1 - iiECRliI' lJNClASSJFf D HISTORY OF STRATEGIC AIR CXMWO FY 1970 HISTORICAL l 1 J sruoy 00 1 J U SPECIAL LING REQUlRED TO FOREIGN 'OT RELEASABLE N Tl ONA LS I 'l'h in1·ormation cont alncd in th l 1 •lo wncnt '-'ill not ba dioclo cd to rorolgn nntionala or their rcprcsont tiven - '1 o -c l I-sl l I- UNr SS H M-CRE T · · r t __ Lr For thoao ronaona the factor a recommended by Oonerll l Hol lO'JCl f in 1969 for l July 1970 were lcaa peaaimistic tho n thooo ouga11tod by Oonoro l Nnzz ro in 1968 for l Jnnunry 1969 Tho revi11d PLS valuoo would be used by the JSTPS in the preparation of SIOP•4 Rovioion H l July 1970 22 9 Speciol JCS Rca iness Test uj Op l In October 1969 the Strategic Air Cor and part1o1• pated inn apooial teat or Unitod Ste tea milito ry rendintaa On 10 October 1969 tho JCS Chair n General Earle O W'neeler notified Oonoro l Hollowo y a nd the CINCa or aoven unified cor 'l' anda that Wt havo boon d1reoted by higher QUthority to institute a aerie• or actiono during the period 13000oz - 25000oz Oct to toat our military roo dinooa in aolectad nreao world-wide to respond to poaaible con• frontntion by the Soviet Union These actions ohould be di101rnible t9 tho Sovieta ·but not-- threo tlffiing in themselve-a 11 Op 3 Subsequent correspondence from the JCS omitted tho ominouo referenoe to poaaible confrontation ar d orr phae1zed tha t tho nct1ona to be ta ken comprised n test The ba k -ound untcince then rood lU her authority hao requested that oc a teat repot t no a toot we take certain ct1ons which would increase our roa di• nooo nnd wh1oh would be d1aoernible but not repeat not threatenin to tho Soviota 11231 llJ ' · · - - •• lu - o p 1 Hendquartera SAC recoived no furthar 1nforrr ation onccrnins tho oriain or purpooo or the cpecinl rond1noBB toot Spooulntion foousod upon n possible connection wtth the peace ta lk• 1n Pario nnd President Nixon'a acheduled addrcos to the nation on tho wnr in Viotnarn 232 It wo s announced qn _13 Oo obcr th11t Pro idont Nixon would deliver nn nddreoo on 3 November on the aitua tion in ViotnQm at that time 233 i ctrssil iu Rt T 152 UJ ·-1 I Initial publio arfniro euidance from the JCS otatod that queries from tho nowo modio ohould bo anovarod vith the otote• 2·4 mont that wo aro moroly taotin currant ronclinooo pooturc 3 Thia was Ghortly ouporoodod by moro opooirio Qnd reatrictivo guidance from the Assistant Socrotnry or Doronao for Publio Arrairo A$D PA Included in thio guida nce wno tho atatement thnt Maximum security must be rrAintoinod to achieve deairod reoulta or thiG exorcise 11235 'l ne guidance from the A$D PA prohibited any pu l1c announco ent con• cerning the JCS-directed toat achedulod to begin on 13 October 1969 and initial v rorbnde reoponat to quoriea unless specifically auth• oriied by J SD PA Tho only reaponst which would then be permitted c vao We do not repent not ool'Mlont on readiness testa 11236 This c policy vns later modified to allow rolQnoe or the authorized responoe c prior to notifico tion or the Af3D PA 237 r op 1 Tho initial moooago from Oenernl Wheeler lioted a number ot nctiono under conoidoration for a do onotration of increased U s military rondineoo Poaaibilitiea included a otnnd•do n or cv bat n rcraft in certain nrono increnaed surveillnnce or Soviet ohtpn en route to North Viotnnm oiloncina rndio and othor comun1• cutiono ln ccrtu1n urcuu nncl nn incrCJ D- _i_n_t h o_ er_ouncl c l- rt ot itu -··· · · ··· · of SAC ·c-orr oera and t nkor 236 B -eci io inotructiono to ea ch indi• ·-··- vidual CINC followod immodintely The JCS directed the CINCSAC to cence tactical flying training and to roinatate as rrAn dograded nlcrt sort es no poaoiblo 2 ---- • _ ' $4Gp l I I I I I I I 3U Thooo notiona were to be effective nt 0800 local t ma on 13 October 1969 und were to bo maintained until further notice by tho JCS Tho JCS spccific lly stated that Theoc d rectcd ncti ons should in no WD ¥ o ffoct Southea at Aoia opera• 241 tionr Althoueh unmontionccl the SAC ICBM rorco waa also unoffocted Thio circumotance illuotratoa two fundamental nets The SAC m1s6ile force woo alwnyo rMlntained inn high degree of readiness lnd manned e rcrnft could more i ppro r r taly support a shov or force •tor SEC ET UNtl SS f lU - CONFI BENTIAI - s ' - •·· t 1 dUJ 1 I %iit· f' I · ' ' O · ·'• C' C- _ r_ · ' I I ' r -- _ · · ·1 I I I I I I 1 Op 1 _On 12 October 1969 th · cINCSAC diaoomlnQtod gttid nco for ro1notat1ne docradcd aircraft alert aortioo in tho continonuil · Unitod Gto too nnd tor ouopcndlna routino cornbnt tdrarow tminine miD242 oio1 c Tho only SIOP nircro ft o lort aortioo not roinoto tocl at 0800 local on 13 October voro the 20 doBro ded B•52 alort sortias at Andarcon AFB Ou m Tho actual aircraft Ground nlert rorco thon incr o aad to 141 B-520 32 B-580 o nd 189 KC•l35a 243 In compnrioon nctunl nlert fi5uree on 30 September 1969 had boen 79 D-520 31 D- 80 nnd 130 KC•l35e 244 There vore oevcro l oxcoptiona to the policy of suopondins combat crew training flighto Tho princip l pne wao con• tinuation or D•52 and KC-135 crew training at Caatle AFB Rotationol ovoments to and from Ooooa AB Eieloon AFB TorreJon AB and catel• lite baeeo continued as ochodulod Also unartocted were certoin teat• inG progrnme movements rel ted to tha conflict in Southeast oln and S C support of TAC dcployrr ents 45 On 16 OctobC r ·Headquo rtors SAC notified its units tho t the roadinoaa test would lo st for t1t least two weoks and accordinBlY provided odditionol instructions for nnaginc crew reoources ond fuel ordero during the test At the same ti e SAC authorized Fifteenth Air Force to r •ovide ref_ _ol_ins_su p - - __· - ---·· lateral cOtnm1Jnde with- Cc tlG--tankijlii 2 G ··- _ _ _ _ U P 1 Meonwhile other teata of U S military reodinesa world-wide were under conaideration In his initinl mess3 e to the CINCc Oonoral Wheeler ho d requested thorn to suggest further actions cornpntible with his guido nce and ProJect 703 247 On 13 October Gcncrnl Hollowo y replied Beco uoe or the lirr ited infor r ation concerning the no ture of the tect the CINCSAC prefaced his reco enda• tiono with the que lifica tion Within tho obJecti vee of this exercise as understood here • - • 11248 Hio moat significant proposal was for n limited exorcise of SEAOA with weapono Oenero l Holloway also stated that additional aircraft above the doy•tO•dny SIOP alert force could be placed in the highest atato of r aintenance readi• ness to include the loading of wenpono 11 However it would not be reasonable to place these aircraft on actual alert because of the UNCLASSIFIED 0 I J a S E CRE-r I UNCLASSIFIED • •d · · JQ P 154 ECRET • -·' --· · J ' • - • C C - - I 0 j 4 ·1 a c · - · · ·I ·I 4 ·1 I - · t · - -I _I I I ' C' c· llrioua ohortaao or oircrowo unlcoa crowa eXCQDO to the 1400 Arc Light oortie rote were returned from SEA 24 9 U - op 1 On 14 Octobor 1969 Oaneral Wh eler notified Ooneral Hollo ay nnd the other CINCo that tho raodineca teat would' lost until about OOOlZ on 30 October Ho a loo informed the CUfCa tho t their recorr endations hod been considered in the preparntion of further teats and that individual instructiona would follow approval by hiahor nuthority 11250 UJ P 1 An intentional omioaion from SAC' a Hot of sueeoctcd actions wao dispersal In fact He3dquorterc SAC atrongly rocom• mended against diopcrsnl durine the rco dineoo teat b cnu e it would further reotrict crew scheduling and aeero vato th problem of crev shortn co On 17 October General Hollowo y cent the follo- ing nnaly• sis or the problem to le JCs 2 51 A serious shortaao of aircrews c uoee limitations in SAC's ability to fully i plernent rurthor r ndineas conditions either for the current tcot or for an emergency Our readi• ncos plano are bacod on the requirement to fully generate end disperce the aircraft force and nloo fly SEAOA Because of the crc• J chortaco wa do not have that full ctipnbility In fact if we were to fully generate the nircroft force todny there would be about oighty aircraft for which there would be no nircrew avoilabl at the 1me thQ lr r ft became generated ---- If we ecnerato aircraft we should implement dispersal but if we disperse wo reduce our ability to cycle crews throu h airborne SEAGA ground alert and submarine reaction poGtura In an actunl e ereency we would havo to evaluate the situation and in some unito 3ke o choice between flying SEAGA and implementing dispersal Almost simultaneously and at the request of the JCS Head4uarters SAC did forward a list or selected dispersal actions which would least ffect the command' a readineGs in case of on actuo l emer• gency 252 Ho evcr the JCS did not puroue tho rnattor further U SZri3 1 ' flN-Gp 1 Also on 17 October tho JCS disseminated additional inctructiona for the military rendineos test In order to prevent the losG of criticnl items of combat crew training the a I C t 3 E C E1 UNCLASSIFIIU ti01 FI 0f NTIAL I Q L S E CRET cC JCS nuthorized soloctive flyina tr inine for tho ock boe1nnine 18 Octobor 2·53 Heo dquartera SAC iminodiatoly notirioc1 ito unite tho t limited and aolectivo flying trainin15 a a outhorhocl in bomber and to nker units until the mornine or 25 Ootober 254 At the anmo time the Air Staff requested SAC to aupport the refuel• ing requirements of TAC'o replace ent pilot tro inina 255 O_J --_ P8•1fOPOM Qp 3 Another sto nd•do n then follo ocl ·p t o800 local time on 25 October Specific instructiono for additional SAC pnrticipation included t o of the actiono auasoatod by SAC on 13 October First the JCS directed SAC to plnco additional nircraft in the high st eta to or mo intenance rendinoao olith_ eapona in conjunction 1th thC 25 October ato nd•dO'Wn Socond tho JCS diractod o Sho ol or Force SEAOA opero tion with wonpona on the 2c6 Eielaon Eaot orbit only olith nn ·I-Hour of 26 1913z October 1969 i - o p 1 On 23 October Headquarters SAC providod ito unito with inotructiono for accomplishing r Aintenanco eoneration All aircraft units except thooe with primary functions or trnining roconno ioGonce and reconna1asonce support voro directed to gcneroto category Charlie and Foxtrot sorties for h1ch aircraft wore vailoble Although aircraft vere to be fully EWO configured u a oulu not be asoigned to the n TC'X'Uft Headqunrtcrs SAC did not eotnblis£ - specific timins but it diractod completion of generation by o800 local ti e on 25 October 2 57 Approxirr tcly 65 per cent of SAC non-alert SIOP o ircraft were cenerated for the JCS teot 2 8 J i-Cl J lu e--J I I I I I 'fS -Op l Headqunrte-r s SAC sir iul tancously rurniohod pla nning 1nforrr ntion for the SEAOA Show of Force opero tion on the Eielson Eoot orbit 259 The B-52 units assigned to that orbit olera the 22d 260 •and 92d Wines The 22d possessed two bombo rdmont aqundrons 30 UE total and the 92d had ono so the operation involvod aix airborne o lert sorties launching daily For the Show of Forco o tion first launch times for these uni ts were o ·pproximntoly 20 hour a nfter I-hour 26 1913z October Therefore the o irborno operation actu•- -·-o 11y b go n on 27 October 261 This was the first time nuclea r veapona TO fl SEe ET GeNROErfflAl 155 1 I INCLASSIFIER · w -- P SE RE T I ti i C' t II ' C r ' -· I 1 0 C _ · ·_ C c - C ·1 '·- -1 I I I I I I vere carried on airborne o l ort sorties Dinoe thcf B-52 crruh nc o r 'l'hule AB in January 1968 uj EmttfOPefflf-Op l 'rhe roodinooo teat enclad almoat o o abruptly os it bogan On 28 Oatober tho JCS directed tarm1nation or the t ot and n rotu rn to normal oparnting ote tua ot OOOlZ on 30 October 1969 262 Heodquortoro SAC notified ito unita 263 o nd Oenaral Hollo• voy informed hiD corr mo ndera that he van very pleooed vith tho excel• lent response and pertor anae ot the aircre 1 aupport paraonnel atnffs end commandero thrOUGhout the current JCS directed readiness test n264 UJ iszno toMt-Op l Shortly after termination the JCS request d the oorr zrandera to comment on the readiness teat••difficultiea impact and benefits 265 In response Headquarters SAC cor rr ented on the lnck of inforrration concerning the objectives or the exerciae Prob• lema encountered during execution ere mink al The rr ost aignifice nt impact concerned tho problem or aircre shortaGeo As expreaaed by SAC the shortage or co r bnt cre s reduces the flexibility SAC once enjoyed and this nt n time when we ara cearching for addi• tional options 11266 'l'here Dimply ere not enough cre'ws to tupport force dispersal or a full•scale SE AOA operntion The readiness te t o loo aggravated ffiip'roblem because or the curtailment of in•unit training for non combnt•ready crew replacements 267 Trnininc nnd Evaluation Un 1t • WO Ev11l11nt1 ono Throughout P'f-10 Hcndqua rtcro GAC continued to rely upon the operational readiness inspection onI syotem e e an effective meano of evoluntin a tactical unit'o capability to accomplish its primo ry misoion under realistically simulated combat conditionn ·Conducted by an inopector sonoral IO team from Headquarters USAFt Headquarters SAC or one or the numbered air force head uartera tho ORI as designed to evnlunte all operat1ono l eapects of a unit'·s weapon systems as well na certain mieoion support arena An opera• tion o l readiness inspec tion test ORIT w ae-that portion of the ORI · U -- io•p•_ SL CRL UNCl A SSIFffD •