' - - · ···-·-·-----····--· -- · ------------ • • -·o·EcLAssiF Eo ··- IAutholiry_1 l sj Ju 7 tBy hJ - r1ARA Date · --··· TOP SECRET MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION Time Place C 0 p y Participants 14 December 1962 Turkish Delegation Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Paris France Robert S 1-lcl-l mara U S Secretary of Defense Paul H Nitze Assistant Secretary of Defense ISA Ilhami Sancar Minister of Defense Turkey ---------------------------- - -11r Sancar began the discussion with an expression of Turkey's concern about the military assistance being given the Iraqis by the Soviets He was particularly concerned about the MIG-2ls which he claimed were being suppl i ecl b McNamara stated he did not believe they were receiving MIG-2ls In any case Iraq did not have the capacity comparable to Turkey of operating and maintaining an Air Force Mr Sancar said it was not a matter of Turkey being afraid of Iraq but it was important to make it clear to the Iraqis that they shouldn't even think of being able to challenge Turkey and that Turkish public opinion should be sure of US support in this matter Mr McNamara said it was quite clear t hat Turkish public opinion shouldn't doubt the purpose of th US to a sist them He did however wish to raise one question -- this was the matter of JUPITERs in Turkey TOP SECRET · I -DEC1 Assi 1Er-·- I 11 1 0 s J Ju 7 · • Authority C By - hJ ' 2 IWJA 02te ··-· - ' ' TOP SECRET - 2 - When the Russians had raised the question of the comparability of their missiles in Cuba to JUPITERs in Turkey we had finnly refused to discuss the matter with them This is our position today and will continue to be our position But there was another aspect of the matter When we considered plans for striking the Soviet missiles in Cuba we thought the Russians would almost certainly respond by striking the JUPITERs in Turkey This consideration acted as a strong restraint on our action We had no desire to draw on one of our Allies a Soviet reaction to an action of ours In any case we consider the JUPITERs obsolete even though they have a certain residual value We think it essential in the interests of our Ally Turkey that they should be promptly removed Mr McNamara said he would presently describe an alternative The reason we thought they should be removed was that Berlin might come to a crisis again in three months or so We would not want to see Turkey under the danger that might flow from such a crisis At the same time we saw merit in having more modern missiles available targeted against the same targets that the JUPITERs are now targeted against -- missiles with a faster reaction time and greater protection Therefore we believe it would be advisable if prior to April the JUPITERs in Turkey were to be dismantled and as a substitute POLARIS submarine-based missiles be assigned to SACEUR and that Turkey participate with SACEUR in the targeting of those missiles Only in this way do we believe Turkey could be relieved of serious danger Mr Sancar said he would submit and expose Mr McNamara's views to his government He said they had thought that a more secure weapons system could be substituted for the JUPITERs but th t this should be done taking into account all the political and military f actors Their place should be covered by efficient weapons covering the same targets Turkey was not prepared to have the JUPITERs removed in a manner which would leave a vacuum which would attract an attack upon them Mr McNamara said he agreed it was not our thought that this should be done until POLARIS missi les under SACEUR with Turkish participation in targeting were on station We did think that this could and should be done by approximately the first of April TOP SECRET ·- -- - - - -- - -· • Uf l ft l Ul - 0 f lf fU 1 1 01 l AHCJ•Yl I · - • ' DECLASSff EO-· -- -· Authon y 111 - sj Jv z ey l y V llARA Date - ·- - TOP SECRET - 3 - Mr Sancar said that the core of the problem was Turkey's confidence in its Ally there must be no moral depression -either in the people or the Army One shouldn't create the impression that the best of Allies was leaving Turkey to a condition of aloneness They couldn't agree to anything which would suggest the US was leaving Turkey to its own fate Mr McNamara said that he could not believe that the assignment of POLARIS missiles -- clearly a more efficient system than the JUPITERs -- should produce moral depression in either the people or the Army He did however think the best way to proceed was to limit knowledge of this discussion to the smallest number of people absolutely necessary Under no circumstances should the Soviets be allowed to know what we were discussing He suggested that Mr Sancar discuss the matter with his government We would send them a note putting our ideas in writing Mr Sancar said that the matter would be dealt with in the highest secrecy 1'fr Sancar then reverted to the question of aircraft He said they had very serious shortfalls They had expected the F-104G at an earlier date Now they were told delivery had been postponed to December 1963 This was having an adverse effect on the morale of Turkish forces It restrains their capacity for training He asked l1r McNamara to use his influence to have the delivery date accelerated Mr McNamara i ndicated we would have problems in accelerating delivery but we can work to resolve this problem He said it would be appropriate to link an announcement of an earlier delivery date with the replacement of the JUPITERs He indicated that time was of the essence He suggested that Mr Sancar send him a personal cable after he had consulted with his government In the meantime he would explore the F-104G problem Mr McNamara referred to General Sunay' s request for rifles 1'fr McNamara said we were going to send 25 000 M-1 rifles a month beginning he thought in April and we would continue to do so up to a total of 250 000 rif les The meeting adjourned C