' ''•• ·v · · - ' FOP smoamT -SENSITIVE @Ebt liilReAfleft 6¥ l8itfF S - DATE SEP 14 2000 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PR S SIDENT FR OM Henry A Kie linger SUBJECT Conceptual Plan for Implementation of Operation DUCK HOOK Operation DUCK HOOK aerial mining of the Haiphong port complex and interdiction or quarantine of the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville would not be approached a a a purely military action but· instead as a combined military and diplomatic operation intended to produce both • military and political reaulta with minimum advera• reactions at home and abroad · · We would commence with ·a diplomatic move timed to precede by· seven daye the actual military trike against the Haiphong sea approaches and the interdiction of Sihanoukvill• We would call in · Ambaeeador Oobrynin and tell him in strong terma that our patience with Hanoi had been strained to the breaking point not only by its' intransigence at Paris but equally by its actions in South Vietnam by overturning the 11 underatandings condu-cting acts of terror againet the South Vietnamese civilian population violating the 1962 Accords in La oe openly conducting acts of aggression with North Vietnamese t roopa and by infringing on Cambodian neutrality · through the overt uee of Cambodia aa a •anctuary We would wax-n Dobrynin that unless Hanoi reveraed its course in all the111e areas in the very nea r future •• a matter of a few days in fact -- wo would be obliged to take some form 0£ action to show Hanoi that it could not eecape thcs consequences of its behavior We would expect aa an immodt- te dgn o Hanoi ta changed intention a a aigni icant c on•tructive move on it• part in the Paris negotiation•• sv -SE NSI'l'IVE t • ' QP 8ECR1t t- •SENSITIVIC · - 2 • i Elrii Aleo at a point seven day• in advance of our p r Jected strike we would have Amba•sador Lodge take the •a me position with the communiats in Parh that we ook with Dobryn1n in Wa1hington We would of cout-ae not apoetfy what we intended to do However by introducing Cambodia and especially Laoa into the equation we would leave the doo t open f or a wide range of optioi ua e- g B•SZ ra lde in Lao ·ra the t than juet countermeasures a gainat Nol' th Vietnam In this way we would pre1erve military aeeurity keep the Sovie ta and Hanol gue uing and build up the threat ol a much •tronger caiJe before the world by introducing Hanoi's flagrant aggreasion in Laoa and Cambodia The Soviets a re undoubtedly very much aware that Souvanna and Prince Sihanouk have both publicly attacked North Vietnam for its Qt 0£ aggrea_aion in their countde• Hopefully the Soviets would then be concerned enough to p'1t pr•••ur• on Hanoi to reapond·to our warning U Hanoi ehould not t-e spond we would proceed with our military measu re•• Fo't the Haiphong operation we envisage the maximum possible ef ort in the shortest period of time with maximum ·security Thie would involve concentrating three attack ca rriers in the Oulf of Tonkin in a mann11r which would seem routine We would not eend •ea-air re eeue ehipa or radar veasele north of their norm al stationa until e mining aircraft were about to be la upched We would not inform any country friend or foe until one hour before the a ircraft · appl ' ar over the Haiphong eea approaches • o that no security leak could occur For Sihanoukville we would quietly detach the requi•U• number of interdiction ebipe and time their arrival on station to · coincide with the fitrlke off Haiphong Th atrike would take plac• about 0500 Hanoi time 1800 in Wa1hlngton whl h would be fi •t light there early evening here One hour before the actual attacks we would call in the TCC'a the NATO powers mem beI e of the OAS the Lao Am ba•sador and the Cambodian Charge' to the Department of State I or •pp opria te a4vanco briefing a on thB rationale for our rnoves I would call in the Soviet · • · Amba asado r to inlorm him that we had given fair warning that· we had been compelled to act and that he and Hanoi should now know we meant •••• TM• waa not antf •Sovlet but only galnet Hanoi • - TOP SECRET• •S NSITIVE • •- •_tt '-- QI ' '- • • ••-- -- -- •••• - •- ••••-- ' i·· - ' l · j '' • J O P E T NSITIVE 3- ' The same points would have bee p made to Mo cow one-half hour later by a Molink message Finally the Ambassador· of all friendly countries with ships in or en routo to Sihanouk ville and the Haiphong complex would be· informed by the Department of State and the Amartca n Cha rgie' in Phnom Penh would inform Prinee Sihanouk Meanwhile yQu would brief the Congressional leadership and there would b4 a locked-door prer1s btiefing Concurrent with the strike you would go on national tele vision and radio and we would sil'nul• taneoualy request a specia l ri eeting 0£ f UN Sec urity Council I anticipate th t this meeting'would-be about two hour11 later 1n all of the so actlona the following point• would be etteesed v _ _ IJ - J l1T t f' c 1rJ o1 No loaa of life need occur • •• The mines are -e·t to arm themeelves 72 hours alter being dropped allowing ample time for all ehipping to clear port 111 • The act a do not constitute a resumption of the bombing 0£ North Vietnam or an act of war again at Cambodia they are in roepon ee to H noi'1 own deliberate tra nagreseions •• Our moves demonstrate that we mean busineaa Although we do not contemplate £urthe1 measures a t thia time we will judge what further atepa may be-necesaary in the light of Hanoi's i-eaponse •• We remain sincerely lntere tod in a peaceful settlement· of t e war in Vietnam and a re in fact calling a apecial meeting of the Paria Talks to move in thia di rection -• Our actions are not directed against the Soviet Union or Communist China but only againat Hanoi One problem about the mining of Haiphong will need to be met the plans call for a seeding of Mark 36 destructor• which are set to a rm them selves 24 hour a a fter being dropped in order to block sweeping and lightering operationa Another a rtk against the Haiphong sea approaches would thus be nec easary no earlier than 48 hours a ter · the fir at etrike believe on bala nce that you ahould mention thi• in J 71 1J ••SENSITIVE r ' ' -SENSITIVE • 4 - your apeech ao that the two separate atrikes 1 be r garded as part of one action even though the destructor miaaiona might encounter increased reaction a reeult a At thia point ·we would have done all we could do to meet the immediate needs of the •ituation We would follow through at Paria with Hanoi in Moeoow and Washington with the Soviets and where r else we need to take diplomatic action with l e spect to our friends a nd our opponents We would aeaume a heightened PACOM and SAC ale_rt o•ture militarUy 7 to show our resolve a d to reapond to whatever contingenciee arise In Paris we would encourage a favorable Hanoi response by reiterating ti all o our previous conceaaione in a new and forthc oming package We would not expect however any substanUve movement by Hanoi until they had asaeaued their new predicament examined alternative coursea of action and checked with both the SovitJt Union and China to determine what lev l and kinds of auppo rt they could expect You will notice that I have not recommended any direct appr ch to · Communist China auch as that made to tlle Soviet Union J anticipate that ou r limited actions wowd ap•ak for tbemselve• as not being directed toward Peking China• • •ta nee throughout the Vletna m war · has b_eoa to at y in tho 'ba kgrou nci avoiding a di ect coufrontatlOQ with u•• and J believe it would continue a• beiore • • p