• • ' 'f- THI JOINT CHIEFS OF ff An IC SM•U•U 10 January 1963 M £ MOR ANDUM FOJl THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE l IA connocd oci with th• decleloci to •ithdraw th• JUPlTER• t'rom Europe th• Jolnt Chieh of Sta ff roqueated CINCI ANT USCINCEUR and th• DiHctor Stratopc Tuaet PlaanlnJ DSTP to pTOrid• thelr 'riewa and recomnandation• 011 th lmpllcatlooa ba ed on the •••ump• Uon that th• lthdrawa l would be comple t d by l J prU 1963 'tblle event• b ava outl'UQ 1ox n1 of commenta the y aro forwarde d for O U' ln O'l'IIUtiOft th••• •• CINCL ANT It h foulble to d1ploy 0111 two or thr•• POL ARIS aubmarinet to tho Madlterra nun from Holy Loch commuiclQI April 1963• with coruln 1011 of oporatina 1 flcle11cy Howovu· ah pa and x nh•il•• at aoa are ••cu re od the aune la nu m ber u U all wore deployed lo I ho Norwea la Sea Upoa completion of overhaul of Proteu• tender la Oecembn 1961 POLARIS oporat1one 1n th• Maditerraiu a n could bo aupportod from Rota t ith approprl ato tars• the 66 ZJ per ceat operatiq 1Uicl1nc y 111 hlc h tho aubn UlJtH lu d acbtend ln th• NorweJia n S a can be ro1alD1d • Tb• lolal CJuo e ot SWl an of th• opi Dloo that not more tbu Gelo POLARIS aubmarlno ahould bo deployed lo the Mediterranoa n by l April 19 3 ' • • b USCINCEUR 1 In General Lemnitzer'• absence General Noratad replied polntlng out the low damage expectancy 25 per cent provided by proaent forcea on Soviet MRBM IRBM• even under optlmum conditlon1 and contraeting thla target coverage with the high damage expectancy 80 per cent to Soviet ICB M11 Thu• it appear to contradict the • tatement made by US official• that the threat to NATO Europe ie covered continuously and on the • ame priority a• the threat to the United State •• 2 The impact of the lou of THOR• combined with the JUPITEiu would further degrade the target coverage Harden• ing of Soviet missile 1ite11 add1 to the critlcallty of thi• problem The contemplated POLARIS • ub1titutlon would have limited flexibility and capablltty dpending on the weapon A•l or A•Z and number of 1ubmartne1 It would be obvtoua to NATO that thh h a subtraction from the over-all capability and merely a redbtribution of the remaining force 43 In addition he indicated that in light of the NATO channeh and procedure• used to make IRBMa available to SACEUR consideration ehould be aiven to the authority or the propriety of the US taking unilateral action U POLARIS aubmarine1 are used in lleu of JUPITER • they 1hould be placed under the operational control of SACEUR in the eame manner ae the JUPITERe directly re1ponllve to the require• znents of SACEUR'e Nuclear Strike Plan and provided with communleation1 facllitle1 euential to direct and ellective SHAPE control 4- General No rstad 1ummarb ed by etating he oppoHe the withdrawing of JUPITER• from Italy and Turkey until euch time ae thi• action can be taken without weakening our nu• clear capability and de • troyina the useful psychological effect thla program baa bad c - Withdrawal of JUPITER mlutlee and movement ol POLARIS eubmarlnee to the Mediterranean would reeult in reduced tar et cqverage againat certain prime targets rangin1 DECLASSIFIED Authority MO 2 'f fJ O f l from ·parUal to complete 1011 of ballhtlc mlulle appllcation on certain DOZ• until major retaraetlng action h completed No baalc problem• ln tar1etln1 are anticipated aa Iona aa Free World mh • lle• are taraeted •• an integrated package However to provide optimum and orderly targetlna lor all force • JUPITER pha • e-out data and •chedule of POLARIS • bmarine deployment to the Mediterranean • hould be provided DSTP at leaat 90 day• prior to effective datea z The Joint Chieh of Staff will conduct a detailed analy• h of the comment • and recommendation• of the commander• concerned ln order to determine the full impact of the taraetlng lmplication •• For the Joint Chiefa of Stafft StGN fD MAXWELL D TAYLOR Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff pECLASSIFlED ·n1MO 1 10 25 Authon- - 3 l