0 AT THE NATIONAi _RC HIVlaS · _ ' ·• - ✓ • ' ' • ' I •• l - _ n ' - · ' -- · ff ·· • • '_3' _ •t l 1 _ J j - _ ·- ffp SECRET · - o '· '· 9 October • r ' 1 Baaed upon Colonel Pursley's initial memorandum to colonel Haig on significant military actions Tab A or • Kissinger has requested an integrated plan of military actions to demonstrate convincingly to the Soviet Union that the United States is getting ready for any eventuality ·· on or about 1 November 1969 The items marked in the Tab are·-to be included · Rather than threatening a confronta- · • •· t on which may or may not occur the objective of these actions '•would be 'a demonstration of improving or confirming readiness to react should a confrontation occur The plan should envision initiating some actions early next week 13 or 14 October with all actions completed by 25 October A low key public affairs program should be included • • i _ 2 The integrated plan is desired at the White House by close of business tomorrow It will probably be an item for discussion with the President on Saturday 3 I relayed this requirement this morning from Colonel Haig to Colonel Pursley who asked me to relay it to you At Tab Bis a CM for the Director Joint Staff whioh lays on the requirement LEMNITZER i · ' i• - J l ·1 ·- • _ - • • · · - - • ' ' • • ri f U-J _ a · • • -oc_ ' - _fa- J • 'l lf ' - • ' - ---·-- • • • L cf_• • • • •'J ' -• - J ' I- I 'i'·'- £- _ r 4 ' J • oFFice _o THE s1 cRiTARY WASHINGTON D C of ·o FE se 20l01 I ' I l • ' • • t r •· • ' · 8 October 1969 • MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG SUBJECT • In response to your request a number of concepts for mtl i tary actions are outlined below which would ·in our judgment be consldered by ·the Soviets as unusual and significant The following criteria were employed in developing these potential actions Significant Military Actio·ns Ease of detection by the Soviet Union b High probabirity of being considered unusual and stgnlflcant • _ · ' c e • low public exposure in the United States • d Feasible of execution as early as 13 October or as soon thereafter as possible · I lasting sufficiently long to be convincing Concepts eeting these criteria wou-1d include lementation of radio an or ther corm1unications sil nce tn selected areas or commands ·· e g in SAC and POLARIS forces • · ✓b Stand-down of flying of combat at rcraft in sel'ected areas or coinnands e g for 48 hours tn SAC and EUCOH - Increased survelllance of Sovfet ships en route to North Vtetnain · d Increased reconnaissance sorties around the periphery of the Soviet Union ✓ Increased ground alert rate of SAC bombers and tankers • • I • I ' -·- - ----------- ----- ---' 2 • _•- orsi i- al of SAC aircraft with nuclOar weapons to only • j • military disp rsal bases with or wtt out dispersal of ONAD fo ces g Alerting or sending to sea of SSBNs currently in port or by tender · • Modification of the SNOW TIME 70 2-E joint SAC NORAD exercise has been considered but does not appear to qualify under the given criteria • ·• The significance of the costs and risks entailed by the military actions outlined above must be related to the over-all effect desired which ls not known at this time In absolute terms neither the costs nor the risks seem to be high •· - Robert E Pursley Colonel USAF Military Assistant • - • 1 •• t - - - ' ·1 - -- - J -· · • - ·· ¼ ' _ • -- - - - •' · ·• _ - • • ' I i - - i ·11 - - • - •• - 1 ' - ··' -- ··-- · · - - - - ·· -· - sc •• r - cc- - - - c '- '' '• ' '-_ c · t' ' J •• • •••- • • - •- - • •• · ·• · - · - ··• •• -• • ••• -• 1 • • - ••• •·• 1r • • · • - - - •• •- ' - - ' - • ·• • - · - - -- I - -• • _ ' • ·••• • - • • - -a - • • · - _ - 1 r1 •• •• • • ' _ • • - ' - · •- ••••-1 ' -I 'I · ' ·•· • • • • •• -- _ l itlP SECRET · • • • • --- f • ' I f - • - • • 1 I • r --·rH • -·b u J J· CM-4621-69 _ - - 9 October 1969 MEMORANDUM POR TBE DIRECTOR JOINT STAPF Subject Integrated Plan for Certain Military Actions 1 x ·would like the Joint Staff to prepare an integrated plan of actions which will physically test our militaxy xeadiness in selected areas worldwide to xes-pond to -possible confrontation by the Soviet Union These actions should be discernible to the Soviets but not threatening in themselves They should include but not necessarily be limited to the following type actions a Stand-down of flying of combat aircraft in selected areas or conmands e g for 48 hours to improve operational readiness in SAC and EUCOM b Implementation of radio and or other communications silence in selected areas or commands e g in SAC and POLARIS forces or in the Sixth Fleet c Increased surveillance of Soviet ships en route to North Vietnam d Increased ground alert rate of tankers SAC bombers and e Dispersal of SAC and CONAD aircraft with nuclear weapons to only US militarf bases - ·- 2 The plan should provide for the initiation of some actions by 13 October and the completion of all actions including retum to substantially normal operations not later than 25 October 1969 A public affairs plan should be included with the theme that the visible actions are simply part of a test of current US military readiness - -- · ·- - - ll'J - · 'ti 'l ' I 1 L l · O I ' • 4 -'I - • t -- - f ·' 3 I desire this· plan by ·1200 hours 10 October 1969 If necesaary detailed annexes should follow as soon as possible • Sgd EARLE G WHEELER ' EARLE G WHBBLER · Chairman • Joint Chiefs of Staff · - - - - _ - • · ' · _ · · - • 0 - TOP stct l 2 - · '• • ' - -• r· · • -'t t •• ' I • • • 'I - - ' •' ' • ·•• • t· - ·