NCUS IHfU l I NORAD CONAD • • •• HISTORICAL SUMMARY ' ·' Unc lass if ied JULY - DECEMBER 1963 I UCUSSlflED Allll'l'IM IN'TBYA lr N0t AlltOIIAncM NO • ---•• ✓ - _ o - J -r _ u · - J • ' · · · ··· · ·· · ·· · w SEA LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE DETECTION BACKG I In early 1962 NORAD stated a requireme nt for a warning system t o detect sea-launched ballistic missiles SIBM's To satisfy the requ ireme nt NORAD and USAF ADC examined several systems proposed by ESD 1 t ci In March 1963 NORAD recommended e ither the FPS-24 26 radar system or the FPS-35 with the back-to-back 60-foot tracker system Modificati ons would be made to s elected SAGE radars -- either the FPS-24 26 ' s or the FPS-35's but NORAD considered these modific ations an interim capability STATU y s5 The Secretary of Defense in April 1963 approved the realloca tion of $25 million of FY 1964 funds a part of which was f or a program to prov i de an early SIBM detection and warning capability The DDR E prepared a PCP that i nc luded an item f o r a warning capability against SLBM's and the Secretary o Defense approved it on 11 September _ i The approved program ca lled for modifications to SAGE radars It was estimated that USAF would release the r e quirements to industry fo r competitive bidding in April 1964 and a cont ract wou ld be awarded in August The SAGE radar modifications were to be operational by mid- 1966 SPACE DETECTION AND TRACKING SYSTEM SPACETMCK SYSTEM lc J S In January 1963 USAF set forth the respon- sibilities of the Department of the Air Force for space detection and tracking Based on an ADCprepared concept USAF defined the USAF Space tra ck System assigned it to ADC and restated its mission USAF distingu ished Spacetrack from the 53 r- 0 • - l ' '-- I - ' l I t v ' l 'J - v ·- ' - ·-·- ·················· operational system SPADATS Space Detection and Tracking System whi h bad been assigned to NORAD's operational control and was comprised of both the Spacetrac k System and the U S Navy SPASUR Space Surveillance System lc 4 ' ' NORAD was not satisfied with USAF's concept of operation for Spacctrack NORAD wanted allelements of SPADATS integrat ed into the NORAD Combat Operations Center Li i l $ The USAF position as stated in October by the USAF Vice Chief of Staff was that the tot al Spacetrack System was to be manned and operated as a departmental responsibility but that it would remain responsive to the SPADATS mission The Spacetrack System USAF felt was also essential to the Air Force space mission in the support of research developme nt test and engineering of new 00D space programs and for projects for which the Air Force would be responsible ' · s' CINCNORAD answered on 1 November that a memorandum from the DOD on command and control systems would have an impact on the subject Explained CINCNORAD when this was r eceived The question of the SPADATS composition design and pperation must be re-examined in the light of present and future needs BAKER-NUNN CAMERAS 4 Backgr ound NORAD also wanted to improve PADATS through the use of Baker-Nunn cameras Of the 17 cameras in existence USAF had four Canada had one obtained from USAF in mid-1962 and 12 were operated by the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory· SAO in support of NASA • U See Chapter Two 54 • · ' · · I • · 'I ' _ _ ·v ' - · Ji • l t Io September 1962 USAF ADC submitted a plan with NORAD's concurrence for the integration of Baker-Nunn cameras into SPADATS The plan called for a basic seven-camera network in addition to the RCAF-operated camera at Cold Lake Alberta The plan also called for taking over three SAOoperated cameras and for getting additional cameras if needed as SAO phased them out NORAD added a request for two cameras to calibrate the Navy's SPASUR fence l f The Secretary of the Air Force and the JCS concurred in ADC's plan and it was sent to the Secretary of Defense in November 1962 In January 1963 the latter said that an analysis of the capability and accuracy required by SPADATS and offered by the camera had been left out An analysis he said would be a prerequisite to approval Also he indicated that NASA would not he phasing out its SAO- of jrated cameras as planned 4 i NORAD then reaffirmed its need for the accuracy of the camera again supported the ADC plan and submitted an analysis of th · apability and acc uracy of the Baker-Nunn NORAD s aid it wanted a basic military network of cameras under its operational control rather than havinK to rely on data supplied from sensors operated by scientific agencies U In the meantime at the end of 1962 RCAF ADC put the camera at Cold Lake under the operational control of CINCNORAD LI 8'5 Status The JCS replied to CINCNORAD on 17 July that the three SAO-operated cameras would not be available as proposed in ADC's plan The JCS asked for a revised four-camera network plan that would include only those cameras currently owned by USAF The camera at Cold Lake was to be included in the plan for a total of five cameras and every effort made to get NASA to provide BakerNunn data to SPADATS The JCS endorsed NORAD's request tor a Baker-Nunn camera network to the Secretary of Defense to include only the cameras currently assigned to USAF l I •· r ' C' - ·- - L ·-' · '-r J ' II •r- J ·-• · '- • • I _ • I ' I ' - l • • I _ • • vi -· '-l J NORAD told the JCS in September that it was completely revising its plans for the operation of the Baker-Nuno camera network The revised plan NORAD said would provide for the integration of the RCAF camera and the USAF cameras into a mutually supporting sub-system of SPADATS However the contribution that SAO-operated cameras could make had to be determined before recommendations could be made for locating the USAF-owned cameras The plan was to be submitted before mid-1964 NORAD also asked the JCS to recover the camera on loan to Chile L4 $ Because the U S Navy developed other methods for calibrating SPASUR Baker-Nunn cameras were no longer needed for that purpose NORAD learned in October that the Navy had asked the JCS to take no further action to provide cameras for SPASUR for that purpose a request which the JCS approve4 4 c Cold Lake As noted previously the Canadian Baker-Nunn camera at Cold Lake had been placed under NORAD's operational control at the end of 1962 RCAF AOC which operated the camera hoped to improve Cold Lake's contribution to SPADATS Computer facilities that were expected to reduce the SPADATS Center's processing load at the NORAD COC were being checked out in December RC AF ADC also asked NORAD for help in determining future manning and capability requirements for the satellite tracking unit NORAD answered that Cold Lake's workload could be expected to go up but was subject to unknown variables such as the level of foreign space activity angles of launch inclination and altitudes NORAD expected however that Cold Lake would have the capacity to operate during viewable periods of darkness and to track all satellites within view 4 Ci Two problems however clouded Cold Lake's future status Secure communications circuits that were to have been available on 15 November had not been installed by year's end because of funding difficulties Also consideration was being given to moving the Baker-Nunn camera 56 •-' _ - ·_· · _ · F ·_-r·1 ' '-- ' ' 1 l- - · _ · _ _ 11 i i i ·• ··············································· • PARL SITE £ Background NORAD had tried to change the arrangements whereby Canada's Prince Albert Radar Laboratory PARL supplied information to SPADATS on a part-time basis NORAD wanted PARL to be fully responsive to SPADATS however the Defence Research Board DRB which controlled the site was reluctant to se t up a capability for handling classified data L'f J Consequently NORAD wanted executive control of PARL transferred from the ORB to the RCAF To do this NORAD suggested to USAF in December 1962 that U S equipment at PARL be transferred to the RCAF when the loan of equipment was renegotiated NORAD further recommended to USAF in May 1963 that if the loan had to be renewed with DRB then it should provide for 24-hour availability of the radar for space observations NORAD also asked that an RCAF unit be set up at PARL for SPADATS operations 1i 1n June 1963 NORAD told the JCS that it wanted PARL as a full-time SPADATS sensor and asked for JC_S approval in principle l ' Ct Status The JCS replied in August stating that they had learned during negotiations with the DRB that USAF's investment in equipment had been gre atly reduced by a fire at the site What USAF had left the JCS continued would not permit it to seek a change in PARL's executive control because of political factors NORAD also learned later that USAF was going to find out if its i nterests in PARL could be ended and the whol e facility turned over to Canada '-i By letter in September NORAD tried to learn from the Chief of the Air Staff RCAF which Canadian agency DRB or RCAF would make arrangements for the continued use of PARL in SPADATS No reply bad been r e ceived by January 1964 however PARL was still providing informat i o n to SPADATS 57 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -· -·· ' - · - - l ' 0 r 1C u_ I • U 1 • • 4 1 ' -' - •• ' I ' - • • _ '- l t• ••••- u I I __ - - TURKEY ITE LIA S As had been planned in 1962 NORAD asswned operational control of the radar site at Dyarbakir Turkey on 1 August 1963 USAF ADC had taken over manning and operation of the site on 1 July when it became a part of the Spacetrack System to gather both SPADATS and intelligence data L'-'1 1 Communication difficulties were met however _ when the site became operational An investigation showed that the Adana-Dyarbakir tropo-link caused excessive distortion which prevented the use of all circuits An interim routing system was set up that provided secure teletype and an unclassified voice circuit from Ent AFB to Dyarbakir The final routing for improved communications was to be completed in February 1964 for secure teletype and March 1964 for a voice circuit TRINIDAD SITE Lu j The Trinidad FPS-44 tracking radar sup- plied information to SPADATS on a part-time basis but in December 1962 NORAD asked the JCS for fulltime operational control of the facility because its near-equatorial location enabled it to observe all earth satellites In February 1963 the JCS told NORAD that it would have opErational control when the facility was transferred from AFSC's Air Force Missile Test Center to USAF ADC In March USAF authorized ADC to prepare a transfer agreement with AFSC L 4 • Transfer was held up however when OSD became concerned over ADC's capability to meet the requirements of other users of the Trinidad facility No action had been taken by January 1964 NORAD learned later that USAF had asked ADC to provide justification for getting the site ADC gave its justification and expected action by 1 Hay 1964 • · • - l r · · LJ I L '- 1f' 1 IJ liii ··········· · • lllCllSS HEO ······· DEEP SPACE SURVEILLANCE S In July 1963 NORAD was surprised to learn from the JCS that it did not have either the requirement or the responsibility for obtaining data on deep space probes and dee p space vehic les The n in October 1963 NORAD learne d through a sta ff visit t o the Pentagon that a 20 000-mile •t iling ba d been set as NORAD's 1 mJ f - 11'his ceiling resul ted· ·from a requi r e1•1ents letter of April 1961 to the JCS o n the basic SPADATS sensor coverage but the l et ter was not ntended to indicate the limit of NORAD's interes1 However NORAD did not send a rec l arua It was f ·lt that such action might cause more positive r c traints and a lso adversely affect other pending Jc actions that we r e then favorable to NORAD _ i NORAD also learned that the JCS did not intend to limit NORAD's activitie in deep space The y did int end how ever to prcvf• nt requests for procurement or funding of a systen of deep space s ens ors Thus the main constraint on NORAD was financial NORAD's intention was not to ask for a special sensor network but to get data f rom agencies with deep s pace s urve illance facilities and to modify some large radar-tracking ante nnas The staff visit showed that such modifications might b e a ccomplished by projects not r equiring JCS funding approval - I l ' -59 UNClASSIFIED ·- J• _J PROPOSED CHANGE IN TERMS OF REFERENCE C wJ S In July 1963 NORAD asked the JCS and COSC to amend the NORAD Terms of Reference to add in specific t rms the responsibilit Jl' __jor space - fense ··-·rrbRAD believed that this change was neces 'S'li ry to insure development of appropriate plans for aerospace defense of the North Ame rican continent I S Canada's Air Chief Marshal told the Chairman JCS that the COSC agreed that NORAD's request was appropriate from their point of view but felt that such an amendment might exceed the scope of the NORAD agreement To amend the Terms of Reference the COSC believed that the s ubject would have to ent r diplomati c channels Lv g ·The JCS r eplied to the COSC in December that the basic NORAD agreement might need amending to change the Terms The JCS felt however that it would be premature for either government to introduce the matter into diplomati c channels 1 1 r NORAD had once before in May 1961 asked for a change in its Terms of Referenc e At that time the JCS had r eplied that they believed the existing Terms were broad enough 60 ' • r