'C01118987 II Approved for Release 2013 07 17 Afghan i of a Taliban ' • - i i 1Ilc@MOUS ooooc o 1 '' c O OD DCDDD dC3Clq OG-9 1l 9 A'IE 2001-06H May 2001 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 NIE 2001-06H MHmpUcadons of a TaUbaim VktoTfy This Estimate was approved for publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence May 2001 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 Scope Note Afghalrnista na ffmpHc afio s of a ThUban Victory This Estimate assesses the implications of the Taliban becoming the de facto ruler of Afghanistan over the next five years The Estimate assumes that the Taliban's momentum on the battlefield will continue and that during 2001 the Afghan civil war will reach a point that most observers would characterize as a Taliban military victory with no negotiated settlement The postulated scenario does not assume the end of aU armed resistance by the Northern Alliance led by Ahmed Shah Masood but it does assume that Masood will either be confined to his stronghold in the Panjshir Valley or leave the country and that neither he nor any other anti-Taliban element will play a wider role in governing Afghanistan The purpose of the Estimate is not to forecast near-term military events in Afghanistan although boxes address this subject and the status of international efforts to mediate a settlement NIE 2001-06H May 2001 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 Contents Page Scope Note 1 Key Judgments Discussion Priorities for a Victorious Taliban Challenges to Internal Control errorists Likely To Remain Perceptions of the United States 18 22 26 28 29 30 32 33 34 35 35 36 36 37 3 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 SE Key judgments Afghanistano- Implications of a ThUbaim Victory After a military victory the Taliban will remain a largely insular movement whose top priority will be to consolidate its power and impose its version of Islam within Afghanistan while seeking diplomatic recognition as the country's sole legitimate government Demobilized Taliban fighters will be available for mercenary service in neighboring'states and Muslim conflicts Taliban victory will not prompt the Taliban to expel foreign extrerrusts who use Afghanistan as a training and staging area The Taliban is ideologically sympathetic to Islamic insurgents such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan IN Kashmiris and Chechens Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 The Taliban will continue to resist pressure to force Usama Bin Ladin from Afghanistan -- - • An end to the war however will diminish the relative value of Bin Ladin's military assistance compared to the value of international recognition In the near term therefore Taliban officials-hopeful that a victory will attract recognition and development funding-may feel less reliant on Bin Ladin • If such outside help does not materialize Taliban officials may grow even closer to Bin Ladin who makes financial and other contributions to Afghanistan's civilian infrastructure The paramount role of Taliban leader Mullah Omar will be a major impediment to changes in the regime's policies • Military victory will tend to strengthen Omar's hold on power in the near term although it will eventually widen existing rifts within the lead- ership Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 ltmk Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 - Anti-Americanism is not a basic component of Afghan culture but Taliban leaders-who blame Washington for abandoning Afghanistan after the Soviets withdrew in 1989 and resent the US cruise missile attack in 1998 and US-Russian cooperation on ITN Security Council Resolution 1333-are increasingly adopting the radical rhetoric and political agenda of transnational elements such as Bin Ladin who have championed their cause 8 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 Discussion Priorities for a Victorious Taliban The Desire for International Recognition A victory would lead the Taliban to step up its campaign for international recognition to legitimize the group's claim as the sole government of Afghanistan The group already believes it deserves recognition because it The Taliban leadership is consumed with achieving military victory and fulfilling a messianic mission to bring what it regards as a more authentic Islam to all Afghans controls the vast majority of the country Ethnic Pashtun Dominance OThe chauvinistically Pashtun Taliban will be unwilling to share power with other ethnic groups apart from a token minister or two The current Taliban leadership is overwhelmingly Pashtun F - Several factors will lead the Taliban to focus on consolidating its power and imposing its ideology on Afghanistan Challenges to Internal Control Upon victory Taliban officials are likely to The Taliban's Version of Shar'ia Law 771he Taliban believes it has a divine mandate to institute a proper Islamic govern- redeploy fighters to try to enforce and maintain their edicts especially in areas that are ment and rid the country of warlordism newly under their control 11 -Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 • No Afghan government has effectively controlled most of the countryside however even under the monarchical rule that ended in the early 1970s 12 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 Afghanistan Frontlines as of Early May 2009 Banaery rre sen an ro nacessanro auoar uu e C TaP aa - Mashhad i Jv r • efa lJr f' -- - 1 r7• r Y a -i- rCt-r -- rJalalabzd - far 1 _ l Z11 P r1fALr hn sto k Zwor l f C Gha nr j r Oryzg n lKand4har Helma d -O 1 L r Territory held by Northern Alliance I Yandahar• Pockets of territory held by Northern Alliance I r F-V-WO tVPMc QW - Province boundary F -i-i 0 NO L7 Pashtun tribes' historic inability to unite however Nvill keep a viable alternative Pashtun group from forming D Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 S f it feels secure in its victory the Taliban may make at least limited attempts to moderate its strict interpretation of Shar'ia law--especially if encouraged to do so by international aid or recognition in addition to the need to preclude domestic opposition Some evidence suggests that from time to time the Taliban has moderated its rigid social policies • In early September 1998 aid workers reported signs of relaxation of Taliban strictures such as women at work and girls in schools in Kandahar-the main stronghold of the movementand claimed that the more secure the Taliban feels about its control of the country the more freedom it has been granting citizens according to press reports • In July 2000 however-when faced with the prospect of new UN sanctions-the Taliban L__jAn end to the civil war would diminish the Taliban's need for Bin Ladin's military assistance In the near term therefore Taliban banned the employment of Afghan women in foreign nongovernmental organizations NGOs officials-hopeful that a victory will attract recognition and development funding-may feel less reliant on Bin Ladin Terrorists Likely To Remain • Taliban officials might grow even closer to Bin Ladin however if they believed the international community was unlikely to provide the Taliban with diplomatic recognition and reconstruction aid • Bin Ladin already makes contributions to Afghanistan's devastated infrastructure for which the Taliban takes credit 14 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 Pin Ladin's ability to remain in Afghanistan rests in large part on his close relationship with Mullah Omar Omar appears to have been influenced by Bin Ladin's thinking since statements that the United States should withdraw its forces from Saudi Arabia Oman's decision to grant asylum to the hijackers of the India Air flight in December 1999 vas a reversal of his earlier decision to arrest them and send them to India mar as ma eseveral M Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 The Taliban's Path to Power The Taliban emerged in late 1994 as a movement of zealous religious school students motivated initially by the desire to cleanse rampant lawlessness from Afghanistan's second-largest city Kandahar Victories over local warlords quickly bolstered the Taliban's confidence and propelled its ambitions well beyond its originally limited objectives The Taliban's goal of ruling the entire country came within reach when it captured Kabul in September 1996 By then the Taliban encountering minimal armed opposition had extended its presence over large areas of the country outside the ethnically Pashtun south The Taliban came close to achieving countrywide ascen- dance with the capture ofMazar-e Sharif in 1998 and Taloqan in 2000 The Taliban's version ofIslam is a mixture of Koranic principles and Pashtunwali or Code of the Pashtuns It is As long as Bin Ladin is in Afghanistan the Taliban will be reluctant to enforce significant restrictions on him-especially if the group continues to rely on him for military or reconstruction aid The Taliban will continue to perceive that Bin Ladin's public support for the group gives the Taliban stature in the Muslim world based on an extremeform of the Deobandi school of Islam which Afghan refugeesmany of whom would laterfound the Taliban-learned in refugee camps in Pakistan in the 1980s and early 1990s Deobandism does have a history in Afghanistan but was not prevalent at the time of the rise of the group in 1994 • During an interview in 1998 Bin Ladin claimed that we support the Taliban and we consider ourselves part of them Our blood is Omar's support for Bin Ladin would so tn f Bin Ladin tried to exert increased influence over Afghan of drs mixed with the blood of our Afghan brothers For us there is only one government in Afghanistan It is the Taliban government 16 S Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 Taliban victory would not prompt Arabs who came to Afghanistan have acquired e an to expel other foreign extremists who use Afghanistan as a training staging area on a large scale The Taliban is sympathetic to several Islamic insurgent groups such as the Kashmiris Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan EVRD and the Chechens In addition many land married Afghan wives and become fully integrated into Afghan society Iz Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 S T • In February 1999 the Taliban claimed it did not know the whereabouts of Bin Ladin to publicly distance itself from the terrorist and avoid what the group perceived as impending US airstrikes iA Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 I in Ladin-s Aid to the Taliban i I i m Ladin also planned to build a near 1 000-student religious school with dormitories mid a 50-bed clinic mid a large mosque north of Kabul I Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 Terrorism Linked to Taliban-Ruled Afghanistan JSuspects in several major terrorist incidents have been trained in directed from or given safe haven in Afghanistan since the Taliban gained control of most of from the Taliban The Taliban did not arrest the hijackers the country in 1996 • According to press reports suspects in the attack on the USS Cole also trained in Afghanistan • The hijacking of India Air Flight 814 in late December 1999 also underscored the ties between Kashmiri militants and Afghanistan The hijackers ordered the aircraft to Afghanistan almost certainly expecting to receive sympathetic treatment continued Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 Terrorism Linked to Taliban-Ruled Afg-kawdstan continued • Last year Israeli authorities announced the arrest of a Palestinian who vent to Afghanistan for support and training and returned to establish terrorist cells in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 1 1 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 Afghanistan Host to Terrorists Without the Taliban Afghanistan's role as a terrorist safe haven is not solely a product of the Taliban Afghanistan's use as a pan- Islamic training groundfor indoctrination and instruction predates the Taliban's existence Muslims from around the world some of whom later joined terrorist groups came to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets in the 1980s he Taliban will continue to face periodic bouts of financial difficulties and may have to prioritize its spending as it has in the past 22 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 S The Humanitarian Crisis L_ oorfood production inadequate irka- I million hectares-taken out ofproduction structure and the lack of social welfare over- the past 40 years because of warfare landrnines and land abandonment More- assistance render Afghans vulnerable to famine and displacement This past year the shifting f-ontlines of war combined with the worst drought in 30 years caused a hugeflow of refugees The Taliban has offered little or no assistance with the burden left to interna- over average yields-about 1 metric ton nrt per hectare compared to a world average of 2 9 mt per hectare--are constrained by the lack offertilizer shortages of irriga- tion water and a scarcity of high Melding reheat varieties tional aid organizations • An estimated 2 6 million refugees now live outside Afghanistan's borders in Iran and Pakistan according to the United Nations High Commission on Refugees UNHCR Another 500 000 Afghans are internally displaced Pakistan has absorbed 200 000 refugees since September 2000 According According to UN estimates more than 3 million people inside Afghanistan will require emergency food aid this summer Major pockets of displaced persons as of early 2001 include the northeastern region around Taloqan-as well as the Tajik- to press reports hundreds ofAfghans seeking food and shelter have died from starva- Afghan border with roughly 100 000 the northern region around Mazar-e Sharif 100 000 the central region around Bam- tion and exposure ian 50 000 the western region around Herat 100 000 and the southern region • According to UN statistics Afghanistan's low food production mainly grain is due around Kandahar with 70 000 mainly Kochi nomads primarily to the long-term loss of nearly 25 percent of cultivated area-nearly z Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 2d Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 To the extent the Tahban becomes more secure the pragmatists' views may increasingly influence the group's policies although without a change in leadership any policy changes are likely to be incremental 26 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 Opium Poppy Growing Areas in Afghanistan ti 1 1l C hina Turkmenistan _ cam LJ R ds%hzhsn rr an ' Bai3 h may n Yondo2 N iT2-har Samangan Farsab v z Boefilan Sar-e POI' J Bad -Is Konorf o Bamian KabO olt 1 O t • Ghovx '- Oruzgan i ' J yY Helmand ISLA BAD J India IL Ghazni Pa tika r Zabol j ca I 111 i-j Growing area Province boundary f Kandahar 10- Afghanistan Opium Cultivation BoundaryrcPre W u nnl n axan d V C ML V an Production 1991 to 2000 Thousand metric tons Thousand hectares 40 Cultivation Production 27 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 Jghayaistan's Narcotics Industry • Afghanistan became the world's leading illicit opium producer in 1998 and the upward trend continued in 2000 with Afghanistan supplying an estimated 72 percent of the world's illicit opium Poppy cultivation increased 25 percent to 64 510 hectares and opium production rose by another 28 percent to 3 656 metric tons further solidifying Afghanistan as the primary source of opiates to Europe Central Asia and Russia Perceptions of the United States • Over the past several years Afghan producers have switchedfrom supplying mainly morphine base to Turkish distributors to producing and supplying more heroin to international markets Anti-Americanism is not a basic component of Afghan culture It is common for Afghans-including Taliban members-to express appreciation for the help the United States provided them during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan This apprecia- tion is however usually accompanied by expressions of confusion over why the United States abandoned them after the Soviets withdrew resentment over the 1998 US cruise missile attack and US-Russian cooperation on UN sanctions Resolution 1333 The Taliban has Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 capitalized on this confusion to foment antiAmerican sentimentbuf in reaction to specific US and Western policies viewed as hostile toward Afghanistan • The President of the United States was burned in effigy at protests the Taliban organized in major Afghan cities after UN sanctions went into effect in late 1999 • Mullah Omar-probably under the influence of Bin Ladinhas resorted to anti-US rhetoric in criticizing US-led actions such as UN sanctions and has accused the United States of anti-Muslim behavior Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 _•-• _ • S -Approved for Release 2013 07 17 - -- -- ---- - C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 32 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 S 33 TA Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 S1 ' QUET Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 S as Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 for Release 2013 07 17 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 37 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 IC01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 S T 32 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 41 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 The National Intelligence Council The National Intelligence Council NIC manages the Intelligence Community's estimative process incorporating the best available expertise inside and outside the government It reports to the Director of Central Intelligence in his capacity as head of the US Intelligence Community and speaks authoritatively on substantive issues for the Community as a whole Approved for Release 2013 07 17 C01118987 Approved for Release 2013 07 17 d Disclosure Information available as of May 2001 was used in the preparation of this National Intelligence Estimate The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this Estimate The Central Intelligence Agency 1• The Defense Intelligence Agency The National Security Agency The Bureau of Intelligence and Research Department of State The National Imagery and Mapping Agency also participating The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army The Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy Director of Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Department of the Air Force The Director of Intelligence Headquarters Marine Corps This Estimate was approved for publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence P CE207IIaU U Or ICC or 5 PPORT SERV9 G-P s Ualll•nell fla oelloa Approved for Release 2013 07 17 Printed m Printing Phorosropln• Group