__ - - ---·- edassified Case NW# 48007 Date l 2-11-2018 SBGRET BXD IS SENS ITIVB - · SRG MEETING · Wednesday 4 October 1972 • _ t _ r NSSM-156 • INDIAN NUCLEAR DEVEL TS t ' r Table of Contents NEA Briefing Memorandum · •- • _ TAB A - NSSM Response TABB• NSSM Request ' • TAB C - SNIE 31-72 Indian Nuclear Developments and Their Likely ImpJ ications •' i' SECR ET iXI IS SiNSITP i eclassified Case W# 48007 Date 2-11-2018 - DEPARTMENT OF STATE BRIEFING MEMORANDUM 1 5 5 it ' · V SECRE SENSI IVE E¥ES ONLY TO The Deputy Secretary FROM NEA - Joseph J Siscctf SRG Meeting on Indian Nuclear Developments on Wednesday October 4 at 3 00 p m Estimate of Situation You may wish to start off your presentation at the SRG meeting on the Indian nuclear problem with a very brief statement regarding our estimate of Indian capabilities and intentions the implications of an Indian nuclear decision and U S objectives in regard to Indian nuclear policy We suggest that for this purpose you draw on pages 1 and 2 of the summary of our response to NSSM 156 attached at Tab A which closely resembles the conclusions of the SNIE attached at Tab C There already exists a substantial consensus on these matters within U S Government agencies and so it should not be necessary to dwell on them U S Action There remains consideration of what we might do to influence Indian policy in advance of an explosion and contingency actions which we might take should ·India proceed to explode a device As between these two we believe the emphasis should be given to the former both because of our interest in influencing Indian policy before a nuclear decision is made and because actions after an explosion could be decided upon only in light of t e circumstances that existed at that time SECRE'l' SElNSI'fIVD EYES O L¥ rl - - --- - -- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - edassified Case NW# 48007 Date 2-11-2018 - Si CRET SENSI'l'IVE EYBS OH§¥ -2Unilateral Actions Before an Explosion pages 2 and 3 of the Summary In describing unilateral U S actions to influence Indian policy we suggest that you draw on pages 2 and ·3 of the Summary of our response to NSSM 156 We suggest that you indicate that most of these actions are not new suggestions In fact we have been doing many of these things over the period since we first focussed on the Indian problem in the mid-1960's You should of ·course note that we are handicapped in pursuing these courses by the state of our relations with India Nevertheless certain actions such as the continuation of U S -Indian cooperation in the nuclear and space fields are sufficiently important to the achievement of our objectives so that they should be pursued despite the state of our relations rIn regard to the proposal of the study that we consider offering India peaceful nuclear explosion services we suggest that -you indicate that this is not a promising idea as it is very unlikely that the Indians would accept such an offer Multilateral Actions Before an Explosion pages 3-4 of the Summary We suggest that you • indicate that because of the state of our relations with India we can probably achieve more through multilateral actions than through direct actions with the GOI You may wish to draw upon pages 3-4 of the Summary for your comments on this subject You might explain that we have already had discussions with the UK Canada Japan and France on the Indian nuclear question and most recently put to the British duri ng talks here on September 21 our ideas on actions we might take before and after an explosion Thus our proposal is simply to continue and extend this process We suggest that you seek agreement that we should discuss the Indian nuclear problem with both the Soviets and the Chinese We particularly feel that we should SECRiT SENSI'l'IVE EYES ONLY eclassified Case NW# 8007 Date 12-11-2018 ' - SECRE'i' SE•m I4'IVE EYES ONLY -3enlist Soviet cooperation in view of soviet interest in avoiding proliferation and close Russian relations with India The Department of Defense has serious reservations regarding the proposal that we seek more rapid progress on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as a method of influencing Indian nuclear policy In considering this proposal i-t is important that the SRG understand tha_t the drafters of the paper are not recommending that we seek more rapid progress on a CTB but are only saying that should the President decide to seek such progress we • believe that conclusion of an agreement would increase pressures against Indian nuclear te ting Contin enc Actions After an Indian Ex losion pages 4 and 5 of Summary ·- The response to NSSM 156 sets forth an array of · actions we might take beginning with a very mild response and extending to imposition of severe penalties We suggest you indicate that the principal problem on this subject is that if we do not react strongly enough the inhibitions on other near-nuclear countries may be reduced when they note our mild reaction If we react too severely however we will lose any influence we might have over India's post-explosion nuclear policy and place another obstacle in the way of satisfactory U S -Indian relations While we believe a final decision should be made in light of the situation at the time of the Indian nuclear explosion our current inclination would be to follow alternative 2 on page 4 of the summary and react in the form of a public statement of displeasure and termination of nuclear and space cooperation which might be directly -related to the development of an Indian nuclear delivery system Pakistani Reaction One special problem Pakistan's reaction to an Indian explosion may come up at the SRG meeting The precise Pakistani reaction would depend in part upon how much progress had been made at the time of the explosion - SBCRE'P SB SI'l'IVE EYES ON t Y eclassified Case NW# 48007 Date 2-11-2018 - SBCRE'l' SBNSI' E'PIE BYBS Q lLY -4toward the re-establishment of permanent peace in South Asia We tentatively believe our role should be to seek to steady Pakistan by a reaffirmation of our previous general assurances of support against nuclear blackmail We would not now be inclined to ·go beyond this and provide more specific security assurances Attachments Tab A - NSSM Response Tab B - NSSM 156 Tab C - SNIE • SECR 134' SEHBI'PIVB DYES ONLY J · Drafted · NEA1 INC DTSchneider nm x22141 1·0 2 72 Concurrences S PC - Mr Thornton PM AE - Mr Turrentine w '1 NEA - Ambassador Meyer· V - r P' - - J ·- eclassified Case NW# 48007 ate 12-11-2018 ANNEX 2 SECRE'P AIDE MEMOIRE PRESENTED TO INDIAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION IN BOMBAY NOVEMBER 16 1970 The United States Government has noted various affirmations of Indian interest in developing the technology of peaceful nuclear explosions as well as statements that the Government of India is not planning for a nuclear explosion Occasionally in the public debate on the nuclear issue the question has been raised as to whether under extant agreements the Government of India could legitimately use foreign-supplied nuclear technology or materials to manufacture an explosive device to be used in detonating a peaceful nuclear explosion We believe the Government of India is aware of the American interpretation of agreements under which the United States has assisted India's development in the field of atomic energy However we would like to reiterate the American view in the interest of clarity and to obviate any misunderstanding ·• The American position reflected in the Non-Proliferation Treaty is that the technology of nuclear explosives for peaceful uses is indistinguishable from that of nuclear weapons and that any nuclear explosive device though it be intended for benign economic purposes - eclassified Case NW# 48007 ate 12-11-2018 - ANNEX 2 - p 2 SECRET could also be used for deftructive purposes development The ot such explosives therefore is tantamount to the development of nucle ar weapons Any other position would be inconsistent with United States bligations unger the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the United States Atomic Energy Act Consequently the United States would consider it incompatible with existing United States-Indian agreements for American nuclear assistance to be employed in the development of peaceful nuclear explosive devices Specifically· for example the use for the development - of peaceful nuclear explosive devices of plutonium produced therefrom would be considered by the United States a contravention of the terms under which the American materials were made available --The United States interprets the safeguards and quarantees provisions of the Tarapur agreement as prohibiting the use of American materials and equipment or materials produced from such materials and equipment for research on or development of any nuclear explosive devices regardless of stated applications --The contract of March 16 1960 under which the United States sold heavy water to India for the CIRUS Reactor states - The heavy water sold hereunder shall • • - - edassified Case NW# 48007 Date 2-11-2018 ANNEX 2 - p 3 be for use only in India by the Government in connection with research into and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes •••• The United States would not consider the use of plutonium produced in CIRUS for peaceful nuclear explosives intended for any purpose to be •research into and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes - edassified Case NW# 48007 ate 12-11-2018 ANNEX 3 SBCRE'F Legal Situation With Respect to India-u s Atomic Energy Agreements There are three agreements with India in the atomic energy field which are relevant if India were to explode a nuclear device A The 1956 CIRUS Agreement - The United States Atomic Energy Commission entered into an agreement with India on March 16 1956 to supply twnety- one tons of heavy water for the CIRUS reactor located at Trombay This reactor was supplied by Canada Under the agreement India agreed the heavy water should be used in connection with research into and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes It is the U S view that India is committed to use the plutonium produced in the CIRUS reactor including any subsequent generations of such plutonium for peaceful purposes B U S -India Bilateral of 1963 - The United States signed a Cooperation Agreement with India Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy TIAS 5446 Auqust 8 1963 Under this agreement the United States agreed to provide all requirements for enriched uranium for fuel for twenty-five years for the two reactors at Tarapur India guaranteed in Articles VI and VII that the fuel and equipment supplied would be used solely for peaceful purposes and would not be used for any military purpose Article VI also gave safeguards rights to the United States riqhts of inspection and access respecting nuclear material and equipment The reactors for the plant are of American origin and were financed by an AID loan of about $73 million to be paid over thirty years starting with the first installment due in 1974 The fuel for the reactors over the twenty-five year period is estimated to cost about $100 million Payment to the USAEC for the cost of the initial fuel load amounting to about $15 million has been deferred by agreement until 1973 The obligation for peaceful uses covers the plutonium produced in the Tarapur plant as well as subsequent generations This is shown most clearly in the Trilateral Safeguards - eclassified Case NW# 007 Date 12-11-2018 ANNEX 3 p 2 SEGRE'¼' Agreement TIAS 7049 of January 27 1971 between the United States India and the IAEA under which the IAEA assumed the safeguards _rights of the United States Both reactors at Tarapur are now operatinq and small quantities of plutonium have been produced C U S -India-Canada Tri-lateral - We have what is in essence a tripartite arrangement with Canada and India under which the United States agreed to the ·use of heavy water of U S origin for the RAPP I reactor in India The RAPP I reactor was provided India under an agreement of 1963 as amended between Canada and India This reactor is of Canadian origin and is fueled in part by natural uranium supplied by Canada The United States agreed to permit u s -origin heavy water to be used in this reactor on condition that the heavy water would be subject to the peaceful purposes guarantee in the Canada-India-IAEA Trilateral Safeguards Agreement and more particularly that it would be subject to certain special provisions which impose safeguards rights with respect to the plutonium produced in the reactor and subsequent generations of such plutonium for the five years or lesser period during which the heavy water is used in the reactor -- As can be seen from the above United States assistance to Indian reactors has been conditioned that the use of the plutonium produced therefrom be for peaceful purposes The Indian representatives in the past have indicated they did not agree that there would be a vi'olation of the commitment for peaceful purposes if nuclear explosive devices were used for such civil purposes such as constructing canals reservoirs etc We stated our views in 1970 on this subject to the Government of India throught our Embassy in New Delhi so that the Indian Government could be under no misapprehension of our position At that time we clearly reiterated to the Indian Government our position that the technology for the construction of any nuclear explosive device is indistinguishable from the technology involved in a nuclear explosive weapon we stated that the use for any nuclear explosive device whatever the device was intended for would be incompatible with the guarantee of peaceful uses - - ' - - - -- - - - - -- -- - ---' -- ----- eclassified Case NW# 48007 Date 2-11-2018 ----- ANNEX 3 p 3 SJ CR i T If it can be shown that the Indian Government has used plutonium produced from u s -assisted reactors we could charge the Indian Government with a breach of its peaceful uses obligation Since the RAPP I reactor and the Tarapur plant are under inspection safeguards the probabilities are that any plutonium · from a u s -assisted reactor would originate from the CIRUS reactor Which is subject to a peaceful use guarantee but not inspection safeguards ·As far as is known no plutonium has been supplied to India by France or the Soviet Union or any other country having plut niu In the event India breached the peaceful purposes obligation the only action we could take in the field of our atomic agreements with India which might have a significant impact would be to hold back · on the performance of our commitments to supply enriched uranium for the reactors Unless the enriched uranium were sup_plied from other sources such as France or the USSR these important and valuable reactors would in due course have to close down thus depriving India o up to 400 megawatts of electricity However any action on our part coul expose us to a refusal by India to make any payment on the $15 million owed for fuel heretofore supplied and the $73 million owed on the AID loan - C - If we knew beforehand that _India was planning to use plutonium derived from u s -assist ed reactors in a nuclear explosive device or there was strong evidence to that effect we could as in 1970 point out that this would be a breach of India's obligations and state that we objected strongly and that if such use took place we would take appropriate action Appropriate action in the atomic energy field could be the cessation of deliveries of enriched uranium as stated in the preceding paragraph Also legal justification might exist to refuse to perform commitments in other areas but this could only be determined upon a review of such commitments Of course we would be completely free to cease any programs of benefit to India which we were not obligated to continue - eclassified Case N V# 48007 Date 2-11-2018 -SECRE'P ANNEX 4 RELEVANCE OF ARTICLE I OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY Annex 3 discusses the legal situation regarding breach of CIRUS and other US atomic agreements with India If India were to use for an explosive device nuclear material not coming from US nuclear assisted reactors we would have no legal basis for terminating performance of our obligations under our atomic agreements with India Since India is not a party to the NPT our undertakings under this treaty cannot modify our legal obligations to India under an atomic agreement with India We do have an obligation under Article I of the NPT to other parties to the treaty not in any way to assist or encourage ••• any non-nuclear weapons state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices While we do not consider that this language legally restrains us vis-a-vis these other parties rom continuing preforrnance under our atomic agreements with India this language might perhaps be drawn upon as one element of a political justification for terminating furtner performance under such agreements if India were to detonate a nuclear explosive device -- SECRE'f I - - eclassified Case NW# 48007 Date 2-11-2018 SECRET ANNEX 5 1968 U S DECLARATION ON NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL Made in the United Nations Security Council in explanation of its vote for Security Council Resolution 255 1968 The Government of the United States notes with appreciation the desire expressed by a large number of States to subscribe to the treaty on the nonproliferation of ' nuclear weapons - We welcome the willingness of these States to undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to seek or receive any assistance' in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices The United States also notes the concern of certain of these States that in co-junction with their adherence to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security Ahy aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States Bearing these considerations in mind the United States declares the following Aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a qualitatively new situation in which the nuclear-weapon States which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council would have to act immediately through the Security Council to take the measures necessary to counter such aggression or to remove the threat of aggression in accordance with the · United Nations Charter which calls for taking effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace - iECRE'f - - eclassified Case NW# 48007 Date 2-11-2018 SECRET ANNEX 5 1968 U S DECLARATION ON NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL Made in the United Nations Security Council in explanation of its vote for Security Council Resolution 255 1968 The Government of the United States notes with appreciation the desire expressed by a large number of States to subscribe to the treaty on the nonproliferation of ' nuclear weapons We welcome the willingness of these States to undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to seek or receive any assistance· in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices The United St tes also notes the concern of certain of these States that in co-junction with their adherence to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security Any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States Bearing these considerations in mind the United States declares the following Aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a qualitatively new situation in which the nuclear-weapon States which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council would have to act immediately through the Security Council to take the measures necessary to counter such aggression or to remove the threat of aggression in accordance with the · United Nations Charter which calls for taking effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace - iECRE'l' ----------- ------------------------ _ I - eclassified Case N V# 48007 Date 2-11-2018 SECRE4' ANNEX 5 P• 2 Therefore any State which commits aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons or which threatens such aggression must be aware that its actions are to be countered effectively by measures to be taken in accordance with the United Nations Charter to suppress the aggression or remove the threat of aggression The United States affirms its intention as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance in accordance with the Charter to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used The United States reaffirms in particular the inherent right recognized under Article 51 of · the Charter of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack including a nuclear attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken measures necessary o maintain international peace and security - The United States vote for the resolution before us and this statement of the way in which the United States intends to act in accordance with the Charter of the United· Nations are based upon the fact that the resolution is supported by other permanent members of the Security Council which are nuclear-weapon States and are also proposing to sign the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and that these States have made similar statements as to the way in which they intend to act in accordance with the Charter UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 255 1968 Adopted by the Security Council at its 1433rd Meeting on 19 June 1968 The Security Council Noting with appreciation the desire of a large number of States to subscribe to the Treaty on the iECRET - • • - SECRET ANNEX 5 p 3 eclassified Case NW# 48007 Date 2-11-2018 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and thereby to undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices Taking into consideration the concern of certain of these States that in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons appropriate ' measures be undertaken to safeguard their security Bearing in mind that any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States - 1 Recognizes that aggression -with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclearweapon state woula create a situation in which the Security Council and above all its nuclear-weapon Sta e permanent members would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations unaer the United Nations Charter 2 Welcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or support immediate assistance in accordance with the Charter to any nonnuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of_ Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat · of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used 3 Reaffirms in particular the inherent right recognized under Article 51 of the Charter of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken measure necessary to maintain international peace and security SECRE'l' - - SBCRET • - ANNEX 5 p 3 eclassified Case NW# 48007 Date 2-11-2018 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and thereby to undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other n uclear explosive devices · Taking into consideration the concern of certain of these States that in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons appropriate ' measures be undertaken to safeguard their security Bearing in mind that any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States - 1 Recognizes that aggression -with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclearweapon State would create a situation in which the Security Council and above all its nuclear-weapon Sta e permanent members would have to act immediately in accordance with ·their obligations unaer the United Nations Charter 2 Welcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or support immediate assistance in accordance with the Charter to any nonnuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat · of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used 3 Reaffirms in particular the inherent right recognized under Article 51 of the Charter of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the Unite d Nations until the Security Council has taken measure necessary to maintain international peace and security SECRET - r -SBCRET • - ANNEX 5 p 3 eclassified Case N Y# 48007 Date 2-11-2018 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and thereby to undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices Taking into consideration the concern of certain of these States that in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons appropriate ' measures be unaertaken to safeguard their security Bearing in mind that any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States - 1 Recognizes that aggression·with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclearweapon State would create a situation in which the Security Council nd above all its nuclear-weapon Sta e permanent members would have to act immediately in accordance with 'their obligations unaer the United Nations Charter 2 Welcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or support immediate assistance in accordance with the Charter to any nonnuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat · of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used 3 Reaffirms in particular the inherent right recognized under Article 51 of the Charter of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken measure necessary to maintain international peace and security SEGRE' ' r - BCR ' T • - ANNEX 5 p 3 eclassified Case N 'V# 48007 Date 2-11-2018 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and thereby to undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices Taking into consideration the concern of certain of these States that in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons appropriate ' measures be undertaken to safeguard their security Bearing in mind that any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States - 1 Recognizes that aggression-with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclearweapon State woula create a situation in which the Security Council and above all its nuclear-weapon Sta e permanent members would have to act immediately in accordance with ·their obligations unaer the United Nations Charter 2 Welcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or support immediate assistance in accordance with the Charter to any nonnuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of_ Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat·of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used 3 Reaffirms in particular the inherent right recognized under Article 51 of the Charter of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken measure necessary to maintain international peace and security - - ' -C EOS0xl NSC EO25xl CIA EO25x6CIA C Declassified Case NW# 48007 Date ll-11-2018 'NW# -C-8-0-0- -· - ·-- Docid 551151 -- - - -- I - --------·- - -· - ' - - -- EOS0xl NSC EO2Sxl CIA EO2Sx6CIA C Q Declassified Case NW# 48007 Date 12-11-2018 NW# t 8 0 01-· - --·- --- - - --- ·-·- Docid 551151 --•-W •- - - · · -- ·- -· · I • - - Declassified Case ' Y# 48007 Date 12-11-2018 -- EOS0xl NSC E025xl CIA E025x6CIA Dedassilied Case NW# 48007 Data 12-11-2018 · ' - - EOS0xl NSC E025xl CIA E025x6CIA Declassified Case NW# 48007 Date 12-11-l0HI - £EERET SE• SITl¥E SNIE 31-72 - - INDIAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR LIKELY IMPLICATIONS SECRET 5Et•51Tl¥E - geCRET SENSITl¥E CONTENTS Page CONCLUSIONS 1 - DISCUSSION 4 I INDIAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES 4 II FACTORS IN AN INDIAN DECISION 6 A A Major Weapons System 6 B A Nuclear Test 6 Arguments For 7 A Nuclear Test Arguments Against 8 III INDIA'S LIKELY POLICY 8 IV MAJOR INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 9 A The Soviet Position B Western Positions C Reactions Among India's Neighbors D The Cause of Non-Proliferation ANNEX - 9 10 11 13 SECRET SEN61Tl¥E INDIAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR LIKELY IMPLICATIONS CONCLUSIONS ·- Indian Capabilities A India is capable of detonating a nuclear device within a few days to a year of a decision to do so Actual time required would depend on how far preliminary work had gone and there is at present insufficient evidence on this question It could fairly quickly build up a stock of 10-12 low-yield devices using existing plutonium and then make two per year until sometime between 1977 and 1980 when new unsafeguarded reactors will be in operation Thereafter it would be technically feasible to fabricate 50-70 each year B India's delivery capabilities are rudimentary They will consist probably for some years at least of a fleet of Canberra bombers with an effective radius of about 1 000 nautical miles and conceivably some Air-India Boeing 707s and 747s which would require extensive modifications -all vulnerable to Chinese air defense Relying on native resources alone India could probably not develop a strategic missile capability for at least a decade effective help from external sources seems unlikely C A crash or accelerated Indian program for the development of high-yield weapons and long-range delivery systems is unlikely during SEERET E • SITIVE 1 - SECRET 6E•4SITIVE' the 1970s Pr sent nuclear and space programs could enable India greatly to enhance its weapons potential by the 19SO heavy additional expenditures now would bring only marginal returns Indian Intentions and International Implications D The chance are roughly even that India will conduct a test in the next several years and label it a peaceful e losion It will certainlr keep open the option to do so It is however impossible to pinpoint a specific precipitant or time for a decision to ao ahead U India does conduct ate t it would almost certainly be conducted und rground and vould probably be secretly ordered and prepared Following a test India would probably go ahead to make a small number of devices-which could be used as weapons E To New Delhi the arguments both for and al ainst ronductin _ a test are stron lrs Gandhi knows that it vould be popuw t le stimulate a rising ense of national pride and inde nde • nd-in the C e of many-reinforce India's claim that it should be t en seriou ly as a major power - F But t t oulcl bring ad er for i danger some of th for i n-p rlicul uh valuabl to Inda • thou h I c tic lh u Indian nucl r pl u ulcl 1 I • I t d m weapon tt m t tlu e I n f • 11 lh ' 1 and of ron 1 mti n I JI - 2 ke ' t m conls ell in d nee t SEERET Sn•SITl¥E probably prove counterproductive Ve doubt that most non-Communist Powers would be willing to bring sanctions against India for going nuclear Even if such sanctions were imposed and included substantial reductions in economic assistance and access to technology India would accept these difficulties I An Indian test would reinforce India's dominant position in South Asia It would be a psychological jolt to Pakistan but would probably not lead Pakistan to capitulate to India on outstanding disputes and indeed for some tin1e to come would make it more difficult for Bhutto to make concessions Islamabad would seek more political and military support from China and especially the US It would cause China some concern but we cannot foresee any major changes in Chinese policies that would ensue from such a development J While an Indian nuclear test would be a setback to the nonproliferation cause we doubt that it would have a determining effect on whether any other non-nuclear power e g Vest Germany Japan Israel South Africa Brazil goes nuclear or not Each would decide according to its own political and security considerations Vere any to go nuclear however it could cite the Indian precedent as one justification SECRET SE• SIT1¥E • 12 8 3 SECRET SE SITl¥e DISCUSSION I INDIAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES N B This section is couched strictly in terms of capabilities Intentions are discussed in Sections II and III 1 India has the requisite skills and materials to set off a nuclear explosion probably of low yield The civil nuclear program in India is broadly based and an objective of that program has long been to move toward greater self-reliance and less dependence on foreign technology The total program including power applications has been l uge the Department of Atomic Energy DAE has spent almost $900 million since 195-t It employs several thousand scientists who ha 'e pursued studies in the US and Europe As a result the civil nuclear program could provide both the technical know-how and the fissionable material required for a nuclear explosives program In addition other technologies-electronics metallurgy computer capabilities and high explosh·es-are more than adequate to upport uch an effort From a technical standpoint there is no distinction between a simple nuclear de ice for military or peaceful applications 2 We have long estimated that it would take the Indians from six months to a year to manufacture and explode a device after a decision to do so But we do not know how much if any preliminary work has been done or whether or not the go 'emment has directed the DAE to ha ·e one readied for detonation on short notice Depending on the amount of preliminary work already done they could explode a de 'ice anywhere from a very short time to as much as a year after the order is gi en Onl • a relatively small number of people from the Prime lini ter through the tcchni ian to tho e preparing the site need be ilwolved ecurity could be very tight Thu both the deci ion and the test could come o n urpri e both to most Indians and to the out ide world Intelligence might be able to gi 'e prcc se advance warning but there is no certainty that this would be the case 3 The weapons would have plutonium as their fissionable material The Indians now ha ·e enough plutonium to make 10-12 bombs and could add about two additional ones annually from new production Eac h would probably be similar in fissionable material and yield 15-20 kilotons KT to the first US test in July 19- 5 The plutonium is produced and separated in the Bhaba Atomic Research Center BARC on Trombay an island in Bombay Harbor A n •actor there designed by the Canadians and built jointly - - - SECRET SE SIT1¥E- by the two countries is fueled by natural uranium mined in India The only safeguard on the reactor is a written Indian promise that the reactor and its products will be used only f r peaceful purposes There are no provisions for periodic or automatic Canadian inspections of BARC or is there agreement on what peaceful purposes means Canada and the US have taken the position that any explosion is tantamount to a nuclear weapons test regardless of the declared purpose of the explosion India has not accepted this inter• pretation 4 The selection and preparation of a suitable site for a fully contained test India is signatory to the Limited Test Ban Treaty would involve considerable time and expense Relatively primitive facilities and modest instrumentation would probably be chosen for an initial test that could be conducted in a natural cave or man-made tunnel possibly a worked-out mine Vertical drilling for emplacement of the device would probably require more than a year 5 Indian delivery capabilities like the prospective weapons themselves are modest With respect to China they are marginal nt best A fleet of about 40 Canberra bombers with a radius of about 1 000 nautical miles and a carrying capacity of 5 000 pounds could reach India's closer neighbors including most of Tibet and Sinkiang but not the heavily populated areas of China India has no long ' range bombers but could conceivably with extensive modifications use some of its Air• India fleet of nine Boeing 707s and four 74is to carry weapons several thousand miles All these aircraft would be vulnerable to Chinese air defense In any event the cost of a weapons system that used only carrc nt nuclear and delivery capabilities would not be great the added expense of operating a program for the production of a few devices would probably be only $10-$20 million a year 1 6 For at least five years India will be unable to enhance this extremely limited capability A large Indian-built nuclear-power plant with two reactors using domestic uranium is scheduled to be in operation somewhere between 1977 and 1980 With current and planned separation facilities these reactors could produce enough unsafeguarded plutonium to make 50-70 20 KT bombs_a year or fewer ones of higher yield A new generation of fast breeder reactors producing U-233 from India's huge supplies of thorium may be ready in the 1980s To come anywhere near competing with the Chinese the Indians would have to make higher yield possibly thermonuclear devices and develop a strategic missile system Atmospheric testing might also be required Costs in the billions of dollars lead times of a decade or more lack of required technical expertise and com peting demands for non-militarv and conventional military program wo ld serve as major-though not final-barriers to program of this nature In the unlikely event that India were able to buy complete systems abroad the price would still be very high 7 India's planned and slowly expanding capabilitie in the nuclear and space-related field will e ·cntually remove some of these constra nts By the 1980s there will be enou Th plutonium and U-233 to make a number f high-yield up to 500 KT weapons The Indian space program which is still in its earlier stages will also probably have borne fruit by then To date only sounding rockets have been tested A full-scale satellite launch is 1 India's defense budget for the current vear is 1 9 billion its atomic energy budget S 157 1illion See Annex for details t There are two other plant under international safeguards one is in operation and the other under construction SECRET SENSITIVE 5 - SE€R£T SE I SIT1¥E scheduled for 1975 though there will probably be slippage After this the Indians will be in a better position to develop a missile Technical problems would be substantial however and it would still require quite a few years and considerable money to achieve an operational missile system II FACTORS IN AN INDIAN DECISION 8 In formulating its future nuclear policies India has three broad options It could of course pursue nuclear research and development while postponing a nuclear explosion indefinitely It could conduct an underground nuclear test labeling it peaceful but acquiring a limited weapons capability as an inescapable by-product It could proceed openly and with a determined effort to develop a substantial weapons capability Each course has strong advocates each can be supported or opposed with strong arguments A A Major Weapons System 9 In Parliament and in the press there are many advocates of a major effort to develop a credible nuclear deterrent 3 Such an • Some who advocate the development of nuclear weapons argue that with no guarantee of a continuing third country nuclear umbrella India mmt begin developing a credible deterrent against China They do not contemplate a force in any wa ' rimling China's but rather one which would have the capability of doing enough damage to the Chinese-the destruction of a number of cities for example-to preclude Peking's resorting either to nuclear blackmail or to actual nuclear strikes against India Vhat aricus bomb advocates perceive as a credible dtterrcnt arie from forces based largely on India's present deliver ' capabilities to fairly sophisticated mixes of sup rsonic bombers missiles and submarines cc-ordinq to proponenu the as ortcd sophbticatcd programs would cost anrwhere from Sl to S15 billion Tho e in favor of such programs maintain that India can absorb the costs that there would be parallel 'ings on conventional weapons an l tha t parts of tht• programs will be undertak 'n anyway-in the spac e program for example 6 act would on the whole be politically popular in India But the Indian Government under both Shastri and Mrs Gandhi has rejected and at least for the rest of the 1970s will probably continue to reject this course The present Foreign Minister's publicly stated reasons for refraining are probably still persuasive to the government a that the building of a credible deterrent would be prohibitively expensive b that India could count on third party support to deter Chinese nuclear aggression and c that India's military problem with respect to China is primarily a conventional one 10 There are other reasons as well The development of an advanced system might require above ground testing India has signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty banning this and its leaders continue to be strong in their support of it Renunciation of that Treaty would be a major and difficult policy shift In addition the moral argument-the Gandhi Nehru position that nuclear bombs are evil still has adherents even in an India which seems to relish newly proven skills in realpolitik And the Chinese with their missiles and thcm1om1clear weapons are already so far ahead of the Indians that catching up is out of the question for a very extended period Some argue that a primitive antiChinese weapons system would more likelv provoke Peking than effectively protect Indi Given the fact that India with its present nuclear and space programs could approach the potential of a substantially in1proved weapons capability by 1980 or 1985 a decision now to speed-up the development of a highyield long-range anti-Chinese nuclear weapons system would involve considerable extra costs for marginal returns B A Nuclear Test 11 India could also conduct an underground nuclear test described as part of a 6ECRET '6EN61Tl't'E - SECRET SH•SITl¥Ei peaceful uses program It is conceivable that India after conducting what it called a peaceful nuclear explosion might actually rest there--i e avoid the production of further nuclear devices Such a course would satisfy those who want simply to demonstrate India's nuclear capability it would also skirt the issue of safeguards Nevertheless we think this course unlikely We base this judgment on the view that strictly plowshare purposes make little sense for India and further that if India does decide to pay the price of any nuclear test it would probably decide to acquire some weapons capability Thus if an explosion is conducted it will in all probability be conducted with intent to manufacture at least a few low-yield devices which could be used as weapons The following discussion is based on this belief Arguments For - 12 There have been continu ng rumors and reports that the government is planning to conduct a test and these have increased in volume over the past year or so the Indians have denied all public ones Some of these e g those predicting a test immediately prior to the March 1971 elections the January 1972 Republic Day celebration or the June 1972 Simla Conference proved wrong But there may be rising pressures for and possibly a greater official receptivity to the idea of exploding a nuclear device 13 India has consistently refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty PT despite considerable great power urgings One of its publicly cited reasons has been that it insists on keeping the option to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions for plowshare purposes One major if unstated reason for refusal has been that signing the NPT would in the eyes of nationalistic Indians permanently deny their accession to great power status They point to their nation's vast human - resources only China has more people its substantial industrial base its considerable scientific and technological capacity and its armed forces the world's fourth largest as proof that India is more than just an ordinary Afro-Asian country Thus setting off a nuclear explosion would they feel force the world to view India in its proper perspective i e as one of the world's principal powers 14 A nuclear explosion would as noted earlier be extremely popular at home where national pride is riding very high the detonation of an Indian device would be received with great enthusiasm Many of those who are antinuclear in principle would be mollified by assurances that Indian-made dev ces would be used only for peaceful purposes Many who believe that long run security for India should not rest on a commitment by the Soviets or any other external power would applaud the act as a step toward genuine national self-reliance And the possession of what could be a nuclear weapon as easily as a peaceful device would appeal to many as a clinching symbol of India's dominant position in the subcontinent and its desires to be taken seriously as a great power 15 The events of 1971 culminating in India's decisive military victory over Pakistan could reduce the motivation for a nuclear demonstration especially in the short run but over time are more likely to reinforce it The military proved itself not merely big but highly effective The breakup of Pakistan demonstrated India's paramountcy in South Asia In New Delhi's view India is a major Asian power to be taken not less seriously than China or Japan In addition the closer connection forged with the USSR as signaled in the August 1971 Treaty of Friendship has temporarily enhanced India's sense of security w th respect to the Chinese Indian fears that even a small inventory of nuclear bombs could in time of crisis trigger off a pre-emptive 6ECRET SH 51Tl'9'E 7 - SEERH SHJSITl¥E Chinese attack has almost certainly been eased by recent demonstrations of Soviet support In these circumstances the Indians may feel that a nuclear test now would not only enhance their country's image but entail much less risk than in the past 16 The durability of the Soviet guarantee however is undoubtedly open to question in New Delhi loreover New Delhi clearly believes it has lost any hope of a US nuclear umbrella against China The fear of becoming further dependent on the Soviet Union for its ultimate security against China and the need to hedge against possible depreciation of the present Soviet guarantee would be hvo powerful motives in favor of an early nuclear decision A N uclear Test A rguments Against - 17 But Mrs Gandhi would think very carefully before ordering a test It could bring adverse reactions from most if not all the principal world powers from whom India receives political military technical and economic assistance India's leaders would probably hope but not be sure that tht• e rt' lCtions would soon die down The Sovfrts h n ' long urged the Indians to si n the NPT though they apparently have not pu lu'Cl th matter forcefully The Indian cannot be Ct'rtain that Moscow·s reaction to an actu l t t would be confined to pro f ormo regrets 18 Mrs Gandhi's currently more relaxed view of the Chinese could change if she felt that Peking was going to become more threatening to India pos ibly helped to do so by the Sino-US detente Though the Pakb tan would be unable to match the Inclfans for many years • cw Delhi could not be certain that I slamabad 'ould not get substantial technical assistance or C 'en wc 1pons from it Chinese friend India could not be sure that the principal non-Communist Po 'ers would ac- - 8 -e_ B 121121 g cept an Indian nuclear program vithout slashing their aid programs to India And for all India's greater stature it remains a poor country to which outside assistance is extremely valuable 19 Mrs Gandhi no doubt realizes that a successful test would set off new demands that India quickly use its technology to develop a full-scale weapons program These demands would come from military leaders some of whom have already said they fa 'or this course and patriotic civilians alike lrs Gandhi may feel she could contain such pressures and indeed she probably could do so at least for some time But with the high priority she has gi 'en to costly social welfare measures even at the expense of o ·erall economic growth she would probably sec demands for new weapon sy terns as a threat to matters she considers more important Ill INDIA'S LIKELY POLICY 20 Th re i no ine -orable process force or logi com lling India oon to conduct or not to condu t nu l ar te t To the Indian o mm nt th • rguments pro and con are both tron r m e tended period-with lar t quantih of un afegunrded fissionable m t nal on hand and the space program ho u1g fruit-the arguments for are likely to become more per uash e the odds are high that India ill enter the nuclear club e 'entually 21 The short-term outlook is far less certain but some idelines may be noted The strongest factors impelling India to set off a test are the Indians' belief that it would build up their international presti e demonstrate India's importance as an Asian power O ·erawe its immediate South Asian nt 'ighbors a_nd bring enhanced popularity and public support to the regime hich achie 'ed it SECRET 5EUSITl¥6 - - - SEERE r SE•4 1TIV6- 22 Most of the arguments against conducting a test have to do with foreign reactions and these are becoming of less importance to India Though New Delhi is hardly entering an era of extreme xenophobic defiance it has now clearly made resistance to outside pressures an important element of its foreign policy Self-reliance is a regularly evoked rarely challenged and sincerely felt slogan of the Indian Government A complete isolationist policy is unlikely but the degree of effective persuasion available to outside powers is less than in the past One main reason is the matter of economic assistance Most of this has been in the form of loans over the past 25 years India has acquired a huge debt The latter now requires repayments on principal and interest of over half of current aid receipts greatly reducing its net value There are now many articulate Indians who state that it would be in the country's interest to renounce new aid In any event the possibility of losing Western economic aid is one which would inhibit but not decisively deter the Indians from conducting a nuclear test 23 The chances are roughly even that India will set off a nuclear device at some time during the next several years The factors pro and con will vary at any specific moment in this period India will never forego the option at any given moment the decision will not be between no versus yes but between yes versus not now The decision would be made by Mrs Gandhi Her unquestioned dominance of the government and unchallenged political strength in the country give her full control of decisions over matters of this import She could afford to do without the domestic political advantages of an affirmati 'e decision and she could also cope with the adn rse consequences of going ahead So far she has publicly defended the policy of ab taining from making nuclear weapons But both foreign and domestic political considerations might work to change her policy 24 Mrs Gandhi is bent both on mobilizing the energy of her people in a massive assault on social inequities and on making India's voice heard with respect in international councils There are obviously contradictions between her domestic reform needs and spending vast sums on advanced weapons in pursuit of international status But she may come to believe that some kind of nuclear capability would be useful in terms of adding to national support for her domestic programs and that having a limited weapons capability perhaps in the guise of a peaceful program would give India increased stature or greater security on the world scene IV MAJOR INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS A The Soviet Position 25 From the point of view of the USSR's purely strategic interests a limited Indian nuclear capability would probably not gi ·e Moscow great concern Its relations ith Mrs Gandhi's government remain close and cordial any step which would strengthen her regime and build up it image in South Asia and cl ewhere ha ome advantages for Soviet interest The R would probably not con ider that n limited Jndi m capability would seriously aggravate area tensions 26 At the same time the USSR is seeking to pre ·ent the future proliferation of nuclear weapons and in principle would oppose any country's taking this steir-lndia included It has long urged ew Delhi to sign the ·PT but has not made an issue of refusal to do so loscow would ha 'e to consider whether an Indian test would encourage other states e g Japan Israel and particularly Vest Germany whose joining the nuclear club would be a matter of gra ·e concern to the Soviets to take this step Overall the Soviets are more likely to conclude that the damage to the cause of non-proliferation would be neither ECAET E•4 1TIVEi 9 - SECRET '6E• 61T1¥E immediate nor great and that its interests would be best served by making the best of it Thus if India conducts a test Moscow might pretend to accept ew Delhi's peaceful protestations at face value and exert such pressures as it could to keep the program limited It would also continue to push for ratification of the NPT by other countries If the Soviets were asked to join in multilateral representations concerning an Indian program they would probably be unresponsive 8 Western Positions ·e 27 The Indians are not unconcerned about Western reactions Any decisions they make will of course take their relations with the Western Powers and Japan into account But concern is one thing and acquiescing to pressures by these powers is another Almost any external pressures would be resented by the Indians particularly if they came after a decision to conduct a test had been made and most especially if they involved any publicity Private demarches well in advance of a decision might possibly prove more effective much would depend however on how many countries approached the Indians how hard they pushed the matter and how seriously India viewed the danger of sanctions 28 Indian resentment would be especially severe if the US took the lead in efforts to pressure or even threaten the Indians into not pursuing a program of nuclear proliferation The Indian Government is wary of the US believing it to have a strong pro-Pakistani bias this sentiment is paralleled in the press and among large sections of the articulate and politically aware public Nor with the end of the PL-480 food program of even limited arms sales and with suspension of new increments of economic aid does the US have much tangible leverage on the Indian Government Given this fact plus the frosty suspicion about US motives which currently e ists in - 10 some circles in India active American pressures directed against Indian nuclear plans would probably prove counterproductive at least in some quarters of the Indian Government 29 This would probably not be so with respect to the UK Canada Australia Japan and the West European countries who collectively supply most of India's foreign economic aid and who individually get along pretty well with Mrs ' Gandhi's government But it is very doubtful that any one or all of these countries could persuade ew Delhi not to go the course of nuclear proliferation if a film conclusion had been reached that it would be in India's interest to do so 1ot only is it doubtful that these countries could or would offer enough inducements e g security guarantees and money to divert India from this path but India vould probably calculate that they would not in the event engage in serious puniti e sanctions 30 A threat by all non-Communist Powers to terminate--not just suspend-all economic assistance unless and until India renounced nuclear te ting would require some hard thinldng in New Delhi India would also be concerned if it thought that a nuclear explosion might reduce its access to Western technology The Indians probably feel that such contingencies are unlikely and they are probably right in this assessment State to state ties with many of these countries are close and trade relations as vith Japan and the UK are substantial A united embargo on aid and technical access would be difficult to achieve and maintain It would also cut both ways India has large debts to these states and a cutoff of aid could lead India to declare a moratorium on debt repayments The obvious beneficiary in terms of political position in India would be the USSR 31 It is difficult to say precisely how much India would be hurt by an aid cutoff The loss SECRET • SIT1¥E II @ii _ J2 l2 t - ·- SECRET 6n• SIT1¥E of a net income of several hundred million dollars a year would force cutbacks in development programs slow down economic activity and reduce living standards for some people Substantial cuts in imports would be required But these would be unlikely gravely to cripple the modem economic sector the principal beneficiary of aid much less bring India to reverse its decision Even with all its poverty and difficulties India has considerable skills and resources and could make up for lost sources of technology from the French and the Communist countries Its drive for self-sufficiency has not brought autarky but has given In dia greater means to resist outside pressures and blandishments These would be in a sense enhanced as a Western aid cutoff would bring on a massive nationalist public reaction in favor of official efforts to resist and overcome the new diffi culties Given this and the fact that the Indians could probably hope to receive some additional Soviet and East European assistance in the aftermath Westem economic pressures to stop India's nuclear programs would probably be limited in effect C Reactions Among India's N eighbors 32 China continues to be Pakistan's principal source of arms No Indian nuclear capa• bility large or small is likely to alter China's willingness to support Pakistan China would continue to supply only conventional weapon there is no apparent reason for Peking to break precedent and share its nuclear secrets with an outside power Peking would feel little concern about Indian nuclear developments per se at least for many years Its margin of superiority in weapons' yield and delivery vehicles is overwhelming and will remain so well into and probably beyond the 19 Os Its principal concern will continue to be the USSR and secondarily the US both of who e nuclear arsenals it docs take very seriously - The Chinese would probably discount the threat to themselves of an Indian nuclear weapons program and would perhaps recognize that the program was motivated primarily by India's aspirations to great power status 33 The fact remains however that China is the only logical target for such weapons oreover the Chinese would be concerned about the impact an Indian explosion might have on Japanese thinking Peking would also take a dim view of any enhancement of India's prestige among the weaker countries of the Third World For these reasons the Chinese would be likely to condemn an Indian nuclear explosion How strongly they did so would depend on whether Peking was interested as it seems to be now in a general improvement of Sino-Indian relations which have long been strained It is even possible that an Indian decision to go ahead would make a Sino-Indian detente more desirable to both parties 34 An Indian nuclear test would at least initially be a startling development in much of South A iu To many there it mi 17ht even seem to bring an entirely 1w w ituation to the area Som ' of India' neighbors traditionally wary of New Delhi would be concerned that India would foe a new seme of manifest destiny and be more inclined both to meddle in their internal affairs and arbitrarily to dictate settlements of outstanding disputes But as the dramatic impact of the explosion faded and as the fact of a nuclear India came to be taken for granted it is likely to prove of less consequence than many would initially fear In any case none would or could do much about it 35 lost states would feel no new or per 'asive sense of military threat n me could hope to match or counter on their 0 11 India's new capability Political reactions would of course vary from country to country For those who arc client states i e Sikkim and Bhutan ECAH SEN ITIVE 11 SECRET SE SITIVE an Indian nuclear explosion would only reinforce New Delhi's already predominant status Much the same would be true of Bangladesh Burma and Afghanistan whose ties with India have been distant and not greatly troubled are not likely to see much if any new consequences for them epal would probably feel some apprehension The Nepalese who saw open and direct Indian interference in their domestic affairs until the early 1960s and who still must use Indian facilities for nearly all their trade and communications with the outside world would be wary lest New Delhi try to again assume its former role as heir to the British Raj and protector of the little mountain kingdom But Kathmandu has adroitly balanced off Indian pressures by maintaining friendly ties with neighboring China and to a lesser extent with other large outside powers These efforts would probably be increased immediately following an Indian nuclear explosion In the long run New Delhi's position in Kathmandu is not likely to be changed by this event 36 India's relations with Ceylon have traditionally been more distant and less abrasive than with Nepal though not without their problems About 20 percent of the residents of Ceylon are of Indian origin and this minority has been the object of discrimination communal rioting and deportations A 1965 Inda-Ceylon treaty agreeing to repatriation of some Indians and Ceylonese citizenship for the rest was intended to settle the problem But it bas been implemented only slowly and partially In addition Ceylon has suffered from social unrest so severe as to lead to Ceylonese concern that the colossus of the north might inten·ene to suppress subversion In any event many in Colombo would on hearing the news of an Indian test probably fear that New Delhi would be less inhibited in further efforts to resolve problc-ms in Ceylon to its own satisfaction This would probably 12 lead them iike the Nepalese to seek some kind of greater support or assurances from one or more of the great powers But the end result in our view would be little significant change in Ceylonese relations with India In an extreme situation either a non-nuclear or a nuclear India would probably intervene directly if developments in Ceylon involved important Indian interests othenvise the present not unfriendly relationship is likely to continue 37 Most Pakistanis would be psychologically jolted by the news that India had gone nuclear Despite their recent crushing defeat and their obvious military inferiority the sense of hostility toward Indian designs remains strong There would of course be considerable public excitement and alarm in Pakistan in the immediate aftermath of an Indian test But balanced against this would be the fact that the government which has long been well informed of India's nuclear potential and many of its plan would not be greatly surprised or would it likely be panicked into abrupt policr changes 38 Islamabad in it own right would be in no position to do anything concrete to counter the event One of President Bhutto's proposals during the 1970 electoral campaign was the development of nuclear weapons to counter India's larger size population and resources But Pakistan will be technically unable to set off a nuclear explosion for many years it has some research facilities a large safeguarded Canadian reactor a few informed scientists but little more On the whole we doubt that Bhutto or any successor would find it either necessary or desirable to concede much to a nuclear India that he othenvise would not An Indian test at least for some time to come would enhance domestic pressures on the Paldstani Government to stand firm in dealing with India In these circumstances Pakistan's most likely course would SECRET SH SIT1¥e - be to continue to bargain hard over whatever disputes with India were currently outstanding meanwhile using the new Indian threat to argue for as much outside backing particularly from the US and China as it could get 39 Pakistan would try to build up and modernize its conventional armed forces as did India both before and after China became a nuclear power For some years its principal sources have been the US France and China The US would be an especial object of new Pakistani request for defense guarantees military materiel and economic support Iran and Turkey would be very sympathetic to Pakistan But able to provide little themselves they would urge the US to be generous D The Cause of Non-Proliferation - 40 A successful Indian test would of course set back the cause of nuclear non-proliferation India would have demonstrated that it is feasible even for an underdeveloped nonauthoritarian country with limited natural and financial resources to develop an independent nuclear capability It would also come to be recognized as a potential source of the technology and personnel necessary for other countries interested in such a program No other non-nuclear state however would be likely simply because of India's example to embark on a plowshare or weapons program of its own Such decisions are going to be made by each government on the merits as seen by that government Nevertheless it is true that an Ind an program would help erode barriers to further proliferation in the sense that add·t onal countries would f nd it somewhat easier to get around the arguments against going ahead 41 Such potential nuclear countries as South Africa Israel and Brazil would not be significantly affected by an Indfan nuclear test or weapons program Each of these states - a is involved in different situation in another area and each will continue to act according to its national interests The Israelis for example who are furthest along in this respect could use the possibility of Indian-Arab nuclear cooperation as one more argument against signing the 1 PT and for keeping their options open Overall an Indian test would give these other states a reason to explain or excuse similar actions of their own were they to take them it would not cause them to do so in the first place In the unlikely event that the other powers effectively made an example of India one or another might be inhibited from going further with their own programs but probably only temporarily 42 In determining West Germany's policy towards nuclear proliferation ratification of the NPT will depend on German relations with countries in Eastern and Vestern Europe with the US and the USSR and on negotiations on military safeguards being conducted by the European Community Indian nuclear developments would play little role in determining Bonn's course of action 43 Immediate Japanese concern over an Indian test would be stronger than in the case of Vest Germany Japan is already aware of and concerned with India's nuclear potential It has signed but not ratified the NPT As a major industrial power a principal Asian state and a potential nuclear giant Japan periodically hears a debate over whether it should exercise this option and an Indian test would touch off another round of the argument For most Japanese the threshold of nuclear anxiety remains high and indeed public opinion against developing weapons has been rising in recent months The new Tanaka government certainly does not wish to make nuclear weapons The small group that docs would use the argument that India's joining the nuclear club was an additional reason for a much more powerful Japan to ECR ET Sl MSITIVE 13 - SEERET S NSITl¥E do so But the argument would carry little weight with those making the decisions in the absence of radical changes in the international environment Japanese decisions on nuclear policy will be based on such central factors as trends in public opinion Japan's evolving relations with the great powers and 14 its view of its proper role in Asia An Indian test will not materially affect Japan's disposition to avoid a nuclear weapons program It might however tip the balance against a Japanese decision to ratify the NPT-already doubtful-or at least provide further reason for Japan to stall on this question SEERET SE •• SIT1¥E - SECRET SHJSITIVE ANNEX - - COSTS OF INDIA'S NUCLEAR AND MISSILE PROGRAMS 6ECAET SE•JSIT1¥E SECRET SH SITIV COSTS OF INDIA'S NUCLEAR AND MISSILE PROGRAMS 1 India now has a gro s national product G P of about S55 billion an annual federal budget of $8 billion and spends about S1 9 billion on defense Xot included in the defense budget are the appropriations of the Department of Atomic Energy DAE During Hot1971 the DAE spent about i0 million Of this about $312 million has been for nuclear power plants the rest for e 'e1 ·thing from research to uranium mining and the building of heavy water plants The DAE spent $136 million 0 25 percent of G ' P in fiscal year 19711972 1 April through 31 larch it is scheduled to spend $157 million in 1972-1973 2 The expenses of present space related - programs ha 'e been paid for by the DAE Scanty evidence point to current expenditures of from S5- 10 million a year With the development of mor comp x rochts and boostc a atclht launch is knt th •ly schedul d for 19i5 co t hould ri though we cannot gi - cxa t dat 3 Given the lrca ly h U ' in t111 11t in nuclear acti iti s thl' ultltt11111 I l'O t ol m ling nuclear dt• 1t·c ulmw oul l h c r small An inih I undt'n rouml h t 111 I t no more than 10 to O nulhon for r r h dc 'clopml' nt rnd fahm hon of th ti and pn•p uutton of th tt· t 1h' Aftt r the initial h t th onnu tl t•ro 01 tin for a pro r un to produ t 1 l r I n Jl 'r year ould lw ab mt 10 million to nulHon u h prol r un uld h d t U tt r an wc lpon· km h cJ on lndi · Ir nt c lpabihtr for h-lht•n ln nin raft Tht additional e h t of a I m t'r t pon 1 ro rnm b l ro on fac-ilitk now hc ·m dt· ltll -d nd imed at produ 1n iOllll' i5 tht d o t r a 10- t' lr p 'riod-1wrh 1p · for d h c r b m1 tic - t probably would be no more than 20 million to $40 million per year 4 Indian plans itb respect to future delivery systems are conjectural The development of an intermediate-range balli tic mis ile IRB I deli ery system would be an expensive long-term project The pre ent pace program is still in its research and de lopment R D stages India could t ·e ad antage of its experience ith its tellite l unch vehicles to start missile R D u h Rill ould probably take at least 5 md cost omt$500-$750 million Once the mitfal I-now-how and technolo v bad bttn u ired pe rhaps by the early 19SOs • Ind uld tut program of production IRB l This t uld co tly $300 to mill nd mu h of that m f n ciu r lc 1 t 5 1r -but hll um ·thin lndu · paln liti if 1t it t rou h t option n t dt l and 10 O million 10 20 million • R D- 300- i 50 mi I- lion toal pro- r - ftl gram 'OIL - Follow-on mis pre du hon far a pmoJ ol at k- ut S r 3 Produ 75 nu r wvbeads O n 10 for ddi 'ff b - - 1 5- 2 billion tout program C06t 20- W m Uaoo a ynr 17