OP SECRET IND Min 2 ' l STEERING GROUP ON IMPLEMENTING THE NASSAU DECISIONS Minutes of Second Meeting Held January 3 1963 at 5 00 p m Present Mr Kitchen Chairman Mr McNaughton Vice Chairman Ambassador Hare Ambassador Reinhardt Ambassador Finletter Mr Meloy Mr McGeorge Bundy Mr Rostow Mr Brubeck Mr Chayes Mr Garthoff Mr Klein Mr Spiers Mr Orwick Mr Weiss Mr Yarmolinsky Mr Rowen General Emrick Mr Popper Mr Schae tze 1 Agenda Item 1 - Mr Me loy•s Planning and Ob jec tives Paper on the Jupiter Miss iles Mr Kitchen opened the meeting by welcoming Ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt who had been asked to participate in the discussion on Jupiter missiles He then asked Mr Meloy to comment on his Sub- Group ' s paper on this subject which had been distributed to Members at the meeting Mr Meloy pointed out they had avoided use of the word withdrawal and were using the word replace in respect to the removal of t he missiles At the end of the paper there was a proposed time schedule of actions which he thought would be realizable There was an unresolved point namely although it was proposed mo st mo ves would be completed by mid-March there was a question a bout the desirability of an April 1 deadline particularly fr o t he point of view of publicity resulting from leaks As a result of the ensuing discussion it was agreed 1 that the April 1 deadline should be removed wherever it appeared in the paper 2 that it should be fully understood by Members that it was a U S deadline for internal use only 3 that it was not to be mentioned to either the Italians or the Turks Mr McNaughton then related the deadline to the statement in the letter to the Italian Minister of Defense that the Polaris force would be on station by April 1 He believed meeting this deadline was not a problem Mr Rowen suggested it perhaps would be better to say on station by April Ambassad or TOP SECRET DECLASSIFIED Authority M7qD 7 TOP SECRET -2Ambassador Reinhardt suggested that the vessels be shown to the Italians by paying calls at Italian ports before the Jupiters were dismentled Mr Rowen replied there would be no problem in t heir visiting Italy before going on station Mr Meloy concluded his comment by pointing out that the letters to the MODs would go forward as soon as possible after approval and preceding the return of the Ambassadors Future communication would be through the Ambassadors and their instructions would follow shortly In respect to Tab E - Public Affairs Problems - the actual papers would be drafted after this paper as a whole had been approved It was noted that Tabs I and J were not ready for submission Mr McNaughton stated he wished to r aise a problem In moving back the deadline to supply F-1O4Gs to Turkey to May 1963 ' it would be necessary to t ake planes away from the Republic of China Norway Denmark and Gree ce Ambassador Hare interjected a question on assisting the Turks on their public stance on the who le Jupiter replacement issue as soon as possible and mentioned he was planning to return on the 9th Ambassador Reinhardt commented on this point that from the Italian view there were two serious aspects First the r emoval of the Jupiters would leave a gap in their weaponry However he thought the Polaris by being on station would solve this problem Second the r e would be a gap in Italian participation in the exercise They have participated in manning the Jupiters What would replace this cooperation They will undoubtedly raise the issue of equipping the Garibaldi and two submarines with Polaris racks There is also the question of nuclear propulsion for their submarines This makes it imperative that we mo ve on multilateral force and that within months we have men selected for training otherwise the Italians may interpret our actions as moving backwards In reply Mr Kitchen referred to the Nassau Communique and Mr Rowen stated that in theory Italian and Turkish officers participate in targeting in SHAPE Ambassador Hare raised a question on the meaning of staged evolution It was concluded that the Ambassadors could best answer questions on the points raised by referrin g to the Nassau Communique and to the statements which Mr Ball will make at the forthcoming NAC meeting Ambassador Hare asked if a non-nuclear country could in any way contribute to a mixed-manned force Mr Bundy replied affirmatively and commented that the Turks might participate in a mixed-manned force sooner than the French if the French do not react positively to our approach on this matter Mr J itchen TOP SECRET DECLASSIFIED Authority k 17qo 7 - TOP SECRET - 3- Mr Kitchen asked General Emrick for his comments from the JCS view on the paper General Emrick noted that i n the letter to the Italian MOD submarines were to be assigned to SACEUR rather than earmarked for SACEUR and that Secretary McNamara had approved this designat ion He continued by saying we should remove any implication under the modernization of SETAF that we are replacing the Cor porals one f or one with Sergeants It was generally agreed that the insertion of the phrase furnishing a suitable force II sh ould re -n o ve this implica tion He also commented that in the last para gr aph of both letters the words this proposal should be plural Mr McNaughton questioned support of SETAF for at leas t an interim period and related it to the problem of Italianization Ambassador Reinhardt commented that support of SETAF should be left vague with an option for Italianiza tion Returning to the letter to the Turkish MOD Gene ral Emrick comme n ted that the JCS wished to maintain the present schedule of deliveries of F- 104Gs Ad vancing delivery of the planes to the Turks would not mean they would be effective militarily because the Turks would not be trained to either fly or to maintain them It was pointed out that Secretary McNamara wanted the planes there in May Mr Kitchen commented we wo uld prefer this for political reasons It was agreed that Mr McNaughton wou ld clarify this point with Secretary McNama ra On the question of nuclear bomb dispersal it was stated that f ou r MK 28s would be in Turkey by July and the remainder by the end of the yea r Dispersal would re quire Presidential approval Mr Bundy sta ted the President was against new deployment of nuclear bombs witho ut permissive links It was suggested that the problem could be avoided by t r ansfe rring the bombs to igloos with the links supplied as soon as possible Mr Rowen said he would wor k out a schedule on delivery of the links and we could merely inform the Turks that nuclear bombs would be delivered by the end of 1963 He was asked to hedge the assurance so no extensive deliveries would be made before the links were available Mr Bundy commented that he thought Presiden tial approval could be obtained under the circumstances i e wit h some links t o be delivered by the end of 1963 but that the President would also wish to know whethe r provision to the Turks would defer installation of links on weapons scheduled f or other recipients Mr Rowen agreed to obtain a comprehensive report on the permissive link picture Mr Bundy TOP SECRET DECLASSIFIED Authority k t- q7qo 7 • TOP SECRET -4- Mr Bundy package to the in Palm Beach Naughton would to the package be wired pointed out that presentation of the Jupiter President was scheduled for Saturday morning It was agreed that Mr Kitchen and Mr Mccoordinate any revisions and the amendments being carried by courier on Friday would A enda Item 2 - Mr Rostow ' s Paoer and Summar Strate Sub-Grou V on Post-Nassau Mr yitchen asked Mr Rostow to comment briefly on his Basic Strategy paper Subsequent discussion revealed that Defense had not received copies of the basic paper Mr Yarmolinsky suggested that Defense prepare a written comment on Mr Rostow's paper and Mr Rowen accepted responsibility for preparing this It was agreed that Mr Rostow's paper would be discussed at a later meeting Mr Bundy brought the attention of the members to the President's backgrounder and commented that the press had not made as good use of it as they should have He asked that there be wide distribution of the backgrounder within both the Departments of State and Defense Agenda Item 3 - Progress Reports by the Chairmen of the Sub- Groups I II III and VI Mr Kitchen referred to the reports from Chairmen of Sub- Groups which had been attached to the AQenda There were no comments in addition to the writt n reports Mr Kitchen referred to the appointment of Mr Armstrong within Sub-Group I to consider all alternatives in making arms deliveries to the British Mr Weiss referred to Mr Rostow's paper and raised the question of whether its treatment of the NATO Executive Committee concept should not be picked up by Sub-Group II After some discussion Mr Popper agreed to work up a paper on the subject although it would as a matter of priority ha e to follow his Sub- Group II paper He also noted it would probably require a different approach and therefore require different membership within his Sub- Group General Emrick reported that JCS was working on a paper considering what could be done to establish a nuclear force Its concept was divided into two stages First what can be done with material available now for the experience for future use Second what could possibly be done under a multilate ral force TOP SECRET Mr Schaetzel • -5- Mr Schaetzel commented that in Sub-Group III they were attempting to determine where the French could begin in order t o gain parity with the UK He stated he would expect a series of flash communications from A bassador Bohlen on what we intend to offer the french He stated the Defense Department would have a fjrst cut at this problem the AEC would refine it then the Sub- Group would expand and refine on these papers Mr McNaughton commented that as a mode of operation it was ccP ptable to DOD to proceed as Mr Schaetzel had suggested i e papers wou ld be exchanged until the problem required more comprehensive t reatment in a full Steering Group or Sub-Group forum Note was taken of Sub-Gr oup IV's meeting at 10 o 'clock on Monday and of the Sub-Gr oup VI paper which would be available shortly for the Steering Group Other Business Mr itchen said he has asked INR to prepare papers on the reaction to Nassau in other NATO countries Mr Schaetzel asked that Mr Dutton be cut in on the work of the Steering Group because of eventual Congressional consideration of some aspects of its work Mr Schaetzel added that Mr Ball in going to Paris for the NAC presentation would also visit London and Bonn and possibly Rome Mr Brubeck asked all members to keep as much ma t erial as possible out of the Eyes Only category using Limit Distribution S S as much as possible as an alternative i n order to ease distribution of papers ' I '1---'-•-----r - t r I Jbhn Lloyd III ·· Exe lve Secretari at S S Room 7313 Ext 8171 TOP SECRET DECLASSIFIED Authority M7qD 7