MEMORANDUM non-log ACTION September 14 1970 MEMORANDUM FOR DR KISSINGER vak jll' FROM Viren P SUBJECT Chile - - 40 Committee Meeting Monday - -September 14 ii Attached is the CIA paper prepared as the basic document to be considered You should read it carefully especially Section I pp 2-8 outlining the significant new developments that have occurred This memo summarizes the CIA paper provides analyti calcnmment and my conclusions I Summary of the Paper A The setting the paper describes includes these major elements 1 Military action is impossible the military is incapable and Unwilling to sieze power We have no capability to motivate or instigate a coup 2 Because of significant changes in circumstances a political plan which Frei has contrived has some chance of success It is still a very long shot but it is the only possibility 3 The plan involves an effort to corral enough PDC Radical votes to elect Alessandri he would then resign · a new election would be required Ji'rei would be eligible this time and would run presumably he would be elected The process is constitutional and legal if unusual and untraditional · 4 The unqualified support and e£furt Pf Frei is central to th ls plan because moving the majority of the PDC congressional bloc to Alessandri is the essence of the maneuver The attraction to the PDC is another six years of political power Frei has taken the necessary preliminary steps to poi iitinn the PDC and himself for such an effort 5 The U S cannot operate this plan it must be Chilean and Frei's Our support and stimulus may be crucial and resources may become important But in essence we would be backstopping a Chi lean effort 6 Korry has in fact already encouraged and pushed this plan if he did not participate in its creation He has already committed us to at least moral support and encouragement Therefore the issue is not whether we go or do not go but whether we continue this encouragement and d· any more or draw back lf t I · trf' 1 i tt· bil t bJ i Ji t1t' 1 SE i NSC DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW fE O 12958 X Release in full by L Salvetti Dat 7 28 2000 _r - 2 - B The possible courses of action to support and stimulate the Frei re-election gambit are described as 1 Authorize the Ambassador to encourage the gambit through whatever resources are available to him locally but on the most discreet basis to minimize expo sure of USG's role 2 Authorize the Ambassador to assure Frei directly thatthe USG strongly supports and encourages his efforts This might include an oral message from President Nixon to be used if appropriate 3 Parallel Ambassador's efforts with outside support to influence Frei-stimulate foreign political figures whom Frei respects to encourage him 4 Work through European Christian Democratic parties to bolster Frei 's leadership and encourage the PDC leaders to contest Allende 5 Encourage the Radical Party through established assets to abandon Allende in favor of Alessandri 6 Generally keep information lines into the military and close communication to be prepared for any future eventuality The risks of exposure are appreciable and rise the broader our involvement and contacts C The paper asks the Committee to address the following questions 1 Should the Ambassador be authorized to continue to encourage and support the Frei plan but with as little risk of exposure as possible If so should he be provided with a confidential message of support from President Nixon to Frei to use at the appropriate time 2 Should his efforts be compleinented through outside diplomatic and covert activities designed to encourage Frei Should a propaganda campaign be conducted outside Chile in support of the Frei gambit 3 Should an effort be made to swing Radical votes to Alessandri Should the German Democratic Socialist Party which has close ties be encouraged to weigh in with the Radical Party in this sense · 4 Should we expand and intensify mi litary contacts to be assured requisite intelligence and stand-by channels of influence of - 3 - II ANALYSIS The description of events and the proposals must be examined through the following questions What are the chances of success What element would USG involvement provide that would not otherwise be there and what difference would it make · What are the consequences of success and the consequences of failure What are the dangers to the US in getting involved Why should we r·un these risks and incur these costs at all really necessary Is it Without long narrative I think' a fair analysis would have to say 1 Chances of Success Frei says one in twenty Korry says one in five No one really knows with much precision but it is clear that the chances of success are considerably less than even Z What does USG involvement add Probably a great deal in terms of moral support and encouragement Now that we have already begun this to quit would almost surely kill the effort It may not be able to continue without our support There is less evidence that any material resources would be needed but some money may be 3 The consequences of success It is vital to understand that it is not just a question of defeating Allende and that's it This sets in motion a number of serious problems If Allende is defeated in the run-off he a nd his supporters are most likely to go to the streets Widespread violence and even insurrection is a possibility He is unlikely to simply meekly run in a new election If there is a new election we would want to make sure Frei wins hence we would be drawn into further action to support his election If Frei is elected his would be an unstable government facing serious dissension Such a situation would probably require massive US economic and military assistance support - 4 - II Analysis continued 4 The consequences of failure If the gambit fails it will disc redit the parties j and the democratic institutions It will give the Communists the excuse to push Allende quickly into a radical course The restraints that would have i been available to slow down or modify his actions would be gone Failure would in short guarantee a fate that may not have been inevitable 5 Dangers to the US The biggest danger is exposure of US involvement This would wreck our credibility solidify anti- US sentiment in Chile in a permanent way create an adverse reaction in the rest of Latin America and the world and perhaps domestically Exposure of US involvement wi th an effort that failed would be disastrous it would be this Administration's Bay of Pigs A second major danger is that while we might begin- with a limited plan of encouragement this is a slippery slope we may very well find ourselves irresistibly sucked into rising degrees oi involvement at rising risks to protect the investment and find ourselves having slipped into a disastrous situation 6 Why the need for USG involvement This is the crux of the issue Do the dangers and risks of an Allende government coming to power outweigh the dangers and risks of the probable chain of events we would set in motion by our involvement What we propose is patently a violation of our own principles and policy tenets Moralism aside this has practical operational consequences Are they rhetoric or do they have meaning If these principles have any meaning we normally depart from them only to meet the gravest threat to us e g to our survival Is Allende a mortal threat to the US It is hard to argue this Is he a serious problem that would cost us a great deal Certainly Is it inevitable that he will consolidate his power He has a very good chance but it is far from inevitable or that if he does that he will be a success Does an Allende government start a South American dominoes Unlikely the impact of a Marxist state in the rest of Latin America is containable III CONCLUSIONS I conclude that 1 Any covert effort to•stimulate a military take-over is a non-starter is no practical pas sibility at this point There f - 5 III CONCLUSIONS Continued 2 We should keep our lines open and broadened into the military An opportunity may open up later but for the moment we should gather information and establish standby channels 3 Korry has already started without killing the Frei plan 4 The Frei plan has some chance and it is the only chance 5 Our support can be important to its success 6 It is possible to backstop it at this point with a minimum involvement and with acceptable risks 7 8 We should therefore enter into this in the knowledge that the calculus can change to make it wiser to cut out rather than just progressively be sucked into massive and disastrous involvement to protect the investment 11 9 We should also understand that this is not a limited operation If it succeeds it opens up still more serious problems as outlined above We t rl_ amost sure to be called upon for continued support of one kind or anothe y §°ei '•u 3 above and success of the plan will almost surely trigger violence in Chile 10 I would recommend the following us on a political track We cannot backtrack there are limits to what we can do acceptably It is not a question of just adding more effort and money Our capacity to succeed is simply not a function of how much effort we put in and the greater our involvement the sharper the danger of exposure a Authorize the Ambassador to continue to encourage Frei to use resources at his command but with the utmost discretion and tact and with absolute minimum USG involvement · I would not authorize a personal message from President Nixon we should protect the President b Organize efforts from the outside i e -- encourage European Christian Democrats to funnel support encouragement and ideas perhaps even funds encourage other leaders 'to do so develop an outside propaganda campaign as Frei suggested SECR ET SENSI'l'IYE · '_i 'i K_ t J' it ' l C ·I - 6 III CONCLUSIONS Continued c Develop an internal propaganda campaign to stir fear of a Communist take-over and expose Communist machinations d Use our separate assets to work on the Radical Party try to get the German Social Democrat Party to do the same e Ask for weekly · reports and establish some mechanism to monitor this carefully This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article ‘Extreme Option Overthrow Allende’ 2020-09-15