MORI DocID b 1 b 3 ret 1128402 71 E Intelligence Report DC1 Crime and Narcotics Center Afghanistan Drug Trade Flourishing Under Taliban A Research Paper CNC98-10006C December 1998 APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE SEP 2004 ' - 51' fru'i' 7i3' fi T k8 tL7 'v yS - l' MYk lw ic s i ' t T _' Sf xx fi i• Copy 3'm k 0 • 7 ' -t er c ' is - 'a r _ _ MORI DocID Intelligence Report DC Crime and Narcotics Center Afghanistan Drug Trade Flourishing Under Taliban A Research Paper This report was prepared by DCI Crime and Narcotics Cen er with contra u- tions from analysts in CNC and the DCI Counterterrorist Center Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the o cret CIVC 986C Reverse Blank ' ' _'s s-wi • i' -1 YaN' a -u i • December 19 8 _ - ' _- M13i' ' uSte t a°'' ' z R-194M 1128402 MORI DocID 1128402 Afghanistan Drug Trade Flourishing Under Taliban F____1 Summary The growth ofthe narcotics business in Afghanistan has exploded due largely to the Taliban's ever-increasing role Its involvement which emanatesfrom the highest levels ofthe militia leadership has intensified over the last several years and earned the Taliban an estimated millions of dollars annually Information available as of 1 December 1998 was used in this report • Top-level Taliban leaders including Mullah Omar set narcotics-related policies including taxation and production levels • Taliban military personnel provide logistic support and protection for drug shipments and laboratories • The Taliban has forged ties to the Quetta Alliance a major regional trafficlcing group and terrorist sponsor Usama Bin Ladin As a result of these actions opium poppy cultivation and narcotics production thrive in Taliban-controlled areas ppmm production has e -twinan seize control of most of Afghanistan Taliban-controlled territory includes over 95 percent of the country's opium poppy growing areas -mreaesince • Morphine and heroin processing laboratories have proliferated particularly in southern Afghanistan largely due to Taliban-sponsored safehaven areas Despite public pledges M ban drugs as a quidpro quofor FIN recognition and counternarcotics assistance Taliban officials are unlikely to do so any time soon The stark state of the Afghan economy and the need to sustain the war effort make drug proceeds a convenient and lucrative means ofsupporting both basic economic development and continued fighting I iii Reverse Blank ' t - r r_- 3c t1f cC io t CNC98-1000 December 1998 u° a• c w d MORI DocID 1128402 ov'6ecret Contents Page Summary Taliban Involvement Widespread Ties to Major Traffickers Rising Cultivation and Heroin Refinement hi 1 3 4 5 Economic Realities of Drug Ban Prospects Appendix Bin Ladin Links to Narcotics 9 o v et Reverse Blank _ t - ' ' - a ' t- 3 •_ 3a H' a T _ re' i mac-' j$ Yi z -' _ r Y •'' Y'' ' airr rS t y7- rF 'tw MORI DocID o 1128402 et Afghanistan Drug Trade Flourishing Under Taliban F___1 Taliban Involvement Widespread The Taliban continues to foster ties to the narcotics trade in Afghanistan-the world's second-largest opium producer-earning millions of dollars in the process Taliban involvement emanates from the highest levels of the leadership and has intensified over the last couple of years International drug traffickers-as well as terrorists affiliated with Usama Bin Ladinare permitted to traffic in narcotics freely in Afghanistan see the appendix Drug traffickers who curry favor with the Taliban do not appear to wield any political influence over Taliban policy but do provide a steady stream of much-needed revenues for reconstruction projects and continued military operations This year top Taliban leaders have become more entrenched in the drug trade by attempting to manage opium poppy cultivation and by raising fees on opium production After the Taliban first organized as a military force in 1994 the militia began to destroy opium poppy fields and punish drug traffickers because they viewed dreg cultiva- tion and trafficking as forbidden on the basis of their interpretation of Islam Over the last several years however the Taliban apparently realized that this was having a calamitous effect on the livelihood of farm- ers in southern Afghanistan where the Taliban movement was founded Taliban leaders likely also faced retaliation from well-armed international drug trafficking organizations in the region if they continued to implement countetnarcotics measures F______ The Taliban now acknowledges that opium poppy is grown in Afghanistan and that it levies an Islamic tax on the crop which is distributed to the poor but the Taliban denies further involvement Contrary to these statements the Taliban elicits handsome profits by levying fees on all phases of narcotics productionopium poppy cultivation morphine base and heroin processing laboratories and drug shipments-and grants traffickers the right to operate freely in Afghan- istan in exchange for compensation according to a variety of reporting I cret MORI DocID 2 1128402 MORI DocID Top 1128402 et The Quetta Alliance Drug Trafficking The Quetta Alliance a loosely based alliance offour familiesNoorzai Notezai Rigi and Shahbakhashbased in Quetta Pakistan currently controls much of the drug tra ffrc originating in Southwest Asia The families use their ethnic tribal and political affilia- tions to operate an extensive drug-trafficking network throughout Pakistan Afghanistan CentralAsia Iran Ties to Major Traffickers and Turkey As long as it receives sufficient dividends the Taliban appears to be willing to host major trafficking organ-' zations and provide an environment in which they are allowed to flourish Some trafficking groups have moved across the border from Pakistan given the opportunity to conduct their illicit trade without risk Each fam- ily contributes a particular strength to the alliance relying on each other's connections money and capabilities to negotiate drug transactions to assemble narcotics loads and to transport shipments to trafficking counterparts in Turkey from law enforcement With the goal of becoming the dominant narcotraf- ficking group in southern Afghanistan the Quetta Alliance-already the largest drug-trafficking organization in the regionbegan to give support in the form of money and mujahidin recruits to the Taliban 3 7-77 MORI DocID Rising Cultivation and Heroin Refinement Both opium poppy cultivation and morphine base and heroin production have continued to increase under Taliban rule Much of the regional drug tra a seems to ave s 'fted from northeastern Afghanistan and northern Pakistan to southern Afghanistan-home to the Taliban movement_ In the early 1990s the Nangarhar region accounted for 60 percent of Afghanistan's opium poppy cultivation By 1998 the souther Provinces of Helmand Oruzgan and Kandahar accounted for 76 percent of Afghanistan's opium poppy cultivation This trend in drug production in Afghanistan to primarily the southern areas which the Taliban has controlled since its inception may be an indication of the militia's hand in the drug trade Morphine base and heroin processing has also thrived in areas under Taliban control articular in the south 1 orphine base and heroin processing laboratories have been relocating to various Afghan provinces This change is apparently partly due to Pakistan's raids on laboratories in the Northwest Frontier Province areas bordering Afghanistan in 1996 and 1997 partly due to the Taliban's hospitable arrangements with trafficking organizations and partly due to the increased Afghan Afghanistan Fills the Yoid f pop y cu cva on in southern Afghanistan-Helmand Oruzgan and Kandahar Provinces-has continued to increase under Taliban rule Likewise since the Taliban seized control ofNangarhar Province in early 1996 opium poppy cultivation has increased although not as dramatically as in the southern regions opium supply OD-Kecret a major growing areas ut 4 I 1128402 MORI DocID 1128402 Figure 2 Afghanistan and Pakistan Opium Poppy Cultivation I Taliban officials appear to be split when it comes to banning narcotics between those who favor using the drug trade for income earned at the expense of foreign infidels and those who are serious about ban- ning drugs mainly on religious grounds Economic Realities of Drug Ban Taliban leader Mullah Omar has tried to use the narcotics issue as political leverage to gain UN recogni- tion as the legitimate government of Afghanistan Omar claims that the Taliban will ban opium poppy cultivation unconditionally if it receives a seat at the United Nations Afghan media report However 5 The militia likely turned to taxes on narcotics as few licit sources of government revenues exist given Afghanistan's war-ravaged infrastructure and econ- omy In addition the Taliban claims that its farmers currently have no viable economic alternative ret MORI DocID oecret 6 -riA%% 4- •f _ •r - f rar _ r r _7 ' '-'Yr7 r'z - 1128402 MORI DocID 1128402 ppgLecret Prospects UNDCP Losing Faith A successful counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan would require peace an unwavering Taliban commitment and massive foreign aid and economic development assistance over a number of years If the Taliban were to implement drug control laws with the same level of commitment and force that it has imposed its In October 1997 the Taliban formally pledged to work with the UN Drug Control Program UNDCP to eradicate opium poppy cultivation as part of UNDCP Executive Director Pino Arlacch1' strategy to eliminate opium production in Afghanistan over 10 years There is little evidence to suggest that the mili- tia have followed up with any actions to comply with UNDCP objectives pium poppy cu xva ion as continue to increase since the Taliban agreed to work with the Islamic law the militia could presumably have an 1 impact-even a significant one-on the drug trade in Afghanistan The Taliban no doubt is aware of the political gains to be made from cooperating on coun- ternarcotics but several factors weigh against the likelihood that it will tackle the issue before political stability and a viable economy are restored UNDCE • A lack of drug revenues to support continued military action probably would weaken the Taliban's ability to make further gains against the Northern Alliance opposition and might make it feel more vulnerable toward neighboring countries particu- larly Iran • Financial realities dictate that narcotics proceeds must be offset by funding from other sources Alternative economic development schemes would take years to materialize and probably would not entirely make up for drug revenues Many Afghan farmers would face grave economic hardship if opium poppy cultivation were effectively banned The Taliban could lose popular support particularly in southern Afghanistan • Likewise stringent Taliban counternarcotics mea- sures probably would provoke retaliation by well- armed Afghan-based international drug traffickers who already do not hesitate to use force to protect their equities in the drug business as currently dem- onstrated by smugglers' armed skirmishes along the Tajik Turkmen and Iranian borders Governments that have recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan-Saudi Arabia the United Arab Emirates UAE and Pakistan-seem to have little success in influencing Taliban policy and probably would not be able to persuade the Taliban to crack down on drug traders Relations between Saudi Arabia and the Taliban have been strained since the 7 MORI DocID 1128402 ret Taliban did not respond to Riyadh's request to hand over Bin Ladin The UAE appears to have very limited relations with the Taliban Pakistan which has the closest contact with the Taliban and reportedly limited influence either does not seem to have much leverage on the militia's countemarcotics policy or has been unwilling to address it thus far Likewise UN programs to eradicate narcotics cultivation in Afghanistan have not yielded results because of the civil strife and the lack of a centralized government Governments in the region may be more amenable to targeting the export of drugs from Afghanistan by building on the current UNDCP plan to form a security belt in Central Asia that aims to enhance law enforcement interdiction along the Afghan border Within this multilateral framework Pakistan and perhaps Iran-which has called on the UNDCP to establish a similar security belt along its border with Afghanistan to stop the flow of drugs-might be included in this initiative Under such a plan the Tali- ban may feel pressured to initiate counternarcotics measures if neighboring countries present a united front at intercepting their narcotics flows f t c cret 7 7 MORI DocID 1128402 Appendix Bin Ladin Links to Narcotics 0 Terrorist financier Usama Bin Ladin's activities in Afghanistan have cut across both terrorism and drug trafficking Ties to Quetta Alliance Northern Traffickers I Since his move to Kandahar in the spring of 1997 Bin Ladin has become more engaged in drug trafficking He has forged ties to ance ule Yuma in Ladin's embrace of heroin trafficking also may be-driven by a need for additional funding to help finance development projects in Afghanistan including costly Taliban reconstruction projects that appear to be part of the price of his sanctuary • This year international law enforcement operations targeting Bin Ladin's financial empire have forced him to seek alternative sources of revenues one of which is drug sales according to open sources- Bin Ladin also has connections to a group of prominent traffickers affiliated with Northern Alliance commanders Masood and Dostam as well as Islamic extremists in northem Afghanistan Extremist Connections Maktab al-Khidmat a Bin Ladin-affiliated Islamic extremist group has increasingly turned to narcotics trafficking Bin Ladin's vast organizational re an usmess holdings provide him with infim-s a ready conduit to transport narcotics worldwide 0 9 - r ' h %KS '•i'rt' «r _ - ta0 cret a'stiS'„r' 3 K' - 'S %L ' - V _M E L• Eif ' - i MORI DocID 1128402 I t To-ft6eeret 10 MORI DocID Figure 3 Bin Ladin Ties to Afghan Narcotics 1kade • Taliban • lincouragespoppycuhivatki%provides protection for labs and narcotics convoys Cnllects•taxes on all aspects of the narcotics trade w VroWdessafehoven for Bin Laden I I 11 asvmrarmnc 1128402