· i ·1NCOMING TELEGRAM I II i I • l 48 · ·•· r s · Action • ·' •• J f • 'I S S Info Department of S1ate j • CORRECTION ISSUED J$ to 29 62 7 a m LM · Control Rec'd · 1- • • • ·19238 October 27 1962 1 18 p m r FROM Ankara - CORRECTED COPY f lLt TO Secretary of State NO 587 October 6 6 p m SECTION ONE OF THREE C 'J J t Il t i PRIORITY I I •1_ _ c v l - t--t ' I' I ' L L '- • l4 • J 'l - ACTION DEPARTMENT 587J INFORMATION PARIS TOPOL PRIORITY 21 ROME 57 EYES ONLY SECRETARY AND AMBASSADORS FINLETTER AND REI1'1t ARDT Reference i I I I ii· I I Department telegram 445 As recognized reference telegram removal Jupiters from Turkey in context Cuban situation would present major pfobV m not only in terms of bilat ral Turkish-American relationships but also NATO association Problem would be partly psycho- political partly substantive psycho-political in sens e that Turks are proud courageous people who do not understand concept or process of corn romise It is this quality of steadfast even stolid courage in both spirit and policy togethe with traditional Turkish military skill which is actually their greatest asset to US and to West generally and by same token it is here that we would have most to lose if in process of Jupiter ' ' emoval Turks should get the impression that their interests as an ally were being traded off in order to appease an enemy Furthermore as brought out in conversation with Foreign Minister Erkin yesterday ·Turks deeply resent any coupling of Turkey and Cuba on ground that situations completely different and tP t suggestions to that effect especially wben co ing from western sources are both inexcusable and seriously damaging and all the more so when associated with id ea that Turkish relationship with US can be equated with stooge status of Cuba with USSR Problem is REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED'' _____e_ _reB £ __ ------ PROHIBITED DECLASSiFIEO '-- I t O 1 6 Sec 3 E and or D j tLJ 5 J 3 SJ otr _ -1 I By_J £ l _NARS _ Data¥ __ -' I --· -2- 587 October 26 6 p m from Ankara SECTION ONE OF THREE Problem is also substantive in sense that Turks as we well know set great store on arms which they feel necessary meet their needs and were adamant in Lefusing our suggestion last year that Jupiter project not be implemented No indication in meantime that th r position has changed and can therefore be assumed that if we insist to contrary demand for arms to fill vacuum would be specific and sizeable In so briefly outliningc Turkish I de of matter I am of course mindful of significant non-Turkish considerations and that in par1 _icular the idea of being abte to use what some regard as 2 dubious and waning asset in the form of Turkish Jupiters as a negotiating counter to effect removal of immediately dangerous • Soviet missiles in Cuba has strong attraFtions In bolstering this point of view I would also venture to suggest that as a bargaining asset Turkish Jupiters might be a ore potent factor in Soviet eyes than they are in fact for simple reason that propinquity tends to magnify as we have repeatedly seen in Soviet reaction to military installations on their p riphcry irrespective of cheir clefensive•purpose I is also recognized that timing is an important element since a sets of termir1al value must be exploited if at all -sufficiently in advance of expiration of usefulness either real o imagined HARE LM r I I · I I • 1·1 '-Ir ' • •• •a I ' t 1 · ail tll · -1- J • •• •• • ••• • ••• •• · 1 • '9 _ Ill • • • • • • Controi 19 144 Action Rec'd ss FROM Ankara Info October 27 1962 10 07 a m TO Secretary ot State NO 587 October 26 6 p m SECTION TWO OF TBllEE 1 PRICRITY ACTION DEPARTMENT 587 INFCllMATION PARIS PRICllITY TOPOL 21 ROME 57 EYFS ONLY S El'ARY iUm AMBASSADCRS FINL T'l'm AND REINBARD'I' Reference DEPTEL 445 Unfortunately this is situation where attempt illuminate essential facts tend empha aize oqscurity Jf road ahead However following alternatives are suggested in 01 der of increasing difficulty 1 lsiest solution would be resolution of Cuban problem without bringing Turkish missiles into picture Not only would this avoid causing canplications in Turkey's US and NATO relationships but it would also be in accord with officially announced poliey to effect that there is no relation between the situation in Cuba and the sitU tion elsewhere 1n the world tfl Circular 738 October 24 which missions authorized to u 1_ in· f denying validity of reports that the US might be willing to negotiate bases in Cuba fer bases in Western Europe but which in view of general character of reply and Turkey's NATO manber g C ship would also be e ially valid in respect of Turkey 0 C Realized of course that ref9rence telegram was differently directed but believed desirable emphasize that this is solid poait on from which deviations pTeeent varying degrees hazard - - • • • g • • • • • o • • • • • • • 1 e • 1 10 1 •• • 1 • 1 e 1 • • 1 ••• • •• • 1 e ec O 'A 4M i This cop DiV t etur 4 to aJI R c tatraJ tn with no AC'TIOilif I ASSIGNCO 1- II Of' VICI SY1118 X 8 m 'Z re z -j m TO hAMC 0 O FtCtlit -i OIJt CTIONS f TO ii- X m z I w w 0 X F77GU05-1473 w f- zw •• • •• ••••• • • • ••• • • •• •• •• •• • •• • z °'cu - • • • •••••••• ···s g • • • • •e • •• •• •••• •• •••• •• • • ••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 9 -2- 587 October 26 6 p m from Ankara SECTION WO OF THI EE 0 w u 0 0 ex w CL Second alternative would be a phasing out of Jupiter program and replacement by some presently non-existent but prospective alternative such as aeaborn multilateral nuclear force within NATO mentioned in reference telegrsm Understood however that although this idea might be sold to Turks on merits it would have limited baTgaining value with Soviets since implem tation would take place later and b it would have to be kept secret and would therefore have no public relations value 2 Third alternative would be directed to earlier and more specific dismantling of Jupiters and in more obvious relation• ship to Cuban situation but would be on strictly secret basis with Soviets Fact that Turks have chosen keep Jupiters secret so far could be of sane help but problem of negotiations with Turks would be difficult since we would necessarily be venturing on to the sensitive ground of coupling Turkey and Cuba and stipulation of secrecy might not be too convincing since would involve good faith of Soviets who would always have option reveal to detriment US-Turkish relations Howe-tier proceeding dubious asstDption that these non-substantive hurdles could be overcane would be foreseeable that Turks would feel need of material filling of void created by loss Jupiters Possible that in that case they night have-some interest in Polaris or seaborn nuclear force but doubtful if they would feel adequate compensate for loss of Jy pite-rs and foreseeable that alternative or supplemental requests for military hardware would be ma de 3 4 Q Fourth alternative would be arrangEE ent where there would be relationship implicit or otherwise with Cuban situation and where although there would be effort handle discreetly pt blicity would be anticipated This would be most difficult of all Not only would we have difficulty reeonciling with our own principles but hard see how Turks could stanach and retain their self respect not to mention compensation in form of additional • • • • • l J • • • • •-e • • • • o • d milit ry is apce v1i 1 c ii m t cg fXPfO C • o • •• •• ee• •• • •• e ••• 8 • • • 8 •• • • •• • •• • •• ·· •• • • 00 HARE - -• ·- · - Ill I II - • I _ - 1 • Deptlrtinent of Sta NT RECORD con INCOMI lB EGRDI • T • F770005-1474 • • •••• gun ·· ••••••••• • • •• •• • ••• • •••• • • • •• ••••• •• •• • c1Jro1 • • • f9214 t • • · w •• Action I a e a C I I ••• • •• •o • ss • d October 27 1962 12 33 p m fl' 1 FROM Ankara Info Secretary ot State TO NO 587 October 26 6 p m SECTION THREE OF THREE PRIORITY ACTION DEPARTMENT 587 INFORMATION PARIS TOPOL PRIORITY 21 ROME 57 EYES ONLY SECRETARY AND AMBASSADORS FINLETTER AND REINHARDT Reference 1 Department telegram 445 As regards tactics in respect of any of these alternatives it is suggested that the following additional points should be borne in mind ' 1 Given Turki h attachment to NATO a matter oi basic policy it would be desirable perhaps even necessary to present any idea re Jupiters in a NATO context ' 2 British abandoning of Thors and possible Italian agreement dismantle Jupiters could be helpful in approaching Yorks In order be effective argumentation for dismantling Jupiter and means of remedying resulting situation should be given C' 3 primarily military rather than political emphasis SACELTR could be helpful since both Norstad and Lemnitzer well and favorably known here m 0 0 C 4 In opening Jupiter issue we should be prepared for s bscquet demands in respect of our other installations in Turkey to which we attach high priority Such demands could come from either Soviets or Turks depending on type or proposal made •s ••• • ••• •• To conclude § - 0 • C' TT1 tJo- •_ Thi • c - o AUIGNl 0 TQ CAlil Of IJICE lt ••• • • Cl • • • •• • • 0 9 • • 0 • 0 •• - a - to amw • oBllhll ai J r J• i th r U Ut i -'Tt Of' ACTI Z i - 01RC CTION'A I TO Witta t GPO t 30 500 F770005-1475 SECRET ••• • •••• ••• •• • • • • •• • ••••••••••• OctoJ iej 16 $ THREE from Ankara • • 6 • rr' 7 • • IC Icit THt $ • • • • · -2-587_ To conclude it is my feeling that if proper means could be found good case could be made for removal of Jupiters from Turkey as counter for removel of Soviet missiles from Cuba Proplem is in finding means but try as I can I have been unable to hit upon a suggested solution other than gradual elimination which would not present acute difficulty in terms of our own relationship with Turkey and the maintenance of itS-p sl d on i as an ally of the West as well aa the chain reaction which so doing would have not only in Turkey but also els·ewhere I say this most regretfully since I have no brief to make for Jupiters However to suggest their elimination in terms of the Soviet-Cuban conspiracy presents problems of substance and principle which seem to be inescapable and to involve inescapable consequences In submitting thia appraisal I realize that other minds are focussed on this problem and would anticipate that different ideas might be generated from other points of view possibly for instance in framework some broader disarmament scheme If so I should be happy with benefit of such information to dig into question further HARE MCA - •• ••• s _ ••• ••a e ••• •• • • •• • • • •• j 90 I - - •• •• • ••••• • • •• •••• •• •e•• ••• • • e•• ••• • • •• •• •a • •e • • • •e •• •• •• ••• •• 0 C 0 0 0 SiCRET G