Castro Addresses Conference CM0304154092 Havana Cubavision Television in Spanish at 2233 GMT 28 Feb 92 Fourth of four pa11s of the special program Reflections on a Crisis a tripartite conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis held in Havana from 9 to 12 Janu ryrecorded Text Well another surprise I thought that this morning we were going to discuss a point brought up by the American delegation and that my speech might be in the afternoon I think I can make an effort in any case If this is what you prefer in that case I will speak Maybe I will need a little help some paper Check and see if the five points are anywhere arounrt there speaking to unidentified aide I think I have the essential ideas to speak right now If I do not speak long do not think that it is because I do not want to provide information but really because I do not want to make a traditional two-and-a-half or three-hour speech I want to summarizl ideas as much as possible I want to concentrate on those things that I believe are essential I must keep in mind everything that has been discussed in the two previous days I do not want to repeat any of those issues I believe that many things have been clarified here I believe that the meeting has been truly fruitful at least for me since I did not have an opportunity to participate in the previous meetings I do not know everything that has been discussed I only know it in very general terms That is why I think that I should limit myself to those things that by their character have not been discussed in other meetings I should begin by saying that in analyzing a period such as this one it is necessary to analyze or report the involvement in it of different personalities Two of them were very important personalities of our time They were Khrushchev and Kennedy They were two people for whom I have great respect I respect Khrushchev for his demonstrations of friendship toward Cuba in extremely difficult times I always thought that he was pleasant I had the opportunity to get to know him personally I remember at the United Nations when as a result of a meeting of heads of state at the United Nations Khrushchev came to visit me at the Teresa Hotel where I was practically in confinement in those days because of the atmosphere of intense hostility that I found there and because I had been virtually thrown out of my other hotel I had two alternatives to either set up a tent in the UN front yard or to go to the Teresa Hotel I was warmly welcomed at the Teresa Hotel I was visited there by many heads of states among them Khrushchev which was a great honor Khrushchev was extraordinarily good to us Always when we requested something from him he made every possible effort at his disposal to approve our requests He gave me the impression of being basically a peasant that was the impression he gave A clever peasant and not only a clever peasant he was an intelligent very intelligent man He was a daring and courageous man Those were the personal impressions I got from him I atso have an opinion of the personal qu'llities of Kennedy apart from the conflicts that emerged between his administration and ours He was a talented man and also courageous A man with the ability to lead his country He made mistakes but also did things right He was the central character in charge of directing the United States during the October Crisis He had new ideas-some of them were brilliant or very intelligentsuch as the idea of the Alliance for Progress It is my opinion that with the authority he attained precisely after the October Crisis-which was when he consolidated his leadership in the United States-he could have been one of the presidents or maybe the president in the best position to rectify certain aspects of the U S policy toward Cuba I had proof of this precisely on the day of his death I was talking that morning with a French reporter Jean Daniel who had interviewed him at length and whom he asked to come to Cuba to talk with me He conveyed a message to me and as we were talking the news of the attack in Dallas was heard on the radio You can see how many coincidences have occured in all of this From what that reporter told me I could see a man who was pondering the possibility of holding talks finding some solutions to the problems with Cuba since he began by saying actually talking or asking he conveyed to me to what degree we had been in danger of a nuclear war Was I aware of this He truly wanted regarding all these issues an exchange of opinions that really became unnecessary We were in the middle of our conversation when the news of his death arrived I think Kennedy was a capable man because of his authority because of his ability to correct certain aspects of U S policy toward Cuba I have explained this and I say it with lots of sincerity to justify why I feel real respect and admiration for these historic figures and because I do not have the least intention of saying things to hurt anyone or to defame anyone's memory In relation to the most immediate antecedents of the problem that would emerge afterwards we have the issue of the Bay of Pigs However I do not blame Kennedy for the Bay of Pigs Kennedy received a legacy from the previous administration Decisions had already been made everything was already prepared Kennedy was still new in office he had just been sworn in He knew that it was a very serious problem he had made certain pledges regarding Cuba in some speeches during the electoral campaign The impression I have is that he did not like that operation It is true that he had constitutional authority to have stopped it but constitutional authority alone is not enough Sometimes you need moral authority and a considerable amount of political authority to solve certain problems which U S administrations usually do not have during the first few weeks of government and sometimes do not have even during the entire first presidential term You are aware that many times it is said that a president cannot solve this or that problem in his first term because the next elections are still pending but that he could solve it during a second term Therefore I do not blame him for the Bay of Pigs invasion Somehow we have to acknowledge that he remained very composed regarding these events As has been stated here the whole thing became a disaster a political disaster that because of its scope cannot be compared to a military disaster with other military disasters From the military point of view and the scale of the battles it also became a disaster It was a difficult trial for Kennedy and I would say that he showed courage at the time I have not forgetten what he said when he assumed total responsibility for it Victory has many fathers but defeat is an orphan He could have made the decision to order U S troops and squadrons to participate The Bay of Pigs' battles were held within view of the U S aircraft carriers and warships that were three miles from our coasts I saw this personally when we entered Giron as it was getting dark that 19 April 1961 The squadron was out there with all its lights off in full combat gear They witnessed everything and were ready to enter into action The invasion plans even presupposed the intervention of military forces later on The goal was to establish a government recognize it and support it with troops In other words the invasion plans included the premise of using military force against our country the intervention and invasion of our country because naturally those troops that disembarked and those forces did not have the support of our people and could not do anything but maybe sustain their hold on a piece of territory arid create in Cuba something like Taiwan or the like nothing else But we know that the plan presupposed a recognition after the recognition The intervention always occurred within this framework In other words if Kennedy had not been a composed and courageous man at the time if he had not realized how mistaken the plan was from every point of view military and political sentence as heard Kennedy undoubtedly was very concerned with Latin American public opinion He did not want to begin his administration with an event of that nature and decided not to give the order for U S forces to intervene That would have been a very bloody war and I do not know if the number of Cuban casualties would have been es high maybe as if an intervention had occurred during the months of the 1962 October Crisis Th re are no doubts that that war would have had a different character and unpredictable consequences Despite that casualty estimates were prepared At the time April 1961 we had hundred of thousands of armed men and women in our country Weapons were distributed throughout the country in the mountains the plains in the cities everywhere An enormous resistance would have been put up by the people who were armed and had just come out of a war All the guerrilla traditions were still fresh Our people would have had to fight a well-equipped army that numbered up to 80 000 men-in-arms yet by the end of the war we barely had 3 000 battle weapons At that time we could estimate that we had approximately 300 000 men and women armed or capable of taking up arms or in different ways organized and prepared We also already had some infantry cannons some tanks on which the soldiers received quick accelerated training I would ask the first advisers-at that time we already had some specialists teaching us how to use the weapons advisers from Czechoslovakia and the USSR there was a large number of cannons and antiaircraft artillery guns-and we asked them if they could train all the necessary personnel The training program would have taken years yet we did it in weeks because what our comrades would learn in the morning they would go and teach in the evening in the other camps that we organized There was a great exhilaration among the people Maybe we might still be fighting if there had been an intervention in 1961 This may have meant a cost of hundreds of thousands of lives for our country A prolonged struggle would have also resulted in considerable losses for the invaders of our territory This is why I said that on thr contrary we should credit Kennedy with the common sense and wisdom to have not ordered the intervention of the U S troops at the time I know of presidents who would not even think for three minutes about ordering the intervention of U S troops I tell you this so you can understand the reason for our opinion of the conduct of President Kennedy at the time In Giron we find the antecedents of the October Crisis because there is no doubt that for Kennedy it meant a severe political blow He was embittered by this event He was very upset And afterwards the issue of Cuba had a special meaning for him This was reflected in the relations between the two countries I am not going to talk about the clandestine operations acts of sabotage that were continuous during that period I am not going to make reference to the problems ielated to assassination plots Unfortunately all these things happened in one way or another durin that period but are not the subject of our analysis But Kennedy was left very bitter about Cuba determined to end in one way or another the revolutionary process in Cuba He also used political instruments and strategies I cite as I used to the example of the Alliance for Progress designed to change objective conditions because he knew that the objective conditions in Latin American were as they still are nowadays favorable for social explosions He wanted to deal with it from that angle We should remember that the Bay of Pigs crisis was followed by a meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev According to the news we received Khrushchev heard with concern the Kennedy statements regarding C•1ba We still need to find out through some of the figures that wer there if that was when Hungary was discussed because Kennedy made reference to Hungary-that they had solved the problem in Hungary and that the U S still had not been able to solve the problem of Cuba I do not have the menas to clarify this now if this was mentioned in the Vienna talks Darusenkov thinks that yes it was in Vienna There was also a later version saying that in a coi 1versation of Khrushchev's son-in-law whom I believe was the director of PRAVDA Aksuvey forgive me if I do not pronounce the last name correctly director of IZVESTIYA right He was traveling and made some remarks in the United States I have heard comrades talk about the conversation between Aksuvey and Kennedy and the subject of Hungary was mentioned-the same problem they did not know how to solve-and they took it as a warning as a firm statement that they were planing to solve by one means or another the problem of Cuba I remember that Aksuvey visited us I do not remember the exact date either if it was after the Washington trip Maybe Oleg Darusenkov remembers this But we have to clarify in which of the two conversations or if on both occasions the issue of Hungary was mentioned I do know and I am aware of the great concern that Khrushchev felt after thos-e conversations It was a frequent subject long before any idea about installing missiles existed Of course we were asking for more weapons We were willing to defend ourselves We asked for more weapon supplies We signed certain accords on weapon supplies for our Armed Forces That was the situation up to May 1962 Here we have already talked about some of the antecedents Aleksandr for many years an ambassador in our country and ambassador during the crisis has talked about this and other members of the Soviet delegation have provided details here of the conversations that took place regarding the missiles when we did not have any news about it We received news of an upcoming visit by Rachido who was the leader of the party in Uzbekistan and who had already visited us and spent several months in Cuba providing cooperation in matters of agriculture irrigation etc He was bringing along a marshal Belysufov or Belysofov corrected by unidentified speakers Bydiusuv I am appalling in English but I think that in terms of pronunciation I am even worse in Russian Bydiusov Bydiusov His war name was Petrov Well Petrov Bydiusov-undoubtedly a very smart and energetic man-I believe that he later died in an airplane crash in Yugoslavia He accompanied Rachido but he was the one basically entrusted with the issue of the missiles Naturally he did not begin talking about missiles right at the beginning We met with him right away He did not begin by talking about missiles He began by talking about the international situation the situation of Cuba the risks facing Cuba anti at one point he asked me what would be required to prevent a U S invasion That was the question he asked me I immediately answered him I told him Well if the United States knows what an invasion of Cuba would mean with the Soviet Union that would be in my opinion the best way to prevent an invasion of Cuba That was my answer To corroborate this with documentation you can if you want see the version that I wrote six years later and what I said in a report to the Central Committee in 1968 A Soviet military delegation came to visit around that time headed by a marshal He asked us how we believed the problem of an invasion could best be prevented We told him that by adopting measures that unquestionably expressed to imperialism-forgive me for using that word but that is how it was said literally muffied laughter -that any aggression against Cuba would mean not only war with Cuba Since the man already had his ideas ready he said But specifically how We have to perform concrete acts to indicate this He already had the mission to propose the installation of strategic missiles and perhaps he was even afraid that we might refuse We might have said Well the missiles here could mean or could be used as a rear on for criticism and campaigns against Cuba and the revolution in the rest of Latin America But we did not have any doubts First of all when the issue of the missiles was first brought up we thou§ht that it was something beneficial to the consolidation of the defensive power of the entire socialist bloc that it would contribute to this We did not want to concentrate on our problems Subsequently it represented our defense Subsequently But really the comrades who participated were the comrades of the directorate who met to analyze this problem and make a decision And how was it presented That in our opinion it would strengthen the socialist bloc the socialist bloc If we held the belief that the socialist bloc should be willing to go to war for the sake of any other socialist country we did not hav any right to consider something that could represent a danger to us The questions of propaganda stayed within us but we also saw the real danger of any crisis that could emerge but without any hesitation and honestly thinking in a truly internationalist manner All the comrades decided to give an immeidate response Keeping in mind the affirmative answer-with an enormous trust in a country that we believed was experienced in many things even in war and in international affairs-we told we stated to them the usefulness of signing a military accord Then they sent an accord bill I already talked about that Here I have what I f id textually in a private conversation in I 968 regardh g the antecedents of the October Crisis In all truth and summarizing we from the beginning saw it as a strategic operation I am going to tell the truth about how wie thought We did not like the missiles If it was a matter of our defense alone we would not have accepted the missiles here But do not think that it was because of the dangers that could come from having the missiles here but rather because of the way in which this could damage the image of the revolution We were very committed to the image of the revolution in the rest of Latin America The fact that the presence of the missiles would turn us into a Soviet military base would have a high political cost for our country's image which we valued so highly So if it had been for our defense-and I say this here with all honesty Aleksandr knows this-we would not have acc pted the missiles But we really saw in the issue of the missile installation something that would strengthen the socialist bloc something that would help in some way to improve the so-called correlation of forces That was how we perceived it immediately immediately instantaneously We did not argue about this It would not have made sense because if we had argued about what they were for in fact the conclusion we would draw would be that they should not be brought In fact we would have refused to accept the missiles because of course their presence was not presented in those terms That was what we perceived immediately Then we asked a few questions about what kind of missiles and how many We did not have any practical knowledge about these things and we were informed that they would deploy 42 missiles From what has been shown here it seems there were 36 operational missiles and six for testing But they told us there would be 42 missiles We asked for time because we had to meet with the leadership and to inform them about all this before coming to a decision but we said we would do this quickly In fact when this meeting was over we organized a meeting of the leadership and we analyzed the matter in the terms that I have explained We said that the presence of the missiles had this and that significance We also were not unaware-and for me it was obviousthat the presence of the missiles was going to give rise to great political tension That was obvious But we saw this matter from the angle of our moral political and internationalist duties That was how we understood it There was talk about the missiles n a different sense After the Bay of Pigs invasion there had already been talk about missiles You would have to review all of Nikita's statements He insinuated more than once that an invasion of Cuba could be responded to with the use of missiles He insinuated this more than once publicly to such an extent that everyone here was talking about the Soviet missiles before the crisis after the Bay of Pigs as if they were their property Many comrades talked about the missiles in their speeches However I refrained from saying a single word about missiles because it did not seem right to me that our people our populace should place their hopes for defense in support from abroad Our populace should be totally prepared-as it is today and today more than ever-to develop their confidence in themselves and their ability to struggle and rt sist without any foreign support That is why I did not talk about the Soviet missiles as a possible aid in any of my sp1 eches and there are quite a few in that period Nikita ncouraged this matter a lot with his public statements As was also acknowledged here yesterday even in the United States even Kennedy said in his campaign that he thought that there was an imbalance in strategic mirjsiles Throughout the world people thought there was an imbalance in strategic missiles It was known that the Americans had a very powerful air force but that the Soviet Union had made great progress in the area of rocketry During those days there were spectacular technical achievements like the space flights The first space flight was made by a Soviet pilot in a space capsule All of that had an enormous effect on world opinion and from what I can see it also had an enonnous effect in the United States It is not at all strange that we would have more or less similar ideas about the combat capacity of each of the great powers in this area of nuclear missiles reco ded So this meeting is being recorded and whenever we have visits by heads of state We asked Gorbachev the last visit we had from him and we agreed that everything we talked about should be recorded We ask permission of the person with whom we are talking as a rule right Of course there ire those who are more in the habit of recording and those who are less in the habit But our meetings are being recorded and you already changes thought The meetings with U Thant were recorded by mutual agreement and all that If one thinks about history one sees how many details and things could have been recorded and kept But veryone thought this and assuming that the USSR had many more missiles than they had we perceived that the presence of these missiles here in Cuba meant a modification changes thought not a change we cannot talk about a change in the correlation of forces but it was a considerable improvement in the correlation of forces in favor of the socialist countries that we saw as our allies friends and brothers-sharing a common ideology But we answered them with these words that if it was to strengthen the socialist bloc yes if it was to strengthen the socialist bloc and also-and I put this in second place-if it would contribute to Cuba's defense we were willing to receive all the missiles that might be needed To be more faithful we said that we were willing to receive up to I 000 missiles if they wanted to send them Those were our words verbatim I used the words 1 000 I said This is our resolution It has been made words indistinct as they say a Roman general said in ancient times-I think it was Julius Caesar If the decision has already been made it has already been made But it was made in that spirit and with that intention This may also explain why we felt so indignant about the later development of events about what happened Because we practically took an attitude of rebellion and intransigence about the crisis Of course we never saw the missiles as something that could one day be used against the United States in an attack against the United States an unjustified attack or a first strike I remember that Nikita was always repeating that they would never make a first strike a nuclear strike This issue was an obsession of his He was constantly talking about peace He was constantly talking about negotiations with the United States of ending the Cold War the arms race etc Then there was the whole process that has been talked about that has been so clearly explained by the Soyiet military officer-how they organized it In a few months they began a great movement of weapons and troops From a logistics point of view it was a perfect operation We can see this not only from theoretical considerations but because we have also found ourselves forced to send troops abroad as we did in Angola for example So to judge the mood of that time one should understand what was thought about this and about the strength of each of the great powers But we saw that this improved the situation of the socialist bloc and we really saw the issue of Cuba's defense as a secondary matter for the reasons I have explained So that was how we saw it and we have continued to have this perception throughout all these years That is why I read this speech 24 years ago If one sees that the correlation rephrases Knowing what one knows now one can see the practical military importance these rockets had because they really turned medium-range missiles into strategic missiles When we returned to the meeting with the marshall and Rachidov we gave them our answer It was in these words changes thought Unfortunately this was not recorded lt should have been recorded but recordings were very underdeveloped at that time Those little recorders that many people have now that they can put in their pocket did not exist Today everything is I remember the first time we sent 36 000 men in a few weeks with a large part of their weaponry But I also remember what we did after Cuito Cuanavale when we increased our forces to 53 000 men We have some experience in transporting troops in our ships There was not a single Soviet ship in this operation We transported our troops and weapons We were all alone in Cuito Cuanavale That was also true of the operation in Angola in 197 5 That was a decision of ours 'fhe only thing that came from the Soviet Union was worries They conveyed them to us in 1975 but it was an absolutely free and sovereign decision by our country A crisis situation arose in Cuito CuanavaJe that forced us to send large numbers of troops and we did so with decisiveness because one must do things decisively Otherwise one will be defeated If 20 000 are needed and you send 10 000 the most likely thing is that you will be defeated We were facing the South Africans They are very powerful They manufacture weapons They have good training good equipment and very good aircraft 'We prepared for battle with the South Africans To give you an idea when our troops advanced they had 1 000 antiaircraft weapons so that they could have superiority in antiaircraft weapons So we also have some experience in troop movements and we know what it means to carry out an operation Of course there were no missiles in this case but we did have to send all kinds of heavy weapons This operation with the missiles was carried out very efficiently by the Soviet Armed Forces and in a very shon time They fulfilled completely the mission that had been assigned to them Well the motivations still need to be clarified Here opinions have been given on this point by almost all the Soviets They really have summarized what was talked about in the Soviet Union and what was said in the Soviet Union and the reasoning Nikita always used I have already said that Nikita was very shrewd about how he presented the problem to the other CPSU leaders and how he really thought or if there was another CPSU leader who knew Nikita's most personal intentions In the light of the facts we know today about the true corr lation of forces we can clearly see that it was a necessity I am not criticizing Khrushchev Really I am not criticizing him for the fact that he wanted to improve the correlation of forces It seems absolutely legitimate to me absolutely legal-if we are going to talk in terms of international law-absolutely moral to want to improve the correlation of forces between the socialist bloc and the United States If what they really had was 50 or 60 missiles there is no doubt that the presen e of tliose 42 missiles significantly improved the situation It almost doubled the effective assets We have not talked about the submarines here You probably also know how many missiles the Soviets had on the submarines and their ability to move with their submarines and also carry out strikes because I know they had submarines with nuclear missiles This information has not come out here how many they had at that time But there is no doubt that the missiles on land were doubled lfwe h Jd known that the correlation of forces which we did not know-I repeat-perhaps we would have suggested rephrases If they had talked to us in those terms of improving the correlation of forces perhaps we would have advised prudence Because I think of course that if you have SO missiles you have to be more prudent than if you ho ve 300 That is clear If we had had that information and if they had talked to us in strategic terms we would surely have advised prudence because I say and I repeat that we were not concerned about defending the country If that were not true what kind of situation would we be in today We do not receive missiles or anything and here you can see that we are all unworried The United States is much more powerful I do not know what kinds of conventional weapons and smart weapons and all those things that it has and you can see that we are calm here We have confidence in ourselves We have confidence in our ability to fight and we are proud of this confidence and ability to fight I say that it is a mystery We do not know Nikita's most personal thoughts But that was how we understood it and how the other members of the Soviet leadership understood it As I have said he was very shrewd He could present something in one set of terms and think in another set But I could not find any other explanation and even today I cannot find any other explanation Of course it is true that Nikita loved Cuba and admired Cuba a lot He felt special affection for Cuba We would say that he was fond of Cuba in his feelings his emotions and all Because Nikita was also a man of political thinking He had a political theory and doctrine and he was consistent with that doctrine He thought in those terms between capitalism and socialism He had very solid convictions He even thought in my opinion erroneously that one day socialism would surpass capitalism by peaceful means I say that this is a possibly mistaken concept because I do not think that the aim of a socialist society should be consumption I do not think Third World countries need to imitate capitalism in consumption I always wonder what would happen in the world if every Chinese family had a car and every Indian family also had a car and every family in Bangladesh Pakistan and all those other places had a car If tl ey reached such a level of develop- ment how much longer would the oil and fuel last How much longer would the atmosphere tolerate this poisoning and all these phenomena we know about That is why I say that there is a mistake in this concept of socialism Socialism should solve people's basic problems-education health culture housing food-all the essential material needs and not be the idea that everyone should have a car or consumer objects They should have what they can have what the environment can tolerate We have a different concept of socialism but he was a man of profound political convictions do not think that Nikita wanted war The farthest thing from his mind was war especially nuclear war He was very aware of what a nuclear war would mean for the Soviet Union He did have an obsession about reaching some kind of parity I think that the words the reasoning yesterday by Mr McNamara was exce11ent when he said that parity existed at all times after the first moment when there was the capacity to make a response that would cause terrible damage But even if al the nuclear weapons were launched against one country the world would be annihilated just the same Because the contamination this would cause-and the problems of all kinds that this would cause-would be such that even if only 10 000 of the 50 000 warheads are used and are used in only one place the world will be finished This reasoning about when parity really exists seems wise to me because pari•y exists as soon as there is the capacity to respond by doing enough damage so that it would be uuacceptable to someone who is thinking about launching a nuclear attack I tried to find out how this was discussed in the leadership of the CPSU and the Soviet Government when I traveled to the USSR in 1963 But in fact I was unable to clarify this I asked a lot of questions of as many Politburo members as I met with Kosygin Gromyko-I do not remember if Gromyko was a Politburo member I asked all of them one by one Tell me how was that decision made What were the arguments that were used I really was not able to e et a single word out of them They ofttn did not answer my questions Of course you cannot be impertinent and say Listen answer me For all my questions I was not able to get a clear answer about the possibility that the strategic argument had been used among the Soviet leadership That was our perception and our conception of the problem I should say this really The agreements were put into effect immediately After the verbal agreement it was necessary to formalize it but it was already in effect That was how a draft was drawn up in the USSR Aleksandr has spoken about this This draft was sent to Cuba Politically the draft was erratic in the sense that there was no clear foundation established about the matter It did not talk about strategic weapons of course I modified it using some of points I took some away some of the considerations and I established the political foundation for the agreement which in my opinion was unobjectionable The articles of the agreement were not mentioned It said The Soviet Union will send to the Republic of Cuba armed forces to reinforce its defenses in the face of a danger of foreign aggression and thus contribute to maintaining world peace The type of Soviet troops and the areas where they will be stationed on the territory of the Republic of Cuba will be set by the representatives named in accordance with Article 11 of this agreement in the Soviet delegation-I can no longer say Soviet from the CIS-but I mean those who participated in the delegation from the armed forces and the country that participated in this crisis have spoken in my opinion with absolute honesty about the reasoning and concepts that prevailed there in the Soviet Union All this brought or gave rise to a great effort in the period when the missiles were installed because there were people living in the places that had been chosen There were farmers buildings and things We had to clean them out rid the places of obstacles We appointed a comrade a party and government official to attend exclusively to everything connected with the negotiations to free the land to install the missiles and it was quite a bit of land I do not have the figures fresh in my mind but hundreds of families had to move We had to arrange this with them find land for them give them benefits All of this was negotiated and all as much in secret as possible without being able to explain what it was for Text There were all kinds of leaks Well we had to adopt a measure All those who knew something knew that they had the duty to consider themselvt s quarantined So sometimes groups of officials came and said Listen I have found something out I have come to stay here now Because in such-and-such a place and while talking with someone a Soviet official often changes thought because you can imagine there were a lot of troops 42 000 men and they establish relations and some talk to some people others talk to other people or another person sees something So we adopted the method that is used in cases of serious epidemics which is to quarantine the infected people Everyone who knew something was infected and was quarantined Article 11 talks about the representatives There is no mention of the kind of strategic weapons and this agreement could have been mentioned pauses could have been published and no one could have challenged the legality and morality of this agreement Of course it was not essential to bring the missiles here to defend Cuba That argument was not included because we could have made a military pact with the USSR saying that an attack on Cuba would be equivalent to an attack on the USSR The United States has a lot of these pacts throughout the world and they are respected because the 'Nord of nations is respected and because the risks involved in violating the treaties or disregarding the treaties are taken into consideration Of course there were large troop movements and there began to be talk relatively early that there might be offensive weapons other sorts of weapons or missiles In addition when the missiles began to arrive those devices are so large pauses I think the current ones must be more modem and smaller Maybe they can bt carried in a suitcase I do not know what the technology is like other people know more than we do about this problem However those were such enormous devices approximately 25 meters long no one knows for sure that it could occupy an entire block When such big devices were unloaded no matter how hard one tried to hide and move through in the streets everyone knew about it That is why I say that you should know this The USSR could have declared that an attack on Cuba would be equivalent to an attack on the USSR We could have had a military agreement We could have been able to achieve the aim of the defense of Cuba without the presence of the missiles I am absolutely convinced of this This is one of the things that reaffim1s the conviction we had at that time and that we have kept until now even though there is not a single bit of proof that a different argument was used That is why the comrades That was the best kept secret in history I would say because several million Cubans knew it It was something that really could not be hidden I imagine that the Central Intelligence Agency must have received letters because there were spontaneous informers here They were people who were not with the revolution and they sympathized with the United States or they were against the revolution There were these spontaneous informers But no one knew anything for sure No one had any proof It was a truly intense process truly intense work We had to see to an infinite number of details and solve an infinite number of issues to keep it a secret All this did not happen rephrases Other things happened that have already been mentioned here I am not going to repeat them Raul's trip to Moscow the trip of Che Guevara and Aragoni to the Soviet Union when he delivered the final draft that was accepted Our draft was accepted just as it was without adding or deleting one comma I have already talked about this We should remember that a tremendous atmosphere was being created which seemed negative to us Therefore we thought that we should come out with the law on our side and simply publish this military agreement The secrecy put us at a disadvantage It put us at a political and practical disadvantage It did both things But we should distinguish between secrecy-many military operations have to be done in secret the operation itself not the basis for an operation-and the information that was given about it I think this is an important point There was a big mistake made here a really big mistake Not only the mistake about the secrecy which is one thing that harmed us but also the information that was given to Kennedy going along with the game about the category of the weapons whether they were offensive or defensive If you want to verify this you will see that in none of the Cuban statements--and there were several-did we ever go along with the game relating to the category of the weapons We refused to go along with that game and in public statements the government made and in the statements at the United Nations we always said that Cuba considered that it had a sovereign right to have whatever kind of weapons it thought appropriate and no one had any right to establish what kind of weapons our country could or could not have We never went along with dtnying the strategic nature of the weapons We never did We did not agree to that game We did not agree with tha approach Therefore we never denied or ·confirmed the nature of the weapons rather we reaffirmed our right to have whatever type of weapons we thought appropriate for our defense In contrast to tell the truth Khrushchev went along with the game of categorizing the weapons He turned it into something intentional Since he did not have any intention of using the weapons in an offensive operation he believed that it was the intention that defined the nature of the weapons But it was very clear that Kennedy did not understand it that way Kennedy did not understand the issue of intentions but rather the issue of type of weapons whether they were strategic weapons or not That was the issue It can be seen very clearly that Kennedy was convinced that strategic weapons were not going to be brought to Cuba Because of this I would say that there was something more than shrewdness here Deception was involved here I think the two things-the secrecy about the military agreement and the deception-were two facts two facts that did harm Because I think a different approach should have been adopted and not the approach of deceit It did us a lot of harm because in the first place Kennedy had a lot at stake He had already suffered the setback of the Bay of Pigs He was entering his second year There were elections Khrushchev did not want to affect those elections That is very clear Perhaps this was one of the factors he used in deciding not to publish the agreement It is possible that he was counting on not doing anything that would hurt Kennedy in the elections but he did the worst thing It was not anticipated that what was happening could become known So in my opinion Kennedy trusted in what he was told This is seen in all his public statements It was like a relief to him to think Well they are filling that country with tanks or cannons or who knows what but there are no strategic weapons there He thought according to a rationale he made calculations according to a rationale This naturally gave him not legal force 1 but it gave him the opportunity to present himself to world public opinion as one who had been deceived saying They have told me this they have told me that they have repeated this to me many times So in the eyes of world public opinion Kennedy gained moral force not legal force But he said They assured me of this but it has turned out otherwise He was put in a difficult personal situation-which was something Khrushchev would not have wanted but that in fact occurred He presented himself as one who had been deceived who had been assured of this that or the other while the truth was something else That was one of the advantages he was given not by the secrecy itself but by the secrecy plus the deception What other advantage did it give him That when the missile sites were finally discovered on 14 October the United States had an enormous advantage because they held the secret in their hands They could take the initiative The initiative in the military realm was put into the hands of the United States because they knew what was happening and could afford to choose one option or another a political option a quarantine or a surprise air attack on those installations I think that was a very dangerous moment from the military point of view-even if it was illegal arbitrary and unjust or even immoral from any point of view because you have to comply with international laws You do not have the right to attack any country or invade any country But well he had the choice in his hands There could have been a surprise strike when no one was expecting it Of course the Soviet military officer explained something here that is extremely important The nuclear warheads were not in the same place They were a considerable distance away-which was the right thing the elementary thing just as I had told the Soviet officer not to put all the missiles in the same place-that was on 26 October already in the middle of the crisisso that they would not all be destroyed and some capability could be kept It is unquestionable that the Soviet military took these elementary measures but I fear that a large part or almost all of the surface-to-air missile units and all the installations that were in view could have been destroyed in a totally surprise ttack Because those antiaircraft missiles really fired above 1 000 meters They did not have defenses The defenses of those installations were strengthened against the low-altitude overflights when we mobilized all our batteries and devoted them to defending those installations These were conventional batteries But at that time they were very vulnerable Of course things changed later The situation improved But the United States had eight days-or from 16 October when it was reported to them six days-to act before making this information public I think this was an extremely dangerous time not only from the political point of view but also militarily the way the issue was handled in these two respects In my opinion these were negative respects but that was how it was handled I have already explained the position we took We had our views We do not know about the others The crisis broke out on 22 October but in the morning we issued a combat alert to all forces when we saw the movement and the meeting all the information that reached us publicly We also realized that it was about the missiles We did not lose a single minute and we issued a maximum combat alert to all our forces that same day before Kennedy spoke We had already mobilized the forces our forces We also warned the Soviets about the situation Essentially the crisis erupted on the night of 22 October and defense preparations occupied almost all of our time after that We dedicated ourselves to feverishly working day and night on things that I have already talked about the mobilization of our forces the protection of the missile bases and also the medium range surface-to-air missiles We assigned to all the· Soviet facilities practically all of our anti-aircraft batteries We thought that it was the most important thing to qefend from the beginning of the crisis What was Khrushchev's mood once the crisis was declared What mood was he in He was in a very combative very determined mood Therefore he sent a letter on 23 October I am declassifying this also Does this business of declassifying have anything to do with the theory of class struggles or what laughter Khrushchev said Begins quoting letter Dear Comrade Castro the Soviet Government has just received from U S President Kennedy the following document of which we attach a copy We consider this declaration of the U S Go·1ernment and Kennedy's speech on 22 October-Oh alright They are telling me to go slowly Thanks-The Soviet Government has just received from U S President Kennedy the following document a copy of which we have attached We consider this declaration by the U S Government and Kennedy's speech on 22 October as an inconceivable interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cuba and a violation of the norms of international law and of the basic rules that govern relations between states and as a blatant act of provocation against the Soviet Union The Republic of Cuba has the total right as any other sovereign state to defend itself and to choose allies as it wishes We reject the blatant demands of the U S Government for control over the shipment of weapons to Cuba and their aspiration to determine what type of weapons the Republic of Cuba can possess The U S Government knows quite well that no sovereign state will permit another state to meddle in its relations with other states nor will it render an account of pending measures until its national defense reaches a point of strength corrects himself toward the strengthening of its national· defense In response to Kennedy's speech the Soviet Government states its most emphatic protest against the piracy piratescas actions of the U S Government and depicts these actions as treacherous and aggressive-See this is all in one paragraph-piracy treacherous and aggressive actions in regards to sovereign states and declares its decision to actively fight against such actions We have given instructions to our UN Security Council representative to urgently present to the Council the issue of the violation by the United States of the norms of international law and the UN Charter and to state an emphatic protest against the aggressive and treacherous actions of U S imperialism As a result of the situation created we have instructed the Soviet military representatives in Cuba on the need to adopt corresponding measures and to be completely ready ready for combat We are sure that the actions undertaken by the American imperialists with the intention of taking away the legitimate right of the Republic of Cuba to strengthen its defensive power and the defense of its territory will provoke the irate protest of all peace-loving countries The truth is that thete were really no big protests because politically adverse conditions had arisen due to the procedures used All of this is in parenthesis This is what I am say1ng -- -Will provoke the irate protest of all peace-loving countries and will move into action the widest masses in defense of the just cause of revolutionary· Cuba ends quoting letter This could' have been accomplished in part if we had done things openly All of this is true because we were within our most absolute right to do so And if we had ·· the right how were we going to act in a way that made it seem that we did not have this right that made it seem that we were doing something wrong I am analyzing this in terms of ethics politics legality-not in terms of force correlations of force or in military terms Continues quoting letter We send to you Comrade Castro and to all your comrades in arms our warmest greetings and express our firm believe that the aggressive plans of the U S imperialists will be thwarted ends quoting letter The other thing is the declaration This is the letter that we received on the 23d and nothing else It contained a clear and firm commitment to fight against the piracy treacherous and aggressive actions words indistinct What was ahead was combat I could not imagine any withdrawal To tell the truth the idea of a withdrawal never crossed our minds We did not think it was possible And Khrushchev who is the one who knew how many missile5 and nuclear weapons he had available and all those things sent us this letter on the 23d We of course told ourselves The issue is clear things are clear and we went ahead with our preparations Then the time came when I wrote the letter when we had already taken all the humanly possible measures I met with the Soviet military command as I have explained before It reported that everything was ready all the weapons that were mentioned here that the Soviet officer explained here and with lots of willingness A truly strange phenomenon occurred among the Soviet troops in a situation such as that one in which the people were in extreme danger and at the same time remained totally calm The Soviet and Cuban troops remained totally calm There was total calm among the Cuban people If you conducted a poll of the Cuban people and asked Should we return the missiles Ninety percent would have answered no Our people maintained a calm and intransigent position regarding this issue That same day the 26th we notified the Soviet officers that lowaltitude overflights were unacceptable as I mentioned before and therefore our batteries were going to open fire and we wanted them to be informed According to the accord there were two armies and two commands we commanded our forces and our country We said well we cannot continue to tolerate this This is extremely dangerous I already mentioned this I should not repeat it Essentially on the morning of the 27th when the U S aircraft arrived-this was an daily occurrence early in the morning-they faced the fire from our antiaircraft batteries The Soviet antiaircraft missile unit shot down the aircraft in the eastern part of the country naturally it was a moment of great tension But in reality it was clear that when we were meeting or even before we met on the 26th when we met with the Soviet officers and were sending a message to Khrushchev he had already sent a message to Kennedy You are well aware of all of this His message proposed the basis for a solution-which was the withdrawal of the missiles in return for guaranties toward Cuba of not attacking Cuba Later the next day he sent another message and from what I am told the message on that second day added to the issue of the guaranty for Cuba the issue of missiles in Turkey Of course when this news arrived the news arrived here on the 28th it provoked a great indignation because we realized that we had become some type of game token We not only saw a unilateral decision a series of steps had been taken without including us They could have told us there was the message on the 26th and on the 27th There had been time but we heard on the radio on the 28th that an agreement had taken place We had to endure the humiliation I understood the Soviet officer when he said that it was the most painful decision that he had to obey in his life the issue of the inspection of the ships We found out about the agreement on the 28th I believe that there was a message on the way informing us after the fact It arrived one or two hours later through the embassy The reaction of all the people of all the people all the cadres of all the comrades was of profound indignation it was not a feeling of relief Then the political decision that we immediately took was to issue the five-point demands on that same day the 28th Do we have it around here Check and see where our five-points are speaking to unidentified aide There were five points very simple and easy to remember 1 The end of the economic blockade and of all the economic and trade pressure measures that the United States implemented throughout the world against our country 2 The end of all subversive actions shipment and infiltration of weapons and explosives by air or sea organization of mercenary invasions infiltration of spies and saboteurs actions that are carried out from U S territory and certain accomplice countries 3 The end to all pirate attacks conducted from existing bases in the United States and in Puerto Rico 4 The end of all violations of our airspace and waters by U S aircraft and warships 5 The withdrawal from the Guantanamo Naval Base and the return of the territory occupied by the United States These were the five points that we issued on the 2s 1 as our demands We would not have opposed a solution If there was a real danger of war if we would have known that Nikita was willing to withdraw the missiles and find a solution on that basis and on a truly honorable basis we would not have refused Logically there was no purpose in insisting on a situation or a solution but it had to be an acceptable and honorable solution The simple solution to withdraw the missiles because the United States had given its word that it would not attack Cuba is incongruent with all the steps taken and it was incongruent with the existence of a situation in our country that had to be overcome It would have been enough if Nikita had said Would you agree to the withdrawal of the missiles if satisfactory guaranties are given to Cuba Cuba was not a stumbling block to that solution Cuba would have helped but would have said the minimum guarantees we want are these Not a guarantee that they would not im t de us I believe that the whole world anyhow would have seen with relief the beginning of the solution of the crisis because the consent by Nikita to withdraw the missiles would already have produced relief The people would have thought that it was reasonable to find an agreement on a basis related to Cuba because if Cuba was the motive for the missiles Cuba should have been kept in mind instead of the missiles in Turkey But it is evident that the missiles in Turkey were present in Nikita's mind because he said that he was in the Baltic Sea near Turkey and thought about those missiles or so the story goes The Black Sea corrected by unidentified aide And thought about the missiles in Turkey and all that And in the end he ends up also thinking about the missiles in Turkey for whatever reasons because someone might have suggested that they could be included But from the political and international point of view for the honest people the peace-loving people those people in the world that sympathized with Cuba or with independence or whatever it made no sense to propose an exchange of missiles in Cuba with missiles in Turkey If the reason was the defense of Cuba what did Turkey have to do with the defense of Cuba Absolutely nothing The demands that Cuba made were completely reasonable a good negotiation point could have been found and the missiles could have been withdrawn if that was the condition required to preserve the peace because peace was really threatened I believe that the procedures used promoted those actions that endangered peace I already explained them We were already at that point on the 28th when another solution was not possible anymore A commitment had been made Cuba had been ignored Turkey had been mentioned then we issued our five points We have already talked about the trip by U Thant The Soviet Government asked us to please hold our fire to not shoot anymore We agreed right but as long as the negotiations last only as long as the negotiations only as long as the negotiations repeats are taking place will we maintain that cease-fire order the order to not fire against the low-altitude overflights Because immediately afterwards on the 27th the aircraft stopped flying Afte t our batteries on the 27th changes thought There were no more sorties that afternoon there were no more overflights There were none on the 28th But later after the batteries went silent they began to conduct overflights again while the negotiations were taking place and it was very humiliating Given the frame of mind of our people to watch those aircraft flying at 100 meters was extremely irritatin·g and demoralizing even for the artillery soldiers arid ·everyone else You have to really understand the Cuban personality to comprehend the harmful effect to our morale of events of this nature Then U Thant came to visit I fully explained to him our position even the five points and especially our categorical opposition to the inspections I told him that we did not accept-because the USSR is a sovereign country and so were we-and that no one could authorize an inspection of our territory if we did not authorize it And we told him there is not going to be any inspection That was one of our reactions because we were in disagreement with the manner in which changes thought with the outcome of the crisis When U Thant came I explained to him all our positions He definitely did not go beyond three proposals He proposed that we accept a group of UN representatives and all that a UN reconnaissance plane crewed by people acceptable to the Cuban Russian and American Governments We really were not in the mood for overflights in those days Begins quoting U Thant message So the United States has told me that if this system is put into practice I will make a public statement in the Security Council if necessary because they will not continue to have aggressive intentions against the Cuban Government and they will guarantee the integrity of the nation's territory etc ends quoting Where is my response I told him precisely We do not understand why this is being asked of us because we have not violated anyone's rights We have not carried out any attack on anyone at all All our actions have been based on international law We have been the victims of an embargo in the first place which is an illegal act and in the second place of an attempt to determine from another country what we have the right to do or not do within our borders Cuba is a sovereign state -1 am reading the essential things-The United States has been repeatedly violating our airspace without any right We can accept anything that complies with the law and that does not involve a reduction in our status as a sovereign state I understand that this business about the inspections is one more attempt to humiliate our country Therefore we do not accept it This demand for inspections is to validate their attempt to violate our right to act within our borders with complete freedom to decide what we can and cannot do within our borders The th reat of launching a direct armed attack is absurd If Cuba were to strengthen itself militarily to a degree that the United States takes on itself to determine sentence as heard We do not have the least intention of accounting to or consulting the U S Senate or House about the weapons we think it appropriate to acquire or the measures to be taken to fully defend our country We have not yielded nor do we intend to yield any sovereign prerogative to the U S Congress We can negotiate with aJl sincerity and honor It would not be honorab - if we accepted negotiating about a sovereign right of our country Then U Thant explained He said All actions by the United Nations on Cuban territory can only be undertaken with the consent of the Cuban Government and people Here in essence are some other ideas U Thant presented They are very interesting He said My colleagues and I words indistinct what I have said Quoting from own letter In the first place our government does not have the least doubt of the great intention disinterest and honesty with which the current UN Secretary General is working We do not have any doubts about your intentions good faith and extraordinary interest in finding a solution to this problem I understand t 1 interest all of us should have in peace but the road to peace is not the road of sacrificing the rights of peoples violating the rights of peoples because that precisely the road that leads to war The road to peace is the road of guaranteeing the rights of peoples and the willingness of peoples to resist when defending those rights Herc I said The road to the last world war was the road set by the annexation of Austria the dividing up of Czechoslovakia acts of German imperialism that were tolerated and that led to that war That is why it is difficult to understand how one can talk about an immediate solution without reference to future solutions when what is of greatest interest is not paying any price for peace now but rather guaranteeing peace in a definitive way l said Cuba is not Austria nor southeastern Czechoslovakia-it is southwestern right I said southeastern that is what appears here-Cuba is not Austria nor southeastern Czechoslovakia nor the Congo We have the very finn detem1ination to defend our rights through any difficulties and any dangers I hope name indistinct has not underlined anything more here because otherwise this will drag on too long Here I said The Soviet Government's decision to withdraw the strategic weapons they brought to defend Cuba should have been enough for them The Cuban Government has not impeded the withdrawal of those weapons If in addition to that the United States wants to humiliate our country they will not succeed We have not hesitated a single minute in our detennination to defend our rights I added We also oppose the inspections at our ports I ask if the Soviet Union has authorized inspections of its ships at sea why would it then be necessary to inspect them again in Cuban ports Regarding this I want to say in the first place that the United States has no right to invade Cuba and one cannot negotiate based on a promise not to commit a crime based on the simple promise not to commit a crime-I repeat-and that given the threat of this danger we trust more in our detennination to defend ourselves than in the U S Government's words I said Why not value equally the public pledge made to the United Nations by the Soviet Union to withdraw the strategic weapons it had sent to defend the Republic of Cuba Those are in essence the ideas I presented Now U Thant said some interesting things U Thant said My colleagues and 1-1 am also reading the essential pans-think that the blockade was illegal that no state can permit a blockade that is not only military or even an economic one sentence as heard This is using the imposition of a great power's force against a small country I also told him that the air reconnaissance that was being done over Cuba was illegal and inadmissible These three things-economic embargo military blockade and air reconnaissance-are illegal Here he said The Pentagon the Central Intelligence Agency rephrases There are three forces in the United States the Pentagon the CIA and the State Department This will not please the man who looks like Hemingway much referring to Ray Cline U Thant said In my opinion the Pentagon and the CIA have more power than the State Department Ah this will not please Edwin Martin much laughter If the CIA and the Pentagon continue to have that power I see the future of the world very black That is what U Thant said Well I hope they do not have any monument to U Thant there in the United States Now they will take it away chuckles with a crane laughter Continues quoting U Thant I said to the United States that if they do anything drastic I would not only report them to the Security Council but would accuse the United States in the Security Council Even though the United States has the vote and the veto there can still be a moral sanction I also told them I would resign my post because if the United Nations cannot stop a great power in an attack against a small country I do not want to be the secretary general I warned them that they should not make any attack on Cuba because that would be the end of the United Nations My aim is to achieve peace and ensure the continuation of the United Nations He said l am thinking about the first proposal by Khrushchev about the dismantling and inspection accepted by the Soviet lJ nion Since Your Excellency considers that the Soviet Union was referring to having the inspections pe1formed outside Cuba I believe this might create some division or misunderstanding between the Soviet Union and Cuba That is what he said There are other things of interest in my opinion but in essence that is what U Thant said That was on 31 October that meeting on 30 and 31 October Then Mikoyan visited two or three days after U Thant Do you remember Aleksandr Alekseyev answers 4 November he arrived in Cuba on 2 November and the first meeting was on 4 November He arrived in Cuba on 2 November The lengthy negotiations or talks with Mikoyan began based on the positions taken by the Soviet Union and the positions we had taken Those negotiations were very difficult because first we talked about the missiles Then we talked about the IL-28's Then we talked about other things It seemed interminable I have already talked about this here I should not repeat it A really unpleasant incident happened when the talks with Mikoyan started The news came from the USSR that his wife had died They gave him the choice of returning to the USSR and he really made a very generous gesture He decided well rephrases He received the news Of course it had a great impact on him They had been very close married for a long time Mikoyan cried but he decided to stay in the country and continue the talks instead of returning to the USSR It was also very hard for us to receive that news at a time when we were beginning talks that were not easy at all He stayed about three weeks and we discussed this As you have seen and heard in recent days-at least many of us have some of you surely knew it before-the letters have been published speaking to unidentified aide See if you can help me find the letters I had them right here Here they are Here are the letters in translation On the first day I was able to reach my goal of reading 85 pages of them early in the morning That is why I was a little sleepy here in the meeting yesterday These letters were really very interesting Here you can see when the problem of the IL-28's came up the discussions With the same honesty I have spoken with up to now I should say that I see a difference here between Kennedy's and Khrushchev's conduct in this correspondence It must be said that Khrushchev conducted himself very well with great dignity You can see that he is anxious to solve not only these problems but also many others I see here a noble thoughtful capable intelligent Khrushchev who uses profound arguments not just with respect to the crisis but also with respect to world peace In contrast we can see a harsh Kennedy The same nobility is not reflected in these letters in 1 ennedy's case You can see th t he squeezes Khrushchev squeezes him more and more and the further away the missiles were the more he squeezed him That is what I see in these letters It is not the same thing to discuss when the missiles were here as when they have been taken out So Kennedy's language became harsher as the ships left for the Soviet Union with the missiles He presented new demands and talked about verification He talked about continued guarantees He insisted on this You can see that he was reluctant to fonnalize the pledges he had made to Khrushchev He used very subtle words He said one thing in one place and then tried to soften it with other words elsewhere You can see Khrushchev struggling so that the pledges Kennedy had been made would be fulfilled and formalized It is unquestionable that Khrushchev's position was much weaker at that stage from an objective point of view especially after 20 November when the missiles had been withdrawn Naturally we did not know anything about this exchange We did not have any information about this But we still had a problem The days went by and the planes continued their overflights That was intolerable We finally informed Mikoyan that we had no alternative but to fire at the planes flying at low altitudes We issued the appropriate instructions about this matter I knew that there would be a U S counterattack Since I was responsible for that order I went to one of our air bases and spent the morning there That was the next day I do not know if it was on 16 November I believed it was a moral duty if there was a reprisal against that base rephrases The planes passed over that base at 1000 and I considered that I had a moral duty not to commit suicide there but to be with the troops that were going to fire I went to one place but many places were going to fire We had warned Mikoyan about 24 hours beforc--24 or 48 hours before-so that he could inform the Soviets We were waiting for the planes at that antiaircraft battery that morning and fortunately the planes did not come That was the best thing that could have happened right For the planes not to fly because they would have been shot down Because there were so many batteries there that it would have been impossible not to hit the planes Even though our gunners were not very expert the planes had been flying very low and relatively slowly at the minimum possible speed and at about 100 meters altitude They would come by like that But they did not come I know that in one of the letters-the one on 15 November-Kennedy told Khrushchev that changes thought because he mentions me every once in a while always trying to cause some friction between the Soviets and us or make the Soviets punish us in some way He would say that Castro was the bad guy and wanted war or who knows what He said that he had received news that we were going to fire against the low-altitude overflights It is possible rephrases I imagine that Mikoyan in some way communicated to someone through some channel that we had decided to fire It seemed stupid to me that the United States would continue with those flights because Kennedy really was so pleased with the results he had obtained t at he had no reason to complicate that whole situation by doing something that made no sense at that time except to humiliate us There were people among the antiaircraft troops who made cartoons drawing spiderwebs and things The Cubans who were at the antiaircraft batteries had a sense of humor unidentified aide hands letter to Castro Yes To U Thant Where What day was this On 15 November a letter from the prime minister Castro to Acting UN Secretary General Mr U Thant says that we will not tolerate further low-altitude overflights over Cuba since these serve U S military plans against the revolution and demoralize our national defense We assert that groups of sabotage and subversion have been introduced into Cuba which proves the military usefulness of the overflights for the United States Yes we also informed U Thant about this on 15 November So fortunately I think the attitude adopted by the administration was reasonable not to cause a conflict They understood that it was unnecessary and senseless and that our reaction was natural This might have interrupted the withdrawal of the missiles or something and made the situation more complicated So they did not send the flights They did not authorize the low-altitude overflights any more then they approached the coasts and there were some enormous exchanges of fire because some came close to the coasts and all the batteries fired at them when they got near But in general the low-altitude overflights ended by mid-N1 vember and the U-2 remained People could not see the U-2 We were not in agreement with the U-2 overflights but we could do nothing about them It was a long process Then they finally turned over to us those antiaircraft batteries when our personnel had learned how to use them We had to take a lot of boys out of the universities or recent graduates to learn to handle all those missiles which were for targets higher than 1 000 meters But when the Soviets turned them over to us they did it on the condition that we not fire at the U2 We found ourselves in the dilemma of either going without antiaircraft batteries or pledging not to fire at the U-2 We had to promise not to It was quite a while later when they turned those surface-to-air missiles over to us That is the only thing I can say basically concerning Cuba in those days These letters refer to it Towards the end of the year things were a little better In December things got better Now were these the only letters No I had three more pieces of paper That one was on the IL-28's but we have already talked about that I think these letters are really very revealing At that moment rephrases The circumstances had changed Khrushchev was one man before the crisis and a different one afterwards Kennedy was one man before the crisis an l a different one afterwards Kennedy behaved with great nobility and elegance and believed what they told him and Khrushchev fed the deception the theory that there were no offensive weapons He went along with that game Afterwards in the other stage we can see a very noble frank sincere Kh ushchev and a harsher Kennedy who in short squeezes him-to use an elegant word But the effort Khrushchev made was admirable He behaved with great elegance He did not make concessions concerning Cuba in the face of all the changes thought Except that at one time he said that it was a question of the Spanish character but he did not say it in pejorative terms according to what I have read there On the other hand he makes a rather rude reference to Eisenhower That is the only little part of the letter that I do not like It is not that I am an Eisenhower sympathizer-not at all We are very far apart ideologically But the way he said it the phrase he used-about an old man who has one foot in the grave should not h t' rfere with our plans-was not very elegant It was no• an elegant way of saying it Then Kennedy of course defends Eisenhower saying that the two problems have nothing to do with each other But I think public knowledge has been enriched with this Now we have to ask the State Department to continue declassifying things more letters Because the one from 1963 is still missing It may contain interesting things from what I remember Let me find the letter Now three more months had gone by and on 3 I January-almost four months later right November December January three months and a bit-on 31 January 1963 Khrushchev wrote me a lengthy letter really a wonderful lettfr It is 31 pages long I am not going to read it of course but it can be handed out to anyone because it is a beautiful elegant friendly very friendly letter Some of its paragraphs are almost poetic It invites me to visit the Soviet Union He was travelling from Berlin to Moscow by train where a conference was taking place You can see in his letter changes thought It was written by him because he was a man who knew how to express himself very well write very well and he wrote a persuasive letter Tempers had been cooling down by then they had been quite hot I accepted the trip You know I got there by a miracle because I had to fly in a TU-114 plane It was a 16-hour flight I think that is a kind of bombardment in a plane like that Words indistinct I arrived in Murmansk on a direct flight from Havana in 16 hours That plane had four propellers and it shook and vibrated and we had to land blind It was lucky that Khrushchev who was very concerned about details had sent the best pilot in the Soviet Union because he was the only man who woulu have been able to land in the middle of the mountains in Murmansk with such a fog that you could not see for five meters On the third try we finally landed Mikoyan was waiting for me there in Murmansk with a delegation I spoke by telephone with Khrushchev for a short time That was the first time I visited the Soviet Union I can say that my part in all this could have ended that day we landed in Murmansk chuckles I said Tfthis crashes we will never even know why I was sitting with the pilots watching the operation Suddenly I said I will get out of here I do not want it to happen that instead of helping I make things more complicated I stayed sitting down until that monster landed It was an enormous plane This is how I first visited the USSR There is an excellent letter This is why I said that I know Khrushchev well It contained outstanding feelings It was friendly he was concerned for Cuba I appreciated this letter very much Then the invitation to visit the USSR was made In the USSR we talked about this as I have already told you I had my theory on what the goal was I was trying to find out what had been discussed yet not once he did talk about the terms he and all the others as a rule I was not able to clarify the issue But for hours he read many messages to me messages from President Kennedy messages sometimes delivered through Robert Kennedy and other times through Thompson that is the name I remember There was a translator and Khrushchev read and read the letters sent back and forth I have read this with great interest to find out if any of the issues touched in the messages were from that trimester but they were not they belong to a later period They probably belong to the first trimester of 1963 January February March and April the first quarter of the year because I arrived in the Soviet Union toward the end of April Khrushchev was sitting with me in Savidova a remote hunting reserve He liked hunting very much He tried to do so whenever he had a chance he did not have much time available he was a hard worker We sat in the patio It was already spring It was almost spring and you can be outside with a coat on in spring in the Soviet Union He kept reading the letters The messages continued on and on discussing the security of Cuba There was a moment when Khrushchev changes thought There were two moments of interest to me There was a moment when Khrushchev was reading and the other man was translating when there was a phrase in which they said Something is going to happen in reference to Cuba Then when Khrushchev later read his reply it said-I have not forgotten the phrase even though it was not recorded-that something is going to happen something unbelievable That was the word used by t hrushchev in his reply Therefore it seems that at a certain point the mood was getting heated again when they told him-regarding Cuba-that something was going to happen and he says that something is going to happen but it will be something unb lievable As if to say that there would be a war if it is not fulfilled sentence as heard You have seen from his letters that he writes with dignity with elegance but with dignity I have not forgotten that phrase Khrushchev kept on reading and reading There was a moment when I believe that he said something that he did not want me to hear Anyone can make a mistake even me while reading letters But here no one had highlighted for him the essential ideas and there was a moment when he read a message from the other side We have fulfilled all our pledges-take notice of these words-and have withdrawn or are withdrawing or are going to withdraw the missiles from Turkey and Italy I remember it well that he not only said Turkey but also said Italy I always kept that in my mind Once I asked the Soviets if in the documents or the papers there was finally something to this effect I sent a query to Gromyko since there was a new campaign in the United States because we were going to receive some MiG-23 or some other planes of that kind They were always examining to see if 1962 accords were being violated I was told that the issue of Turkey appeared but not Italy But in that message that Nikita was reading and that the translator was translating it said We have withdrawn are withdrawing are going to withdraw This refers to the withdrawal of the missiles from Turkey and Italy I told myself well this has not been discussed publicly This must have been some kind of gift or concession made-maybe in this case by Kennedy-to help Khrushchev There had been times when Khrushchev had wanted to help Kennedy but other times he had wanted to hurt him-or did not want to but lid anyway-and other times it was Kennedy wlto had wanted to hurt Khrushchev I only know and remember th2 t phrase When I heard that phrase it was the last thing that Nikita wanted me to hear since he knew my way of thinking and that we were completely against being used as an exchange token This was contradictory to the theory that the missiles were sent for the defense of Cuba Withdrawing missiles from Turkey had nothing to do with the defense of Cuba That is quite clear it is a matter of simple logic Cuba was defended by saying Please remove the naval base please stop the economic blockade and the pirate attacks Withdrawing missiles from Turkey was in total contradiction to the theory that the essential goal had been the defense of Cuba When this was read I looked at him and said Nikita would you please read that part again about the missiles in Turkey and Italy He laughed that mischievous laugh of his He laughed but that was it I was sure that tney were not going to repeat it again because it was like that old phrase about bringing up the issue of the noose in the home of the man who was hung There were two points and this is why I am going to leave it to the researchers to investigate this We will await with interest the day when this is declassified now that everything is being declassified or as it also is called the deideologizing chuckles of international relations It is better if all these documents come to light once and for all Of course this situation in 1962 despite efforts by both parts and we also tried to completely overcome the incident tried to save the relations with the Soviet Union tried to stop it from getting any more embittered Yet the 1962 incidents affected for many years the relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba We are putting all these documents at the disposal of historians and if you think so we can make photocopies No this document also speaking to unidentified aide I believe that the text of this accord has never been made public I do not know if it is of any interest to historians We can have it typed or make photocopies What was that Not typed photocopies We will make copies for the historians This is now declassified You are in charge of providing this speaking to unidentified aide This letter also the one se'lt on the 23d someone might be interested in it Yes speaking to unidentified aide I do not remember anything else that in my opinion might be of concrete and specific interest in relation to the studies that you are conducting If any more papers or anything else of interest surfaces we can give them to you We do not have anything to hide with respect to this whole problem of the October Crisis and if it can be of use or contribute to clarifying the facts and to drawing the pertinent conclusions I am not going to draw conclusions here about all this There is a lot of material to study to mull over many things to reflect on thanks in part to the constructive efforts made by bringing this to light As a Soviet man once said never has a problem been so seriously discussed as this one has from which important lessons ran be derived Thank you very much applause