a TOP SECRET SENSfflVE March 2 1969 MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A KISSINGER FROM Al Haig SUBJECT MemorandUll'I from Secretary Laird Enclosing Preliminary Draft of Potential Military Actions re Vietnam At Tab A is a memorandum from Secretary Laird enclosing the initial albeit unsanctioned plans prepared by the JCS in response to yo l'equest of Janu uy 2 7 for such a scenario • At Tab B ls a proposed reply to Secretary Laird for your signatt re with some suggestions for modifications which might be considered The J'CS plans which have been forwarded a re I believe mol e extensive than the type you and the President visualized as acceptable signals of U S intent to escalate military operations in Vietnam in the face of continued enemy intransigence in Paris Furthermore any such plans should be forwarded with the views of the Chairman and the Searetary included I£ implemented they would require some level of coordination at State The draft plan in fact recommends Page 6 of the draft JCS memorandum that an appropriate interagency Task Force be formed to refine each of the scenarios which have bee n developed In brief the plans provide 1 Actual or feigned airborne amphibious operations against several objectives in NVN Appendix A z An actual or feigned airborne airmobile expedition in force against enemy LOCii in Laos and Cambodia Appendix B 3 Actual or feigned renewed and expanded air and naval operations against NVN Appendix C TOP SECRET SENSITIVE DECLASSIFIED Authoritv ' 2 fJ J l C 5g i · ' ByWARA Dal 7 J f t _ _________ __ -·- -- _____ - TOP SECRET SENSITIVE _ • • • I -Z- 4 Actual or feigned subversion of the population and pl'eparation for active resistance by the people against the Hanoi regime Appendb D 5 A plan for actual or feigned technical escalation of war against North nuclear Appendix E Recommend · You sign the memorandum at Tab B to Secretary Laird which l Expresses your gratitude for the excellent draft plan i ' j j Z level actions Requests additional refinement to include lower 3 Request J resubmission in final form by March 15 1969 Attachments TOP SECRET SENSITIVE • ™ · i iiifW ' '······ lll 'W iil1l'f -- ll 'I - ___ _ ✓ £iJi iii · · DECLASSIFIED Authority ' 2 I 1 l ByWARA Date7 C 5 L v -' ' ' ' • • i I J -1 - ' 1 21 FEB 19S9 MEMORANDUM FOR DR KISSINGER At the luncheon in my dining room on Monday January 27 the President General Wheeler you and I dis·cussed t he possibility of working out a program of po' ential military actions vhich might jar the North Vietnamese into being more forthcoming at the Paris talks I was informed this morning that you would like to review the progress made in the staff work on such a program I am attaching the preliminary papers which have been prepared in the Joint Staff I wo' lld like to emphasize that the papers have no statu s other than as orking copy While General Wheeler gave the papers to me he has not had the opportu 1ity -- nor have the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- to consider the proposals in any detail Other members of my staff with whom I shall want to consult before serio is consideration is given to such dramatic steps have no seen the papers at all While I wish to be responsive in providing material for some initial consideration I wish to emphasize a the preliminary nature of this work b the desirability of much more detailed discussions within the Department of Defense before any formal suggestions or recommendations can be made and c the necessity which I am sure you recognize for coordination with the State Department and others before we proceed with' any such steps as those outlined I must confess to yo' l being more impressed at least initially with the potential disad· rantages of the proposals than with the possibility of achieving movement in Paris by such means ________ - 4 s Attachments -- -- tit• · tiECLASSiFIED Authoritv f 2 • I @ qggByl o4ARA Date 7 J 1 t __ TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE 1 To preclude prolonged stall lng taet tcs by the 1 communists in Par1s a program of military political 2 and psychological uctivit tes can be employed by the 3 Un tted States to create rear ln the Hanoi leadership 4 that the United States is preparing to undertake new 5 highly damaging military actions against North Vietnamesf 6 NVN terrltory nstallatlons and interests 7 2 Althougl implementation of' such a program is technically easible there are also 8 ·- certain disadvari·tages 10 assr c ated w th lt a US actiono may result in a serious Jllisjudgment by ffVN or other Communlst nati0n b If NVN fall3 to react and the US then withdraws 11 12 13 without any change ln the baa1c·31tuation it may 14 strengthen NVN intrans I gencci 15 c If fo·11ow-on ev cnts make the US deceptlon 16 appart nt subsequent J ndicatlons of serlous US intent 17 would 18 103€ their• cred b111 ty d Adverse crtt ' cl m may force the US Government 9 19 to disavow the intent after initiatlng the deception 20 The net result would be a strengthening of the NVN 21 position 22 3 These dlsadvantages not withstanding _ th r•e may be occasions when some type of deception effort would be desirable The following proposals which could be implemented singly or in varying combinations offer a broad spectrwn of possible optiops TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE SM-71-69 1 24 25 26 27 TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE a A combined airborne amphibious operation against several objectives in NVN See Appendix A b Punitive airborne alrmobile expeditiona against 1 2 3 enemy lines of communications LOG and base areas 4 in Laos and Cambodia 5 See Appendix B c Renewed and expanded air and naval operations 6 against NVN to include closure of Haiphong and the 7 blockade of NVN 8 See Appendix C d Subversion of the population and preparation 9 for active resistance by the people against the Hanoi 10 regime 11 see Appendix D e A technlcal escalation 4 See Appendtx E Dtle to the lack of widespread disaffection within 12 13 the population of NVll convinCing the Democratic Republic 14 of Vietnam DRV leaders that they are faced with mass 15 uprisings is not presently considered feasible 16 5 The appendices set forth scenarloa for the proposed 17 operations to include the basic concept and general 18 activltles involved in each 19 6 Guidelines for the execution of scenario a To present a reallstlc and credible threat to 20 21 Hanoi an lntegi•ated pol i tlcal diplomat le and military 22 effort must be controlled at the national level n Actions by the US negotiating team in Paris and public 24 statements by high US government officials must be coordinated with the picture being painted through 26 the manipulatiort of military resources TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE 2 TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE b The threat which is presented to Hanoi in each 'H l 1 scenario must be on a significant scale if it is to achieve 2 the desired psychological impact 3 c Each scenario must develop over an adequate period 4 of time to permit the indicators to be picked up by the 5 communists transmitted through their intelligence network 6 evaluated and considered by the top level leadership in 7 Hanoi a d The message being transmitted by each scenario must be clear and credible to Hanoi To the extent that the 9 10 planned operation will thereby receive domestic or foreign 11 news media recognition the effect on the American public 12 must be considered 13 e Provision must be made to permit ari·esting the il· 14 development of each seenario at any desired stage without 15 jeopardizing US interests 16 f 'fechniques for executing s enarlos 1 There are two ways by which the military phases of each scenario an be executed CU CPAt can be dir cted to prepare to execute an actual ope1·ation at a given future 18 li 20 date employing certain designated resource _ while the Joint 21 Chiefs of Staff malntain control of preparation and phased execution of the operation 22 Alternatively a complete deception operation can be conducted under the Joint Chiefs of Staff control £1 The greatest realism can be obtained by the first alternative The number of persons who are 26 aware of the underlying psychological objective of the ll preparations can be held extremely small_ lessening the chance of its leakage 12 2 Deception operations are considerably less expen- sive and easier to control but are much more diffi ult to present in a credible fashion TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE 3 Planning must be lQ l 32 l DECLASs1F1ito Authority - I £ ByWARA Date t7 f $ __ 58' --···--------· ---- - i I I I - TOP SECRET - SENSI'rl VE i extremely detailed and to insure that execution is l fully coordinated a relatively large number of people 2 must- inevitably become aware that a deception is being 3 presented 4 3 'In the scenarios presented in the appendi9es CINCPAC is directed to prepare for actual a airborne 5 6 runphibious invasion of NVN b punitive expedition 7 into La as and Cambodia c resumption of bombing and 8 institution of a naval blockade and d resumption 9 and expansion of subversion operations However each 10 of those scenarios can be converted to a deception 11 operation if desired 12 In the remaining sceriario technical escalation a deception operation app-ears more feasible l l 15 7 E 'valua tion of S enarios · a Airborne amphibious operation against HVN 16 1 This approach would be the 111ost expensive t o 17 execute and preuupposes a situation wherein sufficient 18 forces to establish a c 1·edible threat ai e deployed from 19 CO tuS or withdrawn from combat dur·ing the embarlcation 20 and rehearsal phases It would be the muat lil ely to be observed and reported by the press 2 It would req uire extensive time to prepare thus presenting an excellent picture to the enemy of a developing US effort This would p1·ovide considera Jle opportunity for the enemy to evaluate debate a nd decide whether to change negotiating tacti s 3 A landing targeted at Vinh would be more likely to '21 ll 23 24 £ 26 £1 28 cause the ORV to reconsider its negotiating tactics than 29 either of the other two lodgements farther south 30 4 For credibility this sceriario must include action pointing towat·d the resumption of bombing TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE 4 31 TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE b Punitive expedition in Laos and Cambodia 1 1 Punitive airborne airmobile expeditions agal nst 2 enemy LOCs and base areas in Laos and Cambodia would be 3 unlikely to obtain the desired reaction from Hanoi 4 because of their limited scope and effect NVN territory 5 is not threatened and feasible alternatives are available 6 to the enemy 7 2 The threat of an expedition targeted on Tchepone being closest to NVN would be moi-e likely to get the desired reaction than alternatives targeted farther s th c Resumption of bombing and or naval blockade 1 The resumption of bombing would be the most credible of all the scenarios since b9mbing was employed extensively by the United States in the past · l and the assets lot res' ll11ption are preserit in the theater 2 With tl e assets already present it would be 16 dt°fficult to present a picture of military preparations 17 tex iding o er sufficient time to a rrect a negotiating posture This course would also imply the application of emphasis on public stati ments and other psychological 19 20 activities to develop ·the picture of a hardening United States Government resolve -3 The naval buildup for a l locl ade will provide the opportunity to ex tend JT ilitary preparations ovet· a substantial period of time thns providing more ll flexibility to this app i ·oach 26 4 This scenario would be tlle easiest to control 27 and less expensive than that for an amphibious airborne 28 attack on NVN d Subversion of the 'NVN population 1 Since it is presently considered infeasible to c onvince the DRV leadership that it is fftced with a TOP SECRET- - SEl SITIVE 5 SENSITIVE mass uprising this scenario by its-elf would not be l l likely to produce the desired result of persuading 2 Hanoi to chang_e its negotiating tactics• 3 f ' ' effect it should be coupled i rith other scenarios · f i·' ' ·• 1 ' ' ' · '' · l Par greatest 4 2 The development of the actions proposed i_n ' 'i 5 ·this scena io would require considerable time 6 e 'l' echnical scalation ' l It is difficult to evaluate the degree of 8 cred1b ll1ty which the DRV leadership will attach to 9 this scenario • 7 It would depend in great pal't on their• assessment of the resoluteness of the United States 11 leadership considering the then existent attitude of g the US population towai·d the entire ·sEA eff'ort a s well 13 as in theil· confidence in continued USSR support I 10 -· 2 Use of atomic bi ologi eal or lethal chemical 11 15 ' eap ons in Vietnam would xci te vei ·y stl'on public 16 and congress·ional reaction 17 3 1'he p1 ·8dictatle rea tion worldwide particularly · 18 in J-apan and Okinawa l tpon the surfacing of this 19 scenario mill tate against its employment 20 8 • If the concept of applying psychological pressure to 21 Change DRV negotiating tactics is approved it is recommended 22 that an appropriate 1ntera genc¥ tas k force be formed to refine ll each of thei attached scenarios and to prepru e detailed plans 24 lf'or the-ir implementatioh 25 I L '' TOP· SE ' E'l - SENSITIVE 6 · f- · • I -· - ' APPENDIX C SCENARIO Renewed and expanded air and naval operations against NVN z CQNCEPT IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS US officials indicate increased impatience l A high US government official in an exchange with with communist intransigence and l1int that the press hints that a breakdown in the Paris statements by US oi' ficial talks could lead to a resumption or the bombing and negotiators will be military conference 1s followed by increased of NVN po sibly expanded key1 -d to actions and air and naval reconnaissance of NVN dis atisfaction p H COMMENTS the bombing might be resumed A high level He also indicates with the slow paqe of negotiations • Stockpiles of air munitions are built up additional naval units move into the Tonkin Gulf and additional aircraft move onto airfields in Thailand Leaks hint or a resumption of air and naval operations again3t NVN Extensive pyschological opera- tions indicate increased us determination and irritation 1t1itl1 Hanoi 1s delays 1J'h·e tone and timing or jstatements_ by the NVN in Paris and elsewhere 2 The US n gotiator in Paris indicates to the NVN and NLF IJt impatj ence over comml- nist intransigence • 3 Allied propaganda· media lncrease empha•sis on VC NVA violation $ of the DMZ Laos and Cambodia -See Leaflet drops are resumed over NVN if not already JCS 2 72 20 dcne 5 A mil tary conference is conduct d a t CINCPAC involv ng SecDef CJCS CINCPAC CINCSAC COMUSMACV CINCPAOAF CINCPACFLT and CDMUSJIIACTHAI if 6 US officials begin issuing statements designed to prepare the American public for the resumption of n • bombings -- - '-•----- ____________ ··1··· ·-1 ' r ' --· - '· p 0 t -11 '· ij 1 Jlit1 1ti1· ' •1 1jtl ' CONCEPT j 7 Allied forces in SVN intensify operations against -1 VC NVA forces H ' ' • 1 COMMENTS IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS 'iii el l · I ' ' - j -• - - 1 SCENARIO enewed and expanded air and naval operations against NVN 0 H 8 CINCPAC is direct ed by message to· prepare to __ renew ' The blockade and closure l l bombing of NVN under reduced ·restrictions to close of Haiphong may be direc d Haiphong and blockade the coast of NVN • as· a sep ate action from he bombing resumption 9 CINCPAC in implementation of the JCS me sage · takes ii'- 11 1 1 11 1·11 r action to -- j a Increase air reconnaiszance over NVN a d ' ' -·- 'hydr ographic surveys of trie coast of NVN b uild up stockpiles of air ordna ce in sviJ and 'fhailand '•·ti c Move additional- carriers _and other combat Or·- Tonkin 'Or· m6vement·· additional -· vessels into the ·ou'lf d Move 'O · Air 10 Air Force and Naval Squadrons in the US are alerted • alert Force Squadrons onto airfields in•Thailand 'O - --- -· Or g_ for possible movement to the ar East X 0 - - • I I li ' J r· l ··1·' r ·• 1 · •I ' -·- - --- --- - ·'·-· -- --- _ _• - JPH • • - w 4 - -- - _ · _ - 1 • _ · · _- _ ·-· -_ _ - ··· - · - - ---·· · -··· - -- -- ··- --- ' 0 ' '' ' tsl § C F _NARIO CPNCEPT Renewed a nd e r panded air and naval operations against NVN IMPLEl'1J NTING ACTIONS 1 The themes in grey and black radio broadcasts '' ra changed to indicate an increa zed lack of 8 patience with Hanoi's actions H j '' ' C and in leaflets dropped on NVN are gradually H COMMENTS c 12· 1GS is notified of a planned resumption of bombing and blockade of the north ' H H ' 13 Rumors of a bombine re umption are Spread by US airmen to local Vietnamese and Thais a 1 'O ---- -- - ' _ APPENDIX'E 5 SCENARIO Technical Escalation rn _ _ 'I _ · · C ONCEPT i8 U ' overnment officials in icate ··CQ_i -Dereased impatience with commu- nist intransigence in Paris and COMMENTS NS M coinmun 1s t intransigence h nt at·a possible technical impatience is repeqted ' e·sc·a1at1Qn by a _h1gj1 -US offi cial in Washington 3 •• _ ° of the ·war A •visit political military confere ce -periddicall' v examines m ans by which new a d US troops in Vietnam commence more modern weapon c_Ould be used ln Vietnam cBR training while an apparent if' necessary Radio broad- increased US determination and irritation with Hanoi's delays sta'tements by the NVN statement conmi nts that the Penta on • ·· keyed· to the _B ctions p ress conference East 1s followed by a high level casts and leaflet themes indicate in a 2 A high US milit ary o f'f icial in a PJ lblic· munit ions occurs 'C 'C and negotiators will b This theme of by technical experts to the Far build•UP of highly classified st·atements Of us of'tic JNN and NLF negr _tiators US j mpat1erlce over· l 1 The t9ne and timing of l The US negotiator iri Paris indicates to the Pari s and elsewhere J Allied propaganda medi iricrease emphasis on VC NVA vlolations of the -DI'1Z 1 · Laos and Ca bodia 4 Leaflet d2 ops are resU med over NVN r not ·see •·JCS 2412 420 alreadr being done 5 A team of Pentagon techni al experts in atomic and chemical warfare makes an extended visit · of the Fat' East stopping off at CINCPAC Q I- x ' Okinawa Saigon and Bangkok 6 A summit conference 1s he d in Honolulu ·' involving President N1xon President -Thieu and the 1 ead e of governmeJlt of 'I'CC ' ' I • • •• •' ' • • f ··t '·· J r -- · fMWsk@ I a 21 a ' ' Cl SCENARIO CONCEPT Technical E ca1at1on IMP _EMEHTING ACTIONS o H ' -3 H • COMMENTS 7 Subsequently a military conference is held at CINCPAC involving SecDef 3 CJCS l j cnwPAC 3 COMUSMACV and CIHCSAC 8 High security storage areas are established at selected sites in SVN and Tha-iland A limited number of' actual chemical munitions are shipped I I ' into SVN and stored at those sites 9 CBR training 1 conducted ror all Vs troops in 0 SVN to include those in rear area Jobs Inspect on s · are conducted Of un t t CBR equipment 10 Allied forces in SVN intensify operations against VC NVA forces 11 The themes of grey and black radio broadcasts I I -6 'O I Q - ' - and ln leat'lets dropped on NVN are gradually changed to indicate an increased lack of patience With Hanoi's actions I I' i I i • _ '1 I ' -- •• '- a•' -·- ·-- · - --' 'T · f- _ -'lntr ii lvililMOMNDUM F0 8 Nonorablfl ql 'tn R Uit1d Secl'etlU'y ol t miiffl$ t FROMt 11 y A lU tisfflltt r SU Sil'EeT Me__ andwn oatag Prelimtna ry l r•# J f Potenttal Mmta111Y Actions S re Vtemam l «m vin•y sr« teM f fQUS metn0 11udum I Jreh rue Y a 1 1969 which '4rwarud th eUmlu 11y pa pe r• pNpared by e J'oint Stall o n po••ilik a ttual or telped m Ww 11y • t O M wkfcb nu 1ht be t lndertaun to ••pal u s · t es te opat altoM fn VletMtn Th111 pl itna u 111 well conaetnd tutd lht mks mvolved fn th llir Ul1pten11J n U 1'e F•cl •ly ettt nl ' Bt ef lam ao®lwW COl'le irM l bowaqr that th• re tik111 f tbe C UIVOU- do 11Uc and uwu•naffout onm itllt ®' uot th eme•lvtu ti an acnp ot •• l'Uks at tbu Clm6 fflll J lKl however so e le•• elabOl'llk adlG M wW dt c0-uld 1lt d wbkh al tb Qu h m oie wbJle I ft •• might bi Uffl'lit wt#h reduced ris f 11 iu w i m e41a r cfpifio11 r d O f MVilli in · GU½tli me 111n'ea a• tllit eeliJCtiff tragle cm if fucU catai-e w llr4# aignal • - 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