OECU SSIFIED E O 129 l Seci 3 6 By TELECON The President Mr Kissinger 4 40 p m September 27 Mr Kissinger said he was just going to call the President when this call came in He said he had an interesting conversation Wi th Dobrynin He came in with two stupid questions l whether we want to have the Berlin talks to be quadripartite or bilateral and s d•nf Z he wanted us to use our influence to see that Gromyko and theA • before Gromyko leavew on Wednesday K interjected here he thinks the State people have practically given away our position K told D his call was providential - - as far as the White House is concerned we have no great incentives D owes us an answer to the question given him in May and another in the conversation K had with him in April As far as we are concerned the train has left the station The Soviets have a choice of believing the President or the New York Times and K if he could advise himj would recommend that they believe the President D said one other thing -- he kaew of K 1 s meeting in Paris K asked him what he knew D said Hanoi told them this was the best conversation they had had and they thought something might come of it K said if it does they will have to make the move Ve are not going to make the move to whicb D didn 1t really respond D said there are a lot of arguments in the Soviet Union and they £eel we are not willing to move very fast on Soviet-American relations in general D did not mention SALT but mentioned trade for example K told him that the President had told D and K had told D that we are going very far on trade but we aren 1t going to let Communist countries supported by the Soviet Union chop us out K said he had been very tough with D -- he didn't giveJl an inch K told the President he didn 1t think we should move very fast on the Middle East P said the point is we can 1 t deliver K said that is not what they are asking They want us to agree to a piece of paper for Yarring to deliver K said they aren't anxious to get something in the Middle East - - their problems with the Egyptians must be very serious He wanted us to be very forthcontlng P wanted to know D 1 s attitude K said they want major improvements in relations with us He said they always run into trouble He was asked in Moscow what advance has been made and he couldn't answer K told him he could have said 11 the SALT talks · D said there will be a positive answer pretty soon but he didn't say any more about it K said he doesn 1t believe the U S should be in a pleading fJOSition on it He thinks we could play it the other way If we go the hard route and can keep them quiet that is what we want P said he is UtC H-ft O E O 12958 Sect 3 6 NARA Dalo 7 - 2 - eenly aware that we don 1t want to take the ha r-d route and make hem mad He asked K ''You have no doubt but that he is rerrrinded f the fact we are going the hard route K said yes he had been ery tough on him D had asked what K thought of the Sino-Soviet roblem K had said the Soviets have a big geopolitical problem lat no death is going to solve D had asked K whether he thought they the Soviets were going to attack the Chinese K had replied that as a historian he thought the Soviets were considering it D had MW said something about Romania - - he asked who thought of it K had replied that every fundamental decision here is made by the President and he waB n 1t going to give D a checklist of who m ade the various proposals D had asked whether we had any response from the Chinese on the change in travel restrictions K had replied that D knew as well as he that the Chinese move in very complicated ways which didn't -really give an answer to his question K said he had been personally much more aloof with D than before P asked what had been said about Vietnam K told him D had said we may not believe it but the Soviets have a real interest in ending thls war but for different reasons than ours K told him we have no evidence of this K said D had said they had been helpful on the shape of the table to which K replied that they were helpful to Hanoi on that K gave no encouragement here and wasn't really very pleasant He had rentlnded D that we have a problem -- there can be no movement U ltil they show us The President said The summit and trade they can have but 1 1 11 be damned if they can get the Middle East etc '' K said he doesn 1 t see what we gain by going to a fall-back position on the Middle East His instinct for handling this would be for1t Rogers to tell Gromyko we will give our answer to Dobrynin in about two weeks K said he thinks D came to see him to let him know they knew about K's Paris meeting and to fix an invitation or Gromyko to see the President D had said in all previous administrations Gromyko had been received by the President K told D that Gromyko hadn 1t asked for a meeting K told the President if Gromyko asks for a meeting$ formally the President vill have to see him but if he doesn 1 t K doesn 1 t think we should invite him K said D came back to this two or three times -- Gromyko would love to have an invitation K further doesn't think we should encourage him to ask for ar WCiWXKDIIS appointment OC-ClASSIFIED E O 12958 Sect 3 6 - 3 - to the President said on the Middle East it would help us if we didn 1 t do anything ight now -- it could be done in about 10 days to 2 weeks between lsco and Dobrynin K said he didn 1 t know whether Rogers 'l 11 make formal proposition -- he hadn't been in touch with K P said waiting ilakes aens-e P said the papers had ma de a big thing about Gromyko getting a warmer recei'ption than he The reason is obvious - - all the Middle East had to be silent to him we have nothing to offer the Africans and we didn't mention Latin America He said he felt it was foolish to go up there K said he didn't think the President got a cool reception he couldn't count on the newspapers giving such a distorted picture The President said we said things not calculated to get a warm reception Getting back to D and Vietnam P asked K whether he saw much movement K's response was that the fact that XK Mi# D told him about his Paris conversation and that Hanoi considers that the most useful conversation they have had he K considers positive D had said in watching the President 1 s news conference it was c l e a r the President isn't going to make any major concessions and that it was useful to get this on the table K thinks we will get a move within the next month • P mentioned the demonstrations coming up on October 15 He said the Democratic National Chairman had been meeting Vil th the doves at the same time of his press conference to make Vietnam a political issue P said he didn't hit this hard with Haldeman but he feels the real attack should be on them K agreed saying they got us into the war P said our people have to start fighting harder K said the press conference was essential and extremely helpful He thinks events of the last two or three weeks show the long route cannot possibly work The President agreed especially with our 60 000-man withdrawal reduction of the draft by 50 000 and Ho Chi A-1inh 1 s death The doves and the public are making it impossible to happen He asked K if in his planning he could pick this up so that we make the tou9h move before the 15th of October K said yes P said he had been wondering if we shouldn't -- he doesn t want to appear to be making the toug h move after the l 5th just because of the rioting at home K said there is a problem however - - if Hanoi takes us seriously and they wouldn 1t have told Moscow if they weren 1t taking it seriously we shouldn 1 t confuse them If we want them to tnake the move we should give them time - - two weeks His only worry is that if we went ahead with the tough move before the 15th - - and there is a l 0% chance Hanoi might want to move if we hit them before they have a chance to make the move it will look as if we tricked them He said the President might want to consider another press conference before the 15th 'MIX or a television report saying OfCLASSIFIED E O 129' l Sect 3 6 - 4 - these people demonstrators etc are dividing the cour try and naking it itnpossible to settle the problem on a reasonable basis 1 P said he would just as soon have them demonstrate against the Ian If we went ahead and moved the country is going to take 1 dimmer view after the move than before P would like to nip Lt before the first demonstration because there will be another ne on November 15 P reminded that Laird had said for three mbnths after we do this it will have MIU relatively high public support K said as an assistant he had to give P the dark side He suggested again the possibility of P going on television before the den onstration -- possibly around Oct 10 P said okay they had had an interesting day and he would see K on Monday If Rogers calls P will try to cool off that thing K said Rogers can be generally positive but defer an answer for two weeks lds