Ul I J1 ' ' ll'Jl U Authority g 5 lo 3 2003 by ShawDG 3 4 X6 gt APPROVED 11 25 MAR 2003 by ShawDG gt APPROVED 11 25 MAR 2003 by ShawOG gt review_history review_markings Not releasable under either Executive Order or other law or regulation US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005 review_markings review_media_Id review_media_id review_referrals n a review_referrals review_release_date 30 05 2024 lreview_release_date review_release_even I nla review_release_ evenI review_transfer_date review_transfer_date review_withdrawn_fields review_ withdrawn_fields secure OPEN secu re status NATIVE status subject INDIAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AND INTENTIONS subject tags MCAP IN tags to STATE to type TE lype dbfields markings Not releasable under either Executive Order or other law or regulation US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005 markings msgtext GEOREl' PAGE 01 NEW DE 07179 01 OF 02 3015072 46 ACTION INR-10 INFO OCT-01 NEA-14 ISO-00 AEC-11 AECE-00 ACDA-19 CIAE-00 10-14 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 RSC-01 SCl-06 FEA-02 PM-07 SP-03 SS-20 EA- 11 EUR-25 DODE-00 PRS-01 DRC-01 156 W ••• -·•·····- ····--087059 PR 3014582 MAY 74 FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1761 INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD CINCPAC S e C R e T SECTION 1 OF 2 NEW DELHI 7179 CINCPAC FOR POLAD E O 11652· GOS TAGS MCAP IN SUBJECT INDIAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AND INTENTIONS NW# 28568 Docid 31829653 REF STATE 112408 1 WE THINK SNIE-31-72 AUGUST 3 1972 ON THIS SAME SUBJECT LOOKS VERY GOOD IN RETROSPECT IN EVALUATING INDIAN INTENTIONS 1 1 E SHARE THAT ESTIMATE'SJUDGMENTTHATTHE INDIANS WILL NOT GO FOR A CRASH PROGRAM TO DEVELOP A DELIVERY SYSTEM THEY WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO CARRY ON ROCKET AND REENTRY R amp D AND WILL HOPE IN FACT TO HAVE SOME LIMITED DELIVERY CAPABILITY BY THE END OF THE DECADE AT THE SAME TIME THE INDIANS WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO WORK ON REDUCING THE SIZE AND IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF THEIR NUCLEAR DEVICES AND WILL STOCKPILE A LIMITED NUMBER OF THESE SO THEY CAN BE USED FOR EITHER PEACEFUL OR MILITARY PURPOSES 2 DOMESTIC ECONOMIC RESTRAINTS ON CONTINUING A LIMITED TESTING PROGRAM WITH FISSION DEVICES ARE MINIMAL GIVEN THE COST ESTIMATES IN THE EARLIER SNIE VVE HAVE NO REASON TO CHALLENGE THESE AND THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THE COST s5CRE 'f SEGREiT PAGE 02 NEW DE 07179 01 OF 02 3015072 MAY HAVE BEEN CLOSER TO THE LOI VE $10 MILLION RANGE THAN THE UPPER $20 MILLION COST FOR A CRASH MISSILE PROGRAM WOULD BE EXORBITANT AND PROBABLY POLITICALLY NOT FEASIBLE FOR THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT AT THIS TIME NO URGENT DECISIONS ON THIS HOWEVER ARE LIKELY TO BE PLACED BEFORE MRS GANDHI IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF YEARS OVER A PERIOD A A DECADE AN R amp R PROGRAM LEADING TOWARD A LIMITED BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITY WOULD BE POSSIBLE AND IS PROBABLY IN VIEW IT WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE DESCRIBED IN TERMS OF PEACEFUL SPACE EXPLORATION THE INDIAN ARGUMENTS FOR TESTING A FISSION DEVICE TECHNOLOGICAL ECONOMIC NATIONAL PRIDE APPLY EQUALLY TO DEVELOP1NG FUSION TECHNOLOGY AS VI ELL WE ASSUME THE INDIANS ARE INTERESTED VVE HAVE NO BASIS FOR MAKING A JUDGMENT HERE AS TO WHETHER THE COSTS ARE WITHIN THEIR KEN AND WHETHER THEY ARE WORKING IN THIS DIRECTION 3 GIVEN THE REPEATED PUBLIC AND UNQUIVOCAL DECLARATIONS BY INDIAN OFFICIALS FROM THE PRIME MINISTER DOWN THAT INDIA WILL NOT DEVELOP NUCLEAR VVEAPONS VE WOULD EXPECT THAT THE INDIANS WILL CONTINUE PUBLICLY TO INSIST THAT ALL RESEARCH-BOTH BALLISTIC AND NUCLEAR--IS PEACEFUL THE INDIAN MILITARY ALMOST CERTAINLY WANTS THE OPTION OF USING NUCLEAR DEVICES FOR MILITARY PURPOSES TO BE LEFT OPEN WE BELIEVE THAT THE MILITARY HAS ARGUED STRONGLY THAT THE DEVICES MUST BE DESIGNED FOR MULTIPLE USE AND ON BALANCE THAT MRS GANDHI WILL AGREE OR HAS ALREADY AGREED TO THIS 4 THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES OF JUSTIFYING A SHIFT IN POLICY TO ALLOW FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD NOT BE INSURMOUNTABLE FOR MRS GANDHI NOR ANY OTHER INDIAN POLITICAL LEADER SEVERAL INDIANS HAVE CITED AN ALLEGED REMARK BY MAO TO A FOREIGN NW# 28568 Docid 31829653 IAuilio s - - - - - I VISITOR THAT ONCE THE CHINESE HAD HALF-A-DOZEN ATOMIC BOMBS THEY FELT THEIR SECURITY VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS WAS SECURE SOME INDIANS ARE FEARFUL THAT AT SOME POINT IN THE NEXT FIVE TO TEN YEARS CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION WILL MEND THEIR FENCES AT LEAST PARTIALLY AT THAT POINT THEY ARGUE SOVIET ASSURANCES TO INDIA WILL LOSE MUCH OF THEIR CURRENT FORCE ANTICIPATING THAT TIME INDIA MUST PREPARE 1TS 0 1 N STRATEGIC DEFENSE EVEN IF IT IS ONLY A LIMITED ONE WHILE THIS VIEW IS MORE PREVALENT AMONG RIGHT- MNG INDIANS JANA SANGH THAN THE GENERAL INTELLECTUAL PUBLIC VVHICH THINKS OF SUCH MATTERS WE BELIEVE SEC f GEGAET PAGE 03 NEW DE 07179 01 OF 02 3015072 IT ALSO HAS CREDIBILITY AMONG THE INDIAN MILITARY PARTICULARLY THE AIR FORCE AND AN INFLUENTIAL SCATTERING OF CIV LIANS AS WELL 5 WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED TO NO INDIANS HOWEVER IM-iO HAVE MENTIONED AN ICBM CAPABILITY EVEN AT THE FRINGE OF INDIAN INTERESTS AN ICBM CAPABILITY WOULD PROVIDE AN INDIAN CAPABILITY WITHIN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA AND UP TO CHINESE POPULATION AND INDUSTRIAL CENTERS WH CH WE BELIEVE WOULD MEET ANY OF INDIA'S FORESEEABLE STRATEGIC NEEDS WE DO NOT BELIEVE INDIANS CONSIDER A NUCLEAR MI SSILE CAPABILITY AS NECESSARY IN TERMS OF ANY CONCEIVABLE THREAT FROM PAKISTAN NOR FOR THAT MATTER DO WE BELIEVE THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE USED IN ALMOST ANY CONTINGENCY AGAINST VVHAT IS IN EFFECT A SISTER POPULATION 6 WE BELIEVE THE INDIANS EXPECTED CRITICISM BUT NO EFFECTIVE RETALIATION BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS ASA RESULT OF THE MAY 18 TEST THEY HAVE BEEN SHAKEN SOMEWHAT BY THE REACTIONS THUS FAR BUT FOREIGN PRESSURE CAN STRENGTHEN THE GOVERNMENT POLITICALLY EVEN WHILE IT POSES POTENTIAL ECONOMIC RISKS MOREOVER AT THIS POINT THE INDIANS DO NOT BELIEVE INTERNATIONAL OPPOSITION WILL BE SO GENERAL AS GRAVELY TO IMPAIR FOREIGN AID TO INDIA NON-ALIGNED REACTION HAS BEEN MIXED AND INDIA IS WORKING HARD TO RALLY SUPPORT FOR ITSELF AMONG THIS GROUP THE ARGUMENT THAT THE quot GREAT POWERS quot OR THE quot HAVES quot ARE ATTEMPTING TO PUNISH INDIA AS WELL AS THE OFFER OF GREATER INDIAN COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT TO NON-ALIGNED STATES WOULD THE INDIANS ASSUME WEIGH INFLUENTIALLY IN PR DIN NRA COUNTERFIRE FRON THIS GROUP TO LESTERN AND JAPANESE PRESSURES ON BALANCE WE BELIEVE SNIE-31-72'S JUDGMENT THAT FOREIGN REACTION WILL NOT BE DECISIVE IN AFFECTING INDIAN DECISIONS ON ITS NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT CONTINUES TO BE VALID SECRET NW# 28568 Docid 31829653 I UL t'- 1ra vu•• • a J- Authority n5 5 o 3 I NNN SEGRET PAGE 01 NEW OE 07179 02 OF 02 3015142 46 ACTION INR-10 INFO OCT-01 NEA-14 IS0-00 AEC-11 AECE-00 FEAE-00 ACDA- 19 CIAE-00 10-14 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 RSC-01 SCl·06 PM-07 SP-03 SS-20 PRS-01 DODE-00 EA-11 EUR-25 DRC-01 1154 W ·---------------- 087086 PR 3014582 MAY 74 FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI TO SECSTATE WASHOC PRIORITY 1762 INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD CINCPAC S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 NEW DELHI 7179 CINCPAC FOR POLAD 7 NEVERTHELESS FOR REASONS OF PRESTIGE TO UNDERLINE INOIA'S DIFFERENCE FROM OTHER NUCLEAR STATES AND TO DEFLECT EXTERNAL PRESSURE MRS GANDHI MIGHT OFFER TO OPEN UP INDIA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM TO OUTSIDE INSPECTION IN SUCH A WAY AS TO LIMIT OR EVEN PRECLUDE THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION WE THINK THIS IS UNLIKELY BUT POSSIBLE SOME POSSIBLE HINTS THAT AT LEAST THOUGHT IS BEING GIVEN TO THE OPTION THE INDIAN PRESS MAY 30 CARRIED REPORTS OBVIOUSLY GOVERNMENT-INSPIRED THAT THE INDIAN AEC DOES NOT PRODUCE ENOUGH PLUTONIUM TO CARRY OUT MANY TESTS WITHOUT SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZING THE INDIAN FAST BREEDER REACTOR PROGRAM A FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL'S REMARK THAT INDIA MIGHT BE WILLING TO PROVIDE FIRM AND CONVINCING ASSURANCES TO PAKISTAN THAT INDIA WAS NOT DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MRS GANDHI'S INSISTENCE TO A NEWSVVEEK CORRESPONDENT THAT NOIA 1NTENDS TO BE A DIFFERENT KIND OF NUCLEAR STATE THAN THE OTHERS ANO TO CLEARLY DIFFERENTIATE ITSELF FROM THE WEAPONS STATES VVE 00 NOT WISH TO OVERDRAW ANY OF THESE MRS GANDHI IS NOT A LADY IM-iO LIKES TO FORECLOSE HER OPTIONS PRIVATELY EVEN THOUGH SHE MAY APPEAR TO DO SO IN PUBLIC 8 THE INDIANS ARE CAPABLE OF HELPING THIRD COUNTRiES TO DEVELOP AND TEST WEAPONS AND VVE ARE UNABLE TO OFFER ANY CONVINCING GECRET -8EC ET PAGE 02 NEW DE 07179 02 OF 02 3015142 ARGUMENTS THAT THEY WILL NOT DO SO IF OFFERED THE RIGHT INCENTIVES OR SUBJECTED TO THE WRONG PRESSURES THE NDlANS HAVE NWtt 28568 1 Docid 31829653 I a l _ 11 1 • u v I Authority 23'5 lo 3 I BEEN TRYING TO BUILD AN EXPORT MARKET FOR SOME OF THEIR NUCLEARRELATED PRODUCTS IN THE LAST YEAR OR TWO AND WE BELIEVE THEY WILL TRY TO EXPAND THEIR SALES--USING THEIR TEST AS EVIDENCE OF THEIR PROWESS--IN THE FUTURE THERE WILL BE MORE THAN ONE NON-ALIGNED STATE AND SOME VERY WEALTHY ONES M- ICH MAY WELCOME THE POSSIBILITY OF DEALING WITH A POOR COUNTRY ON THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY OR NUCLEAR WEAPONS INDIA THUS BECOMES A NEW OPTION FOR NON--ALIGNED STATES IN ADDITION TO THAT ALREADY OFFERED BY FRANCE IN CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY AND COSTS OF quot GOING NUCLEAR quot IN ORDER TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE BENEFITS OF THIS FOR THEIR INFLUENCE AND POVVER THE INDIANS HAVE TO BE WILLING TO quot DEAL quot WE ASSUME THIS POTENTIAL BENEFIT HAS BEEN POINTED OUT TO MRS GANDHI OR WILL BE AND THAT THIS REPRESENTS ANOTHER DISINCENTIVE FOR CHECK AGAINST INDIAN LIMITATION OF ITS NUCLEAR OPTIONS MOYNIHAN SECRET NNN msgtext sasdoc NWt 28568 Docid 31829653