Heproduced lrom the Unclassified_ Declassified Holdings of the National Archives G 330 u D - 06U w t -z - 6 DF C LASSIFlED Authori1 v_ __2 i S - --· ' Sl CltET S PECIAi HAN'ol ING Log No 65-1659 N t Reh 1·d1pbl to For e•ign Nationals ' 1 --- - - -- - -- ------ 383 Copy No· ' · ' ' ·' ' ' DETECTlON AND TRACKING OF SATELLITES ·-· Re p orf of Jb e · Ad ioc WorJdni rouP J n · _Department of fD tei - s·p· c $ Detect ion Surveillah ce· · -Tra W i r g a ij Q ata· · · 'Pio cess'ing· · · -- · · · - · · ' ·- - - · r ·· · ' ' 1 ' · OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF D_ EFE NSE WASHINGTON 0 C · -l r ' · · S 15CRET MARCH 1965 DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR TNTtRVAL8 NOT· AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFlED DOD DIR 6200 10 Seo Def Cont llr X - - -·· fl 3 b -·- Declassified Case NW# 47674 Date 07- 5-202 NW# 47674 Docid 31236323 · Heproduced lrom the Unclassified I Declassihcd Hold1119s of the National Arci1ivcs Dt C L ASSI F1ED uthori1 bl W i 0 S Special Handling Required Nol Releasable to Foreign Nationals r · • DETECTION A TRACKING OF SA1 ELLITES -- ·e_ p or t of the Ad I oc Working Group on · D epa tment of Defense Space Detect io l Suryeillanc e Tracking and Data Proces lng I I· ·March 1965 This document·contains 1 ior a on °aff ct n the national defense of the United States within the me lng of the Espionage Laws Title · 18 U s c sections 793 and 794 The transmission or the revelation of ·its contents · in an any ·manner to unauthorized person 1s - pr Jliblted by law ' ' ·' ' Or£ice of the Secretary of Defense Wa_s hington D C · · - •' ' _ ____ - - -- - - - - -- - - _ _ _ _ NW# 47674 Docid 31236323 __ Heproduccd from the Unclassified I Dcctass1ficd I foldi119s of the National Archives DEC i ASSIFlED tithori blW -i -i_0 _5 THE DATOS GROUP MEMBE RS · Office of the Dlrector· of Defense Rese·a rch· and· Engi eering ·Offi El · Assis tanLDire ctor Mr Daniel J Fink Chairman Defensive Systems Office Assistant Dire ctor Defensive Systems Office Assistant Directo_r Defensive Systems · Office Assistant Dire ctor National MPita r y Command System Technical · · Support · Strategic Com J and and · Control Office Assistant 'Dir ec tor Space Technology Office Special Ass is lan·t Intelligence and Reconnaissance Col Wllllam R Kelso USAF Executive Secretary Mr Charles S Lerch Mr R ussell R Shorey Col John J Shultz - US A Col Willlam H Brauer USAF Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Installations and Logistics Mr Stanley M Matelsk I • Ele tronics and Priorities Division ' Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Manpower · --- ·omce Deputy Assistant Secretary Special Studies and Requirements Col Daniel J Sweelley' USAF OBSERVERS Col Thomas A Rodgers USA Lt Col George W White USAF Col Leroy C Land USA Lt Col Robert O Duckworth USAF Mr Roger D Moulton Col Robert B Hughes USAF Lt Col Garland R McSpadden USA CAPT Edward E VanLi r Ribbink USN CDR William C Campbell USN Major James M_ White USAF Joint Chiefs o Staff Defense Communications Agency Defense Intelligence Agency Defense Inte lligence Agency National Security Agency North American Air Defense Command Department of the Army Department of the Navy Department of the Navy Department of the Air Force ·u NW# 47674 Docid 31236323 Hcproduced 1rom lhc Unclassificd I Decla s1licd Hold1119s of lhc Nalional Archives DEC LASSIFIED A thuritv • ' I I P REFACE C I I i This is the final report of the Ad Jioc _ v orking Group established to study the Department of Defense's overall space detection surveillance tracking and dataprocessing effort This DATOS Detectio n and 'Tracking of· atelliles Group was organized in the summer of 1964 and completed its work in the early s_pring of 1965 The people selected by the Military Departments and o ther Department of Defense agencies to participate in these deliberations brought to the Working Group a broad knowledge and unders tanding of their organizations I activities and interest in space surveillance The DATOS Group takes thls opportunity to thank those individuals for their cooperation throughout the period of this study 1· I For the reader 's convenience the principal flndings a nd specific r ecommendations of the DATOS Group are presented in Summary and Recommendations 11 which precedes the rnaln body of this report Daniel J Fink Assistant Director Defens ive Systems Office of the Director of Defense Researc h ·- and Engineering iii NW# 47674 Docid 31236323 bl 21tj_S t eproduced from the Unclassified I Declassilied Holdings of llrn National rcl1ivcs DE C LASSI FIED 1 1 t thori y _N' J' l_ z i _°t S SIBCJRET CONTENTS -Page Preface iii ' ix ix Summary and ·Recommendations Background Uses and Functions of _Space Sy ryeillance Performance o_f J ATOS Facilities Speclfic Rec_o mmendations 1 Introduction · · 1 1 DoD Space-Surveillance DATOS Facilities 1 2 Organization and Operation of DA TOS -G roup •· 1 3 Review Procedure and Report Outiine _· 2 Resources · 2 1 SPADATS • 2 1 1 Cooperating Facilities I X xiii xviii 1 2 1 2 SPADA TS Center • 2 1 3 NORAD Space Defense Center 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 5 2 6 2 7 2 8 2 9 3 -· ' NW# 47674 4 4 5 7 SPACETRACK SPASUR · NASA's Cooperating Sensors · Oth r DoD Systems and Sensors Intelligence Facilities and Sensors · SPADATS Computational Facilities Communications Costs ' The Stateg Utility of Space Surveillance 3 1 Army · 3 1 1 Support of Army Surface Forces 3 1 2 Support of Space Defense Weapon System 3 1 3 S4-pport of Operations and Planning 3 1 4 Intelligence _S upport 3 2 · Navy · 3 2 1 General Support pf Nava Operations 3 2 2 Threat Information · 3 2 3 Specific Requirements 3 2 4 Acti9ns of Nav tl Forces 3 3 Ai r Force 3 3 1 Specific Mili_tacy _U ses · of Space Information 3 3 2 SPACET ACK Requirem¢nts · 3 4 NORAD and Other Unified and Specified Commands 3 4 1 General Requirements 3 4 2 SPADATS F unctions Tasks and Uses • 3 4 3 NORAD Requirements 3 4 4 Other NORAD Requests 3 4 5 User Requirements V Doc id 312 36323 · 1 1 2 3 7 9 13 14 15 16 17 20 21 27 27 27 28 28 28 29 29 30 30 30 · 30 31 32 32 · 32 33 ·· 33 3 35 r Heproduccd rrom the Unclassified Declassified I loldi119s of ll1c National Archives DEC LASSIFIED At thoriiy- °W_-Z i t - - ---- - - - - CONTENTS continued Appendixes A 1 I - B f ' t I I C D t DoD Space Detection Surveillance Tracking and Data·· Processing Effort memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense 22 July 1964· • · 1 Assignment of Operational Control of the Space Detection and Tracking System memorandum from the Secretary of Defense 10 October 1960 _to · the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 2 Transfer of the SPACETRACK Project to the Department of the Air Force memorandum from the Secretary of Defense 10 October 1960 to the Secretary of the Atr Force 3 Transfer of Responsibility for the SPASUR System to the Department of the Navy memorandum £rpm the Secretary of Defense 10 October 1960 to the Secretary of the Navy 101 Organizatlon and Functions of the NORAD CONAD Space Defense Center NORAD CONAU Regulation No 20-2 26 October 1964 103 · Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the ational Aeronautics an_d Space Administration on Functions Involved in Space Surveillance of U S and _Foreign Satellites and Space Vehicles January 1961 · · · 109 93 97 99 ' E Memorandum of Agreement' Goddard Space Flight Centei· and North American Air Defense Command 7 November 1961 115 F NASA Instrumentation Stations 119 G DoD Satellite-Control Facility National Range Facilities and R D Sensor Facilities H 123 Communications 1 BMEWS - SPACETRACK-SPADATS Communications 2 Green Bar System Data Circuits Ent to Diyarbakir 3 Green Bar System Voice Circuits Ent to Diyarbakir 4 CONAD- Kwajalein Communications Circuits 5 SPASUR-Ent Communications 132 133 I $PADATS Facility and Major Equipment Costs 137 J NORAD Qualitative Requirement for a Space Detection a nd Tracking System Appendix A to NQ R 2- 65 145 vii NW# 47674 ocid 312 36323 129 131 1_3 4 135 Heproduccd lrom 1he Unclassified Declassilied tlokJ n JS of the National Archrves DF C i ASSIFI EO u1hori 1 y_blW 'IS 1 e i FIGURES· 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 SPADATS Organization 9th Aerospace Defense Division Soviet Space Systems Conditions for Detection on a Given Revolution SPASUR Visibility 100 n mi Altitude Soviet Launch Visibility - _ - SPADATS Detection Visibility 100 n mi Altitude SPADATS Detection Visibility ·5 00 n mi Altitude SPADATS Detection Visibility 2500 n mi Altitude Visibility of SPASUR and FPS- 85 100 n mi Altitude Visibility of SPASUR and FPS-85 500 n mi Altitude Tracking Visibility S-III IX X and Moorestown 100 n mi Altitude - Common Visibility Zones for AN FPS-85 and SPASUR at 4000 n mi Altitude 4 8 40 54 · 56 57 58 60 61 62 64 66 76 TABLES I IL III IV V VI VII vm IX X XI XII xm SPADATS Sensors SPACETRACK Sensor Capabilities SPADATS Computational Facilities SPADATS Costs Costs of NORAD Space Defense Center SPACETRACK 496L Costs SPASUR Costs · NORAD Requirements for Space Surveillance User Requirements for SPADATS Information Contribution of DATOS Facilitles to Da ta Base Comparison of Sensors Summary of Current SPACETR ACK Computer Utilization Annual Operating Cost of SPASUR- viii 1_# 47674 b ocld 31236323 6 10 17 23 24 25 26 34 36 50 68 71 78 l eproduced lrom the Unclassified Declassified Holdings of the Nation Archives DEC L ASSIFIED At thori•yj W 2 -i _q _ s r r I I 1· SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDA ' 'IONS I BAQKGROUND I l I l ' 1 II In July 1964 by direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense a working group was organized to review the Department of Defense'$ space detection surveillance and tracking systems for the purpose of determining their capability adequacy redundancy and efficiency with respect to their prima ry missions This · DATOS Detection and Tracking of SatelJites Group was to r eco mmend on the bas is of its study policy and guidance rela ti n·g-t o suitable reductions and consolidations allocation of resources and organization of the systems concerned especially with a view to their operation as a coordinated program See Appendix A In amplifying its review responsibilities the Group defined as DATOS facilih es all ground- based sensors communications computers a nd control center·s used by or available to the DoD for collecting analyzing and disseminating data on orbiting space objects The primary systems are clearly NORAD SPADATS composed of the Navy SPASUR and the Air For c e SP ACETRACK an l the Intelligence Sensor Network Contributing sensor are the Air Force Satellite Control Facility certain DoD test- range and R D radars and the various NASA sens ors when they ar c used under the NASA - DoD agreement f ppendix D Actually the Group concen traled its efforts on SPADATS and the intelligence network T he Group did not however examine t he intelligence system from co s t or technical standpoints but judged it mainly on the quality of its output and its interaction with SPADATS The contributions of other sensor systems and their potential are meager fundamentally because the sensors provided by the SCF and NASA have vir tually no skin-trackinq capability Moreover owing to their technical shortcomings _and limited avail- ability they offer little potential assistance or redundancy in noncooperative space survelllance l I l I I '· '-' ' The DATOS review was prompted by uncertainties in both the adequacy or redundancy of systems performance and the legitimacy of purpose of space- surveillance and satellite-tracking efforts Depending on the space-s urveillance purposes that one is willing to accept systems performance could be conside red as ranging from ext re me inadequacy to an unwarranted_excess of capability ' l I I I I In attacking this dilemma the DATOS Group placed a good deal of emphasis on an evaluation of the real utility of space -surveillance information It is impor tant to note that while SPADATS is assigned to NORAD the fundamental mission of the system goes considerably beyond NORAD's classic role in the defense of North America But it is U e defensive purpose that often makes the most severe demands on DATOS facilities One cannot therefore overlook their interfacing with forces and defensive systems that operate in the space arena The acquisition of space-surveillance data is not an end ln ltself but the fact that continual surveillance of space is practical offers the temptation to do what can be done rather than what needs to be done With existing systems we cap now obs erve most-enemy actions in space far better than we can place his forces at s ea or on land ix I ' ---------------------- - - - - - -- -- - ---- - --- --- - NW# 47674 ocid 31236323 'I I Ir Heproduced lrom the Unclassd1cd Declassified Hold111gs ol the National Archives D£CLASSIFl EO 1 l1thuri' y_ N N-2-_i S ___ ·· _ · The requirements for space-surveillance data often sound as if there is - or is about to be- an offensive force in space and the weapon systems to counter suc h a threat exist The DATOS Group endorses the national intelligence estimate on the Soviet space program while the U S S R 's military interest in space is clear the orbital weapon remains in the u_ncertatn future The Group concludes ther efor e that the implications of the Soviet space pr ogram with regard to DATOS facilities will probably be governed more·by U S assessment of and reaction to the program tha n by the threat itself For example · the U S S R already has reconnaissance satellites U S response to this program does not depend on the existence of a Soviet threat but rather is based on U S decisions to take such counteractions as camouflage and evasion by surface forces · Even if there were firmer predictions of the Soviets' deployment of offensiye weapons in space the implications relative to D ATOS facilities would not be clear without a definition of the countering U s active defense systems There is little utility in requirements for space-surveillance and-tracking s ystems wh ch im'ply that all ·uncertainties re garding the threat and the defensive forces have been resolved • Even in the ab sence of a clear Soviet space threat there are a number of functions both defense-oriented and otherwise that can be delineated and supported but are usually submerged in the fur or of requirements based on tactical space warfare Satisfying those legitimate functions gives the system a bas ic capability that can support other less cer tain objectives as well as provide a basis for handling future developments T he DATOS Group dassified the uses and functions of space survelllance ln these five all- embracing categories 1 Maintaining the space catalog 2 Support of space missions • 3 Space intelligence · 4 Support of antisatellite systems 5 Support of other counter actions · · USES AND FUNCTIONS OF SPACE SURVEILLANCE 1 The Space Catalog The catalog of space objects is both an end in it eli and an intermediate step toward other space- surveillance objectives which include tbe unalerted detection of new space objects maneuvers of old satellites and br eakup of bodies in or bit All of these are detected by their deviatlon from the catalog · The present catalog predicts time of arrival at a given position to better than 15 sec onds in time The corresponding cross- track err ors are cons iderably less than this in mileage equivalent The catalog's accuracy has gradually improved over the past few years and may be expected to imP r ove further as operating efficiency and knowledge of orbital dynamics incr ease P resent accuracy is more than acceptable to most users of SPADATS data Cases in which extr mely high accuracy is needed on several objects can be handl ed outside the catalog Judged on the basis of need requirements for greater catalog precision are not valid Decisions to alte'r catalog precision should be based solely on the actor of abillty to impr ove the system 's operating efficiency For example increasing the catalog's i precision could simpllfy correlation procedures at sensor ·sites and so improve the 1 sensor 's efficiency it would also allow updating orbi tal elements less frequently which would result in an inherent increase of the system ' s capacity SIE C Ht I '1f' X · _J •I INW# 47674 ocid 3 1236323 --··-· ·----·--·-- ---------- ---- ------ ·- I Hcproducect trom lhc Unclass1licd I Dcclassilicd Holdings ol Ilic Nalional Arcl11vcs DEC LASS I FJl - D AL tho ri• y N W_'2-1 tS ·-- A question often raised is whether the catalog should keep track of all objects in space The answer would appear to be affirmative since the present space population of about 500 objects does not tax the facility and it could grow to sever 11 thousand before trouble is encountered Dropping unimportant items such as spa e junk from the catalog would not affect the direct users of the information b11t as an intermediate step toward further reduction of data coverage it would lead to negating much of the catalog's utility Even a very large expans ion in the space population could be accommodated simpJ Y by maintaining the ca talog with one sensor such as SPASUR or the AN FPS- 85 once it is deployed 2 Support of Space Missions The DATOS facilities have served-and will continue to serve-many military and NASA space programs providing special calibration data the emergency loca tion of malfunctioning objects impact prediction on decaying objects of special interest and general policing of the space environment Usually this function of SPADATS requires precision tracking observations from the sensors and is performed outside the catalog Up to now it has not taxed the system but the fact that SPADATS accuracy can now match that of beacon- tracking networks such as the SCF is causing the demand for this service to grow For example the Air Force anticipates an increase in the number of special ml sion satellites that re quire SPADATS support- amounting to t least 6 and possibly 14 Because of the large number of observations required for precision prediction further increases could overload the system If this occars alternate proce dures should be invesllgated for example using beacons on the satellites and tracking with the SCF network 3 Space Intelligence Regardless of the severity of the Soviet space threat knowledge of the real intent of their space operations is an important adjunct to U S policy deliberations and space planning In the view bf -many people this use of s pace data 1s one of the strongest reasons for the existence of DATOS facilities However the collection of space intelligence does not merit the priority accorded other militarily more important areas o_f enemy operations The assessment of Soviet space missions is basicaqy an intelligence responsibility SPADATS contributes two classes of data to the intelligence proce s metric information and radar signature analysis The requirements for metric data to support the intelligence community are similar to those already noted they ine lude the gross orbital parameters that in conjunction with past history help to identify the satellite's mission as well as precision predictio ns that are useful n the l'eacqulsition of radiating satellites by ELINT sensors In some of the state•l requirements furnished the DATOS Group there ls an implied need for mission assessment concurrently with first-pass detection which means much faster assessment than is now the practice The Group does not s ee the urgency for S t' Ch a deer e ase in mission- assessment time is It often implied that SPADATS virtually by itself must determine the threat for U S antisatellite action The current 437 and 505 antisatellite syster 1s must be considered as demonsl ration or selective-retaliation weapons Their · target satellites therefore will be designated either through Sovie t cooperation i e public announcement or through the full assessment of intelligence Afte1· t xi I NW# 47674 oc Id 31236323 ' '· · ' Kepro Juced trom the Unclassilicd I Dcclassilicd Holdings ol the National Arcl1ivcs DEC LASSIFIED Authori iyJ _W i J S • that SPADA TS will make certain that the designated satellite and no other is targeted This I ask ls well within SPADATS' capability Radar signature data have made useful contributions to mission a ssessment While current radar pictures are crude there has been a fair amount of success in interpreting radar -amplitude-vs - tim e records to get rough estimates of the size and shape of space objects as well as their s bil1ty and orientation The system · is basically manual analysts examine the recoi -cls and compare results with r ecords obtained from bodies of known s hape and size The majority of research and development activities in space- object identification SOI is now being sponsored by ARPA It is not clear how much more us eful the information gathered by microwave radars will be than the data now provided If useful signature information could be ol ltained by making r elatively minor modifications in present or planned S PADATS sensors to j ncrease resolution then the · cost would probably be justified by the results obtained But if the us e of highresolution techniques requires a new generatton of sensors perhaps wtth long-baseline interferometers then one can question the need in relation to the cos·t of satisfying it These uncertainties seem to warrant a careful investiga tion of the potential of SOI to determine how much additional information on orbiting objects we can anticipate gathering- and in what time period and to ide ntify those programs that have maximum chance for success · 4 Support of Antlsatellite Systems The current U S antisatellite programs the Air F orce 437 a nd the Army 505 are adequately supported by SPADATS In fact SPADATS' performance in this mission has now far exceeded original expectatiorts At present the system f lnables the prediction of an orbit after 12 hours of tracking 4 to 12 hour s in advance depending on the satellite's altitude with an accuracy on the order of a nautical mile ·both cross- track and alcing-trac As an exercise during January 1965 SPADATS -maintained-special -ptec ision orbit elements for 15 Soviet payloads The net effect is that tracking time to obtain intercept- quality orbit data may be reduced from the ·quoted 12 hours to 4 or 5 Desires to reduce SPADAT ' accurate prediction time still f urther are based on the premise that the current reac tton time exceeds that of the antisatellite weapons The DATOS Groµp on the olli r hand finds the systems well matched within the context of their missions With respect to the concept of using the present weapon systems within a very few hours of a foreign satellite's launch · there ar e implications that go far beyond reducing the -reaction time of SPADATS T he entire concept of the weapon systems- their firepower basing etc -would have to be included as•consid e rations Similarly SPADATS can adequ ately support currently planned follow -on programs to t he existing a ntisatellite systems including those carrying photographic and nonnuclear negation payloads Requests for improvin'g SPADATS to accommodate some future unknown antisatellite sys te m ha ve no merit x ii NW# 47674 ocid 3 1236323 _J t eproduced lrom the Unclassrfied I Declassified I loldings of the National Arcl1ives DEC LASSI FI ED t1thori 1 y_N L2- ·• 1 5 l These are tactical actions other than antisatellite ta ken by any U S militar y force on the basis of space- surveillance information In this category are the mos t demanding and controversial requirements placed on the DATOS facilities To detect track and determine the mission of all spacecraft not ·only before ·they ove ·fly the United States but prior to their completion of a first circuit or first pass over any area of Unified or Specified C mmand responsibility Not only are these requirements unwarranted by intelligence evaluations of the Soviet space program but the- DATOS Group found no evidence that receivers of the data had realistic plans for such tactical use of the space arena I' I I Support of Other Counteractions a It should be noted that past and current requirements on SPADATS as expressed by NORAD in NQR 2- 65 are inconsistent with the preceding functional analysis They submerge the real utlUty of space data are clear ly geared to a tactical space defense environment and imply that all uncertainties in the defensive forces have been resolved They are stated with the implied assumption that all limiting conditions apply simultaneously i e maximum detection probability at maximum range on minimum target on first pass etc In syste ms planning there fore the NORAD document loses utility It might be argued that such requirements are merely a compilation of stated user needs but again those needs were not demonstrated Certain demands are unique to specific users for instance the intelligence agencies place on SPADATS a requirement for data on deep-space probes and imply a need for NORAD to procure equipment it does not need or any other par t of its mission In such cases SPADATS is probably not the vehicle for this mission ·no matter how valid the need PERFORMAI' CE OF DATOS FACILITIES Having established the utility of space- surveillance information the DA TOS Group evaluated the performance of current and projected hardware to satisfy 'legitimate needs An overall conclusion is that- the present performance of DATOS facilities is adequate· to the tasks and demands made upon them This should not be surprising for the facilities were not developed in response to arbitrary requirements but evolved gradually over the years as specific needs and uses became apparent This supports the general premise that information and -command-andcontrol' systems are most successful when they are dev eloped on an evolutionary basis instead of being planned from the beginning as a grand s ys tem exercise The Gro p's analysis of the DATOS facilities dealt with three principal elements 1 sensors 2 computers and backup and 3 R D plans 1 EO50x 6 OSD Sensors SPADATS sensors comprise the Navy SPASUR detection fence and the v ious radars assigned to the Air Force SPACETRACK System The latter s stem i eludes a detection fan and tracker at Shemya Alaska and a --- - ---a tracker at Moorestown New Jersey and inputs of the three'---- - B MEWS sites Clear xiii 1' r •'--- - -·- ·-- - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - -- - - - - - -- ·- ---··-- INW# 47674 b o c id 3 1236323 - ···- --- s Reproduced from lhc Unclassified Declassified foldi11gs of lhc Nalional Arcliives DEC LASSIFIED _blw_2 i 5 u thority fill J i E 0 50x6 OSD Alaska· r e argest part of' the D T roup s ec nica ana ys 1s ea e sensors in keeping with the fact that they account for more than half the system costs It is convenient also to divide this discuss ion into two parts the present and the future defining the future as the time the AN FPS-85 becomes operational There is of course no single figure of merit that can be used to describe a sensor's worth The sensors in SPADATS should be examined in the context of the whole system and in terms of such parameters as range detection and tracking coverage and accuracy wi Range The present sensors in SPACETRACK are outgrowths of the development of high-power long-range radars for BMEWS hence the range obtainable with them results not so much from a conscious specification of require ments but the fact that they were available The detection range of these radars on a 1square-meter target is generally 2000 to 4000 nautical miles and their tracking range is somewhat greater Taking geometric factors into account thes e de tec tion ranges correspond to satellite apogees on the order of 1500 to 2500 na utical miles · When certain ·improvements to the SPASUR fence are completed this s ummer it will have a detection range out to 6000 nautical miles Since most s a tellites of interest are well within the range of current sensors the DATOS Group recommends no action to increase the system's range beyond continuing r esearch and development n the AN FSR-2 electrooptical sensor which is discussed later t Detection · P erha ps the largest single controversy associated with space s urveillance revolves around desires to ensure that satellites in all classes of orbit i e inclination angle a nd altitude are detected prior to first pass over a number of widely spaced locations L e 'various U S Unified and Specified Commands and Fleet elements This requirement demands that the Sino-Soviet land mass be ringed with detection fences In effect the s ystem then becomes an extended BMEWS Since this need has not been es tablished it is not seriously considered _ A better measure for evaluating' the detection capability of a sys te m is early orbit detection that is the detection of space objects sometime during the first few orbits without specifying where The act is that within its altitude range the system detects all Sovie t satellites launched from Tyuratam and Kapustin Yar during their first few orbits The mos t useful supple ment to the detection capability of SPADATS would be the a ddition of more Doppler filters at the BMEWS Site III Fylingdales installation This feature was not included ln the original design of Sit III because it was planned as a ballistic-missile-detection facility and the expected velocity range of threatening missiles i considerably less than that of satellites In addition to detecting ne w launc hes the system can de tect ma neuvers in orbit and the breakup of orbiting objects Its performance is adequate as long as immediate detection is not a requireme nt The provis ion of full a nd immediate coverage in all poss ible circumstances would require an inordinale number of sensors spread over the world The SPASUR fence is partic ularly use'ful in de tecting orbital breakups The BMEWS sens ors now develop a number of satellite false alarms and this tends to slow the detection process A new computer program called MIP SIP for Mis sile Impact Predic tion Satellite Information Processor is now·being_lnstalled for BMEWS nd will considerably alleviate this s ituation • ll _____________________ l xiv NW# 47674 ocid 31236323 Heproduced lroni the Unclass1licd Dcclassilied Holdings ol the National Archives DEC L ASSI FIED t 1hori 1 · H 21 -5 Tracking The SPADAT System has excellent tracking coverage For typ1cal Soviet missions there is essentially solid co verage above 45 egrees' orbit inclination and some coverage all the way to the equator Almos t every orbit'is covered by at least one sensor and many orbits are covered by seve r al The coverage of different parts of tlie same orbit by two sensors is valuable in computlpg orbital elements and l_n reducing the time required for precision predictions It has ·1ong been recognized that' s·e nsors in the Souther n Hemisphere could improve the accuracy of orbit predic ion by providing obse rvations on a part of the orbit that is not-now seen Present system performance however is excellent and the degree of improvement that could be obtained by having s uch real-time track ing observations does not ppear to wari ant the installation of a southetn sensor ' Since it ls both a detection network and a computation center SPASU B was examined separately As a de tection network it currently provides the only de tection coverage -on satellites with inclinations from 30 to 40 de grees and at a titudes below about 1000 nautical mi1es When curr ent-improvements are completed in the summer of 1965 SP SVR will furnish the onl ' detection coverage between 2500 and 6000 nautical miles In the past there was some difficulty ln integrating SPASUR into SPADATS but it was an organizational ·rather than technical problem and has largely been overcome The ·Group's overall' conclusion regarding SPADATS' s ensor -system is tha t a t present all sensors contribute in a nonreduridant fashion to the operation of SPADATS Multiple detections on ·the first few·orbits aid greatly in t he q ick de termination of orbital parameters The _eli ination of any sens or would leave gaps in detection coverage and would also complicate precision tracking With ec iard to the nonredundancy of sensors however the situation will not remain the same i n the future-as shown in th following discussion During the DA TOS Group's' deliberations the AN FPS-85 radar at Eglin Air Force Base was destroyed ·by fire This immediately raised questions on whether it should be rebg llt and µ so ·whethe - its configuration and location should remain unchanged The original i _e asons for constructing this phased-array radar- to i mprove SPADATS perfor il nce and efficiency and to get opera ting experience wifo a large phased- array radar still hoid There were enough s alvageable fac ilities lo warrant rebuilding the radar at the same location An optimum location would probably be outside the continental United States which would not only _be costly but would tend to dive rt the radar from its R D purposes The DATOS Group concludes that the AN FPS- 85 radar should be rebuilt at Eglin incorporatii 1g the pla ned improvements to give it the availability needed for a n operational capability 'f When the AN FPS- 85 becomes operational in late 1967 its coverag will eo5oxs 050 verlap that of o her sensors to - cof1 lderable extent The Group cor cludes tha t '-------- b e possible at that time to close down operations at both Moorestown a nd The AN FPS-85 will also largely overlap the-de tection cov rage of SPASUR up to about 2000 nautical miles and it will have a very useful capability for tracking after detection that will become more valuable as the space popula tion qrows and experiments ln space become more sophisticated The overlapping coverage of SPASUR- and the AN FPS-85 can be put -to us 0 if one envisions a close tie between ilie two sensors so that when there is a detec lion in the SPASUR fence the AN FPS- 85 is alerted to track the object The value of xv -·· --·· ·--·------ ------------------------ ----- - NW# 47674 oc rd 31236323 Heproduced from the Unclassified I Declassified Holdings of U1c National Archives DEC LASSIFIED At thori' yJ 't L2--S- °I _ S - ----- ---- - -- - ------ -s IE C ' this tie lie in the fact that while the Eglin radar can detect space objects only to an altitude of about 2000 nautical miles it can track to 6000 nautical miles or more depending on the target's size and integration time Since the two sensors have a large area of common coverage above 300 nautical miles this could become a valuable mode of operation The tie would be an automatic one SPASUR would feed the AN FPS-85 computer directly giving the location and dir ection of the fence cross_ing within a w 1 y few seconds after that the AN FPS-85 would track the satellite · While this mode of operation would be pr1marily for altitudes above 2000 nautical miles it could be expanded to use SPASUR for all detection and reserve the AN FPS- 85 for tracking The resulting increase in tracking capabntty would be equivalent to doubling the power-aperture product of the AN FPS-85 While this· capability is not needed now the option will always be available to handle any unusual increases ln the space population _The DATOS Group therefore concludes that after the AN FPS-85 becomes operational SPASUR should be retained but should be thoroughly integrated with the AN FPS-85 in an operational sense A question that will need further examination is whether the SP ASUR headquarters should remain at Dahlgren or the two systems should be consolidated at the Eglin site l • The other potential sensor in R D status is the AN FSR -2 Electro-optical Sensor This device promises a detection capability between 3000 and 300 000 nautical miles using reflected sunlight The cost is relatively moqest about $5 million compared to that of equivalent radar sensors but the development involvesa higher risk While the program has had -some success in proving the feasibility of the technique its performance is marginal tor two reasons Its requirements for detection sensitivity were set too low and the hardware has not been able to meet even its design specification There appear however to be several ways of improving the sensitivity of the AN SR- 2 at a nominal cost The DATOS Group concludes that R D on this sensor should proceed since it offers the only real possibility of obtaining long-range detection with modest expenditures A decision regarding operatio l use of the AN FSR- 2 can await the completion of R D and an evaluation of the need at that time 2 Computers and Backup The period of the DATOS Group•s deliberations was optimum for considering the use of computers and their backup because of the pending transfer of SPADA TS operations from the Group I facility at Ent Air Force Base to the Cheyenne Mountain Complex CMC A duplex facility for the CMC is planned the 425L programs l n one machine and space defense programs SPADATS in the other i I· NORAD has proposed that an additional Philco 2000 computer be installed in · the CMC making a total of three computers available to fulfill both the 425L and the space defense functions The third machine would be used·for off-line processing of space -surveillance data and the support of new computer- program development and checkout training and system analysis as well as for absorbing the maintenance-time requirement with respect to an three machines · · Computer utilization for SPACETRACK has been running about 600 hours per month and this can be expected to continue into the foreseeable future • Adding to l - NW# 47674 ocid 31 23632 3 xvi _ _________ i ____ I ____ l eproduced lrom tile Unclassified I Dcclassilied Holdings of tile National Archives DECLASSIFIED AttthoritY N J _ i_ 1 S 1 ii i _ this 120· hours of maintenance for the 425L machine would indicate a total use of 720 hours or 100 per cent of capacity Any additional requirements for new services program debugging integration of new equipment etc would be further justification for the third computer The Group concludes that the projected computer utilization is sufficient to warrai it the _installation of a third machine i ' 11 ' j I 1 I A possible source of the additional computer is the SPACE'TRACK Center Alternate Facility SCAF at Hanscom Air Force Base The-Group recoTI mends that the SCAF be closed down and its computer moved to the CMC This action should result in ·the saving of $3 million over a 5-year period and the added availabillty of 65 military personnel with critical skills The advantages of locating the computers in one place are manifold the ·only disadvantage is that a catastrophic failure of the CMC would leave NORAD with no instantaneous-response backup The Group concludes that adequate emergency backup can be provided by either the SPASUR Center or the AN FPS-85 when it becomes operational Both facilities have standby computers that can be preempted for this purpose In an emergency communications from the various centers to the backup site could be established quickly especially-if commercial teletype lines were _u sed Secure transmissions would not be needed and the total time lost-might be only minutes This type of backup ls satisfactory enough that special standby computers c rews and communications are not justified Personnel Not directly relating to the computer proqlem though tied to the · movement of SPADATS funclions to the Space Defense Cen_ter in the CMC are the personnel requirements for the SDC's operation Currently there is a NORAD proposal to add 94 spaces to the NORA_ D complement amounting to a total of 102 people performing those functions The proposal does not address personnel requirements of the component commands for'space defense operations which now involve 104 ADC personnel for SPACETRACK and an additional 82 ADC support personnel for equipment operation and maintenance of the compute r and communications center at tbe Group I facq ty · 1· I I I Ii · r I 1 1 'I r 1· • I i I Based on observation of SP ADA TS' present excellent performance the Group is led to the c onclusion that current manning levels are adequate for -present and future operations · Thus the problem of SOC manning must be addressed as -an entity it is a matter of deciding which current functions and associated personnel should be assigned to the NORAD staff to carry out their operational responsibilities and which should go to the component commands to ensure optimum systems integrity 3 R D Plans An objective of the DATOS Group in its investigation of R D efforts was to determine which areas are properly directed by a system proje ct office and which are more technologically oriented and should be transferred to exploratory development The Group concludes that as a general rule H D programs belonging under project-office management are either 1 equipments and deve lopments whose near- · future use in the -system 1s highly probable ·or 2 equipments whose immediate use is not highly probable but whose usage ls appropriate only to the SPADATS problem All other R D efforts would be more properly transferred to ARPA or to the exploratory research program S of the development centers On this basis the two major R D programs discussed here -AN FPS-85 and AN FSR-2-should remain with the project office Another experimental program associated with SPACETRACK is the ASFIR Active Swept-Freque ncy Interferometer mr rNW# 47674 ocld 31236323 §EC ET Heproduced from the Unclassilicd Declassified Holdings of the Nalional Arcl1ivcs DIT C L ASSIFlED l1 l1orit ·J W -'2-4 -s I i I 1 I I Radar an in-house project of the Rome Air Development Center RADC This FM-puise radar us·e _s long base lines to triangulate in range on targets with the · object of getting very accurate posi ion and P ·s mon- rate data The utility of such accuracy levels in pace- surveillance system_s is not clear· at this time further incorporating ASFIR into SPADATS w ould require a completely new set of sensors For this reason t le DATOS Group recomniends that e ASFIRprogram be placed in exploratory development at RADC · Almost all R D in space-object identification' is n w sponsored by' ARPA The incorpori i tion of anr of these effor in SPADATS_should_await results of th reco·wmended SOI study · At this lime tQe Group foresees no other large-scale ·R D programs under SPAJ ATS management SPE CIFIC REGOMMENDATIONS 1 The Air Force should be asked to prepare and submit plans for removing limitations o n detection coverage and tracker availabili y at BMEWS Site III Fylingdales This should include the addition of extra Doppler filters and any modifications of agreements with the United Kingdom that will permit greater operating freedom without compromising the primary mission of Site III 2 A third computer for the Cheyenne Mountain Complex should be apprOVE d ' NORAD and Air Force should be requested to prepare plans for rearranging SPADA TS' computational facilities and revising backup procedures as follows the a Close the SPACETRACK Center_Alternate Facility at Hanscom Air Force Base b Use the computer now atthe SC AF as the extra compu_ter for Group IT Cheyenne Mountain Complex _ c Until the ·AN FPS- 8 becomes available back up the CMC in the event of its catastrophic failure through standby' plans for using the SPASUR co·m puters for catalog and weapon- system support · yond that time backup plans · should be coordinated with the study on the integration of SP ASUR with the AN FPS- 85 · see recommendation 5 This recommendation is based on the projected work load on the effici ncy -' in operation and in developing new programs that can be achieved by doing the work at one place and on the need for backup only in the case of such natural catas- trophes as fire This backup need not be instantaneous but could take several hours to become operational · • 3 The A tr Force should be directed to continue with· plans for rebuilding the A FPS- 85 in the same location Eglin Air Force Base and with the planned im- provernents for eventual delivery to SP ADATS This will provide increased performance SPADATS operating efficiency will be improved and operating costs reduced as a result of shutting down other sensors see recommendation 4 · E CRE T ·' I I NW# 47674 oc I-d 31236323 xviii 1 i Heproduccd lrom the Unclassilied I lJeclassilied Holdings of llm National Archives DE C LASSIFIIW l1thuri1y_ -'2--i _ S • 4 The Air Force should be directed t prepfire plans for the following actions to be taken after the AN FPS- 85 becomes operational a EUmi te SPADATS' supper b Close down the AN FPS- 49 tr·' - ac e r - a -r-ir-ir o- o r -e s'-o w -n c E1 tablish standby plans for sing the AN FPS- -8_9 comp back up to the Space 1 fense Center •· · d Coordinate plans with th study on the integration of the AN FPS-85 and SPASUE- 5 The SPASUR network should be retained in SPADATS by being int grated with the AN FPS-85 after that radar becomes operational to pr ovide a hig altitude detection and tracking mode of operation and to enhance the traffic capacity o the AN FPS- 85· Further consideration should be given the question whether t6 ove SPASUR- headquarters from Dahlgren to Eglin Air Force Base The Joint Chi s of Staff should be asked to stu'dy the integration of SPASUR and the AN FPS-85 an to decide where SPASUR headquarter s should be located 6 The Air Force should be directed to submit a detailed plan for concludi R D on the AN FSR-2 so as to offer a long-range detection capability if lt is ever ne de The Air Force should be directed to transfer respons ibility for the ASF Ri • program from the 496L ProjectOffice to the Rome Air Development Center whe EO50x 6 OSD it should be placed in exploratory development 8 The Air F'f-L-1- i __-'- -u u CL 1 1c u J communications line set up quickly 9 The Advanced Researcll Proj ects Agency shoul d be asked to study the potential of ground- based-radars in tcientifying satellites by their radar sf atures The study should delineate the amount of improvement over pres ent teclmiques that may be expected - n i should give an approximate· idea of related equipment requirements · 10 The Director -of Defense Research and Engineering should be requested to investigate the work load - imposed on SPADATS by Air Force special-mission s_atelli s and to recommend the most appropriate sensor system for handling the load 11 NQR 2-65 should be'disapproved as a basis for development procurei ne nl or operational changes in currently programed capabilities and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 'should be asked to return NQR 2-65 to NORAD with instructions to prepare a new set of requirements based on the national intelligence estima tes valid uses of space data national policy and other factors outlined in this r eport Especially any new requirements not only should be identified by time period but should be · quite specific in regard to limiting conditions and the particular deficiency or threat prompting the statement of need The JCS should also be reques ted to review the scope of NORAD's mission particularly with respect to deep-space probes 12 The Joint Chiefs of Staff should be requested to instruct NO' R AD to resolve manning problems at the Cheyenne Mountain Complex by treating the matter as an integrated whole working on the basis of current· manning levels and considering the needs of both NOR AD and ADC xix NW# 4767 4 o c i d 312 3632 3 I ' I ' I I I II I' Hcproduced from the Unclassified Declassified f lokfo1gs of the National Archives I l C ASSI F l ED A 11thori 1 _N t 2 i ' - -- --- 1-- r _ - - - - -- •--- ·- - - -- _ - -- --- 1 -1 1 INTRODUCTION In the summ i- of 1964 an ad hoc working group was organized to study ·the overall effort of the Department of Defens DoD in space detection surveillance · tracking and data processing For convenience it is called the DATOS Det ction and Track ng of atellltes Group By memorandum of the Deputy Secretary of Defense dated 22 July 1964 Appendix A the DATOS Group was authorized · to r eview the DoD Space Petectlon ·Surveillance and Tracking Systems for the purpose of determining their capability adeqQacy redundancy and efficiency-both current and programmed - for accomplishing their primary missions Further the group will reco·mmend policy and guidance relating to suitable reductions and cons·ondatlons · resource allocation and organization of the affected systems with a particular view towar ds the ir ope ati_o n as· a coordinated · program i_ At this point in time such a review i both necessary and complex It is necessary because a number of de velopment programs directed toward gathering and disseminat ng space-survei1l nce d_a ta are complete or are nearing completion and techni cat capabUities or space·surveillance ar e fairly well -understood Judgments must be made on establishing the programs that contribute most effectively to the attalninent -of national goals The review is c•-mp lex because the technical potential for spac·e surveillance is large and because ·lt- ls hard to identify Defense needs for space survelllance in the future It ls also· complicated by the fact that there is a wide gamut of relevant issues ranglng·frorn such broad topics as space policy and utility of data to specific issues such as the future of a particular sensor or the manning of a command and control center An additional complication was injected into the review by the· d'e struction of the AN FPS-85 radar at Eglln Air Force 'Base Florida · in January 1965 · 1 1 DoD Space- Surveil1ance DATOS Facilities For purposes of this report DATOS facilities are considered as including all ground-based sensors communications computers and control centers that are · used by- or are· available to -the DoD to collect analyze and disseminate data on orbiting space objects · 1 NW# 47674 ocid 31236323 II i • I I i t eproduced from the Unclassified_I Declassified Holdings of the National rchivcs Dl CLASSIFIED thoriiv_ '2 J9 _ S - The primary systems are 1 the NORAD SPADATS North American Air Defense Command Space Detection and Tracking System composed of the ·Navy SPASUR Space Surveillance System and the Air Force SPAC_ETRA K 13 nd 2 the Intelligence Sensor Network Contributing senso' t s are the USAF Satellite Control Facility SCF certain DoD · test- range and R D research and devel pm t radars and the various sensors of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA when they are used under the NASA-DoD agreement see Appendix D I • I' ' - The DATOS Group interpreted its charter to include all DoD r anges sensors and supporting facilities but concentrated its efforts on the primary systems ' · Since 1958 space- surv lllance systems have evolved from the early Moonwatch and Mlnltrack along several lines the primary sensors are now microwave radars with supplemental inputs from opttcal devices SPASUR was specifically designed for space surveillance while SPAC ETRACK has been assembled from sensors originally acquired for other purposes Normally control of SPASUR and SPACETRACK is exercised by the NORAD SPADATS Control Center at Ent Air Force Base Colorado while the Defense Special Missile Analysis Center DEF SMAC at Fort Meade Maryland controls the Intelligence Sensor Network The contributing sensors generally have their own control centers All control centers have access to extensive comm unication nets and exchange data on a routine basis l 2 I I Organization and Operation of DATOS Group r The DATOS Group w as organiz'ed under its chairman Mr Dc1niel J Fink Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering ODDR E The mem bers include representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defens e OSD the Joint Chiefs of Staff• J CS and other DoD components A list of the Group's membership and the official 9bservers showing the organizations r e presented is given on page 11 of this report ' h- After its first organizational meeting the Group held other meetings at which interested parties pres nted their views and answered specific questions In addition members of the Group visited a number of installations to gather firsthan impressions and detailed data in areas of special interest The DATOS Group received information from NORAD the Mllitary Departments the JCS the -Defense Intelligence Agency DIA the Defense Communications Agency DCA and the National Security Agency NSA on present and planned systems and on current and p r ojected uses of space-surveillance data Information was also obtained from NASA on its space operations sensor capabilities and plans for the future NASA's plans however were considered primarily for information on the potential use of facilities under ilie DoD-NASA agreement not as being within the scope of the Group's charter I I r I J I I I I r NW# 47674 ocld 31236323 2 I ·'· j l eproduced lrom Ille Unclassified Declassified Holdings of t11c National Archives DEC LASSIFIE _D A Lithori''-' - - · · - • • - u --z _ i_-8 S - 'I 1 i i _ r 1 3 I Review Proqedure and Report Outline The raw material used 1 1 details on ex isling and planned facilities summarized in section 2 i 2 stated needs for space surveillance data and eia ted a tions taken which are dlsc sed in section 3 arid • I ' 1 in the DATOS review falls into three major categories t' r ' 3 'potential Soviet space _ope_r tions dise ussed in s e c tion 4 Results of the DATOS study are presented in section 5 - rl i'I •I 'I It I i -I I 3 NW# 47674 oci d 31236323