oCtTftir · SECR B'f jCCI T 0488 0488 THE THE WHITE WHITE HOUSE HOUSE WASHINGTON WASHI NGTON DECLASSIFIED DECLASSIFIED PER E 0 13526 E O 13526 PER o s01s 1- f'l- C 01 ' ao 5-oi8l-n- 3 13 D 8 3 i3 aD 8 MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION € MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION SUBJECT Telephone with Russian Russian President President Telephone Conversation Conversation with Boris Yeltsin U Boris Yeltsin U PARTICIPANTS The The President President President Yeltsin President Boris Boris Yeltsin Interpreter Dmitri Zarechnak Interpreter Dmitri Zarechnak Notetaker Nicholas Burns Notetaker Nicholas Burns DATE TIME DATE PLACE TIME AND February 10 1993 1 51 - 2 14pm February 10 1993 1 51 - 2 14pm Oval Office SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Oval Office AND PLACE The The President President Hello Hello President Yeltsin President Yeltsin Mr President Mr President Hello Hello U U Mr President Mr President How are you U How are you U The President am fine Thank you for taking aa few few minutes minutes Thank you for taking The President II am fine to speak with me today U to speak with me today U II have just written you more have just written you about about aa more toward Bosnia I wanted to call you toward Bosnia I wanted to call you main L-81 main points points active American policy policy active American personally and go over the personally and go over the First we will be much more engaged in the search for a First we will be much I more engaged in the search for a diplomatic solution have appointed the NATO NATO Ambassador Ambassador diplomatic solution I have appointed the Reginald representative at the Reginald Bartholomew Bartholomew as as my my full-time full-time representative at the He will leave his NATO post and undertake this full-time He will leave his NATO post and undertake this full-time As his first II have him to to As his sense first task task have asked asked him fuller of our thinking and even fuller sense of our thinkingI know and that even your thoughts first hand your thoughts first hand I know that cooperate closely on this CZ talks talks 81 CSj go to to Moscow Moscow to to give go give more importantly to more importantly to you and I need to you aa you get get you and I need to cooperate closely on this Second be reached reached the the U S U S Second if if aa fair fair and and workable workable agreement agreement can can be would be prepared to participate with the UN NATO and others to would be prepared to participate with the UN one NATO and othersof to implement help address key concern implement it it This This itself itself will will help address one key concern of the Bosnians And II would hope if agreement can be reached reached that that the Bosnians And would hope if agreement can be Russia would participate in it 81' Russia would participate in it tST We We want want to to work work to to has to be modified has to be modified strengthen Vance Owen plan plan but but II think think it strengthen the the Vance Owen it to be successful S1' to be successful Third will require require us us to to raise raise the the Third getting getting aa good good agreement agreement will price believe we we should price of of aggression aggression and and ethnic ethnic cleansing cleansing II believe should enforce the no-fly zone accelerate work on a war crimes enforce the no-fly zone accelerate work on a war crimes •BECLASSIFIED DECLASSHllEB SECRET -E 0 13S26 Stc 3 5 -SEGRE T Declassifv on on OADR _O Wttite-HouEBCiptiaik White 11 2fMt6 Declassify OADR ne i le l• • • _ •• •• _ i· • crOTT -gECnB¥ tribunal and tribunal and II want to 9et want to get point 7 point S6 tighten tighten back back to to sanctions enforcement against Serbia And sanctions enforcement against Serbia And you with some specific ideas on that last you with some specific ideas on that last II have also reiterated Bush's have the alsoconsequences reiterated President President Bush's about of spreading the about the consequences of spreading the the no-fly zone could give our warnings the no-fly zone could give our warnings warnings to warnings to Belgrade Belgrade war to Kosovo Enforcing war to Kosovo Enforcing credibility 8 ' credibility IJS All the parties will have to and we going to All the parties will have to compromise compromise and for we are arefair going to tell tell the Bosnians that this is their best chance a outcome the Bosnians that this is their best chance for a fair outcome II hope hope you you will will convince convince the the Serbs Serbs they they must must also also compromise compromise $ We also We also effort effort soon on are looking are we looking and hope and we hope that $ for other ways we for have othersome waysspecific we can can to to have some specific help the help the ideas ideas to to humanitarian humanitarian share share with with you you soon on that I1 know is difficult problem for II appreciate know this this is aa very very difficult problem for you you appreciate Russia's historic ties with Serbia and don't want to cause Russia's historic ties with Serbia and don't want to cause trouble for you at home But if ethnic cleansing is seen trouble for you at home But if ethnic cleansing is seen as as aa successful way to deal with minority problems then ethnic successfuloutside way to Russia deal with minority problems then ethnic Russians could be at risk too 21 Russians outside Russia could be at risk too II am looking forward to meeting soon ammany looking forward to agenda meeting you you soon so so that that we we can can discuss discuss the issues on our J21 the many issues on our agenda I1 know know Secretary Secretary Christopher Christopher will will meet meet with with Foreign Foreign Minister Minister Kozyrev on February 25 in Geneva At that time they can Kozyrev on February 25 in Geneva At that time they can finalize arrangements for our meeting I very much support you finalize arrangements for our meeting I very much support you and believe the U S can be of help II believe believe that together and believe the U S can be of help that together we can to we can bring bring aa successful successful conclusion conclusion to the the crisis crisis in in Bosnia Bosnia Thank you Mr President 81 Thank you Mr President President Yeltsin Mr President thank you very much for President Yeltsin Mr President thankkind you words very much for your calling II want to thank you for your and for calling want to thank you for your kind words and for your wishes of cooperation between our two countries and for giving wishes of cooperation between our two countries and for giving priority to your relations with Russia 3' priority to your relations with Russia II am looking to the 25 meeting between Kozyrev amChristopher looking forward forward to hope the February February 25come meeting between Kozyrev and I do they will up with ideas for and Christopher I do hope they will come up with ideas for the the country where we will meet and the timing We have a number of country where we will meet and the timing We have a number of issues between you issues that that must must be be discussed discussed between you and and me me Concerning Yugoslavia II personally personally fully the Concerning Yugoslavia fully support support the Vance-Owen Vance-Owen plan these are two distinguished people one of whom is plan these are two distinguished people one of whom is Serbs American We will certainly bring pressure to bear on the American We will certainly bring pressure to bear on the Serbs On but On the the whole whole certain certain changes changes may may be be introduced introduced to to Vance-Owen Vance-Owen but on the whole I don't believe there is an alternative to that on the whole I now don't believe there is an alternative to that plan We are working with the leaders of former Yugoslavia plan We are now working with the leaders of former Yugoslavia Milosevic Milosevic Karadzic Karadzic and and others others II was was really really discouraged discouraged and and distressed while he distressed that that Karadzic Karadzic spoke spoke on on behalf behalf of of the the Serbs Serbs while he was was in in the the U S U S and and departed departed from from Vance-Owen Vance-Owen in in his his speech speech at at the the UN I think it would be useful if the U S took measures to UN I think it would be useful if the U S took measures to bring the bring the Moslems Moslems to to hear hear the the voice voice of of reason reason Our Our Ambassador Ambassador to to S6€RET H SECRET the be ready the UN UN Vorontsov Vorontsov will will be ready to to cooperate cooperate with with your your special special representative We hope that when Vance-Owen is endorsed by the representative We hope that when Vance-Owen is endorsed by the UN Security Council it will be supported too including in UN Security Council it will be supported too including in enforcing No-Fly-Zone But used only enforcing the the No-Fly-Zone But force force should should be be used only as as aa means of support for the Vance-Owen plan Let me say again means of support for the Vance-Owen plan Let me say again -— we we will do our best to use our influence to convince the Serbs -81 will do our best to use our influence to convince the Serbs Also Also taking taking account account of of the the negative negative views views that that Karadzic Karadzic expressed to the Vance-Owen plan perhaps the expressed to the Vance-Owen plan perhaps the U S U S could could use use its its clout to get the Serbs in the U S to motivate Karadzic to clout to get the Serbs in the U S to motivate Karadzic to endorse plan 8 endorse the the plan gr II want want to to thank thank you you for for your your views views on on the the priority priority and and importance importance of the U S -Russian relationship I would like to of the U S -Russian relationship I would like to say say again again that that when when Kozyrev Kozyrev and and Christopher Christopher meet meet II do do hope hope you you will will have have proposals place proposals for for our our meeting meeting II hope hope the the meeting meeting will will take take place real soon I don't think the meeting should be postponed real soon I don't think the meeting should be postponed later later than mid-March than mid-March After After all all the the world world at at large large is is looking looking forward forward to to the the outcome outcome of of the the summit summit of of the the U S U S President President and and the the President President of of Russia Russia Everyone Everyone is is waiting waiting to to see see if if your your foreign foreign policy will change I think that the policies of our policy will change I think that the policies of our two two countries countries will will cause cause aa reaction reaction and and echoes echoes in in the the policies policies of of smaller countries I am really looking forward to smaller countries I am really looking forward to our our meeting meeting real $ real soon soon gr The The President President Thank Thank you you very very much much U U President just want promise to President Yeltsin Yeltsin II just want to to promise to do do our our best best bring pressure on the Serbs especially Milosevic bring pressure on the Serbs especially Milosevic Thank Thank calling calling Mr Mr President President II really really appreciate appreciate the the call call and and calls should take place on a regular basis un calls should take place on a regular basis J8T The The President President II agree agree to to you you for for think think Thank Thank you you very very much much and and good-bye good-bye -— End End of of Conversation Conversation -— O octmET U U