0 I' POSrI 0 1 R S'I RICTI · s · canno · rlln c not tura _ e at J· t 't u · y· J eal nt 1 ·cl 1 MAI ·e GS CTJO ITl·O · lI Ile th r rorn1 Tb 11ri lvUian r mil ' but t he 1 tl in · 1 H r n 1r1 h m t soviet Zcne h lc1·casir11JIY dlfficun b Sovkl Lrnve1 csLrictio ru on wesl bound -µas- s engu ntO lro mc hn•e curtailed the means or e 3 Cuatm or retugecs and dc$trtcn who musl now be Jimi ed to rclallvcly lligh 1c el personnel warranttng air ll' nsport 4 E ccept for Lh t capacity of th e Derlln radio of the US cc tor lho value o r Berlin S polnl tor Ute disseminaUon of West em propaganda through Lha So'1ict Zone has been and d 1tA new $o 'lcL MSU mnce- s is expect co to be cu rtailed by SovJe t lnlorfernncc with the dlisem inatlon o Western publlcn t lon-5 and linpedimcnLs to Ut • l$Suance of nny Oerm n pro WcsLcm matc1·1AI in the Soviet Zone Tho eeurh y n nd 1 ratt 1J Ort reguJaUO S ha·•-e ltm tcd the vatue oi Berlin o s o base from wMcb tho TJS can rnp Xlrt anU-C omorn nlsrn In the Soviet Zon o Western Zone Gcl'mtHlS ca n no longer costly enter or leave the So• iet Zcnc- whi le Ugh tened police coouoli have rC c'Juted Ule capabilitic-s and the tetdom ot nlO ·emenL ot anUCOmmunist cle ments alrcttdy wlLhln the Zone- 5 Tho Soviet-imposed dc nrnnds tor lmmecUou ur au wcsLbound Jtclr ht have prcven J Ule shlpntcnl of BerUn m nulactura lhat conl ribule 1 0 lhe ftnls hec produc Uon ol Ole WesLCtn 7 ones rnd eliminated almost au commerce bet ween Berlin and the wesi 6 Alt hough the AIHcd control Council remam In l ciLy to e mba rl Q S'S the USSR as a symbol of quadrfpartJt c agreement In Germany its uncUonnl iropolcnce and ro Uu re to LUt't't since UM USS R nbro p tly tcrmin1 tt« l•c 20 Mnrch - ssion J111 d lmtnished 1·cmnining Gcmna n hope or implemcnl ing U1c Po 5Qan1 method ot u nifying Otrmn ny pol1Ueally am I cc onomkalty b eJlmlno ted 1 $0Undin g board for the revela tion of uh1 e Tiet movea and c cllminatcd a useful u tty • aJ• •c for easing VS-USSR tension Oelo 1 Lhe govcl n1ru nial level The USSll stHl lH 8 at its cllspo$ ll l lUtbCt means tOc hnmssing the US and m ' king lhc l tt er·s posil ion i n Uc -lin more difficul t These means include imposHJon of unllater n 1 traffic regulat iun Qn hll ound ood nnd Creight nh lpme11ts aLtemptcd entorccmc nL ol 1 uHJatcra1 rcgul 1t lons on he Hight oC W t-5tern r ower atrcrnrc o· cr the SovJct Zone compltte re ud1at lon of quadnpa rtit e Komma ndatura junsdlct ion o · the Sn•111 L sector ot Ole city and the incorporat ton of that scc tor into the wieL t one and finally increased efforts Lo ' real e u nr est nmong the civil 11opul ntlou of thl Vestel n scctor s o r the cJLy Slcattg c fost es such ns Lhe danu1Re lo US propsgoJ'ld t r chmcry to u11M1tigence operations and 10 Lhc use or the US sector w i a s · u1ctuar · fo r refugees from the Soviet sy stcm can not I Jc c o mp lOl cly rctrlovocl CXC ' 1t by th J'l'J 10' a l o r 311 1 1c S w1 •hnµrn e l ri sirlctlocu ind lmi cdirntn rckrrcrl to ol ovc Thout h lhe US could capture a dtcrce of tile itrn teg i tit iatne by Intensified clandestine lnteJUg 1f f' apetatlf n sucb action could I lo m lldnr W remedy 1he uuronunaLe sJu m tion in 'J 'ln h rc L'Hl $o ieL hlndrnnc 'S hnvc p l i cd lh •• tnt1-Comnm n ts DorHu cily n • - rnnwnL or to relh Vf the len slon broughl by inc 1cn ' 1' I Soviet inLrans uence In lhr 41u idrip ul 1 Komr i n l hua -eiHt'Ff