BRIEFING ON CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS FRIDAY JANUARY 25 1963 U S SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLICS AFFAIRS OF THE CoMMI'M'EE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS l I I j i Washington DC The subcommittee met pursuant to notice at 10 a m in room S116 U S Capitol Building Senator Wayne Morse chairman of the subcommittee presiding · Present Senators Morse presiding Sparkman Hickenlooper and Aiken Also present Senators Fulbright chairman of the full committee Humphrey Mansfield Lausche Symington and Carlson Senator John Stennis of Mississippi Mr Marcy Mr Holt and Mr Henderson of the committee staff Senator MORSE All right gentlemen this briefing session will come to order The chairman wants to make a statement that this committee is in no way responsible for the news story that this committee is starting an investigation of Cuba · As Dr Marcy can tell the committee when the AP Mr Tony Vaccaro brought to this committee room a story from the New York Times which I shall put into the record in a moment and asking for a statement I said I knew nothing about it · I said I would simply call the State Department to give us an early briefing as to any knowledge they have as to the allegations made in the story In my presence Dr Marcy call d the State Department and notified them of my desire to have a briefing before my subcommittee The Secretary of State as usual in his spirit of wonderful cooperation with the Foreign Relations Committee agreed to set up this morning at 10 o'clock for the briefing CIRCUMSTANCES BEHIND THE SESSION But I want this record to show the circumstances that brought this briefing session into being I shall insert into the record at this time a copy of the New York Times article of January 23 an AP story and for the benefit of the subcommittee I will read it it is very brief The New York Times News Service said today Soviet forces in Cuba are reported working around the clock building and improving highly sophisticated ground and air defenses A Washington-dated dispatch by Tad Szulc said private reports from Havana confirmed in part by American experts on the Cuban situation relate that large shipments of weapons and other materials are continuing to arrive in Cuba 81 • 82 The story added Soviet encampments are being relocated and strengthened and Soviet experts are directing Cubans in the construction of underground depots hangars and runways The construction work is pparently concentrated in the main defe complex between Havana and the San Antonio De Los Banos air base in Camaquey province and in the Sierra Maestra area of Oriente province Soviet troops exclusively are doing the work and some sites are closed even to Cuban military personnel · into Cuba and So far as can be determined the military equipment being brought the work being done fit the classification of defensive weapons ' 1 I felt that before a story such as that started to gain headway in this country on the basis that it might be authentic we owed it to the State Department to really give them the opportunity to par• ticipate in this briefing this morning I want to thank the Secre• tary for obliging us and I want to thank the head of the CIA Mr McCone for coming up here We did not ask him to come but he is always welcome and he is apparently coming up at the request of the State Department which is fine with us STAFF AS OBSERVERS I have only one other matter and I want to state this while the chairman of the full committee is here because I don't want this chair1nan to be embarrassed in any way because of the ruling that he has made concerning the procedure of this committee I think my ruling is right I haven't had a chance to talk to my colleagues but certain absent Senators who just couldn't be here this morning wanted to send their administrative assistants to this meeting and I refused to grant that permission It has always been my understanding Mr Chairman that in our Foreign Relations Committee executive sessions Senators are not free to send their administra• tive assistants to sit for them and as observe·rs I certainly unless I am overruled by my subcommittee shall strongly urge that that always be the rule of procedure of my subcommittee because frankly in my judgment if we ever start in this committee with all the top secret information that we handle to per9 lit Senators and I speak respectfully of them to substitute their administrative assistants as their eyes and ears at any executive meeting of this committee we will never have any check on leaks We don't have much anyway but you will lose all chance of checks on leaks and that is simply I think a statement of reality and not a criticism of any individual But unless I hear some objection at this time I am going to assume that the refusals that I have already made con• form with the pleasure of the committee Senator·MANSFIELD Mr Chairman I want to say that ifwe acted otherwise I would refuse to come to any more executive meetings because they are not Senators and I don't think they are entitled to that consideration Senator MORSE I appreciate that very much coming from the Majority Leader I think it is sound policy Senator AIKEN Me too Mr Chairman Ser ator FuLBRIGHT That is the· policy of the full committee Senator SPAUMAN lam in full accord · 83 Senator MORSE I am not sure in one instance my refusal was too happily received but I am accustomed to that reaction too sometimes Mr Secretary the table is yours and we will be very glad to hear from you STATEM• NT OF HON DEAN RUSK SECRETARY OF STATE ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN A McCONE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Secretary RusK Thank you very much Mr Chairman and gen- · tlemen I understand the committee is interested in the first instance in the question of the possible military buildup by the Soviet Union in Cuba I am deeply grateful to my colleague John McCone the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for being here this morning I would like if the chairman is willing to ask him to give the committee a full briefing on the present Soviet military situation Senator MoRSE We will be honored to hear him Mr McCONE Mr Chairman I would like to discuss the Soviet military equipment that we observed to be in Cuba prior to the 1st of July and that which we believe and have reasonable proof is in Cuba at the present time which will establish the relative position today as opposed to 6 or 7 months ago However I would like to preface that by saying that we have Cuba under frequent aerial surveillance and therefore we have reason to believe that we know pretty well what is going on In addition we have other sources of intelligence which Jteeps us rather currently informed but of course we do not have so-called on-site inspection and to that extent we are handicapped Nevertheless it is our belief that there has been no substantial delivery of military equipment into Cuba by the Soviet bloc coun• tries since October the 24th there have been very substantial amounts of shipping as you know Unquestionably I believe there have been some military items received but there has only been one instance where we h ve detected a full shipload of what we thought was military equipment That was on a ship called the Simferopo_l which we kept under observation from the time it cleared the Bosphorous The _conduct of the ship gave us reason to believe that it carried military equi · • ment It docked and unloaded in Havana between January 17th and January 19th We had it under aerial suI Veillance We are satisfied that it the manner in which it was unloaded was proof in itself that it did have military equipment The crates were large although they were not of sufficient size to crate an offensive missile · We do not know the nature of the material that was received • The fact that it was unloaded in an excluded area by Cuban· military · · personnel proved to our satisfaction it was military equipment That was the only ship which had come in since October 24 car- rying military cargoes to the exclusion of all else Other military · cargo that might have been received was incidental 'and wu ·for t e- ·· ·placement and repair · · · · · 84 INCREASE· OF SOVIET PERSONNEL IN CUBA Now to go back to the situation on July 1st as you know there were a substantial number of items of militaey equipment in the ' hands of Cubans We think at that time there were aoout 500 Soviet and bloc technicians or training personnel who were there to assist the Cubans in the operation training for the operation of this equipment The situation today is quite different We estimate that there are about 17 000 Soviet personnel in Cuba at the present time This number is an estimate derived from all sources of intelligence as well as our understanding of the table or organization of the units that we have learned Therefore it is not based on a head count but we think there is sufficient hard intelligence so that it can be - afforded as a reasonable view of the situation · Hence the rise in Soviet and bloc technicians and military personnel from 500 on July 1st to 17 000 at the present time is in jtself a disturbing fact OFFENSIVE WEAPONS HAVE BEEN REMOVED ''' '- I will go into the specifics of the increase of the amount of equipment However it is our opinion that offensive weapons including MRBM the IRBMs and the bomber aircraft capable of reaching the United States we know of have been removed from Cuba and our aerial· S lrveillance has not given us evidence that any such · equipment remains How the exception to this is MIG-21 which can reach the United States a limited area of the United States and I will speak of that later The absence of penetrating on-site inspection is impossible to absolutely prove the non-existence ·of offensive equipment in Cuba but the estimate that all have been r moved is considered acceptable by the intelligence community Except for the withdrawal of the 42 MRBMs and IRBM the 42 IL-28 bomber aircra t nd a modest q1 1 ntity of ound equipment we have observed no withdrawal of m1btary u1pment from Cuba or no concentration of such equipment at leading points which might indicate a plan for such thdrawal We also have observed substantial construction of various kinds going on the most significant being construction of bal'l' acks at four locations where we believe Soviet personnel are concentrated in units We think this construction are barracks io house the personnel and would indicate to us an intention for their being perma• nently ·quartered AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS We have given a great de l of thought the air defense systems that have been created and installed ThlS involves 24 so-called surface-to-air-sites of· the ·most advanced tm that the Soviets have equipped with radar and linked together with an island wide com• munications net- · · · · · ·· · · · · ·There are six- · Senator MANSPIELD Mr McCone could you tell us the range of · · thoee · · · · · · · · · ' · · · Mr McCoNB Yea about 80 milee mil• effecµv'9-r nge ' ' _ · '' · - ·• · ' · 85 Secretary Rusx And effective altitu de Mr McCoNE Effective altitude from 80 to 100 thousand feet These missiles are effective against the U-2 aircraft There are six launching positions at _each one of the sites · We believe there is an inventory of about 500 missiles on the island This whole system is in the hands of the Soviets Insofar as we know the Cubans do not have access to it at all There is some indication the Cubans are being given some modest amount of training in the communications system but none on the surface-toair missile system itself STATISTICS ON SOVIET WEAPONS IN CUBA Now Mr Chairman to go to the specifics so much is being said about this I would like with your permission to go into some num- hers I will give you first the figure prior to July 1st or on July 1st and the figure that we estimate today Heavy and· medium tanks there were 160 of them in Cuba on July 1st they have 380 today · Assault guns there were 50 July 1st and there are about 100 today Armored personnel carriers there were 25 July 1st · we estimate 165 today We think these estimates are ratherdependablebecause • · · they are taken from a variety of photographic interpretation and which are reasonably good · · · · · · · Artillery pieces ranging from 76 to 122 millimeter there were 400 · on July 1st and there are 750 now Anti-aircraft guns as such about · the same although the number is quite formidable We figured 800 · July 1st and maybe as much as a thousand the present time · • They are 30 millimeter 37 57 millimeter and I lumped them all together · · · · · · 'Now in small arms we have no estimate of what there is now We estimated about200 000 on July 1st We would assume that the inventory is undoubtedly dollbled · '· · · Motorized transport truckl ranging from one quarter ton to ten tons there were 3 800 on July 1st ther re ' etween 500 and 10 000 now I have spoken of the SA-2 m1SStle sites of which there are 24 with 144 launchers and an estimated 500 missiles they are on launching pads or in inventory There are 4 coastal defense missile sites with 10 launchers These missiles have a range of about· 30 miles and we estjmate there are between 40 ·and 48· missiles on • · the island · either on the launchers or available · · There has been a very marked increase in the radar capability · Prior to July 1st there were some normal surveillance radars of a type used in most airports There were no ramirs USOCiated with the air defense At the present time there are between 130 and 200 radars on Cuba some ofthem of the most advlinced Soviet type Only the very most advanced of the m this is the only country in which certain Ypes of radars have been employed · outside of the· Soviet Union There were some 20 or 25 helicopters last summer There are about 100 helicopters now There were 35 MIG-15 and 17 jet fighters in the summer There are 106 now ·· Senator SYMINGTON 106 · • · ·· ' •· · Mr McCoNE 106 Y8' of which 42 are MIG--2t 'There is ap· p_r_eciable·incr eue in the' co m plement of naval 1hipe except for a at • 1 no •· COMAR type coutal defenN ve11el that carrill two· millll• on • ' e' 1 1 ' ' • • 86 each've Sel There were none of them and there are now 12 of · them in Cuba · · · i With regard to the personnel we estimate that 17 000 personnel are distributed as follQws 7 500 of them are for air force operatiol S half of whi ch are ngaged in the 0J 8ra ion of the SA sites about 1 000 associated with the communications and about 2 100 engaged in the radar and miscellaneous support activity and per · haps a thousand of them in the operation of the aircraft · It would interest this committee to know that of the 42 aircraft in the January 2 flyover during the Castro parade that 26 of them were flown by Soviets The army has about 7 500 there of which some 6 000 are in four armored groups that are maintained in units and fully equipped with tanks and with mobile guns and troop carriers and· those sort of things -The balance are in command and training Cubans There · · are about 2 000 naval personnel of which· about l 000 seem to be associated with the cruise missile ships and coastal defense commu nications · · The MIG-21 is a very advanced fighter the ones that are there are equipped to operate with air-to-air missiles That plane has a range of 700 miles or a radius of operation of350 miles if equipped with its wing tanks and carrying a normal load FREQUENT SURVEILLANCE OF CUBA That in general Mr Chairman gives you a summary of the comparative situation as we see it I would like to emphasize that we are keeping the island under very frequent ·surveillance We think that it is productive Although we can't prove the negative we don't think that they· ·have succeeded in hiding or otherwise camouflaging offensive missiles In the absence of penetrating on• site inspection we· n't be absolutely sure of the cognizance of the rumors and the reports that missiles are there and being hidden in caves and so forth I would like to point QUt that it is very difficult for an uninformed person to say for sure just what type of missile he has seen and there are several types of missiles which I have referred to which are on the island some of them are quite large · The'surface-to-air missiles are_ about 30 feetlong and therefore it is ve easy for an observer to say that he saw an article that was · 50 60 feet· o g Our infO JllE ti n d nc t _support the presence of ·offensive m1SS1les But agmn ·1t ts a big island · • Senator MORSE Thank yo u very mµch · · CAPACITY OF SURFACE-TO AIR MISSILES Secretary RusK Since I asked Mr McCone about the altitude capability of ·the surface-to air missiles we might just put· into the record the estimate as to the lowest level ·at which·they are effective because tl iat has something to do with what could be done o r what might have to be done in the· event- action became necessary · They are ineffective below approximately what level · · ·· · · · Senator SYMINGTON I d1dn t hear you I am sorry · · · Secretary RusK We are talking atiout the capability of these surface-to-air missiles · ·- · · · ·· · · · · Mr McCoNE · 2 500 to 3 500 f t they are ineffective -• • 87 • · · Secretary RusK In other wor s the is a_ceilirur but also a floor under wht h they are not effective against aircraft Senator MoRSE Yoti can come down low then Senator FULBRIGHT But the ordinary aircraft guns are effective at the low altitude · Secretary RusK That is right Mr McCONE I am a little perplexed personally why they are re-taining this complex of surface-to-air missiles Certainly they are not an essential part of any defense of the island because they are located around the perimeter of the island and very sensitive in• stallations with their radar and· their associated control equipment they are essentially a telephone switchboard A fighter bomber cominf in low level could take them out with no warning whatsoever conclude therefore that the purpose for which they were installed and the only purpose the Soviets have in keepinf them there is to ward off our high level aerial pho aphy if they · reached·the decision they wished to do that We·have no evidence of that since the shooting down of the U 2 on October Z1 They are not operated and th y are kept under obviously close control · Secretary RusK Mr Chairman I wonder if I might just add a few observations before we tum to questions Senator MORSE Yes sir A TACIT STANDOFF ON OVERFLIGHTS Secretary RusK In connection with this last point we in the dis cussions in New York with the Soviets have insisted upon the ne- · cessity of surveillance and told them w e would have to continue in any event and react if they should themselves move against our overflights They were unwilling to accept that as one· of the rea- sons why we did not get an agreement with them They were un- · willing to accept it publicly but it is I think obvious to the committee they have the ·capability of firing upon and shooting down the U-2s They are not exercising it so that at the moment there is sort of a tacit standoff now That could change tomorrow morning but they are fully aware of these overflights They have the capa• bility of hitting them They are not hitting them One pf the Russians at one point perhaps we could leave this parti cular remark off the record · · Discussion off the record OUT TRAFFIC OF SOVIET FORCF S - Secretary lusK No 'on this matter of the Soviet for you will recall when I was before the··committee before l said we have been very mti h interestedJn the out traffic and we had ta en up this question in phases in order to keepthe out traffic going 'While the missiles were being removijd we did not make a ·sharp issue of the bombers but when the missiles· got ·well offshore we made a sharp issue of the bombers • · · •· • · Now that the bombers have gone ·we have been expecting and discussing witb the Soviets the out traffic •of other Soviet forces · There has been· some out traffic but that seems to ha e slowed down · We have not taken other steps that would seem to block that out traffic or atop it We may be comin to the end of that chapter - 88 · because as the dit ect0t CentraJ Intelligen indicated the bar- racks ·being constructed ·• at certain of theee _installations may h1di• cate they are settling down there __ ·•_ · •· ·· · · We also have bee in connection with other m asures that we • might take have been interested in the recovery of the brigaae and also _the ·23 Americans who are now· being held in prisons in Cuba some of whom are Qf- very pecial interest to us We don't know ··when that-question will likely come to a conclusion but we hope in the next few days we will know about that SHIPPING TO CUBA Meanwhile we have been working intensively on the further isolation of Cuba economically from the Free World and if the committee agrees I would like to put into the record a littleJable of the Free World shipping into Cub8 from July through January of · this year It shows for example _in July 92 It dropped down to 64 and 52 in August and September In December it was down to 21 and thus far ·through January 19 there have only been six Free ·World ships in the Cuba trade · · The information referred to follows Free world shipping into Cuba continues to decline as following table shows July Oty cargo Tanker Total 75 17 92 57 7 64 Se ltllllbll' 43 9 52 October 54 11 65 Novembef 32 5 37 December 15 6 21 Jan to 191 4 2 6 Twenty-five free world dry cargo ships arrived in Cuba between 20 November and 19 January Fifteen of these were under bloc charter Of ten tanker arrivals seven were under bloc cha_rter Secretary Rusx We have done this not by imposing formal measures thus far because_ that could create some very s arp issues with friendly governments who at the moment lack the legal resources to move promptly to co ply But we have been working with them behind the scenes and they with their own shipowners to reduce their shipping in ·the Cuba trade We just got a report this morning for example that the Greek Government has taken the next step of insisting to their own shipovmers that they get all of their ships out of the Cuba trade Their - shipowners _CODl back with t e opvio 18 qu tion about· the 3 ritish • d e Norwegians The Br1t1Sh 1nthe penod from the 20th ofNo _v mbe to th 23rd of Januiuy had four dry cargo vessels and seven tankers That is a tc tal of 11 seven of which were in long· term charter to the Soviet bloc • · _Now this business of long-term charter is a complicating factor · use the g v ern ments theJ l88lves do J Ot ·have _immediate pa b1lity of reaching out and pulling those th1np back · · · · · · · · S ator Moasz 1 he ta le suggested by the Secre_tary • for inclu11on 1n the record W1ll be included at this point · · •· ·· · · · · _ The table rtferred to follon ·· · · 89 CUBAN TRADE WITH NON-BLOC COUNTRIES Value ill lllOuSallds of Ul Mars 1960 Exports IO lmpOrts Cuba 1$62 ·1961 from Cuba IIIIPOf1S from Cuba bports to Cuba United States 223 700 357 300 13 700 0 canada 13 500 7 756 31 800 0 Eurcpean OECO Countries Austria 48 100 0 Belgium Luxembourg 2 097 4 100 0 Denmark 130 700 0 · France 10 700 8 819 5 800 0 Federal Repubuc of Germany 14 500 12 607 11 800 0 Greece 2 5 44 0 0 cetand 186 500 0 Ireland 1 630 0 0 Italy 141 4 000 0 Netherlands 7 400 11 265 10 900 0 Norway 2 400 7 890 2 300 0 Portugal 800 0 Spair1- 10 000 7 329 4 500 o Sweden 773 1 500 0 Switzerland 2 792 1 300 0 Turkey 899 NA United Kingdom 20 700 8 482 13 200 0 Europe other Finland · 30 300 0 Latin America Ar tina 531 324 0 381 Boltvia NA NA NA Brazil 199 311 0 2 625 Chile 733 814 3 414 0 Colombia 211 1 047 NA Costa Rica 100 400 NA Dominican Republic NA NA 60 Ecua 1of 905 7 9 37 Guatemala 16 NA 184 Haiti 0 NA 0 Honduras 1 619 287 4 99 Mexico 1 469 907 3 464 1 Nicaragua 227 402 0 80 Panama O NA 180 Para uay NA NA NA Peru 241 NA 323 El Salvador 1 NA 152 Uruguay 0 1 055 NA Venezuela 27 676 1 322 246 3 Other Countries Israel NA · 15 100 0 Syria NA 4 231 NA Egypt NA NA 6 000 0 Morocco NA 11 858 2 900 0 India NA 475 0 Ceylon NA · 691 14 800 0 Burma NA NA 0 Pakistan NA NA 700 0 Japan _ 6 086 NA 11 600 0 35 100 0 398 October 6 801 October · 5 000 0 8 258 October 1 393 October 100 0 800 0 200 0 1 100 0 1 900 0 3 400 0 500 0 200 0 200 0 4 200 0 100 0 · 0 0 8 700 0 500 0 2 600 0 2 August 802 July 374 October 1 145 September 3 493 September 15 2 NA 10 0 10 688 0 4 o· 16 8 NA NA NA NA 56 August 622 July 51 October 1 662 September •· 5 106 Sep lmller NA 3 909 July NA ' ' ' • ·29 Septimbef NA 110 Au ust 1 113 August 1u Autust 7 084·September 2 826 ember 1 837 September 264 September 8 September NA 676 AugusL 4 459 AIJ ust 715 Au ust 2 338 gust 291 Sei lember 2 535 September NA NA· NA 15 000 0 6 269 October 18 809 October 400 0 340 September 3 056 Seotember NA NA 1 938 May 190 Apri NA NA · NA NA 0 NA NA 2 NA NA 34 0 NA NA NA NA NA 17 1 NA NA 21S l 401 July 11 July 17 0 62 6 NA 65 7 ·NA NA NA NA HA NA NA 8 3 NA 762 5 NA 82 9 NA NA NA NA NA 100 0 45 August 11 Juty · NA 2 407 Aupst 11 600 0 NA NA 6 900 0 3 887 September 14 717 September 8 100 0 1 931 September NA 0 NA 1 559 Octobel' 0 7 902 November NA · 2 300 0 417 Aupst 2 Autust 24 3u0 0 7 397 September 33 112 SepterfN NA ho Secretary Rusx l would to have for the committee before too long ··Mr Chairman · some· atatiatical information on the corre sponding •drop in Free World trade with Cuba Those statistics seem to drag a ·bit in ·terms of becom available but there baa ·been a correapondin drop in Free World trade with CUba in 1962 ' • •• '' • • ' I ' - - 9 · · •• I • 90 ·· · compared' with 1961 We will try to get th tinformation t the' committee as rapidly as we can · · · ·· · In addition to that we have been talking with the other·members· of the OAS about what further D1easures ought to be taken with ' respect to Cuba both _as ·they might affect Cuba dfrf 'Ctly in terms of political and economic isolation or in terms of action in othe countries in Latin America to · interrupt the activity of agents to counter an impact of _propaganda to•$top the flow of surrep itious funds and the other elements in ·this behind-the-scenes · fight against Communist penetration · DIVISIONS tN THE OAS · We will probably be holding a meeting of the OAS within a very short period perhaps a week or t en days but we have encountered · one problem that will be of interest to the committee on which we • would be glad to have your comments On October 23 we had ·a demonstration of unanimity on ·the hemisphere Now that the missiles and bombers are believed to be ·gone and the sharpness of the crisis is considered to be somewhat abated some of the internal political pressures which governments · have to face have begun to assert themselves and it looks as though we may not get at least two of these OAS countries in any further action we take · · Since we have resolutions already on the books that can cover any kind of action that may be necessary the question is whether we go for fresh resolutions that get less than a unanimity or whether we rest where we are and go ahead on the basis of assumed unanimity That is the problem we are consulting other governments about today Senator AIKEN Which two Secretary RusK · It will be Mexico and Brazil at the present time primarily _ W e can't be comp etely sure about either _one of them because Mexico has been· moving at least th government has been moving pretty steadily away from Castro ti they were orie of the first to come in with support on the missile p 'Oblem Brazil has just reorganized its government Their new foreign minister is ·the man who had Ii ·pr e minister just rec · ntly · Senator· AIKEN Who 18 he -- ·· Secretary lloSK De Lima and he is ·very much at ched to· this notion of an indepen dent foreign· policy or Brazil ·9o we can't be certain of Brazil i · · · · • · · But tltf3 · whole·the attitude in the hemisphere _has been extremely 1opeful on these matters and shows say from September 1960 t ili San Jose meeting to· he ctober -23 meeting of last year shows'eriormous movement in_ the heinisphereon this issue I just thought I would add those comments to whilt Mr McCone says ' · Senator Mous I know the Chairman Senator Fulbright has to go to another engagement so I am going to ask him to· ask the questions first B ut before I do Mr McCone if there is any materi• al ·that you wish to file for the record-you read from some tables and you thinkJt· Would ·clarify the· record y have the same · · ' ' ' ' ' ' '·' ' ' · ' 91 _ · privilege that the Secretary had to insert in the rec rd any material you cared to · · · · · ·· · Senator Fulbright ·· PROMISE OF AIR COVER AT THE BAY OF PIGS Senator FutBRIGHT • Mr McCone I regr t l have to leaver l wo de red whether it would be useful if-you could state very siinP Y the situation in -regard to this air cover I get all these inquiries ·I think l understand the situation as the President stated it J o you · care to say that that was a very accurate statement as to the prom ise of air cover in the Bay of Pigs · -_-· __ ·· - Secretary RusK Mr Chairman I wonder sirice Mr McCone was not there at the time and I was I wonder if you will permit me _to comment on that ·· · · ·· Senator FULBRIGHT That is right I forgot he w_asn't _ Secretary RusK As a matter of fact I think T am the only •· member of the Department not on ·roreign assignment who was in-·· volved in that episode _ · · The question of air cover breaks into two categories One there· - _ was never any promise of United States air cover · _ · -· · -· Senator FULBRIGHT By that you mean official United States ·· • planes _ _ _· _ _ ·- _ _· Secretary RusK United States _forces• Jndeed it was made very·· lear from the President at an early stage of thE OJ eration that is -_- 1n the very late phase of the plan that there would not be any par- ticipation in Cuba by U S forces and that this was to be fully explained to the brigade and the brigade should take this into ac count in making their own decision as to whether they wished to proceed with the operation and felt they had a chance of success I must confess-and we got information back from the brigade that they fully understood this but they nevertheless did want to go ahead because they were confident of success on the basis of the information they felt they had from Cuba as well as from other factors · Now the thing hat is puzzling to me is whether or not the'com- -· manders at the troop level in fact made it clear 'to their own melli• _ bers of the brigade that this was_ the situation We know what was · said to the brigade leaders we know wha t they said back to us but whether the company com_inanders or the l att alion commanders or · someone else said something different is something we in retro- spect cannot know So when a member f a brigade says · ''We_ promised X by whom certainly not by anyone who had any au- thority to promise anything and the evidence that we had at th · · ·' · time was quite to the contrary THE BASIC MISCALCUIA1 J ON As far as the air cover that was ·available is concerned this was · - one of the elements wijich-in retrOtJpecfwasa part 'of the· general mistake ·There 'were--sorne eigllt B-26 type aircraft in the hands -of the brigade and those working wi h the brigade I tl'link those were piloted by some Cubans l think we had a report·at the time there was one American Flying Tiger ki11d of fellow who w•-fl 'ing one of them They also had _J think three e r four tranape rt •-• • •' •·aircraft • • ' • ' C • •• • • • • • •• -' • •• •• ' ' ' · • 1·· 92 that would be used to take in supplies if necessary after the seizure of the two landing strips at the Bay of Pigs There were no fighters involved as far as the Cuban brigadest own equipment was concerned · · This proved to be the decisive factor because when the air strike was delivered on the 15th of April two days before the actual landing and there was a postponement of a strike from Monday morning until later in the day in the Havana area the B-26s were not able to provide any air cover over the _beachhead They are not that type plane indeed four B-26s were lost over the beachhead from some T-33 In addition to that there were more planes on the island than had been nose counted ahead of time they were in hangars We had information later that after the strike on the 15th they dispersed planes they hid them and indeed brought some other planes They actually finished the actual assembly of other planes in about two days time Now this is a part of the basic miscalculation of judgment that was made as to the ability of the brigade to get ashore seize these two air strips and then begin to operate their aircraft off these air strips in Cuba The plan was that immediately upon seizing the air strips the planes would be based there They would be Cuban planes operating out of Cuba and that they would go on from there And that is the story of the air cover COUNTERACTION AGAINST SHOOTING DOWN AMERICAN PLANES Senator FULBRIGHT One last question before I go What do we do if they do shoot down some of our planes now supposing tomorrow moming they shot down a couple of our observation planes Secretary RusK That would depend upon a decision that the President would make But we have talked about that a great deal We have told the Cubans·and the Russians we would take counteraction Indeed back in September we announced publicly that we would make full use of international waters close up to Cuba on incoming ships things of that sort and enfor e that Since then we have also extended that now to the overflights and the exact action would depend upon the decision of the President at tn time But we would have to react in some way Senator FuLBRIGHT That is all Mr Chairman thank you Senator MORSE Senator Hickenlooper Senator HtCKENLOOPER Thank you Mr Chairman CUBANS ARE WEL EQUIPPED Mr McCone is it a safe rough percentage not exactly accurate but indicative to say that as of now the Cubans have got about twice as much equipment in there leaving out intermediate range weapons and the bombers as they had last July Mr McCoNE Yes I think that is a good figure Senator HtCKENLOOPER As you went through your sU1 tistical report in here ·it seemed they had twice as many weapons twice as ce_ as any ns t • tha m th her in _ 93 Mr McCONE I think in rough estimate Some items are more than that some items that were not there at all are now there in quantity · Senator H1cKENLOOPER I understand but I am just asking a rough estimate without getting into percentage Mr McCONE Yes I think that is roughly correct Senator H1CKENLOOPER From the standpoint of completely sophisticated according to present standards of sophisticated radar detection devices they are quite wen equipped now is that correct Mr McCONE They are quite well equipped FISSIONABLE MATERIAL IN CUBA Senator HICKENLOOPER The report was given me this morning I don't know the authenticity of it that we have detected the delivery of fisa ionable material into Cuba Mr McCoNE I have no such information Senator Senator MANSFIELD Could you repeat that question · again Bourke Senator HICKENLOOPER I was given a report which I could classify only as rumor I don't know the authenticity of it or the original basis that we have discovered and detected the injection of a cer- · tain amount of fissionable material on three ships into Cuba and that it has caused considerable concern among the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the last couple or three days they have been having m tings on it As I say that is the only information I have I will tell you everything I know about it · Mr McCONE I have no such information and I don't think that any such information is in the hands of the intelligence community I would be very much surprised if it was in the hands of the Joint Chiefs of Staff I spent allof yesterday afternoon at least sev• eral hours yesterday afternoon with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussing among other things this very problem and he made no reference at all Senator HICKENLOOPER Because this was suggested to me I am only raising the question I have no knowledge of it The ships are alleged to be the Simferopol the Mitchurinsk and the Angarskles The information referred to follows Subsequent information suppH ed for the record follows CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Washington DC · Memorandum for Hon WAYNE MORSE Chairman Subcommittee on American Rf Pitblics Affairs Senate Foreign Relations Committee U S Senate Washington DC 1 The following information concerns three Soviet ships mentioned by Senator Hickenlooper at the 25 January 1963 hearings a The Angarskles arrived in Havana Cuba on 8 January 1963 From all informa• tion available the ship carried various types of commercial cargo and in addition one transport aircraft Receipt of this transport aircraft· was reported by the intelli gence community through regular reporting channels b The Mitchurinsk arrived in Havana Cuba on 15 January 1963 This ship is known to have carried general cargo and included in the cargo was a small quantity of radioactive isotopes which ' e believe are intended for industrial purposes The shipper of the ilotopes wai an agency of the Soviet Union known to be exporten of industrial equipment arid the consi ee an organization in Cube known to be receiv• ers of eq ipm ent and material of thil nat re InformatioJJ·COn cemiiw-t 11hilconaip• ment which wu developed by the intelb ence community on 80 December 1962 ' · - ' •-· 94 came through charineli ormally connected with information on industrial ship ents and never known to have been used for notice of military shipments c The Simferopol was unloaded in Havana from 17 to 19 January 1963 As the Director of Central lnteUigence repo ru d this ship·was suspected to be transporting · a c11rgo of military equipment and it was kept under close surveillance while en• route and during unloading The ship was unloaded by Cuban military personnel the cargo consisted largely of large crates which we believe con ined military · equipment but none was of a size to contain large offensive missiles or aircraft 2 It is concluded that the information given to· Senator Hicken looper to the effect that all three ships carried military cargoes including nuclear weapon material is incorrect One ship the Simferopol is the ship referred to by the President in his press conference on 24 January 1963 and discussed by the Director of Central Intel• ligence on 25 January 1963 Analysts feel that if the radioactive substance openly mentioned as being included in the Mitchurinsle cargo was weapon material its transportation would have been handled differently and quite clandestinely Signedl JOHN s WARNER Legislative Counsel nator AIKEN May I ask you a question Bourke Senator MORSE Senator from Vermont Senator AIKEN Isn't this report from about the same source that was so insistent that a buildup was taking place last summer Senator HtCKENLOOPER No it is not It may be But the immediate source to me is not It is a newspaper source to me Mr McCoNE I was asked the same question when I came into the room Senator HtCKENLOOPER I said I have no information Mr McCONE And of course I will go into this immediately but I have no such information Senator HtCKEN LOOPER The allegation was made-I asked for a copy of this memora11dum and was given it-that low flying naval patrol planes equipped with special surveillance instruments detected fissionable materials aboard three Soviet vessels docking in ports near Havana within the past two weeks If such thing has been detected I would certainly think that you would know about it through your department SURVEILLANCE OF SOVIET SHIPS The alleged names of the three ships are Simferopol Mitchurinsk and that last name that is almost as bad as Hickenlooper Mr McCoNE The Simferopol was the ship that I mentioned the one ship we felt came in with military equipment We had it under surveillance Secretary RusK I think ther was one incident during· the movement out of the missiles where one of our planes in low buzzing the ship felt they had picked up some radioactivity We sent additional and more sophisticated equipment over it and were satisfied that this first report was not accurate That was on an outgoing ship Senator MORSE Just a minute I don't think you had quite fin ished the statement you were making before the Secretary made his last statement Did you finish what you wanted to say · Mr McCONE Yes I had I just wanted to point out that the Simferopol was the one ship we suspected and were satisfied it brought in some type of military equipment but we don't know wllat it was · 95 Senator HrcKENLOOPER This matter having been suggested I · raised it Senator LAUSCHE Was that a Russian ship Mr McCONE Yes Senator AIKEN At what height could radioactivity on a ship be detected Secretary RusK I am not an expert to know Mr McCoNE Just a very few hundred feet But if radioactive material is being brought in a ship and with the Soviets suspecting we would attempt to detect it by means of detection devices it would be very easy to stow the material and shield it _so that it couldn't be detected Senator HICKENLOOPER If they wanted to conceal it and bring it in it would seem to me to_ be a comparatively simple matter to keep it from being detected · Mr McCoNE Put it in a shield or case that you are thoroughly familiar with · · Senator HICKENLOOPER Put a bunch of lead around it Mr McCONE And there would be no way of detecting it at all I· couldn't conceive of their shipping a nuclear device without ' some · shielding INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CUBAN BRIGADE Senator HICKENLOOPER Mr Secretary getting down to the Bay of Pigs invasion we have had some hearings here on that matter and as far as I know no evidence has been deyeloped that purely from a technical point of view nobody ever assured the Cuban invaders down there in the Bay of Pigs that American military personnel in American uniforms with American ships and comrnanded by American officers would fly cover there But weren't ·they given every assurance that the Cuban air force would be taken out on the ground by bombing and that at least one and probably two of those planned and programmed raids to eliminate the Cuban or the Castro air force were called off just before the morning of the Bay of Pigs · Those were to be manned by Cuban personnel or non-official personnel of the United States and the planes were supposed to have Cubans Now the public has been technically told certain facts are true but in my view the public has been practically deceived by these · statements that have come out I·base that on conversations that-I have had for a long time and kept still about I am concerned about public information on this thing some of it I don't think was necessary to come out but it is out on the table right now I am concerned about it Secretary RusK Senator there is no question at all that this was not merely a technical communication to the brigade that U S Armed Forces would not be involved · Senator H1cKEN'LOOPER That is right Secretary Rusi This was much more fundamental and far-reaching than that The instructions were to diac1111 this thoroughly with the brigade and let the bripde fully understand it and to let ' ' 96 them know and make a judgment 'on tha t basis whether they wanted to proceed in that operation · · · ·· Senator H1cKENLOOPER But weren't they given-Secretary RusK Now on the question of a r support I don't want tQ offend any airmen present · but as an infantry man I know something about the difference between the hope and the final result in a particular and limited air strike The leaders of the brigade knew what their resources were They knew they would make the strike on the 15th preceding the 17th It was apparently in their mind planned that there would in fact also be surely a strike on the morning of the 17th SOME IMPRECISION IN P NNJNG Senator HtCKENLOOPER Wasn't it also in the over-all plan that was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for perusal that there would be a strike just prior to the landing in an attempt to take out the remaining Castro airplanes on the ground Secretary RusK One of the troubles about that is that there was some imprecision on that point at the time because apparently there was not a clear understanding as to exactly the sequence The plan called for an immediate use of the seized airstrips at once for landing Now there was I think an expectation that there would be the second strike and that was postponed as the President said in his press conference But that second strike had it been delivered would not have made a difference in the success of the operation The first strike the second strike together could not know about the planes that proved to be available some in hangars some dispersed so you still would have had the same problem of the kind of air cover that was required in an operation of that sort and that is fighter cover over the beach as well as persistent repeated attacks on air fields in which Cuban aircraft could have been housed In other words it was not the difference between one or two It was the difference between one or two and many more plus air cover over the beach Senator HtCKENLOOPER Well now the only planes that Castro had over the beach there the first day or the second day were a couple of Furies and a couple or perhaps three converted jet trainers and some bombers weren't they and weren't those known about and calculated and counted before Secretary RusK Planes come O lt of Cuba more than and different than the nose count ahead of time indicated Senator H1cKENLOOPER But I am talking about the nose count that we have had testimony on here afterwards We have a record here of this thing Secretary RusK But the point I am making Senator is that had the planes that had been counted been destroyed there still would have been planes over the beach from Cuba · Senator HtCKENLOOPER I don't know about that I mean that is like the dpmino operation if this had been done or that· had been done aomethilli way out at ·the end would· probably have occurred · 97 It is a speculative thing I talking about the practical fact on the day of the invasion when they were shooting down there the only planes that came out and were over the area of Castro so far as I can calculate were the planes that they· already knew were still in existence Where these extra planes were nobody knew ·· They didn't seem to show up on the day of the fighting Secretary RusK I have got to check up on numbers it was my impression also that some of those planes were those reported to be destroyed on the 15th · · · · Senator HtCKENLOOPER I don't know We have a record here on the number of planes that came out on the types the F'uries and the jets Secretary RusK The T-33 trainers converted trainers Senator H1cKENLOOPER And some converted bombers whether · they wereB-24 or B-26's · · Secretary RusK B-26's Senator HtCKENLOOPER And those numbers as far as I can understand it actually appeared in the air Some of which did the damage with either rockets or fire of one kind or another on the day of the fighting and the next day Those were the ones that were in the calculations as they understood to have remained on · the airports undamaged after that April 15 raid which was the first of either three or two that would be done CONVINCED THAT THE CUBAN AIR FORCE HAD BEEN TAKEN OUT Now I have no evidence that in the plan they were assured of American official participation by air but I am thoroughly con-· vinced subject always to alteration of that conviction that these fellows were told that the Cuban air force would be· taken out there that morning and there wouldn't be any Cuban air force remaining · to attack them on their landing on the beach and the consolidation of their positions Then the question of the diversionary tactic at the east end of the island-Secretary RusK Which did not come off Senator HICKENLOOPER Which didn't come off But I think maybe 'in this publicity hassle we are in in connection with this matter maybe we are talking about two different things Some people are talking about the technically flying in Navy uniforms or Air Force uniforms and participating or whether Cuban pilots were running planes which had been furnished hY the United States or even trained by the United States ostensibly and the Cuban independent movement personnel · · But I am thoroughly convinced at this moment they were assured that there would be air support to go in there and knock out · those threatening Castro planes the ones that remained 30 ·percent of the so-called Castro air force which still remained So it could be argued that both sides of this argument are right the one from a technical standpoint-Secretary RusK Senator I think that one at least ought to bear in mind this was one of several factors in which mistaken judgments were made or estimates were made both on our side and by · - the Cuban b ade itself All of which contributed to the failure a failure for w ch the Preaide t bu 'taken 1'81J On ibility The ···ss· · rate and mass of the Castro· buildup against the beach was faster and greater than had been anticipated to be possible There· was asl-_ • SHORTAGE OF AMMUNITION Senator HtCKENLOOPER I don't have at my fingertips the exact statistics on that but they got on the beach and maintained them- • selves for a day and·a half'and then ran out of ammunition so the buildup 10 to 100 if the ten have got the machine guns and the hundred nave nothing · · · Secretary RusK But the shortage of ammunition was related to · the amount offorces against them and they used it up · Senator H1CKENLOOPER Sure they· used it up · Senator SY tftNGTON They sank an ammunition ship · Senator AIKEN They had a five-knot speed boat which was so far · ·behind the invaders they didn't have a chance · Senator H1cKENLOOJ ER They sank one ammunition boat out there and turned around an d· went away Secretary RusK There was one ship which instead of going in in the darkness turned around and went back Senator MoasE I think the ship which contained most of the ammunition was sunk by the Castro air force Secretary RusK ·I think that is correct Senator AIKEN Mr Chairman I think the situation is pretty well described in the hearings we had in May in 1961 even the · failure to eliminate the Cuban air force They were supposed to strike 3 days they struck the first day·· and some of the parties as• sumed they had got the entire air force but they guessed wrong Senator ·H1cKENLOOPER I · don't get any such assumption like that There were other reasons for calling off this strike Senator AIKEN It was called off after the first day 0 A MORAL PROBLEM Senator HtcKENLOOPER So far as I know and we have had nothing presented to us that alters this the whole evidence is that it is a fairly reliable estimate that 70 percent of the available air force ofQastro wii$ knocked out that first strike roughly 70 percent 30 percent of it was left Now ·you can calculate that weight of the 30 percent as you want to you can give ·a greater value to the jet trainers or the Furies or bombers but in nu mbers about 30 percent were left · · The other strikes were to take out those ' and the statements have been flatly made here in the evidence by I believe to be competent testimony that they knew exactly where these planes were and that these strikes were· calculated to immobilize these ·remain• ing planes · The strikes were · called off These felfows understood they ' ere going to not have to face _ that' strafing and harassment and difficulty by these planes because they ·would be take l1 out · Whether· r ·not officiallr uniformed · Americ n · soldie ·· and sailors· · would take them out with planes marked with· American symbols · or whetller it would be taken Q t by o_ther _plaJ' lea manned by • · • Cub ns·or ercenaries or 'hat lla e·you 18 a kind of onk43y b i· •· ness · · · · · · ·99· · Secretary RusK l'here was no onkey business about the discu sion with the brigade on the poiq t as to whether U S official forces · · · would take part in this none whatever · Senator HJCKENI PER That is cQrrect l say there is _no question about that But there is a serious moral pr blem involved here in my mind as to ·whether _or not these people were·•given assurance that while official U S per$0nnel would not participate that is one thing the other side of that coin being that Never mind the Cuban a ir force will be taken out It is going to be taken out one way or another '' and these fellows were· in training they were · · · · highly trained fighters WHO GAVE THE ASSURANCE J • Senator SPARKMAN Who gave that assurance Senator HtCKENLOOPER I say there is no question but what the· expeditionary force was given that assurance Senator SPARKMAN · Yes by whom -· Senator H1cKENLOOPER By who was planning it the CIA or somebody_ else whoever was running the show That is pretty well established in this evidence that was the original plan and that was the plan that was called off the last two strikes were lled off · · · ·• the night before · Senator LAUSCHE John Sparkman raises a good questio11 here We never assured them we never told them Let's find out who the person was who was in contact with the lead er of the brigade who is the individual and what did that individual telLthe brigade l · merely make that as a suggestion because it is•·· constantly ·being said We never told them Let's find out who the man is who did the speaking and with whom did he talk and have both of them · brought in ·· · · · •· · · · Senator MORSE Gentlemen I want to get to these questions but I want to finish Senator Hickenlooper's questions first and then Sen• ator Sparkman's · · Senator HICKENLOOPER I don't want to monopolize any more time You have others and we will go ahead We will get to· this after a while I merely raised the question Senator MottsE Senator Sparkman Senator SPARKMAN I will continue that Une of questioning btief ly I am interested It is so easy to make these general stateme11ts that they were assured There are some of these things that have puzzled me and I would like to know by whom they were given that assurance · · · Now l noticed there in the paper J week or so ago in fact the chairman put it in the record here in our committee hearings about a week ago a statement by a 1 rigade leader saying that they_ were never given such assurance Did you see tb$t · · Secretary Rusx I saw that in·· the newspapers · Senator SPARKldAN Who was he ·Secretary Rusx I don't have that stoTY with me Senator $PARKMAN • Do you-- r U who that was Then 2 ·or 3 days go another leader V 88 quoted out of Miami ·as saying that · they-_ were· given· t '- 881Utanc · lwould e know who tile ·two were and what their comparative reaponaib1btiea were · · • ' _ _II ' ' • • ' • · ' • • l PRtsiDENT CALLED on THE AIR muit2 Senator HtCKENU OPER John let me llSk you this This is a con f sing thing The President· has admitted h called off the strikes the night before 'If he called off the strikes they must have been on sometime · · Secretary Rusx A strike · · · Senator HtCKENLOOPER Or a strike It must have been a part of the plan or it couldn't have·been called off You don't call off something that has never been contemplated l am just talking about the vhole general conno tion in the pictur here Senator MANSFIELD Would the Senator yield there ' Senator SPARKMAN yes · Senator MANSFIELD · It is my understanding after reading the record l did not attend the hearings unfortunately but the strike that was called off was not an air strike covering the invasion but a strike against one of-the Cuban air fields inland prior to the inva sion · Secretary RUSK In the Havana area that is correct Senator Senator MORSE That is correct Senator HtCKENLOOPER That is correct Secretary RusK But the President pointed ·out in his press con• ference yesterday that he had postponed that to the afternoon Now the idea was that you would get these planes onto those strips hi11riediatel1- and that they would be operating out of Cuba They would be Cuban planes operating out of Cuba It is relevant to bear· in mind that the fil'$t strike on the 15th presented us with a ive political problem throughout the world because the in• volvement of the United S tes was no longer concealed and perhaps never could have been concealed The situation in the United Nations was highly explos1ve Am• · bassador Stevenson did not have to involve himself in this particular question because it was apparent for all to see We were faced with a situation that could be roughly compared to the Suez reaction in most of the rest of the world on this situation It was very important at ·he earliest possible moment to get these planes perating off th strips in Cuba by Cubans as a Cuban ·matter This was the ho · and expectation on that first day because they were getting as re they· did get the strips and this was also a part of the plan fr m the beginning Senator ORSE Senator Sparkman AN UPRISING OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE Senator SPAJlKMAN Mr Chairman I ·am rather lost here I recall a hearing that we had in this committee back in 1960 I don't remember the· date at which time Mr Allen Dulles of the CIA described to us just what was taking place the training of this force down in some of the Central America countries My recollection is that he said at that time that the whole plan was based upon the idea that when these· J 8_0ple got ashore anif we able to get inland there would be an upr1s1ng of the Cuban population · · · · Senator· SYMiNGTON He denied that· without reservation when he ···came before the committee in 1961 and said that the CIA never felt that way at any time · · · · · · · ·101 in Senator $PARKMAN I think we can show· the record ·m 1960 that was the testimony - -·· Senator SYMINGTON I think he is completely mistaken Senator SPARKMAN I think he was the one who · if I remember _ correctly gave the testimony and lnoticed this statement Senator MORSE I want to give an order to the staff Mr Marcy and Mr Holt I instruct the staff to make note of this comment of the Senator from Alabama and I instruct you Jo proceed to do some research on the testimony of Mr Dulles on his two appearances before this committee referred to by the Senator from Missouri and the Senator from Alabama and report at a later date Secretary RusK Mr Chairman I also testified on· this in May 1961 before this committee Senator MORSE And furnish a memorandum COUN1 ER·REVOLUTIONARY ACflVITY Senator SPARKMAN May I continue In the paper either oflast night or the night before last there was a short news item in which President Eisenhower made a similar statement if I construe it · _ · correctly Did you see that statement Secretary RusK I only saw reference to the guerrilla--Senator SPARKMAN Reference to what · · Secretary RusK His anticipation that this group would conduct guerrilla operation ·· Senator SPARKMAN That is what I mean counter revolutionary · · guerrilla activity and my impression has always been that_ is the kind of an operation that was contemplated rather than one that_ was based upon seizing and holding territory l may be entirely wrong But as I say I am confused by these strikes and calling them off and putting them on and so on and so forth · · · -· · ·• · · Secretary RusK Mr Chairman I testifi 'd before the committee on earlier occasions that the idea was that the brigade would go ashore get these two strips and hoped that an initial success would stir reaction in other parts of Cuba That if they failed in that brigade type action they would then resort to guerrilla action · Senator MORSE I remember that very clearly Senator SPARKMAN Yes _ Secretary RusK This was an alternative which was very much in mind The brigade had been trained as a brigade I think its guer• rilla training had perhaps not been emphasized as much as· its· bri- · gade training and I think it is also retrospect likely that the brigade did not make a decision early enough to move toward guerrilla action because by that time the Castro forces had got themselves in a very powerful position at the beachhead I testified on· that on a May 1 1961 · · · · - _ · • · Senator $PARKMAN I would be interested in seeing that 1960 ·tes-__ timony because I can be wrong in my memory butthat is the way I remember it lwon'ttak anymore time Mr Chairman · ' · • Senator MORSE Senator Aiken ·•• • · · · · · ARKF STS ·1N· CUBA · Senator A KE·•· · Iha ve only ·one question re a ting t the plat and ·the ·PNMnt Allwninl· that there wu no ' a couple which relate ' · · - _'· ' · ' '· ' ' ' ' - ' ' - ·- - 102 rit t iri 1 ifJ ft ' j ot 0 Jeft the decli ion to the brigade as to Vhetl_ter they woul_d advance -or not knowing that they would not have air cover __ J • ·_·-_ Secretary RusK - Th t is -the _ i t_J' µctio11 that went· from Washing _ - - ton· to which _we had a direct reply We_ were told from the brigade - - - leadership that they were to be tol4 very specifically that they · would -riot have the participation of U S · ·anned _ forces in this oper ati n at the beach or in Cuba or oyer Cuba and that the question wasthen put to-them 4Under _that condition do you wish to go ahead and do you think you will succeed and they came back and ·· · said We understand that and we think we ought to go ah ad be-- cause we think we will succeed _ · _ _·-· _ · _ You see one thing we got into a kind of descending circle here _· ·_Senator was t t the brigade did not have a chance to sµcceed · ·-- - -unless there was react on on· the island Reaction on the island was · - notJik ly to be stepped -off until it seemed· apparent that the· bri- gade was succeeding Now this created a •situation where the two - - piece11 just didn't fit and this was part ofthe coII1biriation of the failure I testified before the committee in May of 1961 that partly because this covert ·operation•turned ·out_ _ in prospect to- be about_ as overt an operation- as the world has ever seeµ in terms of flagging it -in advance in terms e f newspaper stories• and things like that out of Guatemala and other places that immediately Castro's internal security _forces moved -to a rrest tens of · t usands of people throughout t he island t•ie tified that it is ntirely possible that _ t ose arrests -imm iately broke th - possibUiti f the very reac• tions that w re requiri d for the success of the brigade _ -_-Senator HICKINLOOPD Those _ _a rrests did not- occur until after the la ding · · · · - · - · _ -Secretary RusK They were arres as soon as it was clear that the l nding was taking place -immediately you see and I think the interrial urity capal ilities of the Cuban regime were underestimated _ · _ · -_ __ __This was part of it and it is difficult now after ·so much has hap- · ·pened to go back and recover the atmosphere of the situation at the· time I have earlier testifi that· there was a race here as seen at that time between the discontent of the Cuban people on the - one side and -the -_ capabilities of this authoritarian r me to --- -im instruments_- of controt One of the _reasons ·for taking the •very-· considerable risk that was __ known to be taken· at the Bay of Pigs was the longer you waited the longer that apparatus of control would be -in position to prevent that situation inside from occur ring WHY THE_ SECOND AIR STRIKE WAS CALLED OFF ·- Senator d ORSE l am_ not taking time to ask questions but as chairman l would like to direct the discussion I would like to make this very brief itatement in the record for the parties to comment to me on senators as well as the Secretary and Director It · - that it should be said_ at this poi11t th 't the ·qu ion is not wl'lether · - ___ he bnpde was uaured the Cuban air force wQuld be taken Qut -It _ ___ •·-t Y' r l · part of the in trlion plan ·- - ·that-the Cu fc rce VfoUld _ · · - _ '• -· -- ··· ' • ' ' --··· •·- • _ - -' _ '_ ·_· seems _ ' ·_ 103 taken ·out but this· part ofthe plan along with many other parts failed · · · -_ - · · · · · · - _- · · In any ·military· operation· nothing can really - be assured _by anyone The real question therefore is ·why the_· second air strike that we have discussed this morning was called off Thie is prob- · • ably not the critical factor in the ·failure of the invasion but it is · the only question that has not yet been answered before this coin- · mittee There need not be a discussion about it but I do think the· administration ought to clear up that question _· · · · I am sorry Senator but I wantoo to get it into the record so they would know it is still pending · · --- · - _· ARMAMENTS WITHIN RANGE OF GUANTANAMO Senator AIKEN Apparently they made the mistake of leaving some very important decision to the Cuban refugees them$8lves at that time But I am somewhat concerned about the President too and from Mr McCone's statement· of what we believe the arrangements in Cul a to be at the present time I would judge that Cuba has beco111e on of the stronger military bases in the world today · even assumingthe offensive- weapons · •_ Mr McCONE Certainly in the Western Hemisphere -·- · _ Senator AIKEN In the Western Hemisphere and it has been r · ported I think in the press that fortifications part of them in the Sierra Maestra mountains are within range of the Guantanamo · base that is not more than 30 miles 25 miles _ · · ·· · Secretary RUSK Some· of the armaments are within range of··· Guantanamo We know_ of ri Q actual gun emplacements that· are within range of Guantanamo · _ · · _ _ _ Senator AIKEN Castro hid his revolutionists in those mountains for some years without getting caught or even found and they could do the same thing riow · · - · - · - · - -•· _ Senator HrcKENLOOPER He was in touch with the New York Times all the time though Senato AIKEN That is right He had press conferences I believe ·most of the time he was there REMOVAL OF MISSILES FROM TURKEY But there is something else that I think may be raising criticism_ and that is the announcement of yesterday we are withdrawing our missiles from Turkey The public •will just think ba k to October when removal-of missiles from Turkey wasJaid down by Russia as on c ndition for removing their missiles frorn Cuba When was the - · decision made to· r move the missiles from Turkey _ _--_ - __ -·_- _ _ •- - -•-· _ _ Secretary · RusK • Senator this qqesti n has been•·- up for some· time I first tlllked with the foreign• minister of Turkey about re- · moving these Jupiters in April 1961 · · Senator AIKEN Yes - · · --•· · _- _ · · Secretary Rt sx It was 'known that these Jupiters were then rel• atively obsolete and woul i -become more ·a burden than anything else _ · '· ·f- ·· ·•· _ _ As far as_ the -'October 27th mess ge ia concerned the President · _ -rejected that 1trailhta va1- on the· very date that it came out But· i ' · you·will reca11 that tb ·J'QiniA tomic era Committee l don't · -r• ·•·• · · _ L J· • - ' · -· -_- · - ·- '• ·lOf ' k116w ' natof licketilooper iterbaf 'ye J ·di tll'l ' ther' me ber of 0 · the committee could· h lp detent1iriewhether this shoµld be in this •· record-or rtQt bµtthe Joint Atomic EnergyO Coriunittee haditself been very critl two years ago about these Jupiters in Italy and J'urkeyand utgedthatitbe- - • · · ·• • ·· • Sena1tor 'IIICKBNLO PP They weren't very quiet about it · · Secretary Rtrsx Well he eport was classified butJt did leak at i the e ' You be very EJ re Mr Khrushchev did not propose subst1tutmg Pola for _J lp1ters · · • ·· · ' ' ' ' ' ' Senator AIKEN No · Secretary RusK ·And ·this·-is·· connected· with our modernization of· our nuclear striking capabilityJ 'ith the phasing out of Ju piters in Turkey the removal of Corp rals for Sergeants in Italy the movement from lesser aircraft to F-104'sjri Turkey and the entire pro gram ofmodern ization of NATO forces Jnd it was pointed·out to Mr Khrushchev at the time that this is s NATO problem These things are related to the NATO-Warsaw Pacf confrontation and would not be mixed up with the Cuban situatipil Senator AIKEN And we do not plan to substitute land-based Polaris for that Secretary RusK No sir Mr• Mc oNE Mr Chairman can I make just one additional -remark · Senator MoRSE Mr McCone Mr McCoNE In the· fall of 1960 I visited· the bases with a sub commjttee of the ·Joint Committee on Atomic Energy I became convinced at that tim that these Jupiter missiles should be re moved and_ replaced with Polaris subinarines ·which had become operational· at tl lat tune and improved I made a very strong recommendation to President Eisenhower · in that regard and it was seriously considered Vllether in the fall of 1960 it was discussed with the Italians and the Turks I do not know · · It was felt however in the councils of the high t administration · officials that it presentEMI some internal political problems to those countries However it was apparent as early as that that the system was ollsolete an had to be replaced early ·· CONNECl'ION-OF ·MISSILES JN TURKEY AND ·CUBA Rus - Secretary Thia matter did come- pfn connection with our thinking in the Cuban·mat r early in Octoberin··a wholly different context We were co11sidering as you ltriow th necessity of a strike against these missiles -in Cuba The ni0$t · immediate ·and • shall we say relevant retaliation by the _otller $ide might have - been conventional· strikes against th rii iles ilf Turlt y · • ' · Now had we struck the niissile in Cuba this would have except · for this capability thrown the-nuclear decision to the Soviet·Union · In other words these vulnerable first strike type weapons accessi- · ble to 'Soviet conventional 'capabiliiy·proved to be ·a drag on us at the time f the Cuban decision - wejust did not know what way this thing would escal ate pven an opportuni y Jor an immediate and similar retaliation · · · · ·· · ·· - ' · · '· ' - ' - _ ·· ' · - c · •· 10s the Senator AIKEN ·lam no questio11ing sul stit tio 'C r Polaris · for Jupiter buf simply pointing out that the public is bound to tie · · in the Khrushchev message of October· w ith the ailnouncetnent-- ·• · Senator HrcKENLOOPEa Of course there is no question int· my mind that Jt furnishes propagan grist for Khrushchev's mill l · · ·• agree l remember the arguml' t and 1 relllember Mr McCone's arguments ·and arguments ·of others that they were useless and J should be removed He has held that positio11 for a Jong time and •· he was very early in it and certainly agt'ee •· · · nator J 1KEN With the Chairman's permission I yield to the Senator from· Montana · · · · · · · · · · TIMETABLE FOR REMOVING MISSILF S FR0 1 1 TURKEY Senator MANSFIELD I just want to ask a question to get this matter cleared up Is it a correct statement to say that these nego- - tiations with Turkey and other countries were under way at the time the Soviet Union made their proposal and because they made their proposal we reacted in the negative and perhaps the decision was delayed because of that factor I do not know am just·asking Secretary RusK The reaction was negative because· we could not connect what was a NATO problem withth Cuban business But on the other hand we did not think we should dt lay the substitution of Polaris for Jupitentbecause of the Cu affair because we may have another crisis coming down the track here · say in· regard to Berlin We want to get these fol' modernized as rapidly as possible ·· ·•· · · · · · · · ·• Senator MANSFIELD Then Khrushchev's proposal did not··inter- · rupt the timetable · · ·· Secretary RusK That is correct · · · · Senator MANSFIELD Thank you · · · Secretary RusK Re111ember Khrushchev's proposals did not ev n •· · make a reference to theltalian·missiles There was some reference to bases generally in his· October 27 letter but it had no reference to the Thors In other words this is not the basis of any deal or · · agreement It is not in Khrushchev's interest to make the arrangements that we now contemplate · · ··· · · ·· · · · · Senator AIKEN We decided to take the missiles out anyway why didn't we get a quid pro quo from· Khrushchev Did it look as if we·· were soft in the eyes of the world · · · -· · Secretary RusK No If we put Polarises in the Mediterranean it would be very hard to trade this kind of modernization for a quid · · proquo ·•·•-_• Senator AIKEN ·The way I understand it the Italians want to -manufacture their ·own Polarisi ·They are not asking for missiles All they want are the blueprints --- • · Secretary RusK I hadn't heard that if that· is so I would have to check on that · · · •· • · -· · • · · · Senator AIKEN ·I do not know lwill asking yoij · · ·· · _· •· I ·h· Secretah_ry Ros1 Mr Fanfani did i'lot takttthat up with us whe e VU· ere 106 Senator AIKEN Mr Fanfani did not take that up Secretary RusK I do not think so I do not know Do you Mr McCoNE I do not know that he did Senator AIKEN I do not know Secretary RusK This would surprise me in terms of their manufacturing capabilities Senator· HtCKENLOOPER May I just ask ths Secretary your statement is then that ihe removal of the missiles from Turkey-of which I approve don't misunderstand my position-was in no way shape or form directly or indirectly connected with the settlement the discussions or the manipulation of the Cuban situation Secretary RusK That is correct sir Senator AIKEN e ust one other question Secretary RusK You see this will have to go to NATO for NATO · approval SITUATION IN PANAMA Senator AIKEN I get disturbing reports about conditions in Panama at this time Assuming that the Panamanian Government should change or that they should even elect a Communist Vice President-I believe there is someone down there who has a pretty good chance of being elected-that would become another Cuba Would we permit that to proceed to the extent that armament has taken place in Cuba or are we looking to that possibility · Secretary RusK Senator we are and one of the demonstrations with respect to that occurred in the case of the Dominican Republic where in order to forestall either a Trujillo bloodbath or an extremist takeover we placed the American fleet offshore there May I at the risk of being presumptuous before a committee of such distinction-Senator MORSE There is no such risk here Secretary RusK I wonder if I could make a general remark that is not involved in this area here at all A SERIES OF MISTAKES ABOUT CUBA If we are concerned about Cuba the Cuban story is a long story January 20 1961 is not a magical date The United States has made a series of mistakes about Cuba President Eisenhower and Secretary Christian Herter have taken full responsibility for everything that happened up to January 1961 President Kennedy and I have taken full responsibility for everything that has happened since Janaury 1961 I am not in any sense inclined to criticize President Eisenhower and Secret£Lry Herter about things that were done or not done before January 1961 and they have been exceedingly restrained and careful about criticizing what has happened since January 1961 because I think both pairs have seen tlie complexity and the agony of the judgments that have to be made in matters of this sort particularly matters which may or may not require the use of the armed forces of the United States with the ramifications that go all over the world when this_ happens This Cuban matter is a serious question for the United States It h__ as bro ughi··· up the very edge of th ·e _in_ci nerat_ion ·•··_ of th_e -· Northern Hem1Sphere I would hope that we get to the an l ers to to_ ··101 these questions that the committee is interested in but I hope we can find a way not to let this entire Cuban story from its start to its finish be an occasion for our ripping each other apart· at a time when we n ed maximum unity to get our job done in regard to the · Soviet bloc Senator H1cKENLOOPER Mr Chairman may I answer that Senator MORSE Yes REMARKS BY THE ATl'ORNEY GENERAL Senator H1cKENLOOPER Then I would suggest that these voluntarily offered statements such as the Attorney General· made the other day when he didn't have to do it stirred these things up This thing was rather quiescent That statement stirred-it up and I think now that it has stirred up we had better go to the bottom of it Secretary RusK My remarks covered everything involved · Senator H1cKENLOOPER Because in my opinion · that statement created an entirely false impression in the minds of the American people and while I have had considerable discussion with a lot of people as you well know and others I haven't said much about·· this thing But I am not about to stand still and be pushed around by things that I know are not quite creating the right kpowledge on the part of the American people and that was not done by any dissident group so far as I know of The Attorney General undertook to come cut of a clear sky and make that statement which I · thoughtp was unnecessary He opened up this Pandora's box for full · investigation and I did not instigate this investigation at all I have not attempted to but you know it is two-way street on this business · Secretary RUSK I realize that sir Senator H1cKENLOOPER And there are a lot of things about this that are very interesting and including Panama which I did not get into There are some things in Panama that I would like to talk to you about PERMI'M'ING REFUGEES TO MAKE AMERICAN POLICY Senator MORSE May the chairman only say this and I will be glad to hear from the Senator from Missouri It is the opinion of the chair that what the Secretary of State has just said ought to be pretty carefully pondered by all of us who have the responsibility of being responsive to res nsibiHty in these critical da1s No good is going to be served by our re•fighting the Cuban mistake through two administrations because if we get off here on a partisan front there are going to be charges and counter charges of mistakes in two administrations and ljust do not think our security can stand that at the present time I do not want to spend any time discussing it now although at a later date I think we should I am disturbed about another matter and I asked for a memorandum to have some research done by the committee staff l am v cy much concerned about whether or not foreign policy is going to be determjned by Americans and by l'e ponsible J e fJle in our JOVernment · an d responsibl organimti' DI • who owe their first allegiance- to the govemlD8nt or 1f we are going 108 to permit a group of refugees and exiles in this country to whom we have granted sanctuary-and I thoroughly agree they should • have sanctuary to continue as some of them are doing to stir up foreign policy issues and work with vapous organizations private · organizations in 4-his country to scatter confusion· among the American populace as to • bat American policy is or should be I am passing no judgment now I am only simply saying I do not think we are very far away from having to make perfectly clear to people to whom we have given sanctuary that sanctuary does not permit them to intervene in American foreign policy and I seriously doubt if we should tolerate any longer these leaders down here They have got about 200 factions stirring up a lot of dissension in our country which I interpret to mean that they think we ought to go to war with Cuba and we ought to follow their advice about it AVOID PARTISANSHIP That is another matter But I think gentlemen this is a very delicate balance this morning as to whether or not-I know exactly what Senator Hickenlooper has in mind and I think he knows me well enough to know thatl do not want any partisanship in this whether it is Democratic or Republican Maybe some orders have to go out for some people in positions of responsibility to be responsive to it by letting the President of the United States and the Secretary of State comment on foreign policy no matter how high they may be in the administration in other departments But that is for the President to determine But gentlemen I just do not think we would be doing anything else than playing into Russia's hands if we have a so-called ugreat debste over who made what mistake in Cuba because you will never be able to exclude a Republican administration from that analysis either and no good purpose is going to be served I hope through this committee we can use· our good offices to try to get the sea quieted down Senator HICKENLOOPER Mr Chairman I will just say that I was not a party to restirring this thing up Senator MORSE I did not imply you were Senator HICKENLOOPER No I understand that It has been stirred up so far as I am concerned and I think foreign policy ought to be as nearly unanimous as we can conscientiously make it on all sides But if it is going to be stirred up I am not going to back away from discu ing it · Secretary RusK I certainly agree with that Senator LAUSCHE I concur with what the Chairman has said He is in· effect repeating the words which I uttered repeatedly at the time of the U-2 event I said it is my country my country right or wrong and I will stand by it But I was·ridden over roughshod and the U-2 incident was made a political football which should not · have happened Senator MORSE Of course the Secretary of State has not stirred it up Mr McCone has not stirred it up and the Pen on Building has not stirred it up All I wanted to do was to· find out what the quality of oil would be that it is going to take to calm the waters · Senator LAUSCHR I concur with what you said about it · · · •- ' ' 109 Secretary RusK Mr Chairman I can assure you I know no one in the administration who has attempted to claim any partisan benefit form the Bay of Pigs episode A STAFF STUDY Senator SPARKMAN Mr Chairman if I may make just a s1 tgges• tion and this is probably something which should be considered by the full committee rather than by the subcommittee You know we got into a hassle in something similar to this in reference to tiae Middle East situation back in 1957 and the committee at that time reached a decision and the State Department cooperated with us making the entire files available with reference to dealing with that situation The staff did a study of it It seems to me that if we get to this point of hassling over this we might go all the way back to the beginning of the Batista trouble say 1952 son1ewhere along there and let the staff study the documentation during that whole time Here was the outcome if I remember correctly in the 1957 staff study The committee was satisfied and it was agreed by Senator William F Knowland representing the minority Senator Ful• bright that the whole matter just he dropped Senator HUMPHREY We looked at the ·volumes of documents and-Senator SPARKMAN And nobody cared to look at it The staff did make a study of it and I just throw that out as a suggestion that might be_decided on by the full committee Senator MoRSE Senator Carlson Senator CARLSON Nothing right -now Let some of the other members ask questions Senator SPARKMAN Carl Marcy reminds me that Senators Fulbright and Knowland the two who were really heading it up spent many long hours going through the files It was we individual members who did not spend too·much time Senator MORSE Senator Humphrey Senator CARLSON Let me just make this point I just asked Carl Marcy for this This is just a summary of a transcript of the 2 New York Times reporters the chairman presided and it was a very interesting discussion I am going to read that transcript on it and I urge the other members to read it those members who were· not present 2 It was quite a discussion Senator MORSE Senator Humphrey SITUATION IN HAITI AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBUC Senator HUMPHREY My main concern Mr Chairmar and Mr Secretary is not with what was done because I think you put your finger on it I do not know anybody who has profited from the J Jay · of Pigs fiasco and I do not know anybody who is very happy about the rise in power of Fidel Castro and there· is plenty of blame for everybody if anybody wants to get to wallowiJlg around in the soup there will be plenty of blame for all parties But what is more im• or Tad Szulc and 2 r -Testimony 70 0 f ·TM ff iltOricaJ · ·Se 2 Max Frankel June 22 1961 See Volume XIII Part 2 · ·· ·· · • ' page1 ·· · ·110 portant it seems to me is n1imber one what is our continuing policy on Cuba which I think would be very helpful if we would have stated as clearly and as succinctly as possible I ·think· it is ' rather clear but it means repetition · Second what do we do in case of a subversive take-over in Haiti which I think is surely probable or at least within the realm of possibility Third as Senator Hickenlooper I believe and Senator Aiken both pointed out so wisely this morning the growing problems of Panama which are I am confident being given very careful consid eration in the Department but about which so little is known by Members of Congress or by the public And finally what is going o be the future of the Dominican Republic These are the areas that I think we ought to be looking toward If we get ourselves fastened down into a detailed review of pre-Castro post-Castro or the Batista-Castro era we will be study ing ancient history and it will do exactly what it always has done before it will result in a partisan wrangle and harangue that will not be very educational or helpful In the meantime none of us will really get the information we need on what I think and this is just one Senator's opinion what I think are really tough prob· lems coming up The situation in Haiti is becoming explosive It is right next door to the Dominican Republic it is just a few miles from Cuba There are many people who worry ·as to whether or not they can have a democratic form of government in the Dominican Rep ublic despite the elections that took place I am worried about these matters and what I think we need is to get our governnient concentrating on a coordinated policy of common objectives on Cuba the Latin American countries particularly the Caribbean nations and ourselves the Haiti situation and the Dominican Republic I for one-and I want to go on record as saying so-think it is a complete waste of time to go back over this old ground I think· Bourke Hickenlooper ·is right I do not know what the Attorney General made his statement for I am not trying to defend him I just do not think it proves anything anyway All it proves is that we sure got a lot to learn So I would hope that we might concentrate our attention under the chairmanship of Senator Morse who I think also made a very wise comment on the matter of the refugees to whom we have given sanctuary They do not run this policy They should be treated with dignity and respect but this business of stirring up the masses and multitudes and harassing our government in the most critical time of our history has got to come to a halt WORK OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE Senator MORSE The Senator from Minnesota has really outlined the work of my subcommittee that the full• committee authorized as you remember before we adjourned last fall and about which I am in close contact with the chairman of the full committee As the Senator from Alabama has pointed ·out I think the fun com- · mittee has great res naibility too and any hearing that ·we have 111 every member of the full committee wHI be invited to it to partici- · · pate in it fully • · · I have to work out with the Secretary so that we are· not trespassing upon their precious time a work schedule here where we can conduct this study I shall always call it a study in regard to this whole matter of U S relations with Latin America with reference to the Alliance for Progress and of course with these trouble spots which include not only Cuba but Panama the Dominican Republic Haiti and possibly a couple of other points The Senator from Missouri SITUATION IN HAITI Secretary RusK Mr Chairman may I make a very brjef com ment on Senator Humphrey's remarks-Senator MORSE ·Yes Secretary RusK continuing About these 3 trouble spots They are indeed trouble spots Panama is uncertain in this electoral situation Haiti is the sinkhole of the hemisphere and is very danger- · ous there and we have been working on that quite intensively It is not easy to deal with Duvalier and find f llternatives to him that have any opportunity of taking hold there May this be off the record Senator MORSE Off the record Discussion off the record Senator MORSE The Senator from Missouri Senator SYMINGTON Thank you Mr Chairman REMOVAL OF MISSILES FROM EUROPE First I think it is very instructive of the chairman to call this hearing and secondly I agree entirely with the statement made by Secretary Rusk a few minutes ago although I must say I think there is great merit in the position taken by Senator Hickenlooper Now on these Thors and Jupiters in Europe in 1959 I went to England and recommended that the Thors get out of t ere I agree that the Jupiters in the other two countries were in the course of going out of England and they certainly should have gone out I am glad to hear that they have no relationship with the Cuban situation PLANES ·1N CUBA The question of the postponement I think is clear that is the postponement of the second strike For the first time this morning· I learned about some planes we did not know about and therefore if the Secretary would be good enough to put in the record what · planes we thought were there and later on what planes we found were there I would appreciate that because that is part of the story that I did not know Secretary RusK Those predicted to be there and those reported to be destroyed on the first strike and those that turned up later Senator SYMINGTON Yes ·any planea that turned up later that· were not known to be there that ii new one on me · · i·• · '112 • • ' • · · ··· ·' ·•' • •• · _ · _ - · ·· · • • ' _I • • _ · ••· _ _ • • ' • ' · i ·Senator Mou£ · l will •request0 the Secretary ' ' ' record a memorandum basecr upon his research arid i it'is so ' --dered · · · _- _ •·· · · - · · ' Senator SYMINGTON Thank you ldr Chairman ' ' • tQ 1neert· 1n· the ·· • Or- CONCERN ABOUT POI ARIS is There is· a great deal of talk about the Polaris There a book out called The Tenth Fleet orfthe submarine picture and I hope we do not get lulled into -thinking that the Polaris is the answer to everything ·· ause we plan to put about $12 billion into it The · day they perfect underwater detection it is going to be just 'as hard to detect as a turtle going across a sunny road • · Some of the military decisions that have been made disturb me a great deal I do not want to put all of my eggs into a basket of thirty-mile-an-hourboats especially when you get into that_question and·• especially···el tromagnetic· impulses in the -atmosphere I hope_ we do not get into a Maginot Line of thought· on that and try to sell that to the Allies That fs what this committ ee might be primarily interested in · What I am worried about Mr Secretary and we have not dis• cussed that very ·much -because I· think we· have been flogging a dead horse this morning-on the other 1and I think my friend from Iowa is entirely correct when he says that it was not flushed by the oposition A TREMENDOUS MILITARY BASE IN CUBA But th past is the past and based on the figures that Mr McCone has given us this morning it is just as clear as light to me that the Cubans are building a tremendous military base 90 miles fr9m -the United States A yeJr ago last June they flew a supersonic bomber in- operations quantities •in a show They could refuel at sea · arid use these bases as staging ·bases'just the way we plan to use bases in Africa and so forth They have got the supersonic fighters that are just · about as ·good as anything we have got l think the fig11re Mr McCone gave us was 42 and they also have he said 160 MIG's That is a whale of a big• air force and they have also l think he said _7 500 airmen who are there and half ofthose might_ handling these MIG's l think ought· to find out more about this · buildup because nobody can do ything about what happened in the past-I could not agree wi h you more--that whatever the mistakes are they have· been ltlade• Jut fi qm the standpoint of the futqr especially when the I ji r talks about this b118iness of putting nuclear stuff without o r being able to detect-it these are the types and character · of· things l belieye we ought to get into because if they get a' solid military in Cuba Mr Chair man it seems to· me that is something that is going tcfcause some apprehension · · · · · · · ·• ··· · · · · That is all I have to say about it _It is the futureJ1t which I am interested a great deal more than- about who made the mia takes in the put This nillitary buildup in Cuba diat1 1rbs m great d l vve in base a 113 Senat r MoRSE TheiSeriator ftom Ohio When the Senator from Ohio finishes the chalrman has reserved his·· questions but he has · a few questions · ·· · LEAKS TO THE PRF SS Senator· LAUSCHE Number one in these hearings with' the Secre tary I would like to obtain information of what the military ture of Cuba is · My questioning in the last two meetings was directed to that purpose and only to that purpose Myjudgment is that · if we are to take care of the future it is necessary to know what the · military strength is in Cuba · · ·· · • · · · Now then this is a matter of importance and I want the chair to listen to it I have said nothing about what is· supposed to transpire in these executive hearings Last week after we had our meeting · with the Secretary a columnist carried a story that four Senators Lausche Symington Aiken and Hickerilooper- · Senator MORSE And Morse · Senator LAUSCHE It did not say Morse Senator MoRSE My name was in the column · Senator LAUSCHE Senator Morse's name was in the columri when Senator Morse was fighting against the invasion while Lausche and others were fighting for it · · I never uttered one word in the direction of invasion I specifical- ·· ly said that it should not be But Senator Humphrey was given credit for doing the job of keeping things on the track and four or five of us-· Senator HICKENLOOPER I was pictured as giving the Secretary a · hard time · -· Senator LAUSCHE I pledge that when I come into these• meetings I will say nothing to anyone about what transpirea and I have the • right to expect from my colleagues that theywill not speak Bµt u·· they do speak they should speak the truth · and not the falsehoods So there were 2 grave errors committed One the breach of confi• · dence and secondly the misstatement of the fact · · · · · · Senator MORSE If the Senator will dwell -on 'this for a moineitt because I think it should be out on the tal le is it the opinion of the Senator from Ohio that when one or two of his colleagues Senator LAUSCHE I am not casting- reflections ·on anyone Senator MoRSE My name was in the column · ·• Senator LAUSCHE The colunin is there and it has in quotation marks what was said paragraph after paragraph · · · • · · · Senator MORSE If the senator from Ohio· wants my word of · it · · · · · - · honor he 'has· Senator LAuscui l'am not asking it · · · · ·• •• · -· Sena tor Mo E l have never talked to Drew Pea rson I never talked to anyb9 ly else and I give you my word ·of honc r l want to · say and let usiet it on the table l do not know whether that was · the meeting or some other meeting there was somejoshing in the Senate·· dining room later about some statement that l de· that I · tad ade pledge in my campaign th9 t I was going to speak more · · in this session of the Congress than l did 1n the laat and l told the · · committee l was going to tart with my speech on NATO That ia · the e nly thin that the enator· from re cm ever aboltt th• ' · ' · • ' ' ' · ii• · meeting it was· said irt g h ill6r r do not know who was there ·_ · and I am not sure whe ther or not you were there when I was kid ding about it in the dining room ' • · _ nau r LAuscHE• You and I have been kidding about th t f r a long time Senator' ·MORSE I am going to deliver on 'that But I want this · ·-· committee to know -becauseldo not like my name in his column but I want _this- committee to know that---l remem ler· the column now it sort of gave the impression -· I was fighting GoliatlJ L I want-_ · - you to know that l had no conversation about it _· · · · · Senator SYMINGTON Will the Senator·yield as long as he men• tioned my name - · _ · · · Senator MORSE Yes · _ _ ·Seri11tor SYMINGTON Will the Senator from Ohio yield · _Sei a tor 4uscHE I yield · -_ - -•- · - · SECRETARV WAS NOT G LI q -· _ Senator SYMINGTON I felt very badly about that column Mr Secretary because when I was out in my State lmade a Jlat denial ·on the TV program that the ident had agreed·· not to invade Cuba unequivocally was the· implication you see The St Louis Bar put 3 Republicans and they were all concerned on the subject and · therefore I got quite a _fot of'criticism and argument resulting from that questioning and my answer was l have stated So I was anxious to·· find out ·along with _the 11at r •·from· Ohio what ·the · facts were and I think the Secretary knows that I have no inten· tion in any way of grilling him You cannot find out about these things unless you ask It was a classified executive meeting I believe the $ecretary remembers I congratulated him on his forthright testimony when it was over and I felt very badly about it I _have read the record afterwards carefully and I ani certain that he did not feel asJ am sure members of this committee including ·rny friends from Ohio and from Iowa feel that there was any grilling done If we ai nnot get the information in here we had better fold up this setup and start a new one - ·_ The_ only· other point I want to· make is that l think_ it was said ·- · and that I as the number· one pr ventive war adv9C8te in my party l have -never advocated preventive war B on the rapid clC Sing 'lf the overall security gap that we 'mighf be in in · our favor l sure am not in favor of it now - - - __ · _ · · _ lthank -the Senator from· Ohio for letting me make my state · ment -_ - · · ·- _ · _-• -• - - · ·- Senator MORSE That is an accurate s tement of your position · Senator SYMINGTON Thank you sir · • • • · Senator LAuscaE I came in here about 10 80 Did Mr McCone ·• - testify abou t his understanding dealing with the military position -_ • ·of Cuba now That is in the record · · ·-_ · · · · ·_ · i · · -_· Secretary Rt1sK In some detail - - · -· •· · · · Mr McCoNE Some detail Senatori ·-•· •·- · Senator LAt1SC HE I can get thatout_of th 'record i as 115 · CONTAcr WJTfi THE CUBAN BlUGADE ' •·· · · Vith · Now second y who weie the nv t ations carried on Who was·in contact with the head of the·Cubait Brigade was it the Secretary of tate or the Secre1'ry of the Army Who actually carried on the talk That is only one question would like to ask Mr McCone can you answer that question · ··•· · · · · · • · · Mr McCoNE No I cannot sir because l was not here at that time Perhaps the Secretary of State can · · · · · • · · · Secretary RusK · Unfortunately I cannot as of today identify these individuals because as soon as the subject left the room in which we were talking about it given what we thought were the highly secret nature of these activities1 we lost contact with it and it went through channels that l frankly do not know We will try to et it • · ·· · · · · l nator LAUSCHE · That is the upper echelon people did ·not talk with these Cuban Brigade leaders Secretary RusK That is correct LEAK STQRY · •• ' - ' Mr Chairman could I be privileged to make· a very short comment on some of the arlier·remarks because ldc rwarit to•express mr great app eciation_ for the constant consider ti n l have re' STATE DEPARTMENT DID NOT ceived from this committee I have ne· er Jelt I have l een put upon Indeed if I have any impressi n it is that the members of this com- mittee are thankful that they do not sit in my chair I do appreciate that So far as this recent epiS de is· concerned I am confident myself it did not come from the State Department or the two of us here If we had leaked it would not have been to leak that story · · · · Laughter Senator MORSE I have a few quetJtions to tie up this briefing I and some of the staff have prepared these questions · SOVIET PLANES TO CUBA The Russians are flying_ nonstop from Russia to CuQa with planes · capable of carrying 100 passengers we are told Do we know what these planes carry and how often they fly Senator McCoNE I would ·like to give you any information we have on this subject in a memorandum Senator MORSE Fine • _· · • · Mr McCQNE I just do not have itavailable I can give you the · · fac on airplanes Jhat-have gont from the Soviet Union Cuba·_ and non-stop whetner by stopping or non-stop J ii · · • · · · · - · Senator MORSE The memorandum wilr be made a part of the record ' If this hi hly c lassified -tran scri·p····t·Jll·is·morriing · · The 1nformation referred to follows J · · · • · · ·csmAt IN' J UIGENCE AozNcv · Wai iington DC January f8 1963 · · MEMORANDUll Subject 'Soviet Civil'Air Route to C ba i · · ' t ' •· · ' '• · •· ' ' · · · · The Sovie t civUairlin e ·Aeron··· · ot in•upra tecl · ita tlrat larlt K heduled m ··• 'ht · from oscow Hava na 'm· Munnafllk on 7 1l 1•t -inw gil ht by • •TtJ-114 four ne turboprop t - fb1t ' - · ir _ Jnto the ' · ' · 'ii · ' · ' '·· · ' · • ·· ' · · ' ' · ' M to ua rt 116 · w i re and is billed by M- - the · •• lcl'• longest teaui hon• · stop air - A rouridtrip ffipt is· now· tchidt ded to- flown once a week ·rather· · · ·• than twice u aamounced initially by tlKt US - · ·· · • ·· • · · · ··• · · ·' _2 11-··---• route cf north· from MOICQW to Murmansk a rid from there after a · t t ra 1 ·_ a totaal diatance of more than 6 500 milea The rout doea not pus throu h' the air•· · · · • of Western countries l ut the' Soviet• have requeated the lie of naviga ional •· · and' weather aids from N'orway ·•Jceland Canada _ the UK and•·the US The· flight _ · from Moecow to Havana is covered in about 16 hours ftyin1 time the return trip · from Havana • io M01COw il·shortenecl to about _14 h ur• uae·•·c ffavorablt 'winds By flyinJ nons p ·fr_om du manalc the U R · oidl t P robleni of ob ining ver • _n lit_ arid Ian hnr_1 11 ta frori i_· Weate _ m_ · • · · cou ntnes • - ngh·ts· becamemc_re mg ly diff'lcult for the Soviets to obtain after the Cuban CIUll erupted last October - • a ' though fr uently••llt e to be an und- pendable· _aircraft the TU-ll prob · ably 11 fully· capable of semc1ng the t foecow•Havana · route Maintenance d1fficu1 •• ties which are @mmon to· this tran•port the largest commercial ·aircraft in use · may present some problems however and M01COw has announced they are assign• • ing fiye ait eraft to the Cuban route poui ly in an_ ticipation of 1uc_hdifficulties_ • F r the flight to Cuba the passenger load has n reduced to 60 from the normal 170 m order to carry mo re fuel In addition up to 17 00 pounds ofJreight could be carried ·· •· _ depending on the fuel load Preyiously the only regularly scheduled TU U4 service was· on- route connecting Moscow and Khabarovsk in the Soviet Far Easl r nz lie _ s r DELIVERIES TO CUBA • Senator MORSE I am told by the staff Mr McCone that the New · York Times claims that it checked the story with CIA in advance · •· · of publication and that CIA confirmed the Times' facts as· · substan view of the_ fact that started out this hearing · tially accurate this morning by putting trult Times story iri the record I w uld · -like to ask you that question· for whatever comments you want o we In make · ···' M_ _r M ceo_NE• It • 8 my unders ta ·ndins_that_ some b ut not - H o f · · _ a the actual res 1n that story Vere check So e of hem wer erroneous ·and they w re so advised The manner in whJch·the ar- ticle · was headlined and· the lead sentences were misleading ·as much as they would give the impression that the delivery was taldng place currently or over the last two ·or three months 'Yhere · as as l testified earlier the deliv ries took place between Jhe first · · -of Jtlly and October 24 the date of the quarantine and there has bee n· only one ship that has gone· out 11nd delivered military equipment in quantity since th11ttirrie · · i · · · i Senator t ORSE It seems to me your testimony earlier given itself shows Jn some respect $ thafthe story did not have the facts accur11tely stated • •· · · • •· •·• - ' · ·· · '· · ' ' · · I TELIJGENCE il DING CUBA •·•· · Mr Director in general tenris are not asking you to be specific wha SQurc intelligenc d the United States have in reg rd to· Cul a_othel'·thap ph ·aph1 111d ref Mr McCoNE Deleted ' · · c· · · •· · Sena or MORSE The ·- rei# rn · an i-Castr o µnd ijrourid mov • ments 1n Cuba with wh1cli we maintain· close 1ntelhgence contact · · · · Mr McCoNz That ia correct · and there - ·- ·recent inforriu1tidh re- 'ported ·as recently astoda y that·ther CC JUJidetabl$i '8Jitatio 1ln · some of these underground movements wittdn Cuba _·there are nots ancf we · · _anddilcontent and an_ x •-• - tentbyd t·grou · • • • • • 1 ' ' · •' ' •• • • •· • '·• · · • _ - · • l ' • •· ·••· •••• • ' • •- ••• •' ' 117• · · · ·we hatar J rl yesterday a repprtthatthere were 21 people exe- cuted in a parti lar area We· are inclined to believe that that report is· authentic in view of the fact that we know that that was a dissident movement · • · ·• ··· ·•·• · · Senator SPARKMAN You these were executed by Castro Mr McCoNE• That is tight It comes down pretty hard on that EARLIER CONCERNS ABOUT ·MISSILES IN CUBA · · Senator MoRSE Mr Sec tary you testified 1 w k that most · policy officers in the executive branch had been·-so sure that Khrushchev would not put missil into Cuba· that they failed properly to interpret · intelligence· reports from Cuba •· 1sri't ther e a real ·danger now that our policy· people are so· sure that Khrushchev has suffered a _def t in his Cuban policy that we do not give adequate · · · weight to 1ntelhgence reports from Cuba Secretary RusK nator since I have been reviewing the record much more cl ly in the last few days will have to modifythat subject · ·· · · ·• · · · • · · · · · · •· ·· ·• · First of all l discovered I myself in May 1961 lked about the threatof a possible missile base in Cuba a11d that was one ofour · deep concerns about it · Etnd I also have learned that in ·terms of· some of these preliminary reports that might have pointed the way toward a larger ·missile supposing that came n ·after the jt1dgment · I referred to in my la st meeting so I d rthink if we have learned one lesson one among many in this whole affair •it ·is that we cannot take anything for·granted with respect to Cuba and Khrushchev · · · ·• · · · · · · · · · · · · Mr McCone's agen9y for example takeseveryone_of these news reports rumors that come in and immediately runs them dow l to find out what the _basis for it is ' the origin what the substance of it· ··· is and we try to stimulatethe entire intelligence community and· every other resource we have to be sure we are not caught unaware again · · mean • -·- MORE DEBATE ' ' • • • j '' '_ • • • • IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY•· Senator MORSE Mr Secretary might it be a good idea to bring in · · some skeptics to a nalyze the intelligence reports from Cuba those who are disagreeing with some of the interpretations that the government is making of th em · · _· · · · · · · · · _Secretary RusK My_ inipression is tllatthere is the most vigorous discussion a11d deb£1te in the intelligence community where there are differences ·or evaluation I know Mr McCone is very alive to this and discusses this·frt ely with the top policyoffice rs so we are under no illusion that a-particular judgment w 11 rily lOO percent fact · ·_•· · · · · · · · Senator' Mo its£ I am a Httle conc rne i ttt 'view of ESC me recent eve11ts-l do riot need to particuJarize as towheth el' ornot there a is any dan er that a dissident f one t t does · no J ll ong with what he tnn1ks may be the· 1 9bcy• of h1a supenors 11 going to be · · subject to cr ticism if he atan up and · · ·CQU ·IO to speak in · · · · ' some d1SCUS810111 withbl out 1overnrnent I do not iu ppen to share ·· · that view But there are thoN who wonder if in the National Secu· · · -rity Co c r irt tt e· ' n or in - ·GIA in the '•' _ ' _ · _ ' · _ _'· _ - · t- · · · _ _ ·i_ ·· - - · - - _ _ _· _- _ _ · · _• · ·• · _ · - ·· ' _' t· '- _ _ · · - • ' ••118 ···c1 · ··as ·· · ·• Pep on···Building h · •· slt ptic abc t'spm ·•·P o- - ···· • · whethet lie 19 fn etand encouraged to elCpress ihis d ns1 n · · · · · · or whether we are running the danger because ·or recent-events that if you ·have a contrary opi ion 1ou keep still · · · _ Secretary ·RlisK Mr McCone may wish to add tQ my own · om· · ment on this • In th _JJep1Jt111ent of State · qne of the purposes of ·my moming·11 111eetijlgevery·clay· is-to insure that we ·have full disc ussion· and ·opporl uil ty for thedissiclents·to express their vi 'YJ •· on -p licy or otherwuJe · l think this makes far more profitable a · - meetinc 8lld l o lieve my colleagues ·11nd ncl ttt t taking · n is a perfectly · air game and that they are ll v1ted to do so ·· • · J also have noticed in reports prepared b ' the intelligence com• · munity and interdepartmental groups that the dissidents views if · there are any ·are usually expressed and I d not believe there ·is · ···any suppression because that would frustrate· he purpose of the· m • · ti yt e oil r e r ia rt epeihi rtf · ministration is to insure that these c hann ls of thought and cotn- munication be kept open · · · · · · · ' · · • Senator MORSE 'I know that is the case · but I wanted to make it · part of the record because'you have got people around here who• because ofthe recent Stevenson episode are of the opinion that the beet way around· here is to keep stiU ThisJast Alsop article his - second attack on Stevenson is the one lam referring tQ · · · · lam not interested· in Whllt those facts are to ·be fran k Vith you because l have said from the b eginnirig let us assume h saiq all ·• · heis supposed to· have said ffe ought tQ have said it iflte thought · there was some basis for · raising lt foridiscussion That· nQt· · mean· he is riot· going to support the final policy• I do not care it is Steve n e t X Y or They ougllt to raise all the llternatives But once you agree on a policy then we an· go on it does whether z ucr NE ' RusK ·Yes · ·Mr I- would like to add Just one comment to what the · e·Se cretary has said in connection· wtth your last l l tion Within ' t le intelligence community since l have been the· Di ector of Cen- · s L lt 1 Lttth tc S f r e n h f 8f n •· ¥lth nting viewp0ints · · · · · · ·· · · · · · · · · · ·· · Thtfliite_ U genet Board meets e-very Wednesday ntorning and it · · ·• to o t u ed 1h e cittt t b t · · ' the disagreement is br0ttght 9ut than to at n pt to adjust to the · different views into mething thattr presents ·a • opipromise That a firm poHcy l have · · · · · · C •• ' · · IS 'qa ll EEN cASTRO ANl 11¥ 8 · · ·• Sem1tof Moass l am almost through gentle111e n with my ques- · tions B ut we have heard a great deal in committee and out of com• mi uid about th ibility of a growing disagreement b · ••ffi 1 l itli tha ici' 'n i wo ·· · · ·• ' ' ' ' '• · i · · ' '·' ·• ' ·· · · '_ i · ' - ere·• ·•·' ·''-·· · ··· - · ''· -- ' ·· c ·' ·•· · · ·' ' • · tl f · 'SecretarY RusK l think that the mariiage is still basically intact · tw 11 Castro and Khrushchev although there have- been ten sions· between the two ••certainly very high- tensions duri the crisis in October an4 during Mr Mikoyan's visit to the island •· · · · l think that·it·is possil Ie--andJhis ufsomething which we a · · watching·· very closely--if th ··· Soviet _forces • that were there c• · · remain•·they m y be there to re nforce·the··control· of the Commu• nist apparatus not only as betweerf the regime and the people but ' also •-between elem ents ilf the regime We have indicated to the· · Russi3118 'that· if this Jeads to a· Hungary type operation this will•·' not be accepted in this hemisphere •· ·· · · · · · i I think there have been tensionstbut I do not believe that thoee _ are approaching the· breaking point yet · _I do not know·- whether they will in fact reach a breaking point There has been some flir - tation between el ments in the Castro regime and Peiping and this· has not helped their relations with Moscow · · · · _· • ·_ · ·· • · Mr McCoNE I would like to add Mr - Chairman that thiAI is a matter that the· intelligence community foll4ws veiy closely and • · · our_· opinion· as of_ the present time • oncurs with the•· staternent a · made by the Secretary 'think it is pretty well borne out by not · only· our intelligerice''twurces but also thf public statements · · Senator Mo E Tllerefore we· ought to also keep in mind· that when the State- Department is -n egotiating with Khrushchev in regard to other matters· f lsewhere in the world it ·may·· very Vell _ · increase· that breach between' Khrushchev and Castro depe11dinJ· on · · to what extent depending on the ex nt to which we are suc ful · with him in reaching understandings elsewhere · Mr McCoN E That is correct · I SPANISH·SPEAKJNG AGBNTS • _ Senator MORSE Mr McCone are·you· satisfied that wegf t·• real · · hard intelligence based on·· competenf Spanish-speaking 1 1gents in · Cuba · · · • · ·· · Mr McCoNE Not fully satisfied no It is very difficult - · · One- thing that Castro under Soviet· guidance has succeeded in doing is to create quite a firm police state and it is very difficult for our agents to operate because of hjs system of informers · · · ·Senator MORSE I ask this because of -the constant references ·to · the adequacy of our air coverage and use of the reporj a that · are coming out from sonie' of these refugees 'in exile wh _are speak-· ing to some people in quite emphatic terms about what·was orJiva _not promised which disturbs ine Jw8- to thf Democratic Women's Dinner the other night and spo te ri tb ·Alliancefor Progr and· there was a very very prornm nt C l an exile there i ar1d· l was - aghast at the lengths to which he went prior to the meeting in · · · ·· · talking to me about what we ought_ to do · ·l was very polite to· hiiji f did ipt· exp• anSattitude at alt In fact led him on· because l had heanf he v• a m·an who had been ·· •_· ·a·_ highpolitical figure iri_Cuba_ undet tiata but µicfgo le over tc • Castro at the beginning and now · was anti n a atd J could not talk to him without' m bei convinced tbat hl •ma to be moti• · • vated • to - '-r· -· ·- - uW jra1' 2 · ' · _ ' · · · ' · ' I J • ·i t i f·l ·• ·· • 120 A NATION'S RIGHT TO BUILD ITS DEFENSES My final question goes to a question of international law that has puzzled me throughout all this Under international law any ' nation Communist or free has the right to build its defenses Isn't this part of the trouble we had with Mexico and Brazil because Mr Secretary we· had to deal with their legalistic approaches at Punta del Este You remember you sent me to meet with one of them and Hickenlooper with the other to see if we as lawyers could argue with them about their legalistic approacr Aren't we in a very difficult position here that a Communist nation has the right to build its defenses and that is all they are going to claim that Cuba ic doing And as long as she stays on this side of the line with her defensive buildup she is within the framework of international law Secretary RusK Senator I suppose if you look at just the general propositions of general internationel iaw that this would be correct I believe and we have a memorandum on that which we will be happy to send to you that where security matters are concerned the Rio Treaty is the law of this hemisphere that here is a treaty of which Cuba is a member which has established geographic boundaries for dealing with security questions by the decision of the hemisphere The information referred to follows MEMORANDUM I II Ill IV V VI Legal basis for quarantine of Cuba Legal basis for United States air surveillance of Cuba United States obligation to aid Cuba in case of attack Cuba's status vis-a-vis Rio Treaty Swiss representation of United States interests in Cuba Status of James B Donovan and the Logan Act I LEGAL BASIS FOR QUARANTINE OF CUBA Article 6 of tl e Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance Rio Treaty reads If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra continental or intra-continental conflict or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or in any case the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent Twenty-one countries including Cuba are parties to the Rio Treaty and none has disaffirmed it On October 23 1962 the Council of the Organization of American States meeting as the Provisional Organ of Consultation resolved _ To recommend that the member states in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance Rio Treaty of 1947 take all measures individually and collectively including the use of armed forces which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies-which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba ith offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent · Pursuant to this reeolution a quarantine against the shipment of offensive weap om to Cuba was impOled by-the-United -with the a11iltan -·of ctber meri can Stata At the tame time the Council directed that the Security O uncitof the as follows 121 United Nations should be informed of the contents of the resolution in keeping with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations As explained in the attached memorandum on The Legal Basis for the Quaran tine of Cuba prepared by the Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State at the time of the imposition of the quarantine the resolution of the Council of the Organization of American States acting as the Organ of·Conaultation and the quarantine imposed pursuant thereto are consistent with the Charter of the United Nations More recent analyses of the· legal questions involved are contained in articles by the Legal Adviser and by the Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State A copy of the latter is attached A copy of the Legal Adviser's article published in the current Foreign Affairs will be supplied 11 LEGAL BASIS FOR UNITED STATES AIR SURVEILLANCE OF CUBA As a general matter under international law the air space over the territory of a state is rubject to the sovereign power of the state The state controls entry into its air spar and intrusions without its consent are unlawful This general rule is however sv bject to any modifications to which a particular state may agree In the case of Cut d these include the Rio Treaty · _ In ts resolution of October 23 1962 quoted in part above the C-ouncil of the Organization of American States acting as provisional Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty unanimously agreed to recommend that the member states in ac- · cordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treatys take all measures including the use of armed force to insure that Cuba could not continue to receive military sup- plies which might threaten the peace and security of the continent and to prevent the missiles with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the continent By the same resolution the Council also agreed 'co call for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability The overflights are directly related to the objective set forth in the Resolution of October 23 That resolution was aimed at not only immediat e dismantling and with• · r rawal of present missiles ·but also assurances that Cuba could not continue to re· ceive military supplies which might threaten the peace of the continent Furthermore the resolution authorized all measures in _accordance with Arti· c es 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty Article 6 quoted above provides that in the event of a conflict or other fact or sitraation that might endanger the peace of America the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures to be taken for the common defense and for the main nance of the peace and security ·· of the continent Article 8 of the Rio Treaty provides For the purposes of this Treaty the measures on which the Organ of Consulta• ti0n may agree will comprise one or more of the following recall of chiefs of diplo matic missions breaking of diplomatic relations breaking of consular relations par• tial or c c 1mplete interruption of economic relations or of rail sea air postal telegraphic telephonic and radjotelephonic or radiotelegraphic communications and _· use of armed force Since the use of armed force is specifically included as one of the measures under this provision it is clear that less severe measures such as aerial surveillance are also included The facts of these overflights and the photographs resulting therefrom were before the Council when it considered the resolution of October 23 _ The·· member countries acted in the anticipation that these flights would continue pursuant to the resolution and as a means of carrying out the provisions of the resolution Aerial surveillance of Cuban military activity including overflight·of Cuba n terri · ' tory is also consistent with the Charter of the United Nations Article 2 4 of the United Nations Charter sets forth the principle that All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsist ent with the purposes of the United Nations Photographic surveilJance is not a threat or use- of force Nor is the provision of Article 53 of the Charter which states that no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangenienta without the authorization of the Security Council applicable since aerial surveillance is not enforcement on as that t ermis used in Article 53 Moreover no organ of the United Nations has in a iy 911ay called this pract into t iPnL · · -'c--- c -- ---··--- --- --- - · • c· - - -- _--·· - - -··· • - - •• · 122 Ill UNITED STATES OBLIGATION UNDER THE RIO TREATY TO AID CU8AJN CASE OF ATTACK Under Article 3 of the Rio Treat_y a treaty to which both the United States and Cuba are parties the contracting States agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all American States and that each contracting State shall assist in meeting the attack The Article -also provides that on the request of the State directly attacked and until the decision of the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American System each contracting State may determine the immediate measures it may take to fulfill the obliga tion to assist in meeting the attack Article 17 states that the Organ of Consultation - shall take its decision by a vote of two-t irds of the contracting States and Article -20 provides that no State shall be req ired to use armed force without its consent In the event of an armed attack on Cuba one of the relevant considerationiJ in determining United States action would be the fact that Cuba has persistently defaulted on its obligations under the Inter-American system Tne report of the InterAmerican Peace Committee adopted by the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics at Punta del F ste in January 1962 stated the conclusion that no member state of the Inter-American system can claim the rights and privileges pertaining thereto if it denies or fails to recognize the corresponding obligations As a consequence the Eighth Meeting of Consultation declared that the present Government of Cuba has voluntarily placed it self outside the American system and resolved that that Government is incompatible with the principles and objectives of the Inter-American system and is excluded from participation in that system In view of the above it is questionable whether Cuba could invoke the Rio Treaty in case of attack and whether the Organ of Consultation would take any action under the treaty if Cuba did invoke it Furthermore each contracting state must determine what measures it will tak until the Organ of Consultation has met and agreed on collective measures by a two-thirds vote and in no event may a state be required to use armed force without its consent In the last analysis the extent of the United States obligations under the Rio Treati cannot be decided in the abstract The question would have to be decided in the light of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case Some of the important facts to be considered would be the type of attack what country made the attack and the nature of the Cuban Government at the time IV CUBA'S STATUS VIS A-VIS RIO TREATY Cuba is a party to the Rio Treaty She has not denounced the treaty and remains bound by its terms V SWISS REPRESENTATION OF UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN CUBA The Swiss Government represents the United States interests in Cuba with the consent of the Government of Cuba pursuant to a protocol between the United States and Switzerland signed at Habana Januazy 6 1961 after the United States severed diplomatic and consular relations with the Government of Cuba on January 3 1961 The Representation by one government of the interests of another government in a thlrd country is a rec qpiized ractice in international relations In the case of the Swiss representation of United States interests in Cuba it consists primarily of performing various functions relating to the _protection of United States citizens and the property of United States citizens in Cuba providinf assistance regarding the estates of deceased United States citizens in Cuba receiving and transmitting p port and visa applications performing notarial services etc While there are no diplomatic and consl lar relations between the United States and Cuba the termination of those relations did not result in a cessation of recognition of the Government of C••ba by the United States The United States continues to recognize as the Government of Cuba the Government of which Fidel Castro is Premier and accordingly the Government of the United States holds the Castro Government responsible as a Government for its acts VI THE STATUS or JA ir s • DONOVAN AND THE LOGAN ACT In his negotiations with the Castro Government regarding -the release of the Bay · · of Pigs prisoners James B Donovan acted as a private citizen and as general coun• se for the Cuban Families Com Jlittee a p va sroup which was engaged in neg _ ti• at1on1 for the releue of the pnaoners besinni1111n the 1ummer of 1961 and which 123 was the successor to the Tractors for Freedom Committee• also a private group organized for the same purpose Mr Donovan had no authority to speak for the United States Government nor to represent the United States Government The Legan Act 18 U S Code Section 95 '3 provides that nAny citi1 en of the United States who without authority of the United States directly or indirectly commences or carries on any correspondence or intercourse with any foreign government or any officer or agent thereof with intent to influence the measures or conduct of any foreign government or of any officer or agent thereof in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States or to defeat the measures of the United States shall be fined not more than $5 000 or imprisoned not more than three years or both Mr Donovan's activities do not constitute a violation of the Logan Act There was no dispute between the United States and Cuba in regard to tbe prisoners since although the United States deplored their retention there were no formal efforts by the United States to obtain their release Mr Donovan's negotiations with the· Cuban Government were not therefore in relation to B l Y disputes or controversies with the United States or to defeat the measures of the United States · · ·· Secretary RusK Now we do not make too much of it because it has certain perhaps sarcastic overtones but in fact as a strict legal matter Cuba is bound by the resolutions of the OAS It has not withdrawn its membership It has taken no steps to denounce the treaty It has agreed to accept the decisions of two-thirds of the hemisphere with respect to the security of this hemisphere One could make-it may be a little sterile-but one could make the legal argument that these overflights for exa i nple are an obligation of Cuba under the Rio Pact So that I think we would have to examine the legal aspects of · the security system arranged in this hemisphere by all the members of the hemisphere including Cuba before we coul exhaust the legal aspects of it • · · Senator MORSE I close by saying that I want you to know that I think my committee can be of great help to the State Department in getting ourselves thoroughly briefed on the international law as•· pects of this I want to get myself in a position where I can answer · · · this Communist influence in any other Latin American country that wants to hold to this legalistic approach to this_problem I think you may have some problems in the United Nations about it too so I am going to have Dr Marcy to be of assistance to me and any help the State Department can give this tommittee in keeping our buildup of strength on the international law an- · swers-Secretary RusK Right · · Senator MORSE continuing To some of the Communist claims would be of real service STUDY OF U S ·LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS I close gentlemen by saying that we can go ahead not on this coveragt business but we are going to go ahead on our study of U S -Latin American relations Some n1embers of the committee may ask in due course of time that we have somebody from the Pentagon Building or somewhere else come in before the committee but I will keep you informed Mr Secretary of the progress of this co mittee because one thing this Chairman is going to insist u pon·is that all peop le who appear· before us understand that it is t he Secretary of State acting for · the President -who is _in charge of t 'le American foreign policy and that this committee 'is never roing t u far aa l have any power to ·• 0 ·- 124 influence ·it to do anything·· that will weaken the position of the State Department in the field of American foreign policy I think I demonstrated that many times and tried to again in this hearing this morning I happen to think that this Cuban thing has created a good many critical problems for us not the least of which is the critical problem of American public opinion I think we ought to be of assistance to you in trying to get the American people to be reassured that American foreign policy is being handled on a nonpartisan basis in keeping with what you have heard ·me say so many times it being our duty to see to it that partisanship does stop at the water's e Jge We have this matter-my colleagues have left and are out of your presence-of the transcript of J 9l'd that the committee · m de in the so-called Cuban investigatiot shortly following the Bay of Pigs I am still of the opinion that it should be kept secret I have invited Senators to come and read it I still think it is the best document on the subject and that a reading of it does not justify any partisan attack · I wish that you would have somebody over in the State Department refresh themselves on that document and at a later date advise us depending on future developments if you think any part of it ever should be made public or if you ought to take it and expurgate it as we have other top secret hearings eliminating parts of it and make that part public The trouble with that is I do not think there would be much left if you followed that course of action with this document But you can be pretty sure that there has been· this public discussion of the existence of the document there will be in reasing demands for more and more of it to be publicly discussed and I would like to have somebody in the Department take a look at it I close gentlemen by saying that we appreciate this very much I will close the meeting on the same basis I started it that it was a briefing It was an excellent one and I thank you very much Secretary RusK Thank you · Mr Chairman We are grateful to you Whereupon at 12 15 p 1n the subcommittee adjourned 0