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Letters, Admiral Moorer to Laird, 21 July 1969, and Laird to Kissinger, n.d. enclosing: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, DUCK HOOK, 20 July 1969, Top Secret

07-M- -'1 - _- CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 21 July 1969 Dear Mel In response to Henry Kissinger's request I have had prepared a detailed plan for the mining of Haiphong and the interdiction quarantine of merchant ships carrying military supplies to Sihanoukville The mining plan has three options with response times varying from 12 to 86 hours I recommend option A Viewed solely from a military point of view the interdiction quarantine concept is relatively simple requires few forces with little risk to these forces The other implications of such an operation are of course substantially more complicated I have attached a proposed memo from you to Henry forwarding the plans for the consideration of higher authority With warmest regardse Sincere o T ' - MOORER Admiral U Honorable Melvin Re Laird Secretary of Defense Washington D C 20301 Attachment DECLASSIFIED FEB OS 2 7 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS oo s Navy _ ' I _ii THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON D C 20301 Dear Henry In response to your recent request a detailed plan has been prepared for the mining of Haiphong and the interdiction quarantine of merchant ships carrying military supplies to Sihanoukville Please let me know if I may be of any further assistance Warmest regards Sincerely Dr Henry A Kissinger Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The White House Washington D C 20500 FEB O 8 2007 DECLASSIFIED Authority EO 12958 as ame_nded Chief Records Declass Div WHS l I DECLASSIFIED FEB O 8 20_07 Authority EO 1295a as amended Chief ecords Declass Div WHS l FOR HAIPHONG PORT COMPLEX 1 This paper summarizes a plan for mining the Haiphong Port Complex including Cam Pha and Hon Gai • BACKGROUND In 1968 cargo throughput into Haiphong averaged 4100 tons per day So far in 1969 this average has increased to 5200 tons per day About 90 percent of all imports via sea into North Vietnam pass through Haiphong USSR provides about 50 percent of this shipping This cargo is estimated to consist not only of food and petroleum products which contribute to the prosecution o f the war but in addition trucks genera- -tors and other war supporting materials See Tab A The closing of the Haiphong Port Complex will have a major effect on the North Vietnam economy and the capability of the North Vietnamese to support the war in the South 2 HAIPHONG COMPLEX MINE PLAN 3 The m ning plan· Tab C •is designed to stop entry of deep draft shipping into the ports of Haiphong Hon Gai and Cam Pha all in Haiphong Complex and to disrupt major attempts by the North Vietnamese to employ lighterage for offloading deep draft shipping which would be forced to anchor to seaw rd· of the minefields I 4 Three options are specifi ed in the Mining Plan viz A Three CVA's B Two CVA's and C One CVA Option A using 154 mines 605 destruc·tors provides the most_ complete and effective mining of the Haiphong Complex and accomplishes the mission in one launch except during brief period when no large CVA is available Option A·has disadvantage of longer ruaction time because one of the three CVA's involved may be in port when the plan is initiated See Tab B for Reaction Options Band C using 98 mines and 400-600 destructors provide effective mining of the deep water channels with much quicker response time Disadvantages inherent in Band Care less dense minefields and elimination of certain shallow water destructor tields 5 Arming delays of 72 hours are set on all for departure of third nation shipping n _ _ eol•ln mo _ _ _ Yl' 6 The use of mines is not an offensive act since no weapons are specifically directed against any targe·t Any damage which occurred to either North Vietnam or third country sbippinK would be self inflicted resulting from their decision to penet ra t __ waters · that have been ·openly c ecl ared unsa fe There no coercion on the part of U S is· PAGE l OF 3 PAGES DECLASSIFIED FEB Of3 2007 Authori Y EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS ' 7 ·Plans provide for follow-on launches when directed to lay destructor fields These are designed to disrupt lighterage if reconnaissance reveals that North Vietnam is offloading substan ial amounts of cargo from ships at anchor Destructors will not be delivered earlier than 48 hours after initial minefields are laide 24 hours is maximum delay which can be set on destructors s · AR Search and Rescue ships and PIRAZ Positive Identification Radar Adviso ry Zone ships will•be positioned· to the north to provide necessary support BARCAP Barrier Combat Air Patrol and TARCAP Target Combat Air Patrol will also be provided L 9 Tab A describes North Vietnamese Air Order of Battle which could be encountered - Considering the low level profile of the mission approximately 300' there is little or no danger from either MIG aircraft or SA-2 mplacements ·In most cases minefields selected are @ tside the range·of AAA although some exits from target area will approach AAA defenses Based on planned aircraft tracks and known locations of North Vietnamese air defenses expected aircraft loss rate will be approximately 3 percent conservative estimate ' · · t__ _ 10 Provisions are included in the plan-for follow up ·reconnaissance to check on effectiveness of fields and reaction of the North Vietnamese Reseeding operations will be executed as necessary to maintain the integrity of the various minefields 11 For diversionary ·purposes several weeks ·prior to execution PIRAZ and SAR· forces wi-11- be- re located to positions in the Tonkin Gulf which they will occupy during the actual mission After about 12 hours on·station they will return to current operating areas This relocation will be repeated at random intervals about every 10 days to inure North Vietnamese defenses and entice them to lower their guard when mission is actually carried out 12 Detailed rules of engagement are listed in Tab D Flak suppression will be required against those -AAA sites of greatest threat to own forcese Talos missiles are authorized over land against hostile MIG aircraft·which threaten U S forces 13 Possible reactions by USSR Communist China and North Vietnam have been analyzed and appear in Tab E An interesting conclusion of this analysis is that much of the uneasiness about Vietnam throughout the world has subsided and that it is likely i ha_i i ne mining of _ti __e _H P _g __ _ompJ ex would generally be in- terpr ted as a show of determination wherea$ a year·ago it might have been regarded as recklessness PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES dfr ·- -·- ··----·------- ------- --·--·' DECLASSIFIED FEB Q 8 2007 · Authorin EO 12958 as amended Chief Declass Div WHS Records · · 14 · Third nation shinoing _would have three options Not t o enter enter with risk or anchor outside Many studies show that suffic ient barges sampans and junks are available for lightering operations but -this is a very difficult qperation requiring large numbers of people and excessive time It •is particularly difficult during the Northeast Monsoon season · September-May Further · while moving f om ship to shore lighters are vulnerable to ship and aircraft attack without ·undue risk to third nation ships and without risk of killing civilians ashore If decision is made to interdict lighters while they are moving from ship to shore surface gunfire as well as air can be employed 15 The rules of international law regarding mine-laying have been reexamined The traditional laws of war do not cover mining except in a state of war The political and technological history of the cold war has rendered laws of war based on the war or peace dichotomy obsolete and irrelevant Acts in self defense are lawful under international lawe Therefore the mining of Haiphong Harbor and its approaches as described in this plan is considered to be a lawful exercise of South Vietnam's and U S right of collective self-defense against the aggression of North Vietnam See Tab F i TABS x- ---Inte lligence B - Execution Timing C Mining Plan Concept D - Rules of Engagement for Mining Plan E - World Reaction to Mining F - Legal Ramification of Mining 1· · PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES DECLASSIFIED· FEB O 8 2007 Authority EO 1 2958 as am nded Ghief Records Declass Div WHS · TAB A INTELL°IGE iCE HAIPHONG 1 General Situation l '' a Air Threat There are eight serviceable jet airbases in North Vietnam with an estimated 94 jet fighters of the MIG 15 17 19 and 21 variety Strip alert is stood at five of the eight bases The NVN GCI coverage of NVN and the Gulf of Tonkin is excellent but the NVN Air Force has only a limited all weather night capabilityo b SAM Threat The re are three known active SAM sites which could take under fire aircraft over water conducting operations in the proposed minefield area SA-2 operational effectiveness below 1000' is limited due to ground return · c AAA Threat There is limited threat from NVN gun AAA over the minefield There is known light AAA effective range 4 NM on Ile de Norway and the heavy AAA in the vicinity of Cat Bi Kien An airfields and Hon Gai has an effective range of 7 NM to 25 000 feet d 1 ·J· i L--' · NVN Naval Threat Haiphong Area Motor Gunboat PGM Motor Torpedo Boat PT Subchaser SC Hydrofoil Motor Torpedo Boat PTH 11 9 2 1 1 The PGM is capable of 43 knots for 1_ hour At 20 knots range is 655 NM Armament consists of 2-371ffi single mounts and 2 - 20 MM single mounts It has surface search radar SKIN HEAD 2 The PT boat is capable of 50 knots for 350 NM At 30 knots for 410 NM Armament consists of 4 - 12 7 MM guns 2 - 18 torpedoes 1 and 4 epth charges It has surface search radar SKIN HEADe 3 The PTH is estimated capable of speeds in excess of 40 knots Armament is 2 - 21 torpedoes and two twin 12 7 MM gun mounts· It has the ·roT HEAD surface search radar • PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES • · TAB A ' l DECLASSIFIED FER 0 8 2007 Authority O 12958 as ame nded Chief Record_s · Declass Dtv WHS 2 n Y Forces a North Vietnam ' · 1 Naval Forces The North Vietna ese Navy was designed to be a coastal defense force bu•t has proved itself ·incapable of performing the task Its P 4 Class PT's pose the only threat to large surface craft but NVN tactics and torpedo readiness render this threat almost negligible The Navy's S0-1 SC have ASW ordnance but crews have not been trained to use it The patrol craft Swatow Class PGM and Shanghai Class_PTF provide 37 MM mobile platforms to supplement shore defenses but have no significant anti- hip capability 2 Air Force The North Vietnamese Air Force has grown considerably since the beginning of the Vietnam hestilities The NVNAF combat inventory presently includes about 94 fighters and 4 IL-28 bombers located in North Vietnam ' L 3 Enemy Capabilities a North Vietnam is capable of t f 1 Attacking with light jet bombers and jet fighters bombers opposing nava_l forces operating in the Gulf of Tonkin· or the northwestern -area of the South China Sea L 2 Conducting limited harassment of opposing naval uni ts operating in t _e coastal waters L u G L L 3 Conducting limited defensive minelaying _operations in coastal waters 4 NVN Maritime Activity a The Haiphong port complex handles some 90 percent of North Vietnamese· seaborneirnports - ----- The war has caused North Vietnam's need for imports· parj icuiarly foodstuffs petroleum · machinery construction materials trucks earth moving equipment and generators to grow The principal contribution of the North Vietnamese economy to the war has been as a manpower source and the main enance of a logistics system capable of moving men and imported war material to the c omba t zones b rne bulk of military equipment-used by the enemy in both North and South Vietnam continues to be imported from Communist countries The value of such aid in 1968 is estimated at $400 _ -- 3-- 11 L i L L Vl lf UVWU J --- L l VW -'----L 1 UVUI if'l l A ·-- 1 - _ _ _ _ lnl tP7 tjl'V 'V LU LvUI o Ul 1 L L LVU - n __ I lit 1- _- _ _ lt 11 L J Ut _ LU military imports in 1968 probably reflects reduced needs for air defense weapons particularly ammunition and surface-to-air PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES -_· l DECLASSIFf ED F B O-8' 2001 · '1ii Authori Y EO 12958 as am ndecf Chief Records Decla ss Div WHS _ missiles since the U S bombing cutbacks of 31 March and 31° October 1968 There is evidence that large quantities of arms anct·am raunition have entered North Vietnam by rail from Com-· munist China Although there is no specific proof that pin points the import of arms into· North Vietnam via the sea this is still a strong possi_bili ty It could be coming by sea and never be detected Regardless of the fact that it cannot be determined what percentage of arms are coming from which nation and by which route a reduction in food petroleum machinery cons t ructiou materials trucks and other war-suppo cting i terus will reduce the war-making potential of North Vietnam and have a _direct effeGt on its ability to support the war in the South 1 r r k c Haiphong continues to be important as the port through· which the North Vietnamese economy is propped-up by its communist allies hile its manpower is being drained off to the war in the south I d During 1968 seaborne impoi·ts to North Vi_etnam rose to a netv high of 1 960 000 tons 39 percent above the volume in 1967 and the largest increase recorded for any year Imports from Free World countries remained at the same low level as 1967 accounting for only 2 percent of the total thus imports from communist countries provided the total of the increase t l e More than half of North Vietnam's nearly two million tons of imports during 1968 comprised of food 790 000 tons and petroleum 385 000 tons · -The USSR supplied 77 percent 'of the petroleum some 90 percent of which was motor gasoline and diesel oil Cmn munist China supplied 18 percent Imports of general and miscellaneous cargo construction equipment industrial machinery trucks and motor vehicles chemicals cement metal products and waterborne logistics craft increased in 1968 for the fourth consecutive year and totaled 605 000 tons f Imports of general and miscellaneous cargo incra ased from all parts of the com unist world except Communist China which showed a n 11 percent decrease Imports of this category from China showed a particularly steep decline in the second half of 1968 Motor vehicle imports from China for example dropped off from 6 000 tons in the first half of the year to 1 000 tons in the second halfs Tables land 2 provide ship arrivals by Flag to North Vietnam since 1964 'r PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES 4lili6 ---0 TAB A · C'L Q O - DECLASSIFIED · EB O S tOO Authori Y EO 12958 as am nded Chief Records Declass Div WH$ · Table North Vietnam WJ 'I - t j -- - --- - - UJ 1 yu-- r l d ' 1 ec • Dll p - 'I I by Flag HL·r 1 Vd l S 1964--68 l 1 r Flag i ·l 1·964 1965 · 1966 1967 1968 Total- 580 530 379 386 500 Communist countries 178 274 305 ·308 351 122 44 •'181 ----216 29 31 2 9 1 4 ·1 · 4 USSR Eastern Europe 48 58 •· Albania Bulgaria Czechoslovakia East Germany · · Pofand · · · 79 50 • 1 2 5 48 _ · Free World 72 • I I - ' - ' · 402 J -- CyprusDenmark Finland -France Greece· Indonesia· Italy Japan Kuwait Lebanon Liberia 26 97 98 f 1 6 149 I 256 74 78 °12 5 i 1 1 1 2 28 1· 11 ·l 37 74 20 9 3 2 7 0 -8 43 12· 7 1 -- 2 1 13 · 1 1 1 2 -·- 4 3 · 1 5 29 1 6 9 3 177 8 136 50 67 114 1 ' -· ---- •--·--- --- ________ ' 1·1· · ' _ '• l 24 138 I lalta Nonvay Panama _ J_ngapore Somalia Sweden United Kin -3dom West Germany Illegal flag ' ' 144 1 35 Netherlands f' · 40 3 l · j· -- r I 1' 4 7 Communist China Cuba l I- DECLASSIFIED FEB 0 8 -2007 Authori Y EC 12958 as amended · Chief Records Declass Div WHS TABLE 2 BLOC SHIPPING TO NORTH VIETNAM - 1969 SOVIET POLISH· GRT NO DWT ---- - MONTH JAN 24 i9 FEB ___ 102 343 130 885 2 90 869 4 114 780 MAR 17 APR 21 --- JUN ____ 27 178 39 835 1 113 695 2 13 564 20 359 21 97 656 122 841 1 6 904 10 086 2 6 303 6 496 15 65 373 84 879 1 9 267 12 407 1 5 920 9 200 CUBAN MAR 1 8 810 10 130 APR 1 8 002 10 300 1 8 003 l 1 10 300 2 - TO'l'AL NO RT -- __ DWT $ _ - I __ _ - 7 62 11 600 8 231 FEB l 10 580 CHICOM JAN Jllti NO 22 999 E GERMAN MAY GRT ' 15 771 68 268 85 253 140 591 l AY ____ BULGARIAN CiRT - 8 31 012 44 260 -- 8 39 584 57 610 -- 15 59 341 85 650 9 390·· 12 686 7 30 770 9 732 4 14 592 22 560 7 28 928 42 360 12 686 17 658 23 100 - 48 130 --- ----- FEB 32··· ------ MAR APR 32 MAY 30- JUM 2s· 149 126 165 593 144 650 175 420 143 550 127 136 198 144 223 825 191 613 232 066 181 050 171 946 · PAGE l OF 1 PAGE t rv A • _ _ J 1 c j ' 1 1 - i_ 1 1 1 o - l - _ ' i ot _ __ _ _ r- -•11-ui _ ----- e _ • L ft ti ' _ ··--· e I' t '· i-•M 7 ' -11'1 ' 1 ' ' l 1 ' lil r 1 'l · ' · NORTH ViETNANl MadtBme Ports Anchorages ·cu1d Shipping Channels r 1 I' N O R·• t H • ' ' ' ' · · VIE TNAJA ' J ••1' ' - hf ° _ · Port • 11•• $fl i • I • _ • -' - · Cl 4 g l i f' • r v • if'a f ll'ji ' ' JlO -t t°4 ' ·- 1 ' · · 'ht -'•' 'L• · f • t• • _ J n4 'Z r • j f 9 • i•i ' · ·' i J • 'ff i ttt'1 · ••' f r- ' tl ' ' · · Fl ' cae1jt2on·g i' t 'I is if' t•• rt · · I 1 j · · • • M r ' • · ·t# ft • t-- • - • 7r_ J'1 ll - it - IJ' qi · ' •1•'l' N o •11 t• 7 '¥ ' 1 l1 P· • '' l' Y · '£ · i ti I @ f n t1 ' t - 'ft 1ht J · - ' ' i F '' Gl ' ii l lJ 1 '1k i i •' lJt Jiti AREA Maritime Port ' e - Other Port 1 1 · - T L f · t• 1·'t1 '1 •a » 9 ff • S CJNG THAI B NH C1 NAL oi rs BAMBOUS • LACH TRAY At Haiphong r • Maritime Anchorage Shipping Channel Principal Waterways t fl -JJ r ' '' r ' -- - - 11 1f H • i l t Jif 1· •f A Cam Pi a • i -• 7 18 m h • r 11 1- POL Pier 2-Maritime Wharf I a _____________________________________ l · __ ______________________ ________________ · ' DECLASSIFIED FEB O8 20Q 7 A uthority EO 12958 as amended hief Records Declass Div WHS ' NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR SITUATION AS OF 10 JULY 1969 fb 8 IL-28IBEAGL ------LIGHT JET BOMBER 78 MIG-21 °FISHBED _ _ _ _ JET FIGHTER 1·22 MIG-15 17 FAGOTIFRESCO_ JET FIGHTER 4 YUNNANI 4 PHUC YEN 0 20 Ml-1 4 HARE HOUNO_ VARIOUS AIRFIELDS PRIMARILY HOA LAC HELICOPTER PRIMARILY HANOI HAIPHONG ' '-i - - 00 4 _ _ _ _ VAKJUU AlKf-11 LLJ f-'rtlMARILY HOA LAC HELICOPTER ' 29· PROP TRAiNER---YUNNANl 3 AN-24 COKE _ _ _ YUNNAN 2 GIA LAM 40 MIG-19 FARMER - - - - 10 KEP 30 YUNNAN TRANSPORT JET FIGHTER 1 IL-18 COOT _ _ _ _ GIA LAM 6 UMIG-15 MIDGET _ _ _ _ J YUNNANI_ 3 KEP 1 KIENAN 1 HOA LAC TRANSPORT JET TRAINER · 22 AN-2 COLT_ _ _ _ HAIPHONG LANG SON HANOI 37 IL-14 Ll-2 CRATE CAB _ _ HANOI HAIPHONG YUNNANI LIGHT TRANSPORT YUNNAN AREA AIRFIELDS TRANSPORT LANG SON AREA AIRFIELDS 33 6 59 20 YUNNANI 39 PHUC YFN BAI THUONG YUNN NI S KiEN AN 24 LIUCHOU HOA LAC 4 KEP 7 PHUC YEN 0 Q PEITUN YUHNANI If 33 MIG-21 L 59 MIG-15 i7 30 M S-19 4 ll-28 1 01 116-15 l NVN JET AIRCRAFT FIGHTERS MIG-15 17 llllG-19 'MlG-21 HRS SUB- f ' l TOTAL 122 40 78 LOCATION NVN 39 10 45 - I 83 30 33 -240 -94 __ 146 ' _ · • BOMBERS IL-28 TRAIHERS UM1fl5 TOTAL JET AIRCRAFT ClilNA 8 4 6 5 -254 -103 1- 4 ° ' - 1 151 - 11 JUL 69 r ' j DECLASSIFIED EF'B O 8 2007 Authority EO 1295'8 as am nded •_· Chief Records Declass Div WHS · LAOS l-------- --11• I t I J l t · DECLASSIFIED FEB O B 2oo 7 Authority EO j 2958 ·as amended · Chief Records Declass Div WHS rr r·- · _' -- f r-1 ' AFLO WEAPONS - 5 129 37mm 57mm 4 792 85mm 100mm - - - 337 31 OCT 68 JQ NOV 68 - RP 3 RP4 RPS 550 360 63 93 468 -10 1249 38 1393 539 611 384 34 f to 10 SI 229 135 93 39 1127 606 4753 162 145 412 571 447 599 89 1179 5075 626 ---c J_ 25 C 6 _• --1---1----- i---- -- 1---- -----1 3t Di C 68 V _J 10 9 j Stso4 25 ·- i I 560 31 JAN C9 l53S- --555 36 1'425 31 MAR 69 472 39 10 545 to - 119 44 424 - 94 _ 1232 52 555 446 10 47 491 432 to 45 152 I 364 154 1223 2 _ 4929 '1351_ 153 $13 5041 311 4792 -R ------ 5352 512 1102° NORTH VIHNAh1 STATUS Of AAA --_ ____ 0 lS - 50 Stahle Miles · DECLASSIFI ED' FEB O S 2001 Authorijy 1 0 12958 as am nded _ Chief Recqrds · Declass Div WHS l NORTH VIETNAM E W· G CI · CO V ER A G E - · vrr7 - · · 7 I'1 r $' _ · _ f ' - A _- r _ ·_ J _ _ - ' t I 1· -_ ··· ·--JirPJT ta iff V _·_ Ir Y' _ v· 4P '- · ' _ - · _ e ' '- - t _ _ - i_ ·' ' J · · • i - - J r '- _NA SAN AF •• @ ·- · -c· ' _· · 1- • • L A C ___ · ·-·-- ' B AC MAI CH ti _ DONG · - ' ·· YE ·a @KEP ' ttf - - ·- f-- J_ ·'·- -$· _HIA - c c fr · ·o I i IJ Ii NfJ i · i ' · · r·i '1 ' I C -l' TUA i @-' OONG-HI P r f _ · · _ t l i ·- _ _ · · - C · €fvif ' 1H AF - •• J ··· o· I - d - -- t- · - 'd @ HU NONG CHANG _ - · l --· -- -'--· @ a -·r _• '1 -' '' -- _ '-- _ · - ''c J-y oc @ ' · j ' 1 -' •'j'' J · - ·· · TONG CONG - • tz y·· ' -iw f iG TAM 1 IJ i - 1t ·- _HANOI J ·· 'v c r '- c ' d '·• • LPHUC D G c 7 - - 0 ¢ · -- c '•' ·· • · ' l - 1 -1 ' I · - - · - - - - ·· - t· - ' - r ' _ _ J ·· f l' ' · · -j __ AP· r _· t#p - ' i f ' i 4 - · · •-• · · · • · · i - i V ' 1 • '• ' '· · t - _________ ZJi NORTH VIETNAM l L EW GCII j AS OF Ju 1· _•··1 4 1 1959 1 0 _ • _· · '' f · ·4 74W k ' @J'£i ffl'P#- ' · 41 '1 · J - - _ J · DEcLAss1F1Eo FEB o_ s 2007 18 ·J LY 1969 - Authority EO 12958 as am nded Chief Records· Declass DIV WHS • y TABB EXECUTION TIMING 1 Response time will vary as a result of several factors Location ·of CVA 's currently assigned mission of CVA •·s location arid readiness _of mines and configuration of aircraft The response times in this pl n range from 12 hours for options Band C to 86 hours for option A when one CVA ·is in-- 3most distant port Response-- - -fqr option _ _ ______A could -- · be 0 -- --3 Lt UUvl U 1 V _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 3_-l -- _ llVU L cUl ct l t L 1 1 lll 1 U p LVV LU u 111 i i i ll I --- 3 Lt l U J Ut U -the third CVA to Tonkin Gulf 2 Definition of Execution Terms M-Hour DTG of message ordering mining plan implemented A subsequent order is required for launch of mining aircraft unless L-Hour is specified in this message r L-Hour · Time launch of mining aircraft commences as ordered by appropriate authorityo L-Hour may be pre-designated when M-Hour is signalled or may be ordered separately D-Hour Time when all fields are in place for option selected A-Hour Time when all fields are activated -- - DECLASSIFIED FEB O 8 2007 · · Authori y EO 12958 as am nded Chief Records Declass Div WHS i PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES TABB I ' r 3• f ' Timing of pertinent events M Hour to L-Hour OPTION OPTION 1 CVA in port 1 All desig- rt M 68 hrs CVA from most nated Forces in Tonkin OPl'ION B M O M O M O M O distant port _Gulf 2 All mines aboard CVA 's M 74 in readiness condition ucn I- 3 All Surface Forces in launch position M 77 4 All mines M 82 -M 3 M 3 ' f I f readied ·to Condit ion nA 5 All mines loaded M 8 M 8 M 12 M· l2 aircraft ready for launch ' r- Events - c a - - 3 4 and 5 are proceeding concurrently - - - - Q 'lm - - - - c za - -- - - - - - - - - ca - - - - -- 4 Time available to higher authority to cancel the mining operation after it is ordered implemented a Unlimited if message implementing mining plan did_not specify·a L-Hour and if no L-Hour has been signalled subsequently • r f b Aftei L-Hour has been specified or signalled the mining operation can be cancelled provided the cancellation order is received and understood aboard the CVA's by L 15 minutes i ' i PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES I I -- - - TABB ' DECLASSIFIED FEB O8 20 7 Au horiw 1 012958 as am nded · Chief Records Declass Div WHS i AB C i MINE PLAN·coNCEPT • j la Concept When· directeq TF 77 will conduct offensive CVA aeriarmiuing operations in the Haipho1gPort Co p1ex in order to interdict the· maritime logistic support of North Vietnam • Haiphong Hon Gai and Cam Pha comprise the complex to be mined and ware selected because over_90 percent of the maritime support for Nortl l Vietnam enters throughout these ports The plan provides three mining options i ·e AYA 3 CVA 's BRAVO 2 CVA 1 s and CHARLIE 1 CVA TF 77 can commence mining operations within 12 to 86 hours after receipt of an execute directive dependent on which option is selected a· b·· In each option the mine fields are armed 72 hours after planting and this fact will be publicly announcedo ✓ This allows a safe passage period for shipping that desires· to depart the area 2 Mine Fields See Chart Ap E- lix 7 _ a Haiphong - The port of Haiphong is mined with five ·fields Two fields A and B close the main channel with sea mines Fields land 2 contain mines and destructors and are planted adjacent to the main channel Field 3 is a destructor field which can be laid over field Bin order to seal the main channel to light'arage craft as well as ocean shipping NO'tE Sea mine fields are lettered destructor fields are numbe ed Sea mines arm in 72 hours desti·uctors in 24 hours No destructors are planted in main channels on the first launch for any option in order to ensure a safe departure channel during the grace period b Hon Gai ' Fields C D and E are sea mine fields designed to block the ocean vessel principal access route ·Destructor fields 4 and 5 will block the most used lighterage and anchorage areas serving Ron· Gai c Cam Pha - Fields F G Hand I are sea mine fields designed to prevent B ccess to Cam Pha 72 hours after planting Destructor field 6 will interdict lighteraga ope1 3 tions in the area r - ·· ' PAGE l OF 5 PAGES DECLASSIFIED FEB O ff 2007 Authori Y EO 12958 as ame_naed Chief Recqrds Dectass Div WHS f r· t r t C F l t r- · I l d Mine Destructor allocations - The following qu anti-· • ties of sea mines listed are required for fields A through I for options indicated CJ -TIO MS MII E TYPES MK 50-0 500# ACOUSTIC A B MK 52-2 MAG IND 10 1000# MK 55-2 200 1 r- PRES MAG MAG 67 42 10 c· MK 52-3 101JO# ·10 12 12 42 IND 25 14 14 12 Destructor fields 1 through ·6 require the following assets DESTRUCTOR MINE TYPES' DST 36 DST 40 1 MAG 10001 MAG 5UO# Al 2 Bl 564 40 48 40 36 564 402 B2 c 358 • MK 50-0 50U# ACOUSTIC 30 20 20 20 I See paragr tph 3a for further definition of options l I Il All mines destructors required for the above options are currently aboard 7th Fleet CVA's or at the· Naval Magazine Subic Bay 3o Forces a Carrier requirements Option 1 l i il · 1 i b Other ships for the following additional ships 1 Strike Monitor _J North SAR - 2 DD DLG - North Search and Rescue I Control P RAZ - l C f G TALOS a r l DD DDG Str ik2 and CRp i · i 1 l l 1 1 J The operation includes requirements 1 I I l 1 large CVA C 1 1 Al - 1 large CVA itnd 2 SW all CVA's A2 3 small CVA's Bl - l large CVA and 1 small CVA B2 - 2 small CVA's - l ' PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES FEB O 8 2007 DECLASSIFIED Authority EO 12958 as am nded Chief Records Declass Div WHS J ' ·' I I c · _Supporting Aircraft - Support air raf t required include j Bar Cap Tar Cap - To protect mining force and carrier F4 F8 force Tankers Refuel fighters or mining aircraft as required EKA37KA4 KA6 ECM AEW rL EA6 E2A E1B - To provi'de radar following and to counter missiles and fire c9ntrol radars f IRON HAND FLAK SUPPRESSORS - To provide mining force A4 A7 A6 F4 protection f RECONNAISSANCE - To provide Post-Strike results NVN RA5C7RF8 reaction L l s Operations 4 '· Plan Description - This is a · three optj on plan providing a choice of 3 2 or 1 carriers to mine the Haiphong Complex Principal advantages disadvantages of each option are presented in the following a L L f L L 'i l Ll __ I Option A Advantages A three carrier force provides the maximum flexibility in strike size and composition In this concept total mine requirements are not stored on the CVA's Some of the required mines are· held aboard an ammunition ship in the Tonkin Gulf thus allowing CVA's normal ordnance stowage and operations Provides the1most complete and ef£ective mining of Haiphong Complex · · Disadvantages Requires niine transfer at sea-with attendant delay in response to execute order Current posture requires two CVA's Yankee Station Third CVA at late arrival could delay execute up to 86 hours • Requires dedication of two AE's to partial mine load-out thus restricting conventional ordnanc stowage and AE deployment Option Band C LJ LJ·' Advantages Mines are stored aboard CVA's thus speeding 'response time Deep water fields are still Disadvantages Mines take up come CVA ordnance storage space - requiring increased replenishment or slight ·lessening of the normal Vietnam in country support capability - or -- l• PAGE 3 OF· 5 PAGES DECLASSIFIED FEB O8 2007 Authori Y 60 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS ijl SiiGiAW TAB c I J ' • I i-r' 1' l ·Y b· Aircraft Sortie Requirements - See Appendices I II III IV and V to TAB C It will be noted that second launch or follow-onu sorties· are included These sorties I ----- '1 ______ YVU L I p 1 vv 1 uo 3 ---'---- - - --u 1 ·ui 1 v 1 - 'I - 1- 1 1 rc ui L - t u _ i_ --- ' _J_ L u1 1 r u 1 c1 1 -- -·'- - - - - - - - L l lll J · - it craft but will not be launched until directedo ' co Reconnaiss nce· · and Replenishment 1 Reconnaissance flights operations will be conducted·subsequent to the mine laying operation to determine NVN Foreign shipping reaction response to the mining effort as well as results 2 In order to extend the maximum effectiveness of the fields as planted replenishment operations should commence in about 4 months for sea mines and 2 months for destructors Field attrition resulting from NVN sweeping or mine detonation may require earlie·r replenis ment but no replenishment will take place-until directed 5 Mine Logistics a For option A to ensure ine availability and preparedness two AE 's will be loaded with identical inventories of 101 mines and one AE will alway be at Yankee Station I -'-' b For other options cB rriers will have aboard a preassigned mine loadout and the as$isting Mobile Mine Assem- bly Teams MOMAT c· Subic Bay will support the progran m1ed 4 month m tne replenishment re·quirement and is capable of providing addit ioua l mine assets C0MSERVPAC C0MINEPAC will ensure that Subic mine inventories remain filled 6a F ' Aircraft Losses Estimated maximum losses would be 3o tlo or for example in option A2 with 3 launches and -15 support aircraft per launch included the loss estimate is 6 Minimum loss estimate is 3 aircraft on option c 7 Execution Diversion Deception If an option is approved for planning TF 17 carriers support vessels will be loaded to support the option selected Additionally CTF 77 will randomly move SAR PIRAZ ships into the planned no1·thern position in order to lesse·n NVN initial reaction to support ship positioning when the plan is executed Normal surface escort and F J ir cover vlill be provided during these incursions I i L PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES ·- DECLASSIFIED EFB O 8 2007 Authori ' EO 1295'8 as ame ncfed Chief Recqrds Declass Div WHS ' ABC APPENDICES I - Opti9n Al Sortie Requirements· II - Opt i on A2 III - Option Bl IV - Option B2 · V - Option C VI - Minefield Coordinates VII - Chart 1 I ' J · ' PAGE ·5 OF 5 PAGES '-- TAB C - _ ·----- - --· DECLASSIFIED FEB· 0 '8 2007 i tJttt9rRi Y- -EOaJs 9D5 -sas o v WedHS Ch1ef - ecor _ ec a L _ -- · •••••• - - • ---- --- - · - - ·--- • --------------- 'APPENDIX I TO TAB C MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS OP'£ION ALFA ONE LARGE DECK CVA · CTG 77 X FIELD SORTIES 3 4 MINE DST A6 - 6 lvll 52-2 A6 · B A7-Al2 Bl-B20 C-C4 · D21-D27 Dl-D14 D15-D20 E1-El2 Fl-Fl2 20 MK 5'0-0 4 MK-55-2 7 MK 55 2 C D ·-2 A7 2 A7 4 A7 14 MK 52-2 6 MK 52-3 12 MK 52-2 12 MK 52-2 12 MK 52-2 E F G Gl Gl2 Gl3-G21 Hl-H5 Il-Ill 9 MK 55-2 1 A7 2 A7 4 A6 NOTE 1 2 A6 NOTE 1 2 A7 NOTE 1 L Al-A6 6 MK 52-3 1 A7 5 A7 r MCN H I 5 MK 55-2 11 W tK 52-2 3 6 6 72 MK 36 DST 24 l 1K 40 · DST 16 MK 40 DST N A N A N A I I f lI L 27C CVA CTG 77 'y ' SORTIES FIELD 18 A4 7 6 A4 1 1 MINE DST MCN 180 MK 36 DST 30· MK 50-0 NIA Tl-T30 27C CVA CTG 77oZ ' ' L 8 A4 7 10 A4 7 14 A4 7 NOTE 1 NOTE 72 MK 36 DST 100 MK 36 DST 140 MK 36 · DST 2 5 4 N A NIA iI · N A 1' 1 FIELDS 3 4 AND 6 WILL BE LAID WHEN DIRECTED BUT NO SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO A-HOUR THESE FIELDS ARE ASSIGNED TO A6 AIRCRAFT ON EACH OPTION OF PLANS A BAND C IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A NIGHT ALL WEATHER CAPABILITY OF MINING THE HAIPHONG DEEP WATER CHANNEL IF DIRECTED - MINE CAS-E NUMBER PAGE · l OF 1 PAGES DECLASSIFl D FEB O 8 2007 Authority 1 0 12958 as am nded Chief Records Declass Div WHS · ·c n i ·m•ffit - UX-' ¾' I it - i -- '·- ' ' ' l iii 'J APPENDIX II TO TAB • ·Y C MINEFIELD A SIGNMENTS OPTION ALFA ·rwo 27C CVA CTG 77 X FIRST LAUNCH SORTIES FIELD 13 A4 7 G 5 A4 7 4 A4 7 H UT IJ'l I n Q'J' J lJ A lJ J _ _ J Mf l' I Y LU '-' 1 1 12 MK 52-2 9 MK 55-2 5 MK 55-2 11 N iK 52-2 I • Gl-Gl2 Gl3-G21 Hl-H5 Il-111 SECOJ i7 LA UNCH A4 7 2 72 MK 36 DST N A i FOLLOW-ON 14 A4 7 NOTE 1 140 MK 36 DST 4 N A 27C CVA CTd 77 Y I FIRST LAUNCH 4 A4 7 4 A4 16 A4 7 F A 6 l tIK 52 2 Al-A6 A7-Al2' B l 1 6 MK 52-3 20 MK 50-0 100 MK 36 DST 30 MK 50-0 r -SECOND LAUNCH - ' Bl-B20 N A Tl-T30 8 A4 7- - 80 MK 36 DST 1 N A FOLLOW-ON 8 A4 7 NOTE 1 3 72 MK 36 DST N A 27C CVA CTG 77oZ FIRS' ' LAUNCH 4 A4 7 14 A4 7 C 4 MK 55-0 D 14 MK 52-2 6 MK 52-3 7 MK55 2 Cl-C4·t Dl-Dl4 Dl5 D20 D2l D27 PAGE l OF 2 PAGES 'fl lli z · DECLASSIFIED FEB O8 2001 - -·------· ------------Authori Y 60-12958-as amended_· Chief Recorps Declass Div WHS ·r i SORTIES FIELD 1 4 A4 7 A A I A E -y MINE DST MCN 12 MK 52-2 n J i 1 L 'IR'TP r n - n -1u n v - El-El2 SECOND LAUNCH 10 A4 7 5 100 MK 36 DST N A FOLLOW-ON 10 A4 7 NOTE 1 NOTE 6 40 MK 40 DST N A 1 FIELDS 3 4 AND 6 WILL BE LAID WHEN DIRECTED BUT NO SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR _TO A-HOUR I • I r PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES · f · 1 DECLASSIFIED FEB O 8 2007 Authori Y EO 12958 as am nded Chief Records Declass Div WHS- - i - - i '5¥ 'eitffl ' r · APPENDIX III TO TAB C· tf i MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS · f' OPrION BRAVO ONE i ic r° l -· t INITIAL LAUNCH • LARGE DECK CVA CTG 77 X - r 'F f ----- _ -M NE lJi T FIELD 1 A6 1A7 r ' -SORTIES MK 52-2 MK 52-3 10 MK 5o o 3 TulK 52-2 4 MK 55-2 · 12 MK 52-2 6 MK 52-3 4 MK 55-2 6 MK 52-2 6 MK-52-2 6 MK ·52-2 ' 3 MK 55-2 3 MK 55-2 4 MK 52-2 5 A -6 3 A6 B 1 A7 C 3 A7 1A6 D l'A71 A7 E F G 1 A7 1 A7 4 A6 If I 2 A7 I I 2 I I ·72 MK 36 DST MCN Al-A5 A6-All · Bl-BlO Bll-B13 Cl-C4 Dl-Dl2 Dl3-D18 Dl9-D22 El-E6 Fl-F6 Gl-G6 G7-G9 Hl-H3 Il-I4 N A I 21c·cvA CTG 77 Y FIELD· SORTIES 1 1 18 A4 4 A4 MINE DST MCN 180 MK 36 DST 20 MK 50-0 N A Tl-T20 FOLLOW-ON LAUNCH NOTE 1 LARGE DECK CVA CTG 77 X FIELD SORTIES 3 4 6 4 A6 14 A7 4 A6 MINE DST MCN 72 MK 36 DST 140 MK 36 DST 48 MK 40 DST N A N A N A 27C CVA- CTG 77 Y FIELD SORTIES 10 A4 NOTE 5 MINE DST MCN · 100 MK 36 DST N A 1 FOLLOVT ON FIELDS WILL BE LAID WHEN DIRECTED BUT NO · SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO A HOUR •r PAGE 1 OF 1 PtGE DECLASSIFIED FEB O 8 200f Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS APPENDIX IV TO TAB ·c MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS OPTION BRAVO TWO INITIAL LAUNCH ·r 27C CVA CTG 77 Y SORTIES ·2 A4 ·r' 1 A4 10 A4 FIELD MINE DST MCN B 10 MK 50-0 Bl B10 D 3 MK 52-2 12 MK 52-2 Bll-B13 6 MiT 52-3 4 MK 55-2 6 MK 52-2 2 A4 3 A4 E H 3 MK 55-2 5 A4 2 50 MK 36 DST Dl-Dl2 Dl3-Dl8 Dl9-D22 El-E6 Hl-H3 N A 27C CVA CTG 77 Z 4 A4 4 A4 C '2 A4 5 A4 F 2 A4 4 A4 3 A4 I Al-A5 A6-All Cl-C4 5 MK 52-2 A 6 4 6 6 3 G MK MK MK MK MK 52-3 55-2 52-2 52-2 55-2 Fl- -F6 Gl-G6 G7-G9 4 MK 52-2 20 MIC 50-0 1 1 30 MK 36 DST Il-I4 Tl-T20 N A OPTION BRAVO TWO FOLLOW-ON LAUNCH NOTE 1 27C CVA CTG 77 Y SORTIES i _ - FIELD 9 A4 5 A4 10 A4 MINE DST 1 90 MK 3 DST 5 6 50 MK 36 DST 40 MK 40 DST 27C SORTIES FIELD 7 A4 11 A4 NO-TE cyA MCN NIA N A N A CTG 77 oZ MINE DST MCN 3 70 MK 36 DST N A 4 110 MK 36 DST ·N A 1 FOLLOW-Q1j FIELDS WILL BE LAID W IfEN DIREC'l ED BUT NO ·soO N ¼R T H AN -24 HO URS PRIOR TO A-HOUR ·E ECLASSIF ED FEB O8 ·2007 Authority EO 12958 as ame nded Chief Records Declass Div WHS PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGE I APPENDIX v·To TAB C MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS OPTION ·CH 4 RLIE ·INITIAL LAUNCH _ARGE DECK CVA CTG 77 X ·SORTIES 1 A7 1A6 3 A6 FIELD A C D 1 A7 1 A7 E F 2 A7 1 A7 4 A6 7A7 H I 1 5 MK 52-2 Al-AS A6-All Bl-B10 10 MK 50 0 3 MK 52-2 4 MK 55-2 12 M' i 52-2 6 MK 52-3 4 MK 55-2 6 MK 52-2 · 6 MK 52-2 6 MK 52-2 3 MK 55-2 ' 3 MK 55-2 4 MK 52-2 1 G 1 A7 MCN 6 MK 52-3 B 1 A7 3 A7 1A6 MINE DST 20 MK 50-0 70 MK 36 DST Bll-Bl3 CV--G4 Dl-Dl2 Dl3-Dl8 Dl9-D22 El-E6 Fl-F6 Gl-G6 G7-G9 Hl-H3 Il-I4 Tl T20 N A OPTION CHARLIE LLOW-ON AUNCH NOTE 1 SORTIES FIELD 5 A7 5 A7 4 A6 1 2 A6 5A7 3 A7 3 A6 NOTE MINE DST _ ·- MCN 50 MK 36 DST 50 M' 36 DST 72 MK 36 DST s·6 MK 36 DST 3 0 MK 36 DST N A NIA N A N A 2 3 4 5 6 NIA N A 1 FOLLOW-ON FIELDS WILL BE LAID WHEN DIRECTED BUT NO SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO A-HOUR 36 MK 40 DST PAGE I OF 1 PAGE • DECLASSIFIED FEB O B 200l Authori I EO 129 8 as am nded - Chief Records Declass Div WHS · i - APPENDIX VI TO TAB C MINING 1 • Attrition minefields within 12· mile claimed territorial limits for·the interdiction of ocean traffic in the Haiphong Deep Water Comple will consist of 9 minefields A·maximum of one mine destructor field and 5 destructor fields are _provided to interdict lighterage contingent upon which option · is executed a Minefield Coordinates Use H o Chart 3162 5TH ED and H O Chart 3161 7TH ED --1 EV 12 68 1 · Field A Coordinate·s 20-47 o5 20-4705 20-45 8 20-45 8 r N 106-50 3 106-51 1 106-52 0 106-51 3 E E · 2 · lc ield B Coordinates - 20-45 2 N 20-42 6 N 20-42 3 N 20-44 85 N 106-52 3 106-57 o3 106-56 4 106-5105 E ·E E E 3 Field C Coordinates 107-06$85 E 107-07 1 E 4 Field ''D Coordinates N N N 20-47 6 N 20-47 6 N 20-46 9 N 20-46 9 N 5 Field E Coordinates f 107-08 6 E 20-50015 N 20-50 15 N 107-11 4 E 20-49 7_ N 6 Field i' ·coordinates 20-49 7 N 20-50 0 20-5000 20-49 5 20-49 5 N N N N 7 Field G Coordinates - 20-55 7 N 20-55 05 N 20-54 2 N 20 • 53 o4 N 20-53 4 N i 20-53 0 N 8 Field 11 H Coordinates 20-53 2 N 20-5302 N 20 52 5 N DECLASSIFIED FEB Authori ' O8 2007 EO 12958-as am nded Chief Recor ds Declass Div WHS 107-07 2 E 107-06 85 E 20- J 8 05 N · 20-4805 N 20-4705 N 20-47 1 N i E E 20-52 5 N PAGE l OF 5 PAGES 107-10 1 E 107-10 5 E 107-08 8 E 107-12 5 E 107-12 6 E 107-11 5 E 107-13 8 107-14 9 l07 15o0 107-13 ·9 E E E E 107-16 8 E 107-18 '0 E 107-17 25 E 107-17 2 E 107-15 2 E 107-16 0 E 107-19 65 E 107-19 9 E 107-1909 E 107-19 65 E ' l -' t' fi' ' 9 Field n1n Coordinates •- 21-05 6 N 21-05 3 N 21-0305 N l ' 1 Q _ ' i -- - 19 - J · 107-30 6 E 107-31 1 E 107-29 3 E f 7 _' Q a Q ' Ii --·- I A b Destructor Field Coordinates 1 Field 1 n Coordinates 20-42 1 N 20-43 8 N 20-41 7 N 20-39 8 N 2 Field 2 Coordinates - 20-43 8 N 20-44 7 N 20-42 5 N 20-41 7 N 3 Field n3 Coordinates 4 Field - 20-44 7 20-45 8 106-5408 E 106-57 7 E 107-00 6 E 20-53 8 20-5304 20-52 3 20-53 0 l 5 Field n5u Coordinates N N N N 20-53 4 N -20-55 2 N 20-55 0 N 20-52 3 N 6 Field tt6 Coordinates c Mine Allocations 1 MINEF'IELDS A 20-59 0 - 20-5807 N N 20-57 1 N 20-57 4 N MK 50 MK 52-2 -- r- 107-01 7 E 107-0608 E 107-06 9 E 107 01 5 E 107 -06 8 E 107-09 5 E 107-10 8 E 107-06 9 E 107-21 55 E 107-22 6 E 107-20 0 E 107-19 2 E MK 52-3 ---ir-- MK 55-2 20 D E F G H I I i i TOTAL i 1 AuthoriW EO 12958 as·amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS · 14 12 12 12 6 11 -n --67 7JU' 2 DESTRUCTOR FIELDS l M1XED FIELD bECLASSI FIED FEB O 8 007 106-58 7 -E Option A B C 1 106-52 3 E 106-54 8 E 106-58 7 E 106-56 0 E N 20-43 0 N · Z0-42 5 N I I l 106-56 0 E 106-49 1 E N 4 Coordinates I 106-47 8 E 106-52 3 E -DST 36 180 PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES 4 7 9 5 DST 10 lo __ _ MINE MK 50 -0 30 r J 'f • J DESTRUCTOR FIELDS 72 _· -----72 ··-·· L l V 100 DST 40 MINE MK 50-0 3 r- ·i DST 36 i 6 40 TOTAL 7rn Mine Allocations Option BRAVO 1 MINEFIELDS MK 50 - Hr A B MK 52-2 1i 3 C D 4 12 E 6 6 6 6 F G H I 3 ------·- ··-·· 3 4 Tir TOTAL ___ _ _ 4 r r Jr 2 DESTRUCTOR FIELDS OPTION BRAVO 1 FIELD# ·--r-rnrx ED FIELD 2 3 4 5 6 DST 36 180 DST 40 72 MINE MK 50-0 20 72 ·140 100 TOTAL ffi4 48 -g- 3 DESTRUCTOR FIELDS OPTION BRAVO 2 FIELD# - _ MIXED 2 3 4 5 6 'IELD DST 36 120 DST 40 MINE MK 50-0 20 50 72 110 50 40 TOTAL PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES DECLASSIFIED FEB O 8 2007 Authority EO 12958 Ets_ am nded Chief • Records peclass D v WHS -------- ------ J Jk - e Allocations Option CHARLIE 1 MINEFIELDS MK 50-0 MK 52-2 - A 10 B 4 4 6 6 6 6 G ii 3 ·3 I 4· ru T'OTAL 2 DESTRUCTOR FIELDS 1 MIXED FIELD 42 DST 36 120- DST 40 MINE MK 50-0 20 50 2 3 4 5 6 20 72 86 30 TOTAL d 6 12 E F r MK 52-3 MK 55-2 3 C D p 3S1l 36 36 Mine Descriptions Mine MK 50-0 Mine MK 52-2 •Mine MK 52-3 500 LB acoustic influence mine 1000 LB magnetic induction mine 1000 LB pressure magnetic mine Mine MK 55-2 2000 LB magnetic induction mine DST 36 500 LB magnetic influence rn ne DST 40 1000 LB magnetic influence mine Mine MK 36-3 1000 LB pressure magnetic mine e Mine Stocks MINES NAVMAG SUBIC Mine MK 50 Mine MK 52-2 Mine MK 52-3 Mine MK 55-2 Mine MK 36-3 148 -- 30 40 enroute 250 66 Mine lL 36-3 acceptable substitute for Mine MK f 52-3 Specific Mining Notes 1 Mine requirements listed under options Band C·are considered t -e minimum acceptable number in the minefields 2 When CTF 77 assigns minefield responsibility by CTG embarked MOMATS will ensure the mines are labeled with the proper min e case nu rnber3 MCN f 3 Field BRAVO Delivery runs should mines within the buoyed ship channel 1 t 1 j l 4 FEB O8 2007 DECLASSIFIED · 4 Kuthority- - EO -12958' as am nded · Chief' Records Deel ass DIV WHS 11 PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES c made to place p ' 4 fields DELTA and GOLF Mines MK 55-2 should be planted in the deep sections of the minefield approximately 9 fathoms· or deeper f · g Replacemen Mines CVAiAE maintain 10 percent in excess of required mines for spares Replacement mines will have operational· adjustments preset Spare mines may be substituted without further-adjustment for the same MK Mod mine in any field Spare Mine MK 52-2 may substitute for Mine MK 52-3 in addition to Mi nA MK 52-2 · _ - • j 1 PAGE 5 OF 5'PAGES DECLASSIFIED Authority FEB 0 8 2007 SiJ 12958 as am nded Chief Records Declass Div WHS '· _ t t- i ' - d r t l 1J irt i ' « •- - ' - ' -- I _ ' · ' ' l t ' · ' -- - '· ··- - -·- - I - - t F ft i · 11 - a'i -- -- fi-7' 1 ' · · - t -- 0-·o Jl J ·'i ' ' ·trt -' t ·''' • -- •- • 1 '' - f 'i z j ' '• ' f• 1 1 ''· • · • - • • -1 1 ' l'e ' ' ' _ l •l o r ° - •c r J 1 - ' l _ _ ' 0 '• - ·- · · 1 r· i c•f -i J--'- ' ·' -•Ibi ' f7£fi½ fm ' J it --- · J' i · · ·' ' _ 1 · -· · · 2 ·- -r • ---- •••·r ·· · I - _1· c · - I '· _ -- - · -- --- r -t•- l'n 1 • 1 t·- · · I r · • _u 1 ' n Ti'1J3 CPO l1iINDFI CLD COOTIDINA i 1ES f' - t ' r j ' -·' · l ----- ir---l--··• _ M Mt '• '•V•• W• '' • ••• •• -• t- · ' _ _ ' ' --· l · --·••N•••-• -- -- -- - • f o ' ' 't r - - _·· ·1 - - ' • · •• 1 t i ' ' •ll O t L z i _ - 110 l n • 1 I c _ i • - ' 't· • ·• 1 r- · J- l· · - -_ - • • ' t 1· 11 jf ' £ · ' l · i · _ i1 C ' 'J · - - r - • r J ' ' ' v·· ·· ' • i - ____ APPENDIX VU t D 0 ' • • DECLASSIFIED FEBO 8 2007· Authori Eb 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS ·-•-•· mi _ I TAB D RULES OF ENGAGEMENT MINING HAIPHONG PORT COMPLEX 1 The following rules of engagement are effective for US forces operating in support of t e mining plan r· 2 ' r Definitions a Territorial seas A belt of sea adjacent to a coastal state three miles in breadth measured from the low water mark along the coast -However in the states claiming twelve-mile territorial seas twelve miles shall be observed for these rules as if it were the width of their territorial seas The following distance is presumed to be claimed as a territorial sea 1 North Vietnam - 12 miles Presumed ' b Wafers to landward of the territorial Internal waters sea I c Terri tori al •air 'spac·e Air space above the land territory internal waters and territorial seas of a sovereign 1 · country d Immediate pursuit Pursuit initiated in response to actions or attacks by hostile aircraft or vessels as defined in these rules of engagement The pursuit must te continuous and uninterrupted and may be extended as necessary and feasible over territorial internal air space seas as prescribed herein --- e Hostile aircraft An aircraft identified as non-US and non-allied which is obser ved in the· act of attacking or acting· in a manner which indicates with reasonable certainty an intent to attack US friendly forces f Hostile vessel surface or subsurface 1 A vessel which is attacking or acting in·a manner which indicates within reaso nable certainty an intent to attack US friendly forces 3 - General Rules a US forces executh1g -this plan are authorized to -attack arid destroy any hos ile'vessel or aircraft as herein defined 8 • ECLASSI ED FEB O8 2007 Authori Y Bg 12958-as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS PAGE l OF 3 PAGES - ·TAB D b Immediate pursuit may be·conducted as necessary and feasible pursuant to the above · subject to the following conn ·Hon Anrl 1 imi t 't ion 1 - In event US forces are attacked by hostile forces in North Vietnam or over international waters US forces may conduct immediat e pursuit over internal waters or into territorial seas or air space of North Vietnam 2 No pursuit 1s autnorized into Communist Chinese territorial seas or air space 3 US forces which under the limitations of these rules enter unfrie ndly territorial land sea or air spaces in immediate pursuit are not authoTized to attack other unfriendly forces or installations encountered unless attacked first by them then only to the extent necessary for selfdefense 4 Declaration of aircraft or-vessels as hostile wi11 Cases can occur wherein the destruction of communist-bloc forces would be contrary to US and allied interests All available information and intelligence shall be onsidered in determining action to be taken in such cas es be tempered with judgment and discretioJ 1 I 4 Use of surface to a-ir missiles against hostile aircraft Talos ·Terrier and Tartar equipped ships will attack and destroy aircraft as f asible which are positively identified as hostile in accordance with these rules of engagement a Before firing all indications must eliminat any possibility of firing on friendly aircraft and must indicate the probable presence of a hostile aircraft The above requirements may be satisfied by verifying t_he identity of aircraft through special and other intelligence sources or any other means available b Authority is granted to fire Talos Tartar or Terrier missiles over the lforth Vietnam land mass Missiles will not be fired over territory of Communist China r ' c Missiles will be command destructed five seconds a·fter· passing the closest point of - approach· if intercept is not · accomplished 5 Use of ALQ 91 SEE SAW is authorized in accordance with CINCPACFLT l90001Z SEP 68 PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES DECLASSIFIED FEB O 8 200 Authority EO 12958 as-amended Chief Records Deel ass Div WHS 6 Nothing in these rules modi fies in any manner the requiremen-t of a military commander to defend his unit against armed attack with· all means at his disposal In the event of such attack the commander concerned will take immediate aggressive action against the att cking force f l l I PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES JiYl m TAB D DECLASSIFIED FEB O8 2oo7 Authori Y EO 12958 -as am nded Chief Records Declass Div WHS T AB E WORLD REACTIONS TAB _ i' J J L i I L i ' This Tab reviews possible reactions in response to the mining of the Haiphong Port Compl€x 2 General Comments • be Much of the uneasiness concerning Vietnam which was important in world afiairs approximately a year ago has now subsided In the present world climate it is likely that this act would be generally interpreted as showing determination whereas a year ago it might have been regarded as recklessness It is still possible that charges of • ecklessness'' would be directed against· the U S Small powers would in general manifest more disapproval than large powers who would be more likely to appreciate the dilemma which pushed the U S to this action Large powers would not be likely however to nspeak outn on hehalf of the U S U S a Mining of the Haiphong Port Complex would be regarded as an escalation of the war and would be so treated by the Communist world in its propaganda It would be accepted as such by most of the rest of the world as well - particularly the neutrals such as SWeden and India · 'l l i 'i 1 '' c It would be interpreted by all discerning governments as primarily a challenge to the USSR Few would really consider it as sufficient to disturb the peace of the world but many would act as if they so regarded it In recent decades the world na·s· seena number of example of the application of force clearly calculated to signal resolve rather than rec·klessness The majority of the world's leaders have become inured to the kind of propaganda which--inevi tably follows this use of force In the end those wno have no direct interest in the matter take precautions to ensur e that they will not become involvedo Those who have an interest but no capability propagandize Those governments which have both interest and capability are addressed below 3 North Vietnam a NVN has only a limited unsophisticated capability to· counter the mining program Anti-mine warfare efforts should not have a•ny appreciable effect on he program overall h ' lL • J - Vo TIT T Yn -r CI ilAD ' A---'Jr VilO UC AU C - A __ 1 • ApAU 3 nn n P ho m rd no- -nY no-Y' m 1-h-rnno-h i-h 0- u 9'1' 1 Y ' A c p n-F m 111 - T 'n uwvcu- fmn l u wooden boats and lighters ' Som of these would be lost bf course but this would not deter NVN from putting forth a major •e£fort in this respect 0 oecLAssiFieo FEB 'o s 2007PAGE 1 oF s • 11 0 Authoriw EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS PAGEs _ TAB E r c To ·the extent· that the ining · affected the· flow of goods into NVN a maximum effort to compensate for the reduction would -- - --- - --be--un ctertaken· vra··the-·-ove·rrand•-a nd· coaiital-water routes from Communist China r d NVN could be expected to attack US units engaged in the mining They are not capable of preventing such a US effort but they could attempt ha rassment of US ships and aircraft The expected aircraft loss rate is 3 perqent or loss r NVN would probably consider that it was in its interest Russian ship to be sunk or appear to ·have been su k by u s mines To this end -- and in this eventuality -- NVN might foster a situation that would encourage a UoS -USSR confrontation over the mining issue Russian failure t stand up to the Ameri cans if that should occur would be unsettling to NVN but it would ot drive th_em in to the ar m of -China e for a · · f to the To the extent practicable NVN would probably r sponµ U$s escalation with some escalation of its own elsewhere P Obably in Laos 4 Communist China · a Communist China is beginn ng to figure less and less· as a factor in NVN policy surrounding this war CHICOMS are still the most important suppliers of small arms up to ·the size of mortars and some rockets and ammunition to NVN but · they no longer retain any discernible political influence with Hanoi in return for their arms support il b Chinese reaction to the mining is expected to be negligible except in the propaganda areas which should also have negligible impact c The Chinese might be persuaded by NVN to step up their aid if that is required but Chinese aid and support of any kind would not be likely to compensate NVN for the possible loss of Russian suppor-t Political and psychological support is perhaps as important as material In short ·NVN is not likely· to risk the loss of Russian backing by too ready a dependence on Communist China At the same time China would be asked to do more of what she is now doing I d If the shipments of Russian goods across China re now encountering difficulties as reports indicate then the act · of mining per se would not be expected to affect that situation Other factors such as the Russian-Chinese border talks would be expected to be oi much Teater direct importance The current problems between tho Russians and the Chinese are surely bigger than the futu're of South Vietnam they may even be bigger than the future of North Vietnam l j DECLASSIFIED FEB _0 8 2Q07 EO 12958 as amended 1 'Authority Chief Rec0rds Declass Div WHS 1 PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES DECLASSIFIJ b · J FB ·o 8 2001 ·· -- Au hority EO 12gsg as amenaed -Chief Records Declass Div WHS 5 The USSR -- a If the-Russians are·willing to risk some ship -losses in crossing the minefield in order to demonstrate their re-_ solve to support - NVN little will hav0 been gained as regards the NVN -Russian-u s relations will have suffered a setback but even that should not be serious The Russi ns ·will know that by flaunting the u s minefield they are not running a great political risk that they·would primarily be showing only the depth of their own determination They already know well the depth of the U S commitment to South Vietnam and while they might be momentarily surprised at our mining decision in the light of current u s policy they will soon recover and see it as a challenge thrown down to them to abandon their North Vie namese ally • ' • · war i _ __ t r b I L J fI If necessary to prove their commitment to NVN the USSR might cross the minefield At the very least they would provide assistance to the VN in their efforts to circumvent the mining program perhaps even to the extent of dispatching minesweepers In Russian eyes ·it would be from a political I L • r psychological point of view a Berlin-Blockade in reverse Thus the probability is that no open confrontation between the U S and Russia would result because none would be necessary L i f L l l _ I L iL l- f - c ·At the same time -- once proper allowance has been made for face on both sides -- the Russians would probably be further disgusted with the whole business of the war wh-ich has always been of much less importance to them than to us The net effect could be to prompt the Russians to put more political pressure on NVN to end the war to accept a political settlement They could not force NVN and they certainly would not cut off visible support of NVN but the war in South€astAsia is becoming an annoyance to the Russians in their current foreign policy aspirations which primarily seek support against China The mining of Haiphong would provide them with one more good excuse to put added pressure on Hanoi for a settlement This pressure would not be visible pressure for the world to see and it would not be likely to be instant It might not even be decisive but it could be an- important factor at· this time · d Russia's most visible reactions would probably occur· outside of Southeast Asia and impinge upon the question of U S USSR relations in general They might for example freeze progre s · toward such on-going matters as ··sALT· or --they migh-t· become more difficult on matters having to do vii tn- solutio'ris t - - 'l - -to t hA · Mi rli11P--F i -ts --nrnhl-Pm-_ -- Th v--r An--ln or - to embarrass it politically 6 -AVPn nAr -i-rlP -An a r nu-r A- co j t1 -w1tii -ti i ·•pr s t - i 1n1 -ira t10 -in- n--a tt i t · U S Counter Actions a The u s can blunt the anticipated propa·ganda by the PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES •r - j i '- t - i _ SECRET I USSR Communist China and others· by explaining at the time__ the mining of the Haiphong Complex is announced that the U S has gone to great lengths to end the war in Vietnam by the -- - - - bombing halt the withdrawal of combat-troops and polit•ical -------------- accommodations These att_empts have met nothing but intrans igence ori the part of North Vietnam and her allies U S patience and understanding have reasonable limits which are now being strained The mining of the Haiphong Complex is a low order response to the complete lack of cooperation by th e No th Vi tnamese government and its llies b If the USSR suffers ship losses in attempting to run the ·minefield the UoSo can express sincere regrets and point out that the loss was completely unnecessary since the original announcement· by the u s provide·d sufficient time for all shipping to depart Haiphong safely Point out that the USSR callously sacrified the loss of their men and material in spite of all u s attempts to protect third nation· shipping r· I ' c If the USSR provides minesweepers to North Vietnam or sweeps the minefield herself this ·will be detected by u s · reconnaissance aircraft Upon completion of the sweeping operation the UoSo can reseed the field as necessary ' d If as is most likely the Soviet ships anchor just to seaward of the minefields and le ve the off-loading to the Morth Vietnamese via lighterage the UGS can respond by seeding the lighters' routes with MK S6 destructorso All of the normal routes will have been seeded in the· ini t icl mine lay Followon seeding would be needed if the North Vietnamese select alternate routes - e There is little the u s could-do to prevent the USSR from delaying SALT or withdrawing from Mid-East talkso In the case of SAIIr the USSR might well decide that her vital interests are at stake tu gambling on a nuclear arms race and the ref ore go _ahead with the negotiations If the USSR drops out of the MidEast talks the UoS can express regrets and make plans to continue to seek peace in the Mid-East without Soviet participation f The UoS could accept the use of Chinese ports by_the USSR and transshipment of material by rail from China to North Vietnamo Such an arrangement would delay the arrival of material in Eaiphong and Hanoi and could further stra in the rela tiQns between Communist China and the USSR g - A Soviet blockade o f Berlin should be addressed as a sepa ate issue with9ut relation to UoSo action in Southeast Asiao The U·oS r-ezponse would PRra11e1 thc- se act tons tak-an in the past to all threats by the Soviets and East Garmany to a closu re of ccess· to Berlin _J DECLASSiFIED fEB O 2oo7 i Authority EO 12958 as am nded Chief Recot ts Declass DIV WHS PAGE 4 OF ·5 PAGES SECRET TAB E r- X fi _ Q U ' 1' - - h The us·could destroy orth Vietnamese lighterage with gunfire from US destroyers as the lighters depart the deep wa ter anchorages- for the· beacn ··--Tne-re woulct oe no-· 1 hrea t - to· tl1ird nation shipping and 110 loss of civilj_an lives i Adverse weather conditions particularly during the Northeast Monsoon period from September to May with attendant high sea states would make NVN lighterage operations both dangerous and inefficient In addition both people and resources would be diverted from other tasks like fishing and inner harbor transportation if an extensive lighterage opera·tion were attempted This diversion and the delay in- the arrival of imports would have a c mulative adverse effect on the North Vietnamese economy and their ability and willingness to continue the war effort in the South F- L DECLASSIFIED FEB OB lOO Authoriw EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS i PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES _ SJi@ ii 316 TAB E • TAB F LEGAL RAMIFICATION OF MINING OF HAIPHONG HARBOR Ar rITS APPROACHES l w- Thi t 1 ·aui-i ional in h 1 na tiunal law luci r ine s par J CUrd r iy- _ ___ - as codified in ague·conventi6n VIII 1907 impose the follow_ing restrictions among others on the use of mine warfare f • a The use ·of mines presupposes the existence of a state of ·war b The layi g of mines with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping is prohibited c The use of mines in time· of peace could be considered an act of war by third countries d Interference by mines with movements of international shipping on high seas is prohibited Whatever the historic worth of these prohibitions a modern legal analysis of the use of mines in resent day internatidnal conflict requires an examination of several additional factors The international laws of war have evolved throughout history out of an interaction from disputes between nations I conflicts between military efficie ncy and humanitarianism and changing weapons technology · Sirice the· end of World War II these laws ha e been subjected to fhe unprecedented pressures of cold war international politics 'a d introduction of modern weapons -Because of the re$ulting revolutionary changes the traditional laws of war have been rendered obsolete but no fixed principles have yet been internationally accepted to replace them 2 - r 3 However the national right of self-defense which has existed since time immemorial has been recognized in the u· N Charter and strengthened in international practice Also the former simple dichotomy between stata of peace a d state of war no longer has legal or political validity ·Therefore in assessing the legality of an act of coercion the rigid formulas of pre-World War II are irrelevant and new standards for legality must be sought 1 __ _ 4 South Vietnam a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right to defend itself against aggression In the exercise of this right South Vietnam requested U S assistance in repelling the aggression which has been waged by North Vietnam with increasing ferocity for several years Therefore the United States and South Vietnam have the ri ht under international law to participate in the collective defense of South Vietnam against armed attack j j l _ J Department of State Bu1l tin dated March 4 1966 entitled The Legality of - __ _ United States Participation in the Defense of l 1 --- - v1e1 -r am l l - L CLASSIFIE FEB O 8 2001 j Authoriw 1 0 1-2958 as amended Chief Recqrds Declass Div WHS I PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES r----_-t 5 A principal source of supplies for the continued prosecu-· tion of that aggression is the Port of Haiphong The aggression could be greatly reduced by effectively denying to North -vte-tnam ttrese- necessary suppries - As part o r its se lf-aefehse-·-· · effo1 t therefo1·e South V ietriam and its allies would be justified in employing a reasonable method of denying this flow of supplies The mining of Haiphong Harbor and its approaches can properly be considered such a methode Mine emplacement should extend seaward of Haiphong Harbor only so far as is necessary to halt the entrance of sh pping to the harbor Advance notification· must be given to ali shipping concerning time of activation of mine s laid All shipping entering Haiphong after that time would do so at its own peril 6 The fundamental test of any act in international law is •·reasonableness The reasonableness of self-defense actions is gauged by the standards of necessity and ·proportionality It is clear beyond dispute that South Vietnam is deeply engaged in self defense action against th·e overt hostilities of North Vietnam • Thus the necessity for action is clear In assessing the proportionality of the mining of Haiphong the-following elements are pertinent a Min_ing is a passive not aggressive measure b Advance notice will be g ven to third countries c Mining will be res_tricted to the area around Haiphong d Potentially no loss of life or pr perty need be· incurred e This defensive measure will reduce loss of _ life and material elsewhere in the zone of hostilities In summary the traditional laws of war do not cover mining except in a state of war · The political and technological history of the cold war has rendered the laws of war based on the war-or peace dichotomy obsolete and irrelevant Acts in self-defense are lawful under international law Therefore mining of Haiphong Harbor and its approaches as described in this plan is considered to be a lawful exercise of South Vietnam's right of self-defense against the aggression of 7 North Vietnam -· - PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES DECLASSIFIED F fB O 8 2007' Authori Y ijO 1'2958 as am rided Chief Records Declass Div WHS TAB F