ap1 ms in Europe Later the term was appropriated by DOE AL to cover its involvement in both DoD DOE and intr 1-DOE system safety studies lcxt Sandia appropriated the tcnn when Al N uath in 1991 gave the title Surety Assessment Center to the din ctoratc-lc 'd organization created under Dick Schwoebel Then Surety c301e 10 mean four of Che disciplines under Schwoebcl namely s c plus Relfability This report considers S1C not Surety Reliability is not ca1cgorically ignored however anc l is brought in as necessary to properly covtr rut S1C consider3tion The definitions of terms contained above apply except that focus is on the positive measures taken to avoid tbc unwanted events instead of focus on probabilities 1 2 Tradeoffs of S2C With Other Weapon System Considerations-A Perspective Figure 1 lislS 14 considerations 1hat arc taken into account and halanc -J in order for nuclear weapon systems to be capable of filling 3 basic role in national defens The considerations an displayed in a two-by-two matrix llut differentiates bcrwc n emphasis in pcacclimc and in wartime use and also whctber the thrust of the effon needed is 10 seek improvement or lo seek rec luclion S C is a peacetime emphasis on improvement to maximum lcv ls consistent with achieving acceptable levels of perfonn mce in 1hc remaining t l considerations This formulation for nuclear w apons differs from ones that could he constructed for conventional weapons where for c xamplt effectiveness at low cost of pmcuremenl of h mlware could be m11 ximized Nuclear weapons arc indt ed special because of their potential benefit to national security and their potential for detriment OFFICIAL USE 6Nt ¥ •• Ji 8 •• OFFIGIAL USE ONLY EMPHASIS IN PEACETIME T H R u s To Improve Safety Security Control Over Unauthorized Use IN WARTIME ' T Deliverable Effectiveness Swvivability Flexibility Battle Management I 0 F To E Reduce Mainten mce Logistical Movements Training Required Reaction Time Operational Constraints Collateral Damage F F 0 R T Source Briefing materials used by Rohen L Peurifoy Jr Vice President SNL Figure 1 Some Considerations Affecting Deplofmer1t of Nuclaar Weapons in N3tio al Defense o Pi rAfiase eRt'P zg 1 J I t B ' i - a ·sesr111r OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2 THE EARLY YEARS 1945-1960 2 1 S 2 C for First Generation Capsule-Pit Nuclear Weapons 1945-1956 A basic reference for this discussion is my paper entitled ' Early Emhmon ofth Nuclear Weapons Safety Program Ref 2 2 2 The World War II Bombs Lfttle Boy Fat Man 83 and B4 1945-1952 Initial in1eractions and negotiation s among lhc newly created go ·emmental agencies responsible for nuclc11r weapons- hc Atomic Energy Commission fanned in 1946 and the Depaitment of Defense formed in 1947-wcrc strongly influenced by the design features of the wc opons TI1ese subjects are treated in ippropriatc delail in Necllh Furman's Sandia National Laboratories The Postwar Decade Ref 1 and arc discussed here briefly to provide a conre t for later events 2 3 Safety of the High Explosive Nuclear Subsystem 1945-1954 A fundamental assumption in nuclear weapon AAfety is that 3n accidental dcton3tion of the weapon's chemical high explosive HE will ori i inate al a singli location point in che HE There is a non-ztro probability howc 'cr imall that the dc1onation could l' ccur at rnort than one point but it has been agreed among skilled d sign specialists that Ibis probability is so small th u it can be disregarded The original U S nuclear weapons-Fat Mao and Linlc Boy Jchic 'cd 53fcty of the nuclear systt m by the principle of keeping lhc nuclear componems cores or capsules' s parated from the ordnance p nts witil final is cmbly for a strike mission Only nflcr final assembly w 1s nuclear safety a concern For th gun-assembltd type of wapon Little Roy Hiroshima there was no HE 1nste3d a propellant charge was in iti itcd to c m c 3sscmhlr o the nuclear components Thus onc-poini sarcry was not at issue For the lirst t S nuclear weapon tll hen fit trom postv ·ar de$ign improvements Mk 4 which entered stockpile m 1949 nucli ar safoty i s a k-sign goal This was accomplished by using a mcch inically insentd nuclear component Cntil then the ' ore was stored ma safe Ji tance 3 'JY from th HE sphere Fin31 a i st mbly was ac 1 omphshed in i•lc th bomb h if after t lkcoff-- u1 opcrat Jn requinn ° 1h ut JO minut l L i tcr cakul 1uo1N by I os Alamos sh w i -J that ome - r 11 c l i po11 i Mrhis type indc l w rc 1101 i m1 -pc 1in1 Sjfe in thaf tl c prob thilit t1f a nuck r idd --OFFICIAL--HSE ONL V5 I 1 I 7I I I I7a - · I Nl• iiut Ill OFFICIAL USE ONLY i_d ·cn a one-point detonation of rhe homb's Ii£ would have b1 t 1l considerably higher lhan al low tb c 1od iy 1 For the next several weapon Jevclopmcnt progr an1s use - of the Jcsign principlt of separation was continued but with more and more automation of the capsule-insertion function By the midI 9S0s national security needs such as higher nuclear yields with the limited supply of sped31 nuclear materials less strike preparation time etc affcctl d a signi lic mt change in bomb design The amount of special nucle ir m3tcrinl and its proximity of it to the large HE sphere precluded 11 Jetem1ination that lhc weapon would be one•plllnt safe in accident situ3nons Accordingly the Los Alamos designers used a mechanical sating schemi to pre 'CRt rh we apon from becoming supercritic al in accidental detonations The scheme was ro pl ice inert material inside the pit JS the we3pon was built and co allow i s removal only in the bomb bay after rakcoff But the g encral U S Jesign practice for th early 1950s was to achic 'c onc-pomt safety inher -ently m rhc ck•sign rather than by mechanical sating Nuclear weapons of the early 19S0s used wet-cell elcctrochemic il stora_gc batteries located insid the weapon to provide lhe energy needed to fire tile detonators Early versions of the batteries had to be charged·' from an external source of electrical power w1d after instnllation inside the weapon had a useful life of less lh m one month In tact charge-time an l charged-life limited the capability nf lhc nuclear weapons a II other preparatory operations r1 ' 4uirc d less time and were ffcctivc longer This resultant rel3tivcly low state of operational n adincss was quite acccptJblc to the milit iry services responsible for delh·er ' 1u the beget because warning times bc forc l-nemy strike were believed to be much longer Since the batteries were not installed inside the wcapt1n until the weapon system was being prepared for a strike mission 1hc rc was no such concern as peacetime nuclear safety for the weapon's electrical system Wnrtimc nuclear safety was seen as a responsibility of the military service rhal prepared the wenpon for a strike mission and dcployeJ the weapon system to lhc target I was a nuclear w -rh id electrical system specialist in the U S Anny in 1952•53 ind observed an cven1 that perhaps w is the fust nuclear weapon safety incident 1111 ordnance buualion im·o vcd 'as the first fonnl d to l receive a nuclear warhe - d fr •ru the lorage site facilities to be discussed later 2 prepare at for a m1s 1on md tr msfer it' ro thel pcrali nJI artillery unit and 3 pc -rfom1 the linJI arming opcr i1ions l •f 1r s ning the m1cl ar apsufo anc 1 rcpladng the green SAFE plug ·11h the red AR r lug The la st ViJS my task lS the forward l l'i3cmbly officer Thi sc plug i ClUT 'ovcr from the World 'y II hombs imi rrupt l i c 1 11v rtcd the cir- uits bc twccn ti battcric - iml the arming anJ finng subsystem both th- posi i ·c and 11 gath· ground lines fh • - o i d lW- l rrc -i J p 1p t w -mcn h 1 1 - r-lon _ u i m il 1u h r11 m 1111 ·•rmnt s if r R t 11 •· I • • rn · H 1ih l••• - l i n • ' ' 111 1 1 11 i Jl 11Jt 1 o r d P 1 I f R t 0 - 1lh -•mput t mem •n J ' 1 1 11 ' • •i tli rir ·- • J t • ' '•' b· J ' c lr C Hiv• l Jn 1 np r s - c- i · - • · i l 1'1 t lr o 1t ' h J 1 r • i •r r 1- u e i · - rr d -n 1 r - - 11c 111r 11 i Jn • nr q•JJt - •n 11 ft• t· t n•p · r p ab l i · • • re c · 1 I l•I un 1·Jt• ·•· · w OFFIG AL USE--6-NLY 14·q3 IIIU IC iJl E i I I CS OFFICIAL USE ONLY The warhead preparation process required e tensive component assembly and tcstfog by the highly trained milita y crews ind the finill operation required an elecaical test after the elecnic detonators had been installed on the high-explosive sphere-a reli ibility test to assume that all i onm ctions had been made In training the we ipnn prototype trainer had inert detonators and HE sphere For training common practice was for the instructors to devise and wire in fiendishly clever circuit faults that would have to be dfagnosed and corrected by the assembly techniciilJlS Both instructors and technicians tended to be college gr iduates in engineering and these 0 games reached high le ·els of challenge During o simula1ed final test a technici m reacted lo an abnormal tester indication that he knew meant premature availability ofbattel' 1 power He would remove the ARM plug to regain 5afcty The detonator bridgewires fired Had this event occurred in a real operation the result would have been an explosion ofhumlrcds of pounds of high explosive and certain deaths of the crew and other occupants of the igloo The incident reporting procedure involved a cadre of enraged military officers descending on Sandia·s Project Group Division Supervisor Ray Schultz The technfoaJ lead for the ctdre wos Lieutenant Earle C Williams who several years later would join Sandia as project enginter for lhe W40 I tlon't knuw whati if any measures that Sandia designers took then to identify and correct classical sneak circuits such as this one caused by unanticipated breaking removal of the voltage biasing a vacuum tube in a firing circuit NOTE About two decades later another serious incident of unanticipated type of error resulted in partial amting of a War Reserve weapon During a special tesling procedure to detect occurrence of a reliability problem caused by distonion of soft contact pins on electrical connectors within the weapon voltage was unintentionally applied to arming circuits This was the result of the test opcrJ lor performing certain cable coMections in an unprescribed sequence One of Lhe Sandia engineers involve-0 Stanley D Spray would • -ividly recount this lesson learned through ut his subsequent three decades of dedicat nuclear safety work at Sandia 2 4 AEC DoD Responsibilities Controversies By 1952 the questi Jn of how r sponsibilitics for the development production anti stockpiling of nucle 1r w pons should he divided among lhc AEC an l the DoDr vfilita y Services had become sutlicicnt 1 contentiou o impede progress and high-ic ·cl negutiutions were under way Ref I coi tains c nefully reseMchcd Jcctions describing the role of Sandi3 President Donald A Quarks in preserving the AEC- design responsibilities for all of the nucle ir weapon electrical syst m and r irrs of 1hc arming furing md tiring system That story pa c j30 to 553 is ba cd on two 1 apers Refs 3 1nd • 1hat I wrote about a y ir b fon my n tircmcnt 1 kcisi• n 1985 in upport of he S india History Project In my view Don Q 1 irlc ' per onal '1t c p in ights nnd skills in e pressing his co1wict1on lilt rally saved Sandia M td lie not pre aikd AEC wi opon rc -sponsibility - uid hnvc been limited to the ·• 1 clcar System '' lklim d as follows OIFICIAL USE ONLY eee 1Ui1YFlil OFFICIAL USE ONLY 0 comprised of the fission and or fusion material together with those components required to convc rt lbc system from the safe condition to an explosion This definition specifically excludes the fuzing system of the weapon ••• Presumably Los AJamos Scientific Laborarory·s role in nuclear subsystems would have been unchanged and S llldia's role would h ive been limited to the warhci ad firing subsystem Sandia however would no longer be responsible for the anning and fuzing subsystem and the mechanical features that house these subsystems e g the ballistic case In lb context of the times safety was seen is a wartime concern because the nuclear components were not to be installed in peacetime The notion of·-safing JS used today as a function of the weapon electrical subsystem was yet lo be developed Thus the first two controlling docwncnts mthe U S nuclear weapons program aflerthc AEC Act of 1946 did nol address s c and they have been continued essentially wichanged to the prcsenL Agreement Between the AEC and DoD for the De 'elopment Production and Stmdardization of Atomic Weapons '' 21 January 1953 Ref 4 Missile and Rocket Responsibilities · Memo Chairman AEC to Chainnan Military liaison Commiucc 22 January l 953 Ref 3 This e perience illustrates an Enduring Theme for S 1C namely that 1he allotment of responsibilities for nuclear weapons matters between the design and production agencies involved is likely to be a contentious process that might recur and might have to be resolved on a case-by-base basis Don Quarles' role in nuclear safety in 1957 events is described later 2 5 Safety of the Electrical Subsystem 1945-1952 Beginning with the Fal Man nuclear bomb design of World War lI the safety of the electrical system ofimplosion-type nuclear weapons has been obtained by a design principle fundamentaUy t li ffcrcat from those drawn from the body of experience for conventional HE ve 1pons In general conventional bombs and warheads have used a positive interruption in the initiation-to-explosion sequence of events analogous in plumbing for a water line uot to connect two m iteahlc pieces of pipe until flow is wanted In general nuclear weapons have used a positive in crmption in the electrical power source-tu-iniliation sequl nce i e in the w apon cl ttical system WES in the Sandia ·em 1cufar analogous tc a blocking valve in a water line This departure from precedent occurred as a resull nfthe WWll decision al Lc s Alamos lo pnrsuc l lcctrimtl initiation schemes rather than mechanical deto11 aing fuse s hcmes The r chnology th i t emerged a lied cxplosiv briugr wiic EF3W llctonators remained classified fo1 many years impeding somewhat a more broadly based appreciation of the alternative design principle of elecrrical system s ifety_J In foci the U S Na ·y·s safety communities insistc d until 'fhu u S 1nd11 the nuclear nfi ty tcc hmc it spc 1 ih 1t1on i i pnm ml · in 'olvcd -c le uic al ngtne' rmg Ji c1 111r 1 1l•J Ir 1he nude ir po cr rntlu lry wlwr - prc ure ve- rl- ·ahes p1pm c tc l d to m· h· m1 nt- nr' 24 -OFACtAt -tJSE-ON tY 9£1 lti iii RS OFFIGIAL USE ONLY relati 'ely recently that nuclear weapons for Navy deployment have a phy 1c 11ly removable component that the local commander could hold until intc -ndcd use of the weapon The penally to readiness of the weapon system resulling from the mechanical 3Ct ofrtpl xcment later became intolerable for the t1eet billlisric missile warheads 2 6 Safety of the Second Generation Electrical Subsystem 1954-1956 - Zuclcar we ipon development programs at Sandia ha ·e been 311d are managed by small organizations of engineers and lechnicians fonned especially for that pantcular effon called weupon project groups Project groups arc assigned overall responsibility for program execution and in the cnrly years the degree of autonomy was essentially absolute 'The devclopmcnl work toad virtually exploded in 1950 driven in large part by demand for the weapons using 1hc smaller mort efficient nuclear physics designs of Los Alamos bolh in bombs Figure and warheads for missiles rockets figure 3 With this expansion the number of projec1 groups proliferated with the potential for e ·ery project using its individual preference in choosing iln electrical syslcm design Inability to acquire new technical staff rapidly was a limiting factor and the resultant scarcity or on-roll electric3t specialists in part led to furmul ition in Apnl 12 1952 of Sandia's Ek-ctrkal Systems Coordinating Group ESCO Ovc r ils four-year existence the ESCG was influential in evolution of the phHosophical and technical bases for early nuclear weapon lcsign safety The membership w is comprisal of the supervisors of the electric il syslcms project groups in the two directorates responsible for weapons development-ranging from lour to se'-·cn groups over 1he yc 3Is Three persons had essenti llly continuous mcmbmhip and each scn·cd as chainnan Donald Don R Coner Joseph Joe J Dawson and Leon D Smi1h The original charter was ••coordination of the mutual interest phases of various fuzing programs now under way tu prcnmt duplkation of effort and ro provide designs that are compatible to as many programs as possible Fidds of activi1y were ' l Serve as i clearing house for infonuauon on the ·anous componi nl J cvclopmcnt pmt rrams currently under way •· I Study and comment on new fwjng proposals J Stri c for a commvn fuzing system including test c 1uipmcnt many weapons is possibl - -t Esr 1hlish standard ck igns for commonly uscJ compon ncs For l Xamph a staml 1rJ Sl' 't r frd 1y t -p s of suilabk chara t ri t1i s r- uM he appro ·cd so that any new jum uon b l Xdesign coulJ s kcl from this gr up ii Jr ii rd 1 rcqmrcmcn s Thus procurcm nt and d • ·elopmc nt t imi wou Id b s 'cJ th t f O i l r t •lui to lht th •f 5 1i ci ally ksign d asscmhhi - 1 lany simtlar - nph s Jl be -ired me h ink 1 or n i lc r l n 1111 1 rm l11n 1nJ 11ll 1be I It· t · I flu w 1• l - -1 m · mu pro cdurt-s for iymli int for S 1n• 1 1 1 m•r r 1 11-1 1 111 11 tr _' ' • Figure 2 Bomb Programs In Development Production and Stockpile 0 •J If •t 41 U •f M et U U •• e h 11 H n C Cb 1 en 0 Q 11 n 0 l Ii d rn z i·c t8iil ·• 1J •r H H uLuLulrnlmhulmLulrnhul111lml111l111l11d 11l111li11lml111l111l111l111l111l111lmli11l111liulmlm111l111l111h1ilutlwh11l111l11 l111l111lmlm 111l111l111'1 80111h 1 0gr lffl Bl l'01 owtc1 BV Mal- '1ufflblr lNI l Hcrlpll•t - ------- L• 111na F iio i Aflef A 0 1h Br M iltcallon Number 1 J t9 ff U ••i H 1•0 '· •tc J No OHi ll'tuenl lrnpUK Ho Major 11' Cllllllul «u Closed 1 1 LIIIH ltMIICllt Dntlopmem ' ' ' fl11 Cl lhll A ti- lndlcatea ProV••m SU1f11nlkln 01 C•nctU llon ltp CJI Thi• Affl tf lnGlcn•• RHu pllon ol 0 tlnpffl• nl Solid Lino ndlc n PI04ucli0n and S1ocllplle ProdoK lotl • -· - - ·-·- • i • ' ' 't t f row 11011 __ _ _ __ aHIIL_Jo---- Lf51tn4 II Oe-tcrlplfve Ulle 1 SADM • Ill Alotnk Oemflhllou Mllnllion ······ ··· · - • · - · • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • - • • • • • unit Uc EC• Etr 119c111C7 Clp hillr ' • • • •• • ••• • • ' • • ••••• •• - _ •-•---• - LU • _ • • • • • • • - · • •• • - • • • • • • • • • • • • • -•• · • c - FM •F•lldJr - I ··· t-••-- Ell • Ea emll Carriaga II' • lncc 1111 Cott llC -• r- • _ ' - - - - - Hi _ Attl•rdtd lnjecto y tf111U I C•tt aa• f'I • Fu 1 inf pe on fnMmal C••NQI fll r··· ····· · ea -- ' j' 0 1 ______ t ----- - • • • ·1 ' r - - - - L---- - fl a'1j t • - IK 3 t IUI • 1 t 1 • • 1 _ t • 1 t ••• t -· en • 0 I l H l _ 1·U-U --• g Q ICU - - - •• •• J aH 1 - - _ a LJ -- · •· 1111 i Q ' it•• • w -6 --• ' •tt I eJ I ·- - · - i - - •· • - • • __ _- - • • • • • • _ _ t O• I lourn UHC ••-·•ow - Pm11 amM1r • 1-Datu An111 111u1 DI UI • - W R Re ·noldt Ind oi 111butum lllllDJV- Clllt ffld Mote 0 1 111 111'1 BU BIi and 811 l'rO f-• from IHL 2100 S 111 J tMI - - - - · 11111111111111 II I1111111111p1111111111pn 111 ll'l m1m1mfl lmp1r1111p111 1111111111111111111m111qm 1m1mr11111 n11 npnrnpnp 111111111' I' lljl 111 IIIF lllfffijfll '' o n 1 n H ti 1 •• H u 11 11 n n ff et H at •• o r aas cr f PR» ·OFFICIAL USE ONLY GI I li C' If h 1 u 11 iJ 1Jl11 l 11 -g lj h j I jj I ti r H1U iiU I ii i J f - - ti f a iii r JI • i 0 ' ' ' V M Figure 3 Warhead Programs in Development Production and Stockpile -OFFICIAl --USE-ONt -Y- _ - - 911iltlii kb OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5 Make recommendations to component d ·elopmcnt grou11s on lhc needs of the ·arious w apon programs and cst iblish basic characteristics of comp1 nc nts where us d by several weapon pro '1'3ms ·• Source of quotations Minutes I Meeting of ESCG -1 l 11 2 Ref 2 of Re 2 Over ill first 2-1 J years thi ESCO gradually digressed from its systems goal into becoming a clearing house of nut and bolt problems Jlld a refonn was instituted on 8 14154 to return to cn ss fertilization of ideas and the dissemination of infonnation 0 During delivery to the target wartime nuclear safety was obtained rrincip31Jy by a S itch thJt held open the electrical circuits betw n the batteries a 1d the sevaal components comprising the weapon's amung fuzing and firing subsystem This switch c illcd a Ready Safe or Ann Safe switch was an electromechaniC3l device whereby the application of 28 volts DC roan electnc motor caused sets of electrical contacts to be dosed or opened The cquipmen1 that provided the electrical power from the delivery aircraft or missile rocket to lhc nuclear we3pon became known as Aircraft Monitor and Control AMAC and responsibility for its procurement was assigned to the cognizant military sCJVice mis arrangement W35 to become another of the highly contentious AEC DoD interfaces o ·cr the years and would hea 'il ' impact nuclear safety In Scptcmhcr 1954 the first of 3 new gcncrJlion of w pon electrical systems BS committeJ to dc ·clopmcnt i e use of thermal hanc ry plckages 10 supply both low- oJtngc 28 VDC and high-voh ige 2500 'DC the lower -olt ige for armjng and fuzing anJ the higher for charging the x-unit Thermal batteries arc csscnt1 illy inen until initiated by in electrical pulse at which time heal is produced and dry chemical compounds re- ict to produce voltage Preparation lime is inst intancous and shelf life is tmlimitcd This S 1ndia-sponsored development was a fac1or in creation of a family of woodcn bombs o n tme d because they in concept could be treab d with almost no special care as though lhcy were a piece of wood TI11 nnal bath ries were lhen being consitlcrcd for weapons hJving either the inscrtablc capsule type of HE nuclcJr subsys1cm or the proposed new type of implosion dcsiin fo· ituring the scaled pit wherein the special nuclear m ucrial JS integral with the l lE subsyst m The earliest ipplicaticn was for a retrofit C l a capsule-type bomb B 15-2 first producU•ln 3 57 and the s cond was for the first scaled-pH warhead _W 25-0 first production l 57 An Emergency Capability'' ·crsion of the W25-IJ w 1s product i 12 56 but ii did nnt ha 'e he tull omph m nl of electrical sys11 m compllnents With the advt nt of wooden homhs the r m1 'Safc Switch lvok on add ·d importJncc to safety sine tlw pi acetimc configuration then hJd d1 d 1rical power sou1cc thermal batteries instalkd These switches becam S 111di 1' i lifsl nudc lr safoty compon nts however their mtpl1rta11c as Uch was m 1 it om cci ·uimi1 - d uppreciatcd or supportctl hy Sandia m ir agement-JS illt1stt-aled by rhc- fr I h Wili qii odc n tr J 1 I I I Olson an • kctrn I ub · Li m sign tr gmecr fnr the I X-1 ' ' ·'f X-39 proJ •c t i 1' Hlp in I l5-t r tll i that l is omp nc it t c l1 ' h- 'ol1agc arm -le switch w 15 r ' peti 'n rn d • ·cli plll 'n -li lr-proJ1 Jcti •n pn bk n i1 1 l h d hl cnm he c-m c tt 11cm that threaiencd S rn h 1· 0 FF letAt -1 J SE ONLY i I -I • SifJAliff I -OFFICIAL USE ONLY ability to mcc t schedules Del was callc -d bl forc a program re iew session ch3ircd by Vice President o vclopmcnt Robert E Bob Poole Bell Tc lq hone Labor 11ories ·ctcran who had bec n Sandia ·stop manager for 'r apons progr- ims since 1945 Bob Poole w is not sympathc llc to the need to solve lhe technical problem if that would jeopardize meetang the schedule and made cl ar to Del Olson that schedule slir 1 age was w1acceptable Saic l 3Ilothcr way it wauld be acceptable to trade some degradation in safety for schedule So much for rop management's initial commitment to nuclear safety Del aud his colleagues wc re able to correct the deficiency in time to allow schedules to be met Advent of the s aled-pit d ign emphasizccJ rhc emergence of a nuclear weapon electrical system safoty discipline since the w pon then contained all 1f U'IC' lc mcnts nc dc d for detonation at all tim'--s during operational stockpiled life No long T could one clearly diffc rcntiatc between a peacetime and a wanimc weapon configura1ion During 1955 a nuclear safety philosophy c ·olvcd through successive discussions by the ESCO principally l d by division supcrvis rs Don Cotter TX-28 and Lee lfollingswonh TX-15 TX-39 Don Cotter appears to have originati d the requirement for a trajectory sensing switch that would sense lhat a weapon was in its intcndt d delivcry-to tbe-to rget mode and close allowing the elcccrical power from the low lllt igc thennal bat1eries to advance toward initiating the high- ·ollage thermal batteries Don Coner favored use of both a low- -oltage and a high-voltag arm safe switch--the funner being driven hy the 3ircraft 's AMAC wherCilS Lee Hollingsworth opted for only the low-voltage ready safe switch The discussions however resulted in a standoff ind both of the approaches were implemcntt -d in the stockpile The difforenccs in philosophy l ucr prov d to be imponant St c The Goldsboro Accident 1961 lo folio ' For this discussion it is imponant lo note in rclJospcct lhal the ESCG urangcmcnt did not l-lfO ide for my meaningful degree of independence of view on the part of those analyses considerins questions of nuclear sa l l ' Indeed both Don Cotter and Lee Hollingsworth were project group lc3dcrs responsible for weapon developments They reponed to different managers it the next le ·el of supervision department manager and their Jivisions 'ere in different direcrorates 2 7 Security and Use Control in the Early 1950s Th infonnation prt'tection asp -et of secuncy e g clearances and cl3ssilication dominatcu au mion of the AEC's Dir tor of Secunty one of nine Jh·is ons in AEC Hcallquaners T111s st ry is told in Atomic Shield 1947 952 and Atoms for Peace and War 1' 53-1961 Volum 11 auJ m of the official history of the AEC Refs j anll 6 Sandia pla ·c l 110 special stcurity mle in this arc t ThL' physical protcctiC n of i u ilitks 1spc 1 t f t curity is h u-ctly m ·nt1nnt l in the official AEC' hi -toric Since the fir t dirc l« •qS '-P-5 ·5 J W tl' in dmiral ind th · s1 corhl IO 50-11 G'l a i J rc1ir1 J N 1 ·y Captain wic h cxp1 nrnfe- in 51 ' uriry It i c ms hkcly lh u s1 i 11rny st nd m ls for AEC rre1se u I rt a JI 'I ·1 ' hJ J IJ ff PIIS 111 ii OFFICIAL USE ONLV Jcilitil S would b commensurate with those oi the mililat ' scr ccs Indeed physical security for th llucc Sational Stockpile Sites NSSs that b amc operational from 19-$9 to 1952 was the responsibility of the military seJ ·icc upon whose base the sire vas lnc ucd Ta hnically the sites wt rl commanded by the Anncd Forces Special Weapons Project AfSWP and the AEC employee GS-7 level who served as Custodian of the nuclear capsules was a resident guest By 1952 Sandians also became resident guests to assist AFSWP and the military SCJ 'icc in inspection and quality assurance functions for stock-piled weapons and components As nuclear weapons bcC3Jllc widely dispersed 3fld placed in higher states of readiness in late 1954 Opcrat1on il Storage Sites Vere nuthorized for the Continental U S to be manned by military service persoMel Source Defense Speci3l Weapons Ag ncy 1947-19S2 Ref 7 Sandia played uo speci il security role for these sires Use cont rol in concept was maintained by the President who would issue an order to the Chairman of rhe AEC to release nuclear capsules to the appropriate military service user tRef 5 2 8 Advent of Systems Safety and Use Control In early 1957 the newly appointed Secret try of rhe Air Force Donald A Quarles visited Sandia Base and was briefed on current nuclc ir weapon development programs After having served as Sandia's President for 18 monlhs from March 195 through July 1953 Don Quarles bad been appointed as Assistant SccrctaryofDdcnsc for Research ind Dcvdupmcnl the first occupant of that high position that was C're3ted by the Defense Reorganization Act in the Eisenhower years Two major technologiC3l breal throughs LASL's conception of the sealed-pit nuclear weapon and Sandia's concept of all-electric·• safing devices occurred during the 3-1 2 years since his close in ·otvcmcnt with nuclear weapon designs and he reportedly was concerned abom nuclear safety implicldons of the W25 to be used 011 the Air Force•s GENIE MB-1 air-defense missile carried by lighter interceptor aircraft 2 9 The Atomic Weapon Safety Board 1957 or Don Quarles· concern about nuclear safely led 10 the creation of a board military offict rs chitircJ br fic M Command of the AnncJ Forces Special W ipons Project Jt SanJia Bas Ne kxicu Navy Captain William Kh e reportedly scheduled for retirement was rhe senior ottic er Th Kie Committee ·· as the Board bc camc known w is fom1cd on February 8 1957 nd csamin- d in Je1ail designs of the 14 nuclc 1r capon projects using sealed-pit in ·oh'ing eight Mark-numbered entities then in llcvclopmcnt Th committee's repon issued '- n farch 25 I 95 7 co111 1i11ed I 8 recommendations for remedial ic11ons some c tlhng for funJamental changes in S india 's u signs Rd 8 2 10 Sandia's Electrical Systems Department 3 56 to 2 59 I h · l uJ for Sandia' s saf ty U O n m nls fdl 1 S mdia·s year-old l kctrical Sy aems 1 -p irtmenL Leon Smith ha l propusc J the i rc uion of an org minuion h 11 otild be charscd 1111 th ck$1 11Jf c rtam ctit at p trl t of l 11 ckc1ric il subsysl ms or nuclc 1r wc 1pons icross 1 1 8FFl81 'L Y D ft lb Y - • • I • • I I I iii • Sienm · rRD OFFICIAL USE ONLY wtapon proJects This concept was Sandia's first application of the systt -ms cngincc riog techmcal discipline that had cvol 'cd at Sandia's parent Bell Telephone Laboratories and Leon Smith w is promoted to become the dcpanmcnt manager Don Cotter as 11 division supervisor umJ r Leon Smith had ser 'ed as an unofficial technical advisor to the Klee C Jmmittee and was assigned to respond to findings of the Klee C1 mmitti e Despite internal accusations of nit-picking lnd incredible what-iffing on the part of the Kie Committee Sandia responded most positively during a year-long study by Sandia LASL and LI L presenting a course of remedial i Ction in four repons lo the AEC Chainnan signed by Sandia President fames W Jim McRae Refs I 0- 13 2 11 The U S Air Force's Nuclear Weapon System Safety Study Group 1957-1958 Within less than two months aflcr issuance ofthc Klee Committee final report the Air Fure Special Weapons Center located on Kirtland AFB adjacent to Sandia Base had fonned the nation's lirsl dedicated nuclear safc ty organizatfon and published tl1e first s3fcty study as we know these documents today The organiziltion became known ilS the Directorate ofNuclear Safely DNS and was led by a Colonel anJ staffed mostly by officers on rotational assignments There were a few civil servant cmployccs 1 mostly administrative The group that al ' tually pcrfom ed the studies later tt be titled lhc Nuclear Weapon System Safety Srudy Group NWSSG was all-mili1ary ith field-grade officers representing the major operational Air Force commands e g Strategic Air Command and Tactical Air Cllmmand logistical command e g Milit try Airlift Command and the Field Command AFSWP Tite chairman almost always was 3 Colonel ftom the DNS Within the first year of operation the NWSSGs issued 13 study reports-a remarkable achievement indeed From the first study Sandia was invited to provide a voting member nnd Del Olson then a section supervisor in the ElcclricaJ Systems Department was assigned that role Del acth·cly partidpatcd in lhi evolution of tJ1c process of wc ilpon system safety smdies th 11 several years later becam institutilmalizcd nationally for the DoD and the d111 e military services and some five ye3J'S later for the • EC See DoD Dircc tivc 5030 15 tliscussion to follow Ott WMr3llts the title nf Father of Nuclear Weapons S stcm Safety Gruups as reguds Sandia's contributions His internal Sandia writings e g • Rd 1-l anJ oral interviews are rich source of mform mon on e ·olulion of the NWSSG proc ss In p 1rticular Dd attributes tl11 origin oflhc powerful notion of rositive measures to rnntrnl weapon aml weapon system ikty behavior d scribed later to Lt Colonel John W Rawlings the Logistical Air ComnHmd member of earl N VSSG Ll Colonel Rawlings realized thal wc 1po11 anJ weapon iyStt 111 hardwmc could not hy themseh·cs proviM he cxt -i mc ly high lcvi I of safety ncccJ d and that tb J iscipli11 d b h ivior of th military - t ·icc pcr-sonn I woult ha ' to uc factorcu in This thmkin was crnciai to the e t tbh hmcnt of the Dof 's Human Rdi Jhilil ' Pml r un und ' T t l· h n Ruic for personnel perfrirming critic il dut c is ociJlc d with nudc 1r wcJpons ·-GFRGJAb- USE O NL¥ CJ 'J l • •' -ca nfl · OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2 12 Advent of Environmental Sensing Devices for Warheads ESDs 1958 I can describe this subject in personal terms because I was involved in essentially cve y e 'ent My first job at Sandia began in M3 y 1957 as a member of technical staff assigned as a project en incer I was involved in development of the warhead electrical subsystem for the XW-JS thennonuclear warhead for the nation s first ballistic missile weapon systems the intercontinental ATLAS and TITAN 1 and the intermediate-range THOR and JUPITER 1 was recruited to Sandia by Section Sup-ervisor Bob Peuri foy md worked und r him jointly with warhead system engineer C Herman Henn M iune ' who had just returned to Sandia after military service The electrical subsystem originally was a str ughtforward adaptation of the high-voltage thennal battery variety common to the wooden bomb designs that Bob Pc urifoy had helped develop for the first sealed-pit warhead TX• W-15-2 Because of the need for extreme miniaturization lhe high-voltage ann safe switch W3S to be operated by 111 electrical pulse rather than by a continuous 28 volt DC signal rrom the missile This mnde the subsystem essentially 'allelectric and pulse-operatc d at that For the XW-35 Bob Pcurifoy dedded upon a back-up design that wouJd not be pulse-operated He tumc d to a new type of firing set that was l eing developed as an ad 'anccd concept by Herm Mauney and others in the systems f rroup The heart of the new design was a rotary chopper that fed a transformer rectifier to con ·ert and tep up a continuous 28 volt DC signal to the needed high voltage DC lhat charged a capacitor in the x-unit Following the spumik scare during the fall of 1957 the XW-35 program became of the highest national priority By early 1958 the X V•35 had been canceled when unfavorable results offtlll•scnle nuclear tests Operation Plumbob indicated nuclear safety problems for LASL The XW-28 nuclear subsystem was determined robe adaptable as a replacement design becoming lhe XW-49 Bob Peurifoy decided to use a rotary chopper convertl r approach rather lh m the high-voltage thennal battery design of the XW-28 and committed to a sewn-month development period In rapid succession the high-voltage pulse-operated arm safe switch considered for the XW-2 S was replacl d by the technically less•risky design of a tcw 1-voltage pulse-operated switching component Even that device was discarded as not being needed for safety The rationale theme was that the XW-49 dectrical subsystem was inert'' in the absence ofnvo indepr mdi nt 2S volt DC W ming signals that would be givl n only in•flight after irrevocable commitment launch of the missil in wartime This was the ell ctrical subsystem that I as project eng neer was t iskcd to brief to the Preliminary Safety Sn dy of the NWSSG in January 1958 During the course of lh stu Jy lhe NWSSG's secretary l lajor Floyd Trogdon-later to bc come a Major Gi ncral and intimately in '0 '1 d in jurisdicti •nal issues on USAfiSandia r sponsibilitie for re-entry vd1icks was inslruckd to ins rt th following buikr•platt paragraph into the proc cdings 32 -OFFIGIAl· -1 J-W Rtf V1 • · I 811il21if l D OFFIGIAL USE ONLY This warhead like all other warheads in 'cstigatcd can be sabolaKcd i e detonated full-scale Any person wilh knowledge of lhc warhead ckctrical circuits a hJndful of equipment a liule lime and the intc nl can detonate the warhead Thus the physical security system is the primary detc rrcnt to intentional detonation of lhe Yarhead Bob Peurifoy's reaction upon learning ofthls concern and the - l VSSG's proposed solution by rclianc on security rather than sat'ety systems was both immediate and forceful He had me obtain a prototype trajectory sensing switch being dcv loped for the TX•28 a11d package a pair into 1hc A V-49 to interrupt each channel of one of the urning lines to the firing set This switth MC-874 an incnia-operatcd device based on a rJck-and-pinion mechanical design was to be incorporated by a crash retrofit program duu provided •·mod kits to the Air Force by August 1959 The intent was 10 guard against an unintentional human acl on the part of fricndly troops in the process of handling a nucl ar warhead as aJ1 entity before its installation into lhe payload e g mated to an adaption kil Such a concern was cited in a recent speech Ref 15 by John S Johnny Foster who as Director ofLLL on a visit to a militory site hld observed a technician pmbing a warhead interface connector -ith a voll-ohm meter apparently perfonning an unauthorized circuit continuity test Knowing of the special relationship between Johnny and Don Cotter they were skiing buddies as well is weapon associates I suspect that the component we l iter c im to know as Environment s nsing Device ESD wa born nt this time Don Colter of course had been a proponent of a Trajectory Sensing Switch in bombs for several years ns a weapon project division leader as evidenced by the TX-28 electrical system where he had held design responsibility h forc becoming a weapon system division leader The Sandia safety design initiative ofESDs was not welcomed by the t s Anny's Jesign agency for ad iption kits Picatinny Arsc nal An Anny project o ficer for the JUPITER application ofthe XW-49 Captain Samuel Skemp object d to Sandia's proposal to incorporate ESDs into the XW-49 in a manner such that the ESDs would close arming circuits upon c pt ricncing lhe clecelern1ion attcndanl to re-1 -nlry into the earth's atmosphere He ar ued that the safety enhancement ifany would come a t th cost of possible interference with the functioning of Picatinny's adaption kit during the critical time of re-entry ESDs w rc vit wed as being in competition wi1h the adaption kit which also used trajectory sensing for arming rather lhan for safing Rather than to conh -st Pii alinny's 'ie ·3 on the extremely compressed tim scales of the U S 's ICBM IRBM program in post-spu1nik ye irs Sandia lfosigners Bou Peunfoy Henn Mauney and 1 im·erted the physical orientation oflhc ESDs to operate on the laund1 phasf of the trnjcclory TI1e nJme of the devices was hilllgt d during this process-from tr tj -ctory st nsing dc 'ices to ESl -to ami l the arming cu1mot 1ticn and lo cmph isizc the sa ing role by sensing a nom1 il environment AJditiC r all · ESDs llec imc nly one way tu achieve tlle safety goal amt thi J l fg r t rm H tmling S ifely D 'ic- s HSDj was cmnl J tu 1 r the tol ilit of o ' J yi OTE The XW--l9 cpismk iltuslrah s a rather uns nhng rc iluy in the area of dt 'iskin of responsibilities for nuclear capun saJi ty namely Sarnlia h 13 n form il char11 r th 11 sets frirth cuhcr 1urlrnr ity or aut• nomy in nuck 1r wc ·· 1po 1 · OF RGtAl - IBE-0Nl ¥S I 3 'iii I i %Edi IJ' SRI ··OFFICIAL USE ONLY anning safing and fuz ing s ESDs became II reality because the Air Force system safety study 9 0Up endorsed the concept on its merit The Army never did accept the need for ESDs In fact the same Anny officer who con1estcd their use in JUPITER was to have a pivotal mle some 15 years later in an issue of Sandia Picatinny design prerogatives a story to be told in the PERSHING IT section of this report 2 13 The Tri-Laboratories' First Nuclear Safety Manifesto 1957-1959 Don Quarles by then Deputy Secretary of Defense by letter dated July 29 I957 to lewis 1 Strauss Chairman of A EC requested a study on the possibilities of increasing the safety of nuclear weapons Ref 9 As a result of a confcrcncr with Brigadier General Alfred 0 Dodd Starbird AECIDMA the heads of the nuclear weapons laboratories agreed tl1at Sandia would assume primary responsibility for 3 study w1d the ultimate preparation of a coordinated report Later the study was delayed in order to kt it become the second phase of a total effort--the fi st phase being publication of reports on the existing degree of design safety in those sealed-pit weapon systems lre11lcd in the Klee Committee Refs l 0-13 The report on possibilities of increasing safety for future weapons was prepared by Carl R Carlson Supervisor of Systems Engineering Division Carl had replaced Don Cotter who w is promoccd to Department Manager in the project engineering organization Through his supervisory responsib litics Carl was in contact with others in the national nuclear weapon system safety communityt including Fred Charles lklc of the Air Force's Project RA D Carl Carlson's approach early on included 3 revi w of prior nuclear weapon accidents and incidents in order to place the concerns in perspective He found il lack ofdata no deep understanding of precisely what had occurred and no suitable ch inncl to notify Swidia's engineers about furure events as they occur The Chainnan of the newly formed Air Force Nuclear Weap lns System Study Group Colonel John J Dishuck aided in analysis of earlier a cidents in Air Force operations Carlson's work was a factor in establishment of the Joint uclear Accident Coordinating Cemer JNACC at Sandia Base in 1958 with a DoD branch at FC AFS VP now DSWA and an AEC bran h al AEC ALO The AEC's weapon laboratories were invited by the NWSSG duectly to participate in lhi response team dispatched promptly for investigations See Figure S for a summ iry of uctu ll respons s Carl Carlson·s penetr i ting analyses led to the basic conclusion thut the real opportunities for incr sing nuclear safety muc r tes1de in changes to w p n electrical systems--either in the AEC s boml i w w idu• 1il nr i •he li l ' d li · ry syste-m For dab11 Jtion sr my tw1 • dr iil urh '1 p ipcrs cRef inrl 31 - n the igret menls rr ide in I 1JS hctwt cn AEI md DoD for nuclear u·clpnr l1i l mi tb 1ml m c1 Al 1 si ' ' J k waru• 1 marks on Jivi ions of cSpl•n ibilitic s R f 16_ upu11 his re1in me11t frnm t he Alf •rn • lulm 1 t11 ·k s r d m rh nuc car C pou system snfr 1 51uJy di ·1s1on Jt S mJia l9ci7 to ii 1- -0JiF1@1 c use ob•t - Y· OFFICIAL USE ONLY Tius conclusion apparently was difficult lo accept even within the AEC weapons laboratories since at the time the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory LRL was advocating and having Sandia Livermore work on mechanical sating subsystems for LRJ •s nuclear subsystems as the preferred means NOTE Johnny f osier was Director LRL at the tintc 1n an address on nuclear safety evolution given ill 1997 Ref 15 he mentioned this episode The earliest mechanical safing mechanism was designed in a hurry by an LRL physicist and Sandia Livcnnore's ngineers were assigned to arrange for production During stockpile surveillam e testing the design later was found to b wc a serious naw thnt caused a system failure Metal surfaces in sliding contact bad been affected by the oxygen-free environment instead of the atmospheric environment prescr t during development testing such as to increase the torque requirement for the spring-wound driving molor beyond its capability Sandia engineers had failed to negotiate with U S Navy counterpans for elc ctric power sufficient to operate an clcclric drh ng motor This reliability problem ed to a costly retrofit and the Navy did not soon forgive the errors That the final report Ref 17 took about a ye3r in coordination is evidence of this diffi ulty 7 Nevertheless the thrusts of the report's and subsequent remedial actions were I Electrical System Sating Against Accident Arming and Releasing Bornb Aircrafl Systems a T-249A The T-249 ar almost m1iven ally used Aircruft Monitor And Control A 1AC box located in delivery aircraft to control anning safing and delivery option selection for nuclear bombs was found deficient in l vo respects Firstly it was easy to ann a bomb since only two simple switching operstions W re needed Secondly if a bomb had somehow armed it could nol be safed unless a power switch was reactivated The division of responsibilities for AMAC cquipmenL had been set earlier • ith SU1dia having design responsibility and the military services ha ·ing design nc ccptancc procurement and installation responsibilities A standoff developed when Sandia re cascd a finJ J design of a redesigned switch the T-2-i9A ' ilh better human-foctcir• engmeered conLml reflector switching and the military services declined to fund implementation NOTE Th s w l an early e - Wllph of differing priorities between safety 1Jvoc11tcs in 1hc AEC Md wcopon- y tcm 11cqui ition C1pcmtion11 -rci 1dinc s advocates in th DoD regarding funding for safely mh nc ment-a subject llf spcL ial intcrc t to the Pr i lcnti 11 Blul Ribbon Task Group during t 985 C 1rl resigned from S llldil in fn rr iti n · 1h hi • - r ner cct ·wtth LRL workc I for the DIKE WOOD CQrptir mcn wh1d1 h u b tn fom J w Albuqunq11 - w • c co b ' cwu of Ju L·x-S inuu l r 111 ' i m • HI ' 1C'l1Jtn ·d r• S 1nd1 1 1n S 111 mbl 'r t l tiJ 11 died l mo ' 5 IQ7J 35 s%' · · ·· ·' J sae a 1·J1r au• OFFICIAL USE ONLY b T-280 The T-280 a switch proposed by Sandia ro he mounted in the aircr ift's cockpit remotely from the T-249A bul in series elcccricaUy with it would require a second responsible crew member to affinn intent lo release a nuclear bomb from an aircraft This switch colloquially known as the War-Peace Switch was a measure to funher protect 1gainst inadvertent release the emerging safety concern highlighted hy Carlson's work Incorporation of the T-249A in 1958 and the T-280 in 1959 into aircraft of the Strategic Air Command came shortly after SAC aircraft had been placed on growtd alert See Figure 5 Th is change in readiness posture was to have significant impact on nuclear safety as addressed in the next sc ction of this report 2 Electrical System Safing Against Deliberate Unauthorized Human Acts During preparation of the AEC's report Fred Charles Ikle1 of the U S Air Force's RAND Corporation w srudying nuclear weapon safety and focused on the risk of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear detonation His report published on October 15 l 9j8 Ref 18 raised attention at a national-level to the risk and it supported continuing research by the AEC weapons laboratories for improved hardware lkle's work in par led to fonnalization of the conc pt of today's Human Reli11bil Ly Program for persons in safcty•critical positions and perceptively to the use of somc fonn of lock sealed imiidc the warhead as a safing dcvice----conccplually of course an early mention and perhaps the first conceptualization of a Prescribed later called Pennissive by the OoD Action Link PAL During this period Ode visited Sandia and examined relevant hardware developments a Environmental Sensing De ices ESDs Carlson's report Ref 17 discussed the use of trajectory sensing switches as described above and mentioned the TR BM ICBM application b The Locked Warhead CoMcctor Carlson• s report suggested the use of a locked cap on the warhead signal input connector to provide mechanical isolation of critical electrical circuits where the missile or bomb's trajectory environment was insufficient to operate an ESD A Jrhough never widely implemented by AEC designers the locked-cap concept was used by rhe U S Anny in the t arly 1960s for missile systems already field e g HO EST JO HK and NIKE HERCULES nnJ by Sandia for a n Atomic Demolition Munition W45 Mcdium AD 1 Fm-I lkl l lll r cl' ·cd is Undcr c rlltli'Y of D fcnsc Policy in 1hc DoD 36 •rs sre at 5 4@¢ 81 A@BFKD · OFFICbttL USE ONLY 2 14 Sandia's Participation in Early Nuclear Weapon System Safety Group Studies 1958-1960 The process of sorting out a role for the Atomic Energ-J Commission and its weapons design laboratories in stUdies of the acceptability of nuclear s ifety for each nuclear weapon system to be fi ldl d by a a1ilitary dq artment io vl lved 1bt t1f wo YP ofhieh-lt vt I m 1nae r mcnr attenrinn The fascinating correspondence file reflects the depth of conviction and resolution of the AEC's principals in the process They included • • • Brigadier General Alfred D Dodd Starbird U S Army Director of Military Application U S AEC July I 1955-January 25 1961 Major General Kenner F Hertford Retired Manager of Albuquerque Operations Office U S AEC October I 1955-July 31 1964 and Dr James W Jim McRae President Sandia Corporation 9 The Air Force Special Weapons Center AFSWC had conducted three nuclear weapon system salety studies in 1957 At year end through the Departnentofthe Air Force·s Chief of Staff AFSWC requested of Brigadier General Starbird tll3t the AEC continue to participate in forthcoming studies of he formal safety working group that had evolved AEC participation for the studies completed had been by Del Olson and later by Robert F Bob Kail a member o · the technical staff al Sandia Kail had served as a full member of the group and had signed the reports 10 Brigadier General Starbird' reply was positive as participation but he named a person from the AEC ALO as the AEC representative with the provision that he would be supported technically nt group meetings by members of the Sandia Corporation and by representatives of other AEC organizations and contrnctors as required and appropriate Starbird further slated It should be understood thnt the AEC representative cannot officially sit as a voting member of the formal safety working oup but rather is present to ensure that the AEC gives to the group all possible assistance '' o Although he ori1 rinally hsd agreed with Brigadier General Starbird's views Sandia•s President Jim McRae soon recanted and supported the practice that had evolved at Sandia NOTE The remarkably current worJing of McRae•s letter lo Starbird which l only rc ccntly encountered in the Nucleal' Safety lnformation Center NSIC files established precepts for participants Some twenty years later I articulated the principles as fol ows There are three attributes which in the main account tor the past succcsJ of the p1·ocess namely •• Sandi i·s k y p rson mJ icn1Jl nuthor w is C irl R C 1rl on who had rt'pl 1co d Dd Obon 811h K i il did of cancer m lale• l9ti0 whit scn·ing as t cltnic1I Jlki or to 1h A1r For c ·s s iti ry s1tJiy t roup HI S known lS in ou spok - n id 'oc ir - ofth- 1odl p• nd nc• oinuck ir s ifi ly stu l · s1 e uhst' I ilnd was 'L'f ' h i hl · rc spcct d amon h1s pc mt c Jlk 1i1 c'i - ·' I t a·•· 1 ' • 11nn1r rine OFFICIAL USE ONLY • • • Management Commitment-unswerving dedication to the precept that adequacy of safety s curity and control is a primary positi ·c objective on hich future success of the endeavor may depend Independence of View-provisions which assure that assessments of safety security and control features are made reasonably independcnt 11 of the primary mission of the endeavor Technical Competency-priority assignments of high performance-rated engineering and scientific personnel in th field of safety security and control Of these three the greatest return is paid by the last and it hecomes compellingly paramount in determining success'' Ref 19 The notion of indcpcndence for technical advisors bas been implemented at Sandia by placing these persons in an organiza tion separate from the ones responsible for the principal output or operation Thus the function was born in the Electrical Systems Depanment •· r ither than in a ' Project Engineering Department and one way or another an appropriate degree of organizational independence has been maintained over the years By January 20 1958 the Air Force had formally established the Nuclear Weapon S -stem Safety Group NWSSG and listed as members si c Air Force Commands or Offices DoD Field Command Anncd Forces Special Weapons Project AEC ALOO and AF Cl Sandia Corporation Also about this time the Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided that individual miliia Jy services would have the responsibility for continuing critical analysis of tJ1e safety aspects of its weapons systems employing sealed pit atomic warheads Each military service began to implement the 011 decision The U S Anny's plan was to charg each of its ••joint committees already in being for each nuclear weapon system under Anny cognizance i e XW-31 HONEST JOHN V31 'NLim HERCULES XW-39 REDSTO E and XW-35 JUPITER with forming a safety subcommittee wilh conducting the analyses The Chairman who was to report to the Chief of Ordnance was to be Mr S Julian Pulley 11 and there would be seven members five Army including Picatinny Arsenal one FC AFSWP and c•nc Sandia Corporation This plan was forwanJcd to the AEC s weapons design labora1orics by AECIALO and Los Alamos and Sandia commented tu hh mior n ll ' O rur nu on lhc 11bo wordmg Sundw 's E· ccutin· Vici rrc 11d ·n1 Wilhnm J Jnck Ho ' nrcl said ·•C m you phrase this so it dccsn·r sour d like in1l1 pc ndencc is per - a goal but i a mcthoJ of ss11n11g rlrn on idcr itions ar tnclucfod 1 h1ch m1gh1 not be if nly the guy chJrgcd wi1h th respnn 1h1lity for prumpt w 1rnn mg were ihe jud s I iluni I lJtct ddt d u phrr s •• • in i m mn r wh1 h do s not r qum 1h1 m w ICI in lwh tlf of their ll ' 'OC ' I 11 srnl z mJn lr uh 0 11 kmg up rsi dcd ar th 111m b -· Projccl Offi r·s GNups T'OG' which me cont nul d today AEC' ' I d J n p irticipJtt m joint mtr ittc s Jlll m Pulky w is t• scrw aHh urman ufthc irC1up 11 11 1111 d th - udcar Wc ipon Sys1cm Salcry Ct•mrmlt ' t1'WSSCl nnnl h1 leath i11 197• Hb r- pl 1 - m nt wm Il rulJ Well retired t S f uffo cr 33 L · ·• ii I Ct £ I PRI · OFFICIAL USE ONLY Carl Carlson wrote S india's response it was signed by Jim McRae This document remains t v lliJ c-xpression today of the propl r roles of tht DoD and lhc AEC weapons laboratories in nuclear weapon s3 ety It is reproduced as Appendix A of this report AEC ALO's reply to the Anny did not concur with the Anny's proposal on the basis of conflict of interests between the primary goal ofthe joint committees lo coordinate and om of its subcommiuees to m3lyze md judge Further AECIALO affirmed that AEC 'D IA policy did not pennit either AEC or AEC-contractor participants to be voting or signing members of a safety study group Just prior to his depanure as President Sandia Corpor 1ti1 n late September 195S Jim Mc-Rile personally wrote to Brigadier Gener ti Starbird uf AEC DMA requesting mother re i w uf Sandia's participation in the Air Force's NWSSG Dr McRae continued to fa 'or Sandin providing ll full voting representative In his October 20 19 58 reply to AEC ALO Brigadier General Starbird st ltcd that he had not changed his mind i e the A EC shoutd not become a full 'oting mL'fflbcr and lhat he now was concerned about Dr McRae's obscr 'ation th3t Sandia was participating fully in similar studies by the Army and the Navy Finally Brigadier Gcmeral Starbird ta5kcd AEC ALO to investigate and report to him just how the srudies were being conducted The resulting re icw handled by staff action officers LL Col Srun Goldenberg USAF for AEC DM and Milton A Rex AEC'ALO's Din ctor Storage Oi ·ision occupied much of 1959 These persons also were involvtd in support of the Ad Hoc Steering Committee for the Technical Nuclear Safely Review of Atomic Weapons in drafting DoD Directive 5030 15 Safety Studies and Rc 'icws of Atomic We 1pon Systems ·• Two documents were issued as the final events in this s1 1ge of evolution • On December 29 1959 a mc mo from AEC DMA assigned the AEC1ALO the responsibility for carrying out all AEC functions in ht subject program wilh U1e e icccption ofthc-AEC coordination on nuclc ir safety rules that would be accomplished in DMA with assistnncc by ALO and labor11tmy representatives as re Jttired NOTE T11c i suc of EC coordinatil n on nucka1 at ty rules particularly the valiJity of thc t EC's ni ccl for 1 field rc icw was to anse igair in AEClDoD Jiscussions in the 1970s and ill be discussed in il taler section of this report • On February 3 1960 a Memi lo fjle from NlillOn A R x AEC LO cnullcd EC P irticip uion in Safety Snidii s and RcYic s of - tvmic W apon Syslcms c stablishcd ln undcrstan ling bctwci n AEC · LO Lee I am ock and -lilton Rc J and Sandia Rohen E BohJ Hcndrn on Eton H IDr ipe Drapl·r md Don Cull r on rcsponsib1litics In hrid rhl EC - LO rL·prc sr111 a1h·i would be hi 1llki ll nu mbcr and WOl11i1 cast th - EC• f h r e San li 1 l - r 11lh r lab •rat- ry repr - 1lt sti 'c wo ld ii l' ·c us ci duu al c ·mmlt mr ar d dv1sor·· en he • ECl l O rcpn -sema11vc The lW ' would ··prc-scm i commi n fronl in thi wc irking group 1lh 1 ussio11s 10 the • v1i ll nf rdcrri11 unrcsol ·i J tl1fli rences of pmion 1 1 ct@I' t 532 Gic€-f ' ffi fl Z ' 111 s ·OFFICIAL USE ONLY their super 'isors for ··resolution and c c tablishment of AEC ALO positions Th1s memo h JS not been superseded and remains a '3liiJ description of practice 2 15 Nuclear Weapons System Safety Study Process is Institutionalized 1960 On June 10 19601 efforts of the AEC DoD Ad Hoc Steering Committee for the Technical Review of - c mic Weapons culminated in issuance of DoD Directive 5030 1 5 Safety Studies and Re itws of Atomic Veapon Systems This document i stablisbed a program of safety srudies and rc 'icws for each of the nuclear we pon systems dcployc d by the military services Ir also established the drafting coordinating and chtabin11 approval by the President for nucle ir safety rules for generation or 1 WC lpon syst m Since only the DoD deploys a nuclear we ipon the docwnent carries a OcD label howc ·er tt was conceived as and has been implemented 1s a joint agency agreement between the DoD md A EC ERDA DOE DoD Directive SOJO I 5 was based in large p irt on c xlem ling the practices of the Air Force· s Nuclear Weapon System Safety Group NWSSG to the other mili1ary services The NWSSG bad begun operation al Ki tland AFB N ew Mcxh o in 1957 and by June 1960 had completed about 70 studies or revie ·s cnti il addition to VSSG practices was the provision for nuclear 53fc ty rules The dirC1 th·c remaim in cffoct today essc '1 ttally unchi'lnged-remarknblc vir ility for a governmental docwncnt over a 3-1 i2 decatlc pcnod Major tenets of the initial ·me 'Crsion fol ow Goal to assure that atomic weapon systems incorporacc the mn ximum safety consisrent '-'ith operational requirements Comment The nuclear weapon system safety study process inherently involves resolution of a connict of interest between the basic war-fighting mission of nuclear weapons op rational requirements _ a nd the concern that an ilccidcnt or other unwanted evcnls involving a nuclear weapon would seriously affect n3lional security or public health s fcty' l Thts statem nl of lhc gonl has been intcrprctctl as a dcciJctl tilt in fa •or of afety in the tniJc-off deliberations In fact the curliest known i tprcssion of a goal was stronger in that regard lo d termir c om optimum balance bttw ri required nuclear safety and 1hc dcsir d opt-rational rc idincss As a mnummn th sti'lndi rd against whh h safety rnlr shall apply foiiows Subject •• are i nus 1 ircm n1 i n inr J 111 1 b1 1ch1 r 'l 'S I· lc Jr 'tar-en Spr m li l ' li1011p'' 1 ut•1 m I•i • rl1 · s 1m lnl ldtur il -o 1a1 s r c ncr t t M 1_1· r• •1111 lrrccrt I ibt all 11 Force agcnc1c r rtcim1 J omrri h1•nr c Ii h ' ol th n 1• n1·111cs It WJ• fu11h r ir1 · r l 1h 11 lt•IO 1mml lhJII JIIJ i ommtun upp r1 ba p o 1 k 1 11 Ftslr b SSE IJIIL ti I ' i · · i ' · '6lhl fJUP•• OFFICIAL USE ONLY I There shall be positive mcaswes to prc ·cnt wc-Jpons involved in iccidents or incidents or jettisoned weapons from procJucing a nuclear yield '' Comment This stand ml pcrtlins to the design of the nucl weapon entity in all configurations that apply in the stockpile-10 target sequence- for t tample ranging in complexity om a bare nu lear bomb in a stor 1gc igloo to lhc same bomb mounted on tl1c bomb release rack of a fully prepared delivery aircraft on Quick Reaction Alert Thus the standard penains to the probabilistic ana ysis of the arming fuzing and firing subsystems of a bomb as w is done by S mdia in response to the Klee Committee report and the consideration of these m lyscs by the NWSSC In precisely the same sc nse the standard applies to the an ilysis of the nuclear sating system 35 was done routinely be eilher Los Alamo5 or Livmnorc Al the level of more complexity the standard applies to the gu3litativc judgment that th ' 'l 'WSSG makes on lbc tot ii weapon system Over the years the probabilistic analysis has essenlially been discontinued and qualitative judgments apply lhmughout Probabilistic analyses are made by groups other than the NWSSGs ''2 There shall be positive measures to prevent deliberate anning launching fuing or releasing except upon execution of emergency war orders or when dirccted by compctc nl authority Comment This standard pertains not 10 a nuclear yield from 3 nuclear weapon but to an unwanted action tn ·olving a nuclear weapon system i e deliberate releasing of a nuclear bomb fiom a delivery aircraft deliberate launching of a missile rocket system with a nuclear warhead deliberate firing of a nuclear projectile or torpedo from a tube or-to cover the only remaining generic type of nuclear weapon-arming of an Atomic Dtmolition Munition ADM ln the context of its drafting it surely pertains to the principal concern of Fred Charles fkl in his research report of 19S8 Ref 18 3 There shall be positive measures to prevent inadvenent arming launching firing or releasing Comment This standard pcnains to the other way of ob1airung the unwanted action described in he Comment fhr Standard 2 above namely inaJ 'Cctcnl i1ts1cad of dchbcrntc -t TI1¢re sb 1II be positive measures lo insure adequate security Commr nt This st in lard has been interpreted over the years to require the presence of hardware foatures e g fonccs ind'or procedures identification h 1dgmg 10 delay physical access to nuclt ir weapon by p rsons not 1 uthori1 ed such access h docs nul mean th it i uch foaturl'S ur procedure i e •·positive measures will he inspected by the NWSSG to accc5S thdr allc'-luacy ThJt t ik is h indkd by Jnspeth 'r General or similar programs of th• 1 11 y mai taining posscs sion of the wc ipons '01 I ICI 1 11 E I ri- f ' ·• ' I $ Ill' • ••• Jt § t tt •• -OFFICIAL USE ONLY Studies and Reviews The directive pro idcs for four types of nuclear weapon system safety studies or reviews lnitiaJ Safety Study '' ··Pre-Operational Safety Review ' Operational Safety Review and Special Safety Studies as necessary · Comment The U S Air force safety program upon which the DoD program is based provided for Preliminary and Final Safety Studies the latter to occur some seven weeks or earlier before submittal of the nuclear safety rules to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in anticipation of subsequent coordination with the AEC and approval of Lhc Secretary of Defense The requirement for an Operational Safety Review reportedly resulted from the position bilken by Brigadier General Dodd Starbird AECIDMA that a safety study should be conducted after a weapon system bas been deployed and procedures for operation arc complele lo include traveling to the deployment site to review proced_ures 15 2 16 Origins of Plutonium Dispersal Safety 1956 Advent of the sealed-pit design for nuclear weapons gave impetus 10 11 second type of nuclear safety namely plutoniwn dispersal safety In contrast to 11 nuclear detonation safety accident where the consequenoes of an accident could be enormous if not catastrophic in tenns ofloss of life or property the consequences or a plutonium dispersal safety accident would not ecessarily be life-threatening lO the populace and damaged property could be restored by decontamination operations In recognition of the qualitative differences helween 1he new sealed-pit weapons and the old capsule-type a high-level AEC OoO o 'crvicw group-Joint Board on Future Storage of Atomic Wcnpons--was established in late-I 956 The special problem area of plutonium dispersal was assigned to a technical subgroup called lhe Nuclear Safety Working Group ' As shown by Figure 4 the Nuclear Safety Working Group was comprised or persons drav 11 from the health physics and weapons effects sections oflhe nuclear weapon programs-as contrasted to nuclear detonation safety when participants came from weapon development and operationaluse backgrounds For example • The chairman was the AFSWP's Scientific Advisor i position that had focused on obtaining and appl 'ing weapon effects data 3 5 blast and thermal environments • The ABC's principal reprcscnt itive was a civiii in from the Division of Operalional Safety instead of from the Division of Military Application • The Sandia representative Dr James Jim Shreve was from the Research organization with a specialization in we-Jpon effects Ndtller the Los Alamos nor Livermore weapon laboratories chose to participate ·• '' 42 ·nuHon· 1 uoa 011 the pJrt ofBngud11 r Gcm rul Surb1rd ippcars to be the basis ol the pro 'mon iddcJ for the firsc August 8 1974 tc ·ision in DoD Dir 503U 15 for th o niz int military l rv cc lo uppon ch Alnum F ner _ y Commission tAEC during the AEC SJftt · Rules coordin3ticm pro ess for DoD Safely Ru le Such uppon may mvoh• ''Fi ld Re 'li w by an AEC l RDA DOE ream l d hr O t -' 11 is OJ me misled since the- group w ic cnn c meJ only wid1 1 plutomum Jispersa anJ noi m any CDS« llh 1hc r cr on ems of a nudc 1r 1et n itior The l irltt llc t h w t r h iJ n11t hc cn rcrn ni d 1s i pmhlc-m ii the mnl ind d1J not exist as Jn 1nst11ution 1 1 d con c m · O§EIG1CI 1JSI OMl Y 9' 1 2 1$113 OFFICI-A L USE ONLY Thus began an institutional arnngement where the two main 3 re3 5 of nuclear safety were to be lrcatcd LS essentially wtrclatcd concerns Thi philosophical safety approach for plutonium dispersal that evolved was to assume that an accident involving dispersal would occur and lo adopt proccdurnl measures that would limit the physical extent ofdispersal The criterion adopted was to place a maximum value on the mass of plutoniwn contained in an ensemble uf nuclear weapons that would be pennitted in open storage The ma-dmum was determined by the radiological dose to the lwigs recch•ed by an individual who was located on lhe boundary of the c tclusion region of a storage facility Based on detailed re icws of a series of tests involving one-point detonations of nuclear weapon primarits a11d e posurcs of animal to the radiation t 'nvironments the working group set a plutonium mass lim r The basis w is that upon concurrent dctonalion of the chemical high explosive in all of the we ipons in the ensemble the plutonium aerosols produced would lead to an expected dose uf 15 rem to an individual located 600 meters away-a distance representative of fence lines of the time As shown by Figure 4 the Joint Board met in mid-1958 and adopted the working group·s proposal is a rule' to be enforced in storage operations of the AEC and the DoD This urangement was to be continued wilh the Board meeting bieMiall • to consider the working group's proposals QiifilQI 7 L It tf IW4LV zi · J fl I • a 8i8FtCYi 1 k AFr IAIAI I u a UNI t 5 ' G2 0 SE Joint Soard on Future Storage L r i ' ' Ii - ' I cct w d - i l ·aiS ttj $i Q- - r t I' r n Nuclaar Safely Working Group 1111 11111 I I I bit CNat D N I I J i GS I or Atomic Weapons j i 66 G4 lC Udi '' ''- ' ' • •• l• lf 'IIJ IIO l I• T I I I I l I I I I I II Fonned at Re q11astof MSWG I I I ALO Subgroup NSWG DA SA Sclt JnUllc Al J'I - Chairman AEC Div Opn Sat-ety iDunntn AEC OMA - NUCleN' Safety AEC ALO· tVespe Stueve Earlier Merritt SLA U S Arlll' U S Navy U S Air Forc9 NmeCI Ser oes exi 1ooive Safety Boord 58 5 K•3V Ir u c 1 l · - uln 62 GO ---·- ALO Opn Safety Vespe -Chrulman LASL- Roy LAL - Falrbroth er SLA- Shre• e 64 ltut at 11 1 I I lr lnjn H » l1 -1'M1 ti I I Figure 4 Historical Overview of Groups Consielering Plutonium Weight Umits 44 68 -8FFICIAL USE ONLY A Jd •- t s • -QFFIGJ-AL USE--ONl Y 3 THE WORLDWIDE DEPLOYMENT YEARS 1960-1963 As indicated by Figure 5 two developments combined in the late 1950s to drastically change lhc nature of nuclear weapon safety Nuclear weapons of the staled-pit design began to enter the stockpile in 1957 replacing in SACs inventory the large thennonucle ir bombs using inscrtablecap ule de ign For a year or O earlier SAC had hegun to place a riart nf it Ur tte r hnmhcr force on '•Quick Reaction Alert '' This consisted of having fully fuc lctl bombers loaded with bombs having nuclear capsules contained in the Automalic In-Flight nsertion AIFl mechanism and maintained around-the-clock on gro1111d alert The AEC W3S not made awMe of rhis change in readiness deployments the NWSSG studies considered only the ·new sealed-pit bombs until reli ibihty problems arose from trying to keep rhe ·hot•· ictually thcnnally hot nuclear capsules in the guid tube of the ACFI From a nuclear safety viewpoint this configuration was worrisome because the nuclear subsystem was not saf to the level considered acceptable for peacetime deployments and the electrical subsystems had not benefited from the scrutiny attendant to the Klee Committee's efforts So a ne v design concept and a new deploymenr readiness posture occu1Ted essentially concurrently 3 1 Forward Deployments In NATO 1960 n carly-1960 atler completion ofintcrnational agreements and changes to lhe Atomic Energy Act of 19S4 wider deployments of U S nuclear weapons to Europe bcgan--botb at U S and NATO operational sites in Europe The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 'isitcd Europe in December 1960 ind upon return became quite critical of the arrangements lo ensure that U S custody was maintained for weapons assigned lo non-U S NATO delivery units The fascinating story orhow this concern cvolvc d into the Pemtissive Action Link PAL progr mt championc d by the new administration in Washington under President John F Kennedy Secretary of Defense R bcn McNamara and especially McGeorg Bundy National Security Council and Presid ntfal Scientific Advi or Jerome Wiesner is co ·crcd elsewhere This aspect of the PAL story i3 not created further here The PAL program from its inception and continuing today has betn concerned with the field of controlling the of nuclear weapons as contrn sted to the safety of tlh 'lSe wc apons against accidental insults and th hardware and procedures for each discipline are c m thlly kept s pnrate bur high in importance S 11ulia's solu ion w 10 pro 'idc ESD in the - lFI l ctrical circuit - This pLmtl 1llusrr ui tht national v ih of having i singII agi ncy CllOSich r all t 5pi ts of rrnck r wcapunr ' in th brnad ·' t and most cnmpldc corlh Xt rr 1 lil 1h c-- 11 this C lSI Sam1ia in cuonhrwiion vith its _ _ o sii r l abor 1toric s ·$C Elli1 ii iGtli f 1rrtQ OFFICIAL USE ONLY I 104G · 1955 1s1 o 1960 1966 1976- 1970 I IEonli t In t-'IJltUtll Domb 13 '1 ' P -ulom otk lnlH hl P pn allon lnlH 1hl 1 Nu lnlllghl P1op111aHon 1--- 1 I l s - I I J_ J 'Tc Cuo odyl - 00 - W c ··········••u• -·-· rr r l --'i •-•- ' •·• __ ·•- So aah•d•l-'il 0 '11311011 •·-- ·••1- ·-·-• ···---r- · 111-• 1 - dl•l t11- llal l l i a JIIG ·r ·• I 0« l ic 1nl•r In l•J -'Od $AC Ouyhu --·-··-· --· a 1 ·- so I 11 I nrl Al 1 Only SAt AL ThubAcr ESD -- PAL-·------···· · • • Oon b• ' -Don t • in ru oqoz Jn ru z Jn 1- --- - Born bja an Ci 1ou nu J 1- •t _·i_·_ _•-_·-___ boJ In li il x r -··- ----- ------- Oj • Gok' lr br IU A lch 111 - 1 -45 I C ni 1Alo11 - Ll N C1 to0und nd Al L-o n - Aho t _____ --- Bomba on Dock Al•11 A I I 1055 1960 I A ' Uonlba AlflX m• 1065 • I a t Uomb In M - o - rln- encl 0• k Al•l1 1970 1975 I'd • • t 11o' l' _ Figure 5 Summary of Early Development in Nuclear Weapon System Safety 1945-1975 J6 AFFIAIAI I l C AtJI V 26512 I • s iCAi aYrtle ·OFFIC L USE ONLY 3 2 Retrofits of the Stockpile to lncorpor'ate Environmental Sensing Devices 1959-1961 My first involvem '11t with nuclear safety C3nte upon my lateral transfer from the W49 project brroup to the warhead clcctricaJ systems dtpartment Actually Henn Mauney and 1c xcl1angcd jobs 31 Bob Peurifoy·s instigation In Moy 19591 was assigned to replace Eugc ne E Gene h·c s as Sandia's coonlinator for a multimillion dollar program to equip all nuclear warheads to he deployed in Europe with dC ices that would improve nuclear safety during transportation handling and storage operations This cffon was an expansion oftha XW-49 c xpcriencc described earlier and was championed by Don Cotter for Sandia-Albuquerque and by William J Jack Howard for Sandia-Livennorc Gene lvts drafted the Sandia policy lc rer lo the AEC to set up a highly cxpcdiled program for incorporating Handling Safety Dc 'iccs principally En ironmental Sensing Devices into all appropriate weapon designs then in R D in production by means of in-procc s changes i1Dd in the stockpile by the provision of retrofit kits lhal would be install in Europe by milic uy crew Sandia's Executive Vice President since 1957 Sigmund P Monk Schwartz h11d ta ken a peffllflw interest in the ESD progr u especially for the MC• l 107 inertial switch that was to be developed for wide applicolion- essentially to be a universal component throughout the stockpile r was astonished to le3J11 that the weapon project groups n sponsiblt for packaging ESDs info the 'athcads under their design cognizance in general resented being directed to do so 3S i Sandia policy dc eision-an intrusion on their individual design prerogatives Furthermore some wc11pon project leaders were uncomfortable in trying to explain to their military service and DoD agency contacts just why a remedial safety design change wa really necessary TI1is process wasn't helped at all by the labeling ofESDs as goofproofers to protect against proccdu I errors on the pan of weapon handlers The term goofs '' r guess came from Walt Disney's Goofy animal character 1 am told that a Sandia roirlcvcl manager was blwitly inJbnnc d that 1he Air Force had no ••goof otr' pcrsoMe despiteSandia·s apparent accusations 1 set to work to articulate the Sandia position in the role of ESDs in draft policy documents to be signed by Sandia's President and to com ey the policy to each weapon project group There wa - at the time no design safety organization in Sandia's R D organi7 ation This was driven home to me as compiled block diagrams for the weapon weapon system applications ofESDs Not only was there was no commonality among project £roups but there also were different philosophic i as to how hl place the ESDs iu thc- anning circuits e 'en ithin some project groups re ponsiblc for multiple missile ipr licalions 0 S 1ndia's man 1gcn11mt dc ision lo dcv lop J single ESD the tc-l l07 fur most of thi to kpile Jppli 31ions ' ts of cou s quite cost effecriv¢ hut dt idcdly ri ky The risk was mainly t luc t thi q11cs1iom1bh ah1lity of tlu U S commercial h irdwarc produ tion comp l ll to accommouak the cxm m miniaturit uion of the C-1 lOi brought 1bour hy its c 'mmonalily fo itu c This meant chalJ ng uch is holdi11g a tolcr 1m 20 milltonths-1 'l• lll-mch on lhc Ji 1mckr of hi piston th t would rnt h r air flo in the C ·linJcr into which II wm1k1 he ti1teJ in t r l r hl n spo u1 10 'docily change in thi mi ilc system - s co1u ms developed tiuring protoljpc t sting S n lia IUm d ro lhi unusual measure of establishing a Task Group r prcscntmg 1II OQ ani •alluus -OFFIC¾AL USE Ot4LY r 9 CREt9P MJF OFFIGIAL USE ONLY having a responsibility in the project-under the eyes of Monk Schwartz with his vast experience in such matters at the Western Electric Company oftbe Bell System No organization wanted to have the blame for failure lo meet design requirements and component delivery schedules and there was some careful maneuvering and some fingcrpointing as problems were identified tt seems to me at times that only two of us in •olved had absolute allegiance to lhe cause of on-Lime delivery Ken Gillespie the Division Supervisor responsible for the desi of the XMC•I 107 as a component and I as the Member of Technical Staffassigned as coordinator for systems development aspects I like to point out some of the near-heroic contributions Ken his staff and of others made in support-perhaps the most notcwonhy being invention of lhe dean room by Willis Whitfield in the area of advanced manufacturing process development n retrospect I credit a commercial supplier with ·•saving' the effort by adapting his proprietary process of coating moving parts with a mc lallic material that controlled friction losses Don Cotter apparently believed the ESD story was sufficiently important to record that he prevailed on Hem Mt uney and me lo write a Sandia report Ref 177 NOTE These episodes regarding the eatly ESD and thuse un the PAL programs illustrate two aspects of Sandia's operating philosophy and practices that contributed heavily to accomplishments in those crucial years of the nuclear weapons program Firstly Sandia managed to be involved in all stages of the nuclear weapon program from the conception to the implementation in a special way j e establishing feasibility early on by demonstrating the hardware capabilities of filling a conceptual need-far in advance of any stated requirement by poten rial users There wtre many R D think tank operations in the U S working effectively in conceprual areas and many hardware developers filling contrnctual requirements but a scarcity fcoupling Secondly Sandia placed nust and confidence in members of the technical staff to operate in lhc field essentially alone in situations highly charged withjurisdicriooaJ 11J1d fiscal issues that cou d affect corporate position TI1csc situations elsewhere traditionally called for chain-of-command and industrial hierarchical practices that hardly facilitate rapid rechnically competent actions 3 3 Emergency Destruction Disablement or Denial D 3 of Nuclear Weapons 1960s TI e age-old concept of denying to the enemy the option to use against you in battle the very -e pons that he had e irlier C3pturcd from you e g • spiking the gun ' was applied to U S nuclear weapons by 196 l and became of even greater fntt rest with the forward lcploynu nts LO NATO in the early 1960s The method of denial was to destroy the weapons in-placcjust before overrun or olher takeover was judg J robe immfocnt by firing 1 xplosivc charg s lhat had been fastencJ to lhe skin of all of the weapons in an array Burning of the weapons by a liqui l hydrocarbon fuel lire was a last-ditch option -0 FFIGIAl -USE-8NtY- 1 • · · I -• 3 • j I · C • ' N'5aEIJFR6 ·OFFIGI-AL USE ONLY Procedures for this method of denial were contained in Tcchnica J Publication S0-8 •1Emergency Destruction Of Nuclear We1pons · a mmual drafted by the Do D's Field Command Defense ucle ir Agency in 1961 t ndc r lhc Joinl NuclcM Weapons Publication System JNWPS Sandi3' Miti1ary Liaison Directorate received the technical informalion '°source material dr3fted J procedural manual and cin ulatc d the proposed manual to the three principals for approval AEC AL FC DNA and offices of the military service involved The nuclear weapon system safety organization at SNLA or SNLL was the technical advisor for AEC AL of all D-1 VPS manuals and its signature was required as a prerequisite for approval 3 4 The POPCORN Phenomenon A Nuclear Detonation Concern A su1dy by LASL in 1960 prompled by a question posed by FCIDNA revealed that for multiple cmiage of bombs on aircraft a •·POPCORN phenomenon related to lhi effects of a ooc•poinl detonation of a nuclear weapon on nearby nuclear weapons could occur for c rtain bomb designs The initiating events were either accidents or intentional detonation of the HE i e Emergency Destruction ED This work was-dtended to treat olb r weapons in carriage storage ai1d -wportation situations Ref 20 From lime-to-time the military services would raise ques1ions about possible problems attendant to changes in operational deploymenl configurations fn 1964 the U S Anny became concerned aboul the mass destruction of weapons 3t storage rites SNL responded by offering to develop a firing system network lhat would provide delays in the firing of ED c hargcs in a weapons array lhc offer was not accepted bul SNL continued the proj ct to the stage of evaluation of prototype sys1cms NOTE In earlier years the only schetlulcd visits of Sandians t l L S and NonU S NATO weapon sites were by managers in the Military Liaison Directorate especially the long-time diredor 1947-1968 Arthur B Art Machen and one of his department managers These visits were intended to ensure 3 conrinuing personal contact with Sandia employees who were resid nts there iuached to i military unit for field enginct ring purposes Additionally staff members from 1hc weapon systems safcty lli 'ision were technical advisors fur th1 Operational S3foty Rc ·icw events for soml S 'Slcm deployed in Europe A Sandi i supen·isor tlivision or section of that di ·ision rraditionally was a member not just ad ·isor fthc EC team th u conducted a nuclear saicty Rules Reviews per Q ID Directive 5030 15 As discui scd la1cr p 1ge I03 jusl hcti 1re I rc-cnlcrc l the weapon sati ty are • l wns a techmcnl adnsor 10 AEC staff during a cornprdu nsiv tour of heatlquartcrs Siforage si1i -s and operation i sit s m Europe led by ATSD AE anti MLC Chairman Carl Vulsk Apparently Valske had promuls ited 3 r quircmcnl 10 the effect 1ha1 th milit uy service should be l ap 1blc of d stroyin ti wapcns at 3 sue promp1ly upon rcccipl of in auroori ed cmmn Uld l wa imprt ssed by th fielding t tlkiency shown by lhe troops in ED cXl rcise Jt cry sitc we i itcu but also j f n1 h¢d upon retlectit-in al the l l lblcral J miag c ihat a rc it ma s F D -1 'llt would caus t -QFRGIAb-ll-SE-ONl -¥- m 1 • I l · · I I •I OFFICl L USE ONLY rhe hme t w s s ignorant on plutonium dispersal technology but lhc memory would resurface in spades 3 few months later whm I was trJ11Sfen-cd to the safety area 1 Sandia As will become dear I became a strong aih·ocate of having Sandia managers obscn• military operations in the field lirsthand The evolution of these 0 1 mauers and an annotated time line is contained in Ref 22 3 5 Advent of Prescribed Action Links PAL 1960-1962 As contrasted ro ESDs I was not personally invot ·cd in this story I rely on documents and convtTSarions with those directly involvc l and imp sions of the rimes The history is well told in Gustavus J Gus Simmons' report Ref 23 The technical story of the evolution of PAL can be traced to a routine 1960 briefing of LASL' s Weapons Oi 'ision Leader Harold M Agnew by Sandians Leon Smith and Don Cotter on itdvanced development of components for clc ctrical system safety Environmental sensing devices could not be used for demolition munitions weapons because there was no unique environmcnc to be cd in deployment Sandia's advanced component development engim cr Donald F Don Wilkes working under division supervisor Robert P Bob Stromberg had invented an electromechanical switch that could serve as an ESD The electromechanical switch could be localed inside the weapon case and operated closed by an electrical signal passtd from a source outside of the weapon The signal would be a series of pulses thal would constitute the unique environment a code but not in a cryptographic sense Harold Agnew was invited to accompany the JCAE on the aforemennoned December 1960 tnp as scientific id 'isor Upon his return he milde an association between rhe JCAE's concern about custody and the ability ofSandia·s coded switch to enhance con1rol of use of nuclear weapons until coded intelligence was providc d Subsequently Harold Agnew Johnny Foster of LLL and Don Cotter were to suggest hardware development options for nucle3r weapon use conU OI During 196 t the subject of need for h irdware options to improve C'-Ustodiat control of U S nuclear weapons in NATO led to conduct of Top Secret studies by three high-level commiuccs chaired by the military ser 'icc - of D lD offic i 11 These srudics are known by the names ofth chainncn or 3gcncy • The Stem Commine M in-·an S1tm Assistant Director Dcfcnsl Rcscnrch nnd Engineering DoD spring i 96 I • Thi Panridgc Committee Gcn rul Earl E Partridge Retired summer 1961 • rhc D - SA Special Weapon Anning Commtttcc winlt r I9fJ 1- t tJ6 Some srudir s did not 1dvoc 1t use of my lurdwar optior at all bdicvin th it sccurit ilonc were $Ulfo 1ent D • l •· 3 I I' • i • · mi JSUl 'S -GFFIGIAL USE ONLY Del Olson w35 assigned lo support thcs s1u 1i1 s as technical advisor beginning his long i1wol 'ement in use conlrOl mattc 'TS ln lhc study process the military services insisted that the no1m nclature of the coded switch option b changed from the l 'Jdy Prescribed Action Link to Permissive Action Link PAL a subtle but critical reference to the controvl rsfal and l oncenuous ryumcnts laking place between civilian md military inten sts ·- o Dl Lliiu ''•I - 'J ·- - - - __ -··· -• _ __ A ti1iition kits were maJ available U S Air Force units ha ing custodial ontrol of the missiles in 1' 61 some s vcn numths aftl r funding was made available by A EC authorization-a remarkable Ji splay of the' cmcrg1 ncy capability provided by the AEC's nucleM We3pons complex 'fhis dcctromechanical JcvicL which had to be operated on the ground before the weapon sys1cm could be conunith d to thl 1argi t was later given the nomenclarure of Category A PAL 10 On June 6 1962 Presid nc John F Kcnnc dy signed N3tional Security Action memor mdurn 160 Permissive Action Links for Nuclear w upons in NATO This document made rhe cxpcJitcd incorporntion of PALs in all U S nuclear wc spon systems deployed in NATO support roles a nation il policy i111d it directed the AEC weapons laboratories lo develop ad ·anccd PALs co provide even higher levels ot use control Thi AEC was pro ·ided ii supplemenury lundinc apprapri3tion of 523 million for tbc tasks During this time Sandians were invited to display the prototype and early production PAL hardware in a mul1itudc of civilian anJ military agency briefings iu Washington DC lnilially Don Cotler and Leon Smith presented 1hc bricfing J with Colla covc -ring the nuclear wc spon · syslcm aspects a nJ Snihh co 'c ring the PAL dc ice itself The PAL hwwnr display in luding 1111 cuntroller electronic boxes and the b sucry power supplies wi igheJ about 25 pounJs 1nd h camc a C3n '•On pi ckJge chat surely was noted by lhe lligh1 atti ndants for TW - •s lbily tlights bctwc en Albuqucrqu ind Washington ' • Don Cotter and Leon Smith later were invih d to join U S military scr -icc officers in Europe 10 help fovisc a code management and release system lo opi ratc th- PALs upon au1horiz ition oming from th Pr siJt nt Cotter g3 'c 3 vi 'iJ account of this Ork in an inh rvi w rn id1 short • before his de uh Ref 24 K nn lh D Ken Flynn and Gene Yves both Members 1f rc c hnical Staff in weapon sysrcms engineering foisions n pl c cJ Colter anJ Smith l u r the PAI hlttl rics and b iuery ch irgers beg Jl o lt vdop rcli 1bility 1 roblcm Gem h·ts Jcs rib s thi i xpcril ncc in a Jun 19S7 inccrvicw wit Nccah F•unrnn is a part t f SJndia Hi5t 1r 1 f MJ•'Ct By being on th seem it hl lp rhc milit uy r rsunnd work out haruwart anJ proctdu1 1I pr 1hlcm mJ lo f cd infomtatklll hai k h'I S 1nd1 i h'l iruli 11 clc1 ign ch v1gt i C c11c anJ Ken wi r ahk In diffu- t som i f th c xtr- m r s ntm- nt 1n th parr ufthc military Some ofth 1hin l i11g wa 1h 11 I' ' t ·ili 111 haJ l• 1ri J tllt tr PAL harJw 1r ·i 1 th milit r m i tiut the harth rc w 1 i 1 11 rc ia ll i w cr d i 1_4- 1 1hc sui ces or h• IU'p r3rio 1 1l m s icms f I ri scn m r t h • t m1it1 1 c h he hdJ b nm mili1 11 · pi r- ilrm J I can rdatl i pi 1dc of il in p- rn nall s ' t 11 t d hy ri tir ll •r acti duty niilil Jr - r 'u 111 v m iu c 1pa t1cs orm a 1 EC t mplt• ·· · 1 ·0FFICIAL·U-SE-0Nl -¥ I I Jl t AE IJf Rl Ji ·OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOTE Since the earliest deliberations nn the role of PAL in' rhc nuclear weapons program Sandia steadfastly h taken the position that nuclear detonation safety Jcsign features must be kept independent of use control features Separation has been maintaini d physically by not sharing weapon hardware functions and philosophically by keeping safety and use control in different R O organizattons The basic reason for the independence of function is to ma ' imizc safety consisrent with oper ttional requirements Because both safety and use control devices ire normally open switches in the w irhead wming circuils the clos11re issue becomes the who why where when and how for closure of the switches For safety closure should occur as late in the stockpile-to-target sequence as practicable i e • after irrevocable comminnent to th target in wartime For use control the closure shouJd occur as soon as practicable after receipt and processing of proper authorization to commi1 in order to achieve the degree of operational readiness The concern becomes the posture that exists between peacetime and wanime Sc Figure 1 for i listing of the considcrntiuns involved in this ' gray area Sandians are in the unique position uf having deep involvement in total weapon system considerations vio the roles oftcchnic il advisors to nuclear weapon system safety srudy groups and as participants in the process of concurrence with the proposed nuclear safely rules to be approvctl by the President NOTE Perhaps the clearest example of the seemingly tncv1tablc conflict belween safety and operational readiness was the question of when the coded signal d oulc J be delivered to the 861-5 dcplo 'cd in QRA status on F-4 aircraft in NATO suppon roles The fiBt nuclear weapon to have the Enhanced Nuclear Safety hardware is described later The problem was that the aged F-4 would not be equipped with hardware that would provide the unique signal in flight The choice was to prescribe whether the unique signal was to be given on the ground by the loading crew or the safety device was to be bypass -d by operating a bypass S -itch located on the case of the bomb The Air Force ck-ctcd to use the byp3 U feature making the p acetimc alcn states exist without one of the two nuclear detonation safety features in pl ice 1 nrgucd that the loading crew should dclh•cr the unique signal at he time that 1hey enter the PAL cocJc fwhich time I was led to believe w is as l31e in lhc seqllenc as practicable 1111 Air Force ctc ted to bypass the unique signal ready1safe witch strong link at lmllling and to st md the enlire Q in th it Jess-safe configur tior In a later section t describe how we resurrec1ct the AEC Field Review provision of the nuclear safety rules approval process to brin this matter to lnghc r•k 'c I manag m1cnt tth ntion perhaps not high enough 3 6 Formation of Sandia's First Systems Safety Organization 1960 In I%0 Del Olsm1 W l i promoted from Sc ction Suptrviscir Ithen th first level of sup n·ision Jl ' llldi tJ to Di i ion Supi n·i3or w hc ad a new rrouping of sys1 m i nginccring fum tions OFflG Al USE ONtY- 1 2 l f' ' 1liC21iYi RD OFFICJAL USE ONLY becoming responsible for bomb electrical systems Del's Secrion Supervisor Robert A Bob Dawirs had responsibility to support the nuclear weapon system safety study groups of he three military services per DoD Directive 5030 t 5 issued in une 1960 Del Olson and Bob Dawirs and his successor Bm Hoagland with Don Cotter as Department Manager should be credited with fonnularing Sandia's philosophy and practices forparticipation in the national nuclear weapon system safety srudy process See Walter 0 Dan Buchly s repo Ref 25 for a thorough summary of Sandia's roles in the total process They aaiuired the technical stnff from the Weapon Systems Develop nt part of Sandia persons who were very much immersed in the relevant technology Figure 6 displays the names and remm- s of these safety specialists through 1963 Two of the members of technical sratT later had important rotes in nuclear safety that will be dcscn'bcd latc r i e Don Bickelman and Stan Spray Note that tenures after 1960 tend lo be brief relative to Sandia's nonn and that resignation was also relatively common Th1s work WIIS extremely demanding as to effort required and time spenl away from the laboratory and Jiustrating as to dealing th the ambiguities inherent in the evolving safety study methodology For most studies the Sandia representative was the only tctbnicalty trained person present Furthermore they tended to understand the national significance of their role and felt that Sandia management was unappreciative-BS evidenced by being buried in a systems development section without an appropriate title Del Olson and Bob Oawirs should be credited with beginning the process of analysis from a systems engineering sense of amtlog fuzing and firing AF F subsystems Safing was mosll I concerned with the readyisafe switch in bombs and the Aircraft Monitor and Control AMAC equipment in the aircraft that operated the sv itch and with the barometric switches in bombs that provided trajectory scn ing to ensure the safe-separation of the delivery aircraft and the bomb after release These considerations depended upon reliability assessment techniques and Sandia was the national technological leader At the time l was absorbed as a brand new supervisor located across the hall working on warhead electric il systems and appreciated little of the bomb work I recall that the AF F technical staff leaders included Jim de Montmotlin ready safe switches Al Mandell AMAC and John Zimmerman barometric fuzing Within a few years I would inherit these functions and some of the staff 3 7 The Goldsboro North Carolina Accident January 1961 During a B-52 airborne alcn mission slructur il failure of the right wing resulted in l vo weapons separating trom the aircrafl during aircrar brcal-up at 2 000- 10 000 feet altitude One bomb's par ichurc deployed and lhc weapon received little impact damage The other bomb fell free and hrokc apan upon impact No explosion o currcd Five of the eight crew members survived A ponion of one wc ipon containing uranium could not b rtc wcrcd despite c ca ·ation m the waterlogged fannland to a Jt'Jlth of 50 feet The Air Forci subsequently purchased an cm cmcnl requiring pcmussion for anyone to dig lhert fheri is no detectable radiation aml no hazartl in thl' area OFFIC-IAL USE ONLY 1· 1· · • ' 21't 34Uf R OFFICIAL USE ONLY DOE document classifk3tion guidance issued during the drnfiing of this report Historical Records Declassification Guid CG-HR-2 7 '1 97 specifies that Elaboration above and beyond information provided on any incident contilincd therein is classified where therein'' refers 10 a joint Department ofDefcnse Deparonent of Energy report on the histories of nuclear weapons accidents TI1e p iragraph above b tS been extracted from the DoD DOE report My original comments on the Goldsboro accident arc contained in the Confidential Restricted Da a version of this report SAND99-0847 or Because the classification action described above J do not comment on the m cidcnt episode especially on details of results ofpost-mortem c rnmination11 oflhe recovered bomb p 1ns A hardware modificali1 1n designed by Sandia that would have changed favorably respons s of bomb hardware to the accident environment was 1v ii abl in the AEC DoD pipeline at the ticn in the fonn of a modification kit to be install d in he bomb inventory by th U S Air Force Ah 197 The in 'cntory of this particular type of bomb was ·•red-lined taken off of clcploymi 1 i status and stored in i loos nnlil lhl alteration was completed This change- prupo' i d · ad resulted from San lia's c ufo r rcvi1 w -s in response to the Klee Commiuee repon Rtf S '· S 1r J 1 lkn y U D in U1ckl 'lm in w i in• i11 d 1hi Air fi r s 1c iJ 111 r p1111 c kam Jisp'lli h LI 11h n • 1rht ti uts 1 •fthc icci fcnt frn111 K1i11311J AFR H ai compan i d l rcprcs ntlti · from EC-' - L md f H t'rii n l 1 i A l m1 - 'i ily - f 1he 1md- 1r Ll • m 111111 saf 1 · J peL·1 'I S i n lo l d J b Jun t bur w lh 81II lfoJ 111 l 1 r d 0 - I O rnn Ju vrur th for ml S1n li 1 1i pr il Sf' Of S 1- i I __ - p ISIAL WGG iJilY ilta -1r ¥rn1 a· ·-OFFICIAL USE ONbV Dlpl Snsilh Smiln COiter IDlv catson ea 1son Dawirs C lrlson Daw rs 12SO 1260 1260 IS9C1ion I Patter son Olson Coltaf Cotter Sl vens Hoaglltld Olson Olson 1540 Hoagland Hoagw d Hoagland 7160 1280 12 0 Oawirl l I T II I I I tElectrfcal Sysrems Coordinating Group• An Division Supemscn I I SD System 0eva1opmenr I OA • CUaNly Assl nance MD Mamiracturing Dev FT• FleldT8$l Co2ar 0aflOII I I I auHo -am J CaUldift Smllh r 'I t' I I sol r I •' so sol stJI • SD SDi A 57 1 4 F_ 58 59 I -- 5621 Augraa W D-8 ICIIIV Id l' GCI BOM's Ml 51111 a n NamsSli 111 I L 0 0IIIOII tt A i rt lfter VEnlon R Kd - so I s o Sonw so j I £ Hl1 - WD Bdennan R L Qlamclo'I lsd I 56 sol I 'i 53 S4 55 C S SOIIIMr S0l 1m C1o d'J ' 21W SI i I Dtcf Sld i l i u1C m p34 60 6t t I 62 63 Figure 15 Nuclear Weapon System Safety Specialists at SNLA 1957-1 163 9EfitiAt Wot I iH ·1-iw·· ·· 2 _ 1' • I 9111 JTF- ·-OFFICIAL USE ONLY To my knowledge here was then and perhaps even now no follow-up procedure in the nuclear weapon safely community that would detenninc if safety field retrofits are actually put into the weapons on a timely basis The next Operational Safety Review would do that but it usually was to be done years later In retrospcc someone could have suggested a Special Safety Study NOTE I collected all of the official public statements on nuclear detonation safety that I could locate in 1980 for Orval Jones and published the collection See Ref 102 3 8 The Tri-Laboratories' Second Nuclear Safety Manifesto 1960 1961 The principal impetus for issuing a second statement by the AEC's nuclear weapon design laboratories to present recommendations for improving nuclear weapon safety was the sudden wide introduction of forward-deploy maximum readiness nuclear weapon systems The first statement Ref 17 was motivated by inttoduction of weapons with scaled-pit nuclear subsystems and focused on the nuclear weapon enticy as the prim '1chicle for improvements the second Ref 27 also addressed the broader topic oflhe system of practices procedures and inftasbucture in support of the total nuclear weapons program From a technicaJ and jurisdictional viewpoint another major motivation was to emphasize the need for concentration on protection against threats invol ing deliberate unauthorized human acts--this time in the context of forward deployments instead of the threats ofinadvcrtent or deliberate acts of one's own forces At the time of the drafting there wu spirited competition within ahe laboratories on division of design responsibilities for advanced PAL concepts led by Sandia's Don Cotter Johnny Foster had begW1 a research program X Division at LRL under Dr Marvin Marv Gustavson at least three years earlier partly in conjunction with the already cited work of Fred Charles lklc at the RAND Corporation NOTE The ir toval between the two manifcstoc s on nuclear safety was less than three years The two driving forces advent of sealcd-piUwooden bomb designs and forward deployments in reality were intcrcwincd and their relationships were complicated by the increasing likelihood of severe accident incidental lo deployments on alert postures As is told here weapon design did not fully appredatc the accident thn at for another sb years This oven ight can in part be attributed to lack of a weapon design conscience function at Sandia or elsewhere in the AEC complex As a ne vly promoted Dhision Supervisor August H 1961 l replaced Del Olson anj became responsible for Sandia's nuclear weapon system safety activilies and in the process bt caml the S311dia principal for this rcpon Drafts had been prep ired and coordinat d by Del Olso Bob Pcurifoy and LR L's Man· Gustavson Del Olson was assigned to AEC Headquart1 rs Division of Ji lh iry Application staff on lo in from Sandia In ore er lo hdp pr1Jc ss lb flood of nuclear safety mies coming from the military servicts system safoty studii s Dtl wns Sandia's first employee robe placed on rotation ii Jssigmnent t• i fed rnl ugency but th ussignnu nl wus 56 -GFFiefAL USE ONLY I Q I I • I I ' I - or tt9E ·8AtAt short-lived because the bure lllcracy could not allow continuation of Del's Sandia retirement and other benefits Leon Smith was transferred to another part of the n lear weapons program Don Coner was promoted to Director of Management Staff in a reorganization My experience with nuclear safety had been limited to the ESD episodes described earlier and I took advantage ofbeing thrown into the middle of the design safely policy and practices report for a quick read and study At the time I could detect no distinction between the discipline of nuclear weapon system safely and the discipline here that I later came to call Nuclear V eapon Design Safety Del Olson's contributions to thcmanifc 5to included writing these basic principles used to ensure 3dequate nuclear safety l Energy sources are isolated lrom critical components such ns the deronators or rhe mechanical safing material by interposing several components which respond to different and independent conditions In an abnonnal situation these components arc designed to provide either passive or active isolation Arm safe switches and thmnalsensiri •e fuse links are respective examples of passive and active isolation elements which are used During the normal anning fuziug and fa ring sequence these components perfonn active or passive transfer or transfonn functions 2 Energy is stored in such a state that it must be transfonned to some other state in order to be utilized for the operation of critical components Energy stored at 28 volts in a battery for example must be transfonncd to a high voltage state in order to fire the weapon detonators 3 Energy of a reagnitude significantly greater than that ofmosl anticipated spurious signals is required for operation ofcritical components The use of high-energy detonators is an example of the use of this principle 1 Energy is dem•ecl from certain environments which tend to be unique to the weapon's normal mode of dclh·cry for use either as the primary energy for operation ofcritical components or for control of other components which serve to transfer or transform stored energy for operation of critical components Inertial generators and acceleration switches are examples of some of the devices that are used 5 Time interdependence is required between anning functions For cxa 'llple a requirement may exist that certain arming signals be received in a particular s qucnct or concurrently with other signal l lhus reducing the possibility of arming from other than the intended sources 6 The faiJ safe design approach is used to assure that component or subsystem failures cn isioned a ponraneous environmentally induced or as resulting from accidental human action-2 will serve 10 safe the weapon rather than to arm it Source SC-4630 VD October 1961 Ref 27 Soml readers ma ' note with interest how the thinking abour active and p issh·c isolation has chan ed over the years from that given in th first listed basic prindple ··0FfletAf -USe eNi ¥ ' 57 JJ 1 n1rnr•1 -8FFICIAL USE ONLV The thrust of my coordination task was to seek remonl of Marv Gustavson s hard-sell section on LRL 1 s extreme version of PAL Of course l knew little about PAL since that technology was being separated out of safety by Don Cotter and Leon Smith and held close because of extreme sensitivities with the military se ices My feeble attempts to delete Marv Gustavson's wording failed and he informed me quite bluntly that I had done all the toning down that he would accepL He presented the choice that rewording should cease or LRL would withdraw its endorsement ofthe report Sandia acquiesced and the following recommendation remained 8 Techniques for making nuclear weapons more tamper-resistant should be investigated l was to continue a most rewarding consultation relationship with Marv Gustavson until his early death The issue oflaboratories' design responsibilities was to continue until the June 6 1962 decision by President Kennedy National Security Action Memorandum 160 to equip nuclear weapons deployed in NATO with PAL devices and to direct the AEC's weapons laboratories to continue exploring advanced technologies for improved PALs By subsequent decision of AEC DMA Sandia w is assigned primary responsibility l1lld adapted LRL's work-du highly sophisticated extremely tamper-resistant subsystem concept Orval Jones resurrected the letter from AEC DMA that made this assignment in mid-1997 upon listening to Johnny Foster's Banquet Speaker talk on the history of nuclear weapon safety Ref l 5 and recalling the fragility of Sandia's roles An er net of this letter is Appendix C My personal technical contribution to SC-4630 was limited 10 recognizing an Achilles heel in protection against deliberate unauthorized hwnao actions i e the t ' trcmc detail on weapon electrical system circuits and on component functioning contained in manuals and technical training courses both provided by Sandia's Military Liaison organization for the military service for use in possible future retrofits and explosive ordnance demolition training I had included in SC-4630 an appendix that examined the manuals for two thcnnonucle tr weapons as to content of detailed design infonnation and number of copies to be made for distribution As mentioned on page 23 here my sensitivity to providing detailed electrical circuit schematic drawings to mj itary users and to civilian users without need-to-know for that matter came from a personal experience about eight years earlier 3 9 Electromagnetic Radiation and Lightning Threats to Weapon Safety 1961-1963 In addition to the pre iously described tasks of nuclear safely and AF F subsyst ms tlesign guidance for bombs I inherited responsibilities for technical means to determine lhe susceptibilit · or U S nuclenr weapons to damage by the emissions of friendly communications and radar search equipment in the vicinity Once again the apprcach lakcn was a systems appro ich invohing a broad spectrum of technical adivities ran ing from • researching on E R fields and c oupling mi ch misms Jc cloping analytical techniqul s ·OFFlelAbtJSE ONl V • ' · ·1-•J• 'l • a -1 v na OFFIGIAL USE ONLY 1 • measuring the energy introduced into EEDs • xposing instrumented weapon prototypes • simulating EMR fields and • onducting field trials • Rcforcnce 178 is my rormul report on tl11 episode including presentation of 311afytkal models Jnd test data to affirm validity of the Sandia appro3ch Subsequtnt p31'ticipation by SMdi i in Admiral's tests was sc vcrcly curtailed NOTE I cite the U S S Enterprise episode only to illustr ire that a nuclear safoty conscifflcc fimction as I see it shoulJ include somewhere in the organization a well•infonncd advocacy for balance of safety and op r itional readiness considerations One point of view would insist that this conscitnce function should not be present in the nuclear afcty organization anc l its position on S3foty issues should be pure My practice was to keep the safety Malysts staff and direct sup¢rvisor pure and for me to c onsid r the balances at the next k ·el of supervision mJ to refer the rc sults of both to high r mana emcnt e ·c ls 'ia ' briefings progress report notes or formal report This pr ictke in my 'iew was d cimatcd in 1991 by Al Narath 's abolilil1n of the supervisory levd th it in my time strived to seek balance i e Dcp ulmcmt Manager or Division Sup rvisor u ntil the ubtlrdinatc level of Section Supervisor w is abolished sec puge 169 When thi l' 3vy later rcportc -d 1he tiring • f rocket mo1ors on a nonnuckar missil mat J to lircrnfl locntcd on the Jli t icXk of an ain r 1tl c mkr J hdpcJ urJngc for cxpcd tcu ·mJ s1n 11gthcm d rcscar h anJ d vdopm nt 2ctiV1tks anncd at accuraldy ch iractcrizing the E R en imnm nt including li hlnins instmmcnting the nuclc 1r w 1pon ordnam c Jcvic s known h susceptible to pri m m1rc pcrati 1n by EMR md examining rcm• uial harJw m • or 111 cii uural ch i n s tu 111i11gare the ertc ts l' I' EMR lh n11 y proul m ur u c i I as i I 1 family r1f ckcrrically i111i iah d c pll1 i 'dy 1 r olh• r 1 •h m c d n acli m p l'a J J · i t i EE0 11h 1t r cd tl'l wit ·h i k cri 11 circhil i hJ • 1 r itt i • 1 In d m ch mi il ur - •Jr t•J b1 i11 1i r 1ti m f ekctncJI pl1w r • th lh· mul 1 wt ry pn r -mpplksl 01 i i t ic rdibilii y or pr m mir 1 1p rarim1 1f U I s H cr dihk l I i fE 1R •K iS 1 k tsfSE QtaJQPr •J • environment was established by Sandia an dl crgency•prioriry search was ininatcd to identify in the entire nuclear weapon stockpile my sitwtion whereby use of EEDs that could present a nuclear detor131ion safety concern One such deficiency was found-use of an EEO as the major sating device between the high-voltage thermal batteries and the X-unit capacitor bank in the 827 nuclear bomb Immediate action was taken to place the bombs in inert storage configurations thus red-lining'' or ceasing operational capability of the using military agency ind to redesign the circuits to replace Uic EEO with a non-suscepriblo device a solenoid• operotcd relay switch This event of 1962 was yet another case of a remedial nction program unden3kcn by the AEC for nuclear detonation safety reasons in the fiv¢ ycors since advent of sealed-pits The earlier cases were the retrofits of A MAC and ESOs NOTE Such retrofit actions are at the initiative of the weapon designer rather th an being a response to a dcficimcy uncovered by the user and arc a hallmark of the U S nuclear weapons safcty program 3 10 Maturity Reached in Sandia's Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program 1961-1963 On April 17 1962 AEC ALO announced its int nt to begin a process of nuclear weapon safety studies and rcvie vs to cover manufacturing or assembly operations for its plants at Pm1tex Texas Burlington Iowa or cdina Texas and requested Sandia 10 p uticipaac Sandia's system safety studies organization has provided a voting member for all studies oflhis type and in later years for simil u- studies of atmospheric and undcrgrowtd full-sc i lc nuclear tests and Plowshare experiments This of course is in contrast to nuclear weapon system safety studies where Sandia's technical achisor is not fom131Jy gi ·cn 11 te As indicated by Figure 7 the rate ofacciucnts involving the scaled-pit type of nuclear weapons decreased after 196t •s two serious ones However the involvement of Sandia's system safety study specialists in investigations of two significant incidents not accidents proved to be of high importance in pro •iding essential feedb ick into the weapon design process In 1962 four Mk 28 Fl bombs in a quadruple package that had been downloaded fol owmg QR • st1rus it an Versl as base were founJ 10 ha ·e their high• 'oltagc rc idy s fc switches in the mntd position Following a tenacious and 1 xhaus1i ·e sen n-month investigation by Paul R Soud r in my division th cause W3S Jclt -rmincd to have bt en a loos nul that had shorted an unused ohsoltte rad ir-heaiing circuit to an arming lin inside an Air Force junction box in the aircraft such S to byp 1ss the T-249 A tAC OFFICIAL IJSE ONf ¥ 11 1 i $i8RE ¥FA'¾ FICIAL USE ONl Y- • - •1 ' - ' - • 4 '1 ·•· • • 11111 • I - i I -• ' • • - 'I - i • -i I I 1i - l '¥ Figure 7 Summar of Accidents lnvo Ving U S Nuclear Wot1pons OFFICIAl --USE-0Nt¥ f il ••fd1I I' 1 I l i -t' - i - - l ii Gl O CC 1¥11 b I OFFICIAL US ONLY ' 'iOTE fhc DoD did not ousiJcr this nui leur safoty cvcnl to be an ac id ' as lh n 1crm Vas and still is Jctincd anJ did not have to nil om a response task force 1 inten·encd and supported Paul Soudcr's milJ'Velous sleulhing using my Jivision'j A 1 fAC hat mlhcr than irs wc 1pon systems safely hat In this case SamJia provided a conscience tum rion DEtlJID By tli ·pcoccss ot_seeking tcchnica1 rhe weapon system safety'study Jlaff amed illl essentially automatic in itation from the Air Force to puticipatc Similarly in olvcmcnt of weapon d Sign specialists from Los Alamos and Livermon yielded insights that led to subsequent improvements in weapon capabilities AEC staff and weapon laborntoncs· involvement in weapon ac_cidents and m3jor incidents are sho vn by Figure 8 i i11v'11vem ntrnacciJ nts a nci i ncident in c-stigalions Bickelman and LASL·s Toi n Scolman later a major player in safety of full-scale nuclear tests convinced the Air Forte not to perfonn the Render Safe Proct -dures contained in manu ils published under Sandia's cognizance The RSP procedure would hav1 involved essenti illy complete tear down to reniovc the HE nm IL-nr subsystem on sit md so package it separately for return to the U S I an onJy imagine the rc- iction of non•l S NATO forces if such an C ' l were made known This q isadc was to reinforce my career-long commitment to change E plosive Ordnance Demolition EOD 1 hilosophits and pracliccs so illow maximizing· nuclear satcty and use control My adversary was Sandia's Military Liaison Directonte who wrote the manu ils and seemed lo owe more aUegiru1cc to the military £ OD reruns th3n ro safety This b lltle w3s finally won comJ letely only after my retirement in 1985 D011 DILii ' I t 9 Ar r '1-9 R1Jn itd I Fi OFFIGIAL USE ONLV 11 I LDCIII I i o v -P tlTJ- »C11 -1 'll U cs1 AFB Tuu Abol M Ju sJ B-'1 I u I LA Lll rOtalA U a 1 AfS LA LA l Bult • • 1- 11al e CClllllllKIII Alld D tOOUtlft l itpemf 11 'Ii eriJct HE dctoaari•• llnldut slllpp d 1e AEC OICIINUII Lani 51 A•Nolll LASL-0 ilS nidt 41 0-Nor t Pans lll flU III AEC llnidulr p dmA£C tJG 1111 L- -W B LtJl f I LASL - w w_Cll'r ·1 wa·- cleat Dfl c 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Cit cruh H ull-4 s n 'il jl l U ft a P't i u I S A 0 BICIJctn» 1-Pvaclulie d inlad Rcsi411c sh ppsd Y11l aCey CA JJI-L' I £11r 11 • 1 1 lp lt il-5l ca lh itn 1aa ' A pL Phi fl ALO- - i1c-H llulllt I _ t' N At'- t 1 1 u EOD tllll l calU Af Oym ' l 'r'I A i • r ll-C•J 1' J I l ' r OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3 11 Test Device Safety Studies During the Period of Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere 1961-1962 L pon the IJ S S R 's resumption of ulJ c ilc nuc IC3t tests m 1961 m abrogation of the moratorium of 1958 the U S formed Joint Task Force Sunder Brigadier General Alfred D Dudd Starbird to conduct nuclear weapons tests in the aonosphere Brigadier General Starbird 1ppointcd LI Col Roger Ray U S Anny as his range safety officer for tests at Christnw s Island fdir Imps and Johnston Island bigh altitude missile shots From JJt aJministrative nuclear afc ty ·icw rhc modus operandi was the conventional one ofpr paring Standard Operating Procctlurc SOP documents and having them reviewed by technical staif officc rs There were no fonnal sy tcm safety studies in the vein of tho for OoD weapon systems and at the time tht TC had been no DOE safety studies From a technical nuclear safety vicwpoin however kc · penons trom the AEC ' ·capons laboratories princip3lly S sndia included nuclear safety and uming and fu7 ing spedalists beaded by Del Olson a The initial test series known as Dominic I included 34 nuclear tests--28 airdrop tests between April 25 1962 and October 30 1962 four 01issile-launcbcd tests at Jo UlSlon Island between July 9 1962 and October 20 1962 and two launches of operational missiles by the U S Navy Frigate Bird launched from a Polaris submarine on May 6 1962 and Swordfish launched from a surface ship 3nd detonated underwater on May 11 1962 Available records for the operational 1ests show no evidence that a special weapon system safety s1udy was conducted these weapons w re lauoehcd according to o rational procedw-es studies conduc1 -d artier 11 There was no fonnal involvement of the AEC in these operational tests-a situation to be rectified upon ad 'ent of tho Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963 3 12 Nuclear Test Safety Studies 1963-1975 In consideration of the treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Scaff n commcndcd f' ur safeguards and these were endorsed by the Pr ident L1miccd Test Bm Tre try Safegu irds •·1 11h conduct of comprehcnsi 'e aggrc ssive and continuin underground nuclear test programs designed to add to our knowl di c and improve t Ur weapons in all ircas of significance to our military posmrc for the future l ' Th maintcn3ncc of' motlcm nucle r l ibor itory facilities and programs in theoretical ind exploratory nuclear tcchnoh gy which will attr ict retain and insure the conrinut J • er Sln ibr s cploy d ro the r 1 iti m- i lu lc f W lliJm R 1Rill1 HoJgl m I 11 l J 1m 'i S iimu W11_ h1 t - J rJc p s J 'Ulg lfc l Blrbe s l'o nt I a· lll ln i Wl' n- D ho Jt •h m sile H 1r11t¥ p• m Juhn h m f• m l' IJtli I rlpoo swn uiff1m•J 'r •111 th- ••j'l J t1 n ll r 1h 11hc 11 i II I r 1u1r I atb J tng SJ 1 1 J · 1- t 'i t cnu d h 1 1 ' e rm rd 1 m-llrt h u 1 1Hc 1 11 111J ·OFFICIAL USE ONLY application of our human scicmtilic resources to these programs on which continued progress in nuclear technology depends 3 The maintenance of the facilities and resources necessary to institute promptly nuclear tests in the atmosphere should they be deemed essential to ow- national sc cwity or should the trtaty or any of its tcnns be abrogated by the Soviet Union 4 The improvement of our capability within reasible and practical limits to monitor the terms of the treaty to detect violations and to maintain our knowledge of Sino-Soviet nuclear activity capabilities and achievements Safety studies for the first safeguard under1 'f'Ound nucicar· device tests at the Nevada Test Site and other potential on-continent locations became the responsibility of a new group known as NV-HEG for Nevada Operations Office's Hazards Evaluation Group The NV-HEG reported to the Manager AEC-NVO with members appointed by the Manager's Scientific Ad isors from the AEC's laboratories and the DoD Sandia's loog-temt members of the group were Melvin L Mel Merritt for fallout production and general interests and Robert E Bob Reed for fuzing and firing 0 Safety studies for the third safeguard readiness for annospheric nuclear device tests became the responsibility of a new group known as the JHEG for Joint Hazards Evalu ition Group Joint in this case referred to tbe combination ofAEC and DoD interest explicit in the types of airdrop and missile-delivered tests envisioned The JHEG which reported to the Commander Joint Task Force 8 was chaired by Dr Robert R Bob Brownlee of LANL later by Dr John S Malik of LM9L and Dr Robert E Bob Yoder long-term members of the JHEG Sandia's members were Parker F Jones Supemsor of the Systems Safct I Division and Jack Recd a specialist in blast effects Robert L Bob Hilty ofDOE AL's Weapon System Safety Branch also was a tong-tenn member The NV-HEG was to be a major player in the underground test of the high-yield W71 SPARTAN AB t warhead conducted in Amchitka Alaska in 1971 The JHEG was to consider tests that were not to occur however in the study process the nIEG developed important philosophical approaches to safety Upon cessation of the READG 9ESS program in 1975 both the NV-REG and the ffiEG were dissolved NOTE In 1967 while rethinking the allowable risk lbr atmospheric full-scale nuclear tests in the Pucific Bob Brownlee ofLASL wrote an extremely lucid paper Ref 28 on the gc ncral reaction of society to particular levels of probabilistic risk Brownlcc's concern was with tsunamic waves from a hypothetical nuclear detonation at sea level given a fu1 ing and Ii ring error in the test His 1 apcr was cited favorably in the first rt'pon by the A EC on nucle ir reactor safety WASH I 50 r extracted a passage for publicntion in Ref 129 · J ' · Mli ili7ffff 90FFIGIAL USE ONLY 3 13 Joint US UK Field Tests on Plutonium Dispersal 1963 The U S S R ·s ibrogation of the moratorium on full-fcale nuclear testing in the atmosphere pro -ided an opponunity in 1963 to conduct more thorough field tests of nucltar weapons in order to provide a detailed understanding of the phenomena of plutonium aerosol creation and dispersal A site on Sandia's Tonopah Test Range in Nevada was prepared complete with particle-measurement grids suspended by balloons and a large array of ground-based instrumentation Sandia's Jim Shreve and UK AWR E's Ken Stewart were the scientific Ji rectors for the test series Based on preliminary analysis of test results the AEC-DoD Nuclear Safety Working Group recommended no change to the m iss limit rule set in 19S7 This test series continuca to provide the only definitive measurements for the source tenn'' of a plutonium dispersal incident 3 14 Status of the Nuclear Weapon System Safety Group 1963 As indicated by Figure 6 the technical staff of nuclear weapon system safety specialists at SNLA had reached 11 high of a dunng 1962 Hy reference to Figures 2 and 3 one can note that 1962 was also near the peak level of activity of new weapon systems entering deployments in the national defense force structwe All of the twelve persons who had served on that staff since its inception in 19S7 had been recruited from Sandia's weapon engineering development organizations to capitalize on their understnnding of the nucl ar weapons program Furthermore these assignments were considered by management to be shon-lcrm job rotations intcnded to broaden the individuaPs career potential Beginning in 1963 upon cessation of full-scale nuclear testing in the atmosphere S utdia undertook major technical initiatives in advancing weapon technologies to which inadequate attention had been afforded during the hectic years oftesting and all-out engineering development for stockpile Note the abrupt pause in new programs in the McNamara era'' of the rnid-1960's The staffing of the newly created Advanced System Development Directorate 1600 depicted the safety staff causing a sh i ft in source of staff lo the thcn fcclining areas of Manufacturing Development and Quality Assurance 3 15 Nuclear Weapon Electrical System Design Practices Documented 1963 rn late•l 96' Sandia' s weapon systi ms organization began to draft a report Ref 29 that would review state of the mt in weapon eh ctrical 3ystem design and would offer specilic design guidance in the area of bomb fuzing ancl firing The report also analyzed design problems and approaches that had been used o 'er the years including a discussion of 14 anomalies accidents incic lcnts -ind other significant mishaps caused by design t -rrors 6 procedural errors 2 accidents 2 random circ uit failures 3 and umktcrrnincd failure I The cJusc or the taler event premature HE detonation of a B43 released in a non-nuclear lc St drop from a 8-52 was solved alter tht report Rct 24 was issued in April 1963 This event W3S a safe-separation problem for a wan1mc s1tua1ion and not a nuclear Jctonation in pcacc1imc concern The tallowing topics were discussed under lhc hc3ding of Circuit Design redund mcy circuit isol itton IWO•input ai proach scqu ncm ground circuits connector and c ahling ri 'Sl5tance ' OFFICIAL USE ONLY considerations unusual environments fae eh ctromaguetic radiation lightning and nuclear radiation and testing The authors of the report were Alfred R Al Mandell and Stanley D Stan Spray Al Mandell had been mvolvcd in weapon electrical systems continoously from the Manhanan Project md Stan Spray had been a lead design project engineer on the B57 where bent pins on c lecuical coMcctors hacJ been a most rroublesome problem This report constituted a status rcpon for the state of nuclear detonation design safety There was no organizational entity at Sandia for this discipline at the time and would not f or another five years 3 16 Formation of Sandia's Systems Approach for Safety fn Weapon Design B61 1961-1964 As mentioned earlier I was literally dumped into lhc area of weapon system safety and bomb AF F on August 16 1961 as a newly promoted Division Supervisor who inherited the organization that Del Olson and Don Cotter had buill and had left for other endeavors As can be detennined from Figures 2 and 3 3 major hiatus in the U S nuclear weapon program began in the early 1960s in part as a result of the nuelear test moratorium of 1958 and the advent of the Robert S McNamara era in the DoD e g the use of cost-efTecti eness studies The c 'ltreme paucity ofweapon development projects thrc itened to destroy the capabilities of the weapon design teams and tho weapons producticm complex The ' veapons community within AEC and DoD reacted by commissioning a new bomb-development program rhe B61 tactical tbennonuclcar full-fuzJng option bomb The argument being that one bomb program required about three times the etron for one warhead l s Division Supcn sor oflhe Electrical Systems Division responsible for bomb systems definition August 1961 to April 1964 I used the B61 projecl as a vehicle upon which to advance a systems approach to weapon development This approach involved the broadest consideration oflhe role oflhe new bomb in national security posrure and the appropriate design features to accommodate the role to be assumed In this regard systems thinking attributable to the leudership of Smith Cotter and Peurifoy at S mdi 1 could be conrrastcd to project thinking where strict and narrow conformance lo the requireme 11s·· established by the military service OoD user is inviolate The first contribution or note wns lo challenge the basic d sign approach of having a difforcnt bomb for each operational scenario I cxamim d in detail the origin and apparent rationale for ach statement of ''rcquircmcnt1 jn the MC 11J1d found W1 incrcdibl lack of focu l on the specific nct 'tls and roles for the bomb in short an wunatching set of parameters glean d from the historical base of previous MCs My draft working paper not located for this vriting sec fonh for internal design team rc ·iew the fragile nature oflbc MCs and calktl tor an ass- rt1ve position by SandiaiLos lamos on realistic parameters ln my view the thinking stimulated by this approach was as factor in Los Alamos· and Sandia's initiatives in the B61 subsc qu ntly hccoming the mosl n rsatik wc apon in lhe stllckpilc · -OFFIGf At -ttS1 -eNt V i i 91_1J ICL ifPl'9 OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3 17 The President's National Security Action Memorandum on Nuclear Weapon Safety Responsibilities 5 61 Certain ambiguities concerning AEC and DoD responsibilities arose as a consequence of extensions in deployment of nuclear weapons from sttatcgic operations at bases in the r C' ntimmt 1 US tn t 1e1iC al nprntinnR 1r fnrwarn ha ' t 'l Thr AFC C afrm11n tt c tifir n tn 1hr JCAE in 1959 as to the need 10 clarify by legisl3tion responsibilities of AEC and DoD with respect to weapons in DoD custody The issue arose again in December l960 in connection with a request of President Eisenhower to approve a nucl ar weapon dispersal plan As a result of a JCAE visit to NATO in late 1960 1CAE Chainnan Holifield wrote President Kennedy c iting the need for clarification of responsibilities On May 8 1961 National Security Action Memorandum S l was issued stating in pan With regard 10 the broader question concerning responsibility within the government for the safety of nuclear weapons the President has directed that that Department of Defense have immediate administrative responsibility for identifying and resolving health and safety problems connected with the custcdy 311d storage of nuclear weapons He has further specified that the Atomic Energy Commission will participate in the consideration of these problems as a matter of continuing responsibility He bas instructed that any issues which cannot be directly rcsol •ed by the DoD and the AEC will be referred to him through this office for decision Accordingly it is requested that the Depamnent of Defense in cooperation with the AEC and such other agencies as may have a direct interest in this matter undertake promptly a srudy ofwhat additional administrative and statutory provisions may be required in relation to the safety of nuclear weapons ind nuclear weapons systems and to report to the President through this office as soon QS possible the results of their study courses of action agreed upon ind any actions which are recommended for the President to take This NSAM satisfied the JC I E and no legislative change was suggested i$ ··0FFl6lA --USE-ONl Y • 4 THE LEVEL-OF-EFFORT YEARS 1964-1968 With the cessation of full-scale nuclear testing in the atmosphere in 1962 Sandia cntcr 'C I a period f operation under a funding and managemait practice that I l3ter tmncd ··Levcl•of• Effort LoE and have d -s ribed in considerable detail in a series of essays and memoranda s me of whicb arc includc d here as references for this Jiscussaon rhe relevant aspect of LoE is rhat conduct of Adv mctd Systems R D became 3 lcgitimate mission and attracted commitment oftechnicaJ talent throughout Sandia lo an extent that was unprecedented Review of Figures 2 and 3 shows that there were essentially no really creative nuclear weapon developm '111 projects from 1962 until advent orthc antibaJlistic missile warhead projects in the J3te-1960s Advanced meant in advance of scheduled nonnal weapon projecrs authorized by the DoD-not cxploratory as _the cffon much later was 10 be labeled and mll04jed This distinction as to intc ndcd ultimate USc of the technology is important to appn ciatiun of the times 0 4 1 Advanced Developments In Use Control 1962-1965 The main reference for this section is my draft working paper Blackhatting-A Review of Adversary Simulation Activities in Nuclear Weapon Use Control Programs at Sandia National l aoorarorics dated November 1981 Ref 31 I wu nor directly invol •cd in those use control matters involving permissive action links PALs a ad gathered the m3terial outlined here in prq aration for becoming responsible for the division that did advm3ry simulation analyses of PAL hardware Figure l 0 shows a rimeline that relates in sequc nce of dcvc lopmcml the types of PAL dc ·iccs described later in this p3pr r for purposes of clarity in presentation To review earlier discussion the evolution of use control activitiC'S began with the Con 'l'CSsional Joint Committc e on Atomic Encrgy s trips to NATO countries in late-I 960 Nauonal Security Action Memorandum NSAM 160 issui d by President Kcoocdy in 1962 directed the expedited im orporation of PAL switches in oucltar weapon systems in NATO support This activity became 3 crash progr3n1 n SNL for several years NSAM 160 also directed that the AEC's Wt apons Jaboratl rie b¢ tasked with development of ad 'anccJ subsystc ms 10 prO 'tde even hi hc r Jc ds of use control to include mechanisms to aslure sdf-Jcstruction of 3 weapon if l fforts arc made to bypass the pennissi 'C link herein callcJ PAPS ermissi 'e nnmg and £rotc ction ystem E irly dc 'clopmcnt of the more advam cd PAPS subsystem ' ti undertaken by LLL hO ¢ 'c r by mid-1963 rhc work was lr msforrcd to SNLA by AECiDMA decision fhc Jdinjtions f t m1c given below facililJtc the ensuing Jiscussion f J si n inJ dcs1Lm l ' ffl cti · nc ss uf use l' on rul dc ·iccs and ubsystcm -OFFIGJAL USE ONtY ftp • • • ii l ·• 1 11 p• - 11 J 'OP W I fA ft El OFFI0IAL l ISE ONLY 'Luu HUIII• • n A C ra --- A • ff•H _ D J c t- - - DI ·t--- - -1 --- ----- I ' ii -'iu I· ' -· ' ·- · I- - - r ee El4 82 130 88 70 t--- • 72 78 715 '7 · eo r --- u s ct _ •·- t N e C OAlu uru opf rDJClm•la lal•phon• tnx k u rce Division supervlaor t --- 0 i cl 14 r Ai jc NCJt '' l Cal gury PAL ' Stockpile Category PAL In OU I0lopmnnt - WOtChJ caplhllll tOO And within quotallDfl i2 mark aro codu name tor ewp11rlm•n••• with lu•wn mm Vftrlou organ1 tlunts i iv p ¥4 11 ls Ji- fil Ji • L7 -i - _ - •- tJ Nw 4fftfttl nt1 -------- iG g DO 1d a couNTta ASINK·lt LL 1 · - 'hl a· A I ••• _ ri IJ M t l M A • - '-'' Ul • ht'I - - _ ----· mr 'Q-X-11 Rehired A'9u 14 gj nanl n 'So•-r-••I 1 - -- - i i c -E s L_ 2ia I k •'u• ' • i u nad nn-- nlt• •• cS en 62 84 se ea 70 '72 7-4 78 78 Figure 9 Nuclear Weapon Adversary Simulation Use Control Specialists at SNLA i961-1981 O OFFICIAL USE ONLY so 111• FJiFEi OFFICIAL USE ONLY Use Control ln bro3dest terms use control is the prevention of unauthorized uses of nuclear we ipons gi ·en that access to lhe wc 3pons has been gaincd ° For this n ort the definition is restricted to those nuclear weapon hi11'dW3I'C features that protect against intentionaJ but unauthorized nuclear detonations Pennissive Action Link PAL A coded device that inhibits unaulhori1 c d anning of a nuclear w npon Command Dis-J blemcnt Subsystems CD Ways to render inoperable one or more parts of a nuclear weapon for a lime delay against a specific threat Adversary Simulation '131w khatting 0 An effon organized to counter those me lSUres taken by a designer a Whitehal'' that provides protection against specific unwDnted manipulations of a physical t -ntity by an adversary a Blackhat The effort includes an analysis and or erimcnl where 1he adversarial threat is simulated by a person or group other than the designer in order to m3intain a high degree ofindependence in assessment For use control adversary simulation involves only the protective hardware not the code management and other administrative procedures Design Analysis Effort directed toward identifying weaknesses in the hardware design such as to indicate corrective actions lhe designer can employ to eliminate or otherwise avoid the weakness Effectiveness Assessment Effort directed toward determining the degree of protcclion provided by tbe d1 -sign The first-generation PAL switch w is an clcclJ'Omechanical device invented by D W Don Wilkes a member of an advanced development component di ·ision supervised by R P Bob Stromberg The device was quite noisy while operating and the acoustic emanation was rcc ognited as a potential way for compromising the code to which the device was set Bob Stromberg reveals that prototype hardware was delivered to a facility of the National Security Agcm y io Washington D C for a code-picking attempr that lasted about two weeks and was unsuccessful This finding however did not satisfy John Kane another technical staff mt 'fflber in Bob Stromberg' di ision Following some highly imagioatiw e pcriments in secluded stru turcs John K me de i scd a way lo pick the code and in doing so he hec unc an early ··Btackhattcr '1 1 B -the same tokc n Don Wilke was the ' Whitehaner He later b interested in ways to counter advanced PAPS systems and pmkip ucd as i Blackhattcr Boch wt re in the same divisiont making it difticulr to suppon the claim 1hal independence muse bl an essential altributc in effective and credible d ·ersary simul ition The cpiscxlt did how ver sugg st lhal deep immersion in the rdtv mt technology i e small cleclromcchanicaJ switches might bl a mun importW1t auribuh 1lun independence rhcrc ts a period of keen competition at SNL bi twcen ad x nes of elr ctromcchamcal and of ki -trunic switches for 1he follo ·•on P L switch John Kane i ontintti J to hlackhat the former S c R- - Om fo s p pcr on l-roaJ r a i - b uf -a n eJr iron - r r rroL lki i h IIJt•· · or l'i JI um r clJ S lli J J' T p Srcict m l l -c1 r r n1cJ ipprupri i d 0 f FftclAL USE ONLY q _ 8 i II I 3 I 71 tc -tl E 1if ttr · OFFICIAL USE ONLY and a highly competent electron ic spccialis1 Di ·ision Supen·isor J E rChuck Gross was Jppoinred to blackblt tl1e lanc r Oauck Gross was in 1hc same dcp anment JS the division doing he c ompon nt design-interestingly the radar development department 1hat had originated the l yal ' pposirion c onc pt ofbl ickhalling at SlA -11en PAL switches were committed for incorporation into nuclear we i pons the nuclenr weapons systems safety division supervised by Del Olson iddied a new si c tion to handle PAL supcr ised by M M Max Newsom later that year 1963 - EC OMA directed that secure container system R D responsibility be transferred from UL to SLA iml Del Olson re-oricnlt d the division toward PAUPAPS altogether Gene l 'es supervised the PAL'PAPS systems section and Ma -t Newsom supervised the PAPS component design section Gene Ives assigned two members of his section Don Bickclm m Jnd G R Glenn Norris to wrange for blackhatting of th two principal candidate technologies To avoid the pitfalls associated with the c ttremc specialization on nuclear weapons which then characterized the SLA staff contracts were let with the Stanford Research Institute and the fledgling locaJ-a rea finn Braddock OUM and McDonald now BDM Contracts covered the period July 1963 10 November 1965 The fivc-ycors 1963-1968 was an unusuul period at SNL in that a combination of circumstances elevated tlle advanced development program from a modest portion of total R D say l 0-15% to the major program say O 'cr 40% and research activities amounted to another 1 % Atmospheric nuclear testing ended in 1963 and the four safeguards for 1he nuclear weapons program adopted by the Congress as a condition for the Limited Test Ban Treaty rc quired the conduct of aggressh·e weapons R O f cchnical staff became available as testing activities wuunJ down Additionally weapon system acquisition practices wtre affected by the systems analysis cosl-effectiveness approach of Secretary of Dcfcmc Rohen McNamara and lhe regulating cancellations and stretched-out time scales released weapons engineering Phase 3 staff ut the AEC's laboratories for reassignments Use control subsystems became om of the several major thrusts of Sandia's advanced development program in mid-1963 11 W lS cle ir at the onset lh it use control dcvelopmenl would be fum lamcntaJJy different from rr iditional nuclear weapon urdm1nce engineering because there was no performance specHication against which to design test and evaluate Neilher the 1hrcats nor the Jppropriatc responses to the tlveats h Jd been Jcfincd Titls situation led to i stablishrncnl of a Counter-Effort division John Kane from component development group and H M Hur 1c c Polecl an ckc tronics spc ctalist were borrowc d on a tc mporary basis as IUIOl'S Under Gus Simmons blackhatting of PA S subsystems bc -caruc inslituliunali1 ecl at SL - By nrnl• l1 65 the ad 'anccd J elopmcnt proJccts rdatcd to nuclear weapons w rc complete 1Rl 'ls 6 i mJ 6b f Ref 311 the tcd111olo y shdv- d to await a cus1om r mu the development 'hikhat h am Jisba nJcd Gus Simmons Jr d his li ·ision hi g m to W ' rk on non-weilpons 1p1 lk atil ns f1h t chnology Rt r 6 of R f 3 t 72 -OFFH IAL tJSE ONLV- -s co AE711iP ·OFFICIAL USE ONLY 4 2 Nuclear Weapon System Accidents Cumberland MD and Bunker Hill AFB IN 1964 In June 1963 the nuclear we'Jpon development organization al Sandia Albuquaque was extensively reorganized and in the pro ess I began my second however brief it was to be direct involvement in nuclear wcupon system safety I had inherited jntact the nuclear weapons systems safety section under Bill Hoagland in August 1961 upon Del Olson's assignment to AEC DMA in Washington and my promotion to replace him as di 'ision supcnisor and h ad been responsible for its functioning for about six months until Del's return At lhat timep Del was given b ick the section augmented by Gene hes as a staff member My -cond ''tour ' of duty was to Inst only 10 months ending in April 1964 with a lateral transfer lo Don Cotter's management staff directorate Thus I was on hillld for one of 1he two nuclear weapon accic c nts discussed below On January 13 1964 a B- 52 strategic bomber carrying two bombs the type that 1 knew • -ell having been in lolved in the development project broke apart in Oight and crashed on Big Savage Mountain near Cumberland MD Both bombs broke apart on impact Dan Buchly was assigned by Bill Hoagland to join the Air Force's accident response lc am fom1ed to depan Kirtland AFB promptly LASL did not pro dea representative but Walt Whire from DOE AL responded We learned that an Explosive Ordflancc Demolition EOD team of the U S Army which was in-transit at the time W3S diverted to the crash site and was operating on-scene The Air Force team was preparing to remove the bombs quickly from the site with heavy material handling equipment in order to reduce media coverage I can recall Dan Buchly's anxiety over disrurbing the bombs without knowing lhc condition I supported Dan's concern and this stand by ''the AEC led cventuaUy to a c trefully considered process of packaging and transporting the bombs to a designated AEC Cacility Diln resigned from Si111dia 3fic rwards hut not before writing the Sandia Report that do wnented the overatl nucle ir safely program Ref 25 On December S 1964 a 8•58 str itcgic bombtr c inying in a pod configuration our lhennonuclc ir bombs on the winp slid off of 3J1 icy runway at Bunker Hill AFB lnJi3na on t ta ci exercise mshcd and burned Osc ir L Oz' Oren 'U rhc Sandia safety specialist who joined the Air Force's accident r -sponsc team from Kirtli111d AFB i long wilh 11 LASL and an AECIALO reprei cntati 'c All bomb hardwan was rerumed to an AEC facility l was not im·ol 'ed in rhi » accident rcspons and im -cstigation and 1 recall no particular concern within SiJlldia's weapon dc clopmcnt organizations with res cl to accident cn ironmcnts and we ipon h udware beh wior therein 4 3 Advent of Fault Tree Analysis Methodology Late 1964 to Mid-1966 fol' a more detailed discus iun of this topi see Reference J3 3nd l-l5 When 1 was l 1tcrally transforr tl on Aptil I I%4 ' IS a division ur cr 'isor to Don Cotter's Jvanced Systi 'm Studies staff SanJia w c mo1utoring j contract let in 1961 to faUn matic -ornc· l 1 b - --·an WG i WH r J I I t • - I - n -c as OFFICIAL USE ONLY me • that would formulate n computer code to prepare and evaluate probability equations for complex clcctromcch3ltical systems e g a nuclear weapon arming system Mathematica had hc cn fonned a5 Princeton University spin-off by Oskar lorgcnstem credited with linking m 1944 game theory conceh •cJ by John Von Neumann and cc onomic behavior The S3Ildia sponsor was Arthur M An Brc ipohl of Cotter·s staff Art had been a reliability 3ssessment engineer and was completing his Ph D in Electrical Engineering at the time By latc-1964 George R Ellison ofCotter's sudTbad set up a parallel project within Sandia to write a code using the FORTRA 'l computer language in common use at Sandia-as contrasted to Marbematica's use ofIPL-V language foreign to Sandia George manged with me to ba ·e Sandia hire a colleague of his at Oklahoma University Richard V Dick Worrell to team wuh him on this effort code-named ESAP Eventpoint Systems Analysis Program These computer programs were directed to solution of reliability equations including those for premature operation ot a w pon systems• safe-c scape hardware There was no intent to my knowledge to apply it to nuclear detonation safely Upon my promotion to Dq ar1mc nt tanager on Cotter's staff in January l 196S I inherited lhc project as t manager and upoo lcaminy more about irs potential value to nucle ir weapon systems development became a stronger advocate In order to demonstrate applic11bility of the methodology George Ellison arranged a trial run using a hypothetical version ofa kitchen electrical stove not self-cleaning Mnce the project name HOTPOINT The code and computer hardware combination simply wns unable to handle this level of complexity beyond producing equations of only several orders-of-exactness This experience reinforced the value of appl ing simplifying assumptions to reduce u uctness requirements significantly-making the methodology essientially little better than that afforded by the skilJs of existing reUabili1y engineers at Sandia Ncvcrthc lcss l con1inucd a lo V•key sponsor of ESAP throughout the remaiodcr of my staff assignment-another two years More about ESAP and nuclear safety follows in the events of 1968 4 4 Plutonium Dispersal Safety of Nuclear Power Sources for Aerospace Systems 1965 After a several-year stint wi1l1 the Dikewood Corporat on in Albuquerque Carl Carlson w ts rehired by Dtin Coner on August 16 1963 to serve on Don·s management staff While al Oikewood C u-1 under contract to Sandia wrocc a report that $UnunarizctJ the use control program Ref 161 As p3rt of a program evaluation rc ·icw for Sandia's wkings in the AEC's Aerospace Nuck ir Safety I ANS program Carl was sought lo wril a lr tisc ll' u i m probing tl11 total ANS effort I did not learn about this work until some two ckC' 1d s later wh n I was rcidcwing the history l r 11 c e of prob ibili5tic risk assessment techniqu s in the nud ar w apon progr un Ref 13S Carl' - rem irknbk s1x-pag Jocumcnt i xamines nuclear ' tp n nfory pcricncc for nxioms algoritluns p u- 1bks ancl precautions perhaps rr msferable- to the acrospacl conh xt'' Ref 3•0 Its mnjor tluust was lo make the case for m ddng the safet '' th mc one of sssuring intact re-entry f r3dioisoL1 1pii thcm1oelectri · gcnl rators RTGs giv n mi sion abon rather than the theme in I Qf ilil61 118@1 11 tfs'f- • 1 ··· 7 4 ·sarYHIA• OFFl6W YSE ONLV use at the time that relied on bumup upon n -entry Carl was aware of the reentty vehicle thermal protection technology used at Sandia for wcapona and saw itS application here l include the treatise here as Appendi l D because 1 believe it to be one of the most deeply thoughtful penetrating and insightful statements on safety Gene Blake a veteran and talented mechanical engineer from the weapons developmenr program e g the W49 on which I had worked coupled Carl's theme with observation that NASA's assumption for an abort rate for the Apollo Manned Landing program w35 way out of line with Sandia's missiles and rockets experience NASA used a value of about 1 abort per 1 000 launches and Gene suggested that 1 in 10 was more realistic Apparently Gene Blake's argument was persuasive and the RTGs for Apollo were protected Pemaps you can recall the test Apollo 13 consecutively numbered ntission was aborted the moon-landing module containing the RTG reentered in free fall and the RTGs probably are now located deep within lhe Marianas Trench in the Pacific Ocean Aerosolized plutonium oxide was not dispersed worldwide 4 5 Nuclear Weapon System Accident B52 Palomares Spaln1 1 66 The B-52 and KC-135 collided during a routine high altitude air refueling operation Both aircraft crashed near Palomares Spain Four of the eleven crew members survived The B-52 earned four nuclear weapons One was recovered on the ground and one was recovered from the sea on April 7 after extensive search and recovery eifons Two of the weapons' high explosive materials exploded on impact with the ground releasing some radioactive materials Approximately 1 400 tons of slightly contaminated soil and vegetation were removed to the Uniced States for storage at an approved site Representatives ofthe Spanisl1 government monitored the clean-up operation Sandian Stuart V Stu Asselin of the weapon systems safety study group accompanied the Air Force's initial accident response team from its Dirt ctorate of Nuclear Safety at Kirtland AFB NM along with one person from DOE AL and two from Los Alamos Sandian Jack Howard who was at the me serving as the DoD Chairman Military Li iison Committee and Assistant to the Siecretary ofDefense Atomic Energy was the lead offk ial in the OoD's participarion in the accident recovery process The principal focus was 011 recovery of d bris cleanup of crops and soil contaminated by the dispersal of plutonium from the two weapon that experienced HE detonation and search and recovery for the missing fourth bomb l Their activities were politically sensitive ind received ext nsi e coverage by th press Titis cident was the first iuvolviu widespread cout i mina tion lts occurrence on foreign soil required na1ion 1 lcvel negotiations to dc eide upon the level of cont imination th tt would be ccept tble following cle mup Dr' Wright Langham of Los Alamos becrune the princ ip il scientific spokesman for the AEC's on-scene accident 1' l overy team •• S mdi in R C R mdy Ml ·dc w led u rod 't13mic inlly scs to r producc most problbl bomb ttajl cton s an effort that prcd1ttcd lite bornb's localion 10 be wnlun abour JOO fret of where ii was linally lo atcd hr grirl• s m h 1c d111iq11 which thi ny insi h d on cnntmuini -OFFICIAL USE 8Nt ¥- - • •2 I • • t • I 7'2 75 Aftermath of Palomares and Related Events 4 66 - 4 68 4 6 rn the aftermath of the Palom31'CS accident the U S Ajr Force Scientific Advisory Board established the Ad Hoc Committee on Weapon Retrieval chaired by Dr Edward Teller Associate Director of LRL hence the label ''Teller Committee Following its initial meeting April 1 1966 the Committee made six recommendations the major one being to consider incorporation of a mechanical safing feature in the nuclear weapon to further reduce fae risk of a nuclear yield in an accident n An urgent study was to determine of feasibility of such a fearurc Given demonstration of feasibility the recommendation would require retrofit or all r uclear bombs use of the feature in all future bombs and warheads and retrofit of all warheads scheduled to leave the CONUS Ref 15 of Ref 2 On December 22 1966 LRL 's Marvin Martin released a paper that contwned a candidate feature to accomplish the Teller Committee's chmgc It was derived from a mechanical safing feature of lhe HFJnuclear system that had been demonstrated to be practical by LRL for designs of the early 1960s Jack Howard had been back at Sandia for about six months from his dual-hat service as Chainmm l llilitary Liaison Committee and Assistant to lh« Secretary of Dt feuse Atomic Energy but continued his deep interest and involvement in nuclear safety and use conLrol matters By letter addressed to Dr Teller on Much 10 1967 Howard urged careful thought before changing the policy ofnot mixing nuclear safety and use-control requirements as would be done implicitly by the approval ofLRL's rccommendation 2 NOTE Jack Howard's letter to Edward Teller Ref 162 in my opinion remains relevant to the issue of mixing nuclear detonation safety and use control in szc I intend to include a declassified copy here as Appendix E lnrerestingly Johnny Foster repeated his preference for mechanical safing in his speech on safety at Sandia in 1997 Ref 15 The U S Air Force's Teller Committee met for Ute second and final time in Febru uy 1967 and made two additional ommcndations to the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board via letter dated November 20 1967 These recommendations were to 1 improve field survey instruments to detect plutonium contamination and 2 continue development of crash locators and underwater location transducers on a priority basis Th fonncr was directed it correcting the lad of funding for the U S Air Force's program to develop a new instrument s The latter led 10 installing Crash Position Indicators in logistical Mcd1 miC'31 satin af HE nucl ar systems w is lt lS UC in the prep ir itmn nfthe tiria tri-bboratories nuclt•Jr ifoty m mifr to in th late I950's Ref I7 R produccd as Appcnd1 -c E Tiu Air Fure progmn 1pparcotl ' nc ·cr matcri ih i d and lRL 's FIDDLER instnuni nt fundL·J by the EC was tle' dopr-d 1111J br came the natiQn il st ind mf 76 -GFFIG AL USE ONLY • l 'l IQ ii I 1 t • sail'JFRI OFFIGIAL USE ONLY aansport aircr ift and to Sandia's demonstration of a prototype device that could be fastened to 11 bomb to aid in a search at sea Additionally the Air Sta ff fonned a Special Study Group to consider he methods by which further reduction in the probability that an accident may trigger 1 nuclear yicld t' 3S well as the methods suggested by the Teller Committee at its first meeting in August 1966 Briefings of this group by the AEC weapons laboratories arc discussed later 4 7 • I ' • JJ'' C 'o· One-Point Nuclear Detonation Safety 1967-1968 About the same Lime that LRL' s safety use control proposal w ns being considered a m3jor event in the evolution ofnuclc ar dcton11tion safety requirements began to unfold namely a new understanding - · - ' of the meaning of one-point safety for the HE nuclear system The definition in use at the time statc d • the nuclear system shall produce no more than four pounds HE high cxplusivc quivaleot nuclear yield in tbe c vent uf detonation of the HE by iny means other than the application ofnormal arming and firing signals lo the firing system Sourcl MCs dtd 2 1 l 63 Design practice at Los Almtos called for tests and computations to invcstig3te lhc effects of detonating thd HE al the outer surface of the HE-as would be expected occur when the HE W li insulted by external events such 3 5 fragments or hearing in a fire · · • • -- z _ ' • hidccd the probabahty of nuclear yield was stated to be about · ·1 in 1 000 iiparticufoi point as ontrasted to the general understanding of the requirements as I in 1 000 000 Since the probability of the detonation occurring at that point per se Vas also unlikely say 1 in 1 000 the overall probability would be the product of the two prob ibilities or I in 1 000 000 • for NOTE In my opinion this pisode of combining conditional probabilillts illustrates a fundarm ntal wcr knes in Probabilistic Risk Assessmenr in rim it t nds to foil to account properly for error prupagnlion am•Jng the individu il 1em1 Sec Ref 135 for elaboration n su- alh d ··modem un l- rsr an Jing C 'fl in -poinl m1- 1y 1hal C ohcd 1r m rn1te1I fro111 DoOi H C to EC D ·L- by k lll r on April 3 1968 R f J9 and in u it today st itcs -01 HGiAi OSEHI Wt - · i - 8 l Oi Ml1ftAD OFFICIAL USE ONLY n the event of a high explosive detonation initiated al any one point the probability of achieving a nuclear yield greater than the equivalent of four pounds of TNT shall not exceed l in 10 • Source MCs for the W87 dtd 8 17182 4 8 An Example of Independence in Weapon Systems Safety Studies 1967 By the mid-1960 s full-scale nuclear test C 'Cnts including the Plowshare peaceful u ses experiments had been swcpl under the system safety study requirement umbrella of AEC Manu31 Chapter 0560 Each of the three laboratories had a voting member on the srudy group 1 For Project Gasbuggy a natural gas stimulation project in New Mexico in 1967 Sandia's member Bob Reed objected to LLL's proposal to mechanically unsafe the non-one-point safe primary of the test device before lowering the devicodown the bole Reed's view prevailed and the test was postponed to make changes required to unsafe dowuholc LLL's Test Director Harry ReynoJds personally attacked Reed and petitioned unsuccessfully Sandia's Jack Howard then back from the MLC to remove Reed from safety study groups This incident involved systems safety and did not yet spill over into design safety Ref 173 4 9 Nuclear Weapon Design Safety Philosophy Dialogue 1966-1967 By mid-1966 Bob pe4 uifoy who had been transferred laterally as Department Manager to Livermore several years earlier had replaced Andrew A Andy Lieber as leader of the Livcnnorc contingent of Don Cotter's manilgement staff Earlier in 1966 Don Cotter had been granted leave-of-absence from Sandia to serve as Special Assistant for Southeast Asia Maners to the Do0 s Director Defense Resean h Engineering DDR E Johnny Foster About this time Jack Howard was ending his service as DoD Chaim1an Military Liaison Committee and considering returning lo Sandia Leon Smith appreciated that Jack Howard's experience in Washington the first Sandian to have that would be valuable to Sandia and arranged for Jack to have an imporlant position by offering to be movc d laterally to lead Cotter's staff freeing Leon's Advanced Systems Developm l Directorate for Jack This directorate became mosl prestigious in the final years of Monk Schwanz' tenure as President of Sandia John Homhcr k replaced Sch ·artz in fall 1966 and a new era in Sandia management philosophy bcgan 16 7 The three department managers under Leon Smith in the man igement s£aff directorate were Carl Carlson Bob Pcurifo and mt Bob Pc urifoy initiated a 3 'Stcm study process among the lhrcc to considr r the stalus of nuclear weapon safety in the national defense posture with emph isis on polcnl1al future Sandia roles was at the 11me focused on evolution of a new cost control and budgeting system for Sandia the Case System and slood on the sidelines as J eurifoy and 78 For clabcr 111un on thc 1 cvc nl i sc rny kn lhy report ·•sandi i ation il Labor3tories The Lcvcl- f-Effort Yc m Tltten m Sc pkmhcr 199 i for lhc S mdm gcn r il hmnry proJccr Ref 152 -Sl IR WftD OFFICIAL USE ONLY Carlson began a dialogue lhar featured exch mgc of essays over almost a yt BJ' Refs 35 through JS The nuclear safety dialogue essentfally nded in l3te- l 967 when Bob Pcuri foy returned to Albuqu1 rquc to lead the department vacated when Carl Carlson had takc 11 lc ave•of-abscncc to join the AEC's Combined Operations Plamtlng group fonned at Oak Ridge Laboratory to do systems analyse mostly projection of need for special nuclear materials for the weapons prngrJ111 Cliff Selvage replaced Bob Pcurifoy at Livcnnore 1n December 1967 along with otlu -rs at Sandi'9 I was asked to review a Sandia Coiporation Technical Memorandum on Sandia•s roles in nuclear weapon safc ty wriucn by Thomas D Tom Brumleve of Selvage's suff Tom Brumleve was a Member of Tcchnicu J Staff who had been hired directly 3l Sandia LiYcnnorc had been assigned for awhile to lhc staJTlhere Iha served as technical advisors on weapon system srudy groups of the DoD nnd AEC He had developed into a le3der of and important conuibutor to nuclear safety considerations in general-he was their gurur for safety and h1s views and philosophy were actively sought over the years The ''Brumleve memo • in my 1icw failed to recognize positive contributions of Sandia to national nuclear safety in its zeal to appeal for reforms Its title ' Let's G t Serious About Nucle ir Safety'' was accusatory per sc and surely would have drawn the ancntion ofSandia's detractors adversaries and competitors Thal would have been okay if really wammted Brumleve ciled as a metric of not being serious the number of slaff members assigned to assessing the reliability of nuclear 'll'eapons and to safciy---tltc disparity being quite large As is to be de ·cloped in the ne -ct section of this repon Brumlc •c succeeded in generating considerable debate and nncntion within Sandia The potential for severely damaging Sandia's ability to be cffccti •c in a national sense led to the rq ort being recalled and 3 single copr placed in a permanent record file NOTE The Brumleve report episode touches on the issue of• vhistlc blowing ters such as public health ind safety or n nion il defense The Sandia Corporotion Technical Memorandum category ofpublic uions h3d been used over the years as an outlet for prestnting rechnical information or or inion for internal distribution only This vehicle W tS valued sufficiently tn be championed w1dely The lcdsion to 11ond to the concerns r tised in a positi ·e pro rram of management iction app irtntly w 15 seen is appropria1 anJ proper C 'Cn if accusations of suppressing Q dissenting ' iew could later be kvicd 4 1 o HE Detonation and Plutonium Dispersal Safety Concerns 1966-1975 In 196 i Jack Howard as ATSD AE and LC haim1an requested th 11 the AF C h1horatorics c ' aminc the possibilil ' c f destro ing nudeJr wcJpons in plac ·1tMu1 the higlM·isibility 1ttc nJ 1J1l to the conduct of nulit 111· lp r uion - to oht in the ED h 1rg ·s from stor igct po5ition them on c 1pous string owt he der -inac1cin cord nf d rl to dc'itroy the · • - aplin arr l ' in a sin 11 1 •i nt ·acuat fri n 11 · t ps t'I• S L dt •¢ -11 cd a t ip-on dcm il sysrcm th 11 fcatur J a i fl i '34£ I • • • • 1 8Rl fJFIII OFFICIAL USE ONLY self-contained shaped charge and following a visit to the U S European Command in J 967 Sandia11 Jack Howard the system was demooslt'atcd to the OoD and military services with b interest on their parts Some three years later I he ATSD AE Carl WaJske requested from AEC 11 system that would selectively deslroy critical weapon components other 1han the HE detonation A system was developed and evaluated in tbe field by the DoD over the year 1n 1ns Ref 21 4 11 State of Nuclear Weapon Design Safety in 1967 With the creation of the Advanced Systems Development Directorate 1600 under Leon Smi mid-1964 the process of provision of design guidanco for weapon project engineers changed drastically No longer was thero a group of warhead and bomb electrical systems specialists generated new approaches developed them to the stage of demonstration of feasibility and participated in the transfer of the technologies to the prgjcct specialists in the weapon development groups The latter groups would become essentially self-sufficient and Del 01 would become the lead department manager under Wi11iam A Bill Gardner as director laterally tnmsfem d from the environmental lest organization The state of nuclear weapon design safety in 1967 as regards the weapon hardware under AE laboratories cognizance was captured in an article solicited by the Air Force's Directorate of Nuclear Safety DNS The article prepared by the weapon systems development staff that provided Sandia's technical advisor to DNS's Nuclear Weapon System Safety Study Group NWSSG tmder Del Olson described ten ·•design guidelines No Nuclear Yield Signal solation Unique Arming Signals Fail-Safe Environmental Protection Two S p tr3te Signals Sequential Events S1mplt Control Test Eqtiipmcnl Isolation Operational Si nplidty Inherent one-point safe primary Separate the electrical monitor and Af F cirtu ·•unique•· means sensing on environment uniqu delivery Component failure or accidental functioning safe the w apon Use of filters Md joint seals to cope with electtomagnetic radiation from friendly transmitters Independently provided by the M F subsysc AF F oomponents operate only in a prescribed order nom1al T estc r or controller indications should be rcadil unc crstood Limit tl Ster and monitor current lcv ls to l 00 mili iampcrcs Use a removal clement e g a Suikc Enable Plu The article Ref 39 also featured simpk block Jia rrnm l in a bomb shape format th it illustrat some of the design gu ddine in a typical r lcasc-to-ra rgct sequence 81 oPFfel51El§ USE 814LY 81 GiPtl TIPRB OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5 ADVENT OF ENHANCED NUCLEAR SAFETY DESIGNS 1968-1972 5 1 The Thule Greenland Accident 1 68-5 68 Following the Palomares accident in January 1966 the Strategic Air Command's airborne tlcrt tlying operation was cw-tailed Supposedly this bcc ausc rethinking at high national levels rc •eaJcd high and rising costs for a national security measure 1hat had become less important as the other two legs of lhe triad' forces ground-launched and submarine•l sunchcd inrercontincntal ballistic missiles took over time-sensitive strategic targets About two years later on January 21 1968 a B-52 stationed in New York Stale crashed and burned on the ice near Thule AFB Grecnl31ld All four nuc leM bombs were destroyed in the conflagration impact environment and the resultant HE delonation caused plutonium contamin3tion of the sea ice Contaminated ice snow water and debris were removed to a storage site in the U S over the course ofa four-month accident recovery operation Following this accident SAC's airborne alert operations were terminated altogether Roy P Lambe who for about 2-½ years had been Sandia's technical advisor for Au- Force nuclear weapo system safety studies was assigned to join the accident response team Conned at Kirtland AFB Roy's detailed knowledge or the bombs proved valuable in the extended days of searching rccov ring identifying and packaging for shipment to CONUS sites the damaged weapon components and olher debris Jack W Hickman a young product of the Technical Dc elopment Program TOP that pro idcd pos1gradu3lc education for newly hired t-ngineers t'l -placed Roy after sevcraJ weeks on the ice at Thule Figure 10 shows the nuclear weapon systems safcty staff at SNL for this period Jim Shn e then supc1visor of the Aerospace Nuclear Safety Research Di• ision was assigned 10 the accident response team to add his expenise on generation and dispersion of plutonium oxide particles to the expc rtise of LASL ·s Wright Langham on plutonium health hazards The fWQ scientists became directly involved in negotiations with represcnuuives uf the Danish Nuclear Commission to detcnnine the degree of cle nup of the ice lhat vould be acceptable lo lhc govc ·nuncnt of Denmark • lfFICllltt U8 jt Jt Ii I QI IL¥·· litvci Tlf'4 OFS ICIA L ugl ONLY IDt i I 10 11 I 1secuon1 I Smilh CaUDr o s CallSOII Oawln Carlson Oawils 1260 ll 60 1200 5mi1h C rlson Collet COUIII 011 w5 - Olson Palltrscn suw ns Qlgc n Olson Moore MocHe and Hoaglend HoaQISlld Hoaglmd I Lane Jones Is • j SIIWIIS 1650 11150 Jono 1200 1f 30 7160 1 141 1530 540 --- so• Sy51um Dow1111111111nl OA • Oulll ry 51 wanca MO - - FT • Flt l t TCSI 11 111 _lnumber•••• ___ _____ ______ ____ Sandi• organizations 0111 llklUIIOfl lillu11 and 111111ibu1 II in• collection ol S11nd o teiCPIIOnO boo mainl lnod In Sandia All hives I QA A l' L ar i t SD s c -·--- flE RNd I SO 11 1• __ W- OCG so w W ll-- ii_n - - n 8uooiog 1 11UM'9 c Alt Ollce 19111111231 11 _ IGII 6521 Figure 10 Nuclear Weapon System Safety Specialists at SNLA 1965-1972 OFFICIAL USE ONLY a §EU t•·a1a I 116521 1$11 121·1 JlF-2 I ICII I I 5i't '' C S S - OJ · - J W Dalua ' s r- lis f lllc rou Cli 1 1 I 0 R l- ' I 1650 1551 Oa t _ M 1J 11 I s evll 5 Mc toeman I I I Manulactu1illg De- o IIOli q oml Slftens 1260 ESCG E oc111c il Sys ITI$ Cc rd11 a n9 G1oup • All Oilllsion S11p11rvllors c I Hoavtana Hoaglalld HoalJIDnd T Jona 11i50 liORl TfFRD OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5 2 AEC DoD Nuclear Materials Safeguards Committee 2 68-4 69 Tn March 1967 an Ad Hoc Advisory panel on Safeguarding Special Nuclear Materials the ··Lumb Panel after its chainnan reported to the AEC on the risks of diversion of certain radioactive materials in the non-weapons opcralions of lhe AEC In its report the panel recommended an independent review of the safeguards against diversion in the nationaJ AEC DoD weapons program and by February 1968 a joint commjttce was established to conduct a one-rime one-year study The committee was co-chaired by DoD Deputy Director Defense Atomic Support Agency and AEC Special Assistant to the Director Office of Safeguards and Managemenr1 officials Dr Max Roy oflos Alamos was the AEC weapons laboratories' member and Dr Marv Gustavson Livermore and I were official technical observers during the study At this time I was serving as a department manager under Leon Smith in Advanced Systems Research 5S00 l sought assignment as tC hnical obsen·er to learn about the possibilities of Sandia being considered for a role in this emerging area of national concern Although I could offer no special expertise in the relevant technologies I volunteored to serve on the transportation of special nuclear materials subcommittee This subcommittee dealt in all forms from raw material to nuclear weapons in lhe custody of either the AEC in development production or retirement or the DoD in deployment and logistical movements This concern was reasonably close to those I had encountered only briefly some five years earlier in nuclear weapon system safety The committee's approach featured field trips to each type of facility worldwide that was involved in handling SNM and this turned out to be perhaps the best preparation imaginable for the next two decades of my can er at Sandia Most notable wu s a tour of U S NATO headquarters storage sites and operational sites led by Carl Walske DoD MLC Chairman and ATSD AE His high rank in the DoD warranted VIP treatment for the group including lr lnsportation by Army helicopters operating at about SOO feet above the magnificent terrain of West Germany in the summer NOTES I One of the four AEC members was William T Rih y Dircc1or ofthe Division of Security-marking for the first time known to me the direct involvement of an AEC physical security offici il in the mlal U S nuclear weapons safety program Disagreements between AEC and OoD security specialists were rampant at the time the AEC holding that li-ie Atomic Energy Act required direct participation of AEC for weapons in custody of DoD TI1c Du cror f' fth s newlv forrnl-J cti 'i' llln w i wdl n nvn to SJnd a Br1 adic r Gc nc r3l Dc lm ir L C Hl '-'II retired from 1111 1 ir For whik cri ing i 1he AF Ci nirccco ofMiliury pptic3uon c ·6-'-6·67 1 Join lh A EC a1 l c1 ihJn -OFF I C-tAt -USE-0Nl ¥- • - d tiiT I ' _l - S_ · PJl BitE IJPRO -OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2 Marv Gus avson was denied a theater clearance for the NATO crip openly attributed to his continuing advocacy of advanced use control features in nuclear weapons I recall the military's hostility to Carl WaJske because of PAL especially as expressed by an Air Force Lieutenant Colonel in safety work at USAF Headquarters then in Wiesbaden FRG to me in a social gathering in lhc Air Force's Von Stuben hotel Later f connected this incident with introduction to the AEC ALO civilian assigned to cover the Army's nuclear weapon system safety studies He was the same Lt Col USAF but then retired The finaJ report of the AEC-DoD Nuclear Materials S3feguards Committ e Ref 41 while aimed primarily at diversion ofmaterials and weapons led to provision of equipment and procedures aimed at combating terrorists• threats and other uacts of banditry This need was to become apparent some three ye irs later following the Olympic Games in Munich Notable among the equipment that evolved were the Safe Secure Trailer SST fleet with an associated nationwide continuous communications system for AEC transportation operations and portable rndi 1rinn di tl c tion device which were Liter used by the AEC's Nuclear Emergency Search Team NEST in the 1970s My dimming recollection of evolution of the SST is ns follows l I recalled the work of Tommy Sellers in development of the Distance Measuring Equipment for the Dominic full-scale nuclear tests of 1962-63 and for Joint Task Force 2 for detcmtln ing the position of military fighter bomber jet aircraft in low altitude flights _Through Jim de Montmollin I determined that lhe thcn•cwrcnt technology could tell the location of ground-based transportation vehicles at all times and relay that to a control center 1 wrote an appropriate recommendation that was adopted for the committee's final report 2 I brought the matter to the attention of the appropriate Sandia advanced development organization under Robert G Bob Clem and he sponsored a study of feasibility 3 Much later when J had become involved in nuclear weapon safety and w as briefed on the status of1he project I suggested to Bob Clem that the Secure Trailer design should be modified to include protection of the contents e g weapons during logi tical movements The secure trailers were to becom known as the Safe Secure Trailer SST NOTF· A ' 1 1hr r a t nr ph11noinm dispers I iafoty saf suru-ds aow lllOri commonly lcrmed security concerns evolved essentially independently fror 1 nucle r det ln nion snfoty and rhis trend continJes OFFIGfAL USE ONLY- i ' i ' I I• 9E8A i FMl -OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5 3 Quantitat1v·e Requirements for Nuclear Weapon Safety The Walske Letter 1967-1968 As the nnc-poinr safety requirement discu sions between AEC and DoD continu -d a similar dialogue began in 1967 for a nuclear detonation caused by premature operation of the o rming ft12ing and firing subsystems of nuclc ir weapon systems MLC Chairman Carl Walske 9 12 66 to 5131173 consulted with Sandiaru Ocl Olson John M Jack Wiesen Arlyn N Blackwell and Tom Brumleve m arriving at a new understanding of premature r quiremcnts 10 he contained in fumre MCs tor bombs and warheads Walske was concerned about the unhiguitiiZs in requirement statements ind 3bout politic JI r3mifications of a plausible misiutt rpretation of them A typic-31 MC sta1emen1 of the ume was ·111e probability of a premature nucltar detonation from random component failure within the warhead for the conditions noted herein sh ill not exceed lo• one in 1 000 000 during storage transportation handling and maintenance of the warhead mated or unmated to the adaption kit during prefirc checks of the warhead section and prior to initial arming Source Adapted from MCs for the W66 The problem was that the numerical probabilily requirement was dimensionless e g it didn ·1 address probabiliry rate per nuclear weapon per weapon system per stockpile per ytar etc If as Valske postulated it means per nuclear weapon an intccpretation could be that the national nsk w is about one in 100 JO oblaincd by multiplying 10• by the nwnber of weapons in the national stockpile say 10 Politically an estimated risk of one in 100 clc irly was unacceptable to anyone in authorily Discussion revealed that Sandia's design intent was one in t 000 000 per accident one we spon involved tn that accident W dskc suggested that the requirement allow for accidents and for the c 'eryday situation of normal operations The question W3S how much lower the probability should be for normal environments than for abnonn il e g • 3Ccident environments ind lhc discussion lc d to Io·• for abnormal and IO 9 for normal Then one could dctcnnine the political risk to be one in I00 000 Io·' obtained by multiplying l 0 9 detonations per weapon over its lifl time by Io• such weapons-probably an 1ccept 1hlc level of risk These discussions ulminated in th issuant i ofnc stillldard IC paragraphs by Walske on March 14 l 968 including OfA61AI ttSE-eNt'r 1' ·· I ··- I • ·•' • I ' ' ' I lliEIAlii' iFRD OFFIGIAL USE ONLY STANDARDS FOR WARHEAD AND BOMB PREMATURE PROBABILITY MC PARAGRAPHS WARHEAD MC's a The probability of a premature nuclear detonation of e warhead due to warhead componor t malfunctions in a mated or unmated condition In Iha absence of any Input signals except for speciled signals e g monitoring and control shall not exceed 1 Prfor to launch for the normal storage and operatlonal envlronmenta descrlbecl In tt 9 STS 1 In 1o9 per warhead lifetime 2 Prior to launch for lhe abnonnal' environments dP scribed in the srs TIn 106 per warheae el J Osure or acrJdenl b The probablllty of a premature nuclear detonation af a warhead due lo warhead component malfunctions aftar launch and prior to the receipt of the ffnal warhead anning signal sha0 not exceed 1 In 104 Thfs la a ganeraHzed mlnln m standard which may require amptillcalion whan appHed to a spedk weapon Addltlonal premature probability crttsria may be Included for the after l 1unch situation depending on tne various degrees of safety required for the spec lflc employment concepts • envir nmants are lhosa •• Abnormal environments ar• those env1ronments as defined ln the weapon's stockplle-tatargtt sequenca and militaty char cteristlcs In which the weapon Is expected lo retain full expected Joglsllc al and operationAI environments as denmtd 1n the weapon's stockpile-lo•target sequence and military c harac1eristies in which lhe weclJ On Is required to survive without degradation in operational n liabilify operational reliability Source Reference 49 reproduced here as Appendix G 5 4 Establishment of Sandia's Nuclear Weapon Design Safety Organization 1968 By t 967 Sandia Livermore's staff member principal idvocatc for nuclear WeaPon design safety Tom Brumleve was actively campaigning lo hilvc published il fonnal Sandia Development Rcpon that presented his views on the need for reforms in Sandia's program Ref 42 Tom's earlier 1965 documC1Jt on the subject in the S mdia Technical Memorandum fonnat that constituted n personal view had been recalled by Don Cotter with the management dkection to Brumle ·e to support his vi ·ws with specific cases instead of generalities Although the rewrite addressed the specific episode of Sandia Livennorc's development of the mechanical sating subsystems the treatment was judged to be insufficient 10 support the conclusions presented Tom's department manager Bob Pcurifoy declined tc approve publication Instead the report was circulated to selected reviewers by Jack Howard who had recently been promoted co Vice President Weapon Development 1000 ln arc-February I%8 Jack Howard convened a rather larg and broadly rcpresenlali 'c group of directors dcp inmcnt man ig •rs the di• i iion supcrYisc rs who were responsible for nuclc r weapon system safety study support tn addition one staff member Tom Brumleve was -11s0 p in of this group I bclicvt this si ssion WJS Sandia's first management rc 'icw of nuclear safety Its findings were th uidc used for the next several d cades in that discipline fack Hcm ard p1 rson illy Tote the memorandum Re 43 that presented the findir s in four areas S ·0FFIGIAl -t-JS ONl -Y-Jij _J il I I bs -S C ct l il'ltb OFFICIAL USE ONLV 1 U S Air Force Special Safetv Study Group Del Olson Wll assigned to prepare the Sandia portion of the tri-laboratories bnefing of this group that had been formed to consider implffllcntation ofrecommendaticns of the Teller Committec0 post-Palomares study Del was a depanment manager in the w apuu tlt vi luµrmml dit turati at lht tiuu Hi was selected p1obably because of bis prior involvement in weapon system safety The nuclear weapon system safet1 division under Parker Jones was in a sister dcpanment under Sam Moon who had no particular safety expertise Del Olsoo was to remain Jack Howard's choice for safety briefings lo groups outside Sandia for decades to come 2 Abnonnal Environments Tom Brumleve with the help of Parker Jones was assigned to decide what sort of effort should e devoted to defining abnormal enviroM1ents This resulted in formation of a task group and publication of a report Accident Environments Ref 186 some two years later 3 Walske's 10'6 10'' Nuclear Safety Design Criteria Although much discussion occurred on the meaning and desirability of these criteria lhere is no record of the sense of lhe discussions 4 A New Sandia Safetv Philosophy Director Leon Smith was assigned to recommend a nuclear weapon safety philosophy for Sandia As cited earlier Carl Carlson and Bob Peurifoy had evol 'ed a dialogue on this subject Peurifoy's initiative of 7 66 Leon Smith had endorsed Peurifoy' idea for development of sating devices that required unique signals for their operation rnther than a simple 28-volt DC signal Ref 38 In September 1967 Carlson was on leave of absence to the AEC's Combined Operations study group at Oak Ridg Tennessee and Peurifoy had transferred from Livermore to Albuquerque in to repl ice him Peurifoy was not at Jack Howard's meeting 5 5 The Tri-Laboratories' Third But Unrecognized Nuclear Safety Manifesto Spring 1968 ln consonance with lhe findings of the Teller Committee concerning then for funhe - srudy for means of improving nuclear safety rcprcscntativ s of the A EC's three nuclear we iron de c ign laboratori s were invitc l to brief the AEC DMA DoOn lLC and the Air StaffSpecial Study Group on April 30 I%S 1ml M iy I 1968 The three-part bri fing indn-• 1 in nrfi r nf prcsi ntalion • • IVi1rhc11 f mtJBomb Elecrrical 'Stem Jes r 11 presented by Sandia's D I 01 ion O w-Pvmt Safe Status presented by Los Alamos· Dr Bob Osborne and -QFFICJAb-YSS-ONb-¥ 3 3 l ' 1jli I · I OFFICIAL USE ONLY • Gmcepts for Possible F11tur t ·111 ancl I Vt1dear Saff l • presented by Livermore•s Dr Marv Gustavson Refs 46 47 and 48 respectively i r o my 1- nowlcdgc lhc briefings were not issimilat in a report 31 d were not disseminated Thus lhis effort JicJ nol culminate in issuance of an c -q1rcssion of intent to pursue technological or procedural cnhw1ccments of nuclear safety Del Olson's briefing took note of'•ttic new MC requirements of 10·• and 10·9 but made no reference to the impact on S311dia Indeed in his letter to AEC OMA to promulgate the rurthcr in the national nuclear weapons complex requirements J 14 68 OoD Ml C Chainnan Dr Carl Walskc stated• Based oo infonnal discussioa in the field wilh AF C md L moratory persoMel it is our understanding that the adoption of the attached standards ill not n -iiuh in any increase in weapon dcv lopment rime or costs · 5 6 Studies to Recommend a Nuclear Weapon Design Safety Philosophy for Sandia Spring 1968 In response to Vice President Jack Howard's charge to recommend n nuclear weapon dcstgn safoty philosophy for Sandia Director Leon Smith tasked two of his department managers to indc -pcnJimtly make suggestions on expedited time scales Cliff Selvage who had only recently replaced Bob Peurifoy at Livcnnorc supported Tom Brumlc ·c's approach to intc iew key members of the technical staff both at Lt 'ermore and Albuquerque s nd use the recently developed Delphi technique to obtain a consensus ·i w by i1cr uion of inrc rvicws Twenty pCBOns interviewed attach loc ilion had experience in the arc ss of weapon project development advanced systems de ·elopment nuclt lt safety use control componc nt development and reliability Questions focused on three aspects ofsafoty Samlfa's rcsponsibililics accidents and national risk Ref 44 My ipproa h at SNLA was to ex imine bow various events since my earlier im•olvcmcnt in nudeJr afcty 1961-64 should or might influence tht thrust of future weapon designs I considered both Ute events fhat h id occurred external to the AEC's progrnms and inremal in th 1echnolog1 al capabilities of the AEC's design labocatorics This approach as a simple apphcation of the long-range planning concept for r scarch and d v lopmtmt hat I Juul e 'Ol 'cu dunng e -p nencc in staff work from l 96-t-l 96S This m ll o lology led lo the realiz uion that significant promise for impro •ements in nucl ir sat ty was e ·idenccd by 1 hc body of a h-anceJ icchnolog1 il c 1pabilin s that had been £tneratcd in the mid-l 960s by the laboratories Howc 'f'T apphc uior s had not been found in the few ntw nuclear w apon systems that had sur 'h· ·J 11 c scruciny of the M - lamara era in the DoD z i My rc commcnclcd solution was for ·' flu• ' 'Jl ii Dr Gus i ·sori'J four c itc o tc$ if new on pu h id bctn ir 1plem nccd an lh sto kp1 i k l•i I hi ' i t ' h 11 other fMm of m •ch ini ll Jli 1 1 1 He 111 h ir - 1 -m b l n -ons dl rcJ r I o J · J ir ·e rut n t 1l or1c I 11 1· · II i u d i s l 't this J ' 1 r my tir t lH M • 1 rr irh1 1I rr r Utl ' -if' c · C 'tnl 10 h•m 1r 1I •r kr 1 - nu d1 1 s irpi· r hJ ' b l 'n for R fcrcn i m l' l' S J'i yur 15 o th por l • • I • · 1' 1 OFFl€1AL USE-0Nt -Y -·y• Ii A I • •1IRl T11flll OFFICIAL USE ONLY Sandia to undenakc a structured advanced developmenl project that would draw in the total talent of the laboratories• design specialists by creating a tangible focus in the form of o new strategic bomb proposal In brief the bomb would be the test bed for the technologies that promised a safer national security posture for air-delivered weapons by expanding lhe traditional concern about preventing a nuclear detonation in an accident such ns the Palomares event to including the concern about preventing a radioactive material dispersal even though there would be no nuclear contribution As 1 recall I orally presented my recommendations to Leon Smith using the presentation aids filed as Rcfen nce 45 The outcome of this episode was Jack Howard's decision to elevate the nuclear safety effort at Sandia lo the departmental level under me to search for new technological ipproac hes to nuclear safety in weapon designs 5 7 Project CRESCENT - Advanced Systems Development of a Super-Safe Bomb 1968-1970 In early 1968 the outlook for nuclear weapon deveJQpmen either the fidl-tletlged Phac e J weaponization projects or advanced development projects in anticipation of future Phase 3 status was dim indeed The 861-1 2 Phase 3 vas ending the W69 SRAM A Phase 3 was about twothirds complete the W68 Poscidon Phase 3 was about one-third complete nnd the only new Phase 3s were thi two antiballistic missile warheads the W66 Sprint and the W71 Spartan I shared the results of my study to recommend a new safety design philosophy with William C Bill Myre then a department manager in the advanced systems development iircctoratc Bi11 was attr lctcd by the potential engineering challenges that would be presented by a bomb that had to survive the most cx me fiiendly environments conceivable So he and l set about lo have such a project authorized At the time I was in Leon Smith's advanced systems studies directorate and maintained periodic liaison contacts with the AEC Division of Military Applicat1on's R D staff 1 briefed them on the concept of an accident•proof Alert Bomb·· for strategic aircraft delivery There soon followed an official request from AEC DMA to the three weapons Jaborarorics to conduct advanced development projects that would stimulate the Air Force to think about the need for increased nuclear safely Both design teams undertook projects Project CRESCENT by Sandia Albuqucrque LASL and Project AMBASSADOR by Sandia Livermore LLL Both projects were to be active for about 2 ½ yc ars This pmject is not p irricul irly relevant here and is not addressed further Project CRESCENT had two self-imposed requirements for • accident situations e g fire aircraft cmsh mid-air breru 1 p fi'ee-foll impact or lightnin trike the probability of the wet1pon producing either a nuclear yil ld or a one-point dl tonation of the high explosi 'e would be made as low as practicable ind typiul lpplica11on • 1llcction of my limclin is filed in he uclcu Slfu ' rnfMm3ttnn Ccnicr 1 --iSIC l s Ref 153 -OFFffilAL-YSE ONLY 1- _I lT's rs - j • 1£0ftC¥f nB OFFICIAL USE ONLY • incident situations experienced in °normal use e g a set of electrical malfunctions in the delivery aircraft thnt applied signals to the attached nuclear bomb the probability of the weapon producing 3 nuclear yield would be made as low as practical Ref 50 Major emphasis was on lhe prevention of dispersal of plutonium aerosols created by the HE detonation and the scheme adopted was to mn imize the strength of the bomb's structural case in order to set an upper bound on the penalties of containing conventional critical components within a hard case and thennal insulation In briet results of analytical studies and structural testing featuring scaled models showed that the desired improvements to prevent HE detonation would require an increased bomb diameter of several inches with proportional increase in weight--ilttributes probably not attractive to the Air Force Subsequent studies to develop alternative ways to prevent HE detonation are covered later in this report 1n the weapon electrical system area Project CRESCENT had more direct payoffs in nuclear safety e ·olution namely 1 a puJsc -train-operatcd rcady safe switch in the bomb 2 new aircraft monitor and control AMAC equipment in the aircraft to provide the pulse train signal and 3 hardened environmental sensing devices ESDs in the bomb The CRESCENT ready safe switch proved to be an early major demonstration of potential benefits of new design approaches for enhancing nuclear weapon electrical system safety--then collectively tenned enhanced electrical safety EES 5 8 Formation of Sandia's Nuclear Weapon Safety Department 1968-1969 On July 1 1968 Sandia President John A Hornbeck implemented II major reorganization of Sandin Hombeck•s thrust was to place scientists drawn from Bell Telephone Laboratories and Ph D scientists from Sandin in key positions that would facilitate his shift from emphasis on engineering to science See Ref 152 page IV-2-4 for a summary of these appointments At the same time a new dirocloratc was formed in Jack Howard s weapon development vice presidency to facilitate managem nt of three development support functions that had a degree of indcp ndcncc from the orgnnizations directly responsible for development namely reliability assiu- mc milil iry liaison and publications am I nuclear safety The military li iison group was tlowngrndcd from th directorate level upon retirement of its career-long leader to bee on a department reliability assurance remained at the department level and nuclear safety was xpandcJ in scope arnt rnised to the department l1 vel As 1 recall these c ·cms r viewed my reassignment as manager of the nuclear afcty d panm- nt with mixed emotions On one hand I was pkascd not to be demoted because I was bt ginnin to understand thatJohn Hornbeck did not apprcci 1lc having man igcmcnl staff work done by 90 -OFFICIAl -USE-6Nl 'Yif I -1 3 I J• ••• 3 I f ' 1 4i 8rtEIJPR0 p OFFICIAL USE ONLY anyone except his pcop e from BTL or some Sandia Ph D s Leon Smith Carl Carlson and I were especially marked when we had upset John Hornbeck during the mid-1967 study of the AEc•s Weapons Dcn•elopment Complex see Ref S2 pages 18-20 At the same time l was somowhat anxious because I had not been associated with Jack Howard in any meaningful way and his agenda and modus operandi' were unknown to me I w comfoned by reporting to Harlan Lcnandcr as my director since I had worked with him in weapon project development as a division supervisor and felt that 1 would have his full support I can't recall the details but J believe that my suggestions were lo be provided with a half-dozcnor-so members of the tc chnical staff whom 1 would be allowoo to approve by name a qualified division supervisor and sufficient funding for a two-year effort Titis was presented to Jack Howard-in the sense of a bargain where we would eilher produce a new technological approach to design safety that would constitute a fundamental improvement measured not in tens-ofpercents but in orders of magnitude or be disbanded and reabsorbed in development work Whether this ·•bet was ever a reality or not I took it as my challenge and communicated it in various ways to the staff Staffing of the new Nuclear Safety Department was facilitated by the relatively new precess of laboratory-wide advertising of openings in an employee bulletin publication along with the instirution of a policy o open bidding wherein organizations could not easily block transfers Stan Spray became available as a division supervisor on lateral transfer from work in advanced arming fuz ing and firing subsystem advanced development Stan had worked for me as a staff member briefly in 1962-1963 Figure 6 and I admired his capabilities AJan M Fine signed on He had also been the fir st to join the nuclear weapons system S3fcty srudy group over a decade carliet Figure 6 and w is completing work on a use-control project Project CLOUDGA P 1n January 1969 staffing was essentially complete when I transferred Jack Hickman in from another dh·ision in my department James D Jim McClure bid in having just completed course work for a Ph D in engineering GleM R Norris bid in bringing experience in systems safety Figure 6 and use-control black baning Figure 9 J W Jay Grear bid in bringing extensi •e component de ·elopment experience part of which was as a section supervisor and recent advanced systems development experience Later 1 recruited Dick Worrell to convert his EVENTPOINT systelllS computer progrnm from reliability to safety application Then my staffing goal of six was complete Figure 11 -OFFt€fAt -U5E-8Nl 'f - il l r Jf ' ' ·• t J l Division Division l651 1651 j Division DivlSlon Division Division otvislon Division Division Division 1651 1651 1651 1851 1651 1231 1231 1231 S O Spray S D Spray S D Spray S D SfnY S D Spray 6 0 SPfa ' S D Sprily I S 0 Sr y S 0 Spray S O Sp1ay ' I --J I I' I '' ' 'I ·· -• • 'l r4 i · ltw -01 1 an IOlll·d• 'l l ulr-llOra 111 Salllb J- Olgariz1liCIIIII H111nd Nllblll ilO II' Co lee 4t l I San a lf epllOna bt lkSmllrlllinedlnlhlanpOIIII AldwHClllletdln wics Ar• •ho ol p bicalioll ol lhesa l loOks and ouly hi P•PlMlll Idol da R ' ' I I ' ' t ' • I D1 SO vC I JTF-2 '2l7 I ' Ro llld from 1531 I 'I I I 11s1•1I c •lll G R Nortll J O McOuu ' I t I 1 • ' I • 1 I t j I w M Dawson l1 D Dlllwl I Rclalld blc k '° w oev G C NcMleny 1112211 R B Won U ' ITcnninatod RalWOCI 198-4 1 j 4 I ' I Rccoi'IOd PhD TraM e11od lo Eng Anilyais 1 1 • ' I I 1 _j I i I Tra 8ffed la Ruelar sai tv I Transi n d IO 1233 ti M O I To a r • Orienled Graup I J W Hiclcman I I I I i l i I p 10 rviscfin 1233 68 69 I • i I -171 j M £ Yemen ' 'I •I r I I I ·1 I ' i • II j 1rnow ESA si n 5priy SAT Sid Auilllnl Tedlnical1 I ' I l • I ' • I I'' ITitMklrrld '' l f I • • I I J W G _ I T1ansle1ed to·Seairily 70 71 · I 72 73 i i I 74 l ' 75 I I 16 77 -OFFICIAL USE ONLY stCK2 i fit t I 78 Figure 11 Nuclear Weapon Design Safety Speciafists at SNLA 1968-85 92 1231 a C Garcia J W G1eflf A M Fine ' A J Tlellnll j 1 t t s o Sp ay D P '5dllllnUl i Tlal llalred 10 Reaclof Salely TIIIISftneCI IO WIPP S D Spray M D Pelldn I T111naferrod i o 17 8 W Mic11e1 lrra111le11ed IO 4•21 I ESA I I I II Division V K Smilll - i I SAT I Division 1231 l - •-- - I i R E Oluldl LA Hanchey S V AaMlil • - ' i II t I I f I I Division 1231 S D Spray - r--·-· S D Spray • I I I I J I T · ··-·- -- W A Cfamand Oi J t-dANS i521 1212 ' r4 1231 • I 11 • • r I t I I - Division 79 ' 80 81 SilAEWPH ·OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5 9 Review of the State of Nuclear Weapon Safety 1968-1969 In Jate-1968 during the extended process of acquiring a staff for the n ly created division that was charged with de ·eloping a new technological approach 1concentrated on a personal appraisal of the state of nuclear weapon safety in a broad sense of that tenn e g including nuclear detonation safety plutonium dispersal safety 311d criticality safety I org Jnized my thoughts in a rather detailed technical memo Ref 154 that became my pexsonal agenda for the next several years The memo was labeled as a Draft Working Paper to encourage selected ce 'iewers to comment orally by mark-up of the text and return oflhe drafl to me for iterations or by separate memo to me This practice was to become standard for me and over the yems I wrote draft working papers on a variety of subjects as indicated by the partiaJ listing in Appendix M My review of the state of nuclear safety included discussions with colleagues within Sandia and the other weapons laboratories I searched for a theme around which lo package my general conclusions and recommendations in order to lend a sense of timeli11ess and importance and settled on the main weopon development issue c - tant the deployment of antiballistic missile ABM defense systems This choice was the result of consultation with Marv Gustavson of LLL-a process that 1 rather faithfully renewed every several years and found most stimulating and rewarding After Vice President Jack Howard reviewed an early version of the draft workjng paper and found unsatisfactory my cursory treatment of plutonium dispersal I undertook a crash course in the relevant history and technology for that pan of nuclear safety 1 had included this area of risk merely for the sake of completeness in review but Jack Howard brought to bear his pcraonal experience from the Palomares weapon accident of 1966 Plutonium dispersal safety became a crusade for me as will be evident from ensuing sections of this report 5 10 Origins of Plutonium Dispersal Safety Risk Management 1969 During 1968 while in the process of acquiring a technical staff for the newly created di 'ision I became Sandia's n pres mative for the politically active topic of considering safety aspects of the forthcoming deployment by the U S Anny of an Antib lllistic Missile ABM system TI1 ABM work provided an opponunily to review recent eo ents in the evolution of the national nuclear weapon system study safely process as contrasted lo focus on the nuclear weapon entity alone As a result of a decision to publicly announce the selection of deployment sites for the SAf EGU • RDStSENTINEL ADM system the U S Anny's rcprcscntativc3 usually colonels encountered strong an l uncxpectcJ interest in the s ifety of the system particularly from univcrsily-conncctcd groups near Chicago and Boston and their congressional representatives 11 January I 969 the Army's manager for the AB '11 program Lieutenant Gcncr d Dodd Starbird arranged for ajoim AEC DoD Safety Advisory Group to draft a handbook rcpon that ould become rhe source d tr3 for his officers should tec hnical issues on nuclear safety arise ·OFFICIAL- USE-eNI -¥ ti8Ri l PRLF·8FFIGIAL USE ONLY This episode yielded i timely and remarkably broad learning experience for me abou all a3'J ecrs of nuclear weapon safety I learned aboul LASL 's one-point safety practices from Gene Eyster who had worked with Duncan MacOougall in invention of the concept Gene wrote a classic essay on d1c philosophicalJ cchnical r 1tionale for the concept Ref 53 and we developed a personal relationship lhal continued even after both of us retired Similarly I learned 3bout Lawrence Livennore Laboratory's safecy approach from Richard Rich Wagner then project scientist for the W7 I and later chairman MLC Picannny Arsenal·s representative AI Moss was much respected in the nuclear weapons community for his non-parochial approach 10 problem soJ ing Of course General Dodd Starbird was involved in ouclear s3fety throughout most of his long career in the Anny DoO ERDA and DOB agencies and 1 was privileged to be associated with him several times for events described elsewhere in this report I recall being appalled at tl1e primitive quality of anning fuzing and firing technology displayed by the Picatinny Arsenal and how it would affect o 'crall national progress in nuclear weapon safety This initiated a special interest and involvement on my part that would climax with the Pershing U weapon system episodes dacnocd in some detail later As a result of the nuclear weapon accidents at Palomares Spain and at Thule GreenlWJd the public infonnalion media had become better informed The concern over dispersal of plutonium from an accident at an ABM site near large cities became the dominant concern The Advisory Group's work on plutonium dispersal led to the first ' maniagc of the technological capabilities of Los Alamos in the health physics consequences aspects of the risk and of Sandia in the plutonium aerosol dispersion physics accident scenario aspects This event marks the advent of coordinated efforts to better manage the risk of plutonium dispersal Reference SS c tes the eiccellcnt papers by Los Alamos• Wright Langham and Sandia's James Shreve both deceased The new rechnologicaJ capability was made possible by publication of a Sandia Development Repon thar gave 1 a source term for the generation of plutonium oxide aerosols for nuclear weapon HE deton3tions 2 in atmospheric transport and dispersal model DIFOlIT and 3 development of a set of safety criteria for storage and transportation of weapons i e confirmation of the 20 kilogram rule'1 This work somewhat embilrr3SSingly came some six years after the Operation Roller Coaster field experiments page 75 but was kept alive by Sandia's participatior in the Aerospace Nuclear Safety ANS program for space applications '- 'f radioactive thennoelcctric generations Robert E Bob Luna Ph D in Aerospace and Mechanical Sciences Princeton University l 965 was hired directly into the A 'IS program and was the principal author of the report Ref 56 He was to continue a career-long interest and specialization in plutonium dispersal rechnologie i anJ some oflhat work is cited in context lat r in this repon NOTE In arly 1969 Jcb 1tcs about deployment of th SENTINEL' SAFEGUARD ABM system k l to issuance of a policy statement by AEC Ch iinnan Glenn T Seaborg in the role of the AEC illl l its laboratories in nuclear satcty aspects of deployments of U S nuclear weapon systems l11is policy statement is contained here as Appendix J and Reference 191 OFFICIAl - U5E-GNI ¥- ···1··· · · - • j lh e E1'1Pft8 ·OFFICIAL USE ONLY' 5 11 Implications of Quantitative Standards for Nuclear Safety Risks 1969-1970 Consideration of the iblc implications of lhe quantitative narure of the standards for nuclear w apon safety promulgated by the Walskc Letter of 1968 was an essential p in of my l'C iew mentioned above Ref 194 l had some background infonnation on probabilistic risks ofa nuelear detonation from earlier safety assignments but didn't have a clue on how to calibrate risks of plutonium dispersal and other risks such as loss of possession of weapons • Task Group on Risk Acccptobility One of my early interests in my new job in nuclear safety was to consider a novel des gn approach that would incorporate a built•in weapon destruction mechanism that would detonate the weapon's high explosive deliberately in the event of a severe accident or use control bypass attempt Carl Carlson called it ''Safety PAPS 1 commissioned a small but select Task Group on Risk Acceptability to consider the risk level for a plutonium dispersal that the public might perceive as acceptable in order to achieve 11 higher goal of assuring safety arid wie control The task group's reports are cited in References 198 to 101 The conclusion was that a probabilistic goal would have to be so high that the resultant constraints on nuclear weapon design could not be tolerated The area of deliberate unauthorized acls proved to be especially troublesome leading to cessation of the tasking • Perspectives on National Risk In late 1969 sensing my frustrations in trying to evolve probabilistic goals for safety concerns my close colleague Carl Carlson examined the question of what history of weapon operations says about risk of a nuclear detonation and circulated his analysis in an internal mc mo R f 166 Carl's calculations led to a prompt dialogut with Tom Brumleve who favored a project to collect data on the performance of weapon components obtained from stockpile surveillance testing in order to be able to make statistical estimates about safety for the weapons that used those components Ref 167 For several yeais Tom had favored the notion of establishing a nationlll le 'el ofrisk and allocating that risk to the constituent risk categories for deployment of nuclc -ar wc apons for full scale nuclear testing of devices for weapons and fur Plowshare experiments the latter b ing the llrell of his current assignment al SLL Ref 168 • Search for a Sar dia Position on Numerical Analvsis of Safety In order to further stimulate intcm3l discussion on the concepts of statistical ri quiremcnts national risk and stockpile cxpuri1 -nces as preparation for suggesting a S mdi i posiuon in rhe spring of I9i0 I TOte and circulated a lrafi working paper Ref I 69 chat contained extensive backgrounil and h slorical infonnatiun on the subjects t the rime the cap ibility to use f mlt•m e methodologies to provu lc numerical cs1imatcs for launch safety of Minuteman ICBM missile was being aJvanccJ by Bdl Telephone Laboratories for 1h ' ir Force's prime conrroctor Boeing Aircraft Company The SLL praj ct group for the V62iM Nt TEM NI l'vlk I1RV iCcmcd mx1ou to 3pply r umcnc tl OFFIG Ab-USE ONLY ' J ' j 3 I '5 I -- ' 5 · lilftl lJFRB -OFFICIAL USE ONLY analysis to the nuclear warhead Don Gregson my Livermore colleague and I negotiated an 3gr-ecment not to assign probabilistic estimates ro nuclear safety analyses Refs 170 and 171 and his position continued My disenchantment with the miniscule and unsupportable numerical values obtained by the DoD contractors was a prime motivation to seek a new technological approach for nuclear weapon designe'5 for safety This will be discussed later 5 12 Establishment of a Role for Nuclear Weapon Design Safety SpecfaUsts 1969-on At this writing tile Conner title of Department Manager has been missing from Sandia 's technical management structure for about five years and I suspect that memories of its fwictions arc dimming I devoted much thought to that subjccl during my I966 L967 work to formulate and implement Sandia's case system for budgeting and cost control ' Reference 51 contains a discussion of that work Jo brief J had considered the role of depi1I1ment manager to be the key to making the case system work I was presented with the opportunity to practice my thoughts with the new program of design safety One aspect of this that in reb'Ospect seems most responsible for the success that ensued was the function of personally handliag all matters of setting policy and the administrative chores e g writing progress reports that would consume inordinate energy from the technical staff This prefercnc on my part accounts for the voluminous draft working papers that 1wrote and left behind in files on safety policy and practices see ppendix M It was my choice to do it this way rather than tum to the more common practices of lengthy staff meetings Stan Spray was highly skilled in the latter mode and J attribute that as a main factor in his remarkable success in design safety Although r have not localed a written statement on the matter J am told that some top managers 3t Sandi i referred to the Nuclear Safety Department as a conscience and police function to be carefully kept independent'' of the line function of the laboratory do not recoil ever assigning n conscience function to my staff nor did I ever suggest that they should police anything Instead I set the firm policy that nuclear design safety was a function of the line organization e g starting ' ith the weapon developm nt project engineer and up that line of supervision to the President of Sandia As indicatt -d by Figure 12 the new division 1232 under Stan Spray had the role of developer of new safety concepts advocator sponsor of use of thosc concepts by line project organiz ition and advisor on the design safety matters or concern to the intra- gency DoD DOE Projeet Officer's Groups Nore that per Figure 12 none of the three groups Jivisions in the d partmenr were charged with being an assessor or 3 certifier ofthe level of safoty provided by liue project organizations or anyone else -OFFIGIAb-USE-QNl -¥- -a '' i dL l 7 _ l l i I ·9 8REirFA'1 OFFICIAL USE ONLV Safety Group SYSTEMS STUDIES ROLE 1231 ADJUDICATOR VOTER ADVISOR ALO OPERATIONS NVO OPERATIONS DMA RULES REVIEW DOD SYSTEMS STUDIES ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS SAFETY ASSURANCE STUDIES TECHNOLOGY 1232 1233 - - - POG SA Fen·· SUBGROUPS SL WEAPONS PROJECTS SL OPERATfONS MONITOR PAP ETC ASSESSMENT -- -ERDAiNRC SECLlUTY - - -- -- ASSESSOR - ADVOCATOR - SL EXPLORATORY CERTIFIER - - - DEVELOPER - NEW SAFETY CONCEPTS ASSESSMENT nrn-IODOLOOlES SPONSOR - DEV Figure 12 Roles of Sandia Laboratories Nuclear Safety Specialists 5 13 Guidelines for Development of a New Nuclear Weapon Design Safety Subsystem 1969- As yet I ha 'c been unable to find a document that lists the general guidelines that I issued or the staff c 'Ol 'cd aml adopte l for the ongoing project to develop a new approach to nuclear we ipan design safety The following is my recollection wid certainly is op1 -n to question and comment ·n11 approach should not in orJcr of imponancc' I Nol be lcpt nd nt on probabilistic irguments or anJl ' i l wanted to be able to pr scnt convincing argumi nts bas J on dcmuustr ittd beh 1vior ol •erTJin components and suh ystcms whl n subjectetl to nom al anJ abnonnal -em·ironments 1 used the ' cx implc rhat the items oi s3fcl h irdwar should be placc d on the 1able their expi c1cd bchanors shoutJ be asserted ind skeptics shoul l be im·itcd tu d1all nge the Vllidity of the assl flions I cmph isizc l that Ihis was to b1 a pamcip irory process OFFIG AL USE ONLY sf' • fj I q° ff i QI • •Ji lll8fllfil RD OFFICIAb US ONLY I drew strength of conviction from listening to the frustration of the systems stttdies staff who had been charged with being the technical advisors This group was to study elaborate fault trc c analyses containing numerical estimates of the probability of expected bcha• ior-die overall probability usually claiming two-digit negative exponents c g 10·11 when it was clear that no actuariill data base for the numbers could exist The convincing cvenl however was the findings of Project HOTPOINT By adapting earlier work on development of a computer program inlcnded to provide exact solutions of nuclear weapon reliability equations department staff members calibrated in a rough sense the potential magnitude of difficulty of attempting to understand all of the ways that a practical electrical system could malfunction to produce an unsafe condition To avoid imposition of security clossi fication procedures on a contractor to Sandia an unclassified schematic drawing of an electrical system was daiscd for use as a test bed The system which had switching functions considered to be reasonably representative of early U S nuclear weapons wu that of a hypothetical electric stove hence the name HOTPOINT The results of preliminary rons of the computer code a version of EVENTPOINT which featured set theory manipulation routines on Sandia's fastest scientific computer of the time suggested that some 1o• potential failure paths would have to be considered-a clearly impractical task We encouraged the use of faull-lre models that would present the logic picture of system behavior and would also allocate probabilities indicating the feasibility of the argwncnl to succeed At the time we had in EVENTPOINT the best analytical tool for solution of fault trees in the nation-as was demonstrated in the Reactor Safety Study some five years later 2 Be based on 3 simplifying notion'' By early 1969 appreciation of the basic intractability of analytical solutions of equations describing premature operation of practical electrical systems in accident environments became an impetus in the search by the nuctenr safety design division's staff for a conceptual approach that would be judged convincing in meeting safety rcquironcnts 10 The goal was to formulate a simple panem of behavior of electrical system hardware such that when insulted environmentally e g • in an accident such as a fin behavior will be based on well-understood physical properties or principles This approach a skcd not the question How wilJ lhe system behave in a flre but askedt ·•wm the system behave in a fire in the way we have predicted beforehand ' The resultant development was the simplifying notion of' veak-liak strong-link cxclosion re ion '' conceived by mid-1969 publishc d inte natly at S'1ndia by spring 1970 Ref 58 and briefed formally to the DoD by l ni 1970 Ref 59 0 -• 98 Tom kno ledge th only alltmpl hr S indi I at qu mtilahv prohab11ity analysis in nl'ci1kn1- i an micl pubbshcd in the U S Na ·y's Nudclr Wclpons S ifrty Secret Restricted Dlll publication in 5 -ptcmbrr 1969 flu arnd e n JIOrtcd un applicauon ofreli sb1luy m ilpis tl chwquc s to 3 s ifc t ' s1tu 3tton OFFIGIAk--USE·ONLY FF 3 1A TrPM OFFICIAL USE ONLY J Be based on a dcep understanding ar• abnormal environments 0 Between ·1969-1972 iJ parallel effort of the nuclear safety design division md several materials processing organizations was to investigate the properties of materials commonly used in nuclear weapon ordnance components when subjected to severe nvironmental insults The early and naive goal overstated here for emphasis was to cronte a Wllldbook thnt would describe such behovioraoalytically foruso by Snndin'c weapon designers for components contained inside the exclusion region Such a handbook would complement those widely fou od in engineering technical publications for nonnal environments For the first two years l 969-l 97 l 1 emphasis was on the bare components e g samples of plastic coatings for copper wires for the next year ond a half 1971-1972 the focus was on encapsulated components e g printed circuit boards surrotmded by pl11Stic to provide protection and by early 1972 sufficient evidence existed to upset the traditional engineering understandings of electrical circuit behavior when used in wenpon ordnance when subjected to abnormal environments Ref 60 In brief the startling and aJanning conclusion was that or all printed circuit board polymeric cncapsulants tested and within a specific range or temperahlle time conditions shorting between electrical circuits is to be expected because of charring phenomena This finding in effect shattered the image of order conveyed to the designer by circuit diagrams and layouts Unpredictability became a buzz word of lhc time Figure 13 displays graphically the changes in electrical resistance of polymeric materials commonly used in nuclear weapon hardware The display is commonly called • c Kepler Cun•c in honor of the Sandia National Laboratories Department Manager R Glen Kepler under whom the work was done Figure 14 shows photographs of a printed circuit board one shows the board in pristine condition before being encapsulated for a test The other shows that board after the test which involved the Oowofvery high currents in 11 ground circuit The top l yer of encap lant has been cut away for clarity Chmring and metal1 splatter caused by the high current resulted in unintended conductive p3ths between circuits This panicular boanl was used in a nuclear weapon type for which development had just been _completed W72 WALLEYE and some five units had been produced for stockpile At once Sandia's technical management urged DOE AL to halt production and recall the units then in DoD poisession but not yet deploy¢d in the logistical pipeline' to stockpile A d ign remedy was iui 'lltified and corrective hardware electrical fuses to prevent high current flow w is davelopcd produced retrofitted in o the recalled units and incorporated in the subsequent production run OFFl£1AL- USE-6NtY I I I ti f d J 99 • 111 1· rsSp OFFIGIAL USE ONLY TYPICAL ELECTRICAL INSUI ATION MATERIAL ORGANIC BEHAVIOR IN OXYGEN EE ENVIRONMENT t IC s 0 w I u a z z NON-REVERSIBLE DECOMPOSfflON c 0 Rt a 0 CJ I 2 a l3w LOW RESISTANCE u I ZONE w 0 c i fl _ __ _ __ C 0 200 F 32 392 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ i _ _ 400 __ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ 600 800 1000 1200 1400 752 1112 1472 1832 2192 2552 TEMPERATURE F gure 13 Typical Electrical lnstJlation Material Organic Behavior in Oxygen-Free Enviranmimt 100 -OFFICIAf - tse Slll -¥r dl l t 1 OFFIGIArUSE-GNb¥- NOTE This episode was at least the tit'lh exercise of ll1e wt -apo11s laboratories' consl il nce in nucleM weapon dcsit '1l safety e ·c n in the face of having to ildmit inaJ quacy of its own Jcsigns and to ''n d-line the stockpile for that parti ul 11 type of nuclear wcae n oa i · Sandia Altiuquerque ·as responsible for the rest the 839-2 rcady afe S itch retrofit the 827 high- ·oltage r '3dylsate switch rclrofit Jue to susct -ptibility to elecuomagn tic radiation trom frkndly transmitters page 60 and this t 'Pisode 5 14 First and La t High-Level Intra-Sandia Design Safety Review 1969 Only a few months after fonnation ofSt in Spray's Safety Asiiurance Studii s Oi ision 1632 ' 'as directed to attend a high-lc vtl e g President John Hornbeck E ecutivc Vice President Jack Howard Vice President Liv nnorc Tom Cook intr i-Sandfa review of nuclear safely provisions for the W71iSpart m antiballistic missile '-·capon system lo be held in Tom Cook's office in Lh·mnorc There w is no precedent for this however I had reachtd an undastanding o·ilh Jack Howard l bclie -c that there would be only one design safety concq t dc ·clopcr for all of Sandia and that would be Stan Spr iy's division Since Stan had been in operJtion for nbout a month l took thi responsibility Of cours l knew very little about the di sign details of the W71 or about design safety for that matter l wonder today just who call d this meeting and hy Ar mentioned in spring 1968 l had identilicJ the role of plulonium dispersal in W apon accidc nt situations as illt emerging concern nationally and had begun lo become infom1cd on th tt subject From the briefings on the W7I given by the project group J b an to focus on the plutonium iispersaJ concerns raised by two di sign features J rl call a rather heated oral xchangc with Tom Orumle ·e of the Sandfo Lh ermorc safety st Lii as lo what qu mtitati 'C probabilistic go 11 would he appropriate for sui h concem li My range ot' I ' 'L l - 1u 1o·' woulJ ha vi c 1lled for special protc tion ut lhe way of shidJing fr igm nls from pr marnr l•r otherwisc um -anh d detonation from c Usin a detonation of LLL •s primary one-point 'r mulli-point Sanuia li 'i nnorc's propos 11 hcg l m die to bi rcplJccJ with a con· - ' 'ntion ll dc1 tric il d· siin Sir til trly I su -peLt th it 001t unl in th room ir ti ·nd J t ' q11e ti• n LU · i lh signs about their ch• ir¢ of l command lkstnict curr r onc111 - a th st leatur l m r w m JWJy __ -- ·· - ' ·• Figure 1-1 Result of a Simulated Efectrica Faull lilat Damaged an Encapsulated Printed CircuU Board 102 OFFICIAL USE ONLY J r Si8AET9Pl tf OFFIGIAL USE ONLX 5 15 AEC Headquarters' Review of Its Nuclear Safety Program 1969-197031 In late-I 969 I also seivcd as Sandia's representative for the first intra-AEC review of lhe adequacy of the AEC s nuclear safety program that was concerned with all operations involving nuclear wcapom development testing production tomgc md tnm portation prior to and after transfer ofcustody to the DoD During the review I was requeSted by the study committee to draft a philosophical framework for thinking about nuclear safety in the AEC's part of the national nuclear weapons program The resulting paper Ref 61 included two innovative suggestions 1 the use of probabilistic models of each operation with nuclear weapons in order to assess the risks presented and to prioritize m1 urcc allocations for remedial action this technique later was to acquire the popular name of Probabilistic Risk Assessment PRA and was used to study nuclear power reactor safety in the mid-1970s and 2 the expansion ofrisks covered by the AEC's program to include plutonium dispersal along with nuclear detonation safety These suggestions along with others made by the committee were buried in bureaucratic maneuvering within the AEC headquarters and were not to emerge for another three to five years The two subjects PRA and Pu Dispersal were to become my personal agenda over the remaining 1½ decades of my career at Sandia Figure l S is a timeline graphic that illustrates key events in the evolution of PRA at Sandia for activities other than the nuclear fuel cycle Sandia's efforts in lhc tatter area are documented elsewhere panicularly in the files of the Sandia History Project Each of the events shown on Figure 15 by circled numbers is discussed in other papers of mine and most events after 8° and or years after 1968 are mentioned in c- ontcxt later in this report '' for rnor l 1 iil 011 tl1is topic 1 ec Rer 61 10 I ' I I I • ' a8 GRE I JPft6' usg ON Qf FISIAL f 6 54 64 62 00 59 6G GS 72 70 74 76 eo 78 B2 B4 8S 1o · ' ✓ 3 ' --- 'l' -I'• i• ' t 'i - I q -- 7 'i' A - 21' v· • q 't' t tf ' 'r-· • - r- ' r X _ l' · - a - z 1 'c t' q C' - y • f # • v d' 0® i @ I -if 9 ✓ - o _ • fJ ' @ 59 60 62 64 66 @ 66 • X----X X G t• I o· ·•'· 56 · j-1 ' 54 ' - · · Y - u _ J• ii' _ _ qr @ 70 ' ®@ 72 74 ti ·- v· Qi·•4' ' i -n 1 I # ill _ ' ' ' $' #' I'' o' r- 1 X- 76 - '' q' r 9' ' r· flt _'t' -'-- X x @ @ 78 1 eo Bo' 64 B8 r 11 u 14'tt Figure 15 Timeline Graphic for Probabilistic Risk Assessment at Sandia for Activities Other than Nuclear Fuel Cycle 104 OFFICIAL USE ONLY a tt i 1 £ I ii RI r ai8ft 'PiFRO OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5 16 Radioactive Material Contamination Studies 1971-1972 In March 1971 Sandia Vice President Jack Howard appointed a committee of three department managers to assess e tisting threats to nuch ar weapon operations from abnormal accident nvironmcnts from the viewpoint of increasing concern abour matters pcr13ining to ecology The committee was composed of Thomas B Tom Lane Henn Mauney and me We focused on plutonium contamination uising tram accidental or intentional detonation of a weapon's high explosive we used a risk assessment mcthodoJogy to establish a perspective on threats and we concluded that the situation warranted a vigorous contamination saf'- lY program-within the AEC DoO complex and priority for that program should be second only to that of nuclear safety The two most notable threat situations were identified as logistical tr1111sponation and aircraft standing alert The fmal repon Ref 62' was transmitted for intra AEC distribution by Jack How ml on July 21 1971 In the fall of 197 t the Sandia Los Alamos weapon design team established a contamination safety study group consisting of three members ftom each laboratory o determine what weapon design approaches are avait able to reduce or eliminate the cont3min ition safety concerns Ref 63 The group dctennined lhat several design approaches were available seven were examined in some detail The final report dated April 20 1972 oncluded that the team's 3pproachcs for lh Phase 2 proposal of the High Yield Bomb lhe program that evolved from the Alert Bomb CRESCENT studies or 1969-1971 should be based on in5C11sittve high explosi 'e IHE ---pi rhaps the plastic bonded trfaminotrinirrobenzene TATB formutarion then in an earl dt velopmc nl stage The group haJ precluded consideration of a system being pUl3ucd by 1he Sandia1l awrcncc Livcnnore team at the time 5 17 Security and Safety of Nuclear Weapons in Logistical Transportation 1970-1974 In my opinion Sandia's effective entry into the irea of nuclear weapon security an with 1hc com nitmc-nt of technical staff and funding in the weapon development dircctor ncs lo l fovclopmcnt of hardware to protect weapons during logis1ical h' ln TOrt llion by the DOE In I9i I a l u department I SSO was created under Gene Blake with John T Risse Edwin E EJ Bruce auJ Milton R Milt M 1dscn as di sion supen sors-all h d led weapon Ji vetopmc nt projects ex ept engineerins mech311ics specialist Risse The cki artment cunccntratcJ on dt velopmcn of lh S ife Secure Trailer SSTI system the Saft Secure Railcar SSR sy tcm and several types of Accident Resistant Containers ARC s NOTE In 1996 when twas prcpannr historic il material for lhc Sandin Surety Ih ritagc study page l 7S I stirrcJ up a Jc batc about the origins of the SST John an ccint sicd my 'l rsion that the SST was a S indi i R D inm nivc that sought and ohlaincd iuthorization or li 11 Jcn lopment tl slins and prcicurcmcnl trom AfC · t 0 John dtecl a lcllc r from H C Dunm lly• l C'·AL 10 John A llombcck l1resident SL J Jtl J Jun IS I 9i S requt sting SJndia ro mdy l•J islical shipment and ri l omrncuJ J ·clopmcnt ptions In ' flt ll£ tht5 rcpnrt z 1 l Ll l p tillRIYtr te OFFIGIAL USE ONLY Tfound the probable cause ofconfusion in Dennis Miyoshi 's draft input for the Sandia History Project Sandia History lnpul from S200 Ref 64 I may c 'Cn have seen or helped draft lbc letter that General Donnelly sent to Sandia Thi letter exchange was a rather neat way of obtaining funding from a part of the AEC budget other than Weapons R D As I recall funding came from ALO's operational budget At this time there was no instirutional avenue for Sandia to become involved in R D for logistical movement of weapons in DoD custody I had determined on my own hat those movements constiruted perhaps the greatest risk in the weapons program-a risk of plutonium dispersal not so much one of nuclear detonation safety The only lever that I had was the prerogative of sign-off approval or disapproval ofproposed changes to joint AEC DoD publications principally TP-20--7 that treated safety concerns other than nuclear detonation safety logistical storage and movements were addressed in TP-20-7 by specifying the mass of plutonium that would be placed at risk of dispersal by accidents or other initiating events i uch as c xplosive ordnance demolition or emergency destruct operations Although Sandia obtained n tasking lo do R D for safety and security of DOE operations there was no entry path for DoD operations During 1968-69 I was especially concerned because r had been given the rare opponunily to observe DoD operations worldwide Few if any Sandians had that e periencc Even though security was the subject of one of the AEC DoD nuclear weapon system safety study standards this provision in my experience was largely a joke The study groups tended lo merely take note of the physical prcscmcc of security bardware e g perimeter fences procedures e g • identification badging al fence entry points and later response force deployment given a L'U eat of intrusion takeover etc The Inspector General function of the military services the DoD through the Anned Forces Special Weapons Project and successor agencies or the AEC ERDA OOE conducted field inspections to ensure compliance with specific uions The literature on developments 311d deployments of the SST is extensive and needs no elaboration here e g descriptions and a photograph of an SST are contained in the Sandia General History Book Ref 86 TI1e story of the Accident RcsistJ nt Container ARC project is not documented well and I believ is more relevant here With fielding of a prototype SST in lat -1971 that demonstrared surface-transportatio11 risks C uld be ameliorated Sandia's emphasis turned 10 de -clcpment of ARCs that could surv ve air tmnsport11tion accidents An entire division under John T Risse was assigned to this substantial R D project When preliminary results of the Nuclear Weapon Transponarion Safety Hazard Evaluation Group NWfSHEG study revealed that aircraft crashes were the dominant threat AECIERDtVALO cleciJctl lo impose a mor itorium on air shipments of plutonium-bearing weapons aml test foviccs This removed the need for the nir raft version of ARC and th project was reconstituted ns an R D technology demonstration project During the R D process Brigadier General Frank Kamm then Director of Military - rplic itions it ERDA urged dcvclopmcut of in ARC for Am1y helicopter operations in Europe h nce the Helico1 tcr Accident Resistant Container P ARC project A relatively large number til6 9i1AliTC A8 OFFICIAL USE ONLY of prototype units had been ordered for the planned field evaluation test progrnms and by the Lime the program was revised the units had been deliven d to Sandia and placed in ' dead storage By 1979 this proved to be highly significant as described on page I 13 5 18 The Minority Opinion Provision in Safety Studies and Reviews 1960-1975 Govfflling documents for conduct of weapon systems safety studies pro ide that •·att members participating shall sign the report minority views of the members sbaJl be included Since Sandia participants are technical advisors only they ma ' convince one or more ·oting members to adopt and sponsor their minority view to generate a minority opinion Several examples of minority opinions and associated ••independence in evah13lions and points of ·iew are included in this report for purposes of illustration of lhe concept Examples do not do justice to the power of the concept because many of the more significant diS3greemcnts began as minority positions but gained support to become majority 'liews These are not identified as such in the reports Over the first fifteen years ofDoD Direcuve S030 15 19G0-197S there were about SO minority opinions submitted The rate of submittaJs was high in the early yean and gradu illy fell InhllDoD or militll ' department disagreements ere relatively frequent reasons for minority opinions These often arc mere expressions oflong-standingjurisdictional position and are irrelevant here Over 90% of the totaJ of minority opinions were submitted by the only c i vilian voting member AEC ERDA-with initiation or implicit concurrence by the Sandia technical ad ·isor for about 300 • of the total submittals the civilian member was joined by one or more military member by far most often by the member from Field Command AFSWP OASA DNA NOTE On the relatively few NWSSG studies when 1 served as technical advisor the years I valued most highly the pilfticipation of the Field Comm 1nd military service officer In gcneraJ lhcy w c 1cchnically qualified or inclined often being the only such person other than the Sandfan Perhaps the fact that they were collocated with Sandia on Sm1dfa Base and enjoyed easy access to the technical an ilysis process explains thi close and supporting relation i hip On the other h llld the offices of both the Air force and lhc Navy groups involvrd in th ' VSSG' s were only s 'cral miles distant at Kinlaml AFB We honored the objectivity pro ided by the Field Command member by the ligltt•hearted llknlilication of their uniform as lh purpl suit '' S1 -c rny p3ptr ·•n ONA Role m Nudt•etr Weapo11 · rw11 Safe Ref 98 for clabl ration In my opinion NWSSG's had only three ·otcs th t rc 11ly counted hy th EC by the fidd Comnund and by thi rest of thl milil lJ · integrated as a · te For cx unrl vot111g could result in a 5-1 count agaut t an issue when in re lli y th imp tct coulJ be cons1Jcrcd 2-1 in fa 'l r ith the minori1 · vkw prcvailin O 'Cf OFFICIAL USE ONLY • 107 iiGi1 Yfl'ft90FFICIAL USE ONLY NOTE A notable example of independence and objectivity of view WIIS the contribution of Sandi3's Bob Reed io 1967 for the safety study for a Plowshare c ·cnt cited on p3ge 78 here Bob Recd had an extraordinary ability to argue a poinr persuasively He had become a l er in establishing a philosophical framework for the systems safety study process by lhe time tbat r rc ntered the area in late 1968 In mid-1969 he obtained a transfer from safety to the newly emerging security work on the Safe Secure Trailer and did outstanding work there His five-year tenure in safety had been by far the longest Figure LO Perhaps the best known example of wi effective minorily opinion was the one originally rendered in 1970 for Pb Jse 2 of the P •Operational Safety Review of the Polaris A3 Fleet Ballistic Missile Systc 111 by the tri•party AEC FC OASA md Naval Weapon fa'illunnon Facility N tEf located on Kirtland AFB The concern was postulated capability of a - towledgeablc crew member to t3Dlper with certain m tallic shields protecting sensitive missile l iunch circuits ro cause a powered flight of a Polaris missile For PhMc 3 of the study the Na -y bad proposed cenain immediate measures to correct the vulnerability and the FC ONA 311d NWEF members withdrew suppon of the minority opinion The AEC member Richard Dick M Shay stood alone in the minority opinion Dick Shay's perseverance elevated the matter to the attention o AEC DMA in the format of a briefing that demonstrated the relative case of penetrating the protective shield AEC DMA concurred and arranged for Shay to bril fCarl Walske DoDIATSD AE This evcntualJy resulted in the Navy being rcquin d to make hardware and procedural changes to the fleet invohing millioos of dollars Dick Shay was presented a High Quality Increase in sa1azy by DOE 'AL in 1974 for this and other safety work Ref 171 OTE Dick Shay was supported by Sandia li 'emtore in provision of a technical ad isor in these studies He asked m for technical assistance later The shield material was a met dlic alloy that I hnd encountered in my first technical job in an oil retinery I had personal experience in cutting tubing made from that specific alloy l imnged for Shay to consult directly with Sandia's metallurgy staff and the demonstration of pcncmilion mentioned above e 'olved NOTE emoranda summarizing this subject were written in l 97i by Parker F Jones sup r' 'isoroftbc Systems Safety Division in my dcp311ment Ref 173 TI1« sc an representative ofhis high-quality output d1splaycd over his care r in systt ms safety that ended wilh his death While on-roll Parker Jones exemplified to me the steady wise counsel that the group of engineers with World War 11 exp ricnc had brought to Suntlia in first-level weapon prOJCCI md system dcv lopm nt jobs Sec Ref I 5 I for elahora1ion and the names of others ·OFFIC V st I · n•i 1t r t€1JAE V9Pfll OFFICIAL USE ONLY 6 THE DECADE OF EXERCISE OF DUAL AGENGY RESPONSIBILTIES 1973-1983 6 1 The SAFEGUARD Antlballistic Missile System Safety Issue 1972-1973 Since 1960 tbe governing AEC DoD directive for nuclear weapon system safety sn dies and reviews DoD Directive S030 15 had required an Initial Safety Study to be concluded early in the formal weapon system development program The U S Army's Nuclear Weapon System Safety Committee NWSSC had elected lo conduct four preliminary safety studies during lhc on-again-off again development period for the Antiballistic missile ABM effort between I9651971 The latter type of study had no official status under this directive and most of th onchundred ar-so recommendations that the NWSSC bad made were not implemented by the time that the official Initial Safety Study was conducted on May 25 1972 By tJ1a time the state of understanding of nuclear safety of weapon electrical systems in abnonnal environments had matured to the point where Sandia's technical advisor to lhe NWSSC Donald R Don lewisJ had become apprised of the unpredictability of traditional hardware circuits His input o the NWSSC with my personal commitment to support him was influential in the fonnulation of a NWSSC unanimous position The position stated that the U S Anny's adaption kit design would not meet the qualitative standard of DoD Directive S030 1 S i e would not provide measures to prevent a nuclear detonation of the AEC's nuclear warhead in accident abnormal environments The negative finmng on nuclear safety for the fnitial Safety Study was setn as a clear lb-cat to the time scales of the national ABM program which by then was of high interest-in consonance with ABM treaty negotiations with the USSR In July 1972 the Anny's SAFEGUARD project office challenged the NWSSC's finding and arranged to present its case to Dr Carl W t ske DoD ATSD AE W ilske requtstcd AEC's participation in the briefing session to be held in h1s office at the Pcntagoa The AEC's contingent included the AEC voting member of the NWSSC George L Trimble and the two Sandia department managers Don Gregson from SLL for V71 Spartan and me for W66 Sprint to whom tbe NWSSC's technical advisor reported When the Anny's briefer projected a slide that indicated the nuclear safety criterion to be met was lo·' nuclear detonation accident Dr Walskc forcefuUy inquired how the criterion had been reduced from the standard 10 nuclear de1onation 1cci lent which he ptrsonally ll3d imposed in 1968 Ref 49 now commonly referenced llS tho W3lske letter TI1c briefer expl lined that the 1IY applied lo the total weapon system and 10 was stilt ·alid as a nuctc •warhead-nlonc criterfon-the diffcr1 nce or 1o·' bl ing allocated lo the Army's adaption kit Uon L iis h3S s n·cd as tc chn1c'll ad 1sor to systcrrti Slfct1f sludy groups for O o'Cr 2 ears Jwlc 1966 co Jah w11h 3 s H r3l-month m1i rlude 1u try molh r field He w is m 11 illy m ·11lvcd wi1h lhc l l S Anny 1ten - EC L oJ 1sscnil I · pl int oper nions l11J l3rcr ilh the U S NJ Y• 109 ·J • • I I Qt 9ilill v 1FR8 OFFIGIAl USi ONLY Walske objected to this seemingly legalistic violation of his intent behind 10-- as a weapon system requirement He then asked tbe general question of whether or not c ven the Io-s vaJue was supportable When no one spoke I responded with a statement that the R D work at Sandia in the period behveer the preliminary and initial safety studies sugg ted that hardware response would be unpredictable in abnormal environments however the Army's Io-s estimate could be valid for normal environments Indeed I knew but did not mention that the Army s analysis had used a computer code the GOCOUE0 developed at Kaman Sciences by a person who carher had been a staffmember in Sandia•s nuclear weapon reliability organization which had concerned itself only with normal ' environment prmiarurc probabilities 1 also reminded Walske that the MLC ATSD AE staffs including Walske had been alerted to th abnonnal environmental R D work by me in their isit to Sandia in November 1970 and that the AEC had earlier ceased production and recaJled tmits produced for the W72 Walleye weapon system found by intra-AEC technical review to be deficient in this pecL Fim illy I offered to e pedite the transfer of the technology base on abnonnal enYironments from Sandia to Anny design agencies upon Anny request The NWSSC chairman the late Julian S Pulley remaiked that m ' proposal was im le ·Bllt since he NWSSC used only qualitative standards of DoD Directive 5030 15 and did not recognize the qW111titativc standards of the MCs Walske grimaced Following the briefing Walske issued directives which resulted in hvo important safety refom1s 1 The creation of a special organization to assess qwmtitatively the nuclear detonation safety of the total SAFEGUARD weapon system during the one-and-one-he If years remaining before system deploymcnL The organization suggested by me to avoid the philosophical issue raised by Pulley featured two tiers an Anny AEC Steering Group and an Abnormal Environment Task Group lo do the technical assessment 2 Th revision ofthe DoD directi 'e on project liaison groups POGs to mandate that POGs would invariably have a nuclear safety subcommittee and The assignment of a staff member of the Ml ClATSD AE to monitor repons of POGs to identify potential safety issues curly in time lo avoid threatening weapon system time scales SNLA Nuclear Safety sbff member fock Hickmon w is my choice for the working group ch ired by a Bell Telephone Laboratories counterpart som¢what awk·ward since BTL was SNI ·s ·•parent r recall the day that Jack reported to me the tiustrations that he was having because the study proi css wus cr unmed with visils to facilities leaving him insufficient time to do a ualyscs on lhc volumes of technical reports from contractors that were accwnulating in his cfficc I 'oluntccrcd to cover the next w ek·s visits for him allowing Jack 10 analyzt Jack Hickman's extraordinary analysis skill and use of Spray's division's data base revealed the existence of a single-fault failure mode in SPRr 'T launch circuits BTJ responsibility as shown by the simplified hlack diagram below Ahnonnal environments e g shorting of stoul wiring for the output of a large AC altemalor or generator in the syslc m to lhc point indicated IIIJ OFFICIAL USE ONL¥ a a2 u · 1 1 t _3 - 4'iilftE fffttJ OFFICIAL USE ONLY ould impose sufficient energy to bum open safety switch S2 and firc the launch functions 0 connected in parallel for needed quick response C F 3Ult to 111 Altorn uor I Normally Open h gh current I---•-------•t---- ----------- ------- -J-r- 3ut JCh tntended Source of Power Normally CJo ed S 2 urct10N 2 3 The outcome of special assessment was the identification and correction of deficiencies particularly in 1he Sprint missile launch circuits and the identification of conditions that were juJged to be unpredictable as to behavior in abnormal cnvironmcnls and uncorTectablc on program time scales Rcr 65 The latter conditions were circumvented by the adoption of nuclear satety rules that would prew nt coMecting the nuclear warhead to the adaption kit until the comple1ed missile system was about to be lowered into the silo cell Th is mc iswc oi c ourse rcsultc l in an operalional difficulty but was n as essential to safe deployment 6 2 Papers on Nuclear Power Reactor Safety 1973 In 1973 as a result of the national dcdsion to dissolve the Atomic Energy Commission l EC md plac ils functions into two new govcmmc ntal agencies and also in 1973 Sandia had suffered its first md only major layoff and reduction of staff Sandia's President Morgan Spark tasked Depart1n m Manager Bob Peu -ifoy lo xwninc Sandia's potential in 'ol ·emen1 in rhc field of nudc-at power reactors Research and Dc ·clupmcnl R D work for such re ictors w s tssi rncd Iv the n w Energy Rc e u-ch ind Development Administration ERDA along wtth tit nuclear capons w1 rk and licensing work for reactors was assigned lo the n1 w Nuclear Regulatory Cvmmis iion lu suppon l t Peurifoy's r 1sking I contrihulcd i i ·cral dr1f1 1 •orkin1t papers intend d to present h dmical an l philosoi hical opinions on rh current status of nudc r po er rc 1c1or safoty from 11 u h J pro i htrJI os1m· tr 1 HUte w • 15 su i lc•J 10 Or W iM hy S in t J ' c Pr si li nl ' J Il n ·ard wh i hJJ pri ccd d Dr W slsk · as Llwm1an 11 C OFFICIAL USE ON-f V t_ • ' ' • • a I • 111 s-sssrrsaa IGIAL USE ONLY the 'iewpoint of a nuclear weapon safety specialist Rcfc rcoces 66 67 68 and 69 The two main areas of reactor safety addressed by the papm were reactor siting practices and emergency core cooling systems in reactor design M The concept for a SAFETY FIRST nuclear power reactor Rcfcrcnce 68 is especially interesting even today when the subject of new design ipproaches featuring inherent safety is still highly active 6 3 Study of ERDA Al's Nuclear Weapon Transportation Operations ProbablllsUc Model Positive Measures Methodology 1973-1 sn The extensive study 1973-l 9TT of ERDA• operations for transportation of nuclear Veapons nuclear test devices and related radioactive materials ranks high among the several ·•system studies conducted by Sandia over the years u The methodology used was a 'ariant of Probabilistic Risk Assessment PRA that 1 had conceived and applied during the stud · and later called ''Probabilistic Model Positive Measw-cs PM PM The Probabilistic Model aspect of lhe methodology used for this study was essentially the same as for the classical PRA technique i e estimation of the risk per year of experiencing an accident seven enough to result in the unwanted event of interest e g dispersal of plutonium in the atmosphere The study began with the collection and statistical evaluation of all accident rate data available nationally for the three modes oftransportation used by ERDA-rail truck and air Concurrently the entire stockpile of nuclear weapons was examined to detennine the tolerance to withstand severe environmental insults without detonation of the weapon•s high explosive and attendant dispersal ofplutoniwn When these data were factored into the analysis the probability of dispersal of plutonium per year could be estimated for each transportation operation The Positi 'c Measures aspect of PM PM is L significant departure from the clossical PRA technique In the vernacular of nuclear weapon safecy a positive-measure is a tangible design lc ature or procedural action whose existence is relied upon to ensure that the desired level of safety will be achieved In most cases a positive measure exists solely to cnhwtcc safety This pro ision had pro 'ed lo be c tremcly powerful in the nuclear weapon areo and is in direct contrast lo the negative approach characterized by thou shalt not or 'it can't really bippcn By identifying the positiv1 measures already in use in the ERDA operations e g a 55-milc per hour speed limit for trucks long before this limit was made a national standard and qu311tita tively determining their influence on the probabilistic model the estimate of Jisper nl could be refined and reduced lo reflect ERDA 's operations instead of national practices So far this h -chniquc is the same for PR Both rc is wh m • to become p inum iunl conc ms m the implicauons of the llm c -Mil Island nuc' e ir power reactor icc1dcnt sum years I lier Oth r srud1cs of t cllcncc might 1nclud the sni tit colloqui 1l1y t' illcd TI t Vooden Bomb 1 MPcbbles lfalb rd md FORWARD LOOK Sec ltef 116 fc r dcscnpnons 111 -OFFICIAL USE ONLY 4 iCAE'iVFND OFFIOfAL USE ONLY ext and most important PM PM requires the idcntifica1ion and quantification of influence of potential posilh·c measures that could be 3dopted lo reduce risk significantly By noting the rc la1ive not the absolute risk probobiliries before and after application of the potential positive means the merit and cost of each c µi bt 3lculated The rem ttkable success of PM PM here was that the study's findings led to prompt and drastic reforms in ERDA 's operations to incorporate the potential positive measures including • • • A moratorium on ur shipments since results showed that crashes of commcrc ial and military urcraft on take off and landing were the dominant 50urce of severe and intolerable environments Redesign of ERDA•owned rail c3rs to incr i thermal insulation for accidents invol itng fuel fires Reliance on procurement and deployment of a Oeet of safe secure trailers for movements by truck together wilh a system for continuous communica1ion between con 'oys and a control center TI c study group's called tbe Nuclear Weapon Trn11spo11ation Safety Hazard Evaluation Group ftnal report Ref 70 remains a valid e amplc of excellence in systems analysis and has bcffl used repeotedly is source data or other studi 'S of national in1eresr including transportation operations incidental to the nuclear power reactor fuel cycle NUREG-0170 and transporta1ion of nucle ir weapons by the DoO in Europe See the Forward look' study discussed later In 1973 Ref 71 I suggested a broader application of PM PM to include nuclear detonation safety in uddition lo plutonium dispersal safety 1n 1977 I attempted to have the PM PM technique considcn -d for use in other non-weapon projects ot Sandia by offering to arrange an internal-Sandia study of PRA featuring symposiumlike presentations to a study group Ref 72 My proposal includ J a paper on philosophical and historical treatment of the PM PM technique Ref 73 and a paper on the state or nuclear power reactor safely reviewed from a PM PM paspeclive Ref 74 This aliemp died for lack of sponsor at the d irc clor level within Sandia 6 4 Security of Fixed-Site Facilities for Nuclear Weapon Operations 1973-1976 A basic reference for chis section ts Dennis M1yoshi's 1984 repor1 on si cwicy Ref Ct s the Vietnam W 'lr ebbed S indi 1's R O on imrusion d tcclion sensors 111d c y itr ms shilkll Inward appliculions ti tixed- itc facililil S of high national ·uluc t·sp cially to nuck• tr ' tpnm facilities of thl ' EC ERDA In late 1973 1 joint prognm 'Ith the U S Air F'- rc was initiated wh reby SNL wm1ld dcs1 n J1 vclop ind u-rnngc for procurement ofimnisilln clctection systems th coulJ be installed at t S F nuclear weapon sit s w11rldwide Th • -c syst« ms inchulcd sensors for both internal stn cmri ind C krior arc -as u d sophistic ucd c 1 nal proccs in equipment Clo cd irc ui1 T ' OFFICIAL USE ONLY -t lf ii 2 Ii 3i 11 ilGA ih RI OFFICIAL USE ONLY systems were c vcnrually deploy 10 more than fifty storage sites The Air Force had the tn• scn·icc responsibility for DoD fixed-site s«urity R D under the label of Base Installation Security System BISS bur the 3pplicalions were for all OoO facilities In March I 974 SNL formed a new dircctor ue le ·el organization Nuclear Security Systems Directorate 1700 311d Orval E Jonc s was promoted from a research department to become the Director under Glenn Fowler as the responsible Vice President I000 The directorate soon had three areas of work in separate departments transportation systems sensor systems and nuclear fuel cycle activities waste management and power reactor safety J• Much of the staffing and te bnology in the uansportadon and tiltC l-sitc security areas carno ftom direct transfer of an intact dcpanmcnl tluu had evoh·ed in Bob Peurifoy's Weapon System Developmtnt directorate 4300 in order to provide mission status for this emerging area of n3tional n Aller mid-1974 a fourth area was added to support activities of the ERDA 's Office of Safeguards and Security including intematiooal interests in safeguarding nuclear materials Tn the fall o l977 William C Bill yrc succeeded Orval Jones as Dirc cror and continued for over a decade in that position All of these new missions had bc cn recommended in Bob Pcurifoy's study for Morg in Sparks in 1973 see page l 11 6 5 The First Revision of the Directive for Weapon System Safety Studies 1973-1974 DoD MLC chainnan Carl Wa ke supervised the first revision to DoD Oi tive 5030 l S Atomic WC3pon System Safety Studies and Reviews dated June 1960 His nuclear sa feiy speci ilist Captain Willi Jm Sweet U S Navy did lhc dtilfting As manager oflhe Nuclear Safety Dcpilftment I was contacted by Captain Sweet for infannal comments on the several drafts In my opinion this vernl-yearcfTort had as primary motiv11tion WaJskc's desire to chmge the coverage from pe cctimc operations and also to include high sr ntus of readin including war Jn particular he wanted nuclear safety rules to address the process of recovering from hish re diness to normal readiness Coverage was broadened to include all operations ' 'iOTE The AEC ALO successfully lobbied to add the undefined act of pream1ing to the existing acts to be pre ·tnted by lhe four safety standards i e • to lhc four gerunds of a11ning launching firing or releasing withoul offering any written explanation This iction was fail accompli before I could objccl to po -sible impact of the loiical inconsistency In perspective the p mcicy of changes in the August 8 1974 n vision testify lo lhc rcmark tblc merits of the original version ·· llw Jr · J s hi 1r 111 il 1aapl r ntaM 1 uc' 1h ' rk r i mmcnd d 1r c stt d lh u 5 nJi a r c 1idt n1 turg 1 i pa t• tJ c-1 Ooh Pcunfoy tu r vrv lu t 1111 Hie r udo ir r -r ri Ch t i ll l tci I ydc1 l 1 7J It' s - lu 1r ll'IC l- 1mc i d rtCti rltC 1 1 Ie I wi 11 - W tn 11 $11 Jcr promoted t i c nt w w d1r '-'tl'I l 1 1 OFFICIAL USC-eNc¥r - • - • ' I i I j t 9L' CKE IJPRb OFFIGIAL YSE ONLY 6 6 Sandia Questions the Safety of Air-Delivered Weapons In Quick Reaction Alert the II Fowler Letter Fall 1974 In Sept1m1ber 1973 Bob Peurifoy was promoted to become Director of Weapon DcveJopment 1500 under Glen Fowler Vice President 1000 By year-end Pcurifoy had completed a review of the impact of the new undcntanding of nbnormlll environment ituiltion 1 on the composition of the U S nuclear weapon stockpile and concluded tho t the air-delivered portion of the stockpile constituted a higb•safcty risk that required priority attention to remedy deficiencies He proposed a retrofit to incorporate ENDS subsystems into the older bombs that were exposed to abnormal environments during operational deployment the 828ft 843 B57 and B61-1 and Glenn Fowler agreed Fowler arranged to presc lt the retrofit initiative to Sandia's top-level management council Small Staff On February 1 I974 W Ray Reynolds presented a briefing with results that reportedly varied from indifference to din -ct opposition The latter reaction was championed by Vice Presidents Tom Cook in charge of Sandia Livermore and Al Narath in charge of Research who argued that recommending a r trofit would be a suggestion that Sandia had been imperfect that new weapons development programs would be scheduled to eventually replace the older ones and that a retrofit program would waste resources on the stockpile instead of on challenging R D advances These views prevailed Apparently Executive Vice President Jack Howanl remained passive on the subject even though his record would have suggested that he could be expected to support safety initiatives He had however not been involved in the evolution of this particular initiative 1n April 1974 Fowler end Peurifoy gave the retrofit brfofmg to Major General Ernest Ernie Graves ERDA OMA in Washington in hope of gaining his support By this time Insct1Sitive High plosive Technology was advanced and was included in the retrofit program General Graves and staff were passive recipients of the proposal and Fowler and Peurifoy decided to make their concerns a matter of formal record TI1e letter fmm Fowler lo Cimvcs dated November 15 1974 drafted by Charles Charlie Burks the Department Manager for 1he 861 program would pmvc to be an event of extreme influence on the national nuclear weapon safety program-perhaps corr parable only to the Klee Committee's review of lhe stoclq ilc in 1957 altendant to the introduction of scah d-pit nuclear weapon designs The letter Ref 7S became known as 'the Fowler Letter or in some DoD circles the Halloween letter for its alleged sudden shock to Don C'ltter then D DIATSD AE Briefly the Fowler Let cr rccommemicd a joint ERDAiDoD program to improve the nuc tear safety st llus of the air delivered stockpile over the decade 1975-1985 by either retiring or retrofitting seven weapon types with a wcak-link srrong-link cxclusion region safety subsystem and rcplacmg four weapon types with weapons scheduled to be newly produced later and ha 'ing the modem safety subsystem ' t ntil th sc or similar actions could be taken Sandia recommended that the Secretary of Defense be notified of the risks inh rent in maintaining Quick All oftbc caron sy5tcms im·utn l used nuclear w ube si ls or bombs thar b Jd been dcsi ncd by I he S mdi i Lua AtJmos 1c 1nt Thus Vice President GkM A fowh - uodec '-''horn Sand1 1 lbuqucr1 1ui 1 ·cnpuo l1 VctCJpme1u prul rJm wt re m tnJgcJ 3 i liu ippropnalc i a r S mrha I i1 cm10re w is not lir cdy uwoh·e l TI1is w S th t1flio 1al J tory ·-0FFICIAL USE-eNLY '3 i 1 L 11 ®@'PSTC5G OFFICIAL USE ONLY Reaction Alert QRA operations with the weapons and that the A EC recommend rcslriction of such QRA oper ations to missions •·absolutely required for national security reasons Response to the Fowler Letter can be characterized 35 mostly delaying actions in the guise of requiring detailed safety studies of each of the weapon systems involved Military Liaison Committee MLC Chairman Don Cotter and ERDA OMA Director Ernie Graves visited Sandia and were shown a special exhibit in the secluded High Bay of Building 892 featuring weapon hardware that had beon subjected to severe 3bnormal nvironmcnts e g fire and crushing during SNL tests and stockpile accidents The exhibit and accompanying narration by Stan Spray W3S to become known as the The Burned-Board Briefing after Figure J4 shown here Cotter and Graves reportedly openly reacted so angrily to the briefing that their comments defied reason MLC Chairman Don Cotter's E ecuth·e Secretary Colonel Richard N Dick Brodie soon took action to have the use of Il-lE be mandatory for the only new weapon in development at the time the B77 NOTE In mid-1985 I had made an estimate of total briefings and persons briefed over the period since January 1975 abuut 245 and 200 About 800 persons were non-Sandians including key military and civilians in the national nuc lear weapons communi1y and or their staffs e g several Secretaries of Military Dcpa --tmcnts Flag Officers to Lt General Chairmen of the DoD MLC Panels of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board and the Sandia Board of Directors By 1990 the rotal had reached some 5 000 persons briefed 6 7 Nuclear Safety Concerns for the PERSHING II Weapon System Development Period 1974-1981 The ni ' t major development program by the U S Army for a nuclear-weapon-capable w apon system after the ABMs of the late-1960s was the PERSHING TI This program had such important nuclear safety concerns that it is discussed here in more detail than for od1er weapon systems in order to illustrate the nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system processes at the time Another imponant concern that of deliberate mauthoriz d launch DUL arose as the veapon system approached deployment That story is discussed in a scparntc section of this repon NOTE After the SAFEGUARD ABM nuclear safety episodes described earlier I continued lo 3Ct 3S a staffmember for the S-NLA safety involv ment's with the U S Anny Don Lc vis whom I have commended here for his tenacity in those issut 5 ipj e i r d to he bumed out with tht Anny's NWSSC and our staff had fallen to two at the time 1 continued in this role until retirement in 19S5 • Arming Fuzirig and Firing Subsystems for the Anny s Pershing H Missile 197-1 116 -OFFICIM -USE 0NI ¥ 31011E'1Ffl0 OFFICIAL USE ONLY In the fall of 1974 in response lo OoOIDDR E s expression of interest Sandia entered a year-long technological competition with the Anny's Picatinny Arseml ror development of AF F subsystems for two versions of the proposed Pershing JI theater missile system-an air-burst re-entry ·ehicle and an earth-penetration re-entry vehicle Picatinny had been responsible for all of the Anny's AF F subsystems since the NIKE HERCULES and HONEST JOHN weapon systems of the mid-19505 1n 1971 SNL had been asked to comment on its ability and Villingness to undertake the additional tasks of assuming the nuclear weapon responsibilities of the Anny as contained in the 1953 3grcemen1S SNL's response to AEC DMA affirmed capability but stated that willingness should not exist ' mless or until the Anny has convinced itself that we could do an eminently satisfactory job for il ·• Ref 9 of Ref 76 the latter being a history of SNL 's jnvolvements in the field o AF F subsystems The Almy's Source Selection Board ruled in August 197S in favor of SNL's proposals for both AF F subsystems This board was chaired by a Colonel who had been Commander Picatinny Arsenal and as A junior officer had worked with SNL as the Anny's proje t engineer on the JUPITER intermediate-range ballistic missile system in the late-1950s 'Even earlier he had replaced me as a First Lieutenant in the Anny•s first nuclear weapon ordnance battalion in 19S3 at Sandia Base NM The next higher level in the Anny•s hieran hy the Source Selc ction Authority overruled the Board on the air-burst version and concurred on the penetrator vcaion Their rationale was one of nuclear weapon safety and the argument in my technical opinion was flaky at best The authority was commanded by Anny Colonel Samuel Skemp who as mentioned earlier as a Captain had objected to Sandia's FSD safety initiative page 33 Soon after this deci ion was rendered he retired and be amc an employee of the commercial tum AVCO which was by then under contract to Picarinny Arsenal to produce the adoption kit SNL designers later estimated the costs to the nation oflhis decision to be 15 to 20 pounds in weight penalty and about S30 million in life-cycle costs The penetrator version was later canceled • Rewrite of Army Pamphlet 50-2 on Safety Design Through sponsorship of the Anny•s Nuclear and Chemical Agency or its prede essor agency Picatinny Arsenal's safety group under Warren Reiner with Ed Arbor as technical lend nttemptcd to revise Anny Pamphlet 50- the docwnenl thal containeJ guidance on design fealures for safoty in Anny nuc ear weapon systems This in my opinion was a blatant uy at making PicatiMy' s adoption kit for the WS i PERSHING II be the sole provid r of safety essentiall · ig11oring th contribution of rhe Enhanc d NudeilI Detonation S ifoty ksign in Snndia•s 85 OFFICIAL USE ONLY ·t ' ' · 117 OOU tt I H IIV OFFICIAL USE ONLY As I recall r managed to have a member ofStan Spray's staff assigned lo the effort to lobby for a generic set of guidelines that favored no agency ln the end PicatiMy's ploy failed and the document issued was reasonably objective • Safety Working Group of the Project Officer's Group 1976 The PERSHING II program marked an early if not fust implementation of Carl Walskc's initiative to require that the principal EPJ AIDoD weapon system project dc ·clopment coordinating agency the Project Officer·s Group POG establish a Safety Working Group SWG comprised of technical safety specialists to advise it on safety matters I had personally lobbied Walske's slaff to make the change to the DoD directive to require SWGs-this of coune being the institutionali1 ation of the group that had functioned so well for the SAFEGUARD ABM episode page 110 and the Technical Working Groups TWGs of the ERDA DoD Stockpile Safety Study then in process page 137 The SNL member of the SWG was from the weapon project group and Stan Sprats nuclear safety design group provided an advisor observer This group did exceptionally fine work in my opinion • Technical Analysis Role for the NWSSC Picatinny Arsenal's safety group was assigned the function of conducting the technical safety analysis that was lo be the input to the Nuclear Weapon System Safety Committee The politics were that the NWSSC tried to categorically ignore lhe work of the SWG POG I appointed myself as the Technical Advisor lo the ERDA voting member of the NWSSC George Trimble of DOE AL and pressed successfully for rect gnilioa and acccpl mce of SWG POG work • Abuse ofthc Nuclear Weapon System Safety Study Process 1976-1982 DoD Directive 5030 15 that governed the NWSSC process required an Initial S i fety Study to be conducted ·• as soon as the Military Department concerned detennines significant d3ta are available The U S Anny's NWSSC in apparent coordination itith its de facto parent the Nudear and Chemical Agency with which ir was physically collocated used the Initial Safety Study provision to obtain periodic approval of the design fe itures of the PERSJUNG n weapon system is the d velopmcnl progr Sscd over a ix -year period t 976-I 982 The 1 IC1y wii to subdivide th lniti3l Study into three sr iges 311d the stages imo p1i'ts such that there were fi •e studies in total In ealy 198 I at the Pan I St3ge m tvtm the issu of deliberate unauthorized launch DL ''L_ was considered and a Special Safety Study was scheduled for Inter that year for this issue See DUL'PERSH G I section on page 147 OFFICIAL t JSE-0Nc¥ • • ' ' ' • • • • • 11S SilfP•• OFFIGfAL USE ONLY 6 8 ATSD AE Rich Wagner's Visit to SNL 10 8 81 LLNL's Richard l Rich Wagner replaced James P Jio1 Wade as OoOIATSD AE and Chairman Military Liaison Committee When he ·isircd SNL I w Js tasked by Bob Peuritby tll briefhim on the n itional nuclear detonation safey progr un from a SNL pcrspcc1ive r us -d the SAFEGUARD ABM and PERSHING JI t pisocb to alcn Rich to our emerging concerns that could affect the schedule for deployment of PERSHING JI on his tour of duty In panicular r alerted him to the inadvertent or deliberate WU1utborizc d launch concern that is described here 011 page 167 My annotated cwgraph presentation is Ref 77 6 9 The ERDA DoD Stockplfe Safety Study 1975-1976 On May 6 197s the OoD MLC approved a charter for a joint ERDAIDoD evaluation of oucle3r s ifety for the entire nuclear weapon stockpile ·n1is charter was the main response to the Fowler Letter dated November Is 1984 which questioned the safety of the air-delivered ponion of tht stockpile Ref 196 The charter was patterned directly after the AEC DoD arran1cment of 1972 for evaluation of nuclear safely of the SAFEGUARD ABM A steering group would establish unifonnity in approach among the Technical Working Groups TWGs to be fonncd by each of the three military services and ERO to resolve conflicts ensure timely completion and to establish priorities of reviews for the one-year study effon Ref 78 o The evaluations conducted by the technical working groups arc remarkable in their high qualily of technical analysis and in uniformity of approach The former may be attributed lo lhc enlightened policy of the milit uy services and the three ERDA weapons laboratories in making assignments to the TWOs based on technical competence rather lb4n prior experience in the qualitath·c orcna of system safety studies per OoD Directive SOJO IS The latter may be attributed in major pan to the personal contribution ofSandians Stan Spray nnd Jay Grear who devised and successfully advocated a study methodology that produced a single definition of modem safety standards a tcnn contained in the chartcr -a ra1ing system for weapon hardware response that categonzed the dcgrc es of safely judged to exist and i se ·ttitylikclihood ind x of abnormal environments Ifigure 16 to facilitate arriving at priorities for remedial actions figure 17 im licah s the larg magnitude of the total national i ffon which became known as the l RO -' DoO Stockpil Satety Study and the subsequent consideration of1he TWG s findmgs hy he uclear WeJpon System Safety Group N' VSSG of the military ser 'ices as rtquired by thl ch rtcr 6 10 The Joint Chiefs of Staff Stockpile Improvement Study 1975-1977 Com urr ntly with conduct of the ERDA DoD Stockpile Safoty Study effort an t i$cnti illy indi pl nd nl cffon was conducted under DoD auspices is a tcdmic tl review nf th currclll n aH• nn tm l r 1ture r udc r wc ipon sysh rm 1th rcsp1 -ct to sJfoty security command and OFFICIAl -t ISE ONLY ·1__ ' I I- • I f • ff C ·tE IfPJf0 OFFIGIAL USE ONL¥ control ·· As evt 'JltS Ji vcloped this fTort focused on use control a pects of nuclear weapon systrms Nuclcur detonation safely was not co• er in deference to the ERDAiDoD study Radioactive material dispi rsal safety was defined to be within the scope but nothing or t 1 mscqucnce was done Security similarly w is largely ignored Results of the Join Chiefs of Staff Stockpile Improvement Study wero aot provided to Sandia or ERDA DOE even though Sandian Bill Hoagland had been a full-time participant by invitation 6 11 The POPCORN Issue Revisited the Study of 1975-1977 By means of a co-signed letter to AEC OMA dated June 13 197S officials of the Los Alamos and Livermore weapons laboratories announced that in the past year a significant extension to previous analyses had occurred and results indicate that there may be a problem Ref 79 NOTE This letter which touched off a several-year major restudy of nuclear weapon storage configurations and procedures is an example of stockpile stewardship ' whistle blowing'' to rcpon openly a safety-related situation that might be seen by some critics as a deficiency in performance by the contractors Although the LASULLL letter suggested that the restudy of the POPCORN phenomena could be included in lhe ERD VDoD Stockpile Safety Study already under way the effon was assigned to a task group chaire d by the DoD FC-DNA with mmtbcrs om the OOE's LASL and LLL and arious technical and liaison agencies o the military services The final report was issued on September 13 1977 Ref SO 6 12 Plutonium Mass Limit Controversies 1975-1976 An early initiative of Don Cotter as chairman of the OoD's Military Liaison Comminee appointed in lhc fall of 1973 was lo direct the DoO's Defense Nuclear Agency to conduct a study on nuclear stockpile operating and support costs As a pan of this study a Field Command unit of DNA located in Livennore and lltcn unJer Colonel Marvin B Sullivan USAF onducted a study lo examine economic he3hh b3Z31d and poliric il costs of long-range 1ransportation of plutonium-bearing nuclc ar weapons by logistical aircraft Colonel Sulli 'an u o d probability-versus-consequence diagrnnu to develop an argument that the OoD's public responsibility dem inds a low-risk policy and the nwnber of flights should be reduced by increasing the number of nuclear weapons carried by an aircraft up 10 the maximum physically r racticable rather th in to obsen-c the existing Pu mass limit In some cases the existing limit resulted in being 1ble to load only a fow wcupon i per aircraft He further 3rgucd 1hat th political risks support his po iuon since the risk fulls as lhc number of nights decrease Cosl savings of ah0ut S 18 million r er year were stimatcd Dunng 197 t Colonel Siilhv 111 pr scntt d his limhngs in briefing fom1Jt 10 various pc n um mduding an F R01 cc 1ntm1 i n1 in lbuquc rqu - cw lcxico on Septemb t S 197 i Thi l O r 1rli -r POPC'OR l 1· 111 · •rn mi I Jdinmcins ire ts u c i 011 pli 1•1 FFtetAt-USE ONi ¥U I I i a • • a • • • 'IIIRET1'52D OFFIGIAL USE ONLY was at the request of Sandia's Executive Vice President Jack Howard who had been briefed e3rlier J Representatives of the ERDA weapons laborarories principally Gene EysterofLASL Marv Gustavson of LLL and Bob Luna of SLA argued that the more serious health hazard consequences of higher Pu mass limits given that an accident occurs should be factottd into the considerations aad that an upper limit should be imposed On February 1S 197S a rcpon by Colonel Sullivan recommending a 60 kilogram mass limit was presented to the OoD MLC members ond on March 30 1975 the report was forwarded for comments to members of an ERDA study group on ERDA weapons transportation c perations This group the Nuclear Weapon Transportation Safety Hazard Evaluation Group N VTSHEG h id been srudying the subject since 1973 Its members including Drs Eyster aod Gustavson continued to object to the DNA arguments for relaxing limits b on results o NWTSHEG's detailed risk asStssment The NWTSHEG's work published as ERDA 77 tO in Ianua y 1977 identified 3ir transportation of Pu-bearing nuclear weapons as a higliarisk operation in ERDA operations TWs report Ref 70 was a factor in an ERDA decision to discontinue such flights The MC Chairman reportedly shelved the DNA proposal and no further action was noted until mid-1977 as discussed later Aircraft Crash Bum II Afrenft FuelFlra Accidental NUCLEAR SAFETY REQUIREMENT LEVEL I Launch l e I a a u • PTVan lnwnened Ill t I MafnL Faclnty Ughlnlng flUCLE AR SAFETV -' - Malnt Facility i EJ c Power ia Alert Accident EJec Power Fuel Truck Colllsion Mate Demate Lightning ----••t---••--ACCIDENT MORE SEVERITY UK£UHOOO INIJEX Post-launch i Accident LESS ----- Figure 16 Severity-Ukelihood Index Re-ent y Vehicle Weapon System Example GFFfGIAL USE ONLV l 2 l acer re k'l1 AF S IC 141 I l F ANI ¥ 823 Fl -••··- H Q 0 LL - of 5-ilD-76 J • 1 IH 'I U· H I 1 11 0I 1 t m 11- 1 w 1 1v _r- - J CY7S $ CJ N D F M 4 - - n -1•1 llli UC I wn 1 VAI I l YI J' 1 · 111 ttol tfJl CI ·h I ' 1 J 'Wl•JII - - -----• - - - - - ii - lf UM • y 1• I 11 1 1 111 • v1 o w 1_ II 'll' tt 11 1111 - - WW - - ' - -- - - - ---- - --- - -- -- 1'1 u u 1bu 1 1 1 ' l f•14t i -_____ • '•Y l V•l' - - - 1 ' l t 1°1 V Ot 1 • i• 4J• •4 - - - - - - - - - - - - • J - l L ·- -t - co z i - CAi ' r 1 hu 1t ''· - - - - - - - - - - - •i-- '-'ll f£•1 •t 1A 11r '- lf 11 •I n l •W t·IOU· l il' •N l r- 11- · ·- -•' • • • _ - r - ' I • ffo · - ___ 11'• 'A'I 1 ' t 1 --------J J -Jiw· t i• • • t II ' 1•' ''- f' s 0 N 0 J F M A t 1 J •J A wv ' 'cuk fl Jm nln s 0 N D J F t 1 A u11t a· R I 4 i St 111 c1 N' 'o'SSG RP •i••n Figure 17 ERDA-DoD Stockpile Safety Studies CY75 and CY76 122 F 1- II A -- - - - - ---- - • - u u- ut111 u r - Wt I c lJUl ll l ar r 'V t AS 10 l l ' l Alt - _ - _ - - - - __ - - 11 - 1 l t f U 1 A tl'•V t-t1 ' - - ·-· a 1-J -------- ---- 4 Ill Al e J lh tt u -----W l lo'll l r ' fl ' 14 111 hllll U 0 ·--- l • U••• I t •· •••• - • - ----- --- --- ·n t ''r---- -- - -- - - - -- s A ' 2t ------------- V fll I - - ••• 1o ' E J tr Y -Ut 't·ll l l I' IOI l ml'J l 1 1 l t 1 - - - - - - - - l Al l l'A 'J I I -4°1 111 --i W'i -- -- - - CY 77 A AFl IP IAI l l r AMI Y VIS nu OCIIIRI I JPRE7 OFFICIAL USE ONLY 6 13 The ERDA DoD Transfer Study The Concept of Dual-Agency Responsibilities 1975-1976 The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 required a thorough review o the desirability and f ibility of transferring the military application and rcstrictcd data functions which ERDA inherit from the AEC to the DoD or other federal agencies The revic w officially entitled ••F1111ding und Munagemefll Aller ratives for ERDA '1 ilila y App ica11011 and R atricted DaJa Ftmctiuns but commo11 · called ti Transfer S111dy was conducted during 1975 by the participanls listed in Figure 18 Bob Pcuri oy was the Sandia member oflhc Field Drafting Group and ·rechnical Advisory Group for the Sandia Los AJmnos nucicar weapons progr un As recogni1 c d by Peurifoy and Don Cotter who had left Sandia and was then Chaim Ian LC md ATSD AE in the DoD S1C was lhc pivotal issue in deciding whether or not nuclear weapons program management and funding would be transferred rrom ERDA to the DoD This issue was seen as civilian versus milit uy control of nuclear weapon safety and use control Accordingly I was tasked by Peuri oy to address the issue by outlining the evolution of these attributes ofnuclear weapons The first draft paper Ref 81 focused on custody of nuclear weapons and required interviews of key persons in the ERDA Albuquerque Operations Office especially Wah White who was a party to the original transfer of weapon parts from the War Dcpartmc nt•s Anncd Forces Special Weapons Projc ct to the AEC at Sandia Base New Me ico A later draft Ref 82 and a paper on possible implic itions or the transfer on nuclear safety Ref 83 bec une the impetus for the commissioning by lhc study's director tX•Sandian Gordon Moo of a paper on safety and use control of nuclear weapons The paper Ref 84 co-authored by me and Marv Gusta ·son of the Lawrence Livmnore Laboratory was the origin of the now•common term u scd to describe AEC DoD relationships dunl•agcncy judgment 3Jld responsibilities '' and preservation of this concept provided the telling argument in lhe fin il report Ref 85 This paper is attached here as Appendix H NOTE Colonel Richard N Brodie USAF was the DoD's liaison officer to the study group and was then the Exc cutive Secrcwy ofDoO's Milir uy Liaison Commiuee Brodie ilnd I b1 gan a ten-year c ollaboration 1hat became almost continuou5 after Brodie rctiri d from the USAF and joined S ind1a• tcchnicJI staff In the lale 1970s for whatever causes or tombinalion of causes the he ti th of the dual•i1i cncy jnll1 rmc nl and responsibilities arrangements for nuclear safety began to dctcriordtc at an incrcasm ami serious rate Pokntial contributing causts may have included rhc rcpl 1ccment o ' ERDA by the DOE md aucmlant n Juction of thc Veilpans progr un in the hierarchy demise of 1hc •·warchdol '' and adn1c Jtc Joint Conunittci on Atomic Encrnv retirtments or 01hcr rcm0 1ls ftong•tcrm safety advocates uch ns Gcn ral Dodd StarbirJ downgr iding of the roll and sl ttti le ·ds f 1he DllD's Dcli nse uch ar Aucncy and changc s in stallin u1J management intcrc_ 11 the MLC ATSD E l11er '3 i however no ohscr' 'ahl inclkation of a conspiracy vr other - pres i n of intent to degradL - -· OFFICIAL USE-GHl -Vt I I • 'i GSRE YfPWCI --OFFICIAL USE ONlV _ _ _ _ Ill c r lU _ _ ' - - ' a n -- _ _ __ _'_ _ _ _'-ec••• _ C U ••ODIC f l Q A t -·-__ i -c--i-- a - _ __ U 1-- -- c - - - tu• ca -- - __ -·-- ___C- -4 _ _ m _ c - '- _ o - o1- - C lf llDUIIA 1- i _ _ _ _ 'i 4 - c J llnac - --------- t A IICOl¥fft l-8C11__ •_ _ C- C-1 - -a -- _ _ _ ••• zffl 1 m11oec _ i--e1 - - - II Lftllt - O -rl ---- 1 1 - _ _ _ _ '-L r-- •• '• • -nice y i-c c -- '----·· u - - - ----'- -'-- - aaE ulO 'IAIVIC J tna'a ZII --- - DOIIIICICa Lc nDaC '-- - _ s-s- A NAA UII ke rT tt - 1- iu -n oux IIDOUaUUIIOINt llftD u r -i - _ _ _ _ __ a ra t- i-i --- f L tA 14 _ _ IC lJI J lUIA i - - r a L- _ 1 - _ U DICEIT I A SICD'ff t •UT ' AD 4 o r - - - u- l M-S - i- -y A Sllml'D i sna r n i- i -- -n LIC I D - • T'INA 0 - - - - r m7TD- u » c a U •ID1ftll -s--'- '11 1 ICUD f '-'--t - lla JO-' a 1 -i --i-- WT1nt1• s-i a-- t ana A c 111 -o --o a ca azrut U ou Df i r mi a - '--- YLvcr ml 'CJ - a -i-a-- '-- '--- l'IIIIIIPOT CILJOIIIS lu«XGIUZ - 'c cf MN'l l AA C r1et wr I S OIQIU ltl I _ r - •OOL l JJ# -2 rg c 1 - c _ • IIJ J D -4S 'U- ts ___ _ O'f_ -C' •-------- -Wl 'l'ft2 Figure 10 PrincipJI Study Participants Transfer Study OPFlGtAb-USE ONLY I ' J W 6 14 Abortive Attempts to Reinstitute a DoD DOE Agreement 1976-1978 Infall 1977 MLC Chairman Don Cotter in an economy move to reduce staffsize abolished cJ1c staff billets officers of the military services in ranks 0-6 ind less assigned to the Military Liaison Committee while retaining a st for his other responsibiliries as the ATSD AE In this process Ute nuclear safety sta fT was reduced from three officers to one and the remaining one was lo be a billet assigned to the DSA not to the ATSD AE Also the senior gr3de level W3S reduced from 0-6 Colonel Navy Captain tu O·S Lt Colonel or Navy Commander the lowered level being commensurate with Ute action officer coordination anangemcnt with the military scl' ices that seemingly had gained favor in the Pentagon and at DOE Headquarters During the fall of 1978 Dr Jwnes P Vade a c irccr DoD ci il serv int rq laced Coner and the actionofticcr amutgement was continued The Anny's safety action officer at the time was U S Anny Colonel Retired Joe Luger who was an open avowed opponent of any legitimacy to DOE's involvement particularly DOE ALO or Sandia in matters concerning nuclear weapons in DoD cus1ody His antics in joint ERDA DOB mcerings and his caustic writings endorsed by the Department o the Army's Dq uty Chier of Sta ff for Plans and Operations DCSOPS became so nagrant as to appear to be out ofcontrol He managed by non-concWTCnce maneuvers o stifle altcmpts to fonnalize and endorse the dual-agency judgment prnc licc that had been acccplcd lS national policy via the Transfer Study For example in March 1976 the staff of the DoOIATSD AE suggested that a ilcmor mdum of Understanding MOU between ERDA and DoD on nuclear weapon safety b Jratlcd This action terminated the intra-DoO coordination of a proposed NaJional Securicy Decision Memorandumn th3t bad been dr3fted by the AEC and forwarded to lhc D D ATSD AE in March 1974 Following action-officer-level discussions between AEC and DoD the AEC representative redrafted the MOU and fonvardcd it to DoD ATSD AE on September 29 1977 The DoO ATSD AE obtained comments from the military services apparently this was the first such coordination anempt redrafted a MOU and forwarded it fonnally to the DOE for comment before submission through Office of the Secretary of Defense for final coordination and approv il This vmion was transmhted to the m inagerof DOE iALO anJ tlu President of SNL by DOE 0 on fay 24 1978 This was the first fonnal opponuni1y to bring the matter to the altcnlion ofth scnfor management I '3S assigned by Jack Howard to coordinah Sandia•s rcspons 'The intra-Sandia coordination process included a review of the evolution nflhc 1OU The response- W3S i memo date June 20 1978 from S mdia President lurgan Sparks signed by Jack Howard to DOE DMA fajor Gener ii Joseph K Bratton which in strong language ur cJ that rhc DoD's ·ersion be judged inadequate by DOE cilld that the DOE request a rctum lo the earlier 'crsions for which the DOE and DoD ATSD AEJ action lliccrs had bl n making cxccllc 1t 1 rogn ss Rl f 195 In this process l lc tmcd th it the sourcl ofth objcction3bh langu igc lhat in dfoct wot Id ha ·c madt · DOE emirdy $Uhordinate- to DoD Dcc1 1on - kmorJr lt 11n w uhJ rt pla c aunn al °'l'Ct t 11y l' tion h mor n lum i l bf 1 sy - 1961 • h t h 1ml been uu -r 'Jt- oJ on Fd•n1Jr - 1%9 i · a11 111J S 1101 i '1$ r H nr 1' i s nn - r 1 pan of a t nl'r il rcJu uon 1n ulil r h1ecm C n1 AEC' tpr- JI Ii r mu JUon 1 $c uri1 uon lc 111l1ra111tun1 51 v 1 ' l lll ' cmJ 1111 SJta m ll S i m1ty 125 II '-- ·· · ·-- 1iGAl TJPRD OFFICIAL USE ONLY in nuclear safety-instead of DOB and OoD having the dual-agency judgment responsibilitieswas the Anny's action officer Joe Luger Following further interactions between the DOEIDMA staff and Sandia including another strongly worded letter from Sparks to Branon dated August 8 1978 OOE DMA Major General Bratton personally panicipal in a rewrite of il PDM and a MOU aod Sparks used my draft reply in saying We endorse without reservation and support enthusiastically your revised drafis 6 15 Sandia's Initiatives for Security and Plutonium Dispersal Safety in DoD Logistical Operations The FORWARD LOOK Study1 1976 1979 FORWARD LOOK was a 2½-year major study of the security access control safety plutonium dispersal safety and survivability utility of weapons following enemy attacks aspects of nuclear weapon deployments of the non in the 1980-1990 decade The study was sponsored initially by Don Cotter fbe ATSD AE IMLC Chairman and later by bis successor James P Jim Wade Andy Lieber led the study that drew upon a broad spectrum of Sandia's technical staff Ail i xccllent summary of the results of FORWARD LOOK is contair ed in the Sandia General History Ref 86 pages 202-204 and in the memoirs that Andy wrote upon his retirement and amplification is not needed here FORWARD LOOI drew heavily on earlier work on plutoniwn dispen aJ safely by the staff of the Safety Assessment Technologies Division under Dick Smith • John M Taylor together with associates Bob Luna Hugh Church and Norm Grandjean applied the computer codes developed to analyze ERDA DOE tr3nSportation and lixedsices e g • Pantex to all DoD sites worldwide to quantify the impacts of increased numbers of weapons placed at risk • During 1973-76 Dick Smith led a pan ofthe NWTSHEG study th it developed the Accident Resistant Container ARC technology see pages 105-106 Perhaps the most important result of FORWARD LOOK was the rem irkable display of s c hardware and prototype subsystenlS presented at S indfa in the fall of 1978 for an invited contingent of high-level officials of DOE DoD and especially each of the military services Dubb1 -d ·'County Fair the displays featured bus tours of outdoor exhibits manned by Sandia designers in an interactive mode County Fair was an illustration cif one of Samfo 's great strengths in R D i e the display of prototype ban fo are to potential usl rs with the o ponunity for lhcm lo examine and oficn lo personally op rate the device or subsystem OTE The use control aspect of Counly Fair was demons tr ilion of emergency destruct components that could be positioned on weapon external surface and operated to destroy weapon internals thus assurin g denial of the capability to us l 6 - OFFIGIAb USE ON ¥ I lJ ' ' 1 SiCAiii FAB • OFFIGIAL USE ONLY the weapon given defeat of the access denial systems also demonstrated This provision was presented by Donald W Don Doak of the weapon developmcDL directorate under Bob Peurifoy In sorting out roles and missions Bob nnd Bill Myre agreed that if a given measure for protection involved penetration of the weapon skin or response of components inside it was a weapon development directorate prcrDgative otherwise the securitY directorate could be responsible e g fences NOTE Historical writings by Sandians on security or safety control or safeguards for that matter should consider the extreme sensitivities these subjects evoke in other agencies as regards fundamental responsibilities Security access control in my personal definition is the responsibility of the agency having custodial possession of the entity being secured Thus Sandia could never specify what security feanm s DoD should employ With this in mind I cite Sandia's participation in the upgrade ofphysical security for operational and storage sites in NATO as being of high•nationaJ value Henn Mauney managed the efforts and should be consulted in order to understand the special set of sensitivities By the way the Air Force was appointed as the program manger for the OoD The Army was heavily involved and presented a special problem for Mauney 6 16 The Sandia Stockpile Initiative Fall 1977 A complete but classified case study of lhe DOE DoD Stockpile Improvement Study and its antecedcnty the Sandia Stockpile Modernization Study is contained in Reference 87 The discussions below highlight only those aspects considered particularly relevant to the purposes of this report By the fall of 1977 Sandia Albuquerque's Dr Richard N Dick Brodic 111 an executive staff assistant to Robert L Pcurifoy Jr then Director of Weapon Development JJOO had begun tu examine the nuclear weapon stockpile-planning process primarily from a nuclear safety and usecontrol point of view He used the ERDA DoD Stoc'lq ile Safety Study as a basis The study rcpon Ref 88 develo ed a time-phased plan for redressing higher priority concerns by retirements retrofits or replacements with weapons of modem design all within the then planned Ci pability of the DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories and production complex NOTE Dick Brodie's plan in my opi11ion is a truly outstanding illustration of y atemi malysis wher in he examined the cap icity of the DOE'5 intili rated contracror complex to e ecute the time-phased production program J resurrected the methodology as a Cl1nsultant in 1987 for a srudy of DOE's we pon dcvel pment program Ref S9 • • Rrodic h id JS i C'1to cl USAF scr 'cd as cx curi ·c ccr 12ry DnD MLC prior ta his r tircmcnr A s h had bc ·n the Doi hJ1s- n of iccr for tiii Trlnsfcr S1t1d ' m 1975-t 976 -OFA6tAf -t J5E-6Nl¥ I 7 i fiCAlffl ftfS OFFICIAL USE ONLY Sandia's stockpile improvement study was reviewed by DOE ALO and DOE ALO developed a field-coordinated report that was transmitted to DOE OMA on August 15 l 9i8 The proposill known as the Stockpile Modernization Study V LS forwarded to the DoD ATSD AE OD September 9 1978 By March 20 1979 the DoD bad endorsed in principle the goal of improving overall safety and control of the stockpile however OoD emphasized that replacement was the favored method Retrofits could be considered if on a non•intcrfi rencc basis with new weapon production DoD accepted only two of the retrofit programs proposed by DOE called for additional studies on ten other weapon systems and recommended exclusion of 17 others for various reasons While only three hardware retrofit programs were undenaken objectives for si were achieved over time by change deployments and early retirements NOTE In the decade covered the office in DOE OMA that coordinated preparation of the repon had rapid turnover with at least three directors Thus Sandia provided programmatic continuity 6 17 Intra-DOE Laboratories Challenges to SNLA Nuclear Safety Roles 19TT-1981 The SNLULLNL weapon design team first encountered the Enhanced Nuclear Detonation system ENDS conceived by Stan Spray's division at SNLA for the 877 strategic bomb in May 1974 some two y after ENDS had become accepted as the standard design approach for ill new dcvc lopmcnts The 877 vas 10 be lhe California team's first full bomb program and presented a significant challenge in technological are is new to them For the earlier B27 and B41 programs some parts of the weapons were developed at Sandia Albuquerque or LASL By mid-1977 the extremely high costs of the B77 had become of widespread concern in the DOE complex and LLNL placed the blame OD ENDS claiming that SNLA's design was pricing new weapons out of the market Ref 90 Whereas later reviews indicated that the 877's high cost was anributable to the choice of a relatively large variety ofnew technologies essentially acrossthe-design ENDs seemed to be at the time a convenient scapegoat LLNL established a nuclear detonntion safety design project and designed several components to provide safety for the detonators of the lHE primary oflhc B77 Reports of tbc work were circulated for cevie V one in a blank envelope to SNL Vice President Components The car y approach that invol 'ed an electronic logic circuit was judged concc-ptunlly weak because of obvious su ccptibility to bypa s by a single cvcnl or stimulus The next appro11ch howcYer was to became the focus orhigb technical managt inenl au ntion for years to come Iu 1977-78 MSAD I Mechanical Safiug Auuiug Dclo11atu1 J cuUlit1ut tl tu cmlvl 1atht 1 rapidly from a simpl Jock to restrain a wire that was to be withdrawn by a motor to a unique signal -dri wn saCing dcvici conceptually comp a Lib le with the ENDS MSAD l l n Ami ' rcporr dlr led by nu lc ir ufcl · 3 ' linn offi r Jut Lu·Ji r proposed in ilrcm 111 'e IU the ooE· propv at for tlil ' W l 3t1d a kn tby u1tn-Anny review w is 1mnatcd This propn5 ll did not urvi • OFFICIAl -t JSE ONLY 12S t ' ' ' • •· ' 4i 8Rl FJF RD -0Ff'IGIAL USE ONLY In Dcc mbcr 19i7 the B77 was canceled because of inordinate costs In early 1979 LU 'L announced intimt to commit MSAD r to the WS4 GLCl-l program and throughout 1979 the matter was considered at various lc vels of mill13gement especially at a SNL Small StaffMeeting on July 1O 1979 SNLL Vice President Tom Cook informed LLNL that MSAD would be carried as a backup design to replace one tlf the two strong Jinks in the W84 Some eight months later on March 3 l 980 LLNL •s Harry Reynolds decided to make MSAD II the primary option By late 1981 LLNL's W84 GLCM project scientist leader was trying lo extend LLNL's control over fety by proposing a high-voltage safing switch to replace the n mainir g strong link Funhermore a dri •e to make LLNUSNLL team independent of SNlA was begun by LLNL 's Bill Shuler lRef 90 NOTE I include this part of the MSAD episode to illustralt that nuclear safety d ign responsibilities are not prescribed in intcragc ncy agreements and the currcnr situation at any time should not be taken for granted Reference 90 is a draft working paper of mina that gives opinions on the causes for differences in approach between the LLNlJSNLL team and the SNLA ENDS 3pproach as well as citing intra-SNLA competition The reference mentions typical arguments about ENDS such as ••increased safety ••aU-rhe-egg s-in-one-basker ' threshold of acceptable risk new design and production contractors into safety device arenas and most importantly fwthcr desegregation of safety responsibilities within DOE laboraloric s 6 18 Nuclear Weapon System Safety Rules Approval 1961-1978 Perhaps the most influential aspect of the national nuclear weapon system safety study effon has been the provision in DoD Directi •e S030 1513150 2 for developing and processing of nuclear weapon system safety rules These documents may be consulted for detailed descriptions of the provisions As stated therein Safety ruks provide th procedural safeguards that together with the weapon system design fe 1tures and technical ind optrational procedurc s ensure maximwn safety consistc nt with operational requirements during operations with nucleill' W ctpcms and nuclear w- apon systems For nuclear weapon system the Stcret uy ofD fense approves ntle s before th 'Capon system can he granted illl lnitfal Operational Cap 1bility IOC and be deployed in the national defense structure The process lcutling to approval includ s seque-nti 1lly • prupo5al of a set of rules hy the Nuclear Weapon Sy ilcm Safety Group WSSG of rhc issuing ·1ilitary Ot Jl lrtrm 11ts s of 1hc DoD • ipprci al hythat Dep trtmcnl J • cuorJinat1on with tl1e J S 'P tnd successors • apprC1val by the Joint Chiefs of Staff JCS • cC1ord1n i i 1n ith he AECF RDADOE and --OfFICIAL USE GNl -¥ 1 -I J - Ci I ··s GA tfP tr OFFIGIAL USE ONLY • notification of the President A hisrory of tht controlling documc ntBlion of the process is gi 'en in Reference 127 - Summ iry of PrcsidenliaJ and Other High-Lt 'cl Directives illld Correspondence on Nuclear Ve3pon System Safety and Control • Coordination vs Concurrence Actions Since the beginnings ofnuclear weapon systmi safety in the lare 1950s a basic disagreement has e isrcd between tho DoD and lhc AEC ERDA DOE as to whether involvemenr of the tatter in the nuclear safety mies approval process is one of fannal coord tion or fonnal concurrence lbe AEC dcchucd that its required action was one of coocwrencc before final approval Ref 197 and Appcndjx J lnterim ipproval may be gi 'cn by the Secretary of Defense when in his judgmcn it is opcration111ly necessary to deploy weapon in the interest of national defense This did not require AEC concurrence but apparently did require coordination • The AEC Headquarters Safety Actions DoD Directive 3150 2 s1 itcs th 3t the Stcrctary of each Military Department shalJ ·• support the DOE during the DOE safety rules coordi1U1tion process ln the early years this process included two step led by lhc Systems Safety Br mch ofAEODMA I Accion Memorandum Tius docwnent wu prepared for sign3turc by the Chainnan of the AEC to grant concurrence with proposed nuclear safety rules actions Coordination included obtaining comments Imm AEC AL and Sandia 2 AEC Field Review ln the early years the AEC normaJly caJlcd for a Field Review prior to granting concurrence on final rules This action was arranged by a br mch officc -r who would scn 1 as a member and chairman of a sroup comprised of ·otin5 members from AEC AL and Sandia The arrmgements with tlu Military Dq artrnent were made 'i i DoD ATSD AE channels Th group almost always asked for and usually received i sit ro a military instalfation to witness planned operations-- preferably to lhe first military tmit having lOC npprovaJ - ppar mly 1 ci ause the Sandia m1 111bcr l f a Fidd Rc• icw was gin n voling st itu c is contnis1 d ro tl chnk 11 advisor s1ams for the c irlii r safot studies by the time f my iniria invoh· ment in n11d ar safety 961 Sa uha 's policy as ro appoinl as the mmibcr a supc nisor section or li 1sicm in th s st ms safety org mi dtinn t HJ S I -I •i Ii IIIR• JliAII OFFICIAL US ONLY NOTE These two actions in practice were the main ones handJ by the small staff of military officers assigned to the Systems Safety Branch of AEC DMA The actions in effect put Sandia on a high level as regards approval of safcty rules and this allowed an independent review that culminated in a memo from Sandia's President to AEC DMA that presented Sandia's comments and approval recommendations When I rejoined Sandia's nuclear safety organization in 1968 the practice of requesting Field Reviews h3d about ceased I fought successfully to retain the option as Do0 and AEC ERDAIDOE governing directives were revised over the years ln 1978 I had occasion to request a Field Review as discussed below 6 19 The B61-5 F-4 Safety Rules Episode Civilian Control vs Military In late J977 the first nuclear weapon to incorporate the majority of state-of•the-art improvements in S'C teached production status and the Air Force began processing nuclear weapon system safety rules Such rules are written for each weapon system i e the delivery aircr tft in this instance that apply to a nuclear weapon type The F-4 application presented a singular concern in that the relatively old fighter bomber had not been provided with the monitor and control hardware needed to provide the bomb with the required prcanning eltctrical signals after take•otf The Military Characteristics document written by the Air Force had allowed for this discrepancy by uiring Sandia designers to incorporate a two-way switch on the outside surface of the B61-5 that would nllow overriding one of the two sating components in the bomb Such a bypass would negate much of the overall enhancement in nuclear detonation safety provided in the design The nuclear safety rules package presented to Sandia by DOE OMA for the 861-5 F-4 called for the selector switch to be placed in lhc override position during mating of the bomb to the aircraft for Quick Reaction Alert continuous ground alert and remaining so for the entire QR'- period Jn a letter dated December 23 1977 Sandia advised DOE OMA of its concern about bypassing the very design safety feature U1at would protect against faults in the F-4 that would introduce errant voltages into the bomb without a cle3l'ly compefling operational need to do so In the past four years the F-4 had e xperienced at lc3Sl ti e such incidents one actually operating a bomb safety component Apparently DOE OMA was offended by Sandia's objcc1ion nnd directed that hcm c forth Sandia Oulu uul 1cµly tliiL-clly tu DOEtDMA but wuuh 1 pru iJc cummcnls lu DOE AL -ltu uulcl con iolidale comments attempt to resolve issues and forwartl appropriate comments concurrence to DOEIDMA Wl1cn infonned that DOE AL ha l without fie d consultaciurt alread ' P'Cn appro ·al for interim mies Sandia's Execu1ive Vice President Jack Ho arJ took exception in a strongly worded TWX Ref 174 131 OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOTE Jack Howard showed me a draft of Ref 174 that ended with the observation the DOEiOMA was following a path that could result in a lack of civilian signatures on safety rules and this would be a situation I bdicvc is unfonunatc if not illegal ·· I suggested replacing the last clause with if not conlrary to statutory intent and Jack made that change At my suggestion DOE OMA mrangcd for 11 Field Review for 861-S F-4 nuclear safety rules and l stewed over naming a Sandia voting member In anticipation of potential for an intra-DOE dis3greement l searched for a member who clearly would represent Sandi 's top management After consultation ith Sandia•s legal staff BTL on-loan I nominated my director L n Smith-believing in good faith th it his lc 'el was th3l of an otliccr ofSandfa Leon tater was informed that the ••officer ' level began at Vice President and therefore he did not qualify Sandia officers are n quircd to retire at age 6S I wonder if this episode was a factor in Leon Smith's election to continue as a director subst11ntially beyond age 6S The Field Review was held at a U S NATO airbase in West Gcrmlllly with lbe result of recommending approval oflhe proposed rules In a memo to DOE OMA Loon Smith expressed the technical opinion that the bypass at loading was not es$enlial to meeting lhc stated operational limelinc for readiness and that bypass during the last opponwiity prior lO take-off was the better choice I am cert3in th at the impending retirement of the F-4 mission was a factor in deciding not to clev3le the disagrcen1ent at the time 6 20 DoDJDOE Long-Range Planning Group Starbird Study 1979-1980 This study was initiated by the DoD ATSD AE and was in effect the second study of the lrnnsfcr issue allhough the ERDA ·s weapons responsibilities had been transferred to the Department of Energy in 1977 upon dissolution of ERDA Lt General Dodd Starbird U S Army Retired who by then had become a consultant chaired the study Again Bob Pcurifoy was Sandia's member of the smdy group and he obtaiacd my sen·iccs in suppon Figure 19 is a list of principal panicipants The subject ofnuelcarweapon safety W3$ not on the stud i 's agenda initially Vhcn the study group · sited S mdi3 in late 1979 Peurifoy hod me give a briefing on the recent deterioration in EROA DOE-OoD relations in safety and llu demise of presidc ntial-tcvcl directories that would fom1 ili7 t the dual 1gency judgment amt responsibilities pt tel ice Ref 91 The thrust of my mn trks was th it despite the fact tfo1l the nalion il policy locumcnts that had fonncd the basi for tht joint DoDlDOE program hatl been rescinded revoked r placcll or othcnvise decmph m1ed the program was conrinuin lo iunction Such a si1u 11ion seemed fragil for th 11 111 mn nd not in the spirit fthc tinJing for dcal-agency n spons ihihtic i for s ifety per th rr insfcr Srndy of 1976 Lkute nant G m rJI Starbird a hlng-timc Jd '11cat of nuc lear safety 11111 1 pon5or c J' ll e Tran itcr Study d dJc I to add thl suhjcc1 of nuckar s ifoty ti the igc ndJ of th1 • -eFA6lAl -USE-ONLY a J I 171 I C l h -RD OFFICIAL USE ONLY group Perhaps the most telling indication of fragility was my presentation that compared sidc by-side the wordings of the final draft proposals of the DOE OMA for a Presidential D ision Memorandum and a DaO DOE Memorandum ofUnderstanding with the then current DoD draft that almost a year later was still circulating at acrion--officer levels in the DoD 0 It we s clear to some in the audience that a serious threat to the dual agency nuclear saf ty program was emerging Later Dick Brodie and prepared material which became the basis for an appendix one of four to the group's final rcpon Re£ 92 on Safely s urity and Control S1Ct Also on the matter of S2C I was assigned by S mdia's Jack Howard who was serving as an advisor to Starbird to prepare a strawman draft paper nn formally inatitutionalizing the dual lgeney concept The draft Ref 93 after comments by Howard were accommodated Ref 94 became tho support for a recommendation in the final repon for establishing a DoD DOE high· level oversight committee for S2C matters u Perhaps my more important involvement was the drafting of a detailed paper that discusses the deterioration of the level-of-effort management and funding practice instituted by the AEC for the nuclear weapons program This paper Ref 95 stressed the impact of retirements and otber dissociations of ten persons called lions jn tbe paper who had been instrumental in the practice's evolution support and advocacy Perhaps the paper was a factor in Still'bird Study's strong endorsement of the practice and the wisdom of oontinuing it by not transferring any responsibilities to the DoD The paper was edited and reissued • in 1985 in relation to the Nunn-Warner and Domenici amendments an transfer of production responsibilities for nuclear weapons to the DoD The ''Blue Ribbon Study and • in 1987 in relation to an intra-DOE study of planning for the nuclear weapons complex The Hymer Study Other safety-rclated papers that I wrote in suppon of Bob Peuri foy were on the subjects of • 1 Utility of the DoD's Military Liaison Committee Ref 96 2 Functions of the DoO's Design Review and Acceptance Group Ref 97 3 Roles of the DoD's Defense Nuclt ar Agency in Nuclear Weapon Safety Ref 98 •t s mcn11 ·mcd Joe Lug r h d hc wtly nOu ncr d the DoD dufl A Ll•JO DOE commme W 1$ not impll mi nti d huwi 'cr lite DOE DP l iter est iblished an intrJ-DllE o 'ersi ht comm ue m1w called the s c Commillci Vi c PresiJ n 0 '31 Jone '3 5 indil'i mcmb r initi 111 · follM ed by Boh P urifory -eFFtefAf -t JSE-eNl -Yq ·• · - I I l i 133 • Mli i Rt7 OFFICIAL l JSE ONLY STiiO ' GROUP J- PAW £ QRG 4r9l 4TIQ i MGc a Joma c Toamay Col Kyte D Bania Jr LI Col r bj HQDNA HQ USAFJRDPT U Sn e i Srstana Projc t Office MT Lt Col RadaD E Bea' ' Racers Cuc Jr Gtaiwoocl Cade Thoamct azk Timmy W Comer Mr N S Dicccs upl Leslie I Hcni W J Uoward Hup it I ehnnn DO IALO USN HQNav-1 M1teml Commmd S Ddialaboncozy ll dm Mr Dr LCDR Mr Mr ATSO AE - - USAf Rtt HQAFSC USAF DOE ALO HQDA OOCSRDA SRAO LANSL Dt Gcaq W MKPbcsDll H N Mc cr Jr R L Peurif'oy Jr GoupC Rcmlmdr S Dd£a L abom xy U 'a 3Gc David M Mullmc y TSD - E 0 M Aldmoa JSN OSG CNA USN IXJEJOMA Sandia Laboniory upt Capt Or Ls Cot M - Or tr Dr Col Col LI Col war LBCCQ Richard N Brodie M an m D Ccntda Nelso1l W Easoa Job A Escle USN Seruqic S 'flmll Projc i Office DOE ALO USAF HQ DN 4JSOPJt OSD C Ost PA E Sydd1Go14 LL 1'11 David 1 Besa cr OSD C U ' SL USAF OATSO A I USAF a FIXOXFS USA NCA P r ymldoMor ale s William A Myes E Nclsou 01lear William M Raymond mrnx GRour m· D ir Y C ic Ms Li Cr 1 1 Mr ti ··-· '- - - F Ciwt s Gilb Delmar W Bc rs i di mir 9cnw hu 0£ 150 '-E - o i lo ram St 3 ar J 1 iz Mary Ci udyca Ea• 1 d V dc3ocs Ho11rUd 3 ElisY ·o tb t SN I0i 1t C -cis hnile Proj 1 l 0 t S _ JCS t ury -' Fon tb P iul W Kc 1to11 DOE '01'-iA L- 'lSL Williui M UI Jb 3ilhe C Moore V - 1 -c -l bi i L W i- - DOEJASDP 10E ' NO Lt s A LO Ot SD RA Et •il oc p uticipn ed oa a put lilne basil oul ·- Fioure 19a PrlnL Jp 1I Study P 1rt1cipants Starbird Study Pag8 t of 2 0 FFIC Al -B-SE-OHl Y ' ' I• If Ir OFFICl'4 L USE ONLY Th• Stttrinz Commtues co Mined or u ronnwin• memben P - dm P C-ana MG RCody BG BG J Qaia BCi D Mulba«y O Vcsscr BG N Fwwytcr 01'-6S MG DNA AF XOX I r WHOO ' f C Gilbc rt Mr H Roser OMA NMP ALO DAMO SS D ' TSl AE JCSIJ S Ibe Senior Con1alqns wen Mr MG Dr- Dr Dr Dr Mr ft M D Or P 7 ORGANttAnoN N A apiim J Brutoa E ftlbim M anm-Maricm Acn qni c USA COJtP of Ch•iam11 DSS Mil' LANSL DOE LL lL OOE PSR Eucmivc S ary W lu D iCCff M May G Moe 1' 0'Dem H Roser J ll a G Tapc Ccapc1 I Ly ALO DOE MIT J'Iuzdmt '-Ssocwed li11r1c S'lll S Wuhi lpni o c Ja addition lo tbe Ste iIJpg Ctmmittcc iQd tbs Seplpr Cop sultapu more lhap 50 people wen lavoJvtd dh·ectJv in lhe cogd9g or tbe stpdY Ibric names agd paregf gr•pniutings are 2S foQo' 'l PAREJ' f QRG NJZ TION l t G ll V M Ot j YNC YNI SSGT trs Miss $ M l M ATSD - t'SA RcL · Alfr d D Swoud Patr clc J Ha rmiiiu The odon Gold Joan w ili s Jaccs J l 1ylo 1 u s 3 JoD s ' 'SD z - CSS Rel A7'5 A £ - Oil lo from ub LIVe lOt US l f USS USN CSA us 1 F ilab n S Clilld M11 -y Jue K U- y Su i u c C nu o Oi uic O IC11bac r C 1 ryl RJcii ut so11 TnccyNcbac llSA U£ cio DOE Figure l llJ Pnncipal Study Participants Starbird Study'' Page 2 ol 2 OFFlSIAt-USE Of4LVC I il I ii F IJ5 6 21 Briefing Package on Nuclear Weapon Safety 1980-81 Following the m Al II inten ontincntal ballistic missile accident at O3JJ1ascus Arkansas in the fall of 1980 DOE DMA Major General Wilham W Hoover USAF as DOFJOMA requested that the weapons design laboratories prepare a package ofinformation on nuclear weapon safety that could be used by federal employees to make infonnation releases briefinp to tJ- e public to ensure the adequacy of the safety of nuclear weapons Sandia was asked to coordinate the effort and Executive Vice P esident Jack Howard assigned the task of preparing the material to O1' ·al Jones then Director of Nuclear Security Systems 1700 I was assigned to assist Jones for several months Jones was expert on physical security technology and institutions but bad no relevant experience in nuclear weapons technology especially safety NOTB In the summer of 1980 as I was preparing for a rather lengthy Operational Safety Re iew in Europe I recommended a change io Sandia's policy on who would panicipate as technical advisor for the DoD's weapon accident response team By memo Ref 99 I suggested that the Director Weapon Development of either the Albuquerque or the Livc nnore design learn be the n presentative as contrasted to the fonner practice of being the staff member that supported the particular milirary service's system safety study group This resulted in Bob Peurifoy representing Sandia at Damascus Arkansas The result of Jones• ir tensivc srudy of nuclear weapon safety is a set of transparencies and associated briefing notes Reference 100 supported by the following six documents 1 A source book on nuclear weapon safety 41 pages Re£ l 01 2 A summary of official public infonnation on nuclear safety 128 pages Ref 102 3 A summary of wtofficial public information 86 pages Ref 103 4 117 possible questions and answers 67 pages Ref I04 5 A chart summarizing status of nuclear safety features in weapons 1 page Ref 105 6 A summary of safety features in each stockpiled nuclear weapon 243 pages Ref IOG Although this package has existed in the files of Sandia's Nuclear Safety Information Cent r NSIC it has found lttt e use LLNL a d LANL preferred a highly ibbreviatcd and generalized version LLNL cre lted suc h l ·er ion and forwarded it for comments Only the sixth-nruncd document was kept currc 1t and used in eml rgency response opeaation enters as a reterence NOTE Several yem lat• r l was tasked to support Orval Jones when he was SN L's member of the DOE's S C Committee In rccaJling the process oi pn paring this briefing package Orval mentioned to me that th experience had led him to chaugc his minJ about the utility of Sandia having any on-roJJ career specialists in p irticular disciplines 11 i contrnst 'll to having technically qualifiL d staff that could be ust u in a variety ofroks during a career He became 1 36 qFFICIAL USE-eNt'r -r a· · t -eAE7 r e OFFICIAL USE ONLY C 'lnvinced that Sandia n ded a ''professor'' his term in nuclear safety ind so lab led my role as such Appilrcntty OrvaJ has continued this opinion since the notion of a surety professor 3Ppears in 1be J997 report on Sandia•s Surety Heritage to which he contributed pilge 178 and Ref 149 6 22 Sandia Input to the Annual Report to the President on Nuclear Safety Surety 1976-1984 In 1970 National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger issued National Security Decision Mcmur mdum NSOM 5 which revoke_d rescinded or reissued all earlier directives of a specified vintage NSAM 160 on PAL was reissued and NSAMs SI and 72 on safety were rescinded Effons to reissue National Security Action Memorandum 51 which prescribed AEC participation in ttie consideration of nuclear safety matters w extremely contentious in DoD and AEC staff-level negotiations and showed little progn ss until the report of the ERDNDoD Transfer Study was accepted in Jlll'lWlfY 1976 A Memorandum of Understanding was not issued until I 98 ome 13 years in negotiation A Presidential Directive nonn illy produced before an MOU is appropriate has not been issued NSAM 272 was replaced in content by NSDM 96 issued Inter in 1970 the President in pill t as • • • t expressed direction of An annual n pon be forwarded to him at the beginning of each calendar year describing the nuclear weapons safety rules in effect for all weapon sy5'cms and noling changes in those rules during the past year The President be infom1cd promptly of tho rules approved for new weapons systems aml of any significant changes with regard to existing systems The President requests that a proposed fonnat for the annu al rcpon be forwarded to him for his review by January 1S 197 I Since the co eragc apparently was hmitcJ to nuclear safety rules proc -ssing SNL roles wtr s 'ientially unchanged from those for NS J f 272 By J lenerdatcd July 16 1975 addresscJ lo ERDA from the National Sc unty Cc uncil of the Office of the President ERDA was requested to prepare DJ annual report lo the President on nuc l ir wtapon s ifcty and security in it manner similar to that done by th DoD under NSDM ' 6 sinct 1970 u n conJ of S L 10 '0lvemi nt or nnticc of n pl'rling for calendar yt ar 1975 lus l 1 en lo atc l A m mu from ERDA D 1A Safety and Facilities Dircclor Colond-1 cn I r qucsting input from the fo kl referred to the 19i6 Second nnual Rcpon to the Prcsillcnt 011 uclcar Wi apon Sat t and Security The input rcqucst d was to commcn1 on a clr ift report that had been pn p tr ·J by tl c ERDA st iff three ticld- rradc military officers plus scn r il ci ·ili ms ho had -0FFf6fA-t -t J-SE ONLY ·T l I' I • I • 137 Pi8Rl W 'ftD OFFICIAL USE ONLY retired from military service in•placc In order to meet the 23-day deadline imposed for input l took the lead as Nuclear Safety Department Manager 1 consulted with tcllow department managers working in security fields e g Gene Blake aod Andy Lieber and in other aspects of nuclear safety I drafted a suggested rewrite of the Executive Summary section of the repon and forwarded the pO kagc to ERDNDMNS F directly The SNL material was included in the final report verbatim howtver SNL was not requested to review that report for comment prior to its issuance The thrust ofSNL's 1976 rewrite was to cite and describe initiatives and significant contributions of the ERDA national laboratories in SlC adding use control to safety and security Otherwise the report would likely have continued to be a summary of only Operational Safety Review and safety rules matters By letter dated June 18 1976 from the National Security Council to ERDA and DoD the rcport•s fonnat was changed to that ofa combined agency report and this practice was to last for eight years The modus operandi' for a combined report was for the DoD and ERDA DOE to prepare sections covering their operations essentially independently and for sta ff-lavel officers in Washington DC to draft an Executive Summary These two elements were to be combined and forwarded in draft to field agencies for comment Thus only the Executive Swnmazy was intended to be '1oint but in practice each participant commented on all sections at staff levels or occasionally at decision-making levels through cover letters forwarding comments A summary of contributions from the weapons laboratories over the years to the Annual Report is given in Figure 20 I found that an espcciaJly valuable aspect of SNL's input to the Annual Surety Report was its value as a coordinated laboratory•wide position which can be expressed in other fonns of communications on S'C such as the annual testimonies of the DOE weapons laboratories to congressional committees n the anned services • • • 19781 Morgan Sparks to House Armed Services Committt e on Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safety Utility 1980 Morgan Sparks to Senate Armed Services Committee On the Stockpile Modemi7 ation Progrnm 1986 Morgnn Sparks to House Armed Services Committee On the Stockpile Modernization Program Among the notable other contributions by SNL to the process shown in Figure 20 the sixth column have bc1 n • • • Articulating and stressing the ·alue of the Dual Agt ncy concc pt that has bee 1 challenged by OoD agencies from lime lo time but reaffinncd periodically by major national-level studies Coordinating inputs among the three DOE weapons laboratories Introducing ph tonium dispersal risks as a national_conctm -8FFIGIAt-USE-ON ¥ e ti -·' ' I I 1 Z 'SJilRII ii NB OFFICIAL USE ONLY sn ttauu po • au ur t • HS l · f r tru t i c n EDl 1m Jot 1»11w11 U d W bf Ila hlll aa 2c Dtpl lf 1161 lf llU 1 c SlletJ lac l ly llt l • tm ll h' lilt Sitt lltrud _ __ C a tr i• • ti ot s_ _ fruidut Pruilut 1 1m •1U7H l rrui6ut 0 £ lf 1m 1 hvtat tm 51111111 U d •n a lgt1q ca apt ii ttUct IDlJ o 1ect d to tn • se1li11g' nprirrti tGI Dot -ittd to '1rudtr Sn671 foas oa 'Jtollle1s• • Sit iund Su com1Ls 1J llll • lm f UH t 5todJilt dm it ml Sli J lluis 511 uhd S St11ir qim t• tu 'Staillid Sttif • - mo 20 CouhtC i · 1 11 s - m 9 t 1 - 1m h SdetJ mt 1 ui4ut If llil 1 Pt ih mll ta 1t n e l a btuio lruillut lf 2171 i Coatut d iitl latJ ai r uidut 111 11 u ui J n U 911 u ud taun t ic Stzii u af SC StD ilt Of cat n m111 O ll u a ti il s mt l ts per mom 'ill Sl f' stDd lil fiU DcOJOOt D t-1' Zm lUll0 6 C• Im ui 1 stt1o1ro 1 ut i •c ' co i 2iT i l lS C C 1 Hfamm m CUJ siu •e a ht 1 • D tl li i tSlJ c tn i S IL b c H Sain 1 i s D-cd 1 C cucu r Hti l H tD r i a fr S u D H c · · r ' 2 1cs 1 L T I i til i IUt 1 0 f Figure 20 Notable Contributions for the DOE Nuclear Weapons Labor torics to the Annual Reports lo lhe President or1 Nuclear Weapons Study 1976-1084 0 FFIGl-Ah-USE-ONl ¥- 2'1 j • 139 eeREfJPI OFFICIAL USE ONLY 6 23 Briefings and Testimonies on the Stockpile Improvement Program 1980-1981 In Spring 1980 I vented frustrations about the seeming lack of national resolve to follow through on the DOE DoD Stockpile Improvement Program SIP in preparing drafts for Sandia President Morgan Spark's testimonies to congressional committees on armed services for FY81 and for him to note the situation in signing the Sandia input to the DOE section of the Armual Report to the Pres ident on Nuclear Weapons Surety for 1979 Ref 172 Sparks' testimony to the House Committee on Anncd Services on April I6 1980 noted the requested funding was nor included in the budget We continue to believe that the program is valuable and we hope that it will be funded in the fiscal l 982 budget•· On June l 3 1980 Bob Peurifoy Charlie Burks and Stan Spray bricfed the Inspector General of the Air Force Major General Howard Leaf on nuclear weapon accidents history and ENDS This was the first and only involvement ofthat office in nuclear weapon system safety matters to my lmowledge-nuclear safety was handled as an entirely separate discipline from aitcraft flying safety personnel safety etc On October 29 1980 Charlie Burks addressed the DoD's Military Liaison Committee Cbainnan Jim Wade the MLC and DOE officials ASDP Duane Sewell and DMA MG William W Hoover during the ann1111l MIC visit to DOE offices and weapons laboratories Burks discussed the background of the SIP with emphasis added by the nuclear weapon accident at Damascus earlier that month and the nuclear weapon significant incidenl in'✓olving two of the air-delivered weapon systems On December JO 1980 Bob Peurifoy briefed MG Ed Giller USAF Retired on the safety concems General Giller informed Air Force ChiefofStaffLTG Lewis Lew Alica of the matter General Allen had spent several years early in his career at LASL being a co-author of the classic scientific report on nuclear weapon wlncrability to nuclear radiations from enemy countenneasures the Goad-Allen report In fact I n call lhat he was the only Chief of StaITwho had aot been a command pilot Air Force Inspector General Howard Leaf re-entered the considerations He was briefed along with Colonel Villi am E Bill Endres Commander of the Directorate ofNuclearSafctyby Bob Peurifoyon January 15 1981 General Lc irs interests led to nuclear weapon system safety enhancements in the way of changes to fire fighting apabilitics at SAC bases and to QR A operations ofstarting cngir cs on B-52s NOTE Major General Howard Leaf tJSAF G commissioned USAF consultant I larold I Jal Smith then or the staff of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Ooard to 3llpraise the validity of the basic finding ofthe TWGs and of Sandia that btha 'ior or t lder we ip n ordn mce to se 'ere bnormal tnvironments was unpredict il le ·· Smith's expert opinion·· Rff l 79 wns the incredibly na'ive 1ssertion that beluvaor was indeed predictable to higl1 degree and that prediction was thal I he ordnance would become inopt rable because shorts to ground in the clcclrical sub -ystcm wulc l abouml pn cluiliug application of ck trical power lo 140 0 FFIGJAl -USE-eNI ¥- -i SEOA IZFRt OFFICIAL USE ONLY safety sensitive components He saw the problem as a reliability concern rather than one of nuclear safety 831 Smith who over the years had been a regular consultant to LWLLLJLLNL was appointed to the Nuclear Weapon Council successor to the MLC and ATSD AE in 1993 and served through 1997 6 24 The DoD DOE Plutonium Dispersal Analysis Group 1977•1981 After a several-year hiatus the issue of increasing the limitation on the quantity of plutoniumbearing nuclear weapons allowed to be in an ensemble for logistical storage or transportation was revh -ed On July 28 1977 DoD MLC Chainnan Don Cotter announced th11t the MLC had approved an increase for storagc'-1 that roughly amounted to 300° 4 The DoD DNA Headquarters tasked its Field Command at Kirtland AFB lo ''take the necessary action to change TP 20-7 to confonn ·• The TP 20-7 Nuclear Safety Criteria is a tcdmical manual published through the Joint Nuclear Weapons Publication System JNWPS Any change to it requires the concurrence of at least three agencies a military service the DoD via its DNA and the DOE via DOE AL Obtafoing concurrence ofthe last-named also involvc IS concurrence by the appropriate combination of the DOE's weapons laboratories I led the process whereby DOE declined to concur and the matter quickly escalated in DoO DOE management-level attention Attempts to accommodate the DoO's desires for operational Jlexibility and economies and the DOE 1s concerns about safety continued for about a year mostly in the fonn ofwordsmithing exercises for the text and footnotes of TP 20- 7 The three DOE w apons laboratories held fast to the conviction that the proposed blanket increase was ill-advised and suggested as nn alternative that each specific situation should require evaluation of the peculiarities of the particular site by technically quaJified persons who consider the hazards both to the individuals at site boundaries and to the general populace My words contained in a memo by Jack Howard Re 107 This position vns presented to the MLC orally on October 4 1978 by Ju ck R Roeder of DOE AL and Bob Luna ofSNLA ln the spring of 1979 Bob Luna Hugh Church John Taylor and I responded to an urgent request from the U S Navy for evaluation of lhe potential health consequences of an accidcnl incident in •olving plutonium-bearing nuclear weapons that might be stored at a site under construction in Hawaii ' This work conducted onsite in Hawaii led to refinements ofan analytical technique for quantifying consequences in tem1s of doses of radioactive materials dispersed by an accident giving additional credence to the site-specific approach advocat- d by the DOE In the fall of 1979 al the request 11fDoD 'D 'IA the techniques w re applied by Sandia to h 'O sites in Europe and one in the C0 1JS Th 1hrust o UNA ·s 3J'SUmcnts in lf11 m1d-1970 l Js to incr ljl tho lhml for rr mspon ilion and no mention was m itfo of stor ii c cunccms App mmll the impetu5 lil're was to accorrunotbte hii lac r-Jensil ' stor ssc in i 1 rlain igloos in ATO hile olhet ut1d rwent lhY ic iJ i ecurity con truttion upgr sdcs Th L' S Supreme Cot n decided in t 'Ji S lhu the LS 3 'Yw is not requm d tu prndm c in um la ilil «J ''h pothcttc ll' EIS for us nudc u wc ipun stor l f fa 1hty m H iwan -eFFtefAl -USE-0Nl -V-r f ' 111 I I I ii 1-11 AICJ Eiif RI -eFFIOIAL USE ONLY ' On November l 1979 Jim Wade DoO ATSD AE asked the DoD ONA to contraet for a definitive study of storage of plutonium-bearing nuclear weapons About a year later DNA produced proposed terms of reference TOR for ajoint DoD DOE review oflhe plutonium mass limits issue This TOR was forwarded to DOEJDMA's Major Gener II William W Hoover for comments Sandia Pr- sident Morgan Sparks' letter Ref t 08 to Major General Hoover early in 198 I which l drafted obj tcd to the TOR approach as favoring unilateral DoD control of the process Inst it suggested joint conduct of a systems study using the analytical methodology developed by the DOE weapons laboratories in 1973-1977 for the OOE's Nuclear Weapon Transportation Safety Hazards Evaluation Group and ilpplied by Sandia to certain DoD ttansponarion operations in the FORWARD LOOK Study of 1980 both studies are discussed here The study would be the third to be conducted in a fonnat similar to that used for the SAFEGUARD ABM issue of 1972•l 973 and the ERDA DoD Stockpile Safety Study oft 9751976 My proposed charter was attached to Sparks• letter The Sandia approach was endorsed by Major General Hoover and the proposed charter was forwarded to the DoD ATSD AE on M irch 3 1981 Following further coordination of the charter the first meeting of the DoD DOE Plutonium Dispersal Analysis Study StCCJing Group was held on August 20 1981 6 25 Accident Response Group ARG and Nuclear Emergency Search Team NEST Emphasis Early 1980s The nuclear weapon system accident on January 31 1958 at a SAC Base overseas invol 'ed highly localized rndioa ctivc material contamination 3nd cleanup operations on a military installation classified location even today At the time the potential problem area of contamination from dispersal caused by detonation of the high explosive in the new scaled-pit type of nuclear weapon was being considered by the Nuclear Weapon Safety Working Group chaired by the Anned Forces Special Weapons Project's Scientific Advisor Sandia•s research organization was providing a member Mel Merrin early on followed by Jim Shreve Although this accident did not involve a detonation and the configuration was other than a sealed-pit weapon the group had the appropriate technology at band The Sandian who was invited by the USAF to assist in decontamination on-site was William M Bill Cowan from the research organization Sec page 43 for discussion of this arrangement This accident occurred only eleven days aOer the USAF had fonned its Nuclear Weapon System Safety Study Group at Kirtland AFB Thus this accident response support function originated under auspices of AFS VPIDASA DNA'DSWA As mentioned earlier at the lime Sandia's Carl Carlson was reviewing all earlit r accidents and incidents in his study af nuclear weapon safety for the AEC Thal intcrt sl was a factor in the formation on 2 27158 f Lhe Joint Nuclear Accident Coon linating Center at Sandia Ba5e AEC was represented by a first-level br mch org t '1i1 ation al AEC AL n prJctici all futurl nuclear weap- n accidents a d major incidents im·olved only the USAF and AEC notification usual · cam via NWSSG ch nnels before JNACC The AEC'DOD agreement docwnenl Re l 85 dates the ongin of the BrokL n Arrow code name for a nucl ar wcapl' n accident that W 13 later lo gain worldwide fame l42 OFFICJAl - ¾SE- € NI ¥- In rhc aflennath oflhe Palomares accidtnt of early 1966 MLC Chaim1an ATSD AE Jack Howard led the process of issuing a revision to the AEC DoD agreement on accident response Ref 187 and revising DoD Directive 7730 12 Ref 138 The thrust of this effort was to reinforce the role of the DASA which had been a major source of support staff for Howard for the Palomares accident the MI C part oflhe office's total stafi'was thin at best After lhc Thule accidentofearlv 1968 MLC Chainnan ATSD AE Carl Walske issued on June 10 1970 a higher-level inrcragcncy AEC DoD Memorandum of Understanding Ref 189 A major thmst ofthis effort was to formalize the roles of the AEC and its weapons laboratories iu accident response The AEC was to be notified promptly and given the option to respond by sending a team to the site anywhere worldwide This document was the origin of the notion of an Accident Response Group ARG The flurry ofactivity that followed involving AEC ERDA DOE headquarters and field organizations end the weapon's laboracorics is indicated by Figure 21 The implementing document for DOE panicipation wa AEC Manual Chapter 0470 issued in early 1972 Not much happened until 1977 upon issuance of an agreement between Energy Research and Development Agency ERDA and the DoD Ref 190 This led to establishmcnl of a formal role for the staff of the Military Application s Office at ERDA Headquarters near Gcnnantown Macyland with construction and manning of an A EC emergency response coordination center in a vault beneath the headquarters building NOTE As I mention in context later I consider the extreme of emphasis that developed on ARO NEST lo have had a seriously detrimental impact on nuclear weapon S2C because it competed for the energies of the very ERDA DOE and laboratory personnel who also had line responsibilities in S1C I don't quarrel with the ARG NEST as a national capability-it's a matter of degree By 1974 an activity that can be considered as a parallel to the ARO area had evolved from roots in the Security part of Sze the Nuclear Emergency Search Team NEST Rather than being driven by a weapon accident as for ARG NEST was driven by the threal of loss of possession or control over a weapon weapon test devices weapon parts especially those containing radioactive material etc The principal threat was use of the item to cause dispersal of radioactive materials tl' at could endanger the health of the general population or otherwise have impact of national significance William E Bill Nelson ofLLNL William H Bill Chwnbcrs ofLANL and William C Bill Myre of SNL became the scientific lechnicnl principals all having earlier roles in nuclear weapon R D projects NOTE ln miJ l974 Giller 1 mun d after MG Edward Giller ERO VDircctor of Military Application was the first major field c rcise of NEST Bill Myre recalled Lhat I was the nominal Sandia m inager actively participating in th deployment of Samlians lo accident sitts in sup ort the military services Bill appoilllcd me to aid him by overseeing lhe r sil ual center for the EST team at Kirtland AFB after the team dcp irted by an Air Force C-130 for the exercise sit on Vl1ilc Sands Proving Grounds sci up to simulate a foreign nation th tt had stolen a wc aponJ By the time of the first nuclear weJpon accident exerc1s in 1975 NUWA X-78 NEST had two exercises and l ' o r al-lile p 1rtial responses OFFICIAL USE--0Nb¥ J • • • I I • l-13 at ertE I Fkb' OFFICIAL UGI ONLV 69 66 72 70 76 74 --- 76 ea 84 _ _ _-- 82 DAMASCUS NUWAXS1 I • 1 Acc1dent r I n c 1 P l lli lr 11 • 1 NUWAX7g • • I I 1 Thul OHA ATSO AE NUWAX Concept h _ 3 ltlliN laland Aiaing I I I Accidents ' 'T NVO Role 1 I I • NUWAX 8l 1 Eciuu• ' 5 ' llegU Eln la Cha tor HEST Tl J Sundc g Rik I 1 Roota l l i j • S- l--- - ·I ·- - i- ·- - l---· l···- iJ---·IK- - -w---t-f- ----1·- ·· f - Searches I 1 Se- ll'ches I Giller I MotninQ L I l I I I EC'OoD ooe eoo F EMA AECJDllO EROA OoO AgtNmlint J I rv10U Admin · -----f · --- · ·l·----f·-- - - i-t--- ---l--- --f--- x f t Roi• t EC r Ag1oumen1 «2 Rereo I -m•nt I J - I IK - --1-- Adn lill t 001 DNA Role kJNACC l 21271sa I C 7 M D D Di1e div ' 7730 12 W J I let ·1c1rcJ I EACTFonned at DOE OMA ATSO AE 1-0NA Long A1nQePl 1n I I I 1AECI A0 70 •• • - - - - - - - - - - -- ·- - - - - -1 -- -- --- ' Chooor SandliJ r rol e111hlp Chang1d G6 6S 70 72 74 76 7 eo S2 Figure 21 Time-Line for Nuclear Weapon Accident and Search Team Activities 14•l OFFICIAL USE ONLY 0 1-am z n ta 84 ARO St eflE1'FAg OFFICIAL USE ONLY Following the first field exercise of the ARG NUWAX-79 lhe scope of ARG activities was seen JS large ougb to warrant funding and managemcn1 amngements thal would amount to a scbc Julcd program in the DOE Th- Acciden1 Response Capability Coordinating Committee ARCCC was Conned and became operative by mid-1980 My department provided staff suppon for the Sandia director appointed is a member Leon Smith Roy Lambert became the lead tcclutical pc rson at Sandia continuing the interest and skill that he had displayed at the last two rent accidents at Thule Greenland in 1968 and Damascus Arkansas in 1980 Sandia's role in ARG ARCCC was minor compared to lhosc of LLNL 311d LANL 1 took special interest in the lechnological capability of the laboratories to define the txtent of dispCB31 of plutonium oxide aerosols following detonation of weapon high explosive and drew on the talents of Bob Luna Hugh Church and John M Taylor LL'll compcicd directly by tstablishing in 1979 the Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability ARAC Center at LLNL NOTE In 1996 ARAC had become a national emergency response service for real-time assessment of accidents events involving ahc release of hazardous natural chemical nuclear or biological material to the atmosphere ARAC delivers realistic graphic dose exposure assessments to c mergency decision makers lo assist in the protection of populations at risk Since 1979 ARAC has responded to more than 70 derts accidents and disasters and supported more than 800 exercises Besides accidental radiological releases we ha 'C assessed natural disasters such as ·olc anic ash cloud and earthquake induced hazardous spills manmadc disasters such as the Kuwait oil fires md toxic chemical relenses Ref I 83 In early 1981 the ARG ARCCC took on an added dimension when the newly fonnc d Fedcral Emergency Management Agency FEMA became by fiat the feder3l le id agency for domestic U S events Then followed a classic il bureaucratic struggle within the DOE as L Joseph Joe Deal and his allies elsewhere in DOE anempted by rewrite of governing DOE orders lo impose nuclear fuel cycle and power reactor safety pr3cticcs on the nuclear weapon program in general and capon accidents in particular Ar is described in se cral places in this rq ort l foughr such aucmpts lime and time again as they arose in 'mous guises and ith 'arious sponsors 1hrou out the remainder of my Sandia tenure and later as a consultant We won this episode 1h inks in pan lo the ftne technical paper that John Taylor contributed on the subject of Emergency PlaMing Zones Ref 18 l l Correspondence on this general subJect is contained in i uclcar Safety Information Center NSIC File IN 228 including my thoughts Ref 182 6 26 Nuclear Weapon Transportation for the Pantex Plant Environmental Impact Statement 1981-1983 My P l 'l• f mcth dology for risk a m ssmcnt was cxt nded ind Jppltcd in lhc prcparJtion uJ m Em·ironmcnt tl lmp icl St tcment for th ' DOE's Piilltex Pllnt near mmllo Texas both for lht rrucluctinn a nJ sto Jgc opera1ions hy t A ll i nd for u mspvrtJti n in md out of the plant hy S mdta Sl Rcfon nces 11J9 I IO and 111 1 A sisnificanl i11nov 11ion thlt I s11g cst d was th 3 CRE I Fit OFFICIAL USE ONLY noti n c f a · lhreshold of 3cceptable nslC lc ·cl of less than one chance in a million opportunities per yeM of experiencing a plutoniwn Jisp rsal accident due to operations at Pant ex The threshold of risk notion was used in the EIS instead of the traditional worst credible 3Ccidem·• scenario approach that had b n required in nuclear power reactor fuel cycle programs Acceptance of he final EIS report in 1983 amounted to tacit acceptance of the rermed PM PM approach although there has been no test in courts Later the 3PPro 1cb was considered for fonnal adoption in the DOE1s order on tr msportation ofnuclear weapon materials It was applied to DoD transportation and storage operations worldwide in the period 1981-1986 follo ling the FORWARD LOOK study Ref 86 ln the course of promoting the use of PM PM for the P3Jltex EIS I updated and extended earlier papers on PM PM in the preparation of Reference 111 My final papers on this general subject are Reference 112 prepared at rhe request ofOrvaJ Jones for the DOE OP's S1C Committee post my retirement 6 27 The Plutonium Dispersal Safety Project PDSP 1981-1984 B isic rcfc rcnces for this section and others treating the subject of radioactive material dispersal safcty are lhe annotated timelines contained 3S 11 t A l 956-1979 TL-2A 1978-1985 and TL-48 1977-81 in Ref 153 After rhe DOE·s response to the Titan 11 missile 3Ccident in October 1980 LLNL provided to a DOE review group quantit uive estimates of the dose contoun that would be expected had lhe nuclc ir warhead undergone detonation of its chemical HE as a result of the fuel explosion SNL 's rcprcscnaarives on the review group had made similar estimates for internal purposes and noted 3 brgc discrepancy between the two esti1nntes Subsequent coordination revealed that th L LNL ·s source term for the mass of special nuclear material aerosolized in the hazardous range ofpanidc sizes was highly conservative overstated aoo accounted for most of the difference Firm chaMels ofinter-labor uory tcchnicru c oordination were c stablishcd to 11• oid such problcm i tn the future My rc icttons to the above incid t included ba -iDg John Taylor drlfl a proposal for resean h un the soun e term Ref 180 ·n1is led to a rri-DOE weapons laboratory sludy wilh SNL as tbc lead and pnncipal fund r This study b gan in amest in the fall of 1981 anJ wa c to imprO 'C undcrsrandins of the source term for release- of Pu from detonation of the chemical HE i urrnundin a Pu-bearing pir of a nuclear w apon This study complemented a project under way May 1980 b forc the Titian lJ accident tu im cstig ite the source lcnn for burning of lhc HE as contrnsred to detonation of the HE This project the Plutonium Acrosnliz ition Study was cunJuclcd on Sandia Base al the Inhalation Toxology Research lnstitut opcrJtcd by the Lo ·d ic Foundation und r funding po11sor5h1p of LLKL OTF The data obtained from th cxpcrimi nts w3 i used by LLNL t jw titY thi firr R istar t l'it IFRP hat in 1494 was d scrihcd in unclassified 1 mguage 1 I -OFRet Al -U-SE-E Nl V ·1 • SiCAlif1FRlF t OFFICIAL l JSE ONLY by Sid Drell and Bob Pcurifoy in Reference 147 I found LLNUs 311aJysis W1convincing at my retirement in October 1985 Bob Luna's comments were especially helpful to me S mdia's pa rt of the PDSP included an in-house rather large e g about $3 5 million over 3-1 2 years research project led by Bob Luna 6 28 Deliberate Unauthorized Launch DUL Concerns PERSHING II Weapon System Deployment 1981 The second of the four standards for nuclear weapon system safety studies and reviews since 1960 has required that ' There shall be positive measures to prevent deliberate arming law1ching firing or releasing of nuclear weapons In the terminology used in this report the second standard really is concerned with use control rather than safety of a nuclear weapon system For missile systems the technology used in the NWSSG process to treat this concern was tenned a 'Deliberate Unauthorized Launch DUL study The study methodology tended to be closely held for understandable reasons of security against possible unintentional disclosure of ways to bypass the positive measw-es relied upon to prevent the lawich Since the end event was a launch not a nuclear detonation ofa warhead there was a tendency in the 1960s md l 970s to regard DUL as mainly a DoD concern for those weapon systems that contained a PAL device to preclude detonation even with a launch DUL iHues were addressed by a special analysis for those weapon systems without PAL-mostly bombers and ballistic missiles The analyses were done by a DoD agency or contractor and presented ta NWSSGs for a judgment as to adequacy of the positive measures provided 1 In preparation for the Pre-Operalional Safety Review for the PERSHING II weapon system scheduled for March 1983 for which 1was to be tecbrti al advhmr I examined the practices and technologies relevant to DUL studies and circulated a set of presentation aids Ref 113 within SNL to stimulate discussions on DoD and DOE responsibilities in the areas of S1C I cited examples of cuncnt controversies involving the W84 Ground Launched Cruise Missile a LLNUSNLL program and the W85tPERSHING U a LANI JS1 'LA progrwn - OTE The WS4 GLCM episode that I described in Ref 114 remains classified dct3il 3 c to • The T-1 Countdown Episode Based on ' ' perien e vith the earlier PERSHJNG Ia weapon systt m U S Auuy operational history analysts concluded th it m1r y or the rchability failures i J tt cted by simulated launch ercis s wcri - due to human errors during the cuuntdown-lo-laund1 phase This led to i requirement for PERSHING 11 10 induJc in routirn Quick Re tction l n srntus the ··T-1 Optkm' so named bl causc the operational countdo 11 would proc- ed d0 1l to launch minus one scconJ This operation was to be allowed for il weapon systems in rhe Quick I t 7 - · • '3 I· ·TT' ' '' 2 M U CPti hf RO OFFIGIAL USE 0Nb¥ Reaction Alert configuration compltte with missile motor igniters installed ar d a war reserve W8S nuclear warhead instnllcd in the warhead section of the system-i e all the lements needed for a nuclear detonation were present except that the PAL system in the W8S would not be operated During the T-1 countdown all human actions necessary for a tactical launch flight and nuclear detonation were to be perfonned with simulated codes and safmg signals entered The exercise required removal of the ball lock pins that secured the missile to the launcher structure and actually turning the Launch Key on the system's control uniL I was astonished earlier in the development program when the T-1 Option concept was mentioned and believed that it was so absurd that it would be discarded during the considered reviews built into the DoD's development approval process Wilen the T-1 Option was included in the Operational Concept presented for approval at the Pre-Operational Study I drafted a statement concluding that there would be inadcqu3te positive measures to meet the first and third system safety standards nuclear detonation and DUL and recommended that the option shallld be deleted The NWSSC voting membership voted against my proposed statement 5-2 with only DOE and Field Command DNA members in favor and the statement became an official minority opinion NOTE The PERSHING II first stage rocket contained a Safe and Arm Device of an out-of-line explosive train type that was to be operated by a coded signal This provision may be traced to the initiative of the PERSHING II Project team member U S Anny Captain John C Hogan Captain Hogan had worked closely with SNL 's project leader Ray Reynolds in using the strong link technology for this device A1so he had been instrumental in leading the weapon system contractor Martin Marietta to conduct DUL studies just before the Pre-Operational S ifety Review Several years later upon Captain Hogan's retirement Ray Reynolds processed a hiring application for John but Executive Vice President Jack Howard denied approval About a decade larer John Hogsnjoined SNL's team as a Martin-Marietta employee and later as 3 Sandian JS OFFICIAL USE ONLY ·· · J· T' q· 7 CHALLENGES TO DUAL AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES AGREEMENTS 1983-1994 Vithin the first decade after abolition of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1973 the concept of dual agency responsibilities for SJC had been intensively reviewed by two high-level governmental task groups and was reaffirmed without major changes being proposed The ERDNDoD Transfer Study of 1975-76 had defined and adopted the concept and the DOE DoD Starbird Stml_y of 1979-80 added an endorsement The next dttade would see more reviews and tests of cfficncy In mid-l982 Sandia•s safety statesman Executive Vice President Jack Howard elected ro take early retirement at age 50 His unexpected departure necessitated changes in the way that Sandia handled S1C concerns 7 1 The 0oD DOE Memorandum of Understanding 1982-1983 In the early years of the 1980s evolution of nuclear safety in the U S nuclear weapon program was characterized by a rec o 'ery from the weaknesses in stewardship for S2C in evidence during the l 977 1980 period Although the recovery surety was the result of a combination of events the foWidations were drawn from the reaffumation of the dual-agency responsibilities concept by the Starbird Study After completing his work as executive assistant for the Starbird S11u v in early 1980 Dr Theodore Ted Gold terminated bis employment with Sandfa from a leave of absence and became a deputy to Rich Wagner DoD ATSD AE In this assignment Ted Gold became the implementer ofa princ pal recommendation of the Starbird Study that he earlier had helped ro draft Fincling #7 The concept of dual-deparlm nt responsibilit · for s c of nuclear weapons needs Presidential-level reaffirmation There is no governing policy directive now in force and no integrated management Rccommcndatiort Treat S1C as an entity The DoD and DOE S9trelaries should continue to seek a Prcsideolial Directive reaffinning dual-depmtmcnt responsibility and should establish under ATSD c E and ASDP dual-agency oversight group to write the yearly safety report to 1he President and also lo 1dvise and con mil concerning the S C proi ram ATSD AE should tn kc the mitiativc lo write a dcfiniti 'e inccgrating OoD Direcrh·c DNA should provide tcchnkal support to ATSD E on S1C efforts I Ted chose to ab U1don attempt to draft a Presidential Decision McmoraJ1dum PDM a 1d focused instead on drafting a lowi r level Memorandum of Understanding MOU bct cen the DoD and the DOE Ihat would cover the cniirc lrea ofjoint 1n'uclear Wt apons acli ·ities Safotr OFFIGIAL USE ONLY r i iT iQlt 1 9 ECAEIJPI© OFFICIAL USE ONl tY' · security and control S1C would be just one of the areas of responsibilities considered This enlightened approach allowed re-endorsement of existing working arrangements principally the 1953 Agreement Between the Atomic Energy Commi5sion and the Department of De 'ensc for the Development Production and Standardization of Atomic Weapons and the precedents that had evolved over three decades In eftect Ted Gold's draft captured the intent he actually used some wording verbatim or National Security Action Memorandum SI of1961 for nuclear safety and adopted current practice for use control and security as continuing responsibility The applicable text from the IOU lhat became effective on January 17 1983 follows E The obligation of the DoD and the DOE to protect public health and safety provides the basic premise for dual-agency judgment and 1csponsibility for safety security and control S1 C ofnuclear weapons This checks-and-balnnce role shall continue The DoD and the DOE share the responsibility to l Identify an l resolve health and safety problems connected with nuclear weapons n particular the DOE bas continuing responsibility to participate with the DoD in the consideration of these health and safety problems for nuclear weapons jn Do0 custody 2 Prevent unsuthorizcd use of a nuclear weapon through the use ofpositive control measures In general the DoD establishes operational requirements and develops and implements procedures lo ensure control of nuclear weapons while the DOE develops control hardware features The DoD and the DOE jointly participate in the assessing the effectiveness of control features Source Ref 115 NOTE Dick Brodie and I were in frequent contact with Ted Gold in this endeavor Note that my emphasis on joint and shared responsibilities and Brodie's emphasis on overall responsibilities survived In the process of coordinating Sandia's inputs lo Ted Gold in drafting the MOU J attempted to encourage dialogue within Sandia•s top management to appreciate the nuances in shared joint dual and singular DoD OOE responsibilities for s c 1 Tote a memo on lhis subject Ref 116 as a precursor to the memo that President George Dacey's should sign when the final MOU draft was up for approval To my rusmay Dace · replied that there was oo real difference between ·•sh m d and 'joint responsibilities in his mind As I prepare thfo report l note that the joint nsturc of safety responsibilities thal I envisioned perhaps has been eroded i e • that DOE and DoD arc jointly required to render a judgment as to the idcqu icy of pc siti ·e measures that is total account for the level of risk The issue ofjoint and shared judgme-nts vas at rhe heart of the W691SRAivf-A safely episode outlined lat r in this repcm and l use that episode co give substru1c to this nuance in l in_g Jage l50 I OFFICIAL l J SE ONLY 2 ' -' · J @iCAlilJl'R OFFIGIAb U8 ONLX 7 2 The Third Revision of the DoD Directive on Nuclear Weapon Safety Studies 1983-1984 Following issuance of the DoD DOE MOU in 1983 Dr Glen T Otey DoD ATSD AE •0 inten i fied the process ofrevising DoD Directive S030 l 5 Safety Studies and Re •ieo vs of Nuclear Jf 1capon Systems dated August 8 1974 This document is considered to be remarkGble runong joint agency directives in that it has remained unchanged in thnlsl since original issuance in June 1960 however its updating was n ed to change organizational titles and responsibilities and lo codify practices that bad evolved Glen Otcfs approach over almost two yclll's of coordination was to have one-on-one sessions with the chairman of the military services' system safety study groups the branch chiefs in the DoO DMA the DOE AL and lhe DOE DMA safety groups and various action officers in the Pentagon lnfonnnlly he obtained input and comments from others including Dick Brodie Frank J Murar and me By late 1983 a new version had been coordinated and it entered the approval chain at DoD in early 1984 The version dated Febnwy 8 1984 and renumbered as OoD Directive 31 S0 2 makes at least two significant improvemcnls in my opinion l The DoD A TSD AE was assigned overall responsibility for the nuclear weapon system safety program marking the first time that this responsibility was fonnally assigned on anyone The responsibility review and evaluate periodically programs established to implement this wrective is derived from an internal DoD memo from the Secretary of Defense 3lld is responsive to recommendations of the Starbird Study 2 Reports on safety studies and reviews will contain a statement of the action that the cognizant military service intends to talce on each recomm ndation and will be forwarded into DoD DOE channels within four months of study completion This 1 provision ended the Anny•s practice since the mid-1970 s of not publishing reports and intended actions for long periods--several years had be ome typical The re1vision was not successful in it least one respect in my opinion despite extraordinary efforts by Glen Otey Early drafts of the revision provided a safety standard addressing lhc prevention of radi4 active material dispersal in weapon accidents as well as to continue the eh 1rg to prevent a nuclear detonation Although this ' fifth standard did not survive the revision do s have a weaker charge Measures for reducing hazards that could lead lo detonation of the warhead high-e ocplostve ignition ofrocket motor propellant or other cvcn1s or strious consequtnc es tso shall be considered 01 y was 3 dcp 1mn n1 nun i r It S ' L on lcl ' I of ih cnce i or this iss11mmcnt -eFFtetAl -USE-ONlYa iil h PF I I F l 5 1 al IRIWFRI OFFICIAL USE ONLY 7 3 The DOE Defense Program's S2C Committee 1983 1985 sic Shortly after promulgation of the DoDfDOE Memorandum of Understanding on in April 1983 the OOE's Assistant Secretary Defense ProgrrlD'lS ASDP Hcnnan E tHcrm Roser commissioned the formation of a DOE S2C Committee Th S1C Committee was to be comprised of a senior individual from each laboratory and Operations Office and fmm the Safety Environment and Emergency Actions Division of DOE OMA Its chairman was to be designated by the DOE Deputy ASDP The committee was to meet periodically to discuss current topics and possible ne · initiatives identify measures that may require additional interagency attention and ensure a heightened awareness of the overall importance of S1C Orval Jones then Vice President 7000 served as Sandia's representative and Dick Brodie and I did staff work for Orval In July 1983 Bob Peurifoy was promoted from Director Weapon Development 4300 to Vice President Technical Suppon 7000 and replaced Orval I recall that one of the tasks of the S1C Committee was to obtain an S2C policy statement for DOE via the mechanism ofb1ning the s rc Committee moderate the sh up differences in views helc by the Peterson Jones faction at DOE OMA and the Otey Gold Stevens Brodie faction at DOE ATSD AE and Sandia The draft policy statement died l111985 when the President's Blue Ribbon Task Group found it WlSUitablc for its use Essentially none of the Peterson Jones 0 mdependcnce0 and checlcs and balances harpings are contained in the dran Annual Repon for that year In my opinion this episode revealed in open S2C Committee sessions all of the important issues needed for DOE OMA to clean its house on s c policy The simple fact is that the Peterson Jones faction was still fighting the wording of the DoDfDOE MOU beci1use it seemed to contradict their view I saw this as a dangerous and probably losing campaign with the DoD Ref 192 7 4 Safety Health and Environmental Appraisal Committee 1983-1984 During my two-year service on the committee accountable to the Vice President oi Technical Support 7000 for appraisal of non-nuclear safely of facilities used by tJ1at organization I successfully advocntcc and promoted Ref I 18 the use of the PM PM variant of the Probabilistic Risk Assessment methodology to Sandia·s sled track facility The analysis made b • Richard Dick E Smilh47 of my department was r spccially noteworthy in that it led to appreciation of the potential risks of using in the future improved rockets whose propcllanlS couhl become cxplosh·c rather than merely propulsive A ldilmnally contributed papers on a suggested phi losophical treatment of industrial safety ci3ks l g Ref 119 perhaps a factor in the changing of the committee's n ime am I emphasis from th tr 1uitional o1Enrirmuncnt Safety anJ Heaith to ··Safety Health and Environment challenging DOE flca lquilltcrs' apparcn cmph sis vfa ES H there was an Assistant Secretary •· D1 k Smith h iJ h - en rile p in ipl m mh r of1echnit 1 m ff for the PM l'M 111 thllJ lOll ' for the l 'TSilfG udy an th 197 -70 l - i p m d JmJ hls ontinu I ob Sand1 i's cxpcr in lh S uc i I - -et FIGIAL USE-ONt -V- 1·scsrw R1 - OFFIGIAL U i ONLY of Energy for such to safety and health of employees and the public over environmental concerns 7 5 Papers on AEC DoD Divisions of Responslbflltles 1984 In support of Executive Vice President J3ek Howard's repeated urging for caution in er gagin in matters involving the interfaces of responsibilitiea between the AEC ERDNDOE and the DoO and upon his early rctir ment from Sandia Jdid e tensJVe file research and produced two papers on evolution of the two agreements of 1953 011 • • Development production and staodardimtion of nuclear weapons Ref 3 Fuzing of nuclear warheads used on guided missiles and rockets Ref 4 7 6 Initiation of SNL's Computer Code Security Program 1983-1985 In mid-1983 the Safety Assessment Technologies Division 7233 under Dick Smith began a systems study to examine the state-of-art of computer software codes as regards susceptibility to subversive human actions that could cause the code 10 produce a malevolent outcome that would effectively bypass the S1C protection it was intended to provide A technical staff of four Ref 120 was assjgned a two-year study that clearly established susceptibility of software through a series of experiments whereby the team principally James Jim Gosier consistently •·cracked security codes in use in military and commercial endeavors especially copy protection routines Also Jim Gosier wrote a code that he advenised to contain a m3levolcnt routine presented the code to adversary simulation teams to find rhe routine and monitored the unsuccessful cffons at detection When be demonstrated the malevolent action during a briefing of SNL's Small Staff arranged by Vice President 7000 Bob Pcurifoy the issue ofwhether or not computer software could be relied upon at a very high degree of confidence as a nuclear detonation safety or use• control device by SNL seemed moot NOTE After my retirement in September 1985 1 bec3I11e a Vatc of the continued evolution ofSNL's subversive code work and that technological agencies of the military services the OoO and other federal intelligence secu iry agencies joined to make a national capability in this area 7 7 Conduct of Deliberate Unauthorized Launch Studies for U S Army Nuclear Weapon Systems 1984-1985 Pl ase celt r to SAND99-0S47 NOTE In re -iew of dC1cumentation on Dl L in the Nudcar Safetv lnform llion Center NSlC ·ault l le3rned thnt much of the files h 1d be n transferred oul to ''Jim Gosler's organization '' I hop that all his1oric 1lly imponam documents about s c can be indexed in the Nuclear Safety lnfomlltiou Center 'iSIC even -- ifhdcl dsewher OFFICIAL USE-ONLY a• · rr- · ·· 153 111 1l 1 Flt -8FFICIAL USE ONLY 7 8 President's Blue Ribbon Task Group BRTG on Nuclear Weapons Program Management 1985 ln effect the subject study was the second updacc of the Transfer Study of 1975•76 the first update being the Starbird Study of 1980 The BRTG's fin it rcpon Re£ 122 reaffirmed the earlier studies' re -0mmendatiom not to mmsfer any responsibilities ftom the DOE to lhc DoD and to continue the dual agency judgment and responsibilities for nuclear weapons S1C figure 22 is a list of panieipants in the study I was tasked to support Sandia's member of the Executive Secretariat of the BRTG 1 Vice President 7000 Bob Peurifoy One of my contributions was a paper oudining the level•of-effort funding management practice of the AEC ERDA DOE for the nuclear weapons complex Ref 123 This paper was an update of one I prepared in 1980 Ref 95 for the Starbird Study Ref 92 Another of my contributions was lo draft a background paper on nuclear weapon system S'C in collaboralion with Major Michael Mike Saunders USAF of the Executive Secretariat 1 had known Mike Saunders for several yems he was earlier assigned to the Directorate of Nuclear Safety at Kirtland AFB This paper a nine-page narrative on S'C with annexes on definitions of terms and recent initiatives became Volume IV of the Report of the Executive Secretariat Reference 124 and a basis for Appendix I of the BRTG's report Reference 122 The task group devoted one ofits nine conclusions and recommendations to S2C as follows 1 The President might consider issuing a directive rcaffmning the DoD OOE dual-agency checks and ialances responsibilities for nuclear weapon safety security and control Tn arriving at this recommendation the task group used a case study on lhe Stockpile Improvement Program SIP Ref 87 written by Dick Brodie as a vehicle to c aminc the recent effectiveness of the dual-agency working arrangements for s c contained in the Saunders Stevens paper n brief the task group was distressed by the obs rvation that implementation ofd1e SIP had taken over five years and made a recommendation to s1Tengthen high-level oversight of S C via a new Presidential directive '1 °Jhc Exccu l 'c S cremilt w is chaired by Ted Ciold 154 •·OFFIGlAk-U-SE-0Nl -¥- ' 11 T····wn··- -•••••w••• -OFFf6JAL USE ONLV TASK GROUP MEMBERS WILLIAM P CLARK JR Chairman Lawyer• Rogers d Wells Fonner Secn 11ry or the £ntcrior Fonner Assistant to the Prcsidr nt for National Sceuriry Affairs Former Deputy Secretary ofStz tc JA fES R SCBLESINGE Vi Oiairman Executive Board Member and Counselor Georgetown Univ sity Center for the Strategic znd lntematiorw Srudics Former Secretary o Energy FonnerSecrctaryofOefense Fonner Chairmln of the Atomi Energy Commission Fonnc r Dq uty Director of the Bureau or the Budget HAROLD M AGNEW Former President of GA Technologies lnc Former Director ofl os Alamos National l aborstory ALAN C FURTII Vice Chairman and Oiicctor Santa Fe Soui hcm Padfic Coq Chairman d Director Federal Reserve Bank of San Fr mcisco JEA 'P J KlJUO'ATRICK Senior Fellow America Enterprise Institute Fonner Ambassador to the United Nations FREDERICK J KROESEN Gena I US Anny Retired Fonner Commander in Chlef US Anny Europe Wil Ll tu1 J PERRY Managing Partner H Q Technology P irtncrs Fonr r Under ScctC'tary of Defense for RCSCilrch a 'ld Engmc ring Figure 22 Principal ParticipDnls for tho President's Blue Ribbon Task Gmul' -0FFl€tAt-USe-ONLY ir l t I '- esonc1 r ns OFFICIAL USE ONU' 7 9 Formation of the Nuclear Weapon Council 1987 Although the recommendation of the Blue Ribbon Task Group for a Presidential Directive was not impk111entcd the following rec ommcnd nion was •1ne Military Liaison Committee should be altered in both mission and membership It should become a senior•l¢vcl DOD DOE group to coordinate nuclear weapon acquisition and related matters illld to oversee joint activities ·• The Nuclear Weapon Council created in early 1987 by Public Law 99·661 replaced the MLC One responsibility was to consider safety issues for cxishng we ipons and for proposed new weapon stans The three members were I Director Defense Research and Engineering DDR E Chair 2 Vice Chainruin Joint Chiefs ofStafT JCS 3 Senior DOE Representative appointed by Secretary of Energy For most of the first 3 ½ years of operation of the N VC lhe position orDOE Assislant Secretary Defense Programs ASDP DP•2 which is al the level lhaL requires confinnation by the U S Senate was nol ftllcd Instead on•roll members oflhc Defense Progr uns staff were assigned as Acting ASDP This situation did not escape critical notice by the Drcll Panel in its review of a nuclear safety program in 1q90 As developed later the role played by Acting ASDP Troy Wade Il August 1987 to June 1989 in 1he W69 SRAM-A episode is especially notewonhy On Octobc r 19 I 90 the Senate continned appointment of RichanJ A Claytor Captain t S Na 'y Retired and he became the first 1 111-tledgcd DOE representative at the level of DOE ASDP DP-2• 7 10 Safety Treatise and Safety Evolution Papers 1985·1987 In 1nricipation of my retirement and 10 rroviJe a source data for a treatise on a classificJ nuclear veapon snfcty to be writtL n by Dick Brodie upon com mission from tht s c Comrniltct I Jraricd pjp r$1 on the following subjects Structure and staffing of the national nuclc ar weapon and wc ipon system safety program Re 126 This is an upLlatc and e p rns1on of a p iper pr parcJ for th Sr 1rNrd Sru • m 1980 Ref 91 1 •· hl ou h wri1te11 111 l9 ' -4 -SS IJ1c sc p iper wm 11u1 IYJ '-'d ind pubh hc J umil IQSS 11 cy i camc reler ·ntc i ti 1111 Did OroJ1c ·s trc iti c mJ the 1m1d 1 ilr rnt J n rhc nc - t pu c - i - - · Of £1€1AI t IS --ONt±Y 4 · 2 Summary of presidential and other high-level directives and correspondence on nuclear weapon system safety and control Ref 127 Titis paper is related to Reference 9 I also 3 Design philosophies and practices for nuclear weapon fety Ref 128 This is an expansion of a paper prepared for OOF DMA 's briefing package on nuclear safcty in early 198 l Ref IOI 4 Quantitative tandards for nuclear weapon safety in design Ref 129 This is an expansion of 3 paper prepared for DOE DP's S1C Committee in 1984 5 Summary of accidcmts and significant incidents involving U S nuclear weapons Ref 130 Additionally at the request of Vice President 7000 Bob Peurifoy I drafted two papers on the evolution of nuclear safety Ref 2 for 1950s and 1960s and Ref 40 for the 1970s and 1980s through 1985 These papers were classified CFRD as collections however I intended and believed thac each subsection was unclassified and since have had both papers declassified 7 11 Dick Brodie's Treatise on Nuclear Weapon Safety Program 1987 In 1987 Dick Brodie prepared a report Ref 131 that reviewed the U S nuclear weapon_ safety program from 1945 co 1986 sponsored by Orval Jones as SNL's member of the OOE's s 2c Conuniuee The report treats nuclear detonation safety and pluloniwn dispersal safety but neither use control nor security concerns In my opinion it gives the best possible overview of the subject and should e widely used in the national nuclear weapons community There were 111 copies distributed externally and 129 internally The report contains no references that not being Dick's style This situation Jed me years later as a consultant to undertake a project to improve access lo appropriate references that I had coUccted while on-roll and were or should have been contained in the Nuclear Safety lnformatior Center as discussed later 7 12 Sandia's Policy Statement and Plan for Nuclear Weapon Safety Assurance 1987•1993 In mid-1987 Vice President ofTechnical Suppon 70 Bob Pcurifoy commissioned a committee of seven depanment m 111 igers of vari d technical intereStS under director H rm l fauni y to conduct a six-month ri view of Sandia's nuclear safety processe and to rccommcmJ modificntion 1 thnl shor ld bo con ider rl The commiuee wai tnsked to focus on the va idallon certification aspects oflhc process 1 was not involved in any dir ct way being at the time inactive as a consullant so this account is based on re •1ew of the documents refe enccd I am pleased to note howcv r that the source data Jocumcnts thal I had dralled scverJI years i arlicr page 156 were included is rcicrcnccd in the commitke's report R f 163 This was prec1 ely thi utility of these documcnl'i that motivated me to dratl them -eFFtetAL USE ONLY al I l t 11 l I fi • l IIR-I llr -OFFICIAL USE ONLY In my · ew the most important recommendation was articulation adoption and implementation of an SNL policy statement for nuclear detonation safety The proposed policy statement April 1988 was promulgatNI essentially as proposed md pub ished in October 1990 under the signature of Sandia President Al Narath in the document entitled Wtapon Nuclear Safety Assurance Plan for Sandia NaU011al 1Aborr11orie s n The policy statement is reproduced as Figure 23 The bulk of this cffon was conducted under President Irwin Welber and er dorsed bv N iralh following his becoming President in early 1989 This widely distributed document Ref 164 that contained descriptions ofcvr ry area of responsibility in the process was issued under the caption ''Review and Approved A Narath President Sandia National Laboratories A current version at this writing is Ref 165 7 13 DOE DP's Nuclear Weapon Safety Management Process Review The Moe Panel Study 1988 Before my retirement in September 1985 I had taken note of emerging conflicts on policy and practices on nuclear safety and accident response matters within the DOE Headquarters organizations involved in the nuclear weapon safety process principally in the Safety Environment and Emergency Actions Division under the Director of Military Applicacion See page 42 of Ref 126 for organization Until tbc early 1970s the office was al the lower branch level and was concerned mainly with the processing of nuclear safety rules The staffwas headed by an 0-6-leve officer of a military service on active duty and staffed with an 0-4 lo 0-5level officer from eac of the military services plus a civili in who had retired in-place from military duty Aner the Rocky Flats fire in 1969 the branch was ele 'ated to be ••division and the two functions of environmental safety and health a 'ld of emergency response were added to make a tnt al nf three branches Civil service employei s drawn from within the DOE and added over the years tended to favor the safety philosophies used in their earlier assignments and attempted to apply them directly to nuclear weapon safety One such person Theodore Ted Dobry came from the aerospace nuclear safety program with its focus plutonium dispersal safety and w is especially vocal in puihing for use of nuclear fuel cycle safety philosophies in nuclear weapon safety including Probabilistic Risk Assessments Concurrently tbe emergency action response mission bt gan to domLnate the attention of the division with the odvent of the Emergency Operiltions Center located in the basement ofthe headquarters building and the scheduling and planning of large-scale field ·cxaci cs of the Accident Response Group and the Nuclear Emergency Search Team ' OTE Ted Dobry'8 safely pltilusuphy wa wt ll•k uuwu lu su1rn Sumliaus csp1 ciall ' to Bob Luna from his involvement n the EC staff assigned to the Aerospace uclc ir Safoty Prngrom ·0FFf01At --l f5E ONLY ¢1· ·· 21t 'Tf ¥ I ·wcssr· • OFFICIAL USE ONLY Sandia National Laboratories Policy Statement for Weapon Nuclear Safety Assurance Wupa amcat saJ'df d I join N Garlid rapi ui'llilil ' •f 1M DcflM'III' of CMIO OOE AM Ill Or -nmcn1 o Mauc _ 111 up ian ar his DO iiilily ii ii Ilia p iliq or Suidia l'blioAal uborNana Ilia a - sm lnt r aldf W rca prixily ill die daip pn duaio- nactpil 111ai111DU1C Wld cnlcaa al u _ _ 1o1iJiw1 l uJ apnss ll Ull1lll eucJur afd'I n quRIMIIU wil • _ Ole lA olMlria -a ia 1k i gmlmd uisi-ial Wu - -dc lr mC ' is daipcd - cdut _ _ - • rnr prisipla •liiin # JTdCJIII u q ia whjda tk li p d a Ill JIID MCclJ ia I ptlllcMls 1111aa ' ' - tvjc lal ID NICIIJ ud bnamul lvalJl alll int s - T Dinaani U rcspaaait k Car pctfMDVll iballed l 11L - -ud rc ionin ha lblhp pnt' ' Ulalllleali or u 11 i f• IT iP'm Ulll IDP'l'•inr 1 ••21- uf- y ip i - et i dtwmcnc• penioe d dis-- - ad f• i1J ilaplal uaaaiac • u 7 patlllL 111n1-si- 1h11 dndDpmaS pa m 11114 111a111 wilk mc -alft Y n r amiltk rat iu 1 v adn - • I• d iNl OI al lwliaJuliaD» o f RJ I 1M al'- - llvdcu ufq fw u _ Jpl r 11 u4 pciicdi all ' far tmlinr ' 'n-- tiwe Vii ds _ c • - •IJ - - m- 11 wis-d nlay WI Mi in 11f 1111 1 k nc bU liill - dumd widl m iwte cv _ misl s ' II pa Duclw 11 welapnc m F' l nl'L T ucmM Va-P III 1 spilllilllc l'ar ludialio• l s ud Tmiar ia a W far ffnia1 u4 Ila aa car wc r d ai111 111 ac al 1M I lllii a-f nwd AaaillJ _ ii 111 S y a IJI q icipi C iac s mJ i f d 11 'lu lls iir okiy p r s- Nu k u W f'DD S 1' 1 Sd'•tr c - ml Nm at E plo M Salary Sm dy S1rt17 i cdvhis sbaD m i amlnl I with dz - cir a ad ml aL 'J' p a -Jc Afdy 6r rip iD • - poa Jlftlpsm -S daa raa ia hall• rc 'lic S 1 - tt e cum 1 V m l'nsidals 1114 I b a DC Su ia Nwmal 1 amtarnri All Sl lll a N •aria lr u -1 q UYii i s JhaD Is madt•aad -S do m-•4 a • am tb tc c u - ll su u r- u 17' _ 1- A L l'n sil c t Sa»ia ialillu l ubu Nn o--- scn o U tal'ft IIWE CMOIJ 9 _ c n - Ill v f o•r 01 11 l f' 'ltn•• r ' -flt r -l oft •c I L- 1 ltn -n ii JO ic ow W '- t a ua u a1 -17 ll 19tJ 1ip d Irr _ r C IVni rz • L' C t af' ot 1 ri1 D i t Fsgurc 23 Sandia Nalianal Laboratories Policy Statcm nt for Weapon Nuclear Safety Assuranc --GFFl€tAt -USE ONLY i@ CRE i Ji R i OFFICIAL USE ONL¥ By the mid-l 980s the SE EA Dhision was auempting to rC -ise the DOE's proc«tural manual chapter for nuclear safety and Ted Dobry was insisting on con 'enmg 1he process co suit bis personal preferences Apparently he was alleging that the existing proced11res were inadequ11te in the mode of a ''whistle blowing campaign internal to the division The report on NASA's Challenger Accident provided a convenient impelUS or a politically correct excuse for him to hope th3t a management review of the DOE's safety management process would resolve the matter in his favor A study group was Conned wider contract with Paci fie Sierra Research Cnc•• to he led by one of its senior officers Gordon Moe embers of the group arc listed in Figure 24 - s p u1 ofmy im ng JS consultaru to Vice Prcsitlc nt of Technical Suppon 7000 Bob Peurifoy who served as the Ttthnical Advisor to the Moe Panel I drafted a strawman set of discussion topics for the study group Ref 132 Gordon Moc remarked later that the paper had been useful in sharpening the focus of lhe group as it prepared its briefing aids I don't know ff the group issued a formal report but I do know lhnt Gordon gave a series of briefings on the results throughout the DOE complex NOTE In my draft working paper for the Moe Panel Study Ref 132 1 discussed these matters and suggested ••Effectiveness of the NWC can be significantly enhanced by assuring that it will have a Standing Commiuee on s c and that the OOE's ADWPS nuclear safety principle be 3 11 observer at meetings of that committee '' The Moc Panel went even deeper with #2 below According to the Drell Panel Repon of 1990 discussed later the principal n conum ·ndalion of the Moe Panel in July 1988 may be summarized as follows I Emphasize responsibility of DOE line management for nuclear weapon safety and sln -ngthcn its ability to carry out this responsibility 2 Pro• -ide active top-level DOE leadership on safety issues Par1icular sl s to implement this leadership include assuming chairmanship of the NWC when c nnsidering safety issues and reating a 'Juel Weapon Council Weapons Safely Commiuee ·wcWSC to be chain d by ll1e DOE's Deputy Assistant Sccr lary for Military Applications DAS lA Ensure a broad bolanccd review and analysis of safety issues with substantive issues being elevated to the WC and with the Secretaries of OCID and DOE being kept lully infonncd 3 lfifl Ctr ··3 it ·illiPIDIJ IL I I§ t Ll 4 • ' -• DOE NWSHG C cil 5· 1 GROUP MEMBERSHIP REVIEW GROUP MEMBERS WIDE EXPERIENCE GOnllON O MOI Cl IAIRMAN TIIOMAS n CLAAIC 0 nlCl·IAAO N CODY l UGENI H EYSTER i j· GERALD W JOHNSON PHILIP A ODEEN IIOWAOD T STUMI ADVISER TO CIIAlnMAN C C i i' SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES TECMNICAL' ADVISER noaenT L PEUnJFOY WILLIAM L STEVENS CONSULTANT JJ 2 -C DOE DASMA EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 111c111rno N onoom ERIC IC MATSON PSA STAFF SUPPORT WILLIAM w CAnTlm J J ICELLY JUDY 1-fAMILTON - OFFICIAL USE ONbV 7 14 The Internal Review of Sandia's Practices for Raising Nuclear Safety Concerns 1989 On March 1 1989 Vice President Technical Suppon 7000 Bob Pcurifoy arranged for a board of inquiry drawn from Sandia's legal staffto detcnnine whether or not Sandia had adequately made known its nuclear safety concerns over tho years to appropriate federal government officials The briefing package prepared by Nuclear Safety Department Manager Jim Ney used three nuclear weapons to typify three eras of weapon development I Pre-1968 by the B28FI 2 lnterim Period by the W69 and 3 Modern by the WSO--all three weapons deployable wiLh the B-52 Ref 135 This effort a le a ' e Murder Board in my interpretation of the documentation since 1 was not involved is affinnation d1at Sandia bad discharged its fonnal obligations technical suppon and assistance fully and fairly in making known its concerns and additionally had perfonned special ••out-of-channel actions to bring safety-related concerns 10 the allention of high government officials Ref 136 The Jattcr cited especially the Annual Nuclear Weapons Surety Repon to the President as an example 7 15 The W69 SRAM-A Episode-My Real They Story 1988-1990 NOTE Of co' Jrse I realize that the events related here are subject to more than one interpretation DDd that I may not even have all of the story Nevertheless this version serves tu Hlustratc some aspects that might escape notice in a less opinionated treatment including the roles of deep personal commitment to a belief perseverance knowing how the ''system really works and the value o serendipity plus a leak to the media Figure 25 is a timelinc summary of safety-related events for the W69 SRAM-A taken from Ref 135 After noting a lack of response by the nuclear weapons community to addressing nuclear safety of the W69 SRAM-A weapon system Sandia Vice President Bob Pcurifoy by leucr of February 26 198 in' ited the DOE Assistant Secretary of Defense Programs ASDP Aeling Troy E Wade U to ammge for he Nuclear Weapon Council to visit Sandia for i briefing on c ncems about the s if ty of olc er weapons in the slockpile There was no reply On March 15 1988 Sandia President min Wclberrnet ' ith DOE Undersecretary ofEnergy J 1seph F Salgado and raised the safety concern as one of three issues Salgado commented hat he agreed ith the seriousm· ss of the concern and that both the Ser retary of Energy and Secretary of D fense should h i' 'e been brie red on the an mer Ht identified ASDP Acting Troy Wade 3S th appropriate action person There followed in 1988 an exchange of correspondence ber vc ell DOE ASDP Troy Wade and DoDIATSD A E Robert G Bob Barker that in retrospective cxuminaliun I must characterize as evasi c actions •' 1 0- -8FAelAL USE ONLY ·----· Sl lvl wG f divilicrn 11 ca· C 1 1 'I - 3° 1 ti T1 0 ' en i Q Scilely lniliCJUves iii' I 0 I iii iii Q in' en I 0'i C 2 • lUU ' l'ltan 3 1'tt'tla11111t11I Produc Uon 111 olo chpll• Phdll D 6 · Phusc G ·• rawlor q Crov_ u icrallWug Hr clallor111 yreor on urel l1l Sll'r Cruvn• lo cruvH orlc• 111111• same I C c l iJIIKIIO lo ltov M 0 C'ollor_ cull for olock11 i i udy 1t1pw Slocks 11• Sul•lY SlucJy IWO loat r lo I Wad llroi lla rc11arl 011 • lotkP D• mocJorulzollon SllAM A WGg t1111nr lu UrJul1011cl 1 ock1•tll•llk1r 110v•111•11l a uou rH lonH 1 11111rovml 11 11 1'''11u11 1u Wq • • 1oc J Wui le lo Orullon slot 1 1 iu 1rcw111l p II J Wuclt lo Hoov r Sanulo lv'tllod Son cot Cqmm brltl•cJ by ork• SAAM 1 WG'J L• ul b -lal• d by P1urlloy opllvn• J Wud brlaf1d by 011tk1 L1of lo J Wod1 Gllltr brltled by P•urlroy W69 opUon Looi brl• fecl by Pourlloy S11urk • o Lour 020 D63 OG WGB ntu l• or • oltly Po1Klloy lo lloonr WOO SAAM A 1 Wl lton lo llork11r lon9-1landlnv • lotkpllt l• tu11 · · D111kor rHponH lo Wl her Wooilru f brloltcl by M tnharcJVP1urlfoy S•II% GGI zel o l 5WJA A WGg alt olorl und• «O ' 101m1r brl•f•d IF DOE Raltoll Op lion • SluJr OUC'kll' r quHI Watkin Ch n• y lirl fod W lbor o J WaiJ• waopan 1uf1I ' T Wucl• lo Sorktr C 11 onso JonH lo l o'lonouoh rli1po•J• Barlt•r lo T Wull• S 4 1 t_Yl • • 5a1Qado lo Toi • ar• l ' unc• r111 19l 7 • lock h •ludt T Wud Q SAAM If 1 • •Y r • 9 I CoU r GnVH G Datktr 2 Slarblrd 7 Culp • pptt I I' • '° • r r 3 Hounr -1 Wagn •r sY tA B Twlnlnv 9 Mo• Cornmlllt s Wllhen - - ----IJ 1 Gol i g or 111z2 N 1 i 1§l ulnl1ol ool 1102 0JI 0 tlo5 o lozl oe a9l 9QI v119' ¥JJp-1l 01go rifil Sl AM rcplocc1nc11l m livilies Ph 2 Ph J Ce1111 1a11 Wulucnl IU U 51WA U ilCU D- I cuncolloll SUAM O larniinul•J l'lh t rh 2 l J j yuun WWII_ _ l J I I AsN 1 1- - - - - lormlm lecJ Ph 2 -llk• SIW t raflluc111na11l h ml11u acJ supanadecJ by MSM slucJr D- ID 1lurl1d Ph · MSM _ lermlnolocJ l'h 1 Mlnlmur11 u1111rucl•- WG9 - • lorrnlnolacJ f' U an•-y•ar •1111 l N5 • 1·001GJ16ii 1if i11tl11l7 tiJ11-1 11u 11ii1 7 ro 1rv1oti oi 102 -El t AJCu Alorl tnro t 3· 1· n G · o 1y ou o 02 JJl o• o i 00 01 00109 901 1192 9J1 1 1961 IGI ''IYO 1ii G7 @1 G9 7lll 11l12ffi 11·lil q n zii 79 0 01 iiinp@ li oz O ot go fj im3ffi 'ifiliGl fll¥D Wullk• slranv 111i7N 'ukLl1ili' • • t · G E lu1lan R• Ion •2 •J CAO R porl • •7 10 f nr as C DIICDJ I SIP se lon IF 00 fll•k Radu Uol Slu f il cb T1 - Gi'I oo jyl 10 111 nl 7JI 1- 1101 Pl1 2 Ph 2A sn M II - 1 Ph J nxx rr i 1 1 1 1 olii 1as • 87 as ii'volgj rz i3 is su iiuo 1 ii8 tE liPftOZ -OFFICIAL USE ONLY n mid-1988 the seemingly unrelated at least loosely related internal review of management practices for the nuclear safety program under the cognizance of the DOE Deputy Assistant Secrelary for Military Application DASM1 began The study was led by Gordon Moe a senior officer of Pacific Sierra Research Inc a contractor to DASMA for the study As the study progressed the issue of the W69 SRAM-A loomed more and more important in providing a definitive case for examining the overall program management weaknesses that becsme the essence of the Moe Panel's findings discussed in this report in an earlier section The result of the Moe Panel Study that bears most directly on the W69 SRAM-A is the following concluding thought Anention to safety has wan and we still have risks from weapons that will remain in lhe stockpile for years The potential for a nuclc ar weapon accident will remain unacceptably high until the issues that have been raised are resolved lt would be hard to overstate the consequences that a serious accident could have for national securily One of Sandia President Irwin Welber's final acts before Al Narath would return to Sandia from BTL to become the President on April l 1 1989 was to sign a letter e pressing Sandia's continuing concern about the failw-e of the national nuclear weapons community to adequately address the remaining principal nuclear safety deficiencies in the national defense forces At this time the W69 SRA vl-A issue was some 15 years old and had been active over Welber's threeyear tenure at Sandia Wclber s letter however was addressed to the relatively low-level official in DOE weapon program management Troy Wade IJ the Acting Assistant Secretary Defense Programs The draft letter presented to Wclberwas to be addressed lo a higher appropriate level the Undersecretary of Energy but W lber elected to soften the wording and lower the level-with the rationale that maintenance of good relationships with the immediate reporting level ASDP would be enhanced this way Wclber•s letter was not answered The nex t set of events io this episode was one of serendipity Senator John GleM D-OH was in New Mexico campaigning for re-election of Senator Jeff Bingaman D-1 M and the two plus some stnff were given a half-day set ofbricfings at Sandia on April 26 989 Senator Glenn reportedly became inh resced in Lhc thrust of Bob Peurifoy·s briefing on weapon safety and asked if newly appointed Secretary ofEnergy Jwncs Jim D Watkins• U S Navy Admiral Retir d had been brieted Senator Glenn remarked that be was soon lo be with Admiral Watkins far a visit to the DOE's Savannah River Plant and would take up the issue TWs upcoming event of course broke the tacit banicrs to information flow in 1he DO E and DoD 1hat the Wade-Barker faction sc mcd to have arrmgcd Gordon Moe was rehired under contract to briefSccrclary Watkins u nd Secretary of Defense Richard Dick C hency of 1hc- n w utministr tinn lr am NOTE My information is that Gurdon Moc specified thar Bob Pcmifoy must be present at the briefing At che tintc Pcuritby was on vacation in Texas and w is called to attcnc His boss Execmi ·e Vice President Lee Bra y declined to approve tht travel adv mc and President Al Nar nh Wililted Peurifoy 10 attend a Sandia Small Staff meeting th 11 day Pemifoy noutied Moe of inability to attend 16-4 -eFFIGIAt-USE-GNt ¥1lI 3 -•-n - ·s Gfll llffRI -OFFICIAL USE ONLY After some discussions President Al Narath approved the travel and Peurifoy attended In lhe fall of 1989 the Nuclear Weapon Council Weapon Safety Committee was formed to bring safety issues before the parent NWC The NWCWSC commissioned two safety studies transportation of nuclear weapons and deployment of the W69 SRAM•A By the charters written by Ca Chainnan DoD ATSD AE Bob Barker these studies had to be quantitative in nature with requirements to estimate specific probabilities of risk-in contrast to the qualitative judgments that had been rendered in a minority opinion by the DOE member of the joint DoD DOE nuclear weapon system safety study group lo the effect that the weapon system did not meet established standards for safety Ref 175 Jn practice study methodology for the W69 SRAM-A was an application of the fault tree analysis technique developed by the Boeing Company for the U S Air Force pages 73 and 74 and major parts of the studies were perfonncd by Probability Risk Assessment staff specialists at Sandia During the routine process in 1989 of prep uing Sandia•s input to DOFJDASMA for the DOE DoD Annual Repon to the President on Nucle u- Surety for 1988 Sandia slarT mt mber participants encountered a wall ofresistance to incorporating the W69 SRAM·A issue into the report the opposition coming from the junior officers of the military services assigned to the staffofDoD ATSD AE Bob Barker and ofDOE DASMA Troy Wade IL In the spring of 1990 the routine process oftestimoDi s by DOE Undersecretary of Energy and the three nuclear weapons laboratories' directors to the U S House ofRepresentatives and Senale committees and panels on anncd scmccs involved with fimding fur the nuclear weapons program featured questions on W69 SRAM-A safc ty addressed directly to laboratory directors Responses ofLLNL's Roger Batzc I LA i'lt's Sig Heckler and SNL's Al No rath indicated concern Y ilh the strongest expression by LLNL Several days later on May 25 1 1990 R Jeffrey Iefl SmHl1y Washington Post Staff Writer broke the story that lhc DoD had decided not 10 remove the SRAM-A weapon system from alert operational status recounted the testimonies oflhe laboratory directors mentioned the Special Safety Study not then complete and aired DOF DoD squabbles extant On June S 1990 the House Amtcd Services Comminee joined by the corresponding committee for the Scn ile impanelt d three eminenl physicisLo 5' lo evaluate the safety issues and provide advice Dr Sidney D Drell of Stanford Uni ·ersity1 Dr John S Foster Jr of TRW Corporation ind Dr Charles H Townes of University ofCnlifomia Berkeley The Drcll Panel Sid Orel became Chairman is discussed in a later section of this report On June S 1990 DoD Secretary Cheney ordered 1 mpor 1ry tlownlo3tling of the SRAM•A force pending outcome of the study in process As a result of Gordon Moc ·s frn tralions bout his inability to con 'incc certain audiences that Sandia's technical safo1y arguments on lhc W69 SR A -l-A w apon system wi rc vuli l and the matter was of serious nation i l concern Huward Stump and l as consultants wert tasked in midSi i Drdl w vs Dcrul · Dir ccor of the St nfoni l inc3r t cckr it r C i n1 r Clmhc Towne w is l 1'cbcl Laurc m ind JohMy fost r h1 ad d th Defense S 1cnc Da ird -8 FFI etAl -tfSE-Of ttY- 's IFCRili ifRi OFFICIAL USE ONLY June 1990 to provide supplementary examples ofim idents and controversies about nuclear safety that bad arisen over lhe ycan in order to better understand the situation On a highly expcdiced and abbreviated basis I drafted a document Ref 133 that summarized notable past disagreements in the nuclear safety ucna between Sandia's technical position and the position of agencies ofthe military services Almost as an afterthought 1added Part Casa possible explanation as to why wide divergences in assessments of safety risks can occur amoag otherwise objective and qualified persons wh-en prestnred with the same input data I was told rhat Gordon was appreciative of this document I know th it he renewed efforts 10 present the case In July 1990 the fonnaJ report of the Joint DoD DOE SRA 1-A Safety Study was issued It in essence affirmed quantitatively the earlier quantitative minority opinion finding of the Nuclear Weapon System Safety Study Group that nuclear safety was inadequate On December 9 1990 Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney made permanent the temporary ban on peacetime loading of the SRAM·A for strategic aircraft on alert that he had issued in June The final report of the Drcll Panel released on December IS 1990 acknowledged Chcney s action NOTE The prevalent notion that somehow the DOE weapons laboratories• directors triggered resolution of the issue is in my opinion nonsensical ln fact 0 anecdotal accounts suggest that they were considered themselves caught cold and that Al Naralh later claimed that he was blindsided '' In my opinion the W69 SRAM-A episode was resolved only at considerable personal costs Gordon Moe's zeal in advancing the argument to stand down the weapon system apparently drew displeasure among the military and militarycontract oriented This was a mainstream business of Pacific Sierra Research Inc where Moe was Vice President for its Washington DC office Gordon left the firm and entered post-graduate work at Boston University obtaining a MS in the artificial intellig nce field After two more years working in that fiel he rejoined Pacific Research as a staff member and is there today 7 16 The Panel on Nuclear Weapons Safety of the House Armed Services Committee The Drell Panel 1990 Summarization of the report of the Dre II Panel is beyond the scope of this report however some observations arc considered relevant 1 S66 The 49-page report Rei 134 is lhc first broadly based presentation of the national nuclear weapon s tfcty process in unclassified form easily a cessible to rhe public and thus tills a long-lime need Additionally the eminence of its authors in the U S scientific and governmcnral arena assured a wide audience bcc iusc of their findings A copy of lhc news rcleasl is included here as Appendix I QFFISIA-b-USE ONt ¥ • II I • 3 C 1iFRb OFFIGIAL USE ONLY 2 7 17 TI1e issue of 1he W69 SRAM-A deployment became moot during the study when the Secretary of Defense announced his decision to remove the weapon system from alert status on bombers of the Strategic Air Force Speculatively this would have een a recommendation in the report instead of being noted as an action of the government to take immediate steps to reduce the risk of unintended accidental detonations that could result in dispersing plutonium into the environment in potentially dangerous amounts or even generate a nuclear yield Creation and Replacement of the Nuclear Weapon Council Weapon Safety Committee NWCWSC 1989-1994 Over a year after the Moe Panel study was complet the recommendation to create the NWCWSC was implemented with the charge to bring saftty issues before 1he parent Nuclear Weapon Council The two special safety studies commissioned by the NWCWSC were noted earlier in the W69 SRAM·A section The NWCWSC was to be co-chaired by DoD ATSD AE and DOfJDASMA DP20 with members to include flag officers of each of the three military departments and the DOE Weapons Facilities Office DP·64 Advisors observers included the DoD Dcfensc Nuclear Agency DOE AL and the three DOE weapons laboratories Executive Vice President Orval Jones served as the Sandia Technica Advisor from 1989 until late 1991 when Al Narath Teorganized Sandia and created a Directoraae level safety office as treated in a later section here During this period Jim Ney served as Orv il Jones' close associate The NWCWSC operated for over five years 1n early 1994 the parent NWC considered combining its Standing Committee and its Weapon Safety Commiuec in the expressed interest of efficicncy although the fonnat was to hold two hour meetings of the NWCWSC once a month In the opinion of original NWCWSC DOE member Dr Richard D Hahn DP-64 this move woultl amount to emasculation of the weapon safely function His internal DOE m morandun1 dated January 4 1994 that gave a minority opinion in opposition to combination is contained as Appendix L 11 In Dr Halm 's and my ·iews the cwo early issues addressed by the N' VCWSC were handled on party lines where the potential vote situation for the arent NWCSC was 5-1 DoD over DOE with co-chair votes 6-2 with no option for a veto One of these issues was the W69IS 4-A c liscussed in detail earlier here and the other was nuclear weapon transportation The m·o issues Vere examim d by special safety studies chartered by the Co-Chairman DoD ATSDtAE Robert 8 Buh Barkt r Dr Bwkcr spL-cificJ that P1uual Jilis1k Rjsk Ass -ssmcul 1m thut lulugit mu I Le used to obtain quantitati •c estimates of risk-in direct opposition lo DOEts long-sta 'ldmg p lsition thal behavior of the weapon system hanlwarc was unpredictable and therefort not amc nnble to uch quantification The results of the W69 SRAM·A study discussed ina broader context earlier hcrt supported the DOE's concerns that s ifety was inadequa te l67 e 1 1 S a · - E S tEWFIU OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOTE For the W69ISRAM-A issue the DoD ATSO AE in l 989-90 essentially controlled the agendas of the high-level S1C management groups Bob Barker was Executive Secretary to the NWCSC- He was also co-chair ofits Weapon Safety Committee Barker's former colleague for LLNL's full-scale nuel ar testing program Troy E Wade rr was then Acting DOH Assistant Secretary for Ocfcrtsc Programs a roughly parallel level at DOE Review of attendance lists for NWCWSC meetings shows a trend toward lower and low le •els of igeney management involvements lnd d the modus operandi· essentially became that of action officer -a long-standing DoD Pentagon practice Sandia's representation wu lowered two levels when newly appointed director Richard L Dick Schwoebcl replaced Orval Jones and his technical advisor level dropped when Stan Spray replaced Jim Ney as principal support Neither Scbwoebcl nor Spray had experience in nuclear safety policy issues In the latter several years Sandiareprescutation tended to be handled by a Sandian Jiving in the Washington D C area on a special assignment other than safety In brief the NWCWSC did not enjoy consensus as to need at workin levels being seen as a policy decision imposed by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy NOTE My opinion on this reorganization and ensuing changes is I hat the S 2C management review process took a tum toward becoming seriously ineffective The concepts of independence in view and deep immersion in S1C technologies became essentially missing at the table as histoty tells us will be the trend when S C concerns are mixed with and made subordinate to other seemingly urgent and compelling tasks in the overall weapons program Operator and programmatic dominance was inevitable fronically one of the U S Anny action officers for the nuclear safety committee activities oftbe NWC was the same Joe Luger who had been most obtrusive and vehement in his opposition ro DOE roles in safety some 15 years earlier sec page 1 25 The combination of committees accurred in mid-1994 7 18 DoD DOE Joint Policy Statement on Nuclear Weapons Surety 1991 Sevcr il months after rosolulion of the W69 SRAM-A saf ty issue the Secretari of Defense and Energy that had been directly in 'olvcd Dick Cheney and James Watkins cosigned the joint policy statcm1 Jlt on S C given b1 low This stalcmcnt fulfilkd the firs half of Recommendation 7 of the Drcll Panel ·'The Sccrclarics should issue rt joint policy dirccti 'c emphasizing the importnr ce of safety and security dimensions of our nuclear we ipon systtms in the new postCold-War wprld and fonnulating an appropriate strategy for redressing satety concerns in the existing stockpile in a timely manner by C mbination of retirements improvements and de 'elopment of new weapon systems l jS -0 FFIGtAl -l JSE-GNf -¥• • ' '• j I '• · BOite IJF R _ OFFICIAL USE ONLY Joint Policy Statement on Nuclear Weapons Surety The policy ar the Department of Defense and Energy is to support the national security of the United Stales through developing and maintaining an effective nuclear deterrenL Nudear weapons and nuclear weapon systems require special consideration because of their policy implications and military importance their deslructive pcwer as well as the potential consequences of an accident or unauthorized act Thetefore safety security control and effecUveness of nuclear weapons are of paramount importance to the security of the United Stales In developing and maintaining the nudear deterrent the Departments of Defense and Energy wlll jolnUy preserve the publlc trust by protecting the pubr c health safety and the environment Therefore nuclear weapon system safety security control and the effectiveness will continue lo be evaluated throughout the entirety or each nuclear weapon system's lire cycle Our Departments remain dedicated lo protecting the security of the Nation in a manner consistent wilh health sarety and environmental needs Source Ref l 38 NOTE In April 1991 Robert L Bob Pcurifoy Jr Vice President Facilities 7000 retired age 60 7 19 Formation of Sandia's Nuclear Surety Directorate Center 1991 rn late 1991 less thwt three years after he returned from yea rs at Bell Telephone Labontorics to become President of SNL Al Nara th decreed a sweeping organizational change that even todny remains in place but appears to have csscnlially no visible support This change was to eliminate one of Sandi 1's six levels of technical supervision-a move that in concept that long had heen seen as needed and prudent Nurath however apparently personally ovcrrultd counsel to eliminate the tcvcl of Director that was intennediat between Department and Vice President in thl l1ii aarchy uf Divisiuu Dcpwl1m nt Din -cto1 Vice President Executive Vice President and President Instead he climinal d Department Manager OTE Since 1969 Sandia's pro 7Tam managcr 1cnl and financial accounting cast sys1cm hat l been buih around the role ofDcpartm nt Manager I devoted sc vcr l years to the conception and implementation of the case system and knew the details lin lltand Fortunately in my view the end of the Cold War and ' 4 · OEG H hi it OFFIGIAL USE ONL¥ subsequent cessation of dc ·clopmcnt of ocw weapons precluded a management disaster that would have seriously cndnngered the future of Sandia-and perhaps aJl of the laboratories Jim Ney who had replaced me in 1985 as Manager Kuclear Safety Department had his nuclear safety specialization ended when Narath chose an existing Director to head a new organization to be called the Surety Assessment Center 300 In order to continue in safety Jim was demoted ond became a Division Supervisor renamed Depanment Manager Ph D scientist Richard L Dick Schwoebel was assigned to lead the Center perhaps in recognition of his splendid performance in leading Sandia's investigation of the probable cause of the bigh-exploiive shell premature detonation accident aboard the U S Iowa battleship in 1989 Dick bad no weapon development or other safety experience having been a scientist in materials research most of his c11recr NOTE I was astonished upon observing that the Surety Assessment Center was a flat organization with some 16 departments reporting to the Director Surely that defied concepts of span-of-control in lcchnical management 7 20 Unfettered Studies of the Elements of S2C 1990-1994 Concurrently with the generation of proposals for revising DOE and OoD nuclear SJC standards discussed below Sandia conducted a set of internal studies on each of the elements of S C All were undertaken under Dick Brodie's leadership with this notion of taking 311 unfettered' unrestrained view of what requirement statements might devolve from a high-level goal The study encouraged mer ibers to do brainstorming ''innovative and out-of-the-box lhinking To me the positive results indicate that this was a wise choice The downward cascading devolution would lc ad to end-requirements from which the enabling technologies would be identified The loop would be closed by demonstration that the concepts implemented would meet the requirements The goai was to make the unintended event e g a nuclear detonation be virtuaJly impossible The first unfettered study was on command and control It was sponsored by Sandia' Surety Guild end was completed on September 30 1991 The second Uch study was on nuclear safety and was completed on October 28 1992 The third such srudy nn physical security was 1mder way in spring 1993 but I have no further documentation The final study to consolidate L'le three into a single integrated set of requirements is outlined in files of Dick Brodfr that I obtained only r ently Ref 125 All studies featured the twopart combination standard concept that l describe nc I 7 21 Proposals for Revisions to DOE and DoD Nuclear Safety Standards 1990-Date The c •cnts described here lor proposing rcvis1ons 10 the governing DOE and DoD slandnrds for the nuclear weapon system SJfcty evaluation processes began in lall -1990 in aftermal 1 or the V691SRA M ·A episode dcsrribcd earlier The di lemma arose over the tradcoffs between the DOE' design-safety features prescnl in a particular nuclear wc 1pon or vcapon system and lhe 170 -OFFIGJAl -U5E-eNtv- l iJ i J _1 ft DoO's operational deployment configuration that could impose severe environments on the nuclear weapon ntitics l was not involved in any wa y but became aw31'C that studies had been under way before June 1994 when became a consultant for Dick Schwoebel Director of Surety Assessment JOO This account is drawn from files of Dick Brodie and Clyde Layne that l rcc e ntly obtained and have incorporated into lhc Nuclear Safety fnfonnation Center files The reasons to revise standards were identified by Dick Brodie 3S • • • • Military expressed unhappiness that stringent accident prevention and accident mitiga1ion measures etc don't contribute to mc eting standards Not all undesirable events seem to be Jddrcsscd m the current standards Interpretation of current standards vary by group and by individuals within a Mroup Systems passed by safety groups were later judged to be U113Cceptablc He tbtn identified what revised standard should do as • Be unambiguous in their meaning and intent • Be explainable and understandable to a ride audience including those insiJc and outside the weapons surety community Address all undesirable surety events Be reasonably aligned with expcctalions of those in high d'--cision-making positions Allow consistent and repeatable application Be achievable by existing weapons weapon systems • • • • The abo 'e was followed by this sentence Differences between DOE and DoD sl lndards should be based on common aensc and be explainable '' Sometime in 1990 Dick Brodie conceptually fonnulated a novel i nd brimant simplifying notion that promised lo resolve the problem areas in nuclear weapon system S1C He would replace the existing single-part standards that addressed only prevention of prescribed unintcmlctl events C e g 3 nuclear icld with two pan stamlanls th it addressed both prevention ancl mitigation of sc ·erity of the ictions th3l could cause thi prescribed unintended ·enr to occur md the cvc nt its lfin the same w iy forth exisrin sbndard He explained the ration3le for the two pan approach 3S follows • • Align the s1andards as close to the re il decision-making process as possible In general if the decision-making process finds th u l um nt dcsign 'u a e •f WC3po11 weapon S '5tem i accep1ablc for continu d opl ration llu n the va umic'lfl pmcess using the standards should ret1C l rhaf the Wl' apon vc tpo11 i-yslcm m c ts the st tmlJr ' s fNote this 11uy n quire an ·· 1s currently hcing dcplo ·cll'' Jr other qualifo rs I 71 t s -a - 1' iil 'll WPft f OFFICIAL USE ONLY • • r a wcupontweapon sys1- rn is found to be deficient in one pan of a standard but has sufficient compensating lttributes in the other part to offset the Jcficiency then the weapon weapon system wou Id meet the tandard If a weaponiweapon system is found lo be deficient in one part of a standard but is found to meet lhe standard through compensating attributes in 1he other part there should be provisions in the implementing directive requiring a plan program lo address the deficiencies Note this provision should be kept completely separate from rhe evaluation process · NOTE The material in the paragraphs marked by a squ3re above are from visual aids of Dick Brodie dated Fcbru uy 23 1993 As has been developed earlier in this report the most effective ways ofinflucncing conduct of DoD opc rations bas proved to be by thing corresponding DOE operntions e g weapon transportation and by encouraging DoD to adopt similar mc35Ures On June 23 1992 the DOE Defense Prognun's S1C Committee tasked n working group to propose S3C standards that would npply to DOE orders and then modify them as needed for proposal for those DoO operations considered by joint DOE DoD aHJWments The working group was chaired by the newly ere ired DOE Weapons Safety office at headquarters DP20 1 ind members were appointed for DOE Al DOE NV DOE SAN ond from the weapons laboratorits Dick Schwoebel was the Sandia member with dirc ct support from Dick Brodie and Clyde Layne By early 1993 two conJlicting positions had developed and hardened 10 the point of becoming im concilablc by further working group negotiations DOE HQ and SNL proposed a version bused on two-part standards and implementing guidance DOE Field Otlices AL NV and SN LLNL and LANL proposed a v- rsion based on single-part stand ird- each of which must be met no combinntion of parts and on a narrow definition of use control includes only intended mode use Furthermore lha DOE AL member Ben Corley and others asserted that the DOE HQSNL proposal ' vill shut down the weapons complex Both propoS3ls were presented by DOE HQ for resolution by the S'C Committee After inaction Dick Schwoebel by a lener t ud April 14 199-4 to DOE DP20 1 Dr James M Turner DoD 'OASMA We3pons Surety Office DP-20-1 propos d re-opening considcr mon oflhat propos 11 Did Brodie passed away on - larch 19 l 99 and Dick Schwochcl retired on October J 1995 NOTE This experience sc cms In aflim1 the obser 'alion that 1 made in May 198S just prior to relirem«ml that rhc S C Committee ·as d volving from high lc el 111anag mcnl membl rship to micldlc-lcvcl representation l¢nvms il void for the fonncr R f 193 4 0 In I1 8 i Cungrcss crcatcJ the Odens uclear Facilitic Saiet · Bo tCd CDNFSB to proviJc • rsi ht cxll mal to lhc DOE for the DOE's ddense 11ucl 1r facilities e g nuckar material pw cssing planls such as S 1 - mnJh Rh·cr The impetus was the increasing number oipubl c 1 _ --OFRG Ab-USE ONl -Y a I • ' ill 'T a ifHlEY fft l OFFICIAL USE ONLY health and safety iss11Cs that accwnulated at aging defense nuclear facilities'• especially at Rocky Flats The DNFSB as an independent organization was placed within the Executive Branch to provide advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Energy and an annual report to the Congress By summer 1989 lhe President had nominated and the Senate confirmed fi •c members l John T Conway Chairman engineer and attomC JCAE Staff 'S6-'68 1 Con Ed Co C70-'78 2 John W Crawfo Jr Memba no informalion on background 3 Joseph J DiNunno Member engineer naval nuclear power reactors AEC SNAP 4 1 Eggcbbcrger Vice Chairman nuclear reactor and fuel cycle earthquake engineering 5 Herbert John Cecil Kouts Member nuclear reactor safety research including AEC andNRC Notably none of the five had any prior involvement in weapon development or produc ion either conventional or nuclear Nuclear safety experience cited ic official bibliographies really meant nuclear reactors or nuclear fuel cycle safety By means of Recommendation 93 l of January 21 19931 the DNFSB four years later in effect expanded its charter to include ·•nuclear explosive safety '' i e by including facilities that assemble disassemble and test nuclear weapons notably the Pantex Plant In particular the DNFSB focused on the DOE orders for nuclear safety and quality assurance it these facilities especially DOE Order 5610 10 Appanmtly the DNFSB's criterion would be to ensure that operational safety of Pantcx would be commensurate with that of nuclear materials facilities such as Savannah River With this event the auempts over the years within the ERDNDOE to replace the nuclear weapon systems safety practices dcscn'bcd in this report with practices that I attribute to nuclear fuel cycle interests to include the Nuclenr Regulatory Commission and the National Research Council of the National Academy ofScience may have become moot Time will tell 7 22 Revisions of DOE Nuclear Explosive Surety Standards 1995-1996 As view the record the D FSB's Recommendation 3-1 applied pressure 10 DOE organiz itions to break lhc 1993 stalemate on revision of its nucleM safety orders tl at 1 h w discussed ln July I995 DOE AL reissued its AL SD 5610 10 11 to include a Vl rsior of the two-part surety standarJs that had bt -en dcbati J before the DOE 'DP's s c group in 1993 On April 29 1996 DOE DP followed with replacement of its ordcrs DOE 5610 10 with DOE 0 452 l that included two-point surety standards similar but not identical' to DOE AL's DOE 0 452 1 which contains these standards ·0FFl€tAl USE ONLY 2 JdJ t I I r 17 l t CAliif6FA OFFICIAL USE ONLV • Nuclear Explosive Surety Standards All DOE nuclear explosive operations sl aJl meet the followin_g qualitative surety standards to prevent unintended nuclear dctonition fissile material dispersal from the pit or loss of control There shall be positive measures to I Minimize the possibility of accidents inadvertent acts or authorized activities that could lead to fll'C high explosive dcflagration or unintended high explosive detonation · · 2 Minimize the possibility of fire high-explosive det1agration or high explosive detonation given accidents or inadvertent acts 3 Minimize the possibility of deliberate unauthorized acts lhat could lead to high explosive deflagration or high explosive detonation 4 Ensure adequate security of nuclear explosives 5 Miaimize the possibility of or delay unauthorized nuclear detonation Several observations from these experiences arc relevant to this report l Brodie's two-part combination standards concept in essence is an expression of the Probabilistic Model Positive Mea llll 5 methodology that Dick Smi Bob Luna and I developed for- the 1973-1977 study of ERDA AL•s nuclear weapon transportation operptions page 105 only without the trappings of probability assignments 2 The contest to adopt them was abandoned at a relatively low level of Snndia and DOE management There is no record of Sandia support beyond Director Dick Schwocbel although Vice President Roger Hagengrub r was kept iofonned of progress and J endorsed Brcdic's concept The DOB's orders covering nuclear safety now include standards on all elements of S1C but the DoD's standanfs remain essentially as conceived in 1960 NOTE The OOE's fifth standard on plutonium dispersal adopted in 1990 is essentially the one that 1 had suggested to an AEC study group in 1969 page I 03 and Dick Brodie and 1 had suggested to Glen Otey for inclusion in DoD standards in 1984 page I SIJ 7 23 Nuclear Weapon Safety Flies In the Nuclear Safety Information Center 1993 In miu-1993 as commltanl to Glen Otey I began a project to locate and index Ute documents on S1C thll I had written or had filed nt lhc time th 1l I he filing system was being converted front the several sys1ems maintained hy department secretaries to the ccntralizc l Kudcar Safety lnfonnntion Center co ccived by Stan Spray This effort produced suggestions for crossindexing such that users can easily lind documents that they recall only by sumc key words buzz words lr pcl phr tscs and to provide enhanced continuity as more and more users retire Refs 139 17 t ·OFFl AL USE ON-I ¥ I • ·1 •l I I SI I I I • • • d ·a eneTJFA OFFIGIAL USE ONLY and 140 Additionally I compiled a list of the documents that 1 had originated contributed to or otherwise considered important in the Nuclear Safety lnfonnation Center NSIC collection Ref 141 Finally I prepared a memo that listed the documents 13 in number that 1 would recommend for persons seeking to better understand the nuclear weapon and weapon system safety discipline and processes Ref 142 Dick Brodie's treatise was the first on that list 1 later collected the timetines and related graphics on S2c which l had used OVCT' the years into a single document Re£ 1SJ A few ye later l received a telephone call from someone in the Secretary of Energy's office inquiring if 1 knew anything about the involvement of the Danish g vemmcnt in the Thule nuclear we3pon accident of 1968 described the Nuclear Safety Information Center NSIC tiles knowing that lhc rc were reports on Thule filed there and suggested they contact the Nuclear Safety Information Center NSIC asset that they in essence owned Later I was told that the report needed was quickly identified and acquired in Washingtonprecluding the nec d to set in motion an expensive investigation 1 consider the matter of these suggestions as incomplete at this writing 7 24 Use of Probabillstlc Risk Assessment PRA Techniques in Nuclear Weapon Safety 1994 During one ofmy visit to Sandia for consultation with Glen Otey in mid-1994 a staffmember in the Surety Assessment Center 12300 who had worked in my department over a decade tarlier expressed concerns about a document on nuclear weapon safety lhat was being circulated for comments 35 a draft with final publication imminent The document w the report of the Surety 2000 Safety Working Groop some 6 i 11divid11als within the DOE 17 SNL 9 LANL 2 LLNL 2 DoD D A 1 some other organizations that I didn't recognize S and its two principals Captain U S Navy David Olson DOE DP-20 l Chninnan and David Carlson SNL assigned to DOE DP-20 I OTE 1 do nc-t mince words here in order to best t xpress my reaction to lhc Surety ' 000 report Ref 143 in the context of the totality of this report The first draft was anotha blatant end-run around the S1C assessment process that was evolved at SNL ovc r the years in an attc mpt to have the author•s preference · advanced In this case the preference was for Probabilistic Risk Assessm nt 1 chniques used in the nuclear fuel cycle field to replace the SNL lcchniqul s bas1 d on first principles positive measures etc The proposal could have 1t suht ll in technical direction being imposed on the we tpon labor -uories bf DOE hcaJquarters staff It would rn 1 ke dcfensihility' in peer reviews the main thrust of assessments to replace in po rt SNL 's rcli u cc on ••indcpcnclt nt assessments by t1 chnical Slaffdeeply immersed in the relevant 1cchnologies There arc of course oth r points of 'iew ext int on Surety woo ind Lhe value l' r PRA that co n be accessed in Directorate 12300 '· ·OFFf£-fAl -tfSE-6Nt'r a1 I rz· • 17-i •fl i8AiWFll t OFFICIAL USE ONLY l was insulted by the statement that I knew to be faJse ' •• while probabilistic risk as essment and olhcr techniques for quantitative assessment have been developed and applied for many ycnrs in other fields their application to nuclear weapons is relatively new With Glen Otey's support l drafted a set of presentation aids transparencies and annotated notes to document the use of quantitative risk assessment techniques in the nuclear weapons program from 1955 to 1985 my retirement year J reviewed but did not address in my presentation aids the internal SNL decision by SNL President Al Naralh in December 1989 to conduct a six-month TCview of the applicability of PRA to nuclear weapon system safety Ref 144 and the reports on that work I met with Glen Otey Dave Carlson and Dick Schwoebcl in Glen's office to express my views Later I made a presentation using the aids lo a staff audience which included invitee Dave Olson who by then had retired and was on-roll at SNL Ref 145 7 25 SNL's Input to the Annual Report to the President on Nuclear Weapon Surety 1994 In a consultation session with Surety Assessment Center Director Dick Schwoebel I detected a sense of frustration about the decreasing value of the Annual Surety Report to the President in infonning senior governmental officials on the sbte oisic in the national stockpile The process of coordinating the preparation of SNL•s input had become to me an essential way of focusing SNL technical management at least once a year on SlC issues and of advancing the issues that survived internal rC 'iew to DOE Headquarters for review adoption or revision and coordination with the DoD agencies 10 produce a joint agency n port Jim Ney had continued the process and seems to have made it even more inclusive within Sandia Figure 26 summarizes evolution of this process After review ofSNL's correspondence with DOE Headquarters on this subject I draftc d a set of presentation aids transparencies and annotated notes to document the histocy of Sandia's involvements in the annual report from 197610 1994 The 33-page document is Ref l46 NOTE I had made the annual report process 1 personal crusade to involve SNL management in S1C by drafting the initial input and circulating it within SNL DOE AL and DOE OMA with iterative drafl and cover letters that addressed the comments received When 1 took stock of the success of this venture Ref 150 I treated it as a failure except for interest and involvement on the part of a few Bill Myre Bob Peurifoy and Orval Jones at SNLA and Don Gregson at SNLL Am•lh iniciative was 10 make quadrennial report - in years coincidental with Presidential ckctions be a melded inter-lab and DoDfDOE slalr mcnt It failed due to lack of support h could ha1 •e become countcrproducth at the DOEiDOE action officer lc ·el anyhow Fom1cr influential member of the Air Forcc·s Dircctor itt'-of Nucl r Safety at Kirtland AFB and an a qu iimancc of mine Colonel Jim Greening then at ATSD AE S3W our draft as a big brother·· appro ich 1 suggested that the 1988 annual repon could reinstitute this approach if it by thctt could h ivc S C Committee suppon 176 ·-OFFletAI USE ONI ¥- _ _f C ltE hPRD OFFIGIAL USE ONLY Intra-DOE 50 DoD OOE National Polley 52 54 - 56 - 58 - r- I SM Ted Ad¥bofs T S'ytle n SalllY _KIii RtpOl1 MF7 TDnO AEC s i y I 60 JCAE Tnp Eanlpe 'BO OoO Dir 50 0 15 62 - _ 513 DMO 10 AEOOMA 511• - USAM 1tl0 84 11 13- NSAM272 66 - - SM s•rvai FonNd 68 - TI SHI Saltly Oeslf FOf ll'd wt S r -- 70 72 2'3 na 76 T 78 - 80 I ERDA bt CIClffldS DOE 1117 - - QoDIDOE MOU 86 - 88 - s'c - ' I NWC Fot1r4'd - WSC ol NWC r-atm - - DCE Nuc c II Prog Mgl S11 ' fy ' MOE SluO'f T ullQp - N tl S111 Otietsllln Dir 30II - -I Pt ld1111'S Bk -e Ri'l bo11 7 00 I II - Nat SIIC Oec Dir t SC ° • 1 'M S R'14 rf JF Ney I 90 96 T 7 15 •Smftllnr Sllldy 84 94 Dkll AVfn Y Attca ERDA OoO SE EMlMA Fofflltd I 82 - ·•AECbOCDA s ER a dNRC l DOE A f l 1100 I ERO lw'DoD ltanslet Slu01 i 1 - OoOIEAOA Arvalal ' SNl lr pillll 2nd EADA Repa 1 NSDM5 12 1' -NSCMIII 74 - 92 sAMSI _ WLS lo Sf Safaly ltCIO j I - • WSC C lnt nc h M NWC St 11 C Ccn I lHASC P anet on tl c V e 1C1 • I Orv P rfl TtoOit OE Joinl l clley 114 li Sl iltn'le I O'INlldeatW ap l s TNi Jo nl Advis Commd i o l i Vlt aoon 'Sfcu• r ' Figure 26 Time-Line for Evolution of the Annual Report to the President on Nuc ar WcJpons Surety ·E FFICtAl -USE ONtY · pl J l I ' · ' I J orrUSIZv 7 26 The Drell Peurifoy Paper on Technical Issues of a Nuclear Test Ban 1994 Just as the Drell Panel Report of 1990 Ref 134 effectively described the national process for nuclear safety the Drcll Pcurifoy paper of 1994 Ref 147 describes the teclmical aspects of nuclear weapon safety reliability and verification in lhe context of proposals for a comprehensive ban oo nuclear weapon testing was honored to review in late draft lhe sections on nuclear safety and note that my summary of nuclear weapons accidents WIIS included as Table f I will not speculate or omment on the impact that the paper has had already in national-level debates and Presidential decisions on nuclear testing-or rnay have in the upcoming debates on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty History may record that the paper was the cornerstone of evolution of lhc concept or-•stockpile stewardship that became the justification for support of the national nuclear weapons program after the Cold Var I believe this will happen 7 27 Sandia's Surety Heritage Report 1995-1997 I learned about this project ro conduct two-hour interviews with 17 senior statesmen and current surety leaders with the goal 'to understand the essential element of Sandia's surety heritage and its implications for future surety programs almosc by accident In late 1995 Bob Peurifoy agreed to participate in this project that apparently had been initiated by Dr Laura R Gilliom who bad been assigned program management and funding functions for surety-related work at Sandia After being interviewed and responding to a set of sttuctural questions Bob apparently suggested that I be included in lhe list of interviewees and so informed Laura That inclusion didn't bnppen By mid-1996 1 bnd extended my consultant arrangement at Sandia to have periodic liaison sessions olm William C Bill 1' ickell the recently appointed Director or the Surety Assessment Center 12300 Bill showed me a notice for a seminar to present a synthesis of the findings of lhe group that had conducted the interviews Bill was astonished that l had not been contacted and remedied that situation promptly The seminar was postponed 311d five interviewees were added to the list- including Jim Ney and me 1 was then immersed in the process of reviewing drafts of the Sandia General History book but took this interview is higher priority--the two projects being somcwhar complementa y however 0 I provided a handwritten 29-page response to the set of questions and much later had these typ1 l and documented Ref 148 l especially enjoyed lhe exercise of identifying J 1 n13Jor events and issues in s c that l bclic 'c wt 1c most i111po1tJ ut--and the individuals who were the rr ain co1ttributor5 I was most pleased with the report on the project Ref 149 which I received l ue in 1997 ind read as I finished the lirsl draft of this rcpon commend all who contributed J7S -0FAetAL USE ONtV- 7 28 Review of S2C Sections of Draft Chapters Sandia General History Project 1995-1996 As consultant to Glen Otey 4100 and Bill Nickell 12300 reviewed several ver ions of drafts of the chapters of the Sandia General History book and provided detailed comments The comment that bear on S 2C arc contained in References l S4 through 157 Additionally drafted two lengthy volumes on overall SNL history thal coot am sections on all three elements ofszc Reference 1S1 covering 1956-65 under the title of Dtn1eloping the Natio11al Nuclear Weapon StocJ pile and Referenc-e 152 covering 1996-70 under the title T7re Level-ofEffort Yea Almost all oftbe information on S1C in these two documents is also included as text in this report under spcc ific topical headings Also for the history project I collected the unclassified timclincs that I could locate on S2 C and some R D management topics in one volume Reference 153 filed in lhc Nuclear Safety Information Center NSIC 0F-FICJ-AL USE ONLY 179 sea cc 111H10 ·OFFICIAL USE ONLV This page intentionally left blank -OFFIGIAL USE--ONLY 1 t t ·• • •' ··o· ZJII QRtiiit C OFFIGIAL USE ONLY 8 REFERENCES I Funnan Necab Smidia ational Laboratories The Postwar Decade U l ni ·ersity of New Mexico Press Albuquerque NM 1990 858 pages tN 1865 1 2 CFRD Draft Working Paper Early Evolution of the Nuclear Weapon Safety Program 1950s and 1960s U W L Stevens Consultant to SNL 6 87 89 pag 4V 446 l UNC version is also filed 3 QUO Draft Working Paper On lhc Division of Resporw bilities Between the AEC and the OoD for Fuzing ofNuclear Warhe ids Used on Guided Missiles md Rockets 1950-1953 U ' W L Stevens SNL October 1984 45 pages lN 262 1 4 OUO Draft Working Paper On Evolution of the AECJDoD Agrcemi nt on Dc ·elopment Production and Standardization of Atomic Weapons of March 1953 lJ W L Stevens SNL September 1984 39 pages IV 3373 S Hewlett Richard G and Francis Duncan Atomic Shield 1947 1952 Vol D ofa History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission The PcMsylvaoia State University Press University Parle PA 1969 IN 1812 I S 6 Hewlett Richard G and Jack M Hall Atoms for Peace and War 19S3-t 961 Vol D ofa History ofthe United States Atomic Energy C Ommission University of California Press Berkeley CA 19S9 lN 1812 2 7 Defense Special Weapons Agency 1947-1997 The First 50 Years of National Senice OSWA Alexandria VA 1997 34 pages lN 3631 1 8 SRD Repo •·Proceedings of the Atomic Weapon Safety Board U FC 05570001 RSJ46 J 2491 S 10 57 rv 2888 1 9 SRD Letter Hon D A Quarles Deputy Secretary of Defense ro Hon LL Strauss Chainnan AEC Q•6934S subj Weapon Safety 1 29157 Nor located after extensive research in DOE and DoD Sec Rc f 17 1O SRO Letter I L McRa President Sandia Corporation to K F H Ttfocd tgr EC-A LO RSl l046 subj Weapon Safety 8128 S7 Sec Rcr 17 11 SRD Letter J_ L ' fcR3e Pre idcnt S india Corp • co K F Hertford Mgr • EC-ALO RS1 1054 subj Weapon S3fcty I li 0 57 Sec Ref 17 12 SRD Letter J W McR ii President Sandia Corp to K F Hertford Mgr AEC-ALO RSl I068 subj V aponSa fcty 119 58 SeeRct 17 I - SRD Len r J W McRae Prc iclcnl Sanilia Corporation to K F I-fort ford Mgr • t1 EC LO RS I 1158 subj V apon S 1fc1y 9 15 SS See R f 17 I•• SRO Mt mo D I Olson S L-15 IO to Distr buti ln RSI 5111 li 1 6i sub_j· i uclear Safety I '3 '71 I pages IV J3 1r 15 15 roster John S Banquet Speech Hi h Consequences Operations Sat ty Symposium 11 i l 7 Q-31 9i I -USli I --eFFICIAL USE ONt V- 6 ISi ' J j fo · OFFICIAL USE ONLY16 IJNC Memo W J Howard SNL 2 to A Nmth SNL-SOOO subj S3fety Polley P r NWCC's Requat 8 l 78 2 pages l V 3222129 17 SRD Report A Survt y of Nuclear Weapon Safety Problems and the Possibiliti s for fncrcasing Safety in Bomb and Warhead Design U prepared by Sandia Corporation with the advice and assistance oftbe Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory and the University of Calitomia Ernest 0 Lawrence Radiation Laboratory RSJ466 26889 SC-4241 TR 5129 4V 452 l 18 SRO Report On the Risk of an Accidental or Unauthorized Nucl nr Detonation U Fred Charles Ude' et 31 • U S Air Force Project RAND 1U A-22Sl RS3466 l 1382 10 15 5S ' IV 3409 1 19 Reference not located at this writing · 20 SRD Letter N E Bradbury Director LASL to BGen A D Starbird USAEC DMA OIR-1619 subj POPCORN _p3raphrased side 10 10 60 21 SRO Report ''Feasibility Study of a Strap•On Weapon Denial System U SNL sc OR 68-685 10 68 lV 1977 1 22 UNC Timeline ''Nuclear Weapon Destruction Disablement or Denial Bvoluiion U · W L Stevens I0 13 80 S pages 1V 3860 2 23 SRO Draft Report The Early History of PAL Code Management for Nuclear Weapons U Gustavus J Simmons SNL SAND77-IOl3 RS5120 l 13 3 19 78 1V 3373 12 24 Nuclear History Program Oral History Tr inscript #2 An NHP Interview ' ith Donald R Cotter NHP 135 pages 12 18 90 25 SRO Report Sandia Corporation's Role in Nuclear Weapon Safety U W D Buchly 1532-1 RS71' 3 104 7 63 IN 1990 1 DRLf TID 27 SRO Report Nuclear Wenpl n Safely U SC·-'630 Sa nuia Corpornlion with the cciop r tion of LA '1L and LRL RS3423 717 10 ti 1 IV 1971 1 28 SRO Report ''Some Cammcnls for JHEG Guidclini s 'tl '' Robcn R Brownlee Los Alamo Scientific Lab Jr itot • Original 8 J J 67 as 1-l 567-021 Rc ·facd 812-'IGS as JOK-68-17 RS314S-l l 01039 1V 3346 13 19 SRD Rl port ' npon System D sign Pr ictice U '' A R Mand ll and S D Spray SNL-7t 13 SCRD I0-6J RS3• 23 l 1-l0 April 19 3 5S p ges 4V42S I 30 not JI t NC Drnft Working P ip r ' Blackh ming' -A Ri vhm or dvi -rsary Simul ttinn Acti 'ities in 1 uclc 1r 'capon Use Conrrol Progrlms lt Sandia N 1tion3l l 1bnr uori s '' William L S1 n r s Si' L· 1 30 I Iii 7 '3 I 53 pa6cs f 2 W t SRO P pl r ··At 1 litional Th'tn gh1 on 'Nud ar apon Control R X Brodie RS-i300179 101 I F S 19 1V 3 iJ 1 c us- d - · 9 Eli st 2 r If S@ G JF a 11 1 i TfJRI OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3 UNC Memo 0 R Corter SNL-100 to Director subj Ad H c Committee to Dctcnnine SLA Efforts in ESAP Computer Progr un Development 3 l 3 69 1VS 49 34 UNC TrcatiSC' ''The Aerospace Nucltar Snfety Program Carl R Carlson SL-5520 undated probably 2 65 6 pages t J 221 Sil contained as Appendix 0 35 CRD Private Memo R L Peuri oy Jr SNL-5510 to C R Carlson SNL-5520 and W L Stevens SNL-5530 subj Weapon Safety 7 11 66 lV 3344 14 36 CRD Memo C R Carlsoo SNL•5Sl0 to R L Peurifoy Jr SNL-SSIO subj Weapon Safety 515 67 lV 3139 or lV 3344 17 37 CRD Memo R L PeuriCoy Jr SNL-5510 to C R Carlson SNL-5520 subj Weapon Safety S 18 67 lV 3344 1S 38 CRO Memo l D Smith SNL-5500 10 R L Pewifoy Jr SNL-5510 subj We ipon Safccy Si29161 lV 3748 48 39 SRO Article 'Nuclear Weapon Design Safety l ' untitled paraphrase William A Gardner Director ofSystems Development SNL-1500 published in USAF Nucleflr Safety Magazine July•August-September 1967 RS16S0 020 7 pages t 6 69 l V 3139 60 40 CFRD Draft Working Paper Recent Evolution of the Nuclear Weapon Safety Program 1970s and 1980s W L Stevens Consultant to SNl 6 S 4V 446 2 UNC version is also filed 0 41 SRO Final Report AEC·DoD Nuclear Safeguards Committee U ' RS342l 6849 April 1969 IV 32S7 1 42 SRO Draft Repon '4The Nuclear Safely Problem U '' T D Brumleve SCL·DR•67• _ __ RS8232-2 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1967 Exact copy 11 28 67 is RSSSl0 1381 75 pages lV 3282 43 SRO Memo W J Howard SNL-1000 to Distribution uhj Meeting ro Consider Appropriate Chang -s to Sandia Corporation Design and Analysis Activities Associated With Nuclear S i ctyi RS7000 4203 3 1 68 1V 3344 8 44 LINC Memo ··octr hi Safely Survey ' author and date unknown probably Thomas D Brumle ·t S1M mid• I968 IV 3139 68 J5 SRO lcmo W L Ste 'ens SNL-5530 to L D Smith SNL-5500 subj Suggestions for a Kudc u-Wcapon Saf ty Study RSt S010Qt 8'6i6S 20 pages IV 3139 62 -16 C Sl Paper Prescmation on Kuclcar Safory U Ddfred fo t Olson SNL- l 51 O SIS 68 J pages IV 31Jb ' t2 J 7 SRD Letter Rob 'rt K Osborne LANL W- J Group Leader h Bdg idi r Gt-ncral Edward 8 Giller AEC D' I sub Summary of Stilt us of Onc-Poinl Safl ty ofStockp1k i and Sd1 dukJ Suckir We rcms 1un1i1lrcl p 1raphrnse Sn 6S I V 3 lSJ 5 ·OFRCfAl USE ONt-Yl • ' I ' I _ as OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2111 a a SRD Letter R lC Osborne LASL W To Carl Walske OoO MLC subj POPCORN RS341 i 6j952 I 10 68 1V 37S2 39 48 SRD Memo M R Gustavson LRL subj Enhanced Nuclear Safety RSJ41S 69149 5 9 68 summary of remarks made in briefings to OMA MLC and Air StaffSpecial Study Group 30 April and t May 1968 I V 3139 66 49 SRL Letter Hon Carl WaJske Chainnan OoO MLC to Brigadier General Edward B Giller AEC A 1 subj One-Point Safety Standard untitled paraphrase RS3415 68106 413 68 2 pages 4V 1594 22 · and Declassified Letter Hon Carl Walskc Chllinnan DoD MLC to Brigadier General Edward B Giller AEC AGMMA subj Standards for Warhead and Bomb Premature Probability MC Paragraphs 3 1416S 2 pages I V 3054 1 G 50 SRD Report Project CRESCENT A Study of Salient Features for an Airborne Alert SUPERSAFE aomb U D E McGovem SNL· 1214 SCWD•70-879 RS3410 2097 4 71 4V S92 l SJ not used 52 SRD Report Input to the OMA Study of Weapons Development and Test Complex First Sandia Laboratory Draft U W L Stevens and Carl R Carlson SC-WD-66-26S0A RS3410 893 12 '66 lV 3371 1 and SRO Paper Philosophy of Organization for Weapons Research and Planning and Resource Allocation U C R Carlson and W L Stevens RSt 1617 2 15 67 6 pages IV 3371 and SRD R porl Study of the Weapons Development Complex BOB Special Analytical Study No 6 M Division of Military Application U S AEC 374 158 6 13 6 IV 277tn 5 3 SRD Memo Accidental Nuclear Dctonalion of the SPRlNT Warhead W66 U ' E H Eyster LASL GMX-2224 2120 69 JV 3248 1 54 not used 55 SRO Report ' SAFEGUARD System Safety Report U Special AEC DoD Atl Hoc Group 8 69 published by Picatinny Arsenal RS3412NC 501 20 I V 3339 39 56 SRD Ri port A Model for Plutonium H izard Assessments Based on Operation Roller Coaster t R E Luna H W Church and J D Shreve Jr • SC-WD-69-154 RS34t0 106 l 5 69 IV 3277 1 -OFFlet AH JSE ONLY I - • ti ·i fr r 1 ' - 57 UNC Memo ' An Annotated Topical Index and Reference List for lhc Writings on Nuclear Weapon Program Management Topics 1956 to 1988 of William L Stevens Vol l 1956-1967 and Vol 2 I968-1988 June 1988 typed March 1994 IN 158212 3 58 SRO Draft Working Paper A Design Concept for Achieving Acceptable Nuclear Safety in the Abnormal Environment U RS16S2 0S8 4 '28 70 4V 115 1 59 UNC Briefing Text DESIGN FOR SAFETY Weak Link Strong Link Concepts W L Stevens SNL Briefiog fortbe DoD's Military Liaison Committee l l 17 70 4V 1593 30 60 UNC Report 'Results of Excessive Current Tests on Printed Circuit Boards Cables Wires and System Components · L A Hanchcy SAND74-0025 printt cl 217S l NJG 300 1 61 CRD Draft Working Paper ' A Philosophical Vi£W o Nuclear Safety Risks in AEC Operations With We11pons and Other Explosh·es U W L Stevens SNL 1650 undated probably 12 69 11 pages 1V 3424 13 62 UNC Report A Study of Accident Threats to Nuclear Weapons Opcrations T B Lane Chairman C H MaW1ey and W L Stevens SNL transmitted to Distribution within AEC complex by private letter from W J Howard SNL to Col R T Duff AEC DMA 7 21 71 lV 3763 8 1 63 SRD Report Rq ort of the Contamination Safety Study Group U B E Bader SNL-1543 to Distribution 4 2on2 1V 3507 26 64 UNC Draft Report History of Nuclear Security Systems Directorate · D S Miyoshi SNL-5240 to Necah Furman SNL-3160 12 17 84 65 CNSI Report Safeguard In-Cell Safety Evaluation Task Group Report U U S Army Safeguard System Command 1 73 4V 901 l 66 UNC Memo •·some Thoughts on Safety Significance ofDifferences Detwccn U S and U K Reactors In Regard to Underground Siting Possibilities W L Stevens SNl1650 to R L Pc· uifoy Jr SNL-1230 2 14 73 25 pages lV 3853 24 0 67 UNC Memo W L Stevens SNL-1650 to R L Peurifoy Jr S 1A230 subj Aids to Improve Reactor Silfety Dialogues 2 14 73 1V 3853 25 68 CNC Memo W L Stevens SNL-1650 to File subj Concepts for a SAFETI' FIRST ucJear Reactor 5 22 73 10 pages I V 3853 22 69 UNC Memo W L Stevens SNL-1650 to File subj The Nuclear Power Rca tor Safety Crunch 5i22 73 3 pages l V 3853 21 70 SRD Repurl •·safety Asscssmcut ufERDA Nud- ar V apun Transpo1t Operations U · Energy Research and Development Administration ERDA-77 l O Janu iry 1977 3 V l 8 I 71 SRD Draft Working Paper ' A Unif ng Approac h to Quantitative Assessments of Safoty Risks l ' W L Stevens RS 1650 071 115173 15 pagl s IV J 189 1 Dral't 1 ' 3853120 72 lf C Memo W L Stevens s -L-1230 to L D Smith Sl'- 1 -1200 suhj A Sug rcd Stutly of Risk Ar alysis Tcchniqu1 s I i9 77 l V 5125 1 18 - l l ftl TfI' OFFICIAL USE ONLY 73 m TC Vorking Draft Conceptual App oaches filr Treating Engineering Aspects of Low Probability High Consequences Risks to the General Populace William L Stevens SNL-1230 11 4 77 26 pages 1N JG601 7 74 lJNC Memo W L Stevens to Distribution subj An Opinion as to Why Safety is Being Seen as a Major Problem for Nuclear Power Reactors 12 9 77 23 pages 75 SRD Memo Glenn A Fowler SNL Vic e President 9000 lo MG Ernest Graves AEC DMA subj Safety of Aircraft Delivered Nuclear Weapons Now in Stockpile RSl000 4465 11 1Sn4 1V 3150 38 76 CFRD Draft Working Paper lnstirutional and Competitive Aspects of Development of Anning Fuzing and Firing Subsystems for Nuclear Weapons U '' W L Stevens Sl 'L March 1976 revised January 1978 43 pages l ' 3956 25 77 UNC Annotated Viewgraph Presentation Package Involvements ofDoD ATSD AE in Nuclear Detonation Safety fssues 1968-1984 V L Stevens 9 30 81 for briefing of Rich Wagner on l 0 SiS l 3 7 pages1N 2256 10 78 UNC Memo D R Coner DoD ATSD AE to Secretaries of the Military Depa tments subj Joint ERDA•DoD Stockpile Nuclear Safety Evaluation Sl9n5 4V I630 1 79 SRD Lener D P MacDougall_ LASL and H L Reynolds LLL to MajorGcncraJ Ernest Gra •es AECIDMA subj POPCORN U RS3171-J l 844 dtd 6 lJns 1V 3484 44 80 SRD Report Report on Joint DOFJDoD POPCORN Task Group U '' FCIDNA FC11770426 RS3141 23431 10 30 77 lV 209411 or lV 2088 L 81 SRD Draft Vorking Paper Custody of Nuclear Weapons U W L Slcvens RS1230 0l 3 8 21 75 18 pages IV 3098 2 82 UNC Draft Working Paper Susceptibility ofNuclear Weapons to Threats U W L Stevens 2 76 15 pages lV 3856 l 83 Private Draft Working Paper Some Possible l' mplications on Nuclear Weapon Safety Resulting from fae ERDA DoD Decision U W L Stevcnsj 5 17175 53 pages IV 3097 13 84 Draft Working Paper Dual Judgment Roles in Safety Control and Security of Nuclear Weapons U '' M R Gustavson LLNL and W L Stevens SNL Prepared on Tcques1 of the ERDA ANS Study Group for the Managcmcnl and Funding Alternatives for ERDA Military Applications and Restricted Data Functions Study December 1975 9 pages I V 3054 61 or 1N 37419 85 LINC Report •'funding and Management Alterr atives for ERDA Military Appli ation and Rcstrict J Data Fw1ctions · Executive Sununnry ERDA 97A 1 76 IN G0 38 86 UNC Rc porr Sandia Narional Labl ratories A History of Exceptional Service in the National lnlcr st SAND97-I029 1997 42 pages S7 SRD Report The Stockpile Improvement Progrnm - A Case Study U R N Brodie S L RSSJ00 85 22 1'8185 JV 3152 1 lS6 t •• - ' s j ' • ' • 9 QQSTtlifttJ1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY 88 SRD Report An Examination of the U S Nuclear Weapon Inventory U R N Brodie RS4300 2275 J1 30n7 JV 3052 1 89 Prcdccisional Draft Infonnation On Planning for Research Development and Test Activities in the Department of Energy's Nuclear Weapons Prognun RD T Subgroup Report Strategic ssues Analysis -Nuclear Weapon Workload Planning Study Vol I July 1987 56 pages 90 UNC Draft Working Paper ''Opinions on Caus for Differences in Approach Between LLNL SNLL and SNLA on Nuclear Safety Design W L Stevcn ci SNL- I230 to Distribution 12 3 81 10 pages containing Attachment I An Outline ofSNL LL'i'L Nuclear Safety Interfacing 10 29 81 11 pages lV 3961 9 91 CFRD Annotated Briefing Notes 'On lbe Workings of the National Nuclear WeapoD Detonation Safety Program W L Stevens 12 18 79 53 pages lV 3479 1 92 SRO Report Final Report of the DoD DOE Long Range Resource Planning Group U 7 IS 80 11 Long Range Weapon Planning Analysis RSJ 141 80 1613 Appendix A - Backgrowid RSJ 141 80 1614 Appendix B -Resources RS3141 80 161S Appendix C - Acquisition RS3141 80 1616 Appendix D - Safety Security Conuol Case Histories Summary R $314 l S0 1617 93 UNC Draft Working Paper On Institutionalizing the Dual Agency Responsibili ies and Judgment Concept for Nuclear Weapon Safety Security and Control W L Ste •ens 1 22 80 10 pages plus J•pagc appendix 1V 3332 19 94 UNC Draft Working Paper ' On Instirutionalizing the Dual Agency Responsibili ies and Judgment Proc for Nuclear Weapon Safety Security and Control '· W L Stevens 1 23 80 4 pages plus 3•page appendix transmitted to MG W W Hoover DOE OMA by R L Pcurifoy Jr SNlr4300 by letter dated 2 7 80 95 UNC Working Draft Paper On the Character of Management Practices for the Nuclear Weapons Program '' SNL W L Stevens 4 8 80 67 pages IV 749 1 96 I NC Memo W L Stevens SNl -1230 to R L Peurifoy Jr 4300 subj Comments on the Utility of the MLC 2 6 80 16 pages tV 3332 14 97 LINC Memo W L Stevens subj A Curso1y Review of the Functions of the Design Review an l Accc plancc Group DRAAG for Reviews and Standru-dization of Nuclenr Weapons 10 pages plus 7 pages ofaltachmcnts 9 U 'iC Memo W L Stevens SNL-1230 to R L Peuriroy Jr SNL-4300 subj The DNA Roles in Nuclear Weapon Syslcm Safety 1 2Jl80 1N 205 9 99 L C Rough Drali M mo W L Stevens to File subj SNL's Accident Response Group l ARG Rost r 7i16l80 2 pag s IN 22S l-t md -eFAC-iAt-ttSE ONtY ' I 14 I q· tS7 1@0 U TfPft9 OFFIGIAL USE ONLY UNC Memo W J Howard lo H E Roser USDOE ALO subj ARO Roster for lnitial Response 8 4 80 1 page JV 3940 J0 I00 CFRD Preliminary Draft Report ·•Materials for DOE Presentation on Nuclear Weapons Safety U ' 0 E Jones 1 12 81 44 pages 1V 3218 1 IUl t HW Preliminary Draft Report Sourcebook on Nuclear Weapon Safety U 0 E Jones 1 12 81 41 pages JV 3217Jl 102 CFRD Preliminary Draft Report Available Public lnfonnation on Nuclear Weapon Safely - Volume I Offi ial Public Information U 0 E Jones 1 12 81 128 pages IV 322 1 103 CFRD Preliminary Dlilft Report Available Public Information on Nuclear Weapon Safety Volume IT Unofficial Public lnfonnatior 11 0 E Jones 1 12 81 86 pages tV 3216 1 104 CFRD Preliminary Draft Possible Questions About Nuclear Weapon Safety U 0 E Jones 1 12 81 67 pages 1V 3219 1 105 CRD Ch9ny N lear Weapon Safety Features U • 0 E Jones 1 13 81 reV1sed 2 9 81 upon consu Jtatioa with R L Pcurifoy Jr IV322 l l 106 CRD Report 11Safety Summaries of Stoclcpi cd Nuclear Weapons ul SANDS -0269 2 82 243 pages IV 2429 1 l 07 Reference not located at this writing 108 UNC Letter Morgan Sparks to MG W W Hoo• cr tmtitlcd paraphrase Proposed Cbart c for an Ad Hoc DoD DOE Radioactive Material Dispersal Risk Study 1 20 81 J V 547 25 109 SRD Repo An Approoch to the Pantex Environment3l Impact Study PX EIS U ' W L Stevens RS 1230 81 10 S 18 81 32 pages IV 3047 1 110 UNC Working Draft On the Probabilistic ModeJ Positive Measures Approach to Assessing Risk far High-Consequence Low-Frequency Events • William L Stevens SNL 1182 31 pagcs IN 1977 1 111 Private Working Paper Thoughts on a Pantex Environmental Impact Study EIS '' W L Stevens 1230 to Distribution l 2 24 80 S pages IV 3048 33 I 12 l JNC Working DraftT Transportation of Pu-Bearing Nuclear Veapons -An Annotated Timelinc W L Stevens 6i8S 113 CFRD Memo Evolution of Measures to Contr I Deliberate Unauthorized Launches of uclear-Weapon-Capahle Missiles William L Stevens SNL-7 30 1 t • SJ 51 pages JV 438 1 or 1V 3862 1 114 CFRD Working Drat1 Deliberate Unautboriz d Launch DUL Consideration of GLC 1 ' W L Stevens 1 26 S 3 6 pages I V 3135 1 l SS -eFFtetAL USE ONtV- IE8 1 E 11Pfl9 · OFFICIAL USE ONLY 115 UNC Memorandmn ofUnderstanding between lbe Department of Defense and the Ocpanment of Energy on Objectives and Responsibilities for Joint Nuclear Weapons Activities l 17 83 1V 3054 14 116 'UNC Memo W L Stevens SNL 1230 to Distnbution subj Nuances in Languag« for Divisions of DoD DOE Responsibilities in Nuclear Weapon Safety Security and Control S1C 8 25 91 l V 3 IJ9 S 117 UNC Memo W L Stevens SNL-7230 to Distribution subj Request for Comments on Draft DOE Policy Paper on Nuclear Safety Matters S pages 6 22 83 l V 3054 14 118 UNC Memo W L Stevens to Distribution subj Vice President 7000's Facilities Safety AppraisaJ Committee FSAC 12 14 82 20 pages IV 1176 1 119 UNC Memo W L Ste-vens to R L Pcurifoy Jr • SNL-7000 subj Infonnation on the DOE's Environmen Safety and Health Organization 9 19 83 37 pages 120 UNC Time-Line Timc--Linc for Staffing of Ad 'ersary Simulation Srudics for Computer Softwaret W L Stevens S 2 8S title added 4 24 95 121 Not used 122 UNC Report Report of the President's Blue Ribbon Task Group on Nuclear Weapons Program Management '' 7 85 lN 283 1 2 including 11 Appendix 1 - Requirements Issues SRD U Safety Security and Control Safety Security and Control Backgrowid Stockpile Improvement Program Nuclear Weapon Surety- Annual Report to the President Dual-Agency Judgments Safety Security and Conttol Oversight 123 lJNC Draft Worldng Paper On the Character ofMan igemcnt Practices for the Nuclear Weapons Program W L Stevens September 1984 79 pages and 3 attachment lN 267 3 t 24 Report of the Executive Secretariat of the President s Blue Ribbon Task Group on Nuclear Weapons Program Management March 1985 Volume I Nuclear Weapons Program lV 74 1 Volume H Pre 'ious Studies lN 854 1 Volume II Appendix - Pre ·ious Studies 1N 854 1 Volume HJ Recent Initiatives I N SSS 1 Volume IV Nuclear Program Rcsponsibiliti1 s Part l - Safety Stcuricy and Control M - lucll ar W apons Filed in Organizo tion 5100 - We ipons Di velopment 1 2858 fl I 5 l ot ustd 126 UNC Draft Workin Pap r On the Struct re anJ Staffing of the National 'i uclcar w apon and Weapon System Program Report A 5 86 74 pages IN 23211 -OFFIGfAl USE ONt-V 1S9 · 11iiORITJIPt1• OFFICIAL USE ONLY 127 u'NC Draft Worlcing Paper A Summary of Presidential and Other High-Level Directives and Correspondence on Nuclear Weapon System Safety and Control U Annc x A to Appendix A 5 86 16 pages l N 359 2 or 1N 125413 128 UNC Draft Working Paper Design Philosophies and Practices Used to Meet Nuclear Weapon Detonation Safety Criteria U Report B 5 86 27 pages lN 231 1 129 UNC Draft Wurk iug P t p r On Quantitative Standards for Protection Against 3Jl Unwanted Nuclear Detonation of U S Nuclear Weapons in Normal and Abnonr al Environments U Report C 5 86 13 pages plus 4 annexes 130 UNC Draft Working Paper A Summary of Accidents and Significant Incidents Involving U S Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapon Systems U '' Report 0 5 86 8 pages plus Annex A lN 229 1 131 SRD Report A Review of the U S Nuclear Weapons Safety Program- 1945 to 1986 U '' R N Brodie SAN086-295S 2 87 28 pages 4V 409 1 132 UNC Draft Working Paper Strawman Discussion Topics for the DOE's Nuclear Weapon Nuclear Weapon System NW NWS Safety Management Proc ess Review 5188 30 p3ge 1N 250 66 133 SRD Memo Annotated Briefing Materials Package U •• W L Stevens RS7230 90 00020 6 15190 1V 2420 1 134 UNC Report Report of the Panel on Nuclear Weapons Snfery of the House Armed Services Committee December 1990 lN 910 10 or 1V 2611 S t3S UNC Memo J F Ney SNL-7230 to Distribution subj Nuclear Safety Briefing for Organization 4000 3 30 89 1V 889 2 136 UNC Memo L S Greher Attorney SNL-4010 through M R Kestenbaum Sl 'L VP 4000 to R L Pcurifoy Jr SNL VP 7000 subj Nuclur Wellpons Stockpile S ifety l 16190 I V 3492 8 137 UNC Letter Senate Committee on Anned Sen iccs to Secretary of Defense '' 6i8 90 IN 269417 138 UNC Report Nuclear Safety From Production to Retirement Background and Principles Stanley D Spray NST203 2 9 99 65 pages page IO 139 UNC Memo W L Stevens Consultant to G R Otey SNL-4100 to S D Spray SNL-12331 sub Nuclear Weapon Safety and Program Managcmc -nt Fill S 6 2 94 27 pages IN I 126 ' 140 UNC Memo W L Ste 'ens Consut1ant tu 4100 to S D Spray SNL-332 subj CrossIndexing of NSTC Files 7 21 93 6 pages IN 1J 26 3 l-11 LINC Memo W L Ste ·ens Consultant to G R Ot y SNL-4100 to S D Spmy SNL- 331 subj Nuclear Weapon Safety and Program Management Files 7 20 93 20 pages N' 1126 3 -OF-Ftet Y k 1 11 I I ·111asz•sa -r OFFICIAL 1 18 ONbY 142 UNC Memo W L Stevens Consultant to 41001 to S D Spray SNL-332 subj Candidate Documents for Understanding Nuclear Weapon and Weapon System Safety 7 19 93 S pages lN 1126 1 14 3 UNC Report Surety 2000 The Planning Process ind the Safety Module Surety 2000 Safety Working group Captain USN David Olson DOE DP-20 1 Chairman and David D Carlson SNL-DOIYDP-20 1 on lo in 4l94 lN 4192 144 UNC Letter Nuclear Veapon System Safety Assessments A Narath President SNL to RADM Jon M Barr DOE DASMA 9DP-20 12il2 89 See SANDSl-1716 1V l776 15 145 UNC Memo On the Use of Qmmtitativc Risk Assessment Techniques in the li S Nuclear Weapons Program 19SS to 1995 - A Personal View •· W L Stevens S 94 SJ pages IN 2975 8 146 UNC Memo On the Involvements ofSandia National Laboratories in Processes for the Annual Repon to the President on Nuclear Weapons Surety 1976-1994 W L Stevens 8 94 33 pages IV 2975 8 147 UNC Paper ''Technical Issues of a Nucle-ctrTcsL Ban ' Sitlm y Dn ll and Bob Peurifoy Annual Review ofNucle ir Particle Science 1994 1N 210S 1 148 UNC Draft Working Paper Heritage Study Questions '• W L Stevens 34 pages typed 8 97 149 UNC Internal Distribution Only Sandia's Surety Heritage J T Ringland SAND978242 3197 IN 3737 1 150 LTNC Memo W L Stevens SNL-7230 to 0 8 Jones SNL-5000 and R L Pcurifoy Jr 7000 subj Afterthoughts on the Process for Preparation of this Year's Annual Report to the President on Nuclear Weapon Surely 4 4 85 l V 2775 1 151 lJNC Draft Report •-sandia National Laboraiories Developing the National Nuclear Weapons Stocl -pile 1956-65 W L Stevens July 1995 IN 2975 2 152 UNC Draft Report Sandia National Laboratories The Lcycl-of-Effon Years 1966•70 W L St vens September 1995 CN 2975 3 I 53 UNC Report ''A Collection of Time-Lines ind Olher Related Graphics on Nuclear Weapon Program Topics of Safety Security and Control and R D Management '' W L Ste 'ens Consultant 5195 219 pages IN3657 J 154 UNC Memo W L Stevens to G R Otey SNL-4100 subj Sandia Hislory Project 2 3 9 3i95 4 p ige5 I N 2975 1 155 UNC Memo W L Stevens to G R Otey SNL-4100 subj S3rldia History Project 313 9 3 95 3 pages lN 297511 156 U C l'vlcmo W L Sh 'Cns consull ml to G R Otey SNL-4100 subj S mdi i Historr Project Chapters V and VI l0112i95 S pages IK2975 1 157 U C Memo W L Stevens consultant to G R Otey SNL--i I UO subj Sandia History Project Chapters VH and Vlll 12 3 95 5 pages I N 2975 1 -OFFICf·Al -USE ONL-¥- I' I 81 8rtl I I au OFFICtAL USE ONLY 158 Cotter Donald R Managing Nuclear Operations Chapter Two Peacetime Operations Safety and Security The Bookings Institute 1987 Washington D C IN 1984 1 159 Not ustd 160 Not used 161 crnn RP pOT1 in l Rr pnrt nn PAT U r arl 'R r rl n Dik VOl' 'd Cl' 'tp 'ralion Sr TM 251-63 91 10 6 3 11 pages 1V 3251 1 I 62 CRD Memo W J Howard SNL to Edward Teller LRL untitled paraphrase Comments on Mechanical Safing 2 pages 3 10 67 IV 3139 64 Document declassified on 312 99 by authority ofOrg 7447 163 QUO Repon ••A Study of and Recommendations for the Nuclear Weapon Safety Assurance Plan for SNL Report of the Nuclear Safety Study Committee C H Mauney Chairman SAND88-1530 6 88 164 UNC Repo Weapon Nuclear Safety Assum nee Piao for Sandia National Laboratories a Jc a the 'Blue Book' re iewed and approved by A Naratb President SNL 10 2 90 IN 1463 1 165 UNC Design Guidance Repon The Process for Achieving Nuclear Weapon Sa ety at Sandia National Laboratories The Blue Book owners E E Ives 5200 and R L Schwoebel 12300 10 93 lN 1393 l 166 SRD Memo C R Carlson SNL-100 Staff to W L Stevens SNL-16S0 subj Inferences from History on Weapon Safety and National Risk ofa Nuclear Detonation RSIOI 016 11 4 69 IV 3139 SS 167 SRD Memo T D Brumleve SNL-8184 to Distribution subj Nuclear Safety Goals and the Significance of History U RS8184 18 11 26 69 1V 3139 53 168 SRD Report ''National Risk Allocation Study Plowshare Nuclear Safety Goals U SCL-DR-67-95 T D Brumleve 12 67 26 pages 4V 591 l 169 SRO Draft Working Paper SC-TM Notes on the Concepts of •statistical Rcqu rcments · 'National Risk ' and •The Stockpile' in Nuclear Safety Considerations U W L Stevens SNL-1650 RS1650 044 4 9 70 55 pages lV 3187 1 with 170 Cover Letter uclear Safety Goals W L Stevens to Dislributiun 4 8170 1 page l V 3187 1 171 UNC Pri 'mc Draft Memo V L Stevens S L-l 963 tu D E Grt g mn SNL-S 30 subj Numerical Analyses of Safety in Abnonnal Environments 4 23 70 4 pages 1V J 139 47 172 LINC lmemal Distribution Only document Ethos Necnh Stewart Furman pre ared for the Fall ' -fanag mcnt Confen ncc 9 24-25185 65 pages with cov r letter to Large Staff from R L Hagengrub 9 17 85 r --1 1436 l 191 -GFFIGJAL USE ONc¥- d -• ' · fi 3li J 118 ft I f @ · OFFIGIAL USE ONLY 173 SNSI Memo P F Jones SNL-12ll to W L Stevens SNL-1230 subj lnth endem Safety Assessment U RSt23J 00l 1128115 4 pages JVJ 139 24 and UNC Memo P F Jones SNL-1231 to W L Stevens SNL-1230 subj Independent Safety Assessment 1129195 I page 1V 3138123 174 UNC W J Howard SNL-2 to MG J K Branon USDOE DMA with copies to H M Agnew LASL R E Batze LLL md D M Kerr USDOE A - SD Untitled B615 F-4 Safety Rules paraphrase 0715332 Feb 1V J 139 20 175 SRD Report Combined Operational Review illld Special Safety Study nf the B-1 B Weapon System U ·• USAF NWSSG 88-4 September 1988 wiih tr msmiual letter from USAFIDNS dated 9 26 88 JV 816 1 t 76 SRD Report Historical Summacy of Nuclear Safety Requirements for Stockpiled Weapons U ' SAND74-0l41 RS1523 36l 12 10 74 41 pages IV 3258 1 11 177 UNC Repon SRDuntil lOfJ 7 9S A Summary oflhe Program to Use Environmental Sensing Devices to Improve Handling Safety Protection for Nuclear Warheads U W L Stevens 3lld C Henn31'1 Mauney SCDR 193-61 July 1961 lV 3333 1 178 SRD Report ••An Examination of Electrom ignetic Radiation Problems for lhc USS Enterprise U 0 W L Stevens SCDR-63-0067 RS 3423 1203 June 1963 55 pages Technical Library 179 SRD Lener Harold P Smith Jr Prcsidi n The Palmer Smith Corporation to LTG Howard W Leap USAF The Inspector General subj Possibility of Nuclear Detonation of the B28 in a B-52 Fuel Fire unlitlc d parap RS7230 88 09 2 pages lV 2734 3 180 L'NC Memo I M Taylor to Distribution subj Proposal for Research Concerning Acrosolization from High Explosive Detonation Events 2 81 IV 3584 3 1S1 UNC Memo John M T3ylor SNLA-7233 subj -' n Ev ilu i1ion of Applicability of 1hc Concept of Emergency PlaMing Zone to Nuclear Wt pon Sites 10 81 7 pages IN 2 8 6 Anachmcnl I I82 UNC Memo W L Stevens SNL-1230 to Oislribution subj Emergency Preparedness EP Pl uming 6 lS 81 14 p3ges lN 228 6 Attachment 2 IS3 UNC Report •1nc Atmo pheric Rele isc Advisory Capability ' Lawrence Livermore National L iboratory January 1997 lN 519 3 1S-t SRO fom H D Bickcfman to W l Stevens subj DOE Response to Weapon cciJcnts Ul 7'20i79 RSl Jl 79 '0S 4 pa cs l ' 3 40 '33 1s L-XC Agri l mcnl ''Joint Oq Jtnnent of the Army Na · Air Force ar1 l - tom1c Energy Commission grccmcnt of General r as f Rcsponsibilitf and Procroun s pplic iblc to the Prompt Effcctin anJ Coordinated Rc ponsc to Acdcknts Involving Nuckar Wc tpono 1111158 1 pages lV 3940 12 -GFFICIAL USE ONLY ' 89'1WPft0 OFFICIAL USE ONLY 186 SRD Report Accident Environments U Task Group on Accident Environments T D Brumleve Chainnan SCL·DR-69-86 RSS232-2 28606 1170 180 pages IV 19 7 187 UNC Agrccmcn ''Joint Department ofDefense and AEC Agreement in Response to Accidents Involving Radioactive Material S 9 66 6 pages IV 3940 41 attachment 188 UNC Instruction Nuclear Weapon Accident and Significant Incident Notification Procedures '' DoD Instruction 7730 121 6 15 66 W J Howard UoU ATSl AE Cancelled version of7n7 62 fV 3752 58 189 UNC MOU Joint Department ofDefense and Atomic Energy Commission Memor indum of Understanding for AEC Response to Accidents Involving Nuclear Weapons in the Custody ofOoD n 6 10170 4 pages IV 3054 75 190 UNC Agreement Agreement in Response to Accidents or Incidcn Jnvolving Radioacti ·e Material or Nuclear Weapons Joint Department of Defense and Energy Research and Development Administration 3 1 77 5 pages 1V 3940 37 191 UNC Letter Glenn T Seaborg Chairman USAEC to Hon Sidney Yates U S House of Representatives subj Role ofthe AEC in Safet' of Nuclear Weapon Systems 117169 2 pages 1V 30S4n6 Also included as Appendix J 192 Not used 193 UNC Memo ·'Proposed Revision to DoD Directive 5610 3 '' W L Stevens to R J Peterson USDOE DMA DP-226 8 S 31 8S 2 pages IV 2722 34 194 SRO Dr ul Working Paper Nuclear Safety Today Impacts of ABM Jssucs W L Stevens RS16S0 033 SC-TM-69-392 8 69 69 pages IV 3380 195 UNC Memo Comments on Draft MOU on Nuclear Weapon System Safety Rules Untitled Paraphrase Morgan Sparks by W J How ird in Sparks' absence to MG I K Bratton US OOE DMA 6 20 78 lN 3222 36 196 UNC Memo ••safety Ev iluation of Stockpile Nuclear Weapons t' MG Ernest Graves ERDA D vlA to ERDA AL SL LASL and LLL 3 26 75 transmitting Joint ERDA-DoD Steering Group Safety Evaluation of Stockpile Nuclear Weapons '' 2 pages IV J l 50 34 IV 3222 6 l 197 UNC Letter Glenn T Seaborg Chairman USAEC to Hon Sidney Yates U S House of Representatives subj Role of the AEC in Safety of Nuclear Weapon Systems untitled paraphrase 1 17 1969 2 pages lV 3054 76 19S UNC Memo Task Group on Risk Acceptability '' P F Jones 1651 to Distribution 7 3 1969 2 pages 1V 3346 20 199 LNC tvfcmo ''Risk Acci ptability Task Group·s Second Meeting on 8 25 69 R P Lambert 1651 to Distribution 9 5 1969 4 p igc I V 38176 200 SRD Memo Ri k Acceptability Task Group's Third Meeting at SLL on S 29 6 U ' R P Lambcn 1651 to Distribution RS l 6Sl 060 I0130 ' l 969 S pages IV 3S I 7 8 -0FFICIAL USE ONLY L _ T I I '·'a • ' _ ts IRE ii I JCJ -OFFICIAL USE ONLY Ol SRD Memo Resume of Risk Acccpt3bility Task Group Meeting 7130 69 1 • R P LolDlbert 1651 ro Distribution RS 16S1 053 8i20 l969 IV 3817 4 -8FR61AL US t -V-- 195 i 5 IRIWPt CO OFFICIAL YSE ONLY APPENDICES A UNC letter J W McRae President Sandia Corporation to K F l lcrtfbrd Manager Albuquerque Operations Office U S Atomic Energy Comm1SS1on subj Safety Analysis of Weapon Systems wath Sealed-Pit W Jrheads 5 SISS B Not used C SRO TWX A W Betts OircctorofMiliwy Application U S Atomic Energy Commission to S P Schwanz Sandia Corporation J S Foster Lawrence Radiation laboratory and N E Bradbury Los Alumos Sci r tifie bboralory subj Research S Development Effort on Weapon Commond Control 2 26 62 D UNC Treatise The Aerospace Nuclear Safety Problem · Carl R Carlson SNL-SS2 undated probably 3 1 65 6 pages lN 2215 1 E CRD Memo W J Howard SNL to Ed Vard Teller LRL untitled paraphrase Comments on Mechanical Saf1 1g 2 pages 3 10 67 lV 3139 6' Document declassified on 312 99 by nuthority ofOrg 7447 Not used F G UNC Letter onginatly Confidential National Security lnfonnarion Carl Walske Chairman DoD Military liaison Committee to th Atomic Energy Commission subj Standards for Warhead and Bomb Premature Probability MC Paragraphs 3 14 68 2 pages H UNC Paper• Dual Judgment Roles in S ifety Control and Security ofNucl« ar We ipons M R Gustavson La TCncc Livermore Laboratory and W L Stevens Sandia Labonito ies 12 75 9 pages l UNC News Release •·Panel Urges High Priority for Nuclear Safety Issues •• U S Honse Armed Services Committee 12 18 90 4 pages · J UNC Lener Glenn T Se ibor Chairman U S Alomic Energy Commission to Honorable Sidney Yates U S House ofRcprcsc ntarives subj Role of the AEC in Slfcty of Nuclear Weapon Sysrcms untitltd parnphrased 1 17 69 2 poges lV 30S-tn6 K Key Persons of Sandia National Laboratories in the Evolution of Nuclear WC3pon Safety Security and Control S2C l US DOE Mcmorllndum ·•Non-conc urrcncc Reorganmnfrin ol'thl Nucl ar Wc3pon Council Standing C'ommitrec NWCSC and W ipons S3ttry Commitl1 c Wsq · Richard D Hahn DP-64 l 4 94 2 pagcii I 19u c mpllation of Dratt Workin P ipcrs Oil s c and Rt llkd SuhJccls by W L Ste ·cn s -'OFFICIAL USE ONLY • - - 1 • ' I f 8 'tl TfP 't' J OFFIOl f L USE ONLY APPENDIX A l Al' t se Mr K F rtrord Manager Albuquerque Cperatlon Office P O Soi 00 Albuquerque tie• Mei lco fety Analysis of •apon Syste• s •itb·Seale Plt W1rheads R • Re erenc es1 1 2 SRD MelDO Hertford to Mc Rae and Bradbury dtd S' lla ALPaABW 0-7•B02 Saa e Subject• 3 10 se SRD •110 Scholllburg OCO to Manager ALCO and llan a9n SAN dtd 2 2l 5B Syrni OilDTN 72477 Salli Subject • To p rface our reQarks on the 1ubject of the above refer•nc1s •• bellrve ION very general coinmnts 1r1 ln order C rtalnly you are aware af the mnner in which the nuaber of 1afe y board and request• for safety studies ave bean 111 Ushrooll nq We trust you are equally aware of the dr stlc and still incr1a1ln9 work load this situation has imposed on the development or9ani1ation We have been atriving to provide full support in all 1rt1s to insure $Dlid technical inputs in All uch delibcr•tions in a caaxi111Um at eq t to clear the ai And prevent a ecurrenca of the near panic caused by the SlfP -Klre Rrport• ai last year We have already passed th• point a whlch -tli1 aut ide support is inte frrlng •1th our internal tudles and work to•ard increasing •••pon safety llhethe intentional or not the i11pllcation exists that the A EC and apecifically the nuclear and en91neer1ng laboTatorles ha e a l s e interest and a 1mller state in the catte of nuclear •1apon safety than have t e OOD 1 and its various Nlitary agencies Thi of u sP 1 ·unt u and in fac oi - stakt is e ha l1r11r The •test difficulty in studying t h over•l aafety p oblen and thls 1 a problem which can n2 l b1 attacked pieceineaJ 1 •e • • lo • ve at o t m 11ly ufr dnign h that the various 1e9 nt_s cf he 00D are uncertiin as to what inc i dent and sltuations they des e ZM£t t be p otuctsd •salnst The a t ter o • ree nt •lthtn the COO s the efo e a loit hope • thou his F•e• Gui itt Th ap 0a h e th se ert a- A C udlts has a a e0ns quen t been to pJr polnt c e fic a ea c conce an t con nt 1 e on n iuenc J o s n on OFFICIAL USE OtH V ·• ' I I • rcssz·rs1 c OFFICIAL USE ONLY w K f He t o d Manager - 2- that point There is• very t•l danger here ln that •uch narrow cor11detat1on if im lt111tnt•d can hamper aaftty efforts in IICl e i- ort1nt • eas We alncerely lleve the Navy preoccupation at the pre•ent t1111e with re1110V1bility of all or pa t of an already inert power 1upply is an excellent era1r9lt of thi• f1ll1cy In thls instance •e could prc vlde · better safety with e ther or both 1 •burJed goof-proof devlceR and 1 •1ockid• warhead connector while • t the a11ie tline lm roving 11boteur psychotlc re l tanct Provldirig access Snto the warhead for pa•er supply removability ls contrary to all philosophy for reducing huun error probability We submit that the greatest service which can ti p•rfOTmed by DOD safety boards ln their own and the national interests is a thorou9h and competent analysis of all the operational factors and envi onmenta to •hlch weapons are likely to be subjected and then to arrange the pot ntlal danger points in order of imporbnce far each warhead Thus app lsed of the overall • afety picture as 5ten by the DOO the AEC dtsigners can focus full d•sign effort on firsl thin9s st Ai a co olla y of course the COO 111Ust also decide what thPy are to p•y for increased saf ty in ter1115 of reliability flexibility and operational readlne s since we feel cc taln that the evolution of presen t design has Already e hausted whatever reservoir of free• safet mi9ht have at any time existed •lll ng To com n nt on the particular request of Reference 2 we feel it is highly desirable to ave the safety aspects of each particular appll- c tion dellberat•d in the respective joint committee and •orting 9'f 0Up unctions ls official members of these bodles • • •then in the best p sitlan not only ta provide 1ound ttchnical inputs on the warhead installation but also to participate in• thorough 5a ety review of he adaption k t and other COD cont actcr - 5uppli d weapon systen C0 90nent5 s CRC 1261 llw D1ctr1but1ona l 9A • Y F fwrtfordt Mana9e ALCO 1 vA - Rrlg r nP r1l Alfr d 0 Starhlrrl D A J 9A - H A ridler anager SAN 9A - N E B adbury D eetor LASL • - Edward Teller Dir• tor UCR -liver o e - 9A W Htnd r on 1000 Attn L D Sol 260 7 9A - R Poole 8000 6 9A - P K Smeltzer C ntral Record File 7221-3 0 9 - J w McRae 1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY - · r' b Jt 6 £2 IJPRtl OFFIGfAL USE ONLY APPENDIX B Not used -8FFICIAL USE ONLY t • • Jt l• 1·cati OFFIGII L USE ONLY This page intentionally left blank R£1AL USE ONLY • t ' APPENDIXC From AW Betts USAEC WASHDC To S P Schwanz Sandia Corp Albuquerque NM J S Fosttr Uvi nnore CA N E Bradbury LAS Los Alamos NM K F Hcrtf'ord USAEC A OO Albuqucrqu NM E C Shuic USAEC Su Berkeley CA lnfo DTG26193SZ FEB 62 Subject Research Development Efron on Weapon Command Control In view ofthe above I hereby designate the Sandia Corporation u the Primary Agency respons ble for research and development on command coauol dC'l ic -s I make this choice based on my observuion that most of the schemes envisioned involve non-nuclear hardware I would like LRL and LASL to restrict their activities in this area to 1pproaches that re aie directly and intimatdy to the nuclC3J' system unles5 asked for assistanc e by Sandia Corporation I assume thal ariy ideas generated by LRL and I ASL would be pz sscd on in conccpruzl fonn to Sandia for more detailed invcsti ation Excerpt d from SRD TWX j ' 2 ·-5 7 -·- I If -· I _ I JI l IJfPRI OFFIGIAL Y6E ONLY This page intcnlionally left blank OFFICIAL USE ONLY l · · i I I -' - tt-· l111JIISJIWJ OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPENDIXD c R Cul son - 5520 T ils t re - 11 e is intended to a id i' l pro oini he tou l erospi ce nuclee sef'ety 13ro'ble 1 £ rphesis is 111 e ced on s0111e o the subjecti'Ve 212d non teclmicu facets or i t is necesse 7 to 11 ci te that he z to the J rosnm e--e llOt si ply lated 'to ba ud s to e0 1e ' be u osoaca ru tcl ear e 'ort c2 1not a f' 1'ord to e put on t le dd ensiw becm se it is iatrlnsicall y ex_pencz bb Se 'et- engille rins lo-ill h ve to centre lly o sam zed s-t ro g 1' 1 its sel '-pollcins e '1d agel 9ssive - d rt m2inins above I'e2 a h 0tm 1 ise it 2 y not su -vive OFAetAL USE ONLY J i _ Jl 1•• 2 r 1I11LJ 1 11 OFFICIAL USE ONLY H 1 Jor spcnsibility 1'ell to Sandia CorporatioQ dwiag the cbaou or pusicn and prejudice tha t e uptad qU i te swidenly 1n 1951 over the satcty ot wclear ve i On•• To sme dep e tbi e 'l'erieace was a precedent 1'or tbe usignment of turtber ra 'ety i sponsibill ty 1D tbi tlcl 4 ot e erorpac• nuclear devices It i1 ineot l Dll neccsaa y then to e umine this precedent cJCP41 -iencc or iaicu alSQritms pan'bles and precautions peni 1p1 tn ns1'cru 'ole t o the aero pace - oat ext 'Ole r cat obvious distinction to be 12 de tetveen th at rosi ace a d nuwz epoa pl 0bleu is that t ie 5PGce llli ssioelS gi ring rise to buaris ba • -e ao timdmcnta l role i a selt-preservatioa 110 res iDg ur ency Del no tanpb-le bene its to tbe cwrvbel ains caJo rity of pe Sons potea itlly to be threate eil Unl i l e the vea cm progra wc tter nis 2nd or z n ed oppo51 t lon in be o arety tar hllllliUlity mght hen succeed in huttiug oft the ecti't1l uuclear erra It nu st antici e ted therd'ore that ba ards if they a re to be ntion l hed 11Nst uihenntlv ipec r negligl'ble -· •at most no larger thBA those e ssocie ted vitl l the so-called ''acceptable hau rds 'For mju t thoup it me y be e a theH ''staad 2 l'lis a re frequently unclt r fire AAY overt co npe rison Vltll nucleu ve on builllia ls certai to be avoided the pei-U ot $UCb a usoci tion 1s too great a r sr The u 11 lbe - gme o probabilit-J c eter u ia-cio u coo inua I y p Jcc the Yel OD n ety 'Ob For e erlng decisior s bua -d probab ll ies z -e use u l i a a tla tive secse bu ro tfeTed as a i ea sw -e 'they inev 1 y c o i scl- 2 and hen u i r 2ble cd wJAeraole to a l's rcbol05iclll ly e hcud p -0·0 u il i - 7 ini i es a cl e rsei a s su l - u a 'bull ti's iter' s an J a- e S 11 a co - l a -y it J r ved u scrul 1n be dsi io U7 se se ll k' I cocp lso ls · i ve n vel l ll e 'e y i s a Jd tte u ic1 t 1u o da y-'to-c y l g or to fl- queacies d s t ies ca' U '1 1 d suu s I't 1aould be ec ed t 1lz t llice -etionc1e 1 iJl - he Be OS JBCI co i - e t VQ Sl d SC equal 17 edee Within tbe s p e cf coaeeiV ble e '051' C' nisha pG 1 e na or t e z ' ion bz cree cea cz n -mg tro- J sicilui ty to a '11 r pon cidl n- ta c o l dispa -1 ' 1 e i'or ae r cate cy to e xa pl e a VI % ' en - b iccn a l --e hat nsu t c in su·c e g cc 2 Jd excL-sion o a eac-tor p ylo d c iul d cl Dsely re e ibl e a cnl •3 oint VCil laC detona- on i the dispL-z te cz eso y ci t pus e c pc -stl ii z ir or in fr h- tc - n ' P s o l gf I ie s o ' ve -y c - i· - ct c i e -s-ld lr s -z Jct i ics oi 1 - a s ecUic e xz ile - r uz 1 Y q c -- Q cc parabl c ' 1· i es res' ll z ° 'C I _ c i a - i - s c - c a 'ull see le - - s usl e 2lj' ce-e 1 a ne li - blc cont oc - c i D l ' teen - ic s el ieS i rd c o puisoes sa - as _ ls or P -t e- t ·ce ig tc i 1 e- - cr vher he a e -0spa ce sou - ic•tt1 ·res reactc - iu o t- r C c i ve i ' orie• a id less cl c o isou pic so L -ces r e- £ op pi lic e-c er be a e -o pac p ble i s - ' li - i ly cu r -e nt i l _ o i cc 11ie 1t c occu Of' o aN S - ir -e e c s 2-- -OC uced - o -ed e ' - sc c l' ad ' ll o ed -- u - 1 r o f ir i ll c b ' 1 'l 'o cn ect e w cd - 7 n n C w L - i t ' c• 0 L rc c c0ve -c 1 ba - il o y titic ' i i e s- i l c a e - c s -ic•z 0 - ct u 'jy t e leba a te alt ei' 'C ' t - s tcl en • y 4 · 7 n- - - 'be t t 3 - • ft ec - • t C - • - i - --- - e ·_ - l - ·• - -- 'z • - ' i1 p ' 4 ic tl -e · • - el i i - - e a 111 J • ·OFFICIAL USE ONLY • a x r ··n ·r 4 -at est ban a sree%11Cllts and vhich qrgl y u veil to tbe Plovshare progrm ca mo't vitb consistency 51Jmllml y i6llQre4 in ur long 'tellll eero pace uuclez r progrm TeelmoJ ogical nxes 1n the ve pon safety problm --premature l'll l 1 abil 1-ty the sensias ot delivery envil'Oment comaan4 and contro1 features ao¢ nist rative and securt ty 211eas 1%U - - have 'beea sicpler to implement end to cie lc c un erstool'l because a nuclee r wapon has tadtly' been regarded i s benign mtil it he s been detcme ted 'l'his a ttitude uq- successful ly be conserved tow rd aerospace reactors but isoto pic a er ie tors abaax i aercspace vehicles are cl ee ly e no r breed A single nevs enaounc e0ent th t a quantity- ot a tive strontium ''equ ivuent to th t produced in a 100-1' t i siou lmrst oa s been di51 4 rsed in - ne a tmosobare is net iml1kely- to be treated by C 1 ead ad toe as de facto viol e ti01 1 01 the spir11 it not tbe l ctter ot the test bu tTe2 ty It is al so -true tll t many ne tions including nuclear 't2ve -nots are routinel Y szmpling the e tmospbtric burden o radio etbity Addition l inJeci ioa a o£ radi011 eti debris o'f any sort v l ll 'be detected and reporua In aonie qUL-ters it 11DC1t 'be expected bz t sucb detectiDDJ vill be eq 12 d vith 2 la announced es bomb 11t '5 residui In consequence leaning ovar bac J - mrds 11 1 sponse cacl4 bamstrlng S J2 ee nuclear pmjects for years Political reali ties1 eJ IOtiOnel 1a ei on gin cm ear or be c re ted overnight to svee J u taa or en - be moat o rly a id n ion2 l ar teclmolo cal - Neches The IUl be - aoe l essoa to be cier1 ve l ' rm -W8 Jon se 'ety expe -ience is to avoid to the atest er- ent 'Deina plec ed en he def'eusive Fcr a e no e - n villg CP losit1on· to ae 511 ee nuclelU' rojec- s 2 r11 yet 'tO ·oe deveJ a ping It cai ho -ever be trig5ered by 2 e ruly serious c se ivec ture1 b an e ger -at1 d o Uicie J conce n over a ll iDor 2ccid ent c 1 ublic el mi P D rap-a et1p uu1inn b U rd eva i '1 2 tion and cont -ol ox- e --en by d 2 1 educE tio - a 11 ca paig o to allay pul Jlic fea oPS -tbat bave no-t really let ·oeen eX ressed• Al Jong tbe teciu tic il '1'2 llties to be -faced at t ds s t or - he gcme ue t he ollo'lrllig l Cc iplete re-eni y bunl i not so sil iple an dieut 2-S c -i 21 ly SU J' POSe d 'u er i cw new - 'be as i c q lete es tile -i tion i 'ithin a nuclee - 'L oall It is in viU 'ble tna s iould pu l c question a 'ise this wry coop -ison · -11 1 be lWie c ld in l context dised -antai ea 1s a erospace p r o 2 i'or the vllol e Si ect -um 01' post-1 zunc' sr te m 't ilm es 1 -e-ent -y be i ig o at 1ezst 1 a 3 eq e rc ut J' lle ting iS 10-t 2 Cc c DOll s bseque it e i i -on nt 3 or h prese r rellabili y o ' cc e·1d id ce t ol d -i es cne - s- 2 e i c - s •- 1 a t eric 1 e r plosiws i l Oi ell - s a n i o- bi r ior ibl' c i ·I' cocrponents ld subs 4 e s 11e - o - 11 s ety tu ctio is c a ' t Cc c c -- - ed 1 110n o 7 lo li t -es i ' e a c ·r- - 1- OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1 I 1 i • ·t J' r llUS i fli R 3 OFFIGIAL USE ONL¥ -3- l The ecgineering a proach to some tom ot intact re--entl'y particulu f'or small ccmpa ct pack QH like the tu el earpmile ot m bot Jpic ner- 2 tor is a more st -ai btl o i rogr ror vhieh tbere exi i s a more co zprebansiw ' ot e enence · ' be 1Jature ot tbe supporting tes1 pl Dsr2 is al SO 'IIIOrt tnetable m4 l Us sopbist1cated coe1pued to that for re-ei txy 'buruup · The b slc se ety problem ill Ur I r diological ·ccmtext -- aerospace e 00 1 or gmund reactor -- lles in the -rac t that abso1ut bua rd c umct be defined and iS not 1 0 el y to be 4etined lerhaps tor pentio i i A careful distinction 111 lSt be i imie bet leen the source of bczud end the huud 1tsel r It' the source c in be contained and coutn l led1 tbe sa i'ety 9roble11 is 1 R' llagea ble The ri J 1 c1 uises in tbs usmpUcm tha t a source can be subdivided over a l ' volme 2 -ea or -pop tion antl tbe t by this Jt'OCess the hazard can be defiDed u nesllsible• n tact howw losing or intentioael ly gi r ag '1 1 1 coutaiameut uid ccmtol o1 the aou --ce has no datana1·01e 'beuing on the cl ini-tion or buud 'or e le the USl l Jticn ot un tom d1S Jerstl of u y source is teelmicelly UD51 pporta 'blJ 1 hence the resul tant hi S al'd 'becc ies· as objectiooe hl e u zn objector cbcoses t o it In c l l 1 051t2Ce p Os - it is of' coun e un2 voiiable tb coutrol o'C t be radioactive source be e1 inquished in cost ce ses bu t it is not so obvious tba cootzi lent tn St like 'Wi se ·oe given U -- this is a maJor »oin in re vor or int act re-entry I r cont i mznt C2 %l oe reuone bly ssuri d by engineering ms cont 'oJ t12 Y in ny ces· ·oe e¢ ied - ro - e x m le 'b • buy in ba e recove ed acl- 2- 9The engineerlns sc-lutio is to contdmen not o l y n Dpcct out ave - r z -iy yee iJ1 e iv-4 romerr s cc be sought in t ie hbora tory a 4 i fiel4 re ther tb 1 i l s p ce It 2 so seems uonzble to postu1a te tba t e sl t'es • 11 ro'blc 11 is dn1mi Cd 2 5 tee au mer ot 11e -sons H' e1y be f 'e ted not iecessuily th 11 te ied is rri r rl zed inL Dup 2 Jpn ecli cie lies - hi past ulat en i Cly At - Ms O nt in til oe it is possible to l y out el 'bon te te okgi c l c Jd sciellti1'ic %'0 in q st Cit ro e c nuc lea r sctt- y A y of tbes posse55 ti sc J r s 1 1easu 'e11 ill us A rospa ce x ucl u l -Ojects 7 ho'--ever ue clu ly riot to · e itirdy SU5llenc ed or such p riod s A yOSi ivc f r i ad -O is a osolutely ecessa ey until etli 'inee ing ender c l'u S 2- z - 2 i 1able rr in e 'Deat i 1e '1101 U lta Y res ric t io'lS 2 nd p rollibitions on questio11ebl e rcsgeci r 1cl ar idveo- u -cs a -c not l cc ' t r 1 rltnic1 · iile oyt ons t'or ute r 12 2 tio i cc ·ce re tZ ei re r leu s t betic 'ro biticr s · ill e v e n be plzced rem ritnout Ir t c p c ses d sc ussed ·-to tllis point e re -ee onehle 1 the £0 1 0 1 5 g -css co 1clusio 3 iollo -s tl e c tly p cach to sa et y 3' m J l 2 r conc 'te propos fo - e iine r'- l6 solu or s t o ac ie sc ' o o c S 1 solution should no 1 l ac e - - c c e c 0 1 n S ocl ·c e 1 C -fo - ' t C e J i - e - t n1 - 2116 OFFICIAL USE ONLY # ' -• 1 1 II -43 A series of volunt-u-r contl'Ol J cm e erospzce nuc leu proJects shoulll be a i-eed upon vitbia the com nmity BD4 placed in e rrect until longer ter 11 F D solutions en ready tor q plicat1011 The l'Ul es or ttstrictiou end prohibition to 'be negoti Ate4 under 3 above cm not 'be l Ol ular but they tl wl4 be a matter ot strong CNtual sel 1'- Jiterest The 1'01 l olri Dg suggestions discussiou sight tor a on ion or the initial inputs I m AC l'OBS pcMtl' reac'ton a -e tu d- •n- ll y 'be Jigu betore they have gone critic el they u potentially t ie satest o r aerospace nuclear pa yload s Incoll Onti ng tbose desir n t'e tures no l n en11teuce to tacilltate eventuu blmnz they should be passed for orbi z l nigo- r subJec t to ese adcli tional provisos 'Because Ul e aapom a Tbe reactor ccmt rol systea and Ill u sociated cazr aanc ene Jling am actuz tor ciecae nim ls should i Ju orpora t e tbe 'best feil•saie and re llle'tUre•re istant eclmolou that experience rroaa the 'tomic vecpoa prosra i or f oz l my other sou --ee en provide b The OSsibllity or actor excursioc rollo- ri is launch or 11 -e--oroi a oo -ts n s- be - 11cibi- ecl to e gnc - est exteat possible by re liz ol e ir c l w sys- e s tor d sr ie obe 11 ent or the con prior ic pacli S·Jch syste ss sboul 4 'eSlJO' ld to bot l ccm c id sipia ls ed signc ls certve4 t a s tl e an·r- nt c U atil lo ig tem reli bili- y o ' reactor r butdcr r I cont -ol s i s Jt d r 1 a cc t tb e · l Jl or'bi-t u ree e r sbo- tl d not be tu - cd on u tless m agreed uyon mni Jn l lif'e et e o t1i t is e chieved A p ssi ol de1 il1i ion ot tile ci UJ ru l U f e cipt fo exz aple be 'tl e N l o t be e ct ea po er--ge e S l 1 e o t e core '01 5 t e i ies t Ce lt l e of C t O J Ot 50 thi J ig o rer 3QO CUS cs- • - i 'i i Ul ortu atc teat th se d- viccs u-e he cli e est d ee sies - oi' it c lei -pow - CCZ O t i s t l y to ae c a- c c is ons T c xis - setu o' 'le u d 6 • o cai - e a p - c el ose 1 soto es • 1hich 12 ·oec i ·oran d orld- vidc he r illers i lrl t r -s r Jr t i n ger er ioos C J t O'tbt 1- c d be i -✓ aes' ce - ot i oto ic 6 e -c tc - -cakr S e 1 r h - ' c ti e C i i - - J'l' r - - e - ch o r be d b r - c e i- - c t c c- - - c i e s· -nc 'lC d • - i in 4 • - - c - - · e ll i i t ce' l ro cnn'ct nl nc - c er d - llcn - r ese 5 y tf 1 OFFICIAL USE ONLV a I ·-91 • le ii I J ·8FFIGIAL USE ONLY -s- b Fuel roma f'or isotq ic gcne t ors should be cbuge4 to bir hl y 1 moluble cc npound I tor use in intact -entry coa' ein rs Tbs al pba-ai i tters pose a ditticult ptoble a A precedent has alreedy been cet vith the SNA'P·9A but a ishap not vt r ee or possible c011 equences has lso occurred vith this syst em AJ eba a itters haw been near-totally ignored u a w ipoa tall out hazard bouner tbe quant i ties mcl activitie i ot these ute iw in SlVIP systems insure that tbey will be quite detectable 1 hea iDJectecl into the pper a c spbe re Pu238• in particular is an o 41 r ot mqnitudc or tw le a too4 ancl - - iter c ycl e b %e rcl t han is s llut b • iu cftcce rroar KfC staoduds 1 t is at lea st tw orders zrzpi - ic rse a bu _ t s 90 in e r On the othl r b2Dd1 it it coula 'be guuenteed at P x238 pe r icles CGuld 'be di sper iecl in sizes cnu b J ar r titan a fev microns 1 'a three t tQ b human body tbroup lung ingestion si ms ner rly tc disa e r Pu238 1ay he w to be recogDiu d cs the i oc a for ca apra lise and ba rse 't -ediug Absolu p uc ence wul 4 lace it under the sme genenl rtsttictiou z s s -90 uic csl31 p is l ey dic- 2 te that ore ' J ge -s-c -i ssed cbances b uc - ed 11th 3a to keep toe iso ic e ene - t lr e o -t ztt lel S- Ji rtiel J y active 'I r ere He ta be s inte rilll measurer like packaging the Pu238 in predeter rl ned si e icsoluble 3lariicl s tor dispernl ciuric5 or i ed 12 tel y a 'te re-ent y burrn o tl- e cont 1e - this d 5 i be co side ed es oi e i rerequ s 4 e to c - rugb'tS It may or may tio be iecess ta nega it 1e n les 0 - o - sys ens ai du g u ca tbei scz les 2nd ie 'ti c iness or si¢ i cco p roa cn sa t'ety eng u e i n5 -p sis O o i-lite wil cles a re pT1 'Se ly prcsc -i'bc i i e c - h te s 0 ' t l - es- b -i t rea J rry fll t ct o f · iou cqui -e i t cnz l e duri iG uni eh e s e- y aspec- 1t1uld -ecei'Y'e o -e t lt 1 suf ' cii n tte - tion r 'ci vchl l v5 e 1 - s t cemi lly be t- -eaT d u o-e i sys- e i o - w e s % - t y c -ti eriz and z t ccptu ce s i r -c s a -e -- r y co to ·oe a cspor i·r ill • o - he ae o co11 n y ·Th sc J tl ion sy s • ril ' ctu s a a - c e c e 9Tt7prt tl - r -' i io i p -- il t O· i ' 5 r ei - - n Jc ' ' - pc u c -our ci ci - OS OFFICIAL USE ONLY a I I' I • · I ------------ dECPSiJFRI OFFICIAL USE ONLY car ultimate ret ml to ea rt b an to be cons 1dered1 the actor uDi ts may be treat eel lD ler ulu similar to reactor JIO'o'l r supplies IOODU is a specitl case of the i sotap1c geuera tor Its geODCtry ay not be 'Wl ll sui d 1nu et re1atry but oi a t la otbt r bmd ita fuel oa 111e y make l t dll'fie llt t o Ult• Cl a CU'L U ID J ysis V1l l be equi -ed to estahllsb a best safety IPll Oacb WRA3 AND PLAHE'tAlrI MISSIONS It seas clee r t ba t ingestion buarda of my r ort fllsult1ng 1'%'01 l impac- or rzdioiu tive sources upon tbe moon o pl oets or the solar system vill b precl uded by' the life S lp IO rt nacas1a r1 to l a tet- • lora tion or se llodles Thus it does not seem necessuy to 'be c0llce r ie4 for iaret y i-euoa5 abou t extn -terrestr ilil illlpact of 1JUff al n beta em - ters Gema sou es bow-ver l D4 this im luaea 1'1 sion product in· ntorles or reac COr payl o ecs could i ideed constitute a pourntul redie ion hue rd to estronz s or earlDeeriog solution of the iDtect re-eut -y iirablem it is suases d taai 111ajor e phcsis be p d on cont it ent o t e source during re- nl r e ad 1 spa ct 'l'o 1111 ke e rtll pelletretian ad ·aur lr l en e rly 10cl 2 y be o a 10115 I r con iit cc be ec dewd i't is i 0ssibl e to i' 1 ffl to other b i chnolog ictJ aeims £or recover at coo roi e United Ste tes ld p I' faze e ca ph pul lic 1ze ·JO ld-'91 d c by e-ver l llo'JJ necs e gee us ·ool 1- y ot e ' ro retu l o't recoff tcl scn rces The e p iuis sr auld · ' lzl ed oa e nl e 0 ese sourcss n r 'the i t be ard Ir e 0 z i onetar-J 9 y1 1m u I ·oau i or n sc n t e - thzn as Ul indcmdty c z 'be ecbiewcl inst -uctioos and equil Clent or s2 e lienill ng e id -e L ' 1 c r sou -ce c 1 tei ie s cm be ore r tceesstull y encl coo p ra ive cy diss i ted n c ec ion vJ u the P u Osed yrlor cy _progrt 2 AA ooject o r tllis ld nd or p Oc - 1 d or c ontzuic - d sisn it sell shO J d bO t biaa in VOr o iDt ell igent d 1SoO'V9r am - hua n - J •t' - o pru- 1 t 'Utln1 0 u ed r-Olll-es One mis' lt inves'tise te ro - ac le iii' o iSycbclo¢ - c c cho1ees re - saepe d p peE ce or ae con ner - be - '01 l d s- cu ge e 'ld e d e ic w 11 lite r t e 11 lld 51 iperstitio- pe011les t is q uJte c eu the t e cen d t'oz- iul io i o pollctes e id c i teri2 both in i l c lo - cm Jee is to - 1 ced' e y relti -c i ' o u cc i icel p -cg a u til 'ield of -rospace nucbe - sZ i'ety 1 e p ilosopb ou- n -i J h se p -el JL--y sui ge - ions otl - t e pan ph '2 Sed as o ie - itlcn t s t e J -al c rite rian ''d 1litlu l -is t 0 iJe p -ogrm--a 'Co -e s -ins -r t -e - e t' ie i rini lu 1 ri k - o Oe r il Uo o'th - ar ie c i se 1 e so 2 e ti t --e wor ld 2 S 1ca lec - o ii 'l 'l I ncb oz c- ivi r as i- 1 S leL-n d - - - - ll ueoi lol 1 e b3 cco and - be u tamo ile OFFICIAL USE ONLY 209 'ff rr th m OFFICIAL USE ONLY This page intentionally lefi blank OFFICIAL USE OHL ' d l •' ·T 1iQRilJPR9 OFFICIAL USE ONL¥ APPENDIXE s ch HI 67 c r cward Tell r A ociate J rect r ft er ce r adi3 icn 5bora o y P s Cf ce acx O CJ L veoore Cali rnia 4 Sl Marv MArtin's paper f D cemoer 22 l966 points out a need o continuin dy or ways o improving che odes qains a p aeatim• r uelear accid r t c s·JCitg u s a soluti t- -i l ag ee with o r e r eed tor 5tudie i 1 ch -is ·ocr Slt3 - n ' 'lit ee sugges t i ar d feel that st c t c sid at 1 • '1 ci ul I lead t e ·eu it'lr st i r g design t6Ch iques o u ure pores 1 ic e the fi rst fo al n1 c ilr safeo y s- · sdies in 1951 e• ieh pro -ess us b 'Jn aJe i i r tinua ly i xpan1ing ro ac on agains pea e- t il n·Jcl 1c iJ' n' s - st c sir g on e u p ient fail lra f lllat'J I t r h•Jman e rors t en unusual e r-1 r nm r ts rashes e- 1nd lat ly delibetdte 3 thcrized c iona COlllllll 'ld and con roll A eacn stag we have b en able tc unders and more of tho totnl environmen that iuclear weapons ar ctually exp sed to and inpr ve safety by i prove ents equipmen and op 4t onal procadur s A st dy ba9 d da •3 acc J lulat d knowledge ot tte elati e cost ve 3us net ga1a o 1- iditional safi ty attires night ar ow tnac A J o r er si' n i ficant gain cur i1 d ed be rr ade w thin prac- ic 1 cons o - he 1ys e n 1· 1 basic echn1 al lroble n t oday n pro idl ng a t i'1h avel of pea -ei i T tt n-l lear safl ty centers aro nd th' n • d or q- aic e-sct ior weapon whi a ca l co wert- d f om ir r -foc tly safe o pe -factly ' lia lfl wi- l III r ii ii r 1 1 1 f t i ne and ffo t by the tl 1ers This is done o • judicious hcice of arming 1igr1a s to t ll the w ap n when ta convert i neral th ae arming SLgn ls ar nera ea by phenomena nornally en ou ta ed nly ir th a t 1 wcapcn t J c ory such As 3Ccelera ion y locit1 p 'es ure ct a ge Such s1qn l arE- u sed corit • il tha- and ope a i st i- cal t' un· n- nu- 1 - ir y1 ld - e t ler the t -in of the d na n n or -poi t s f $ · er cs ¢ - he i'ilX' rac' ic o th nhn1 r a t e -ia on r - cha u all · u ea e ons We tr3ji lo a11y h os sucn pher er J p we pon sys e 3 l y to esi· n th' 3y rtem aro• ir d r h' ' t wo es ti ng rig 1als JS s h3t bypn 1 1J - he3-t signals by sp• dous phenol l ' nl n iny seo of n H t ions is e c rc111 y i nlik ' ' y Thi i rnvolves putting hot dt'lvices n- ro la I by tbosl s 1 n 1 s -1 J J -w - s reall' r r •ni r t 1 c it I en i o i -ao ic-n pr 33l l lle anti rr akl Vl - ' ' d vi s 1s ·a -s f as o5s l' t ir t' ' n' lJ O l -po - s l r ¼ ·3• erns co 1 t- e - ttign s h3• ' ' n 1 led o ' '' · n ii - -lt --4 t - sys - • t - 1r· · ta s sc- s - h t l3 i 3 i 1 j c r J l 1r $1• s 3 · ·-e i tt 4-J - - • p i 33 ' • r - •· r s or tr· - 1 t1tr • y -- cd d i - r a c o• ld i 3 OFFICIAL USE ONLY l I J 1· 1 j ' A l I iiGMIWMt OFFICl L USE ONLY r at ft t - 1 alli· th9 is in eper 1 en t i- ' a l «d si11 1ul - 11r eo• sl t lr• l n 1 e ir ak si al o n l ar yle w cl sult $lmila 9a1n might t p icti- al by c her t9ct niques h c h O a ' cown tr a '1 'om he detcnator s 1nt '-•nt 1 1 1 n s1 a y • tr i l t1 -i q sys er- · er - h-e Y dra le echan al m ve en ot cr e a t fro p Qper position tt ditional in conventional or nanc l n i it r c ived a corr9ct coded si1r al rniqht be eff ctiv Having a d libe ate as1mul eity ti e-delay in •jn d- t 1 t ne or ar auto-de Jt uctc c for r h se• onda -y t b'f removed by ' c - rr - t - dsc s gnal i i•ih- I ' Jct al cied i on' o l o node -nize i • 1 - s cns t the lr il ght-ln-1o rt Llln r i ct ini i IFJ J m j - h- 11 1 eilr t aii 3 l' m IA · F or of ny - nd-op• rJtlW1 w u t s fori ti riaUy down §trea i f c - te i- ' onator sys- e ns ni-3ht g1 1J 1 - pro· ie 1t n nu lear u e- - · 1t a c ptabl price £ -cam 1 1tton of 1cdi icr al cievi i t fo iif - 1 ' r har cO a • m •' f uu - fa hea s hc i ld be dor e - are ully and a- · • ri ely y p Qple q• al Hied - Jctig be' t I real zard and - h pric f th f1x Perhaps aodttional p o ect ion ho• ld e tforded o ly or the part ot th stcckp1le-to•t rget s quen e where the ha ard exi$ts e 1 silo-based warh ocs m y ne d p ot c in transit but n t in th9 sll The missil would be r l1cv d oi the weight and -eliability osts of the pro eeti e aP VlC by ddir g i t to the cor ta ier Lnstead o t e warhead WP have added seri s cQmpo tents c o enhanc varii us kinds of sa e y c th p h t where they might concelvably oecome counter pr juctive Har M irt 11' s i qu ant f or a r ew ·Jso'J f r A h f 1ce s an audienc• pained by r cen • d n c t he rcli ib ltty r n e -exa ted ty u re -it •c h ir l - al a ir 5yst1a- r s e· er c - e c tt t e actua l wering of the r-e ll safe y c t eapcn ir i ht accro e -c- i a are 1 q est fer a s f y tW co•Jld i - re - d i qei - f l q 1- 1i 19- r ducer • l 'J i Ce ' ' a- cr yiP l·J -a i pm er e i - ' rin ' w rhead -o gh wi es or te L d v1c 1 A cied swlcch a n clear weapcn canoe e hgr cloar s te y feature er ¢ n and c1n j cont rel fea ure or cc - h - i lg ruc l ar safety -equ r r ents 1 T ar d und control eq re ents mus- b car ully s d ed before us g cod 1• -1it h- ' J prir iarily for r • clear u e' ' ' aa son s Release of a J ocltpi for itl or tro 1oul d not remove ne assar · safety ea 1 es u qc •'t co t rr it ee ponsor ih rid 1r mbers t P- c refu ly cvalu ' a b • t o- - r c 1r d A C OFFICIAL USE O LY j r lifl' il 'FAIJ OFFIObliL USE ONLY APPENDIXF Nol used 0FFICIAL USE ONLY ·-wCRSZfFBQ OFFIGIAL l JSE ONLV • This page intentionally left blank OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ · II 3ECniWFEII OFFICIAL USE ONL¥ APPENDIX G PE PMll'i 7'tC OF' DEF'C SC MWtar LJ• un Com1nl11H 10 lhc AIOwe Cnera Co11 ml11ian Waalll Clon D C 2DHS U t lar ltH Jlripdier Cme-nl EAl'l 'vd I mer' A• -lat nl Ccnrnl 'J 1111ccr r UW1 '7 Appllra io• o s AtouJc Eaua C Dear Ed aa ATSD A l Jmer 10 D u A A'EC d•tclf 24 Uarcll nn I be ac ackd to pu1lc lpatr In a DA SA •Po ° 4 a iai7ai1 DI wr r c nlcrl• as •acd In i fWLa 7 Claarackruti '0 l11 t- r antlyda al sale17 ut nta hu btcn ccc ilcltd pnd the allll'c1J' 11udU'II• ror p -cmuu -c pro JalliUtlcr Sor -a nitai a aall ba ba N ll• ll d la the l11c losurc Thcac s 1 ndu-d ar-c • lmUar· to thD c p acd b r S1dl1 Corporal Ian lo Firld Coni rialld DASA ac t Ul t tl c mer-al p -L-r 11111rc pr -o c li1r rTqulzemR for- 6-c Iller Jaand dt aalloa nirc '11 b ol he - rtlu4 IC's haa been r • tr lr'Ot'C reS' - iC- ivc 0- hu• apecllic T Clf Jkcmc l• 1 1 7 be r atcd fD indl'fiAi al weapon • -stuaa dcpcndin o i U r apcr• lonal conc c ' h - Drpa -tmnt DIDdniac hu ado itnl thcae a1iutd- c 1 as a pldc for lht prcpi r illlr I cal J tQlla ' ' Chu-acc ir ic s l'llC' · -i J ll n t • nc -ll an1Uc lor LD i ast ecr n1 bu1 caodl ic •• Iona r uy be -cqlrl -c I d ic cues for aa a ilc aUNni dcmoUUon m11n Uons Sid - lcar a - le pnJei tlJcL We a c vc'7 mu Sz lc 1 cd Jn a co inu i 11·11 rs -cnt gf wa -tic and Kz nb nH·e hut 'la a c r b1 1 J nr rr r 1 i C'D f Jr c uii i - I hd - cuDdard dcll c -y l' 'Sltmi Thir -ir o c -er H i'-' r a u c C t n- t II re - n ID lhc l'nlrn Rc1'inr - s A rpta ce C1 111 1D t CI c n·rrin1 uirl a n l •c 111 '1 1 d1 1n1 of 1he •a -11 ad r -11• 1 1• l 'C - b llti•C for c e c n - b u dc-1 c - ed b 11' ' kdly S •ld MC••· uu es H'l U r p a aUch ie c ruur s r u ' tn -c t i- to he · dc-r -c-c ol conS'a - 1U11 e to the J 1C•c ln aitl io • r f - her rr uc th - ee J C p1 ' Jclp c in k rc aln •11 '-i the Ar r DO '•c -cc- ic t on 1' -o c o accs L is · -o r -rc 1n analo w• joln1 l C 'IOD ana1 •1r anrJ C'W'a ut le 11 al le p -t' l i -r i -u lu ar the ovn•lllll wc 1f i r y i f••M nd pl11e the aec c r 7 lu Jr ar I f n ll 'S £r u c u ap 11 lhle U t 'bo i •a l -c -z f7•h n gu d o lrlo -- al 411 1 sc Clft lJa the field wlt i I EC and - tA 7 p r -s -iftcl l ia GU' - n r -s • r Sn tl a r di Jo D hr a a itll ta i a • wW aat nlt tn L T'f 1 - c -uic tr wc pon dC 'J lt1J•mc 1 its • e ii We a p -l' lc t· the- ui c lr i i op rrr li n • r • uh tan r pnwJded b7 Un- AU uqu -q-n tlons Or lcr r - 5 l'lr Sc Car o -uihr In tilr _ 11 ' 'cu Or--11 • 5 foccrcJy 1 f C • Tl CAltL • At ShE h•l 1 I • i -• A Sr O l O i1 7 t t · OFFICIAL USE ONLY 15 1 8Ml ifJPR l OFFIGIAL t ISE ONLV ffAJa AIU S FOR ARKCAD A'fl '1 DD ID MU t-lAnJlt PftOBAUll JTT UC PAl ACMPHS _ T c pra1t•111tr o r • prtmahlrs 1Ndsar •riONlllml at a •artac• d dltc ta •a rbu 4 a pgnca m al• aaactle••• la • ma C'd e- - nmalcd c1mfWoa ID ht r r • 1 htp11 _ 't'f ll for IJW dl'id 11riw c C• mollllD illC w eantrnll lhall DIil cscesd • • • C Cl Prior l•l 1111dt rar thr ral C' -l• ctor• ir rod o -n U-111 a1rizoamcnt s dcac rDH d la the STS l la u 1 per •· -head 11fel Dc ' Prior t JavftC 't• lor the - ormal er o sun at •tddc d - m r en l clcic rlbd la l lc SIS I la ID per w -hu d - b -n p 1 '1117 oC a p - 1 iu·c 1tUdu r°dcto11ul- ril • ramnd disc o • -tln4' c omponcal sn-1• fu11CUons a Itc -1wr h prio - '- b receipt ol Ute final 'K'U'ttrad an ln al nal shall not d 2 in u c rnita b • rcru cl rs inl llas a stand ltd •hJcla an• · rcqislrc am Ule tio• 'hat app c d to• sptcUi weapon Ad1m1 a1 p -cmalllr• prollullll1 c rllula r 111•1 be ladudcd la Uu dkr IU llndt sttia U1n1 dcp•ndbc ex1 t u nrl011s dci -cc• i d s Sc- y r c d for Uu apcc Ilc empJO 'ftlcnl conccp s BO IB MC1 1 a The 11 lu ll - or a prcmr 11 c liaclcaer de1araatl1J11 or a lnn b dll to bo n'IJ _ p i mal t it h• c ic t i the abr cac of any lnF -'I ls c eecpt ler •pccilicd c nala c c c onlu r-L f and eol -oD s r JI czccc d • s 11 -a e ud 11 »c -atl11 sd CSlT'lT a ' 'l r nts l P -i11 ID - cl1-l af lhc pre-a -m cl nt fD - nar al du ll cd 1n S S J b 101 pc -bc alt 1Ur J nc n P - - o rcuipl al hr p -r-a -m cli 'al lor Un abncn i l- mdniamcn 5 dn -D11 d in the STS 1 ln tali pe bor ib nponrc car aedde t • lo 'nlc p llba ll r ar a -c re n-aclcr r dnan Ho D • bo d1 1c 0 offl'b co poncr t z n a i - 'ls le Uu rcecljl or Ui p -a-arm slcn-1 wnlch wDl ndan cr Ulc 1h•Uvc J dn lt 1hall ' accctl J 1oJ 10 1 r tc1 a0e c-Jlc Cor Is Oi C - t lo ' lll env1re mcnt drp -nal 11 on the s - li ba ib t s mi 11 1plir ncm t 11 -d inut tic nlllu tcd for the ui 1llt11 - d 'adc -laUa for th 1 J la - -upo arffll c mrL-c - t S a' 'C L't o• c c pe ttd JocJatlnl a r o er-aUon czwlr 1 icn1 u ddi r Ill '• wc•por •a clo tpllrLa-t r ri c H cncc a d mlll arJ ch nclc -lr lc • ln hid Ul wc pcrn JI r li - d 111 a 'YJYc r hc il d -t -azlat ni la c e ll lnal rr Ua IU J' •• b o T 11 L-n rlrant u nls • l t lhaac en -L-onz1 w 1 •• dr lned kl Ou• i - en•a Sltie r-1 t - 1·l -q acn e allt r illl -J' ic 'u 1o ci• tc1 tn •hla tbl' upou h esnc- i -9 lo rr n lull o - - 111 - it n1 l a iDI - OFFICIAL USE OHL¥ I I '• • 8if 8Rli JEA k OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPENDIXH l UAL JUDQENI ROLES IN SAFn'Y CONTROL AND SEClTRITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS M B Custavson Lavrence Livennare LabcratDTY V L Stevens Sandia Laboratories Thia paper vas prepared on reqcest of the ANS Study Croup to p ovide backgro nd for the H luag ent and runding Altenia ives o £llDA Milita y Ap icAtion and Restricte Da a Func ians Study OFFICIAL USE O ILY ·d l l ·r·i · ' ' r ID addit ioD 1 0 thdr pTiu1 7 respoudbWty for 11auitain1 ac adequate co ba capabilic t he a1litary force of the Uo1ted Scates have alvay1 had• Dumber o other •eriou• eoncen1 includiAg ••fee c the pravaatioa of lo1ae1 arlsiu frm accidents coDtrol e 1 the ability to applJ ISJ• t• selectivelJ and securitJ e g tb preclusioD of loss of capability or equipsaect by sabot• • or the ft For aoa•ouclear veapou1 aode1t 1hartfalll 1n n7 of the1e desireble capabilities or qualities can aCtc be tale • tcd bee• •• o the ltJ aite results vhicb cm he attd Ded by tbe use of DDe or• few conveatiocal veapaas For nc lear veapon1 these coac e ms for • afety coatrol mad secu- icy take on toul17 llCW dimensions The bdividual veapons have such larae cluuucU vc potcdal that the iHuu of adequate sa et y 5ecud cy cd control are elevated i oto 1scues of 1 1at1oul policy 71le pauibly catastrophic couequ1 11cu from ui msaucborized nucle•r detonation have been a matter of national caacenl 1ince such vupc ma vere first created Uis coacer i is Vidcaced by tbe fact tbat nuclear devices can ouly be uaed even in experimentatio 111th direct ud specific Pres1dent1al authadzatii r i Since 194S our naUoa al defcae neec s a ad che- nuclcu cech 1olagy r ailable io i ae e c thesa needc h ve chacged l l in1 his pedod 1 se 0£ pracedu cs has bcco de eloped ud 1 1ctitu ioo l 1%ed to •eet t e ne essirtu of pre serviJlg ID Ucary ef eccivenl Ss vhile precludi u i u bcri etl nuclear e enu The heart of tbi a prace dure 1s a cyste l a dual agency jutpumt vbere ill J olJ and JmA assume CIJICPle eutny roles to bsure th l both utiooal goals a re met The puTpo se a tids paper is to rerlev liridl7 the bi tory of this nce -ac ive process h tha coiitu t a chan ing tiaaa l need• anrl the graving technical capabilities • a ilab1e to aeet hese needs 1 'hi is done separa e ly fo the three areas af cacce u 1afety coD rol and •ecurity lnllvidul lly and colle iveJ y these review tndieate that the O ited Sutes has bun vell aerve d by the d ul lw Jg ent i echa is s Ce eral Baek5round Ce t aic e1 evec a hzve uz atte d on eecb o the •reas U de iccu srion here Dd de e -ve tr£at e ot a • backdrop to the e ara e rca diacuscio s uhich follov The cre t10n a0d first use of ato ic vea o s occurred in 194S lnternacianal negod Jltio ic i cd1ately began follcu d •bo tly b an uitea e da estic debate cm l lita ' as contrasted vj th civilian coat l Thia Jlcue uac reaolvt d dcc15ivcly in favo of civil1 a i cga rol vi h the cre tioo 0£ t be A ocJ c EDcrrJ Ccr i i sio 1n 1946 AJJ a par of tbic act the M 1litary Liaicon Co it ee s e abli hed ha chair L l vho c TC$ On lbil1t1ca i Dcluded tranc aics on o t c A C defc se ou lea o t o i reQuirr cots Io the ollc- -1 g y ar 19 7 tbe Deparoee a Dt e ae vas o - ally csca U£ned OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' i 1 1 I • • SECHE i F t J OFFICIAL l ISE ONLY In US2 the first thefllOnuclur devtce vu erplodcd Thb • d other major technical changes besan to appur in the nuclear weapons in the 7cars bllad1ately aub1cqucnt the design of early US nsclcat capons tutured auclcar ••terlal packaged 11 the fora ol a capsule vhich was not aatcd to tbe rest of the veai 011 ayu·e 11 until lite in the delivu-7 cycle ly late 1956 the f f nt nuclH'C' veapons 0 • uev duisn the aealcd-pit type vhuein the nuclear utedu and Ol'dnance componeots are ao intecral u1mfactutcd as ably vere 1Dcraduccd to the 1toekp1le D lring the 19S0's there vue alao dwages 1u the nonveapollS are vbtch cre ced • Dead for and guat• teed ready acceptance cf these uev technologies Jtockct delivery becae • practical rc lity National Hc urity oeeds chansed ud requirements nose i o achieve and maintain bigber 5 ates of read1De1s The need for echuical 1mpect1o a aad monitarias 0£ n lear veapons by U C desfp ea as to assure rel i ility vas rechac ed k1 iDcreasin lY luge pa rdcll of the uatioual uc pon atack ile vQ transCnred frca AIC to DoD Ibe du of d at •tock pile bcsa i to grou • pidly iD order to support he vide var1et7 of defense needs ay the end of the 1950' nuclur VUl'OH bad beeii widely deployed Forvard basiog iti Europe • otbe theaccts vu c anablisbed put of defense posture Soma of these veapons vera • utioued under US custodiansh p iD poddoo for del1vet7 by allied natto11 vu 1c les··uul tt bilatcnl an-a icments During the 1960's e vi esyreAd 4eplo meut aud the proliferation of IC IM's io hig e dine ss posture tbe NATO Quick llc• c tioa Alen forces and c nces ilJ t ry plumini and altered political pcccptian gave rise to izscreasicg caucena vi th control aspe ts oC nuclear ve a aney A ec evbat analogous vave of CDUCUU vith sec urlty has occu ed 1n the l970's •• numerous instances of terrortsa Dd ttantit-ry gaitu d vorld ic e attcuti0 i Safety While safet'J has bee c ouidercd u i po'CUDt issue sbc e the very ceit the rclauvdy low ctatei of rudi iess dcanded or DJL io al 1ecurity iu tbe early yu s of auclu r vea o ry pe 1ttcd cc Jsider -ble flu iblli'ty iD 111ecung safety require ients Veapous le- e •tared 1n • part1all1 d1sa 5embled ctate und r AEC cuseodia sh1p iaspeccioc aod aoaitoring Conceptually the plans spoke of declarat1o of ua obili aciaa including dcl1vcry of veapous o the litaey and fi al leapo ac1e ioly earoute to target f i 1t device The increased •Cates cf rudiDe s requited for aa ioe l aec i y and he technical innovation 1 splaaebted co eet these ne ds e g the iotroductian in 1956 of ''i ealed-pit tYPe vupoai r haoged ufe y uaues dra a ic al ly Sub equen change in ilicary p an a d dcl vcry odes rApitly i reascd t e nni 0 e aviroc entG to -hich nucle r veap cs ciht be expoaed e eii 1n peaceti Aa the Scraceg1c Air Co i nd deereaced i response e by grcu •n •1 bo n alert eJCc 1$eS• the rate of vea OD ecc1dectG al c incr ase OFFICIAL USE Ot4LY · 1·- i r Ni lETJillftO OFFICIAL USE ONL¥ ta 11id-19S7 aa all-11111t•T1 • atety board isaued • report on the potent1•1 t pact• of tbe nev type of mac lur veapoa the resultizs 1 Du ns ve aearchiD reexaminations of vupma deaip and veapoa s71tm procedure led to the first of th• dual •1acf relatiouhtps the nclear ••fety rule procea1 ducribed below ' Ccrta A lllbiguid e• coacendD A EC • Mi DoD rupcms1bil1ties arose aa a coasequeace of ezteuioas 111 daplofllQt of auclear vc• poDI from •trate i operat1Dlll at ba1ea 111 the eont1Dntal US to tactic1l ope •dcn• • forvard beses the AEC Chairua u t1Uad to die JCA in 1959 a • to the oeed to clarify by legi latia11 rcsponsil i11Ues of AEC and tJoD vit h rupcct t o vaapoDs 1D 1JQ1 custody the bwe aroH a1aia in J eceaber 1960 1Jl comsectioa vith • request o Presideat Eiunhovet' to approve a uuclur veapoa dispersal plan ls • result of a JCA£ visi to MAIO in late 1960 JCAE Chai run Holifield r Ot e l'ruideut ICenaedy cit1a1 the iaeed for clarificatiw of upomibilitics 0D Ma 8 1961 Nacion al Security Action Kmoraudua Sl vas isaued sutiDg in pan Yitb re1ard to the broader uaation eoacc uing recpocsibility vf thiD t b gov rmaenc for the safety o nuclaar veapoaa the President bas di -ected that tha Department of Defease have iDadi te acbdnistrative Tupousil Wt7 for ideDtifyil 11 • Dd resolving heal th and sa£eey proiilc u c omsacted vith the custody and at once of nuclear vu pons Be bas further pec1f1ed tb•c the Atomic Enera COlmicsion Vill 'Jl rd cip te 1D the coosidun100 of these problms as • JU tter of conti iuui nspoo si- billr Be has iilstncced that IIDJ' iuuu vhicb cumot lu d rec cly resolved by tbe DoD and the AEC vU1 be nferred co hia throu1h th1a offi c for decisiou ccardingly it is requcated that the Depar011e nc flf Defense 1A caoperatioD vith 'the AEC and • uch other •sencies as my l iave a direct n u t in this tter msderuke prc ptly a •tud7 of fb• t addition al adl n stntive and • tacutory proTiaioaa ea7 be required 1'D relation to the safety of nuclear vupom aad uuclear ve apooa ayst- s cd to report to the President throu1h this office as aan as possible the Tl 5 l l s 0£ their • dy course of action agreed upon a sd fty aetio s vhic h are rcco meaded for the President to take 'Ib 1 a HSAM •• iafied the CM a cd ao leiislative thante v s auggestc Tbe soal of vupon cyctt l ••fety stud e eoaducted cond aually since about 1960 1a aaxf u •feQ' consbtc i vith oper at ioo al reac iacu •• The a1l1tny • e vic es chair 1 nd p -ovide ce sbers or the ctudy vich ap- i -cpriate log ctcal and operational re pons1bilit1c and the DUlt pro ides an tRDA voticg caber aad • technlc l advi• or froc the nuclear weapon design laboratoriea The 1tud1es generate a act of 5afe r c hich gcvet l the p opo• ed dcploy ic t •• ega -ds auclca - safe y l'nile • vcapon aystc ie io dcvelop ie t sa e y study g -oups are o - e to Coll OFFICIAL USE ONLY t • i 1 1 • ' ' -8 e- TirR OFFICIAL USE ONLY the vupons develop•eat md assure adequate ufety criteria Iatcri aafety rules are approved befare the veapon bccoae1 operational After a field ••fer study final rules are approved by the Secretary of Defense and vith the cOGcurreuce of the Adld nist-rator of EllI A the nlu ai-e f owarded r o tb• Office of the Preddca t ita a amiual report lt 1a i oteuonh7 that while issues of re c ondbilitiu bave required referral to the 1reaideDt for resoluticro all Du ear • afcq- quutions involving technical detail have been re olved abort of 1ucb referral So e of the AEC ERJ aliuortty news as vell as those which cvvlvcd i11t0 aajority 'lieus led to ujor lllpacu on vea 011 s11te s for e uJB la 1n the cu• of add1d oaal protection of laUDch circuits 1n the POLARIS P0SODON fleet ballbtic mi• sile ad ill the case of additional protectioa against the effecu of acd deuta ia the SA FEGUAlUJ air defc nse veapon •Jltem Certaiu design feacure s of 1 mc lear ve•pODS da ooc cODtrtbute ta milituy effectiveness-the - eld st soluy far veapon prouctiou Some af these features 111ay even delimit the vaya m vhicb a veapou may be effe tively used IA general ia itiativu for impnivcment• iu safety devices and feaCUTes lay vith the nuclear vu pcm laboratories of AE C DDA Rouble c u mples 1Dc l w e •• l Accidea ul R•lease of Bombs 'lvo-Man Con-crol JttcopUt 1011 of iuac vertant release 0f ready bcncbs froe flying aircra c as the majar •afe proble zi a c t t to irt ione aler po5tm-a ia tbe late 195D's led co davalgpment a£ special bm release rack locks by the Air Fore• an4 improved 1 rc aft _onibtr and Control equipment by A C ve pimc l • ho-ra'Cories 'tbe aicd lg t-249 mAC ccntrol bo vu fitted vith · a 111ecbllldc al lock and •ea I co revaiC inadvertent Oi'er tiou tbe T•249A conttal box vas ieVt laped co prevent a prmomly a nie4 bOClb f1 01ll lieing l eft 1n mi uz afe c ondidon b imp oper mam pularlw of the svitcb on the ccm rol box ad a aei bod andllg control feature the T-380 Readine u Sldtch colloquially • Vu eace svitch vas developed and installed 'Ihe laUct device fac 11 ie ted furcher extcnsiOQ of the Air Force's bu m rel 1ahil1ty progrm l iu the fom of che tvo-i wi rule coocept Today this coocepc bss advanced to uie follO'o-iA type of fim6- cutal practice established fgr the operations vidi aucle a r vea ou A lld aiDm of tvo authorl ed penous ucb cap gle of detecdng incorrect or UDAu hort ed procedures vi th reJ pect ta the tas'k bd 2 1 pcr on ied aod famili ar vith pertinent • ety requi ' l' ltc chall be pr eat al2d 1 a DSitio to ohaervc all ope ations peTfo -med on any ato ic veapcu No lo ie iodi i dual hall be af ct ded an OP C 't U ty i 0 uu any act cr i vhich ri ll c au se • the- i or l Jl tr aa c usutbo - %ed nuclea- de ooatioQ OFFICIAL USE ONLY r 1• • r ·s OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2 Environmental Sensing Devices Startin 1D 19S envtronmeatal sens1DI devices st's vere developed and etrofittr d into the nuclear veapons stockpile SD's prwide • po1itive-inten-uption of critical arm1n circuits until the eapaD i • coa mdtted to the targec e g •• launched in tbe intended vay these devices alleviated problems being faced by operational forces because of eusceptibilicy of nuclear varhead to uuclear detonation fra11 human error and or equipment malfuDctions aad fram aabalage S lAilar features r0tecc bc bs until dropped 3 Abnormal Envirom cnts ln tbe late 1960's the ERDA nuclear weapon labcra aries established edvanced development p ograms to improve technical under• taDdiug of the 1l'lp11cations of designing nuclear Yeapcus for safety in the abnormal e g accide11t enviraaments izu ludizlg de rclPJJDU Dt of uev cypes of safety devices and features A study uas m ade of the abnormal enviromaeut sa£ai y or •tockpile systems vith prioriey tD aircraft-delivered ll 'StUlS because of the f equency of veapon pre-an ng incidents and the histar of aircraft-related • cidants involving nuclear vupoiis r iu nudy is a aample of tbe cgzit lllui 1g task of assessing the potential uapacta of clum1es b tachuolagies or n plll Xls for opeJ adan l deployments Currctly a joint ERDA Doi plan is being evolved to ide at S fy remedial acticni• far the •toclcpile were needed at the veapon sysc« m level Cb 0geii la ailicary posture reqairme11tc and meanc of de livisry •re cmu iuuing o c re ate 1ll V 1 afl isi ue - l'oi-the't IZIQr i proved safety is co sidered to be of illlportanc c by all part ies The milit r7 service re uire ents for 5te ady iuc ea au in •afeey are paralleled by • 111ajor mphacb ou reaearch and developnieat iu this aru by retrafit to exisdng systais bat major advance a equire total replace eut and are likely to be introduced as part of a broader stockpile m0der ii z at 10n and retirement plu Control Aa vith safety tbe early year• of oucleaT ve aponey per it ed use 0f a vide variet of techniques to insure control since readiness v s not• cigldf cnnt is1 t1e 1elatively lcugthy procedures of custodiau• b1p transfer reccipti g inspection and moru toriug could be rcatUy •cccm nodated i n-part because the atock ile 11%e va5 5tll illl aud the nu aber of torage ite few in number Mobil1zacion for use involved bours if no d ys Tbc gravi trends tovardG rc•diocus larger nu nbers fon ard deployment and use 0£ aon-US cans of d livccy occu r1n gradually OFFICIAL USE ONLY q 1·1 · 1 T' - •t 8'1ElfPR -• OFFICIAL USE ONLY ta be 19SD'•• focu ed ever incre•sius attention oa the national ability to apply these veapotlS selectively and under precise ccmma d authorization A 1960 CAE report erpressed concem DTer •ecurlty of veapona deployed in non-US KATO support for iustance pDssible • abata e of a weapoa y1t1C11 in Europe aad fictional possessicm by the fev OS m111ta cuatodians at MATC -'llaaned • itcc Conttol upects of this coacem are di• cuased firat After study by aeveral hisb level cc mittees chaired by military • e vicu and DoD official•• the need for Pen dssive Ac ion L1nks PAl 's as tht coded A-itche• V re called vas ei2dorsed In June 1962 Pres1te t lennedy issued Haticmal Security Action Mamraudm 160 vhicb direc ed incorporation of PAL's into all land-ba ed ve•pous ill NATO NSA 160 also directed the M C DUJA to c uk its uclear veapou laboratories vith dev lopmeac of 1dvanced s7st1 11S to provide high r 1evel5 of veapons concral PAL svic che s vua first retrofitted into • veapOD 17stem in Europe e fa z mc nitbc afcec projec authari atiou It is pertiaimt t the first PAL avicch vas • 111odific atioa of a s - ltch lrudJ prmred feasible 1n an U C DU A u plorat0ry davdopment p -ogn a for c fety-• puls tr in ope-rated A tch tor thoae bcmb s ud varhe ds having trajec ory euviror umt• not eomp aiibl• '1th cDUVantional ESD's the nuc luT veapoa desip labaratorlea of DDA vere by mid-1962 already deeply mvolved iu coutrol teclmalogy and bad • nu ber of in navadoo s 1D prd1n1uary development vhich vere later Jltroduced into 'the •tockpile the forward basing sicuatiou also led to iaaue of• Bat1ona l Sccu ity Act1rm Mmorandu a lfo 272 oa Novembe-r 13 1963 ta fon a li i e proceduus for establblment of safety nslu for -nutlur weapon IS 'stezu Procedures required that p-roposed Afa y ra lieJ1 1ncludiilg procedures goveri a uis the use of AL derl es be coo inat ed vi th tbe AEC p ior to ap-p ovai by t be Secretary of Defenu and uotificatiou of the resident of 1Dtcut to deploy N 'i 27Z alaD required a listing of die DoD imd A EC org niutions tbac bave studied die proble and take rupous1biliey for the technic sl judpenu m vb1 h conclus1110s a s to adequacy of sa feq measures are based Tha ccucrol developments given ajoi- impetu in the 1960'5 have conciuued -to iuture Several cate ories of control equii ient are uov • a lable and use in nuclear veapocs to 11eet dive -ce i 1l 1ta -y uccds As 1 l ao a any reac ccn se of the latest technology can be introduced by retrofit but most major advances must avait w beed repl ace ent I should be noted that in p•r llel vi th the develo n ieotc outlined These b ve de al £or the most par v l h pe fecti lg the control linkage bctvcc o nn auchori y and the varhe ad Theue ATe ma t porcanc parts 0 the total pro c 1 v th the control chain o ly being•• trocg as its ave the ilicary serviccc h ve al o beea aking ajor ch 11es OFFICIAL USE ONLY I • ' I ' I • -- l - O ' lf11Fftf 9 OFFICIAL USE ONLY vcakest link lo h oD and DU A have VOTked ift clo1e cooperation on th se issues in atte111ptin to insutc both adequate flexibility to •eet military conti fl encics uhile alSUriaa that W'l uthorized use does not occur Sccud9 MaiDtaiJliq and protecting veapoo - st i lllS in the face of possible hostile actions is also alDD v1th safety and control a traditional area of military cancEm Cntil the late 1960'1 ao ual dlitat' ' measures and ailitaty prosrams on huaan reliability vcre cenerally con11dered adequate to meet nuclear ve apon Hr urtty concern The additional aeasures and equipment introduced or purposes of con rol described above vere seeu as desirable augmentations of aec urity and iadeed there i• considerabla overlap l e tveen these wo conceru s During the t te 196D's and vith ever increasing force ti the 1970's tbe more se u•r•l resort to high levels of violence by orsanized gt'ou s operating under ao recognized national authoriey have ex cerbated security coocnus Banditry and terroriaa ba e aemi111ly became ubiquitous In tbreata crudied bJ both 1968-69 tbe area of eecuritJ mi asun s appUc eble to diversion fo't' aateTials and vupons for trauafu or··cransferred to DoD vu by a jo t AF C DoD aup l'rc mpt remedial ect10D5 vere t kea ageiscies to •trengdlcn 11 01 1e idcntifieci 11ulcne sses Sulu1equeu bardvare developments and cys'Ca sc aualyses have led to sup-fmiction i pro•aaenu 1 n safeguard capabilities forveqo11S 111 ElUlA cunody uoubly the use of fo•ed plas ics for access denial cout bluous ccm mmicaticr ls for veapons 1n n-ans it sa£e • er ure trailcs and site security systms Hilleary and DoD ag cies upgraded physical protection requirements far veapous iu their custody pan icularly as regu-dG rupaase forces Tbe potenrial uaefuluesa of ERDA-developed t chuical fe aaires in DoD operations u under study particularly capab llicy ta deny or destroy the uaeiulneas of vupons Chrough built-ill future vbich can be operated on cc r ca id The Talue of cc ntimw ig ERDA DoD dialogue u be illustrated by c urrimt concern aver transparution of e apoos In recent year I oD has re-u lrlued loatscical t ansportation of uclear veapoas a id for a ccn r puling •ecuricy advanca1e has directed IUXim m use of aircraf A current study of ERDA air truck ai1d rail tt' DSl'orta'tion 0peratio is au gests that radioactive concaz duatiou safety risks are bighe st £Dr air tra isporc Furt h r definit1 e studi to illuminate broad aspec s of accuricy-• afeey trade fn vill be needed Iufo tiou fro a ERDA and DcD stuc tes ii be g excb- nged fo - c ouside -ation in 'Che revieu of cl e opcra'tio ia of each age 1ey o e generally tbe proble 1a oae of achieving a ••tistactory level agaic s botage and or theft vhile noc unduly enc bering cilitar' ' operatioaa the n tu •l ERDA acd DoD advocacy roles in each of the e led to opportuni ie• for il prove ient ia both • e a 4 OFFICIAL USE ONLY a -eas has I •a irliTJr lilt • OFFICIAL USE ONLY Conclusions Iu the areas·revievcd of nuclear safety concrol and security of uuclear veapons dual agency judgments have yielded b portant benefits n idenc1f1c tio of mlitary e eetivenes1 requiTt 11mts pri'llarily by DoD qd measure• to preclude unauthorized events pri Darily by Eru A has indeed prDYen to be• natural partitioning responsibility vhich insuTes that any conflicts in requ1Tments are given adequate scrutiny lt has avoided the imposition of an uimatural requirement on either agency to uork 1ae in1ly at aoss-purposes to it major m1 a1oo • d cD11lpetences esoluticm rather than confrontation has been achieved by the establ h11ent of jo ac agency uor1d ng and ctudy gro ps and by che ciJlely reviev of future proble s at the early developmental stage• Yhat once vere technical immvat l 01lS have cca• to be csta lisbed practice and spc ified R 111tary requiremeuts the military senices are cont1-auing o develop aud perfect opcraticmal innovations such as the bu an reliabilicy prosrc vhicb alaa vith che equipmen 1mJ0vations vb1ch are 1ursued as loug-tens research • d davalopi nt objeccives by ERDA 1e- ve to • dveiice the 11atieul objectives iu cse areas b • secondary benefit the checks anc balaucH derived from dual islvo 1rE11esat also provides aa add1tiooal safeguard asainst oversight or n adequac7 v ch regard ca boch milltc17 effectiveness or che precluciao of unauthorized aveut• Bu it 1s the prt ary russion of i3uring chat adequate scrutiny is given t situac1ons where thase c iu 1oals interact tbac provides the coat1r u1ng justification for a dual advocacy echminl at OFFICIAL USE ONLY S@i hf I I - t OFFICIAL USE ONLY i This page intentionaJty left blank 216 8-FFIOIAL USE ONLY # f a OFFIGfAL USE ONLV APPENDIX I 21 0 Raybu Offl a l Wash1ng on D C 2051 c LtAS Tuesday Dece b•r 19 1 1990 10 A H re urth r nfon iation contact yn Reddy 202 225-2191 A t - i c s XIG I i O T'Y i O l SH GTON - se t- UC nul S1'FETY ISSUES panel cf three eminent physicists told h med Services Com uittea toda1 tha - nhanced sa i •t · s c ld bo he op p o i y o th U S nuclear eapons o L ha panel expressed concern ·that serio • a e y ss es • kno1 l' l fo a teast a tecad• re alned unatte ded ors · OFFICIAL USE ONL¥ ' ' __ JES liffi it OFFIGllcL l JSE ONLY One safety concern 1s that 2n unintended nucle r y1eld -- 2 ato 1c explosion -- could result re an accident Mother 1s that through conventional explos1 n or tire highly po1sono s utonsua could be released lnto the e vironment e en ithcut a r ·JClear yield n addition to long-identified problems that have net b a oddrassed the panel elso noted th t recent ad nces in co ut r uodeling raised new concern9 •A major consequence of these modeling results is a reali ation that unintended nuclear cetonatlons present a greater risk than pre ioualy es ima ed a d teliaved for some of the warheads in he stoc pile • the por ead The specific wa hoads ere not id9ntified in the 1 class1tied version of the panet's report 7he chief maana of e 'lhancing nuclear weapon s•fety he t dtt on of Enhanced Nuclear D et0nat10n Sdety £ -OS le 1ces h• use 0 Ir sens1t1ve Kigh Explosives IH safer missile opell2n and spacial designs for cont2irwent of plutoniu i c lled ire esi ta nt pits ms are element9 built nto th detonation process o th apcn -·So e are designed to ta -ob s enough to es1st he e ects of ai craf crashes and f1re9 thus preventing c tonat cn Others eleman s n the detona ion procvsa a e es1gned to brel k on impact in a c ash or o ha JiSG aal c ct cn o rever t da onation nsensi ive P igh x losive 19 gcch less likely o e c a e c • c c esh educing ho risk o • reading plu o ic ire resistant pi e ar to the container o plctonic -· h n rn clee r ve pons that is 2bla o v1th ste nd h gh s ' l i a u -11s a r d thu pre·an't he eleasr J of plt tor u 1 n a - 7h anai r9coc sended these sa ety o asures es r o - ty ccll I 9 The ell nuclcer •Gt r s be qulp o v S v l a a so e l 4d c · T et all nuclear bo tba loa d onto a rc 9 1 a high explcs1vo nd c e es19t4 Only - - 25 p$ -cen o tho we rho ids n 't • U S sr ' tnel ra ·•J H a n y 10 percen hav9 o ire -as1st t pit • 0 - sP 9 v9 • o SB v -he d is no oquipped - th HZ nc1 t io OS ssil e d stage co ein9 c high c er -y p opellen Wc -hea g t u 5 e olaced e -o n6 he thi - s agc cc et r v t h6 ° NV 9 ls e caso in l nd base •ea ns 7 s done tc s o ove ell length o a s l hlch oys 1 y 2 S 9 o OFFICIAL USE ONLV a J1 8 RBif11fRir OFFIGIAL USE ONLY APPENDIXJ Ut ITED ST1'T£S ATOMIC ENERGY COMM1S 10N WASlntfGTON 0 C cUS Appendlx J Konor4ble Sidney B Yaces 1lou e o llepTUc Ju ativcs DcAt' Mr Yaces Thudt you for your letter o Deceal cr 20 19681 iD Mhicb yoa inqui e about the le played by the Atoaic EneTl 1 Co 111 ssior in co incc tio 1 • the cst alalisbacnt of nucleu mulilc instillations such as tbat to 'be located at LibcT yville• llUr ois The Co nissio pcrticipat cc vith the Departnent of Defense in thl co • sideracion of bc lch and safety matters connected vic h the CUJtody a d storate of nuclcarvcapo u rius %C SpDDSihility iaclude particip o in programs £or the prevention of accidental nuclur detouatio as vell as the fumishing of technical advlc e n4 assi•t•nce in the cont of - u iolo ical health b izuds vhf ch 111 gbt result fro luse- acr itci s or incidents involvin nucl 11eapoa 'Ibe Co mss 1 i da t no pl y i To e in such purely adliea y matters as deteQi a ion of overall c li · Tcqu re cn s ox selection of cites for tdlitat7 iostallations a id pl y no Tole in che 11ei hiD of political acil social ia licatio is of uc' ' install a ioa s The u S aoc lea - vc 1 cins aystc s ufe' y p -01- i b io t COl l51Tehc 1s ve thoTough and vigorou in its pu-rsuit of a 11x tJU111 u ety consistent li i ope at o Al requ1rc Dents fa each type of nuclea veapon system beglnnin vi h the develop um of the 1ystc ind co i ui t th ou hcut i s c -vic c life Thu p ograQ is codified 1 Depa tmcnt of Defense Di- c V SOJD 15 vhich vas coard na ed th the Cc dssion ptioT to publ1catio lt p utgates the u s te vc pons yste i s sa e 1 standards vh 1 ch u cty n1lc s for each cys e cust be 1 1easu ed 1 arid 1 tl s co 1 - rcquiriu thal eAch nuclear vc ron y te s be providl d pcs1 1ve ezsu c o ·- prcvc t vc3pcns invol ed in a ct ents or 1nc de or Jet sonec leapocu frcm p oducing a ·nu lcu yield · b c ·t t deliberate ' 1 1 r i llun ' itii 1 rl c r rehs in c c cpc ae tion o emc gency or c o v en dl cctc by CC ' C - •utho cy ·OFFICIAL USE ONLV ¢ • r · m lAiifJFR J OFFICl L USE ONLY Ho or blc Sidney R Yates c • - 2 - prevent Jn d c tcnt analnt launch nt f1Tin r rclcasln and Fo your convcn1cncc 1 • apy 0£ th t oD Directive is enclosed Tccbnically collll'etcnt rcp ucntativcs romAtC field o iccJ nd labo ato cs actively participate vitb • fcty specialists fyo the Hilitary Sctvices a d the I chnsc Atolldc su11porc Aecncy in Des Ecv Cfl And klaly sis Croups one so£cty subco i ittccs durint systc 1 dc vclop amc and also in Initial and Pre• oper tlon l W ori System S1Ccty Studies prlor to tho Initial Opcr tia al Ca 'bUicy lOC d uc of tho syst CJ11 The purpose of these rc v1cus and studies is to assure that the fc t n-cs incoq or tcd in design and the p ocedur d •euures applied to each systCJ11 •cct thir standards described abov In addition no nuclear vaThe ds aTc rclc3scd to the DoD by the C until they h vc been tutcd and ccrti icd to adcquiltoly ca 1cfy very riti auclc r safety criteria for use in the 111ilitu·y vca11on systelftS for i1hich they MVC been de sf cned Ibc sc tests p ovicfo Jass ura nce that in t hc event_ o acc ilcnt l dcto iltio of the co ivc tion l h1 h explosiv rlitcr eo1 9oncnt of a ·yc pon by other than tllc intend d electrical initiation sys c no ' sienific n nu l r yield contrlbution vUl 'Clult lwldplc other dcd n fciltu u rad vc rific tio tests provide assur nce e ainst ac ilental pre tu c fm1cticr i o the wuhco d el c tricill initiation systci i ' systU11• as for other syste s • o ic o the specific unc or s i'or the SEliitmL of the P eopcracioo l Silfctr Stuoy in vhich AEC representatives ill partici tc• ill be to dra proposed safaty rules These proposed $ £c 1 ulc s lill be -reviewed 'by the An- Matcdcl Ccmaaad and the J rmy Nucho r Uc o s Surety Croup coordinated vi h the Director D ense Ato ic Surport e cy ·and f on udcd to the Joint Chiefs of Scaff for tbc1 l approval 1te11 ip rovcd by the Joinc Chic of Staff the fcty n1lcs ill be £0 v rded to the Secretary of Defc sc an J to the J to dc i ' cr y Co lir ia i l 'ben bi t1u Judr icnc o the Secrctaty o Pt en$e it-is cpcr tion lly access ta dc1l0y e pcns 1 be interest of catiOQ i11 dcfc isc be ay deploy the • d 1uuc in e l t ulc vhich t ave een devel0red by tlsc procedure de crihcd ova l 1 thou the cc icun-ence af th Aca ic E a Co iss c ho cvcr before the ulu b c0-ie fi Dd they vill ba revie - rcd a -id eo Jcui- cd 1n by the Co 1 on · IC ' u dedre further ar 5 1 tan'c c in t h1s cat te plea$e le cc· k - o· r Co- d 1 lly OFFICIAL USE ONLY I • SlfiQRFJ 'iO OFFIGIAL USE ONLY APPENDIXK Key Persons at Sandia National Laboratories Involved in the Evolution of Nuclear Weapon Safety Security and Control S2C Key contributions ofSandians to S1C have been cited in context of events described in the tcxl of this ssay The Index section contains the names of those persons in alph i beticaJ order Ai discussed in the taxt on page 1OS in 1996 I contributN to the study Sandia·s Surety Heril ' lge Re 149 One of the questions asked in the study W3S Who wcro the key individuals behind past advances and what specifically did they do·r In my response Ref 148 l identified contributions of some two dozen persons in the areas of nuclear detonation safety plutonium dispc rsal safety use conb'Ol and security As I review my response now 1 find hat 1 did not ltCat security fairly and J apologize to the major contributors in th at discipline In 1984 Dennis S Miyoshi Reference 64 compiled a hislOry of the nuclc31 sc curity systems directorate and commendably cites key individuals The discussion to follow cites in roughly chronological order c ontnbutions to S1C by Sandians that I consider to have been especi illy noteworthy 1 ha •c arbitrarily limited the list to ten hose roles arc highlighted in S1C These are alphabetically Richard N Dick Brodie• Carl R C Carlson• Donald R Don Cotter- Kenneth Ken Gillespie Williillll J Jack Howard• Robert E Bob Luna · Delfred M Del Olson Robert L Bob Peurifoy Jr • Leon D Leon Smith• Slanf y D Stan Spray• • - biographical skclch anachc l Of course thc ioc individuals had close associates in s c lt is re illy not rnssiblc to clearly scpar itt the contributions of each ln recognition of this imponant r ality 1 mention some key as oci atcs For cx 1mple most rcallcrs -oulJ recall the signific3nt contrihulions of J W Jay Grcur 1s tht ' read about Stan Spr iy lr of William R Bill floilgl tnd is they r ad about Del Olsun l n Coner and Leon Smith perfomu c l a a t1 am in tl11 lalc 1950s and t irly I%Os m applyin i ··s -tc1m cn i ring d n lopm nf' ap11r0Jch to nud ar detouJtion safety 1nd use cc n1ro ck-men M s c Tins 3pprl1Jch aJtkd Jimcmicms of considering th1 •sc sp c al concerr s in t fr m wMk f 1mponam 10 o c-ull 1a ion il dcfonse to compl 1111 nt the unportancr th 1t th OFFICIAL USE ONLV· I ·11 I • • 4 1 OIO U ii tfJ OFFICIAL USE ONLY project and component groups gave to meeting rc-quiremeots delivery schcdul performance charncteristics etc fn brief and perhaps as an overstatemenl Cotter brought intangible conceptual and big picture thinking and Smith brought disciplined engineering th it produced t mg1ble hardware to implement the c oncq ls The early availability of prototype hardware and 1bility to commit to highly e pedited tlcvelopment-to--producrion times was a Sandia specialty that often tipped the scale during contentious debates o ·er incorporation of safety and control tlcvices into stockpiled and in-production weapons Smith and Cotter as dq arnncnt managers in the late 1960s nunurcd evolution of the philosophical framework for nuclear weapon systems safc ty and use control principally articulated by Cul Carlson and guided evolution of a practical structure for the roles of Sandia·s h ·dmical staff principalJy implemented by Del Olson Carlson•s contributioa may be beS1 appreciated by his perusing the first AEC manifesto on nuclear safety of 1957-59 Ref 17 and Olson's by the second AEC manifesto of 1960-61 Ref 27 and by lhc repor' s tbat outlined Sandia's roles Refs 14 and 25 In the early 1960s Smith and Cotter pcrsonnlly led the process of incorporation of PAL in Europe assisted principally by Gene Ives Jack Howard may be credited with leading the process of institutionalizing the roles of the 1 EC's national laboratories in nuclear weapon system safety accidc nt response capitalizing on his experience as chairman of the DoDiMilitary Liaison Commiltcc during lhe Palomarl s Spain nuclear weapon accident episode of 1966 Howard returned to Sandia wilh a set of unique credentials as to deep understanmng of AEC'OoD and inter-laboratories relationships He bec illlle in my view a statesman for safety whose influence began high and increased as his counsel was sought again and again as safety issues arose in the W ishington arena His dialogue with Edward Teller on mechanical safmg of nuclear primaries in 1967 influenced greatly the future dc signs and the possibility of a huge stockpile retrofit program One of Jack Howard's pcr onal specializations was appreciation of the problem area of dispersal of plutonium oxides caused by detonation ofweapon high explosives in accidents--this of course being paramount in 1he Paloma accitlcnt recovery operation He used and relied on the tah nts Sandfa's Jim Shreve and Jim's associate Bob Luna in this work and supported a continuing technical expertise al Sandia o 'Cr lhc years or Pl rh 1ps Jack Howard's mos1 oulslanding contribution to safety came shortly after hrs return to Sandia from the MLC issi 'l1mcnt when he commissioned the rcation of the nuc1C'31 safety Jc ign and assessment technical specialization that generated the tcdmologjc d capabilities laler called modem nuclear safety or Enhanced Nuckar Detonation Safety tESDS St m Spray Jnd Bill Stevens led rhis effort 1nd both continued in this spcci iliintion for rhe remaining decades of their careers Stan Spray hccamc th master of nuclear weapon Jc sign safety gaining respect throughout the nation ti 1nd inl mational wc 1pon safety communities pon his fom aJ rdir mcnl from SanJia $1 10 pl ms lo rrc t rh stlll1' of how F S n vulutioniz d 1h1 • t hrmlogical 1pproa- h 10 safety just a s I have llli mpted her w capture lhc slory fi r the p 'lli y md m m igcmcnt J ip1 'l 'IS of afety -··- OFFICIAL USE ONLY a ' • _ I 11 F • J f J llfAI OFFIGIAL YSE OHL¥ 1 n my opinion Bob Peurifoy was the master advocate and implementer of S C tmprovi m1 nl 5 for thl national $h ckpile His contributions wen essentially conlinuous throughout his four-tkcaJt ucer In lhc l arly 1950s as a newly hired Member of Technical Staff Bob Pl Urifoy bc-g m the project 10 incorporate the first nuclear dtron3tion sating dC ice a Ready Safe Switch oper ited by a si Tlal from th dcli_vcry il ircraft in-flight for the lirst ''wooJcn bomb '' As a S ctioo Supen·isor in the late I1 St1s he adapted the inh rently s iter rotary chopp riconvcncr wadu ad electrical system thc -n in c tploratory J •dopment and h3d ir incorporated wilhin highly 1 xpcilited - ·e ipcin system progr im time-scales for the warhtad of rhe nation's first intercontinental bollistic missile weapon systems W49-0 This swtcd a new generation of warhead electrical subsyst ms thJ t would be the standard tor Jccadcs He also formul ited the ncc -d for the first Environmental Sc r in Device ESD and led the crash Jevclopm nt project ro ha ·e it incorporated into lhc '-W-0 I tlu sc cffons he Vas supportoo by staff members Htrm M suncy ind Bill Stevens As a Dcpartmc nt Manager at Sandia li 'ennorc in the mid-1960s Bob Pcurifoy initiated a dialogue with coll agues C ul CMlson and Bill Ste ·ens ill under Director Leon Smith lh u was instrument il in formulating rhc i onccpls that later bi c amc Enh inced Nucle r Detonation Saf ly ENDS about five years later Beginning with his promotion to director of weapon de• -elopmcnt in 1973 and continuing in c ·cr•incrca sing ·igor after promotion to Vi c Presidimt in 1983 Bob Peurifoy can be credited vith 3Jl unswcr ·ing solid commitment to implement modem nuclear satety technologies into 1hc national stockpile In this effort hi was supponcd by on oflhc most n 'tlliU'kable of all Sandians the late Dick BroJic whom Bob hired after rctircmc11t from thi Air Force Brodie's m istcrpic cc contribution was the Srockpile Jmpro ·cmcnt Program of the lute 1970-s As impressive l j the comributi ms cited abQ 'C were J con sider that Bob Pcurifoy' iral lfld lasting rill v is hfa chan1pioning and dietending of the nuclear weapons laboratories' critical role in 1hc s c in tilutional ftamr wl rk both intcmall ' and in the 11atlonal ar mas Time and lime again h snught u d obtainl d a position is tcchni'-·•11 u h-iscr in lhc crii s of 111 jor high-h · I mldic5 of ERD DOE DtJO n spQnsibiliti s 1h u occurred b t i cn 1975 and 1 19 1 and succL' tkd in convmcing 1fikials lml J Jth iritii s of th 'al 1c of continui111 lh cssenti 11 rd 1lionship l lu- work has d fcc1h dy continucJ atkr his r Ur 'm ·nt in 1991 J 11 k lf• lward also can be r -d ll lt 1r p •rnonal cun111h1 1iuns to the c m 1jur studies u 1 fl r helping ht Iran Pi urifoy i11 • h cl The major nh in 1 rn nts •Jf s c t hich s ndi in contnb111i d l't• il l rwl h n 1 · b • 11 ri - 1lizc I • l lliu lt · ah1 I 1r I'' • • -dq Jrd ·r J11i -1 • rl r h m war - · mplili tl hy ESD J L 1 J F' t '- - n i -r b -11· r ful • r th j S - rm 111 t pr j -ct kaJ -r h allH• •-· 1 t' 1 il · t' 1tu · ·s 1 1t 5 reali Uinn dt·m tmls n co niti1 111 of tit lu ot S in iia • _ ' r apun i c 111pu11 nt cJr cr · p• ' l 1li t m I o• • r th y m n Gilkspi • ·m1 lili J the hit h I krd 11f • · dkm in th it 8 Pi • et _ 0 1 E O ii 'L - _ -8f C E hFRLJ OFFICIAL USE ONLY profession that was the steady reliable underpinning Other safety component designers who warrant special mention include Don Camicom Bob Fox and Bob Pinkham Sandia's missions and roles in security and safeguards for nuclear materials and weapons were derived from a 1973 internal study commissioned by President Morgan Sparks and directed by Bob Peurifoy Orv31 Jones was promoted from a rcseaxch position to lead a new directorate-level organization and Bill Myre succeeded him Upon Orval's promotion to Vice Prcsiden Bill Myre can b credited wid1 institutionalizing lhe roles and missions ofSandia in nuclear weapon security in themid-19i0s just as Jack Howard had done for safety Henn Mauney dcsavcs special notice for his skillful coordination of contentious security interfaces with military agencies Bob Luna maintained a career-long specialization in the area of atmospheric dispersal of contaminants and in a balanced consideration of the attendant risks to lhc general populace He lc d development ofan analytical model ofdispersion that quantified the risks and presented decision-makers with ata and tools that elevated this highly emotional risk to new levels of assessments Luna became a mentor for a small group of Sandians who adapted his work to 1 nuclear weapons and nuclear power fuel cycle concerns including John Taylor s and Dick Smith•s work on transportation and fixcd•site facilities analyses OFFICIAL USE ONLV Richard N Dick Brodie Richard N Dick Brodie in his seventeen briefyears at Sandia laid down a record of accomplishments in nuclear wenpon development counsel and advice that is without parallel in the field His iccomplishments were so well regarded by his peers and associates that upon his untimely death from cancer in 1994 his name was pl iced tln the w apons Training Ct -ntcr that he had championed-4hc only instance of a Sandian being so honored by name Upon graduation from North Te ' as Univcnity in 1956 with a BA in Mathematics Dk'k joined the U S Air force iU1d rose rapidly in rank as a pilot ofhigh-pcrfonnancc tighter interceptor jet aimaft some armed with nuclear weapons When 311 unexplainable health episode 3fose to lunit his flying career his mathematical talents were exploited to lead a hydrodynamics research group at Kirtland Air Force Base in AJbuquerque He had received both the MA in 1963 and Ph D in l 969 in Malhcmatics from the University of Tc xas Aus in Air force Institute of r -chnology program The computer code developed under his leadership ertjoyed wide use in analysis of vulnerability survivability of weapon systems when exposed to enemy countcnncasures His final assignment was as a Colonel serving the DoD as Exccu1ive Secretary to the Military Liaison Committee then chaired by e -Sandian Donald R Coner His remarkable grasp of the technological and polilical aspects of the nuclear weapons program was noted and admired by Sandia's Rohen L Bob Peurifoy Jr during the 1975 ERONDoD ••transfer Study Bob rurcd Dick as his special assistant in 1976-thc first instance of such a position at Sandia Later Dick's role was expanded to bC Comc a principal 3d 'isor to top management As an advocate Dick Brodie's hallmark contributions were th inc c ption formulation articulation and promotion of a systtmatic lime-phased ERDA Inter DOE ind DoD program 10 significantly upgrade the stare of safety and use control or certain nuclc ir weapon systems then in or proposed for the U S inventory of nuclear weapons nus effort continued over 1Yr decades and was successful by 1990 with lhe removal of the I isl deficient weapon system from operarional deployment Another lasting legacy is the We3pon Technology wetk-long course orig in ited by Dick and inspirationally taught by Dick to thous mds of Snndinns and colleagues in DOE DoD and other in 'olved agencies Litmlly on his deathbed be passr tl on the content and culture to Dr John C Hogan who continues Dick's course today tu August 1993 Dick 8rodii was awan lcd tbe DOE Distingmshal Associatt Award and rhe citation rtads in pan for·• distinguished and unique contributions to the swi ty of nuclcnr c apons and nuclear weapons systems and for his outstamlin leadership in na rion il security an as focused on wc ipon safety and use conm I OFFICIAL USE ONLY p ZO tt iii R I OFFIGfAL USE ONLY Carl R C2 Carlson C'arl R C CulsonJoined Sandia Corporation's cw Weapon Systl -ms Studi S Division in the Rescnn h Dirc ctor ue in early 1953 upon graduation from Purdue University While his dc1 rrcc was Master of Science in Physics he bad successfully completed coursework for the Ph D -lncking the dissertation His spc Ciahy was to become systems analysis although the discipline ofthat name today was essentially in infancy at the time C' C-sqwarcd in the vcmacul ir participated in early systems analysis conducted at Sandia especially in the classic woodm bomb 111d laydown° bomb Jclivcry mode studies and bis fine work was noted by Donald R Don Coner Don Cotter promoted C twice in 1947 firsl as a Section Supervisor in Systems Engineering Division under Cott r and jCCOnd as Cotter's replaccmenl as the Dhision Supcn·isor when Cotter was promoted lk1 artmcot Manager in weapon project development In these capacities ci was instrum -ntal in articulating nuclear weapon fety concepts developed by the three AEC nuclear weapons laboratories and in establishing the joint AEC OoO nuclear weapon iu cidcnl incident rcponing sysrcm The extreme frustrations that he reported during altcmpts to ·•coordinate0 the differences m technological 1pproach to nuclear safety among the laboratories caused him in 196_10 resign from Sandia C1 joined the Dikewood Corporation in Albuquerque which had been fanned by two fonner Sandians 0 In September 1963 Carl Carlson was rehired at Sandia by Cotter for the staff of his Directorate ofAdvanced Systems Studies-Sandia's first think tank In '-arly 1965 he was promoted to Oepartmenl Manager in Cotter's dircctorn1e and mnaincd there until fllJI 1967 when he was placed on lca ·c-of-absence to join the AEC's Combined Oper itions Planning organization There he did systems analysis for the AEC's nuclc ir materials production complex until he returned to work in 1969 for Coner in a staff position Upon Cotter's Jcpanun from Sandia c continued to do staff studies until his untimely death in 1972 He was perhaps Sandia's consummate systems concepts thinker and was indc cd gifted in expressions of his U1oughts Sec Appendi 't D for an oxamplc ---OFFIGIAL USE OHL¥ •• --• Donald R Don Cotter Donald R Don Cottcrc ime to New Mexico in 1947 on loctor's orders to seek a better climate for relief from a respiratory disorder He had to stop his clcctric3J engineering course work at Lehigh University and to rely on his wanime Anny tr lining in radar to join Los Alamos' Z-Dhision in production testing and assembly of ordinance for early nucleu bombs In 195 l Don joined Bob Henderson Don Shuster and others from Sandia for Operation GREE 'HOUSE rhe A EC test series at Enc wetak Atoll in the Pacific to do anning of lhe rest thermonuclc 11' devices of Los Alamos Upon return to Sandia Don was promoted to supervisor of a division developing the clcctric3l systl m for first nuclear bomb and warhead for tactical w pon systems Early in his career he displayed a rcmarkabl even uncanny ability to focus on th broadest 3SpCCts and implications of a task and 10 involve and inspire tah nted colleagues at Sandia and elsewhere to join in Don would bec ome a systems study specialist and L- on Smith would become the systems hardware developer specialist - a teaming with high payoffs for national security sec Leon D Smith's sketch for description of their work on SJC in the early 1960s In late 1961 Don Coner was promoted co Director of Advanced Systems Studies to lead a small rroup which would conduct studies of promising future 3rcas ofR D and would perform certain staff functions for SNL 's President Seigmund P Monk ·1 Schwartz Don s new group also would do infonnation research and coordination o agenda for important visitors The directorate Sandia's flISt staff became both a source of innovative thinking by its select staff members and a rc servoir mail drop in Don's terms lo receive and consider ideas notions and proposals from interested persons throughout the laboratory Coner irrilllgcd to have Interdisciplinary Colloquia Seminars in which key Sandin LASL and LNL s1affwould participate along with noted outside national and international experts and specialists Henry Kissinger John Lehman llllcr Sccr tuy or the Na 'y and Richard Perle then staff aisistant to Senator Henry Jackson later A ssistilllt Secrcl uy of Defcns for Policy 1n 1966 Don Cotter w35 called by long-time colleague Johnny Foster Connerly Director of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory of the AEC to scf' ·ice in the Department of Defense including as Deputy Director of the Ad 'illlccd Research Projects Agency for which he received the Civilian -·leritorious Medal for tt -chnological contributions related to the Slluthea st Asi3 CC1ntlic1 Following brief tours at AEC Hcadquaners md the Central lntelligcnec Agcn y with colleague Jomes Schl singer in 1973 he received i Presidential appointmi -ot as Chairman of th Military liaison Committee 10 the AEC md Assistant to the Si crctary of Defense Atomic Energy In 1978 h -served as special ad 'isor to the Cha1rm m Senate Annl d Services Commincc and did other policy t onsuhin He di d in 1991 after 1 long illnc ss at ig 69 OFFICIAL USE ONLV 3 7 • Wt t Tf Qtl OFFICIAL tJSE ONLY William J Jack Howard WiUiam J Jack Howard joined the 2-Division ordnance of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory upon graduation from New Mexico State University in 1946 with a BS in Mechanical Engineering The 2-Division was the forerunner of Swdia Corporation which was fanned some two years later Jack's early assignment wa _ in the field resting part of the Applied Physics Depmment Within a year he was drawn into the newly created Atomic Energy Commission•s nuclear test series Operation SANDSTONE in 1948 on Encwctak Atoll in the Pacific in engineering logistics support work see pages 286 and 298 of Reference I of the text and Operation BUSTER-JANGLE in 19Sl at Nevada Proving Grounds us Project Leader for air pressure recording rn 1952 when Sandia created a new directorate for development of warheads for guided mis 'iiles Jack Howard was promoted to department manager to lead projects for large guided and ballistic missile weapon systems Some four years later he was transfened laterally to Uvcnnore California to lead Sandia's engineering department for the laboratory being created there By latc-1956 Jack Howard became the first Director of Systems Development Livermore and played major role in establishing its technical capabilities and culture Jack Howard was on leave of absence from Sandia from latc-1963 to mid-I 966 He had accepted Presidential Appointm nt Scnate Confirmation for lhc position ofChainnan of the Military Liaison Committee 10 the AEC and Assistant to the Sccretmy of Defense Atomic Ent fgy He succeeded Lawrence L vennore Laboratories' Gerald W Johnson in that position continuing the practice of selection from one of the three AEC weapon's laboratories During his len' lfe the national nuclear weapon program adjusted to the cost-effectiveness emphasis for weapon system acquisition employ by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and the nation experienced the first major nuclear weapon accident on foreign territory the Palomares Spain accident of January 1966 Jack was aw irded the Depanment of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service and tltt'l citation read in part His extensive knowledge of military weaponry matched by a keen insight nto the operational needs and capabilities of the military forces qualifies him as a principal and valued advisor His contribution to cominuniC3tion among the mHilary services and between them and the Atomic Energy Commission will be oflasting bcnc fit to the nation's security fn fom ulating and guiding the implementation of national poUcy in a highly sensitive and dynamic area he displayed exceptional perspecti •e and judgement Motivated by a deep patriotism and distinguished by courage and dedication he has earned the r -pect1 uust and appreciation of his associates in the highest levels of national decision Mr Howard's distinguished record or service in a viral aspec of United States defens posture exemplifies the highest standards of citizenship ·· Upon return to Sandia Albuquerque in mid-1966 Jack Howard served as Director of Advanccu Systems Development for a few months before promotion to Vice President Components and Systems fn April 1973 he was 1 romotcd to Executive Vice Pr siclent and scn·cd for a dl cade as Sandia s chief executh·e in R D programs rn 1976 l e served as a U S Delegate to the Strati gic Arms limitatio11s Talks in Geneva Switlcrfand He retired it age 60 after nearly 6 years of distinguished service to Sandia and the nation OFFICIAL USE Ot L¥ tr' i ' · · · ••···••2• OFFICIAL l fSE ONLY Robert L Bob Peurifoy Jr Robert L Bob Peurifoy Jr joined Sandia Corporation's Weapon Systems Development Directorate 1200 in 1952 upon £radwition from Texas A M University with a BS in Electrical Engineering His early assignments were as Mt mbcro Tc chnical Staff in developmcnc of arming fuz ing 1111d firing subsystems initially for the first postwar nc V type of fission bomb Mark V and later for the ·•crash program thermonuclear bomb projects including the first wooden bomb Bcfo the laner project was complete he wu tapped for the first uf a series of special assignments to consider Sandia's potcnriaJ technological in ·nlvcmcnt in R D endeavors that appeared suddenly on the horizon His study completed in I9S5 on how to do anning fuzing and firing for the nation's first generation ofintercontinental ballistic missile b -'Cmtle the concept that was adapted essentially without change by the two mdustrial contractors of the U S Air Force's Western Development Division Thus began a three-decade tnditioa for Air Force reentry vehicle programs 0 Development of the warhead electrical subsystem for the first thermonuclear warhead to be used on the land-based intercontinental and intermediate-range ballistic missile systems ln 1958 he was promoted to the next level to manage to complete warheild development project During this time Bob was again tapped to consider Sa11dio1•s technological capability to contribute to i project at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory to create a machine to produce energy from controlled fusion reaction fn 1961 upon completion of the warheads for ICBM IRBM weapon syste Bob was promoted to the middle level oftethnical management and transferred to a weapon component de 'elopment organiz tion responsible for explosively driven deviccs--this being the third promotion in his nine-yw cru-ccr ln 1964 he was latcnJly tr 1nsferrcd to Sandia's Li 'tnnore California laboratory to lead dC ·elopment of systems field testing instrumentation md later to lead srudies in advanced weapons systems rcsC3rCh In 1967 Bob Pcurifoy rc tumed to Sandia's Albuqu uc laboratory to lead exploratoiy development in the are i of hardening wc3pon hardware to enemy countcnneasures and soon aficrwards was tapped for yet another special issignment-fom1ulatc Wld lead an engineering approach to Sanwa•s first major project that would be sponsored and funded by the t S Na ·y namely the urning fuzirag a nd fuing subsystems for the rcenuy body of the Poseidon Mk 3 tle t ballistic missile WQpon s stcm lronic tlly this task was a consummation of his l 955 proposal for similar work on Air Force wtapon systems In early 1973 Sandia President lorgan Sparks u kcd Bob to lead a m1dy to dettrmine Sandia s potential in ·Ol 'crm nl in the field ofnucle ir puwcr reactors and fuel eye le This study comiu suon ancr dissolutic lll uf lhc AEC aml creation of lhl ' Energy Rcsi arclt Jnd Oe ·clopmcnl Administration ERDA1 was instrum nt il in S mclia ·s ubs qucnt fom1ation l'f Jirector uc-lc 'CI orgJniiation to pcrt •rm sckctcd tasks for the new - 1ck i r Rcgub lor ' Cornmis ion 0 In 1973 Bob Pcurifoy pruinoted to 01hx11 u capon Systems D clopmcnt wh1 •rc h lS to rcm ain for a dccaJc lll l lwcrsee 1hc d velopml 'nl of thl SIC ckpilc - -rodcmization Progrjm anJ i -0FFIGIAL USE ONL¥ I O • 4 I • · e llltiSJFR J OFFIGIAL USE ONLY live new weaponization projects In 1977 he was a recipient oftbc prestigious ERDA Distinguished Associate Award and the citation read For outstanding technical mtd managcm1 -nt contributions to a broad range of activities in the Jc ·elopment of nuclear weapon systems Under his direction technically complex ordnance engineering tasks on warhe ids for strategic missile systems including the reentry bodies for the U S Navy POSEIDON and TRIDENT systems continue to be perfonned ilh an exceptional record ofmeeting critical deadlines within funding constraints and without sacrificing quillny of ystcm perfonnance ·• In 1983 Bob Pcurifoy was promoted to Vice President Technical Support where he was responsible for weapon testing nuclear safety reliability quality assurance and military liaison activities as well as planning and opcnuing building and other infra structure facilities On March 15 1991 Bob Pcurifoy retired after 39 years of most distinguished service to Sandia and che nation -OFFICIAL USE ONLY t I ' • i j' i - C Rt1 11n0 OFFICIAL USC ONLY Leon D Smith Anny Air Corps First Lieutenant Leon 0 Smith served as a weaponeer in the ordnance squadron of the 0911t Composite Group that was fonned to deliver atomic bombs He was one of the three we3poneers and by toss of the coin beca1m the backup for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki drops In early 1946 Leon was mustered out of the military in a JO-minute p1ocess to join the ZDs ision of Los Alamos group destined to Bikini Atoll to support Opi ration CROSSROADS the muion·s first postwar nuclear test This time Mr Leon Smith Elcctricill En ineer would be the weaponccr for flaring a bomb Aller CROSSROADS Leon specialized in design of anning nuing and ruing subsystems for hombs with time out for doing that work for the devices that Los Alamos had developed for the AEC s first test series SANDSTONE in 1948 In the early l9S0s he wns on of six supcn jsors of an Electronic System Division for early fission bombs and warheads Leon and colleague Don Cotter suggested Dnd led implementation of the first in a series of iMovative technical management initiatives lhat would fbnd unenratly improve Sandia's capability to handle vicissitudes in weapon development programs wrought by vinual explosions in military requirements An Electrical System Coordinating Group was formed to voluntarily introduce systems thinking in 3fl arena dominated by urgtnt time pressures of the individual ·c apon projects resulting in economics in allocation of scarce resources through avoiding duplications of effon and standardization Systems engineering as a discipline had only recently e ·olvcd at Sandi i's parent Bell Telephone Laboratories and this was 211 e3rly and effective application In l 9S6 Leon's innontion was elevated lo the higher organiz itional level of a dcparummt and he w 1s promoted to be its first manager Many of the incoming members oftcchnical staff recruited tor the stocJq ile buildup thrust of the late l 950s hired into Leon's group to mctt the l«hnological challenges presented Lcon•s reputation for setting high standards for performance anJ demanding total commilment to tbc t 1Sk grew ind in 1961 he was promo1cd to the director level to apply his skills to the area of ch ctromechankal component development He teamed a second time with Don Cotter to lead Sandia's initiatives in providing the cnvironmcntul sensing device ESD ind pennissivc action link PAL components that would play a major part in the revolution in nation 11 commi1mcnt to nuclear weapon Safety Security and Use Control S C Leon anJ Don were made members unoffici3lty of 1hc high-le• cl military tc JllS that evol •ed on-site the politically Stnsltive command and C lntrol system for NATO- in the public icw by the infamous code-cont linin_g brio fcnsc lhat aftc nvards was ahvays with lhc President ln 1964 Leon JJ J Dun Coner again tcruncd 10 h ad emergence of an advanced sysrtms th n lopmcnt p -o raiu that would challcngl lhc 11 chnical staff to create new options national ccurily in a1 h-am •Jf iny stJted military ri 1uircmenl Thr ensuring period is 1hough1 hy me lhs1 rv rs 10 h i ·i bctn -nc of SmdiJ's Jir c sl 1imr s - its C undut Forexa mpk it proj -cr u1 th dop and tcsl prot typ small muhipk rc-cnlry - ·chicles cumpaliblc ith th advilflCl d r r hall is tic missile ysh ms of the military i cn·ic ·s would lea I 10 the highly succc-ssful ir rit S lif re nlry bodies for th N'avj 's tkc t ballistic mis5ik Leen p ri ll11 II · lcJ thi scnsitivl m•gl tiati 1n$ OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1 1- ··· a1 OFFICIAL USE ONLV w th AEC Na -y and N3 vy contrnctors that married lhc best features uf L ilCh- all in the n ttion il interest Sandia's role wns to design develop and have produce tin the AEC's complex the anning fuzing and firing subsystem for the Poseidon and follow-on weapon systems at cost reimbursed to the AEC by the Navy Leon·s leadership continued in the S1C area wd extended into rel3tcd interests in intelligence agency research suppon and in lest ban Ucaty rcrification programs foro ·cr rwo d adc s He retired in 1988 OFFICIAL USE ONLY- • ffll iWIAIJ OFFIOl L YSE ONLY Stanley D Stan Spray Stanley D Stan Spray joined Sandia Corporation is a nuclear bomb development project engineer in 1954 upon graduation from the University of Arizona with a degree in electrical engineering From t 954 to 1966 Stan was a staff member involv d in the design of weapon electrical systems safing arming razing and tiring Stan had a two-year tour in the 1 nuy from 19SS-1957 during this period This work included design acti ilies in the aircraft monitor and control systems A1'4AC advisor to the AE DOE Nuclear Weapon System Study Group tNWSSG weapons projects development lead electrical engineer on the B57 bomb and s veral years in the Phase l 2 division focusing on new weapon conc -pts He was promoted in 1966 to supervise 11 group responsibl for development or advanced arming fuzing and firing systems for missilc Jclivered weapons In 1968 Stmi began a 30-year career specblization in nuclear weapon safety when he WJS selected fo fonn and lead Sanwa·s first division devoted to the 8SSCS l1t1ent of the degree f nuclear safety present in existing nuclear weapons when exposed to nccident environments Part of the mission Vas to develop safety principles and hardware that would enhance safety in future weapons The latter work culminated in what was called a remarkable breakthrough technology that become known a Weak Link Strong Linlc Exclusion Region or ENDS Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safety a IDS became the standard weapon design approach and was incorporated into all new nuclear weapon programs beginning in the mid-1970's and was retrofitted into older weapons scheduled to remain in the national stockpile For this work in nucl ar safety in 1983 he was among the first Sandians to rcceh·c the Award of Excellence for the DO E's 1' uclcar Weapons Program In 1989 Stan became supervisor of the System Safety Division which supported the DOE in the assessment of the Nuclear Weapon System Safety Group NWSSG for the Anny Navy and Air Force weapon syst ms The Division also supponcd the assi ssml nt oflhe assembly disassembly activity at the Pante Plant and the nuclear lest activities at the Nc - ·ada Test Sile Nuclear E plosi 'e Safety Study Group NESSG He also b ame the program manager for Sandi i•s nuclear weapon Accident Respnnse Group ARG which supported DOE's emergency response capability This involved emergency response exercise planning training technology dc ·clopmcnt and program management In this period Slan also initiated the development of th Nuclear Safety Information C ·nlcr NSIC to prescr c nuclear safety crilical infonnation and make it T ldily l ' tili blc ro assessment and tlesign personnel He 1lso initiated the tlc ·clopment ofrhe Nuclear Surety Trainmtt SST prosr irn o transfcrcxpcricnce and knowledge ofnuckar weapon s ifcty pnncipks 3 nd assessment mcthodolot Y to n1 w staff and ninnag mcnl ind lhc We Were There series of ·idco mtervicwi with indl ·hhmls who wen at U S nuclear weapon acch knts I le h is n1wn numerous p p rs l'lJl safety at national and intc matiun il cuufcrcnccs Heh is hJt1 d this safety b ckgr 1unJ m I exrenence via hnl linr s and classes with nvcr l 0 000 inJh·iJu ds prona t J t0 Senior Scit ntist Cn m cr 111 1 -197 w th th rcsp ns1b1li1y of upp ming lt c Dir crnr r f Surety i il ssmcnt with rc p1 l to iJvk 1 - ted nical mJ policy issu f k h ld th t posi1 ion until r tir m nl in Dcccmbc r t J Jl-5 StJn VJS OFFICIAL USE ONEY ' - ·U Sii l'lf If Pr OFFIGIAL SE ONL¥- This page inlenliunaJly lcfi blank FFICIAL USE ONLY r 1' # • • I 1 1 OFFICIAb USE ONLY APPENDIX L APP U 1 Department of Energy rnited Stales Government •• emorandum Janu r ' 4 1994 JP•a Hahr l•l7S7 lfonconcurrenc1 ReorganU t 10r of Nuclear We Jporis Council SUr C 1ng Comltl e N CSC and Weapons Safaty C011 1ttt11 WSC 10 Ch1 rm1n Wei ons S•fety C011r 1tttee O •ZO Assoc te Olrector for Weaoor s SafftY OP-ZO t ss 1t1nt Sta6 f Directer for he Hucli r w pons C unctl DP·Z0 2 c 1 9 Oirector Offtee of 01vetop ent Testinq and Acquisit11n OP·2S Th s 20r1ridu was orlg nally uartd for the June 10 1993 conb d WCSC•WSC ••ting fnt ts enc tr d need for his t110r1r du ft v• not chang1d l feel ver1 stron9ly about the WSC and its intended function to prcv•dt forum to car out t e o nt responsibilities of the O •rtment of nergy CO£ and th o partntn or Defense 000 on nuclear •• ns fet dur ng all weapons phases rrcm design lo ret rement To asiure thlt safety •ssues are addressed In a cocipiete1y objective manoer it Is my opinion that s why tt e WSC· wis esta ll lsiied to l ne equal 00£-000 voltng er - bershlp tn fact rinq the early days of tne wsc Stitral deployr ent safety Issues re vote t bt addressed not addressed along • atty 11nes • Eaalllilles nclude - 9 a1rCaS wea ons aler and airborne Toving shi n These «irt ajcrts d o t1 a ter sucs 1nt Jl ij tner t dy • d r -£ perslsten e i a9 ce t ar In ovbi •ng t e St n 1 9 01T 11tt e and Safety Co 1 t e the tonolr fd O art tnts gJ•n ffic1e c1 · I do r ot uJ ort hat J 2-ho r meet1rg once a eionth gn weap ns ssfety Is in overburden or anyone Sul what t 1 u i t ts rr r an· attcn h 11 J 1r t Dl llilrt lental H•oni bilft_y a ·eilet ei e'ltal 0ti11 r r ser uti n 0n saitt r a ter- s w i J O•Jli te paramount 1n 11 design dtploym nt rat re er t and d1 nll r nl actlv1 ·e$ Z If there were 1 r•Jrd 1 11Ul disd9re nent bet e l COE and DCO 3r 1 i t 1 l COE tlw1y l J i tht arg ent 5•1 er ·Z r i n1 on t2t tr o nt the cc-ch1•r • YQt s Th r 4r PC r i •1nf f r a l3E or OCO i- tJrnr in 1 1eto wtl1t'l ould 01 ntc hn probhr i u r i 1 i• tl Mitch 9 u 1 · t 1 1 1 Pl Thi r C t ltr • -hc uble OOE f1 1 u ns 3ret1 O h ft' O r i lrm h'ed io diy•to• 1 1'11 1 - entHian •J saf 1 ·n all pon pr ' i are eli fnated iS m ers $9rie Stin1iog Co 'T'111 t e in • n·t i 7 ore liry 1 d acQ is1 111 ori nle • l - -l 1 e·s t uui da 11t t 1· •e ro C J n- th - ' • co m·t r 1 • an In r1 oJp nion tl' ls r oru n1 fJr oo ii he i ' ' t f co i n d t'ltmil t c r tJ ·•OFFl0 ¥· ✓ - - ' · t r fl fBt • OFFICIAL USE ONL¥ z Thus as a charter member of the original WSC I am requesting th s entire stat ent be re1d verbatim into th record of the Januiry 6 1994 combined me ting lor wnenever that meeting i i held so that minority opinion fs presented to the t ucleu Weapons Council whenever the final r clillllend t1or s fort combini g of the Standing Co1r 111tttee and Safety Co11111ittee are made as prov ded in the draft Mer iorancum of Understanding Reipectfully submitted Zt JJ fl 4LU Richard D Hahn WSC Member DOE c J Pebley DP-25 OFFICIAL USE ONLV • ···· · a 118 E Ii I tl tl OFFICIAL USE ONt Y APPENDIXM Compilation and Annotation of Draft Working Papers on S2C and Related Subjects This appendi compiles citations for certain reports papers ind essays th at 1 wro e or collected on szc md related subjects during my tenure as manager of rhc Nuclear Safety Depanmcnt 1650 1230 7230 from 1968 to 198S and as a consultant afterwards These documents often arc in the fonnat Draft Working Paper for distribution to interested or involved persons to seek their commcnu for subsequent revisions by iteralfon In I lier 'Can I favomt the fonnat or annotated bricfiog notes over draft working p lpcrs lhe former technique C3ught to me by Dick Brodie and most of these are included here The putpose of both types was twofold l to record my lea ming process and to do research on learning more about new subjects or issues and 2 to suggest positions practices or policies to rc soh·e issues The listing of docwnents is alphabetical by subject For each subject rhc first notation is the location in the Nuclear Safety lnfonnation Center NSIC of U1e file folder that was used during lhe period 1968-198S and the numberofdocumenlScontaim d therein Documents not filed in these folJcrs are them listed chronologically and brief notes and annotations are included where needed for context in the evolutionary process containeJ in the text of Ibis essay The lndc t section oflhc report contains lbe s imc set ofsubjccts and tics the subjects lo the References s ction In general Jocumcnts listed in the References section are not repeated in this ppcndix Subjects Abnollnlll Accideul I E11 'ironments Accidcrus ond Significant Incidents Acddent Response Arraan Monitor Conttol Equipmenl Adversal ' Simulation 81 tc khattini Custody and or Security Delfucratc Uruulhomc d Luuucb DUL Dcmll D1s Jblem nt Desuvc1ion W DOD Om cti c 5030 1S ind SucccJSors DOE Or i r 0560 and Succc s on Duct J g ncy Rcsponsib1htie El ctrom 1inetic ludfati 'n If_ lRJ L1i htning E t e J• ' Oenru or El Enhl i cd uelcar D l narion Safety IENDSJ fapll lii c Ouln mi e Drmulition EOD lnrrinsic R 11l1 ition from udcar Wc ipon11 ' fe h intc 11 Sltini S Ann111 Devk e tS n Mc monodum of llndcrst mdins DOD 'DOE MOLIJ fllllary Characrmsrics MCs l' ucle u Power Rc Ktor fuel C C'h Sa c I · 1'uclcu Wc apoD Dcion ihon S tfcry Sbnduds Nudear Safely Philosophy Polley and Pr lctices uclc ar Sa ety Srand lrds RequirtmcnlS Rt -por s1bd1tics SuclcJr S lfc ay Kuks u lc u Wc3pon S ·stemS 1fery Sn1d Groups l WSSGsJ Nude Jr Wc- 1pon Tr ansporution One-Pomr and Popcom Nudi ar D cnn ition S iicty Pc rsonnd 5$w mcc and tJuman Dc1on 1tion S f ty Plulunium Dispersal Sa tc ty Pmb i1'1li -tic RukAsscumcnt rPRA Roles ofKuckar Safety S cialisr s c Comm1t1cc for DiJI DI' 0 c 11111r cu hllly Sim kpilc Slfer · Srudy of ERDA IJOD l ' c Cu urol Ph 11 JI ccr i Trmn ism My day fik folJcrs li lm 1%7 through 19S5 ilrc c ontain J in NSIC' IV J852 through IV JS65 OFFICIAL USE ONLY 247 ·1ccrsz'ssr 1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Abnormal Accident Environments TI1 rc is no file collection lV 3290 is n1arktd Accident Environments hut it contains only three docwncnts-none relcv mt UNC Memo ·•characterizing Abnonnal Environments W L Stevens 1650 to Dislribution 13 Department Managers dtd 3 14 73 12 pages IV 3853 23 Suggests that lhc Enhanced Nuclear Detonation S ifery ENDS concept being developed obviates the need to improve quantitative detinitions of ibnormal cnvironmenLS and that Project Officc r Groups should define such for each weapon in the stockpile-instead of trying to --rite common dc-finitions Accidents and Significant Incidents CFRD Paper Exercise of Weapon Systems Not on Alen Starns U '' W L Stevens 1230 to Distribution 9 8 76 lV 3857 8 pages Attachments Discusses the need for exercise of stockpiled nuclear weapon sysrffl s and gives examples of related safety incidcnlS0 W2S AIR2A Ready Safe Switch Overheating and B28PJ B-S2 BDUs NOTE This paper was e panded and updated 6 3 77 as IV 385718 Sec also the seer ion on Explosive Ordnance Demolition especially 4V l l0 of 8 69 Accident Response File collections rv 3940 contains 63 numbered documents ''Accident lnve ligation and Administration'' ARG correspondence l9SS-1980 IV 3960 same subject but to 1991 contains 95 numbered documents IV 228 contains documents on the Accident Response Group 1V 31 ti5 Titled ON A- Emergency Planning cont wtS 35 numbered documents IJNC Memo Comments on AEC Responsibilities in 3'1 ucle ir Weapon Accidcnrs 1ncidcnts ' L Sle ·cns 1650 to V J Howard 1000 and T B Cook 8000 through H E Lcnandcr 1600 J2il0 68 9 pages lV 3940 53 UNC Memo ·•tnfonn3tion Packages for Nuclear Weapon AcciJent Rc- spon c U · V L Stevt ns 1230 to G J Hildebrandt 4 320 7 28 80 1 page IV 3S60112 Suggests creation of ''bu111h books coulaining informal ion colkctl d specifically for arc1dcnt responses re al anti c x rciscs-irlSlead of using EOO 1m11111als This w is ione L' - ' lemo S unty Pt nmclt r E · cuJtion Distances ational Ddi nsi - r as ere for -J 1de 1r ' 'e pon Accidents W L Stl ·cns 1 3• h Distribution 61lfSJ 5 pa cs l ' JS il • us OFFICIAL USE ONLY r - Ftrlll I h1 ffi OFFICLAl MSE ONL¥ Contains the author's thoughts 311d suggestions for control of local real cslate during u cident response UNC Memo ·• Emergency Preparedneo s EP Planning ' L Sle ·cns 1230 to Distribution 6 18 81 l3 pages IV 3861 27 Discusses the dangers of sweeping nuclear weapon 3ccidcnr response procedure into 1he mold established for nuclear fuel C 'Cle and re ictor accidents UNC Transmittal Memo ··EMR Restrictions at Nuclear Weapon Accident Sites U '' W L Stevens to Disrribution 7 8 81 7 pages JV 3861 26 UNC Memo7 Attitudes on DOE Roles in Weapon Accident Response W L Stc 'cns 1230 lo Distribution 2 16 82 9 pages IV 3862141 UNC Memo Comments on Draft Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures NARP Manual dilled April 7 1982 ' W L Stevens 1230 to J R Roeder USDOE ALO OSD 5117 82 7 pages JV 3862 26 Questions and plans for tre itment or operational and technical aspects of accident response UNC Memo --comments on Draft DOE SS30 Response to Accidents Im oh-·iog Nuclear Weapons U • W l Stevens 1230 to J R Roeder USDOFJALO OSD 4114182 7 pages lV 3862127 Contains comments on eleven topics mosrly on operational and technical subjc cls-as contrasleJ lo the administr3tion and agency interfacing cmph3Sis in the draft UNC Memo Suggc s1ed Positions on Degre of Hands-on Participation by Sandia Employei s in Nuclear Wcapc n Accident Recovery Operations W L Stevens 1230 lo Distribution 2111 82 5 pages IV 3862144 C C Memo Some Distinctions Bc Lween Accid nt Response-Group ARG and th Nuclear Emergency Search Team NEsr · W L s e ·cns 7230 to W C M Te 5200 -i ·2 84 5 pages tV 3864 8 md l ' J960 24 Discusses future AEC r1 sponses lo icdJ nt s and r spon 1bihties of AllG 1m l i ST i lr any IL sf' Wl apon siruation Cosam ms on a pmposaf by Ud ·s DuJnc Sc w ll ··OFFICIAL l JSE ONLY -· • · '' ' i · · OFFICIAL USE ONI ¥ UNC emo ··Nuclc ar Weapon Accident Prtp iredness •· V L Stc vcns 123010 J R Roeder DOE ALOIOSD 12 23 81 2 pages JV 316517 Argues against applying NRC reactor safety policies lo nuclear weapons faciliti s as was being pushed by L Joe Deal of DOE HQ This view was adopted by DOE AL and the elfon ceased W J Howard TOte 3 high-level memo an the same subject UNC Memo to File •·sNL Involvement in DNA's AR AC Fc asibility Study W L Stevens 1230 9 1 Rl IV 316S 15 Argues against an aUempt by DNA aml DOE OM staff offices to get SNL funded for i study that could require use of LL'l1 •s AR AC capabilicy for ·•site specific surveys associated with plutonium dispersal threalS See also Accident Environmen1s File Collection lV 3290 1 for lclter from Harold Agn w LASL Director 10 U C Dormelly AEC AL on DNA's role in accident response Adversary Simulation Blackhatting•' The tile collection entitled Blackhat Activi1ics is rv 3287 and il contains four documents None of these are particularly applicable to 1his t Ssny on S C See also 3V 564 Aircraft Monitor and Control Equipment AMAC The file collection is IV 3764 and it contains 36 numbered documents LINC Memo Nuclear Safety and the AMAC Stand-off · w L S1evcrtS 1650 to Dislnl ution I 0 17 69 5 pagt s 4V l 573 52 Suggests formation of an intra-S3Jldia study group to consider a new Ai fAC system compatible with the Project CRESCE ' 1 bomb ad 'anccd development concept Thi rrort was organized by S D Spray 311d his memo with the abo ·c mlc is attached lo Stc ·ens' cover memo Deliberate1 Unauthorized Launch DUL o Iii collection on this subject has been lo atc J CFRD Dr ift Bricllllf ·c t s E 'olu1ion ' ' 1c t$Ur S IO Control Ddihc r ilc Un iullwrizetl l aunch s of Nucbu- Weapon Cap ihlc t hs iks t ' W L S1cvt mi l · l J 83 R visctl Si° p l cs tV 3862 ' l OFFICIAL USE ONLY • 1 u7 ••• I l · · • I t taw -• OFFICIAL USE ONLY Summarizes evolution of DUL rrom SAC'5 buddy system through Pershing ll and discusses unresolved questions and issues UNC Memo Deliberate Unauthorized Launch DUL of Pershing 11 W L Stevens 7231 Acting to R M Shay USDOE ALO WSSB 2 9 83 2 pages IV 386 1 14 Denial Disablement Destruction D3S of Nuclear Weapons - file collection of L D Smith is IV 2895 and it conrains relevant documents See also 3V l 29 for discussion of non-violent disablement and IV 27 I 9t I for Pre Disc nablemenL SRO M- mo Suggestions for a long-Range Solution To The Ve3pon D1s iblemcnt Probfcm · W L Stevens 1650 to W C Myre 1210 and D E Gregson 8310 RS 1650 002 8 9 68 7 pages V 38S2 32 Discusses the concept of 0 implosion inhibition based on ideas of Robert L Peurifoy Jr SRO Memo ··weapon Disablemcn ·• W L Stevens 1650 to D E Gregson S130 RS 1650 018 10 23 68 2 pages IV 3852 24 Discusses improvised weapon destruct systems and PAL systems SRO Mt -mo Destruction of Nuclear Weapons U J A Hornbeck Pr idcnt Sandia Corporation lo Major General E B Giller USAEC AGMMA RS 1 1681 9 27 68 J pages IV 38S2124 I believe lbat I coordinated drafting of this memo that present$ Sandia's recommendations SRO ' lcmo Thou ts Arising from The Wc-3pon Denial Symposium U1 · V I S1 ·ims 1650 Dis1ribution RS 1650 068 1211171 5 p iges J V 3852'2 10 Discusses silfcty rules and EOO procedures Pu di ersal saJc1y including mention of a u-graph d picrion hypothtlic 11 results of l Pu disrcrsal at Bunker Ifill AFB nnd Kirtland AFB and weapon 1ransportation EOO manuals and PAL hypass and Johnny Foster's Gull gc -neratorlPAL code idea SRD Drall Working Paper ·•some Tcdu1kal Qi estions md Policy Issues Rdarcll lo 'iolimt Di slnw1ion l fl S ucle ir WcapJn J '' W L Ste ·ens 1230 RS 1230 '0JS n I 77 Re is d 1 ·141 77 IJ r 1gi s JV 3S57 '6 Later rcvis1 -J i nJ issued as IV S5 L S OFFICIAL USE ONt ¥ • • • 51 iit'FCr153 59% · OFFICIAL USE ONLV r Tilis meml led to establishing the Stockpile Interfaces and Rcsponsibiliue 111 Srudy an atttmpt to assure responsibility and consistency tn Sandia's treatment of S2C' concerns particularly D3S The memo contains 311 e vly 'cr ion of suggested Sandia policy statements for s c including security See JV 129 CFRD Memo 'Measure of Weapon Disable1Destruct U '' V_ L Stevens 1230 to A A Lu bcr 1310 12 19177 S pages IV 3S57 1 Gives thoughts and approaches ro set a pcrfonnancc measure on various disable dcsrruct methods CFRD Memo 0 D1S and the Stoc kpile U '' W L Stev ns 1210 to L D Smith 1200 7 l 7n8 2 pages l'V 3S58 14 Suggests a D S snidy o tbe stockpile No response SRD Orafi Memo Not Issued ··oJ Sand the Stockpile-Baseline Terronst Case U ' W L Stevens ro Distribution RS1230 045 I 0 9178 3 pages IV JSSS 6 My response to IV 3858 14 above CRD Memo Noles on lncrcmcnt il vs Ultimate Safety ind Control Improvements '' W L Stcv1ms 1230 I O l 9nS 6 pages Altached to fV 3858 2 Contains works prepared for W J Howard in contesting LLL's position against HE effccti 'eness UNC Time-Line and Annotated References Nuclear Weapon Destruction Disublement or D1 11ial E- ·olution • W L Steven Late 1990 8 pages IV 3860 1 Tbis is one of a set of four Olhers 3rc on Nuclear Detonation Safety HE Nuclear Subsystem Aspect E -olution llV 3860 l Nuclear Detonation S ifety Anning and Firing Subsystem Aspect Evolution I V 386013 and Nuclear Weapon Use Control Evolution IV 3860 4 SRO Working Dr3ft Some Nuckar Safety Issues Related to Disablement ofU S Nuclear Vcaporis lJ '' W L Stevens 1230 4 25178 RS 1230 0-H 18 pages tr msmittcJ by LP C Cover Lclll r ··stockpile Interfaces and Respon 1hilili s Smdy Ul W L Stt H•ns 1230 to U1stnbutfon -li26 •7S I p tg IV JSSS 15 DOD Directive 5030 15 and Successors The file culleclh in s IV 3340 and DOD Dm ctm 5030 15 52 11 contains I 8 number d documents Tl1 • folder 1s h1hdi I · OFFICIAL USE ONL'f OFFl61 L 1 19E ONL c UNC Draft Memo The Notion of •Prcanning' in Nuc ear Safety U W L Stevens 1230 to Distribution l I 19 76 4 pages IV 38S9 23 Discusses possible detrimental impacts of the addition of ·preamung to the set of arming launching firing orreleasing of nuclear weapons in the 8 S 74 revision ofDoD Directive 5030 15 UNC Memo The Four Nuclear Weapon System Safety Standards Per DOD Directive 5030 ls · W L Stevens 1230 to Files 2 pages IV 3859 25 Discusses origins and intents of the second and third standards as regards the terms anning launching firing or releasing UNC Draft Working Papen Some Personal Opinions on the Impact of DOD Dircctiv 5030 f5 on Design of Nuclear Detonation Safety and Control FeatW'es ofNuclear Weapons U W L Stevens 1230 3 26 79 25 pages tmnsmitted lo Distribution by Memo from W L Slcvcns 4 18 79 IV 3859 23 Discusses in detail the four standards as related to nuclear detonation safety and to use control UNC Memo 'Thoughts On The National Nuclear Weapon System Safety Process As Governed By DOD Directive 5030 IS 12 pages attached to UNC Memo Revision of DOD Directive 5030 15 on Nuclear We3 pon System Safety W L Stevens 7230 to R J Peterson DOE DMA DP226 3 6 1 83 3 pages IV 3340 4 Contains a lengthy candid and somewhat tutorial discussion of the subjecc and argues against e tensive chnnges to DOD S030 l S UNC Memo Proposed Revision to DOD Directive 5610 3 ' W L Stevens 7230 to R J Peterson USDOE OMA DP-226 3 S 31 85 2 pages IV 2722 34 Contesls Bob Peterson's suggested r vision and suggests that the OOE OP's S C Committee is rapidly devolving from high-level m magcment membership to middle-level representation DOE Order 0560 and Successors and Nuclear Explosive Safety Studies NESSs The fili collection for this subject has not been located UNC Memo ·•tmphm1ent 1tion of DOE Order 5610 J aml U Order 5 it0 3 W L Stevens I 30 to J R Roedl r DOE ALO OSD 10 6 '82 IV J$62i7 OFFICIAL USE ONLY I 1 53 Contests DOE AL 's attempt to cxp311d covcr ige 10 include damage to the nuclear xplosivc and personnel injury on the basis that these are line responsibilities of the contractor M H See also IV 3861 22 of7 l l 81 L'i C PRIVATE Memo u0pinions on the Cwreni State of the DOE's Nuclear Detonation Safety Program U W L Stevens to Distribution 6 6184 9 pages IV 386416 with 5 sets of enclosures Contains opinions assembled in rhc way ofa stock-take perhaps in anticipation of approa ching retirement of the author Coverage includes st ites at DOE AL DOE AUOSD DOE AUAM for S S DOE OMNSE ENSSB DOEJOMAISE EA D08 DDMA LLl 1•• and ithin Sandia UNC Draft Mc -mo Nuclear Explosive Safety Study of 11 Nuclear fixplosivc Like Assemblies ·• W L Stevens 7230 7 13 84 Not Sent I page IV 3864 S Tws memo in the fonnat of a suggested memo from R L Pcurifoy Jr • 7000 to DOE ALO AMOS S comments on differing views oflhe Los Alamos Sandia und Livermore Sandia design 1 ams NOTE The file collection for Nevada Test Site Operations safety is IV 3833 There are 53 numhcrcd docwncnts UNC Memo Comments on Nuclear Explosi ·cs Safety Program Per ERDA mnnual Chapter 0560 W L Stevens to Col James G McCray DRDNOMNSSB l 20 75 2 pages IV 3833 23 Challenges ERDNNV's position that s curity matters are not wilh in the scope of NESS groups Dual Agency Responsibilities No file collection on this subject has been loc3l d Origin of this concept is discussed on page 12 ofS '- 099-1308 this report Rl S-t IV3B5-1161 or l 374 9 of L i5 ipplii s L 'NC PRlVAl'E Dr ift Memo ·•oual g ncy Jurlgmt nts in National NucleJr Vc tpun S if t fattt 1s '' W L Stc ·cns 1230 to forgan Sp uks I G - Fcl lcr Il OQ and L I Smith I S I 7i7S i pa_ IV 3S58 13 L' 'IC -Ok1r o --1mplemcn1 uirtn of tl1 Starbird Study R commcmlations '' V_L Ste ·ens tu Di m thulion 71 1 - SI 10 p tgc i l o' stit O OFFICIAL USE ONLY 11 • Considers basic responsibilities between DOE llfld DOD on S 1C in conh xt of Ted Gotd·s draft MOU Mentions joint shared and singular responsibilities s also Mcmorandwn of Understanding section especially 4V 1628 of 6 20 78 See also lV 3222 36 and IV 3858112 for lcner from Morgan Sparks by W J Howatd to DOE OMA Electromagnetic Radiation EMR and Lightning Environments The fiJc collection is IV 3941 and it contains 36 numberc d documents UNC Memo Nuclear Detonation Safety and EMR Environments for U S Army Theater Weapon Systems U W L Stevens 1230 211n1 16 pages JV 3857 114 UNC Memo Lightning Environments for Nuclear Weapons W L Stevens 1230 to Distribution l l 26n9 2 pages IV 3859I Gives thoughts on treabm nt oflightning threats in safety themes md as credible envimnments SRD Memo Pershing la Safety Rules U 1•• W L Stevens 1230 to Caprain W Beech USN DOE OMA DSE EJ RS 1230 81 02 1127 31 3 pages lV 3861 40 Addresses technological aspects oflighming vulnerability oftbe Pershing la ancJ suggests that the issue be elevated to the nat1on J lc ·el INC Memo Lightrung Protection for Nuclear Weapons W L Stcvcns•l230 lo C C Burk 4310 3 3 81 0 pages JV 3861138 Record personal prejudices and inclinations of the amhor to stimulate dialogue See also AcciJcnt R sponsc and Accident En imnments File Colkcuon IV 6290 2 for Lightning Events 1961-6S Emergency Destruction ED Memo ·'Destruction ofKudl ir Weapons Uy Burning in a Liqm I Hfdrocarbon Fu I Fire · L Stc · n- 12J• 10 Distribution 12 2 76 t p igc TV 3S56 3 t C Contams pmpos 1 by San lia It• d1s ominu this mctl1od of 1 lllcrgl Ilc tkstrudion OFFICIAL USE ONLY a f'i · ·• •F - 3 HE JJP f OFFIClalcL l ISE ONt V SRD Memo U S Policy for Emergency Destruction U W L Steven I 7230 to A A Lieber JJO RS 7230 8201 6 25 82 4 pages JV 3862119 UNC Memo Strawman Write-ups of Concerns Operational S3fety Review '85 W L Stevens 1230 to Stuart Wright DOE Al WSSB 61181 SS 6 pages IV 3865 Discusses lhrce concerns logistical mo 'cmcnts by hc licopters fire-fighting for nuclc3l' weapons invoJ c d in fuel tires and emergency Jtstruction ED Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safety ENDS No file collection on this subject has been located UNC Memo Nucle ir S3fety Design Guidelines U W L Stcvcns-1650 to L A Hopl ns Jr • 9500 11 12'68 1 page 1V JSS2i30 This is perhaps my earliest expression ofinrenr for direcrion to be t lkcn by Stan Spray's sllftty design division to begin on 11 15 68 favoring quantitative approaches o 'cr the qualitath·e UNC Briefing Text ·• Design for Safety Wt3 Link Strong Link Concepts V L Stevens SNl Briefing for Ooo·s Military Liaison Committee t 1111no 4V 1593 30 JS pages Contains my notes for the first cxtra•Sandia briefing on 1hc concepts that later became known as ENDS LINC emo Rc riscd Standards for Nuclear Saf ry·• W L s evcns 1650 to Dept Mgrs 1200 1500 8100 and 1640 8 31172 IS pagt -s 1V 38S2 This was a draft memo that proposed a new nuclear weapon design safety appro ch bter called ENDS for weupons dcvclopm¢nl and in stockpile The me copy is marked ith changes b i scd on comments recch ed The document includes 3 smiwm m memo that 1 Jraficd from Carl Walsk DoOi'MLC to John S Foster DoD 'DDR E on the prJcticc of the military s l ·ices in unilaterally wea ening the Valske safety critl Tia 0 I NC Memo Re ision of Nuclear Safoty S1w11Jards W L Stevens 1650 to W J H0 1 ard 1noo 9 I6 'i1 5 pages JV 3243 3 Cm1tains th• lirst '1pinion of W L l 'l rts on the impacl of E 'Ds on the nuck- ir ali ty process OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1 1 - 1 1 II F 910 1 E IJF i OFFICIAL USE ONLY Explosive Ordnance Demolition EOD The file 1 olh -ction is lV 3927 through 1983 and it contains 104 nwnbered documents This subject ha s interfaced with S1C in several important ways The discipline ofEOD changed drasric31Jy from concentration on unexploded shells and land mines on the banlefield World War I to removal of danger to the general popul JA c caused by unexploded bombs and warheads in cities World Var II England The discipline became highly technological in nature when GennilJI ' rcaJized the tcm r value and began to install clever deadly anti-disarming features into the orcfn311cc This concern eanied over to U S nuclear wc apom in the form ofEOD personnel r uiring fuJJ disclosure ofweapon designs in order 10 prescribe safe EOD procedures to publish the procedures in military manuals and ro 1rain EOD pt TSonnel in execution of 1he procedures An early concern of mine was the availabiliry of highly scnsirive detailed information on cl trical circuits for weapon safing arming and tiring in EOD manuals and the worldwjde distribution of the manuals See page S8 of the text After le sding the process lo eliminate the information 311d restrict distribution of manuals my concerns shifted to the EOD pruc tic e of requiring the tearing apart ofweapons that had been invoJved in accidents or serious incidents in order to remove the nuclear matc r'i31 from the high explosives that surrounded the material socalled Render Safe Procedures'1 EOD teams were trained to do RSP and naturally insisted on doing RSP on every applicable actual nuclear weapon accident and accident cxen isc on which I studied For e ' mnple the Navy EOD team insisted on tearing down the B28Fl bomb recovered at sc3 al Palomares on the barges at sea This process is not suited to such field operations wid requires very special equipment found only in the AEC ERONDOE weapon production plants Two of the AECIDOD accident response team members successfully con inccd military authori1ics that the bomb was s3fe to transport lo a U S site for examination precluding the need for RSP The two wen Stu Asselin of Sandia and a young Air Force officer from the DASA For almost twenty-tive years l engaged in conflicts with Sandia's otllitaiy liilisoo organiza1ions to correct these S1C dcficieacies and even at my retirement the solution was in view but not at hand My successor Jim Ney continued the bJUI anJ won in the late 1980s SRO Draft Working Paper Explosive Ordnance Di -posal Procedures for Nuclear Weapons-A Re-Examination tu ' W L Ster ns 1650 RS lb50f036 S 69 73 pag IV 3186 1 iv 110 Rc ·1cws the broa l area of EOD and ccnclu lcs th 11 lht c dsting procedures m h t hnically invaliJ This rcpmt inch1ll s lnhk-s summaries incidents of p utial •nning of nudc u weapons wc ipon comroni nts opcratcJ in m tjor icddcnis anJ incidents md iniLial responses to accidcnt and incitli tts for seak-J pit weapon u c Memo Proposed f cch Manual TP 60-XX w L Stc 't IIS 1650 o I M JMrc I610 l •il6 7fJ I page lV 3852115 OFFICIAL USE ONLV- 1 Ct' I l'P %1 Si 2 I JPltJ OFFICIAL USE ONLY JJ C Memo cw EOD Philosophy •• W L Stevens 1230 to L 0 Smith 1200 R L Peurifo ' Jr•• •BOO and W J Spencer 8100 917 78 2 pages IV 3927 43 Recommends non- ' oncum nce on a proposed W31 EOD manual because it included too much detailed design infonnation LTNC Memo ·•EOD Training on Nuclear Weapon Component h Jcn1ification W L Sle 'ens 1230 to Disuibution 10 9178 7 pag I ' 3858 7 · See also the ARO NEST sections CNS Memo EOD Actions in Nonnal and Higher Slates of Readiness U W L Stevens 1230 lo J F Burke USAEC ALO 7 28 80 7 pages IV 3860 14 Recommends elimination of ''wait periods and •·Render Safe Procedures in EOD manuals for modem designs of nuclear weapons UNC Memo 0 8OD Policy and EOD Training W L Stevens to Dis1ribution Not Sent 7182 10 pages IV 3862117 UNC Memo Disposal of Damaged Nuclear VC'ilpons ln•Place ' W L Stevens 1113 8'2 5 pages IV 3S6213 See also Accident Response lJNC Memo EOD Training W L Stevens 7230 10 Distribution 1 23 84 2 pages JV 3S64 transmiuing SRO Memo On A Suggested SNL Policy for Explosi ·e Ordnance Disposal lattcrs U '' W L Stevens 7230 RS7230 84 02 10 16180 37 pages and rv 3862 17 hsted 3hovc Presents views on rethinking the DOE's approach lo EOD and lhc technical content ofEOD manuals tr - c Dr ift Working Briefing Not s A Proposed Appro3ch to Rethinking Technological Aspects of Explosivi Ordnmce Dispos 11 tor Nuclear Weapons ·• W L $te ·er1s 2 84 • l pages 1v Jst 1 11 IV 2719 33 ot contained m IVJ864 1984 D iy Fi1' t Insensitive High Explosives IHE Th lik collt ction i IV J-117 and it contains 7 numbered focumcnts IV 3417 t is lhc Do l's p licy statement on incorporacing ilf E in Jc ·clopin_g nuck ar systtms See also thl section on Plutonium Di pcrsal S ifcty ·OFFICIAL USE ONLY 8145 f l Ji UC OFFl81 'cl tJOE ONLY Intrinsic Radiation from Nuclear Weapons 'So tile collt -ction on this subject has hc m located CRD Draft working Paper On lnuinsic Radiation from Nuclear Weapons U ' W L Stevens 1230 18 10179 18 pages IV 38S9 3 Summarizes the history of treatment of intrinsic radiation con cms in TP20-7 Nuclear Safety Crircria·• and suggcsis a change on approach UNC An unclassified version of the above is IV 3860 dated 3 3 80 UNC Memo SNL Role in Intrinsic Radiation INRAO Study b · MLC W l Stevens to R L Pcurifoy Jr 4300 10 13 80 V 3860 8 Logistical Transportation The file collection for this subject if my has not been located UNC Memo ·-some Opinions on Safety in Transport ofNuclear Weapons • W L Stevens 1650 to Distribution Undated Prob ibly lace '74 6 pages JV 38S3 6 Contains my opinions on the state ofpluronium dispersal safety considi rations in logistic il tr3Dsponation particularly as regards plutonium mass limit increases bc-ing proposed by Colonel M irv Sullivan FCIDNA See also JV 3865 of6 18 8S Mechanical Sating and Anning Detonator MASO ThL'T« is no file collection on this subject U C Memo MSAD and the V84 Program U • W L Stevens 1 30 to W J Howard 2 through G Fowler 1000 anJ L D Smitli - 1200 7 Si79 1V 385lJ120 Addresses whether MSAD is worth doing at all and what it Wi lUld take to do MSAD well This is an xamplc of the rclativdy rare ne d ro elevate a safety is m to hit h-lcvel Sam li i manag1 mclll alh ntion especially l 'oidJncc of ··safer·· claim CFRD lcmo Adc qu icy of Safoty Pro ·i1kd by ' fSA Dll l' ' ' ' I Srcvcns lo Di mbtmon In 15-81 2 p 1ges l ' JS62 9 OFFICIAL USE ONt -V- CFRD Draft Letter S3me as above Untitled letter Paraphrase T B Cook 10 William B Shuler LLNLJADMA 3 2 83 4 pages IV 2719 15 CRFD Memo Comments on the WS4 U J W Grear 4 6183 I J pages 1V 2il 9 16 Memoranda of Understanding MOU Thd file collection is lV 3350 and it contains 21 numb rcd Jocumenls The folder is fab l d ·· Presidential Decision Memo Memorandum of Understanding See also IV 3054 Safety Rt oquirements 89 documents St-e also Dual Agencr Rcsponsib1lilies section UNC fcmo Comments on Proposed MOU on uclcar Weapon Syslem Safety Rules tltd 5 29 78 t ntitled Paraphrase W L Ste •ens 1230 to Distribution 6i8 S 33 pages IV 3858 19 and IV 3350110 A collection of 6 attachments pro iding background information ror SNL directors on the subject l NC Memo Comments on Drafl MOU oo Nuclear Weapon Sysh 'ITl Safety Rutes•· Unlitled Paraphrase Morgllll Sparks by W J Howard to MG J K Bratton liSDOE D tA 6120178 58 pages lV 3222 36 4V 162B and is a part of lV 3858 12 Disagrees ith draft version by the DoD Supports dual agency responsibilities concept UNC lemo ••Agreements on Proecssmg of Nuclear Weapon System Safety Rules U ' W L St ·ens 1230 to Distribution 8 1 7S 17 pages JV 3858 12 UNC Memo ·· Proposed Prcsidcnrial Dirccli •e md DOD DOE Memorandum oft nd rst3 nding on -- ud m- Weapon System Safety Rules W l Ste• cns 11J0 co Distribution I l 30-79 I pages tV 3S 59 '8 Contains sidc-by-siJc Jinc-in-Jm -out markups i f three ir tc-racti ns in evolution -'fa PD k v10l1 Military Characteristics MCs The lilc colkction is I 'J24J and iE ontains 7 numbered llocmn nts Nuclear Power Reactor and Fuel Cycle Safety OFFICIAL USE ONLY n11 rn• a·r t J OFFletAL tl9E 8NL¥ There is no file collection One collection is in my d3y file for 1973 i e IV 3853 References 66 through 69 of the text Private Memo ·· Comments on Transportation ofNucle ir Reactor Fuel W L Steven 1650 to Distribution 8 73 12 pages IV 3853 18 Contains critical comments on the AEC' s Environment1l Impact Sratemt -nt For Reactor FueJ Transponation UNC Memo usenate Hearings on Transportation of Hazardous Materials W L Ste ·enSy 1650 ro Distribution 6 19 74 2 pages JV 385319 Nuclear Safety Standards Requirements Responslbflitfes The file collection is IV 3054 and it contains 89 numbered documents UNC Draft Mcmot lntctprcling Safety Goals W L Stevens lo Distribution 2118171 6 p3gt s lV 3S52 13 Contains early thoughts on using quantilath·c goillS for nuclear safety e g probability of an occWTcncc and probability of spcci fie undcsiroo c onscquencc given an occurrence CFRD Memo Background on the 'Walskc Leiter' '' R l Pcurifoy Jr 4300 to LTG A D Starbird 12 20 f79 2 pages JV 385912 Transmits the '' Valskc Letter and comments of Pcurifoy Stevcns for use in the Starbird Study· UNC Time-Line und Annotated References Nuclear Dclouation Safely Anning and Firing Subsys1cm Aspect Evolution • W L Stevms Late 1980 IV 3360 '3 This is one ofa net of four Others MC on udcar Detonation Safety HEi uclcar Subs stern Aspect Evo uti ll fV 3860 1 Nuclear Weapon Destruction Disablcm1 nl or o nial E ·olution IV 3960 '2 and Nuclear Weapon l'sc Cl' ntrol E olution 1 V 3860-'-n Nuclear Safety Philosophies Policies and Practices Th tile colkction i JV 31 J•J and it cun1 ains 6S numbi r1 •d d11cumt nts The foldc r 1s l ihclc41 ·•Safety Philosophy S also kch uik al iling mJ Am1ing Dcton 11or -01S D section OFFICIAL USE ONL¥ ftSCBiI'f i2 I OFFIGIAL USE ONLY SRO Or lft Working Paper Peacetime and Wartimo Nuclear S ifcty Risks lbr Device Weapon Electrical Systtm Designs Used in Full Scale Nuclear Testing iU '' V L Stevens 1650 5 i I 16 pages Tnnsmitted by UNC PRIVATE Memo FLAX uclCMSafet • W L Ste •cns 1650 10 G E Brnnvold 8170 619171 I page IV 3S33 42 Reviews evolution of quantitative nuckar safety design requirements for weapons weapon systems and dc icc testing and suggests use of Walske-like criteria for the laltcr activity UNC Draft M o National Nui lear Weapons Safety Practices ·• W L Stevens 1230 10 Distribution 2 13 76 3 pages JV 3856 32 Discusses need for a national center of c xccllcnce for nuclear safety to be located in Albuquerque NM UNC Draft Working Paper A Reappraisal oftb U S Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program ' W L Stevens 12176 18 pages IN 11S2 1 with Appendix A A Description of the National Nuclear Weapon Safety S1udy Program 16 pages Appendix B Dual judgment Rotes in Safcty1 Control and Security of Nuclear W capons 8 pages Appendix C Principles Guiding Nuclear Weapon Silfcty Activities al Sandia Laboratories i pages Appendix D Covmge of Some Risks for Nuclear Wtapons by Groups and Ocher Activities 9 pages This lengthy memo discus ' es four concerns and possible alternative ichons to address each l lack ofinstitutionat framework to resolve issues and disagreements 2 lack of national dirccCi 'es for dual agency responsibilities 3 low quality of l hnical analyses for safc ty studies Md 4 insufficient coverage of risks other th m nuclear detonation CFRD Drd t Working Paper WM and PC3cc 3nd In B twccn-J uclear Detonation Safel ' Aspects of Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe LI '' W L Stc• -cns 1230 3it01i7 u page l V 3857 ' I0 Discuss afety aspcc1s of the procc iS of·· wind• down from high s1a c of readiness l i i'C kmo ·· udcarSafcly Di sign 'Ri quiremenis· W L Sh vcns 1230 tv H W Schmitt 4340 4113 77 15 pages IV 3S57il I OFFICIAL USE ONt't ' ' J I • --' N t H TJI ' J OFFIGIAL USE ONL Gives references and notes on eight docwnents concerning requirements for nuclear weapon clc ctricaJ subsystems UNC Draft Memo Pica1inny Arsenat•s Requirements for Nuclear Safety in Designs W J Stevens 1230 ro Distribution Draft 71'2 S 77 7 pages IV 38S7iS U C PRJVATE Dr ift· Vorking Paper Some Key Events and Dr unatis Personae in the Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program Over th Past D Cade W L Stc •ens 21 li78 1_ pages IV 3858 33 Discusses the writer's premise of st -rious erosion in Ibis safety program at al I levels of consideration CFRD Draft Working Paper Some Key SuclC31' Weapon Safely De ·c lopments By the DOE Weapons Design Laboratories Over the P3St Decade U '' W L Stevens 1210 2 14178 IV 3858 32 See also Dual Agency Responsibilities section tr - C Memo Draft SL Positions on Certain Special Concerns Regarding l' uclcar Weapons • W L Stc 'cm l 3010 Distribution 7 13178 11 pages IV 38S8 15 This memo contains suggested policy statements for Sandia in lhc areas of nuclear detonation safety radioactive malcrial dispersal safety explosive ordnance demolition use control and security It was prepared for Sandia's internal Stockpile fntcrfaces and Responsibilities Study IV JSSS 23 and il became 1hc basis for the memo listed below lV3850 10 lJNC Memo Strawman DOE Position Paper on Safety Control and Sccuricy · W L Stcnms l 30 to Distribution 911178 7 pages TV JSSR 10 These statements wen based on the conlt nt oflV 38S811 s ahove but were adaplcd to the role of the DOE's Nuclc ar Weapon Coordimiting Commiucc UNC kmo I A's Draft Policy Statc m n l n CDS U ' W L Ste -cns l 30 to ' J How ird 1 11 09t18 6 pages IV 3858 1 Dis1 usses implication of an cxpantkd rnk proposal uf DOEi AL m sic mat1t•r_1 St l also Ref 17 J ' J E-low -ml i n r- i Rules fV 3139 '20 l N'C Ankk Sc 111 h ' h·cmer t f SJ111li 1 l 1b r uorieii in C S ir Fore -- ud 1r Safoty anJ Surdy Activities V I Ste ·ens 1·9•'79 'f page TransmittJI letter frcm h r tn Sparh 10 Cul Wcmkll E Cosn r U AF-D- ' S l '12·7'J l 'J j59 '32 1 OFFICIAL USE ONtV '• _r _ SEC il th tt 1 OFFISIAL YGE ONLY Published in USAF DNS•s Nuclear Safety magazine Discusses Sandia's roles and missions in s c CFRD Memo Some Philosophical Thoughls on lhe W79 P311te Safety Study Abnonnal Environments and Use Control U W L Stevens 1230 to Dislribulion 7121 81 IS p iges V J 861 22 Discusses the proliferation of safety'' concerns that the DOE seems to expect NESS groups to handle and potcn1ial impacts on Sandia UNC Memo Request for Comments on Dr ift DOE Policy Paper on Nuclear Safety Matters V L Ste 'ens 7230 to Distributio0p 6 622 83 I 1 pages V 386315 Attaches str iwmau draft reply to be signed by SNL President to MG V W Hoover DOF IDMA regarding subject policy paper draft questioning the notion of 0 indcpcndenl judgement' vs 0 dual agency judgments '' See Dual Agency Responsibilities UNC l 'lemo Comments on Annual Report 10 lhe President on Nuclear Weapons Surety 19S3 W L Stevens 7230 to Lt Col G T Palmer USAF OOE O WSE EA 3 5 84 1 page IV 386419 Mentions avoiding the advertisement of' safety R D vs safety accomplishments nnd in particular anributions to indhidual laboratories Nuclear Safety Rules No file collection on lhis subject has been located At one time there was a folder ••s fety Rules Gcnerat·• See also Memoranda of Understanding MOU page 261 See also lV 3054 Safety Requirements • 89 documents lJNC Memo Example of Time Taken Between Approval of Interim and Final Nuclear Safety Rules untitled paraphrase P F Jones and F J Murar to W J Howard 19 78 4V t 028 '9 L1 C Memo AEO'ERDA DOE Nl n-Concurrcnce in uckar Safety Rules W L St vc ns 1230 to L D Smith 1200 1i23178 2 p3ges lV 2719 35 Cites l O examples of threatcmihl fnot actu3l non-concurrence SAFEGUARD ABM System anJ POSEIDON UNC l fomo Procedures for Nuclear Wc -apons Safety Rules llnritlc J Paraphr ts MG J K Br st1t m VSA C'f IA to lcrgan Spark S L Presidenr 1 -tn 8 I rage tV JOS-Uil l There shoulcl hen question that SL ts lbc prini 1pal h clmical ad iser to OOE 11n nuclear weapons safety matte rs houl l communu ue Jirectly wnh me or an ' w apons s 1fo1y issui which you bi lil 'I should be called to my m ntion l 1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY lf fPl Ill f fl I OFFICIAL USE ONLY CFRD Draft Working Paper A Suggested Mcthodolog y for Sandia Li1boratorics' HanJling of Nuclear Weapon Concerns Having Negative Wurfare Waging PotentiaJs V L Stevens 1130 Based on rnpuls from an Ad Hoc Committee 6178 53 pages rransmincd by CFRD memo Stmwman Version of S1ockpile Interface Responsibilities Committee Preliminary Findings W L Stevens 1230 to Distribution 6 14178 I page JV 129 Discusses some areas of Sandia concern nuclear detonation safety radioactive material dispersal safety use control weapon destruction disablement denial and explosive ordnance demolition and their possible interactions Uses nonviolent disablement as an example UNC Memo Status ofSafety Rules U W L Stevens 1230 to W J Howard 2• S l 3179 2 pagL S IV 3859 24 rs a news note on status of rules processing a subjc cc of personal continuing interest to W J Howard Mentions Joe Luger's attempt co rewrite rules for most Anny systems UNC Memo S atus of Nuclear Safety Rules lnvorving OVERRIDE Switches W L Stevens 1230 to W J Howard 2 G A fowler l 000 and L D Smith 1200 S 9n9 3 pages lV 3859 18 Update on status of cc -rtain rules UNC M o B61-3 4 and S Signal Selector Swilch and lhe F-4 Wc3pon System '' W l s evens to Distribution 9 6179 l page JV 3859 1 l SRO Rough Draft Memo F-4 Safety Ruh -s U Morgan Sparks to MGW W Hoover DOi IOMA RS 1230 80 04 3f3l 80 3 pagcs IV 3S60 15 Draft version of Sandia's concurrence action on F-4 safety rules rutd the general issue of concern about operations with other air-dclivcrcJ weapon systems No copy of final lettt't' loc llcd in this file See also Pershing la Safety Ruh s '' IV 3861 40 SRO M mo Operator Domimmce on Nuclear Safety Rules Issues U RS 1230 82 I8 6t 1 S' 10 pagcj lV 3862 2-t Cites cxumpl of reluctance or L'SAF tu atlopt safety mi asun s chat off er L1pcrations pn ti mn that DOE n dcsii _'Tl tht nuclear weapon OFFICIAL USE ot LV • l - • Nuclear Weapon System Safety Group Studies NWSSGs Thero ire several file i ollections one for each milit3J' ' service UNC PRJVATE Memos ' Recent U S Anny Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies•• and ·•ta nee Special Safety Study W L Stevens 1230 and J L Wirth 8340 to V I Howard 2 G A Fowler 1000 and T B Cook 8100 3i2317S S pages lV 3858 20 Discusses the tcrionsiinactions of specific persons offices especially those of Joe Lug -r UNC PRIVATE Rough Draft Memo •• The Politici1 ation of Nuclear Weapon System Sufcty Studies by the U S Anny U W L Stevens 1230 to Distribution 7 78 19 pages IV 3858 S and N 3859 1O Describes the antics of Joe Luger UNC PRrV ATE Memo ••concerns On the U S Anny's Nuclear Weapon System Safety Committee NWSSC W L Stevens 1230 with assistance ofS D Spray and J W Grear 12 pages IV 3861 35 Describes the antics of Picatinny Arsenal's Ed Arbcr on Pershing n safety studies UNC Memo Rol4 or lhc Army's Nuclear Weapon System S 1fcly Commincc NWSSC W L Stevens Distribution 4 26 82 6 pages lV 3862 32 One-Point and Popcorn Nuclear Detonation Safety The file collection is IV 3484 and it conbins 58 numbered documents t Nc Time-Linc and Annotated Rcfercacc s Nuclear Detonation Safety HE Nuclcar Subsystem - spc t W L Stc vl ns late 1980 IV J860i1 This is one of a set of four Others arc on Nuclear Vcapun Destruction Disablemenc or Denial Evolution V 3860 1 Nuclear Detonation Safety Anning and Firing Subsystem Aspect E 'olution TV 3S60 3 and Nuclear VcJpr n Us Control E ·olution tlV 3S60 -l SRD lt mo Popcorn Guiil mcc Li W L Ste ·em l 30 to Disllihution 3 t 7lS 7 pagt 'S rV 3S61 1J t R1 po11s on the succcsslill effort offo Lug er US Anny Rctircll to block prnmulgation of technological guidance on the POPCORN phenomenon lo mil11ary agem i •s thr ' ugh nu 1-co currcnc 1 lll TP20-7 OFFICIAL USE ONLY 916PST'Fllt• OFFIOIAL USE ONLY Personnel Assurance Program PAP and Human Reliability Program HRP No tile collection for this subject has been located Use AskSam to search PRJVATE Rough Draft Memo ·• Personnel Assurance Program PAP md Nuclear S3fcty W L Stevens 1650 to Distribution 11 26 74 12 pagcs lV 3853 2 Contains a discowsc on the ERDA PAP in late 1974 summari1 ing practices at the we 1pons laboratories and otherwc Jpons facilities UNC Draft Memo NOT SENT Policy on Assignments to 1he Personnel Assurance Program W J Howard 2 to Distribution l 2 10 75 2 pages IV 3855 5 UNC Draft Memo Suggested Policy on Access to Nuclc-Jt Weapons and Explosives b ' Employees of Sandia Laboratories U '' W L Stevens 1230 to Distribution l l S 76 IV 3856 9 UNC Paper Guidance to Employees of Sandia Laboraroric '- Albuqui rque Who Visit the Pantex Plant W l Ste ·ens 1230 3 41 77 S pages JV 3857 13 UNC Memo ·•Personnel Assurance Progr m PAP Meeting • W L Stevens 7230 to Ca dos Garcia USDOE ALOtEA H 6112 SS 2 pages IV 2722 32 Plutonium Dispersal Safety No file collection for this subject hiJS been localed Use AskSam to search Plutoniun1 Dispersal SRO Memo ·•rnformal Comments on Recent Visit to European Nuclear Weapon Installations t1J i' L Stcn -ns-1650 lo Distribmion RS 1650 0l i 10 10 68 7 pages IV 3S52125 Reports on field trip to Europe by AEC UOD Committ c on -- uctear Materials Safeguards focusing on c nicrgency destruction and weapon trnnsporlation This may contain my earliest thou hts on Pu dispersal e g All OrJlty Am1y c i lponl just aficr thl r volution in Czccholllnvakia u' XC Dn11i temo ug stiom for a Plutonium Cunt m1inallon Safety Pmgram · W L S1L cns 1650 to H E Lcnamkr 1600 8 J -72 S p g s £ • 3S5 4 Sugg 'Sl5 formJlion or a t chnical Jivisi m in Dept 1650 10 ti •cus on contln11nation afoty in a ay inalogous to Scan Spray's w rk in nuclear Jctonari 1n design safely No int rest dc ·dnpctl OFFICIAL USE o LY f t Ak i ft OFFIClllrl l JSE ONLY· CFRD Memo Plutonium Weight Restrictions U W L Stevens 1650 to H E Lenander 1600 I0 20 69 I page attached memo not attached to file copy IV 3852 22 Transmits W L Stevens' first draft memo on Plutonium dispersal safety Memo not found UNC Memo Selected Reference on Plutonium Scattering W I Stevens 1230 to Distribution 4 20 76 7 pages JV 3856 21 UNC Memo ''Transportation ofRTG's for the Nuclear Weapons program W L Stevens 1230 to V E Blake-1710 10112n6 2 p3g IV 38S6 10 CNSI Memo TP20-i Plutonium Mass Limils' H E Roser Manager DOE AL ro MG J K Bratton DOE DMA 7 26 78 IV 3417 3p Discussion o this issue orcho nging Pu mass limits is contained on page 14 l of the text ofSAND99-l308 this report By this letter DOE AL declined to accommodate DoD's mandated change to a higher limit for all operations Tius led to several years ofjoint studies on the subject UNC Paper A Perspective on Plutonium as a Radiological Hazard John M Taylor 1233 3 1 78 17 pages transmitted to Sandia distribution by memo from W L Stevens 1230• Comments by Sandians on Hazards from Pluronium · 1 30 791 IV 3859 31 Presents a perspective on health hazards from dispersal ofplutonium to the populace based on a survey of the literature Cover Lener suggests that Sandians refrain from commenting on such hazards UNC Study Outline A Methodology for Decision-makers on Acceptable Storage Limits for Plutonium at Weapons Sites·• Untitled Paraphrases John M Taylor Transmitted to file by memo from W L Stevens 1230 Pu Mass Limits U 2116 79 2 pages IV 3859 27 Presents a Saodia counterproposal to DNA 's risk assessment methodology Si e also Probabilistic Risk Assessment section Ul C Memo Proxi111 il Dispersion of Contaminants Center · W L Stevens 1230 to Distribution DirL-ctors U r l 25i80 IV J860 j Suggests a Sandia iniliativ to build a national-level capability in this area LLNL later did this called Almosphcric Releas Coordinating Center UNC Memo 'Plutonium Mass Limits for Tr uisportation by Logis1ical Aircraft W L Stcn ns l 230 to R L Pcurifoy Jr • 4300 27i8l 2 pages IV 3861 39 iS OFFICIAL USE ONLY rn response to suggestions by l SAF Inspector General HowJtd Leaf this mc no suggests measures to reduce the tenn Pre ·ention of dispersion gh'c '11 an u cidc nt lluring logistical uansponation of we 1pons by air CRD Memo Comments on Draft En ·ironmcntal mpnct Statement Annex on Nuclear Weapons Storage Facilities and Activiti1 'S W L Stevens r230 to G P f 1cer DOE DMA SE EA 3 17 81 3 pagc s plus 15-pagc attachment lV 386liJ6 Comments on a DNA- sponsored study by Kaman Tempo ofnsks associ 1ttd with a hypothetical weapon storage site nctualiy for a spc Cific sir¢ 0 UNC Memo Nuclei1J' Weapon Con figurations for Non- Operational Movements · W L Stc 'cns-1230 to Distribution 8 1718 l 1 p 1ges IV 3861 2 l Suggests use of accident resistant containers ARCs for logistical movements of theater -based weapons UNC Memo Risk of Pu Dispersal in Nuclear Weapon Maintenance Opcrotions V L Stewos to Distribution l 0 28 82 3 pages IV 386216 UNC Memo ''Nuclear Weapon Accidents and Latent Cancer F4talities W L Stevens 12 30 to W J Howard 2 through G A Fowler 1000 and L D Smith 1200 21 9 82 I J pages V 386V39 UNC Memo '' Minimum Dclcclablc lung Burdens Following Acute Plutonium Exposure I 27 82 I page IV 3862 45 transmitting pnper of S3me title John M Taylor 4551 to R E Luna 4551 12 16 81 S pages CFRD Memo A Ma i Accident Consequences Scenario U W L Stevens 1230 to distribution 3i30 82 2 pages IV 3862 49 U C le mo Risk of Pu Disp1 rsal in DOE on-Transportation Oper 1tions W L Stc 'ens 7 30 to T B Cook 20 through 0 E Jonc s i00O and J M Vi s n 7 00 2'23 83 8 p igcs IV 3863113 ssemblcs rlocumcnls on thi subjL' l in relation sp ially to ''Gra ·cl Gcrties·• SFRD Orielinr Nml s Plutonium Dispersal Risk in NuclL-ar Weapon Transpon uion Operations li RS i 30·83 43 document being loc 11cd for filing in NSIC It's in R N Brodi 25 colh ctiun t KC kmo Otis n·Jtions on the St Jlc of Security Safety lnh rJctious for i de ir Veap ' n Op1 1 tfons m Europe il I W l Stc ·cns 723U hl m mibution Ii ' S t 8 page-s l ' 3S6 J•l OF AL USE-fa ILV i9 · OFFICIAL USE ONLY Probablllstlc Risk Assessment RA TI1e file collection is rv 3346 and it contau15 20 numbered documcnls The folder is labckJ 'Risks SRO Rough Draft A Unified Approach to Specifying Allowable Risks For Releases of R11dioactivc Materials U W L Stevens 1650 RS 1650 07S 8 28173 45 pages IV 38S3 20 Dc tailed essay on use of probabilistic risk assessmfflt 10 di types of fcry involving Sandia•s assessments Rc l·icws the work of Chauncey St irr and Frank R Fanner li C Draft Paper Coacepruat Approaches for Treating Engineering Aspects of Low Probability High Consequence Risks to th General Populace • W L Stevens 1230 I 1 l 2r77 28 pages fNJG60117 Amplifies and arranges my notes from review oflhc literature on du subject of high consequence risks to the popul Jce L C PRJVATE Memo '·PM PM and Me • W L Stevens 1210 to distribution 1 78 6 pages IV 3858 37 Gives summary of origin and usage of Probabilistic Model Positive Measures 1NJG60lli above CRD Memo Comments on DNA's Generic EIS Annex · W L Stevens 1230 lo J R Roeder USDOE ALO OSD S 20181 4 pages lV 3861 30 See also CRD Memo IV JS6J 36 Suggc itS that DNA 's contractor Kaman Tempo not use a PRA approach but use lht PM PM methodology being developed hy the DOE we ipons labor ttoncs for the Pantcx E rS L C -fcmo Pcrspe ti 'e on tisc o Qu mcit iti ·c Estimates of Probability on Risk Ass sments V L St wns to Distribution 6 I 11S2 l p igc V 3S62i2 2 rr msm1ts tbrc drafl workin p pcts App ndix A On the Credibility of Prohahility Estirnatl s uf the order Onl win- One ti Ilion F vi nts P r Ycar 15 pages ppcndix n PreJictil lns bl ol ·ing Sntlli Prohabili11cs F W -fulkr 7 pages OFFICIAL USE QtJ1 V a · · · _ f l r • • 2 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Appendi C On the Use of Rcalistic·• or Conservati 'e'' Analyses in Risk Assessments 12 pages UNC Brictlng Aids A Risk Assessment Approach for the DOD DOE Plutonium Disp rsal Analysis Study W L Stevens Undated probably 1983 19pagcs lV 260 31 Th c briefmg 3ids were used during a trip to EUCOM by W L Stevens Sc e also Pu Dispersal Roles of Nuclear Safety Specialists UNC Letters ''Comments on Revision of AL Chapter 0560 untitled Paraphrase W L Stevens 1230 to W F White ERDA AL l 18177 2 pages JV 3857 15 Discusst S lcgnlator sheriffs objccth·ity mdcpendcncc etc roles for Sandia's NESS memben UNC PRIVATE Draft Working Paper ·•on the Role of Sandia Laboratories TechnicaJ Ad •isor in System Safety Studies W L StL Vens Revision 2 6il8179 17 pages fN 378 24 This discussion paper was stimulated by the general lack of support that NWSSGs yavc to recommendations of the TWGs in the ERDNDOD Stoel-pile Safety Study S2C Committee of the DOE Defense Programs The file collection is IV 2718 and it exists in se 'croJ volumes UNC PRIVATE Memo DOE Oversight on S C Matters Untitled Paraphrase W L Stevc n s 7230 to J M Wiesen 7230 S 17 83 3 pages IV 3863 10 Discusse i inJpproprfatc actions al OOE HQ levels ind sugg sts s c Committee consiJt r remedit 5 Sec also Dual Ascncy Rc ponsibilith s DOE Ordcn md ooo· Directive 5030 15 md Successors Security Custody file collection on this subj ct ha hccn l1 1c 11cd Ui C Drati Working Paper Tcrrori m and Nuclear Safety Sccurily anti St1fo£uards U W I Stevens l dlJ to Dis ribution 1 16 11 t 5 p iscs lV 3$53 5 ··OFFICIAL USE ONLY 271 iliCRiil f 00 OFFIGhfcl USE ONLY Discusses Jifferenccs in the Tiuec Ss ind which group at Sandia should b the initial contact for emergency response SIW Draft Paper IV 3098 2 •·Draft Paper on Cus1ody ofNucle ir Weapons W L Stevens S 21175 IV 3098 2 18 pag UNC Memo Loss of We3pons · W L StcvfflS 1650 to V F Blake 1710 1219174 3 p 1ges IV 3853 l Cont nins thoughts on security from a safety person C FRD Mano The Blatk Dot Mousctmp L' '' W L Stc ·ens 1230 lo Distribution 12 4175 4 pages IV 3885 J Describes an unio1cnlional situation oflack of considcrJtion of trade-offs among various aspects or•·sccurity' nnd safety for nuclear weapons CFRD Rough Draft Mmno The Third Pnrty Problem in Safety Security U '' W L Stevens 1230 to Distribution 3 pages IV 3856 3 Discusses threats of person s causing a nuclear weapon incident to occur wichout ba ing to be present UNC Draft Working Memo Notes on Concerns Related lo Custody of Nuclear Weapons lJ ' 1 W L Stevens 123 to A A Licber-1310 amt R L Pewifoy Jr -4300 8 16 76 7 pag s IV 3856 15 PrcscnlS dclinittons oftenns m s c in preparalion for the FORWARD LOOK study IJNC Draft Working Paper On the Risk of ln•Place Nuclear Detonations from Dcliber ite Unauthorized Acts oflnsiJcrs W L Stevens 12 76 24 pages IV 3856 5 li C Draft Working Paptr On Adequate Security of Nuclear Weapons The Fourth Nuclear Safety Standard W L Stcv ns 1230 10116178 8 pages auachoo to JV 3SSS 4 See also NWSSG section Stockpile Safety Study ERDA DOD Tht lilt o olkcrion i - r • J-l 18 and it contain i IS numb r c l d tlril ms The foldl'r B l lhdl-' l foinl ERDA DOD nckar Safely fa alualion u Stockpih d ' apon-•Gener il Com i pn 1dcr11 e ·• -OFFICIAL USE 0 4LV • •• • I t -Q j ·- ' • __ OFFICIAL USE ONLYSRO Memo ••overview of Results ofSystems Safety Studies for UpgraJing ir• Delivered Wcap ln S stems U W L St vens- 12 30 to Distribution l 125178 Rc ision 40 pages IV 3858 JS Contains comments on Air Force am I Navy NWSSG's concerning the TWG's recommendation relative to disconnection of cables and removal of clements for air--dclivcrcd weapon systems Titis is a study of safety vs operntional readiness issues Use Control Physical Access No file collection or this subject has been locattd Use AskSam for search for the Control and PAL See also 3V 574 JV 575 and XV Jl UNC Draft Memo Why and How to Keep Safety and Command nnd Control Separate · V L Stevens 10 1 71 2 pages the last is numbered 13 indicating this is a section from another document JV 3853 10 SRO Draft WorJcing Paper •• On Pre-Discnablcd Designs to Achie 'C Safety Control and Security ofNuclcarWeapons U • W L Stevens cl al RS 1230n9 0I I I0 2 n9 Revised 1 30 79 IV 2719 Suggests an R D i11iti3tivc by LASUSL and LLUSLL design teams similar to lhosc leading to lHE UNC Time-Linc and Annotated References Juclcar Weapon Use Control Evolution 1 V 386014 '' W L Stevens late 1980 IV 3860 2 This is one of a set of four Others 3 rC on Nuclear Detonation Safety HE Nuclear Subsyslcm Aspect Evolution IV 3860 1 NuclL ar Deronalion Safoty Arming und Firing Subsystem Aspect Evolution IV 3360 3 and Nuclear Welron Di struction Disablement or De1u l Evolution N 3860 •l CFRD Memo •·rcchnology Denial Concept for the Control Subs ·stcms V V L Stcn ns 7230 10 DistnbUlion 5 1 J S2 1 page rv 3862 l l lnnsmilS CFRD Memo R E Smith 7233 to W I Sccvcns 7230 9 8 82 A Sii nilicant lmpro 'cmcnt on Active Proteccion Systems Ul 0 -t pagi s Discus cs a cum cpt of Jcslruying ci rtain use ontrol hardw irl 1tkr im•oc ttion of tht dcnia I penalty to 1lr cluL c re crsc cnginc cling by 1d 'crsmi1o s Cf-Rt kmo Ccrt nn Po ibk Susccptib1litics co AdYers 111 r cti1 ·'ins l'ant x Pl mt C · W L S c 'cm I 31 1 to I D Smith• 1200 l i I 51S 7 pJgt s 1V 3S6 '-l2 ·OFFICIAL USE ONLY '4 @ 2tfPtsl t OFFICIAL USE ONLY Discusses threats of small arms projc c1i1es oo nuclear wC3pons and 1 st devices Ut'C Memo ··ooE Security Affairs Council SAC W L Stevens 7230 to W C Si'2SiSS 2 pages IV 386S12 ·• · 5200 Presents candid comments requested by Orval Jones on a DOE HQ proposal lo separate security rrom S' C concerns by fonning another group within DOE QUO Draft Working Paper On the Risk of In-Place Nuch ir Detonations from Deliberate Unauthorized Acts of Insiders -• W L Stevens 12 76 23 pages IV 2743 4 Discussc -s susceptibility ofU S nuclear wcapom by a pcrson s allowed to be present lo perform an authorized act with focus on the two-m in rule This memo was a factor in the DOE AL decision 10 use protective co ·eis over weapon hardware at PantC' See tile IV 2743 of Jim Ney for this subject and IV 3351 2 for Gene Ives· response memo CFRD Rough Draft Memo The Third Party Problem in Safe1y Security U ' W L Stevens 1 Jo to Distribution s111 r11 3 pages IV s30 l Adds another threat to insiders and outsidCJS namely a third party with skill and knowledge who c m gimmick equipmcnl so as 10 later function to cause an unwanted action without having a be physically present then See also Secwiry OFFIGI L d use ONLY I I 7 l t I -1rT1Pa I OFRGIAL USE ONL¥ INDEX A Iii concern 1 11 I 71 105 dt ti1111io '• qioti S7 Abnunnal Envitonmi nt Ta ik Group 11 1b1ol11tc dc n c or afcty · 17 1 cnt Rcs1nu1 C -o tain -rf - RC l•J S 106 1 6 mJcn Response ipabrlrty C ordtnJ11nJ Committee lr RCCC · l•U r cc1JcntRcsponscGroup1 RG · 142 I-B 15S 1c dtnrrcspor sc h m · 7 1 i I ll6 JccrJcnl lhtc u · $6 JcciJcnrs uiJ si nillnnl in1 iilcn1s AEC ttc urr mvoh i mcn1s in · 61 Andcr on AFB u11Jnt incident · 1tnurm t icct lrnt crmronn m15 · 115 126 115 LIQ 112 111 1 a2 IJJ I 19 1$1 l 162 16S 167 1 s 176 AOJIOJ'Fhcric Rclc 1 SC Jv1mry l 'Jp 1bili1y RAC · •h t fomic EncrJ 'C11mm1 ion EC · 11 17 I I J 4 9 J I JI 34 l 37 J9 J2 -1 J5 J7 SI ti M 6 61 72 '6 S S-1 11J1 1 11' 111 123 t i • •s ll0 IJ7 1-J 1-19 l O 1 s liS 173 11 Alom Wupon Sift1y Do ard Kl Conurullce · JO u1om 111 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71 72 74 76 TT 84 91 95 120 I J 1 6 121 US U7 150 153 IS ' I72 dcfinllion • 1S J 11011ng mcnbct · JI • 17 9 o n I07 IU I IS 130 l i 1 is X 1 · 5 • J IS XW 9 J J l7 -aFRCIAL USE OHl -'f I • -·• I I I ofr1c1AL ·use ONLY · 282 II I -0FAetAL-USE ONI ¥ DISTRIBUTION UMITF D RELEASE 1 1 1 1 I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l 1 1 1 1 l 1 26 I 1 1 1 I 1 I 10 1 1 I 1 2 MS01B4 MS0101 MS0102 MS0457 MS04S7 MS0479 MS0481 MS04Bl MS9034 MS9036 MS9U14 MS0632 MS0429 MS0447 MS900S MS0509 MS0507 MS0469 MS0151 MS0134 MS0421 MS0428 MS0492 MS0492 MS1219 MS9018 MS0899 MS0612 Or 'al Jone John Crc1 for l Robert Peurifoy Jr llcnm 11 Mauney J sck Howard BiJJ Myre Richard Schwocbel William Nickell William Stc 'Cns Sidney D DreU Rick Glass DOEtAUOOM Mark Baca DOE IAL WSD Ted Sherry DOE Al WSD Helmw Filacchionc HQDOE GTN DP-211 S e •e Goodrum I-JQDOEffSTLJDP-22 Karen Boardman DOE ALIWPO Mike Zamorski DOE KAO Paul Robinson 1 Joan Woodard 2 John Stichman 2000 George NovoDJy 2001 Bill Tedeschi 2113 Mark Rosenthal 2114 Kcmt M ks 2131 Robert Monson 2263 Martin Hinckley 2266 lknms Beyer 2267 John Hogan 2907 Ste 'e Rottier 2100 Jim Hamson 2111 Rick Wayne 2200 Michael Callahan 2300 Carolyne Hart 2600 Mchssa Murphy 2900 Tom Huntrr 9000 Jim Powell 9700 Ron Dctry 9800 Da 'c Carlson 12300 Dilvid Olson 12332 J 'uclcar Safety lnfonnation u nter 12332 John Taylor 5907 Central Technical Files 8945-1 Technical Library 9616 Review Apprcwnl Desk 9612 OFFICIAL USE ONLY CCFflti' 'r i t 283 OFFICIAL USE Ot LY OFFICIAL USE ONLY k e4f fH l J