1 - ' SEGREq' NODIS XGDS CUBAN CONTINGENCIES • SUMMARY This study considerB possible US reactions to a further Cuban-Soviet Angola-type intervention It discusses 1 Those political-ecoµomic non-military actions which might be taken now or over the next few months to dissuade Castro from further intervention py isolating and exerting pressure on him 2 Intermediate actions to be taken prior to an actual further intervention which foreshadow possible further application of military force and which are intended to give more credence to our warnings and 3 A set of possible military options predicated on the as sumption that deterrent- actions have been unsuccessful and that the Cubans have already taken or are in the process of taking an interventionist action Our basic objective is to prevent the creation o £ a pattern of international conduct in which Cuba and the USSR arrogate to themselves the right to intervene with combat forces in local or regional conflicts We are already engaging in such an effort through public warnings signals to· the USSR changes in our African policy and some measures designed to isolate Castro If this is not successful we will have to decide between two bro td courses actions intended to make the Soviets and Cubans pay a political price over the longer termJ or actions intended to terminate th e Cuban action including measures involv£ng application of differing levels of force It is difficult to determine in advance a precise threshold which would determine our response to a Cuban provocation It would obviously be lower' in a US territory like Puerto Rico or in this hemisphere than elsewhere Furthermore intervention 1nay be a gradual matter beginning with advisers and pl·ogressing to training shipment of arms and actual combat forces The situation which the US confronts may therefore be ambiguous and involve a flow of Bloc supplies with Cuban personnel support SEGR ET NODIS XGDS Photocopy from Gerald R Ford Library f GRE'l' NODIS XGDS • 2 - There are four categories in which the courses of action available to us can be placed 1 The first re afos to political and economic measu i -es affecting Cuba Some are irii'mediate and unilateral actions li ke confining their diplomats to a radius of 25 miles f rbm New York Gity · 1 - - - - - - - - - - - ' and reinstituting special broadcasts to Cuba Economically we can ti·y to penmade Western European nations terminate aid programs encourage Argentina Spain Japan and others to limit credits and attempt to restrict the trade of fri endly countries with Cuba Supplementary measures involve Cuba and other countries and should be keyed to some further Cuban move They include sending a message to Castro and raising the issue in the UN the OAS NATO to and BG 9 2 The second category of action relates to the $oviet Union It is easier to bring pressure on Cuba as the closer and weaker partner in a tightly interwoven relationship than on the Soviet Union Nevertheless any action taken against Cuba will inevitably affect USSoviet relations Furthermore Cuba could not undertake fu rther intervention without Soviet willingness to run high risks of crises with the US Therefore if we believe that we can achieve our objective more effectively by broadening our pres sure we ¢an begin such measures as postponing low ·substantive exchanges and delaying the opening of G nsulates in Kiev and New Yo t k · Then we could cease licensing computers More severe long-term actions would inclµde delaying additional gi-ain purchases renouncing some of the bilate ral agreemenl $ and breaking off SALT and MBFR negotiahons · 3 The third category relates to reventive actions involying dis osition of militar forces in the Caribbean Such actions i n c l u d e - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - re info r cirig Guantanamo jamming of Cuban communications and navi ation aids increasing force presence in the Cc 1 ribbean and reorg amzJ ng our force posture there to establish a command in Puerto Rico and reopen bases t here and at Key West Such io i ce adjustments would not degrade other commitments It is intended to de monstrate the seriousness of our purpose EGRET NODIS · XGDS Photocopy from Gerald R Ford Libran r S-ECR E'F- NODIS XGDS - 3 - 4 · Finally there are a se ries of military actions on a graduated scale of seriousness which involve the possibility of hostilities and would be considered acts of war In all cases a preliminary decision would have to be taken whether to evacuate some 4 000 dependents and nonessential employees from Guantanamo and reinforce the 500-man defense force there in view of the great vulnerabil-ity of the base to attack from Cuban forces All four options contain the possibility of engagement of Soviet naval or air personnel and non e would have an irnmediate and direct impact upon Cuban support for its military intervention force overseas Military requirements would involve a large part of the force allocated to ClNCLANT 2 carrier task forces and the US would be hard pressed to confront the Soviets or other opposing forces militarily elsewhere in the world while engaging in such operations of The lowest level of application force would be a series of blockade-type actions ranging from a quarantine of war materiel entering or leaving Cuba to a quarantine of all POL entering Cuba and finally to a total blockade of all material except food and medical supplies Since 95% of Cuba 1 s trade moves on foreign ships two-thirds of whfrh are Soviet we would uickl be brourrht into confrontation with them It is estimated that Cuba has a two-month POL reserve and that it could extend this to as much as ·six months by applying measures of severe austerity A concurrent air quarantine blockade would have to be considered There are seven civilian -airlines serving Cuba three of which are free world flying about six flights a day Neither the _Soviets no r the Cubans have the capability of maintaining an effective oil ai1·1ift and only about 5% of Cuba's total imports could be supplied by airlift - Another possibility would be the mining of Cuba 1s ports through naval and air implacement This would probably result in from 50 to' 60 ships being imprisoned in Cuban ports Ai t superiority would be requfred prior to mi nelaying This would involve probable engagement of Cuban and possibly Soviet air defenses Interdiction of some airfields would also be required '6EGR J T NODIS XGDS I I II Photocopy from Gerald R Ford Lihrary BECRE'f NODIS XGDS - 4 - The last measure contemplated would be a punitive airstrike to destroy selected high-value Cuban military tar gets All targets are located within defended areas Some US losses could be expected as well as engagement of Soviet personnel All military actions would have to be accompanied by a series of complementary political measures involving Congress our allies in Europe and Latin America the UN and the Soviet Union XGDS Photocopy from Gerald R Ford Library