MEMORANDU M THE WHITE HOUSE WA-SHINOTON -SECRE T SENSITIVE Nov ember 5 1970 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM E enry A iss_i ger· SUBJE CT _NSC Meeting November 6 -- Chile ' This ·me_ ·ting ·w i11 con sider 'the questi n ol what ·strategy · de al with an Allende Gover Q ment-iil Chile • J w should adopt t • DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM A • ' • of ' -The election Allende as Pr-esident of Chile· p ose s for lls one of the most · serious challenges eyer faced in this hemisphere • Your _de··cision as to wh t to _do bo t it may b ·the histo ric and di icult foreign affai1'$ decision you will to tn ke this· year £or what· happen i n Chile over · the next-six to twelve_ months' vrill b aye ramificatio s _that 'will go £ ir··b¢yond just US-Chilean _relations They will have an effect o ·what happens· _in · · e rest-of Latin A4neric-a ·and ·tl e dev lopi ng worJcl wha t our £uture · position will be in the hemisphere and· on _the large wo ld pictur in _ · eluding reJatio n s with the _U$$R• will even affect our own· concepµon of what our role in 1Ji e wor_ld is most have on our They Allende i's a ·tough de4icated 'Ma rxist · He co es to pe wer with a profoW3 d The Communist and Socialist p rties·_form tbe ·core -of the politic c aUtion at is his power base Everyone agrees· ·that Allende · · anti-·us ias w lll purpose·fully· seek - to estabii h·a r ioc ialist Marxist state in Chile' · -- to_ li nin_i lte US inftu nc·e from Cm le and tlie' hett dsphere · ·' · - - to e·stablish close rel tions iid linl tage s with the VSSR Cuba and ot ller Socialist countries The ·consolidation of Allende in powe·r in Chile the e fore would pose s ine ve -y serJ ous· threats· to our hiterests and positiol in ·the hemisphere ·an4 would affect developments an d ou t relations to·_th' 'n i elsewhere in the world US inv estments totaling _sonae one billion dollar s may b_e lost at least in part Cbilei may d fault on debt_s about $1 5 billion ·owed the US Government-and private US banks _ DECV lflEO HELE At EO O N - SECRET SENSITIVE by NAB1 on lhe rntommr ndatlon of tlie NSf under provisions 'olE 0 12958 t1 _ r r SECRET SENSI'l'IVE - z- Chile would probably become a leader of opposition to us in thp int 1·1·• American system a source of disruption in- the hemisphere and a focal point of support for subversion in the rest of Latin Am e1 · ca It would become part of the Soviet Socialist world not only philos 1-- p ically but in terms of power dynamics and it might constitute a support base and entry point for expansipn of Soviet and Cuban p rcl icnce and activity in the region The example of a successful elected Marxist government in Chile would surely have an impact on-'- and even precedent value for--other parts of the wo_rld especiaily in Italy the imitative sp read of simila1· phenom ena elsewhere would in turn s ignifica ntly affect the world balance and our own position in· it While events in Chile ppse these potentially very adverse consequences for us they are taking a form which makes them extremely difficult for us to · deal with or offset · and which in fact poses some very painful dUem1nas · for us a Allende was elected legally the first Marxist govern ent ever to come to power by' free elections He has ·legitimacy in the eyes· of Chileans and _most of the world · there i oothing we can do to deny hlm that legitimacy or claim he does not have it ' b We are strongly on record in support of self-'determination and respect for free election you are firmly on re ord for ·non-intervention in the internal affairs of this he sphere and of accepting nations 11 as they are It would therefore be very costly for us to act in ways that appear to V'i late those principles and Latin Americans and others in the world will view our policy as a test of the credibility of our rhetoric 11 On the other hand our failure to r·eact to this _ itua tion risks being pci-_ceived in Latin America and in Europe ·as indifference or impotence in the'fa ce of learly adverse de elopmcnts in a ·region long consi iercd om sphere of influence · £ _ ' Allend 1 s government is like y to move al- mg lines that will 1nake it ve1·y diffic m1t to marshal international or hemisphere censure of him-- he is most likely to· appear as an 11independent 11 soc-ialist country rather than_ a Soviet sa tellite or 11communist government 11 Yet a Titoist government in Latin America would be far more dangerous to us than it is in Europe precisely because it can move against ottr policies and interests more easily arid ambiguously and b causc its n111oclel 11 effect can be insidious SECRET SENSITIVE ' 3 SECRET SENSITIVE A Dimensions of the Problem continued Allende starts with some significant weaknesses in his position Th re are tensions •in h s suppo1·ting coalition l There is strong 'if diffuse resistance in Chilean society to 11 1 oving t o a Marxist or totalitarian state · There is suspicion of Allende in the military Th re are serious economic problems and constraints ·To meet this sit u ation 4llende 1 s inunediate game plan is clearly to avoid pressure and coalescing ·of opposition prem turely and to keep his o pponents within Chiie fragmented so that he can neutrali r c them one by one as he is able T this· end he will seek to -- be internationally respectable - move cautiously and pragmatic ally · -- avoid immediate confrontations with us and -- move ·slowly in formalizing relations with Cuba and other Sociali st· cowitries Ther·e is disagreement among the agencies· as to pr 3cisely ·how success fol Allende will be ir i overcoming his problems and weaknesses or how inevitable it really is that ·he· will follow the course described or that the threats noted will materialize · ·· - 'But the weight of the assessments is tb t Allende and the forces tba1 have come to power with him do have tl ie skill the means and the capacity to maintain and consolidate the selves in power p ovided they can play th ngs their way Logic would certainly argue that he will have the motivation to pursue purposefuily aims· he has after all · held for some 25 years · _Since he has an admittedly profound anti- US and nti-capitalist bias his policies a re bound to constitute sedou problems for us if he has any degree of ability to imple·ment them SECRET SENSITIVE · SECRET SENSITIVE B - 4 - THE BASIC ISSUE What all of this boils down to is a fundamental dilemma and issue a Do we wait c 1 nd try to protect our interests in the context of dealing with Alleµde becaus we believe ·we cannot do anything _about him anyway he may not develop into the threat w fear or may mellow in time -- we do not want to risk turning nationalisrn·against us and damaging our image credibility and position in the world AND thereby risk letting Allende consolidate himself and his ties with Cuba and the USSR so that a year or tw-0 from now when ·he e tablished his base he can move more strongly against us and then we really will be unable to do anything about it or reverse the process Allende wguld in efiect use us to gain egitiniacy _and tlien t n on us n some economic issue and thereby_ caste us in the role of Yankee imper alist11 _on an is sue of his choice OR b Do we decide to ·do something to prevent him from consolidating himself nQwwhen we know he-is weaker than he will ever be and when he obviously fears our pres sure and hostility b°ecause -- we can be reasonably sure he is dedicated t opposing us · •-- he will be ·able ·to consoiidate himself and then be able to counter us in increasingly intense ways aJ -d -- to· the e Xtent··he consolidates himself and links to the USSR and Cuba the trend of events and dyna cs will be irr eversible AND the re by risk giving him the nationalistic issue as• a weapon to entreri c himself -- damaging our credibility in the eyes of the rest of the world as interventionist -- turning nationalism and latent fear of US domination in the rest of Latin America· into violent and intense opposition to us and w perhaps failing to prevent his consolidation anyway SECRET SENSITIVE · SECRET SENSITIVE C 5 - OUR CHOICES There are deep and fundamental differences among the agencies on thj § basic issue They manifest themselves in es·sentially three possible approaches 1 The ·Modµs Vivendi Strategy This school of thought which•is essential y State 1 s pos ition argues that · we really do not have the capability 0£ preventing Allende frorn consolidating himself o c forcing his failure that the main course of events in Chile will be determined primarily by the A lende government and its reacti_ons to the internai situation and that the bcist thing we can do in these circunistances is maintain our relationship and our presence in Chile so that over the long haul we may be abie to £oste1· · and influencing domestic·trends favorable to our interests In thi view actions to exert pressure on Allende or to isolate· Chile will not only be ineffective but will only acceler·ate adyerse developments i n Chile and limit our capacity to have any influence on the long- r_an ge trend in this view the risks that Allende will consolidate hiniself and the ' long-raJ ge consequences therefrom are less dangerous t·o us tha_n the -immediate probable reaction to attempts to ppose Allende · It·s per ception of Allende's long-term development is essentially optimistic and ben ign Implicit is the argument that it is not certain he can overcome ·b is internal weaknesses that he may pragmatically lilnit t4is oppos tion to us and that if he turns into ·another Tito that wonl l not be bad si nee we deal w i th other governm e ts of this kind anyway -2 The Hostile Appr_oach DOD CIA and some State people on the other· hand argue that_ it is pat·ent that Allende is our enemy that he will move counter to us jusl as soon ·and as· strongly -as he £eels h·e· can that when his hostility is manifest to us it wµl be because he has consol dated his powe r and then it really will be too late to do very rp uch--the process is irreversible · In this view therefore we should try to prevent him ·from col 1 solidating now when he is at bis weakest · · and Implicit in this_ school of thought is he asswnption that we can affect · events and that the risks of stirring up criticism to our position elscwh re are- less dangerous to us than the long-term consolidation of a Marxist government in Chile SECRET SENSITIVE SECRET SENSITIVE 6 - 2 The Hostile A i pi oach continued Within this ap12roach there are in turn two schools of thought Overt Hostility This view _argues that·we should not de-lay putting pressure on Allende and therefore should not wait to react to his moves with cowiter-punches It considers the dangel 's of making our hostiJ tty public or of initiating the fight less important than making wiar nbiguou sly clear w l at our position is and where we stand It assumes that Allende does not really need our hostility to help cqnsolidate himself because if he did he would conf rent us now Instead he appears to fear our hostility This approach therefore would c all for 1 - initiating punitive measures such as terminating aid or economic embargo_ 2 making every effort to r lly international support of thiR position and 3 declaring an9- publicizing our concern and ho stility · ·b Non-overt Pressure Cold Correct Approach This approach concurs in the view that pressure should be placed on Allende now and that e should oppose him · But it argues that how we package that pressure and opposition is cr0 cial and 1nay make the difference between effectiveness and ineffective1 1es s It argues that an image of the US initia ing purutive measur s will perm it Allende to marshal domestic support and inter national sympathy• on the one hand and make it d icult for to obtain· internation l cooperation on the other 'It further arg ues that it is the effect of pressur e not the posture of hostility that hurts Allende the latter gives him tactical opportunities to blunt the impa ct of our opposition •Implicit in this appr ach is the j udgme1lt that how unambiguous our · public po ition is and making a public record are all le as in1portant in the long run than niaxim izing our· pressure and minimizing i-isks to ·our position in the rest of the world This approach therefore ccl 1ls for esser itially the same range of pt·os sures as the previous one but would use them quietly and covertly on the surface our posture would be correct but cold Any public manifestation or statement of hostility would be geared to his actions to avoid giving him the advantage of arguing he is the aggrieved party ' SECRET SENSITIVE SECRET SENSITIVE - 7 - D · ASSESSMENTS As noted the basic issue is whether we are to wait and try to adjust or act now to oppose The great weakness in tht modus vivendi approach is that it gives Allende the strategic initiative it plays ·into his game plan and ahnost insures that he will consolidate hims lf if h does consolidate himself he will have even more freedom to act aga i nst us after a period of our acceptance of him than if we had· opposed him all along there a -e no apparent reasons or available intelligence to-justify a benign or opti mistic view of an All en de regime over the· long term In fact as noted an 11 independent 11 ational sociali'st state linked to ·Cuba and the USSR can be even more dangerous for ou1· D ong-term interests than a very radical ·regim e • ' There is nothing in this strategy th t promises to deter or _pi event adverse· anti-U S • actions when and if Chile wants to pursue them -- _and there are far more compelling reasons to believe that he will when he feels he is established than that he will not The main question with the hostile approc1-ch is whether we - effectively prevent Allen le from consolidating his power There is at l ast some prospect that we can• But the argtilnent can be made that even if we did nt t succeed --- provided we d d not damage ourselves too severely•in the process -- we could hardly be woree off than lC 3tting him entrench hitnself that there i tin fact some virtue in posturing ourselves in a position of ·opposid n as a means of at least· containing him and improving our chance of irid cing others to help us contain him later if we have to · · In my judgment the dangers of doing nothing· are greater than the risks we run in trying to do something especially since we have flexibility in tailoring our efforts to minim iz those risks I recommend the refor that you make a decision that we wUl oppose Allende as strongly· as we cah and do all we can to keep hini from consolidating power taking care to package those efforts in a style that · gives us the appearance 0£ reacting to his moves SECRET SENSITIVE SECRET SENSITIVE E -8- THE NSG MEETING Contrary to your usual practice of not making a decision· at NSC meetings it is essential that you make it crystal clear where you stand on this issue at today•s· meeting If all concerned do not unde_rstand that you want Allende oppos ed strongly as we can· the result will be a steady drift toward the modus vivendi approach This is primarily a question of priorities and nuance The emphasis resulting from today's meeting must be on opposing Allende and preventing his ·consolidating power and not on minimizing ris_ks as I r_ecommend that after your opening remarks you call on Dick Helms to give you a briefing on the situation and what we might expect I would then outline the main issues and options along the above lines after which you could call on Secretaries Rogers and Laird for their views and observations Your Talking Points which are appended are written along these lines Also included in your book are --· A State DOD options paper -- An analytical summary of that options paper SECRET SENSITIVE '