• • r J - 1 Ji' _ - - • Lw 2 1i Jece • To lv ing Paper for the Chail'l'llan TCS for diacussioH L'eputy Secretary of Oofense on 26 December Subject w1 ·' th tht Planning Requirement Rooult1ng F1•om Tl e Naseau Pact and the JUPITER Decision c ro•md - Rocently t he President decided i ubj ct to agreer- ' l'Y ne countries concerned and NATO that the JUPT'l ER misoilc l Turkey and ltaly would be withdratm after being r placed by l'C a oubmarincs in the M diterranean i bout 1 April 1963 - On 20 Doc at Naesau th President concluded a farreachir g agreement 1·11th UK Primo Minister MacMillan concern1n0' t ' arly establjshment of a NATO nucloar force and the later estab1 oument of a NATO mulitilater l miso1le force - ·3 JNCEJR1 CINCL NT1 and CINCSAC have be n invite to eutinit '1 1T meri s t • JC on the manner in which tho Nausau ocia1on should be 1n 1c i1e11ted n ee_ - The military implications of these two d r ieions r not aTl been examined in terms of how they mi ght be carried o • - The JUPITER decision has been closely held the targeting 1mplicat1ona have not been fully amined Hence - It is desirable to take an early look at the tmr 1 tionr of implementing these deciolons partic larly the w1thdr ·t or TU ITERa and the creation of the initial NATO nuclear for e ana permit thooe r-eaponsiblo to begin their planning - Assumin3 that Gen Lemn1tzer has been informed cf _ TUPI TER decision J-3 pl ns to ask t he D rector t es1c a -Plann1ng DSTP and USCINCEUR to report on the imI lications 01' withdrawing the JUPI TERs about 1 April 6J and the problem of re targeting • - It i s to be noted that imple1 entation o the J TPfi' c cision depends upon agreement of the countr1 s con Prreu and of NA'ro itself North Atlantic Council since t hc JUPITERs fult' l a 1 ATO requirement Tho decision on the NATO nuclear force on t other hand can be implemented by the US and th UK o1nce th 1 ould be no problem w1th NATO approval - Att ached 1s a d1ecusa1on following you r outl111e r · Planning nequirements of some of the problems co' lncct d wi n pJ mentir g the two decisions Suggested planning responJ1tll t oignments are shown for each item Items in paragraphs 2 U l'l 11111 be tav cn up at the JCS meeting on 26 Dec J-5 report o Jr ' 421 169 recommendations - That the attachment be uued 1n your discueai n hlJr 7ff1pa tr1c Director J - j Approvtd by Opinion as to Recommendation Director Joint Start'_ _ _ Talking Paper prepared by ____ Concur Nonconcur Ca tai n D W Wilson European Br nch J-5 Extension 54149 U m Corr ctcd Copy 26 Dec 6 j DECLASSIFlf D Authonly MO 1 o2i_ _ • rroP si1tm11adll to OONADEN'ftAL ENCLOSURE PLANNING REQUIRE V ENTS RESULTING FROM THE -NASSAU PACT AND THE JUPITER DECISION l R8target1ng to Corepensate for Withdrawal of JUPITERS Respons1b lity JCS DSTP and SACEuR USCINCEURJ Problems The Italians O 'l d 'l'urks will have to be satisfied politically The North Atlantic Council whose reg irement the JUPITERS fulfill will war t to be assured hat the threat to NA O Europe will be cove d adequate y t-r quicj - reactic-n weapons after tl1e JUPITERS are ''i th lra zn T ' final retarg ting will have to await t outc vme of p ' - c2 i_ discussions Meanwhile -l argeting priorities mu3t be eex nined in the light of the reduced capability and alternative courses of action identified 1th their implications Italy and Turkey have be n assured that the POLARIS missile targetjng will be handiE l by SACEUR in the soJ11e way a3 JUPI TERS are now targeted The Di ec tor Strategic Targe t Planning DSTP CINCEIJR CIN'JLlNT a c CINCSAC should be informed of the JUPITER decision so that the nc cessary retargeting can be planned 2 Ini tial NATO Nuclear Force This item is be ing addr sueo y the JCS on 26 Dec3mber The report is in prepar-ation Son 01· t he problems and factors being considered are isted brt f y a Compcsiti n of I nitial NATO Nuclear Force Responsi ility J CS Problems and factors In general Shou d e stav oqual with UK in contribution but not more than e ua'I Z 1 POLARIS a Reconciliation Hith previous c- rnrnit nent of five POLARIS subs to NATO b Possibility of equating with Mediterr-anean cocunitrnent made to replace JUPITERS 2 Tactical Nuclear Forces in Eur a Tac Air only Army tactical weapons should reruain under commanders they support b Desirability of keeping tactical unita intact 3 Element of SAC a B-47 1 s in Spain b Desirability of keeping tactical units intact D1wngra IM _ tu -'l GP-SFCBET • ' IJJ GRCUP 3 OOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR WTERV1U S NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ma 1 Do'lrJlmI1 j DECLASSIFIED Authority MO 1 1021_ I • Dffltradad tt-OONADBH td • 'l'OP SBORE'i' De r dad u GOHFIBEKflAl b Multilateral Features Responsibility JCS Problems 1 Difficulty with doing much under this heading under present law 2 Multilateral manning of single unit theoretically possible but not desirable c Targeting Responsibility JCS USREP MC SGN Proble r s a - d factors NATO Target Planning Group lin l t ed ' o cou t ributor nations • d Cc1J1Dand anci c t ol Responsibility State White House OSD JCS Probl ems and factors 1 US forces must e T' ain unC -r s control unless the law is changed 2 National governments exerc v to on NATO use of own force3 J 3 Shoul d force consist of eannarked units 3 NATO Multilateral Missile Force Th s item 1s being a dressed by the JCS on 2b December The report sin prepar l • Some of the problems and factors being considered a1e li ted briefly a Conditione of Sale to UK of POLA IS Missiles and R J gi pment b Same for ranee Responsibility OSD Navy c Conditions of Adr lisgio to Nonnuclear Gour tries Who Con ribute Personnel aruf Resources R s onsibility State OSD JCS Problems and factors 1 Difficulty in findir g 1ay t make it worthwhile for nonnuclear po rors to contribu e without being able to allow their fingers on the trigcer # or give them command of US nuclear f rces 2 Possible change in US law when political climate favorable 3j Perhaps privilege of participating in targeting may induce contribution 4 Est blishing guidelines fo acceptable progress in conventional forces as prerequisit for participation in nuclaar force could be major headach DECLASSIFIED AUthOrityMO 2 1 IO f • • 'ii' OJ ii ' SJS CIR lS ·it' d Targeting Responsibility JCS USREP MC SON 1 NATO Target Planning Grou i 1tc 1 Problems and factors t o contributor nations e CoJ'lltlland and Control Responsibility Sr ate White Ho se OSD JCS i oblems and factors 1 US foll'ces must remain under control until the law is changed s 2 National govern nento exe •ci ' ve v on N iO use of own forces 3 Should force consist of earmarked 1mit · l Arrangements with Tu ·key and Italy for Withdra al of JUPITERS Responsibility State OSD JCS AF Probl ems olitical considerations in the host countrieP US military personne l w-lth their dependents assigned to JUPITERS a Provisio of SERGEANTS for Italy Rasponsib1lity OSD JCS Army Problems Army at present considering question of hot'I many SERGEANTS From a military standpoint scarce SERG Ji TS sl oi l a a be assigned to ie centnl I ••ropefl' front recommendation of US INCEUR Ho ver from a political standpoint conoideration is being given to assigning oome to Italy - to replace obsolescent C0RPORALl We should try to satisfy the Italians at lowest pri e ln SJarce SERGEANTS b POLARIS Submarine in the Mediterrane n Responsibility OSD JCS Navy State Problems 1 The nu ber of PO ARIS submarinea to be on station in the Mediterranean to replace the JUPITE will depend on the outcome of political discussions wit the Tcrk s and the Italians 2 The efficiency of use o available POLAID S submarines will be degraded when they are deployer' in the Mediterranean before the ROTA POLARIS b se is cornpl ted Hence it will be to our over-all advantage to keep the number of eu mar nes so deployeJ to a rninil'llum 3 n DECLASSlFIE D AuthontyMO 'f o • 1t 3 The Navy would be abl to rlvis on the OPoratior al aspects or the problem including poa · interim arrangements to base POLARIS subma1·1neA t R Yl' before the base arranecmenta are coropleted to cut down r transit 1 me to nd from station In th1o coMection t'ie Itnl1ano have been intereoted in the posl51bil1ty or our eatabl1oh1ng a POLARIS base in Italy and have d1Jcourated them 4 We have already COllll1itted O J rOClVOb to Turko t provide a POLArl S submarine 16 missiles on station in the Eastern Mediterranean to replace tho 15 JUPITERS A one-for-one replacement of JUPITERS 1n It · • would c 1 1 for two more POLARIS submarines on station 1n the t- e 1ite·r nPan i owevor our approach to tho Ital1L1'1 on t h i point Pus not cl 'nr and theroforE orcn to inte1·prot at1on 5 i1-esw 1ably the arraneements t'or operational control of the submarines sam as SIXTH let and tarnotin0 ot POLARIS same as JUPITERS would not cause a prob em c Speeding of 104-o ro3ram for Turkey Respo sib111ty 030 AF Problems This w s urgently requested by the Turke at the time of tho Cuba crisis and gave the s urn It is a matter of production schedules and pr1orit1es llnlfldll to toHf1DfftTI l • 4