·- -·----- ------ ··- - 9 17 69 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE INITIAL COMMENTS ON CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 1 See attached for suggested changes on first page 2 Questions on list of possible actions -- Why must the mining provide long duration closure We then lose control - - there would be no way to reward good behavior Wouldn't medium duration -- say 2-3 months -- give us more flexibility We could then promise to allow reopening or threaten to reseed as the situation required - - Each package will be politically more difficult in the U S The first must therefore be as tough as possible to gain as much psychological effect as it can Would it be physically impossible to carry out all of 1 2 and 3 as the first package Of these actions the following seem most dubious however Ground actions in North Vietnam would run a very high risk of Chinese ground reaction and we do not have the re sources - - especially in the face of Vietnamization - - to carry them out on a scale which would pose much threat to Hanoi Bombing the dikes will raise particular problems here in the U S It would be best I believe to save this for later but somehow imply its possibility during the first actions A permissive channel into Sihanoukville could face u s with t e daily decisions we wish to avoid if the Russians chose to force the issue there ·under 4 would there be any geographical restrictions on these high value target systems 3 Other possible actions What would be our concurrent movements of ships to the area our state of strategic readiness our posture in Korea and Berlin -- If we go as far as the interdiction measures in 4 and 5 what other actions should we take at this very high level o escalation once the precedent is established - - What would we do if these actions fail -- What counter-actions would we take in various contingencies Attachment l-t' t -- -·