--· -- - - - - - - ------------- eclassified Case NW# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 eptP-mher 1 1972 C f CRE'P SEHSI'PIVE EYES OHL Y NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM 156 INDIAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS Table of Contenta page I II III ' IV v S l l'mary l The Problem G Indian Intentions Capabilities 7 External Impact of Indian Nuclear Exp osion ll Impl cations for India oF a Nuclear Explosion · 16 s Interests and Objectives and Policy Options A US Interests l B US Objectives 22 c Possible US Actions 1 - Before Nuclear Decision Taken 2 · After Decision Taken w I J I Prepared by Ad Hoc Group of representatives from State Defense CIA AEC and ACOA l I iI ' 5il CRfl ' SSNSI'l'I'IBf D¥BS 8N r • RW# 48007 Docid 551150 -· ·· ---' 'l eclassified Case NW# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 C aECRET SENSITIVE E'fflS ONLY SUMMARY Indian Capabilities Intentions At present India's relatively sophisticated nuclear energy program provides the capability of conducting a test on short notice and of mounting a rudimentary weapons program at relatively low cost in the $10-20 million annual range However India currently lacks either long-range bombers or missiles needed to strike major urban targets in China India will probably not be able to develop IRBM's before the 1980's and then only at a cost of $2-2 75 billion There is no firm intelligence that Mrs Gandhi has given a political go-ahead for detonating an underground nuclear device which the Indians would undoub edly label a peaceful nuclear explosion or for developing nuclear weapons and a delivery system In July 1972 she reiterated that the GOI's nuclear policy was to investigate the possibility of peaceful nuclear explosions but not to develop nuc ear weapons Our intelligence assessment is that over the next several years the chances are about even that India will detonate a nuciear device The argwnents in New Delhi both for and against testing are strong Public opinion in its present nationalist mood would probably favor tests although in the wake of India's victory over i s h e l al pressures for going puclear are Implications of an Indian Nuciear Decision An Indian test would be a setback to non-proliferation efforts By itself it would not prompt other nearnuclear powers to follow suit but woula make it easier for them to do so should they decide the acquisition of nuclear weapons was in their national interest The Soviets would be concerned about additional proliferation but would probably be wary of hurting their position in 6BCR£'f SDNGI'i'I'IB B'lDS ONlrY • NW# 48007 Docid 551150 I - ------- eclassified Case W # 48007 ate 12-10-2018 - SECRE'l' SENSI'l'I'JE EYES ONLY 2 India The Chinese would regard an Indian test as a significant development adding to China's strategic defense problems In Japan the hands of those favoring a nuclear weapons program would be strengthened In South Asia a1 Indian explosion would be extremely unsettling for Pakistan US Interests and Objectives Limiting the number ot nuclear powers remains a major us interest Additional interests are our desire for a stable South Asia and our wish to develop mutually satisfactory relations with India Since an Indian nuclear decision would probably conflict with all three interests our objective should be to do what we can to avert or delay an Indian test and if these efforts fail to limit the harmful repercussions US Options The choices divide between things we can do before and after an Indian nuclear explosion In both instances us ability to influence events is marginal Indeed given the present poor state of In90-US relations an overly visible US effort could hasten rather than delay the day India explodes a nuclear device Multilateral and non-us bilateral efforts especially if joined by the Soviets have somewhat better prospects of affecting Indian actions but would probably not per be decisive • Possible Actions Before a Decision Unilateral Actions - We can continue low-keyed efforts to dissuade the Indians by stressing continued US concern over the dangers of nuclear proliferation stressing the US view that peaceful and military nuclear explosive technologies cannot be distinguished pointing out but not threatening that Indian nuclear testing would require a review of US cooperation in the atomic energy and space fielda and possible reductions in our programs SECRE'P SSHSI'PI 'E BYES ONLY eclassified Case NW# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 - SECRB'i' SDHSI'i'PIE EYES ONLY 3 -- stimulating discussion among Indian academics and scientists of problems inherent in developing PNE's of the high cost of an Indian force de frappe and of its questionable strategic value -- main aining and possibly expanding scientific cooperation in the nuclear and space fields to help in channeling Indian efforts towards peaceful applications In addition we could consider offering India PNE services This could however be viewed as weakening the value of our offer to provide PNE services to NPT signatories In any case it is unlikely the Indians would accept if such an offer foreclosed the possibility of India's developing its own explosive device Multilateral Actions - In the past we have periodically talked with the UK Canada·· Japan and France about the Indian nuclear question We can continue these discussions trying to stimulate other countries to use their influence with the Indians to prevent or delay a nuclear decision · I -- We can also try to enlist USSR cooperation Given the close relationship between Moscow and Delhi Soviet actions could have a considerable impact on · the Indians While we are uncertain the Soviets will be willing to cooperate we see no harm i n r aisi ng the issue with them We can also discuss the subject with the Chinese to allay their suspicions that we and the Soviets were up to something with the Indians and to point out that Chinese actions such as launching an ICBM over South Asia could increase public pressure on India to conduct a nuclear test -- In the International Atomic Energy Agency we can continue our efforts to gain wider inter- national acceptance of our view that since the technology for civil and military nuclear explosions cannot be distinguished peacef-ql or 'hon-military uses terminology in IAEA agreements precludes using IAEA - SECRE'i' Sm•SI'i'IVE EYES ONLY ------- - -------------------------------eclassified Case NW# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 - SECRET SENSI'l'IVB EYBS ONLY 4 safeguarded material in explosive tests of any sort the past the Indians have questioned this position In -- We could also seek more rapid progress on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty if the President should decide to move toward active negotiations on a treaty India has long favored a CTB and while it would probably not sign if China continued testing the fact of an agreement would increase pressures against Indian nuclear testing Defense does not believe that the conclusion of a CTB would have -a significant effect upon India's decision to conduct nuclear testing After an Indian Nuclear Decision Proliferation In deciding on a course of action we will have to weigh the potential pluses in the non-proliferation field against the losses in the Indo-US _relationship Although penalties against India would be unlikely to have a decisive policy impact on major near nuclear powers Japan Germany and Israel apparent us acquiescence could lead them and others to anticipate nothing more severe if they became Member No 7 in the nuclear club The range of choices includes 1 Relatively Mild Response This would include some public indication of displeasure but few if any tangible penalties 2 Some Penalties A ainst India in Scientific Area We cou terminate e supp yo uranium to the Tarapur nuclear reactor and curtail or end other USG cooperation with India in the nuclear energy and space fields We could urge other nations to follow suit and of course sharpen our public expressions of displeasure 3 More Extensive Penalties We could launch a major effort to penalize India by moving beyond the nuclear energy space field reducing or terminating all economic and technical assistance programs assuming we have any and mobilizing an international campaign to condemn the Indians • We would expect most other countries would respond relatively mildly Some would impose penalties against India in the scientific field Canada has said it will SBCRE'l' SENSI'l'IVB BYBS O H ¥ r NW# ·soar --· Docid 551150 I ·---·- -------- -------- '· - Declassified Case NW# 48007 Date 12-10-20UJ SECRE'P SEHSI'PIVE EYES OHLY 5 It is however doubtful other countries would join in more sweeping penaltie especially if the Indians label their test a PNE and not part of a we 9 pon prograrn Other Repercussions We would have to consider carefully our handling of Japan the most important near-nuclear power and the country outside of South Asia where the repercussions would probably be strongest In South Asia our problem would be how to steady the Pakistanis A spectrum of possible actions with the Paks includes Doing nothing Providing Pakistan an expression of support against nuclear blackmail by recourse to the United Nations along the lines of the declaration we gave in 196B in connection with the NPT Providing a more specific and firmer commitment of US nuclear protection Broadening the 1959 US-Pakistan bilateral to include support against aggression by non-Communist powers i e India - SEC T SENSI'l'IVE E¥BG ONE ¥ - - eclassified Case NW# 48007 ate 12-10-2018 SECRET SENSI'l'IVE EYES OHL¥ I 6 The Problem Over the past two decades India has developed a large and sophisticated civil atomic energy program Six nuclear power reactors are in operation or under construction Indian nuclear policy as stated on numerous occasions by Mrs Gandhi and other leaders is to utilize atomic energy only for peaceful purposes and not to develop nuclear weapons At the same time the Indian Atomic Energy Commission is 'developing technology and industrial facilities capable of supporting a small - nuclear weapons program India has been unwilling to si gn the NPT and has maintained that an Indian underground peaceful nuclear explosion PNE would not violate India's international undertakings a position with which the us has disagreed In recent years we have periodically received intelligence reports that India was going to test a nuclear device While to date these reports have proven false alarms and we have no firm evidence that Delhi has decided to explode a nuclear device India does possess the capability of doing so fairly quickly once her decision-makers approve such a step India does not however currently have an advanced nuclear - weapons delivery system -- either long-range bombers SECRE'i' SEHSI'fIVD EYES OHL¥ eclassi6ed Case NW# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 - SECRB'l' SE 1S I'l'IVB EYES OHL¥ or Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles 7 India is unlikely to have the capability of producing IRBM's before the early 1980's Were India to explode a device in the near future it would almost certainly all the test a PNE rather than a first step in a weapons development proqram II Indian Intentions Capabilities It remains our assessment that the evidence to date does not confirm an Indian political decision to test a nuclear device Moreover there appear no new political or security considerations whicn would impel the Indians toward a nuclear test in the near future At the same time the Indians have the capability of exploding a nuclear device on relatively short notice and there is considerable nationalist sentiment in India in favor of joining the nuclear club - EO25xl CIA EO25x6 CIA EO50xl NSC eclassified Case NW# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 EO25xl CIA EO25x6 CIA EOS0xl NSC SECR ET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY C 8 we conclude that India is L--------------1 i k ely to keep open the option to test a nuclear device and ultimately· to develop its own missile delivery system The direction of the Indian nuclear and space programs will continue to provide India this possibility India will also continue its policy of non-accession to the NPT but is likely to live up to its commitment under the Limited Test Ban Treaty not to conduct atmospheric tests The conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would increase the force of arguments against Indian nuclear tests even though India would probably -- refuse to adhere to a CTB if China continued nuclear testing Defense does not believe that the conclusion of a CTB would have a significant effect upon India's decision to d velop nuclear weapons The Indian nuclear decision will be based on its perception of its national r' interest mrt -4·a·o1n - -···· -·- ·· -- --·- - ----- ·-----Docid 551150 I eclassified Case N V# 48007 ate 12-10-2018 - 9 SECRET SB•WI'i'PIE EYES ONLY In this regard and as a factor in determining what actions we· rnay wish to take it is useful to review the a guments among Indian policy-makers for - and against a po itive nu lear decision A Arguments Favoring Nuclear Program 1 To achieve major power status India needs to be a member of the nuclear club It could achieve this status at relatively low cost by exploding a nuclear device which it could label a PNE 2 The possession by India of nuclear wea- pons and delivery systems even in rudimentary form would provide a det rrent against a Chinese nuclear threat and reduce India's sense of ependence on a Soviet and or US nuclear shield 3 By freeing India from Great Power de- pendence the possession of nuclear weapons would contribute positively to India's ability to remain non-aligned and to provide a Third World nuclear balance to China 4 A nuclear weapons program would be a means of achieving a measure of technological equality with the developed world 5 Membership in the nuclear club would further strengthen the sense of India's nationalism that Mrs Gandhi has cultivated in building a strong political base eclassified Case 1' W# 48007 ate 12-10-2018 - SBCRET SEH6I'PIVE EYE6 OHL¥ B 10 Arguments Against Nuclear Program 1 conventional The Chinese military threat is primarily This can be best met by further modern- ization of Indian conventional forces an expen•ive Indian nuclear weapons program would divert scarce resources from this end 2 The possession of a rudimentary nuclear force especially one lacking an advanced delivery system could in the short run weaken rather than strengthen India's national security if this move led to _increased tensions with China 3 India lacks the economic base to compete with China in t e strategic nuclear field wh re the Chinese already enjoy a long lead 4 A nuclear eapons program could harm relations with the US and the USSR and also endanger peaceful nuclear cooperation programs with these countries as well as with the UK Canada France and others· s India's view of its position as a moral leader of the Third World would be further tarni • hed by going nuclear 6 Development of an advanced nuclear wea- pons missile delivery system would be very costly and would divert scarce resources_ from badly needed economic and social development programs eclassified Case NW# 48007 ate 12-10-2018 - SECRE'f SEHSI'f'IVE BYBS ONLY 7 11 A nuclear testing program could also affect economic assistance relationships with Japan the US Canada and other countries strongly opposed to further proliferation 1II External Impact of Indian Nuclear Explosion A South Asia The explosion by India of a PNE or the development of nuclear weapons would further confirm Indian political military dominance in South Asia While none of India's neighbors would like such a step only Pakistan would react strongly 1 Pakistan Unless a radical shift in Inda-Pakistan relations occurs an Indian nuclear decision would severely jolt Islamabad C Pakistan's fears of Indi would be intensified and the prospects for relative stability in South Asia would be set back An Indian blast would make it more difficult to work out the post-Simla arrangements to establish a modus vivendi between India Pakistan and Bangladesh To protect itself against a perceived Indian nuclear threat Pakistan might attempt to launch its own nuclear weapons program though this would be a long-term project given Pakistan's currently limited capability in the nuclear field Pakistan would also seek to the extent feasible - to involve major external pow rs especially the united States and China in providing assistance ecl usified Case NW# 48007 ate 12-10-2018 - 12 SEGRE'I SBNS ITPIB EYES ONL¥ for a Pakistani nuclear program or at least assurances of protection against potential Indian nuclear blackmail The Pakistanis would perhaps seek to expand their military relationship with China into the trategic nuclear arP a in order to gain additional protection against India They might even seek the stationing of Chinese nuclear weapons on Pakistani _territory In the case of the us the Pakistanis would probably ask for assurances of support and or assistance in the event India threatened the use of nuclear weapons but would be unlikely to go as far as - with the Chinese 2 Bangladesh Sri Lanka and Nepal An Indian nuclear blast would not create major political security concerns in Dacca although the Bengalees would probably prefer a non-nuclear Indian neighbor Even if Bangladesh Indian relations become strained an Indian blast would be unlikely to spur an effort to develop nuclear weapons by Bangladesh The concerns of Sri Lanka and Nepal about the danger to their independence from a strong India would be heightened if India went nuclear While these countries might look to outside powers for reassurance India's action would not be likely to prompt a major policy shift • Neither coun ry has the capability of developing nuclear weapons edassified Case NW# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 - SECR E'P SEHSPPPIE EYES OHLY 3 China 13 eking would view an Indian nuclear explosion as a matter of concern • Although the public reaction might be relatively muted especially in view of China's own nuclear testing program Chinese policymakers would be prompted to take a fresh look at China's policy toward India Even though the Indian blast was labeled a PNE and an advanced delivery system for Indian nuclear weapons was not at hand in the short term the Chinese would interpret the Indian action as a first step toward the ultimate development of an Indian force de frappe and make their calculations on this basis Militarily a nuclear India -- even one possessing only _a rudimentary deliv ry capability -would be regarded as adding to China's strategic defense problems In assessing the implications the Chinese could come to either of two conclusions They might regard India's nuclear decision as part of a S vietsponsored effort to tighten the containment ring around China and this could lead to heightened Sino-Indian tensions Alternatively Peking might decide to work more actively for a settlement of outstanding disputes with India to reduce the possibility that a MoscowDelhi axis would confront China with nuclear enemies along its northern and wester11 borders Declassified Case NW# 48007 Date l2-I0-20lfj SECRE SENSITIVE EYES ONLY - B USSR 14 The Soviets share our global concern about proliferation and in this context would regret India s proceeding with the development ot PNE's or a nuclear weapons program But the Soviet response could well be ambiguous despite Soviet preference that India _remain non-nuclear Moscow values its relationship with Delhi and it would probably be unwilling to press India on the nuclear question to the extent of damagi g the friendly relationship Nonetheless given Moscow's current close relations with Delhi the Soviets would have greater influence with the Indians than any other country C C Near Nuclear Powers It is difficult to measure precisely the impact of India's becoming the world's sixth nuclear nation on the other near-nuclears especially Japan Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany By itself an Indian test would not be decisive as each country would decide its nuclear policy according to its own political and security considerations But the Indian example would make it easier for others to follow suit if they conclude that nuclear testing is in their national interest l Japan India's going nuclear Japan would react negatively to The Japanese would be disturbed by further proliferation and by the additional political r ·mrf- •s-oo '-- military destabilization which India's nuclear decision might cause in Asia While an Indian PNE or even the development of a weapons system would proba ly not cause an immediate shift in Japanese policy the hands of tnose in Japan who favor -- ·- ···--- · Docid 551150 edassified Case N Y# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 - 15 SBCRB'i' SEHSI'i'I'IE EYES OHLY the nuclear path would be strengthened The prospect for Japanese ratification of the NPT would be lessened The example of another Asian power especially India far inferior to Japan in economic strength or military potential breaking the nuclear monopoly could prompt a rethinking of the non-nuclear policy Japan has to date adopted 2 Federal Republic of Germany An Indian nuclear decision would cause some concern to the Federal Republic of Germany and could make it somewhat more di·f ficult to obtain ratification of the NPT - It would not however produce any fundamental reassessment or c ange in Germany's npclear policy The Germans will continue t o adhere to a European policy on nuclear matters and not embark on their own weapons program for the ·foreseeable future A decision by Germany to develop nuclear weapons would not be triggered by what India did J Israel India's action would probably not have significant impact on Israel the other principal near-nuqlear power except to remove the psychological deterrent against being the first to make the break Israel considers its nuclear policy intimately linked to the confrontation with the Arabs and will not be decisively affected by an Indian nuclear decision ·-· eclassified Case NW# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 16 SECRE4' SEHSI4'IVE E¥E6 OHL¥ Since the Israelis consider their relationship with the United States unique a highly negative us reaction to an Indian explosion would have limited impact however the appearance of US acquiesence fn an Indian nuclear venture would be considered significant by the Israel i s 4 Other Near-Nuclear Powers Other poten- tial nuclear powers such as Argentina Australia Brazil South Africa and Taiwan would be principally affected by the response of the United States and other powers to an Indian nuclear blast as an indicator of - likely response to further proliferation on their part In this regard failure by the Unit d States to react in the face of an Indian nuclear explosion could suggest that the action elsewhere us was not preparP d to take forceful On the other hand each potential nuclear power would see itself in a somewhat unique situation and would not necessarily directly apply the Indian example to itself IV Implications for India of a Nuclear Explosion A Political-Psychological India's decision to explode a nuclear device would help satisfy Indian nationalist aspirations for major power status and Third World leadership but would be unlikely to cause a fundamental shift in Indian · foreign policy India's - eclassified Case NW# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 SEiCRE' P SENSI4'ITJE EYES OHL¥ 17 feeling of dependence on the Soviet Union especially for protection against a potential Chinese nuciear threat could lessen India's new strength could stiffen India's attitude toward China and decrease the prospects of Delhi s making concessions needed to settle the northern border dispute Conversely India might conclude its enhanced power position made it possible to adopt a more flexible stance on the border issue A nuclear decision would probably not prompt a shift in India's attitude toward the US except _in resp nse to our reaction to India's move Possession of a nuclear device could make India more self-assertive in dealings with its- South Asian neighbors and with regard to the Indian Ocean Finally an Indian nuclear decision could be bOth the effect of rising Indian nationalism and a cause of a further increase in Indian nationalistic confidence B Political-Military Until India possesses long-range bombers or missiles an Indian nuclear decision would probably have only marginal impact on India's military capabilities India could use aircraft in its current inventory such as Canberras or reconfigured Boeing 707's or 747 1 s as delivery vehicles but these would be a rudimentary affair essentially for one-way eclassified Case NW# 48007 ate 12-10-2018 - 18 SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY missions Given China's air defense systems and the distances between India and China's urban centers approximately 1800 nautical miles from airfields in Assam to Shanghai and 1200 nautical miles to Canton a rudimentary nuclear bomber force would face some difficulty in striking China's major cities even if range were increased by air refueling China's nuclear facilities would however present closer targets only 800-1200 nautical miles and would be within the existing range of Indian Canberras At present the Indians have no long-range bomber£ although there are indications they have unsuccessfully sought these from the Soviets Unless India elects to develop or purchase a long-range bomber force she will need Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles to have an advanced delivery system capable of striking China's urban centers The Indian space program can ultimately provide the basis for an IRBM although India is at present a long way from possessing this capability The space program aims at launching a satellite in the mid-1970 1 s with foreign support and appears unlikely of being able to produce an Indian IRBM capability before the l980's Barring a policy shift we doubt the Soviets would help India develop this capability it is conceivable the French would be prepared to collaborate with the Indians - edassified Case NW# 007 Date 12-10-2018 SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY 19 One defensive military use which would not require an expensive and sophisticated delivery system would be emplacing atomic demolition munitions ADM's in the Himalayan passes which constitute China's only irect land access to India Considering the terrain of the border area and the type of threat primar ily ground that China poses ADM's could be considered favorably by the Indian military Although this possi l ility has been discussed we do not know what conclusions the Indian military has reached c Economic The development and detonation of an initial nuclear device followed by a relatively small nuclear weapons program should no impose major strain on Indian financial or technological resources As noted pre- viously India laready has a well-developed atomic progam and could with rela ively limited extra expense produce the needed nuclear fuels and undertake other necessary work E02Sxl for a nuclear weapons program I - I eclassified Case NW# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 E025xl CIA - SECRST SEHSI'l'IVE EYEC ONLY 20 The development of an IRBM delivery system would pose a far harder problem both in terms of money and know-how j India's GNP is currently about $57 billion and its defense budget about $1 9 billion In the early 1980's GNP would rise to about $80 billion - assuming a 3 per cent growth rate and over $90 billion assuming a 5 per cent rate Expenditures required to test a number of nuclear devices and even to proceed with a modest weapons program could be absorbed without substantial impact on India's development program The development of a missile delivery capability would however require a major diversion of resources from India's social and economic development efforts 1 and also from programs of modernization of conventional military forces Nonetheless the needed financial resourc s could probably be generated by an economy the size of India's - The domesti political impact of the loss in momentum would be heavily influenced by the mood then prevailing A strong and popular government could present the ' - eclassified Case 1''W# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 21 aECRET Si WSITl li i ¥ 5 ONLY decision as one needed to realiz Indian national goals and would probably gain popular acceptance r it A weaker leadership might well face criticisms for diverting scarce resources from the economic development process V US Interests and Objectives and Policy Options A US Interests 1 Non-Proliferation Limiting the number of nuclear powers remains a major us interest The acquisition of nuclear devices by any new state whether India or some other country would increase the ultimate pojisibility of nuclear war and thereby diminish the security of the United States A new member in the nuclear club would make more difficult the task of holding the line on- proliferation elsewhere 2 Stability in Asia A second US interest is in attaining a stable and peaceful Asia By adding fresh complications to Sino-Indian relations and risking new troubles with Pakistan an Indian nuclear decision would probably be destabilizing 3 US-Indian Relations A third US interest is in having mutually satisfactory relations with India in view of the country's regional political military importance and its strategic location in the Indian Ocean area An Indian nuclear decision would - eclassified Case NW# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 ' 22 SECRE4' SENS I4'PIE BYDS ONLY cause fresh difficulties in our bilateral relationship At a minimum we would have problems regarding possible Indian violations of existing bilateral and or trilateral peaceful uses agreements as these are interpreted by the B us • US Objectives Our analysis indicates that an Indian nuclear test either of a prestige PNE or a nuclear weapon would be contrary to US interests Our actions should be designed to develop arguments and provide incentives that reinforce existing Indian policy and make a PNE o weapons program look less attractive We should also try to corral supporting pressures on India from other countries Our £forts should take into account and follow logically steps we have been taking in support of this objective since we first became concerned about Indian nuclear intentions in the mid-l960's Even if India eventually com- mences testing a further delay would assist our non-proliferatio efforts by allowing more time for the NPT regime to become firmly established c Possible US Actions In considering the · spectrum of possible US actions it is well to rell ember that any Indian decision will be based on Indian calculations of national interest The impact of Any Indian test in the next year or so would have to use plutonium from the US-assisted CIRUS reactor at Trombay although in the late 1970 1 s India could develop devices from plutonium produced in unsafeguarded reactors it is currently building near Madras ·-- ---·- - - - - -- - -- - - - - -- - - - - - - -- eclassified Case N Y# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 23 SECRE4' CEi 1C 14'P B B¥BC OHL¥ advice and the degree of persuasiveness of outsiders will depend on how many and who are trying to persuade and the overall context at the time including progress toward disarmament Only to the extent that the US and others particularly the Soviets but also the French British and Japanese are prepared to draw upon their relationships with India -- political economic and technical -- will there be a possibility of affecting Mrs Gandhi's calculations of Indian naiional interests Even with maximum pressure Delhi could decide India's interests were better served by going nuclear In this regard _the Soviet position will be of much greater significance than our own although even Moscow's influence is limited given India's increasingly selfreliant nationalism US influence has drastically diminished over the past year and our current unilateral ability to affect an Indian nuclear decision is marginal Indeed in view of the present poor state of Indo-US relations a major US initiative would probably produce an effect opposite to that intended and hasten rather than delay an Indian nuclear test 1 Possible Measures Before India Decides to Explode Nuclear Device a Unilateral US Efforts Over the past decade the USG has on several occasions reviewed the • • - eclassified Case NW# 48007 ate 12-10-2018 24 SECRE'l' SE ISI'l'I TE EYES OHLY question of India's nuclear intentions a d carried on an extensive dialogue with the Indians on this subject both in the context ot the NPT negotiations and subsequently For example we discussed the costs of a nuclear ' • w apons program and as recently as June 1970 gave them unclassified data In November 1970 US officials stated our view regarding the indistinguishability between the technology of manufacturing a PNE device and a nuclear weapon We also presented the Indians an Aide Memoire which stressed our position that bilateral US atomic energy agreem ntswith Jndia prohibited using materials supplied - by us or produced in a us-assisted reactor for an Indian PNE attached as Annex 2 i Private Cautions The US could continue a low-keyed bilateral effort with India taking into account the prevailing state of relations The Indians could periodically be informed at senior levels of the likely impact of an Indian nuclear test on us actions toward India Discussion should be in terms of our non-proliferation policy interests and possible legal problems rather than in the form of threats If relations continue strained any threat would probably be counterproductive We could mak the point that a nuclear decision would require a searching review eclassified Case NW# 48007 ate 12-10-2018 - 25 SECRET §ENSITIVE EYES OHL¥ of our existing technological cooperation We could underscore our view that a nuclear decision would be a short-sighted move unlikely to enhance India's security In addition we could reiterate the points made to the Indians in our November 1970 Aide Mernoire ii Discusion of the Costs We could continue to stress to the Indians the economic costs of developing an advanced nuclear weapons and missile delivery system In addition we could ry to focus attention on the technical - difficulties and costs involved in developing a meaningful indigenous PNE pro ram We could sponsor or encourage t he visit to India of academic experts on proliferation and nuclear policy as we have in the past to promote better understanding in Indian academic and governmental circles of the issues involved in a nuclear weapons and missile delivery program particularly questions relating to the cost effectiveness Such dis- cussions might help to demonstrate to the Indians the negative aspects of nuclear weapons in relation to India's security situation or national interests - Declassified Case NW# 48007 Date 12-10-2018 - 26 SECRET SENSITIVE EYES OHL¥ iii Encouragement of Peaceful Scientific Research and Programs India has a very substantial number of trained nuclear scientists and a growing number in the space field It would be desirable to engage their energies as far as possible in non-military research not involving nuclear explosion or delivery system technology If usefully em- ployed in meaningful peaceful scientific applicat_ions India's scientific elite might be less likely to urge the adoption of a military program one which would clearly divert Indian manpower and resources from peaceful programs Through technical cooperation programs we are currently assisting India's peaceful atomic and space programs We should continue and depending on concrete possibilities perhaps increase these efforts In this context we should ensure that our technical cooperation in the space field does not contri bute directly to an Indian delivery capability the existence of wnich might encourage an Indian decision to develop nuclear weapons eclassified Case Y# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 - SECRET SENSITIVE EYES m LY iv 27 Undercut India's Pretext for Developing a PNE Device We might seek to dissuade India from developing its own PNE device on the ground that India could obtain PNE services either from the US or the USSR when concrete applications appear economically attractive Even though India is not a party to the NPT and hence not a beneficiary of the Article V assurances relating to PNE services we possibly together with the Soviets could offer these to the Indians on the condition_India would forego testing its own PNE device - Acceptance of an offer of this kind would deprive India of i s public rationale for continuing a nuclear explosives program and of course prev nt India from gaining the prestige of carrying out a nuclear test As such it is doubt- ful the Indians would respond affirmatively More- over offering to provide PNE services to a nonsignatory to the NPT could subject us to criticism that we were undercutting the incentive provided by Article V for countries to adhere to the NPT The offer could also lend support to those Indians who are promoting a PNE project Decbnifirl Cpf $W#'§007 P••• U-10-2018 eeeRB 1 8BN8ITI¥B B'fB6 OHbY - 28 EO25xl CIA EO50xl NSC - Declassified Case 1'' W# 48007 Date 12-10-20UI SECRET SENSI'PIVB EYES OHLY 29 is clearly limited anything we could do either with the Chinese or the Indians to improve SinoIndian relations would serve our interests with regard to non-proliferation and Asian security I --------- One action_ likely to increase pressures for India's exploding a device would be the firing of Chinese ballistic missiles over South Asia to target areas in the Indian Ocean b Multilateral Efforts Other powers share our concern about an Indian nuclear decision These include not only our NATO allies particularly Canada and Great Britain but also Japan and the Communist powers including the Soviet Union and China All of these nations for different but perhaps mutually reinforcing reasons do not want India to becqrne a nuclear power i Soviet Union In light of the strong Soviet commitment to non-proliferation and eclassified Case NW# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 - E025xl CIA 6ECRB'l' SEHSI'i'PlE EYE6 ONLY 30 the desirability of not having our own efforts isolated we should periodically raise the Indian nuclear problem with the USSR This is a common interest of the US and the USSR and it might do some good to remind the Soviets of this f ____________ I __ _ Nonetheless we appear to have little to lose by initiatinq exchanges with the Soviets - The chances of their exerting pressure on Delhi would be greater if we maintain a dialogue ·on the issue rather than delaying an approach until after we learn of an Indian nuclear decision Accordingly we should have more regular exchanges with the Soviets especially with disarmament and nuclear energy specialists in Geneva and Vienna and periodically raise the Indian nuclear question through diplomatic channels in Moscow Washington and New Delhi ii Britain and Canada 1 ---___ we should periodically consult with the British - and Can dians regarding actions we should take eclassified Case N Y# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 - SECRE'I' SENSI' PIVE EYES miLY 31 both before and after an Indian nuclear decision Discussions with the Canadians and the British are particularly pertinent since an Indian nuclear weapons program miqht involve material provided under an Indo-Canadian agreement or material produced from the CIRUS reactor in Trombay and since the British currently have increased influence in New Delhi as a result of their policy in 1971 iii France In recent years France has become a major provider of technical assistance for India in the nuclear energy and space field Despite France's independent nuclear pol- icies it continues to oppose proliferation and would be unlikely to collaborate in an Indian nuclear weapons program or to assist directly in developing an Indian IRBM capability In February 1971 we discussed the French position on PNE's in the light of reports that there might be more extensive Franco-Indian nuclear cooperation including the provision of a PNE service The French This would not necessarily exclude French collaboration on aspects of India's space program which might indirectly contribute to India's developing an IRBM capability -- -- ·- - -- -- - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - eclassified Case NW# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 - 32 SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY reiterated the view that France would act as if it had signed the NPT They have however continued to be less restrictive than the US in providing India with nuclear equipment For example they have supplied technology for producing heavy water for the unsafeguarded reactors India is constructing near Madras At periodic intervals we should hold further discussions with the Fr_e nch on the Indian nuclear issue In the context of these we should continue to seek French cooperation in -- efforts to inhibit Indian development of nuclear devices and or missile delive y systems and to provide interna ional safeguards on India's peaceful nuclear activities such as the two unsafeguarded reactors under construction near Madras iv Japan Since Japan is a major non-nuclear power whose nuclear policies might be affected by any Indian nuclear decision we included the Japanese in our recent exchanges along with the British and Canadians and informed them of our concerns and of the diplomatic and other steps which we contemplate taking if India takes a nuclear decision in close touch with the -Japanese • NW# 480-07 Docid 551150 ---- - -··· · ----- ---· ·- - - We should stay It would be edassified Case NW# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY 33 useful if Tokyo periodically reiterated the warning it gave the Indians a few years ago that Japanese public opinion would demand a reduction in economic assistance were India to go nuclear v China Although India regards China primarily as a threat in conventional military terms it also fears nuclear blackmail by China To the extent that Sino-Indian relations improve and India's concerns about China lessen the pressures for a nuclear detonation mighf diminish In this regard we could usefully discuss the Indian nuclear question with the Chinese On the one hand we might allay Chinese suspicions that we and the Soviets were up to something with the Indians On the other hand we could point out that Chinese actions for example the launching of an ICBM over South Asia could create consi4erable stir in India and increase the pressures on Delhi to explode a nuclear device to satisfy nationalist sentiments In addition it has been suggested that consideration be given to the possibility of a parallel undertaking by nuclear weapo states including China similar to that undertaken by the US and the UK in Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against India if it did not develop nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or permit weapons to be deployed in its territory ---- - -- eclassified Case 'i' W# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 c 34 SECRE' P SE -1619 1 TE EYES ONLY I vi Other NATO Countries In addition to the British Canadians and French several other NATO allies particularly the Germans have a concern about the general question of proliferation Now that we have had low-key consultations with Canadians British and Japanese we should consult the Germans concerning our assessment policies and diplomatic efforts If we have a ser ies of substan- tive discussions with the Soviets we may also wish to advise other NATO llies vii r '-- · IAEA A further multialteral forum in which we can take ac ion is the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna body the us In this has been trying to gain international acceptance of the View that all nuclear explosives regardless of their intended purpose should be consi dered the same as far as international safeguards are concerned The Indians on the other hand have maint ained that a difference exists between peaceful and military explosives and that the IAEA peaceful uses 11 concept and also India's atomic energy a9reements with the US and Canada do not prohibit PNE's • The ambiguity stems from the fact that the NPT refers directly to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices while the basic IAEA Statute applying to non-NPT parties refers to safeguards against use of nuclear material to further any military purpose • • NW#· -·481 0 - Docid 551150 edassified Case NW# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 - SBCRE'l' SE IS ITIVE E¥E ONLY 35 In line with this approach at the March 1972 Board of Governor's Meeting the US representative reiterated our position that the term peacefu1 · uses 11 in US agreements and the related agreements preclude nuclear e xplosive devices of any sort Following the US lead the UK representative at the June 1972 IAEA session made a similar declaration that all UK agreements barred the use of any items supplied by the UK for any type of nuclear explosive evice This position has not been accepted by the Indians and has also been coptested by the Brazilians at whom the Ma ch 1972 US statement was specifically directed At present efforts are under way in the IAEA to induce the Soviet representative to issue a similar statement at a future session We should continue to seek Soviet agreement to do so --- A parallel Soviet statement would cons i derably strengthen the position we have upheld It would also prove a potentially important way to undercut the ability of India to label an explosion PNE · A second area in which the IAEA might be helpful is the so-called Zangger Committee e-classified Case N V# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 - 36 of supplier state representatives that has reviewed controls over the export of nuclear-related equipment and materials to determine what items would trigger IAEA safeguards In the group's deliberations we should keep in mind the possibility that export controls might prove effective in limiting India's ability to pursue a nuclear weapons program The value of this forum would b e enhanced if efforts succeeded in inducing the USSR France and others to apply the same standards in the requirement for safeguards on nuclear exports viii CCD The possibility of any action by the CCD in Geneva affecting Indian r· · decisions• in the short term is not large However the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty especially one which included China could influence an Indian decision India has publicly long favored a CTB It is doubtful that India would adhere to a CTB if China refused to sign and continued testing A successful CTB would however strengthen those domestic forces in India opposed to nuclear testing even if India remained outside the treaty -- Defense believes India's decision to develop nuclear capability will be based on the perceived threat the factors of national security and the need for additional prestige Domestic pressures have not halted the development of a technology including components that would permit India to detonate a nuclear device once the decision to do so is taken i CRi 4' SENSI'¼lIJJE EYES ONl i'l eclassified Case V# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 '- 37 SECRB'P SEHSI'PIVE EYES OHL¥ · - 2 After Decision Taken Once India takes a decision to explode a nuclear device whether for reasons of prestige or on national security grounds the ability of the us to affect or reverse the decision would be minimal Between the decision itself and the actual aetonation of a first device however there might be a limited period during which it would conceivably be possible to take steps to prevent or delay the detonation While we would hope to have information on an Indian decision to detonate a device in advance of the· actual event we may not know of a decision until the explosion is imminent or a fact In an attempt to delay the implementation of an Indian decision we might · urge Inida ·to defer any detonation for a period of years · This effort would be more likely t be successful if we were able to hold out hope of progress on a Comprehensive Test Ban or some other major disarmament step It is of course· under- stood that any decision toward active negotiation on a CTB would be taken on the basis of overall interests In order to reinforce us national security any appeal for delay we might simultaneously offer India certain inducements in terms of aid or technological cooperation although this requires further detailed study to evaluate what possibiliites are realistic and desirable We could also make clear we might have to cut back future nuclear -SBCRBIP 6BN6IIJIIW 'S YBG ONL¥ • NWJ Tilfl'f --- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- Docid 551150 eclassified Case NW# 48007 ate 12-10-2018 - 38 SECRET SE 1SITIVE EiYEiS ONLY cooperation if India nevertheless detonated a device Prospect for success wnuld be measurably increased if we had the cooperation of the Soviets as well as others After we concluded there was no realistic chance of averting or delaying an Indian nuclear test we should make our objections clear but focus our attention on the problems India's action would cause a Non-Proliferation Problems The spectrum of actions that might be taken include the - following i Public Statement At a minimum we would wish to express our regret over the Indian action as setting back efforts to limit the number of nuclear nations in the interest of world peace Assuming the Indian explosion is labeled a PNE we would wish to underscore our view regarding the indistinguishability of a nuclear device for peaceful and military purposes We would probably also want to in- dicate that the USG was reviewing its various programs of scientific cooperation with India in light of the Indian nuclear action eclassified Case NW# 48007 ate 12-10-2018 SECRB'P SmWI'PIVE EYES OHLY 39 Should we decide that circumstances dictated a stiffer response our public posture would accordingly be more negative The criticism of the Indian action would be sharper and we might state what other facets of US-Indian cooperation i e technical and economic assistance etc were under review in light of the Indian nuclear move ii Possible Unilateral Actions to Limit Technical and Scientific Cooperation If the Indian explosion occurs before the two unsafeguarded Madras reactors go on line in the late 1970's it is likely the plutonium would come from the unsafeguarded CIRUS research reactor provided India by Canada in the 1950's for which the United States supplied heavy water Under the terms of the 1956 Inda-US agreement on CIRUS the Indians agreed that the heavy water was to be used · for peaceful purposes only Since we have officially advised the Indians we consider them committed not to use the plutonium produced in the CIRUS reactor including any future generation of the plutonium for nuclear explosions we could cite the 1956 agreement as the basis for restricting our - - - - --- - -- - - - - -- - - - - -- -- -- - - - - -- - -- - - - eclassified Case NW# 48007 ate 12-10-2018 - 40 SECRET §ENSI IVE EYES ONLY nuclear assistance to the Indians It should be noted that the Indians do not agree with our interpretation of the 1956 agreement arguing that the peacetul uses concept does not exclude a peaceful nuclear explosion As a practical matter there are two areas in which we could act The first would be to discontinue the supply of enriched fuel to the Tarapur reactor which unlike CIRUS is safeguarded Tarapur Under our 1963 agreement on are obligated to provide all Tara- pur's requirements for enriched uranium Howe-ver we could use the breach of the CIRUS agreement as justification for d iscontinuing further supplies of enriched uranium How damaging this would prove would depend on the attitude of other potential enriched uranium supplies specifically the French and Soviets If they stepped in as a substitute for the US to provide the enriched uranium we would simply be making a political gesture and not penalizing the Indians in a practical manner At the same time the Inaians could retaliate against -the us if we break the See Annex 3 for discussion of the legal situation Annex 4 discusses the relevance of Article I of the NPT edassified Case NW# 48007 ate 12-10-2018 SECnE4' SEHSI'i'IVE E¥ES ONLY 41 agreement on Tarapur by refusing further repayments of the $15 million for fuel already supplied and another $73 million owed on an AID loan for the Tarapur reactors A second area in which we could take action would be our program of scientific and technical cooperation in the nuclear field we· have over the years estab- lished a good working relationship with the Indian atomic energy scientists As a sign of our displeasure we could take steps to limit and or terminate these relationships ' We could also initiate action to restrict c Indian access to the nuclear energy field in the US i e refuse to invite Indians to technical conferences refuse student visas for higher education in the atomic energy field etc Such a course could of course deprive us of future opportunities to influence and keep informed on the progress of the Indian nuclear program iii Possible Multilateral Actions The effecti veness of any unilateral US measures would be greatly increased if our actions were • NW # 48007 Docid 551150 eclassified Case N Y# 48007 ate 12-10-2018 42 SECRE' P SE 1SI'l'IVE EYES m1L¥ r seconded by parallel steps of other nations especially the USSR Obviously each nation will weigh what it does in terms of its interests in preventing further proliferation and its relations with India The chances for something like a me aningful collective response would be much gre ater if this possibility were discussed with other countries in the pre-decision phase One international forum where the 'India _situation could logically be raised would be the International Atomic Energy Agency '· In ·this regard the s ccess of efforts to gain wider acceptance of our view regarding the indistinguishability between peaceful and nuclear explosives would be particularly significant D iv Other Unilateral us Actions If we chose the US could obviously impose more wide-ranging penalties against India than those outlined under ii above We could curtail all cooperation in the space as well as atomic energy fields where some potential ilitary applications xisted We could also curtail our other programs of scientific cooperation • ·m -#- 41JOUT_ __ __ _ _ _ __ _ ______ ·--·- ··- ··-- ·- --Docid 551150 eclassified Case NW# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 43 SECRET SEWStITIVE EYES mlLY - and reduce or eliminate our economic assistance programs with India assuming these are resumed b Likely Prospects and Impact Possible moves would of course have to be analyzed in light - of the situation that prevails at the time of an Indian test as well as the manner in which India describes its device i e whether as a PNE r as a nuclear weapon Assuming a test in the near future labeled a PNE we 'Wouid anticipate the following prospects and possible impact - i In terms of US-Indian relations sweeping penalties especially in view of the likely Indian contention that the±r explosion is peaceful would cause drastic damage India would probably retal i ate in ways available to it most likely in terms of obligations it could repudiate in the area of our aid rela ionship If our penalties were more specifically related to India's nuclear energy activities we would probably lessen the prospect of Indian retaliation The Indian reaction would nonethe- - less be strong and the effect on Indo-US relations severe This would be especially true if the eclassified Case N Y# 48007 ate 12-10-2018 - SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY 44 US actions were substantially harsher than those of other countries ii Some other countries might be willing to impose penalties in the nuclear field The Canadians have already stated publicly they would do so We are doubtful how far the French and the Soviets would be willing to go Probably they would make some noises of dis- pleasure but then not join in any multilateral effort to penalize the Indians We believe it doubtful that other nations would be willing to - take actions against the Indians that ranged beyond the scien ific and technical area however prior consultations might establish the basis · for concerted actions iii In terms of th3 effect on other near-nuclear powers penalties against India would be unlikely to have a decisive impact Some of the near nuclears -- Germany Japan and Israel -- would not expect the US to apply the same criteria to them as to India because of their special relationship with the US although a very mild low-key US response could lead them to anticipate nothing more severe if they became n ber seven in the nuclear club Others might be infllenced to a greater degree by a stiff us reaction eclassified Case NW# 480-07 Date 2-10-2018 - Si CRET SEHSI'¼'IVE EYES ONLY c Regional Impact 45 As discussed earlier the major regional repercussion would be from Pakistan Unless a major shift in Indo-Pakistan relations has occurred an Indian nuclear test would rigger requests for political support and some form of US umbrella against an Indian nuclear threat The other countriPs in South As a would express con cern about an Indian nuclear test but would be unlikely to seek any concrete steps by the US to counter India's increased political military power In dealing with Pakistan our choices - - probably range from on the one extreme advising the Pakistanis that we see no Indian nuclear threat to C them and hence no need for support verbal or otherwise to the other extreme of offering Pakistan the sort of nuclear assurances we have given our NATO allies and Japan Outlined below are four possible choices within this broader spectrum i Essentially Do Nothing We could tell the Pakistanis not to exaggerate the Indian threat India does not require nuclear weapons to prove its superiority over Islamabad We would proffer Pakistan support avail- able to all countries under the UN Charter but would do no more edassified Case NW# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 - 46 SECRE' F SENS I' FPIE EYES ONLY ii Calm the Pakistanis by Verbal Assurances But No New Commitments We would recognize the Pakistani fears as real if overdrawn and seek to convince them possibly drawing on help from allies like Iran that they were exaggerating the military significance of an Indian nuclear test At the same time we could without making any fresh commitments make a statement along the lines of the declaration of support against nuclear blackmalJ which we made in connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and possibly even seek some form of reaffirmation of the related UN Security Council Resolution 255 of 1968 Annex 5 provides pertinent texts iii Provide Pakistan a Nuclear Umbrella We could explicitly offer Pakistan US nuclear support in the event India threatened or used nuclear weapons against its neighbor to the West This presumably would be in the form of new US-Pakistan bilateral This would be regarded by India as a major policy action against it by the us with inevitable drastic consequences on US-Indian relations It would eclassified Case W# 48007 Date 2-10-2018 SECRE'f SEtiSI'fIVE EYES CliLY 47 also run counter to the thrust of the Nixon Doctrine of maintaining existing commitments but not expanding them Substantial public controversy would be likely in the US iv Revise 1959 Bi l ateral to Expand Protection To provide more concrete assurances for Pakistan we could revise our 1959 bilateral security agreement to enlarge the scope of coverage from aggression by a Communist power to any form of external aggression For both options iii and iv the costs we would ay in terms of freso destabilization in South Asia and the controversies generated at home and elsewhere through the expanded US commitments in Asia would not balance our gains in terms of steadying Pakistan We are therefore doubtful about the utility of these options At the same time we think i does not go far enough in providing Pakistan the sort of psychological lift Islamabad will need in responding relatively calmly to an Indian nuclear test The best means of achieving this without at the same time creating new fundamental problems for the US in South Asia would appear to be something along the lines of action outl ned in ii eclassified Case N '# 8007 Date 12-10-2018 - SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY d Impact on Other Countries 48 The other country most immediately affected by an Indian explosion would be Japan How we dealt with the Japanese once India joined the nuclear club would e of considerable importance both in terms of Japan's nuclear -policy and our relationship with Tokyo In view of Japan's military potential we would want to consider carefully in light of the specific circumstances at the time wha steps we should take to help in maintaining Japan as a nonnuclear power Preferably before but certainly after an Indian pro-nuclear decisio we would want to demonstrate to the Japanese that our nuclear security relations can keep pace with changing conditions It will be more important than ever that the Japanese be assured that the _voice can be heard_on security matters without Japan's having to go nuclear