SECRE'J • B€RETTHE WHITE HOUSE THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED · R O 115· 6 F J - E PER E 0 13526 I • - t '-o u · o 3 -1 1 0' '1 £H f 'o 1 o L O WASHINGTON MEETING WITH MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN DATE April 3-4 3-4 1993 DATE April 1993 LOCATION Vancouver Canada LOCATION Vancouver Canada FROM FROM I I ANTHONY LAK LAKo ANTHONY PURPOSE PURPOSE 1 1 To personal relationship relationship with with Yeltsin Yeltsin and and To develop develop your your personal to discuss a wide variety of economic security and to discuss a wide variety of economic security and foreign our two two countries foreign policy policy issues issues that that concern concern our countries 2 2 To how the the Russian Russian To hear hear from from President President Yeltsin Yeltsin how political crisis has affected his plans plans for reform political crisis has affected his for reform home and for a foreign policy based on partnership home and for a foreign policy based on partnership dialogue dialogue 3 3 To To convey convey commitment commitment strengthen strengthen at at and and in ways U S U S and in constructive constructive ways and Western Western to the process of reform in ways that will to the process of reform in ways that will Yeltsin and that process Yeltsin and that process KEY POINTS KEY POINTS Review his country's Review Yeltsin's Yeltsin's vision vision of of his country's future future including plans for the April 25 referendum and the including plans for the April 25 referendum and the continuation of economic reform continuation of economic reform Present a two-phased strategy for support of Russian Present a two-phased strategy for support of Russian reform reform based based on on our our $1 6 $1 6 billion billion core core bilateral bilateral economic assistance package humanitarian economic assistance package humanitarian support support concessional technical assistance concessional food food sales sales technical assistance encouragement of greater U S trade and investment and encouragement of greater U S trade and investment and nuclear nuclear dismantlement dismantlement assistance assistance and and aa longer-term longer-term program of expanded bilateral support program of expanded bilateral support Review Review our our support support for for concerted concerted G-7 G-7 development development of of aa substantial multilateral package for Russia and goals substantial multilateral package for Russia and goals for for the the April April 14-15 14-15 meeting meeting of of Foreign Foreign and and Finance Finance ministers in Tokyo ministers in Tokyo ' _ Encourage an acceleration in implementation of START I I ' and and ratification ratification of of START START II II and discuss problems associated particularly as they associated with with these these treaties treaties particularly as they affect the three other states with nuclear weapons affect the three other states with nuclear weapons Present Present an an agenda agenda for for expanded expanded cooperation cooperation on on defense defense and security issues with an emphasis on and security issues with an emphasis on nonproliferation nonproliferation defense defense cooperation cooperation and and cooperative cooperative peacekeeping peacekeeping BCRE'f -ggCRET- Declassify on OADR PHOTOCOPY photocopy WJC handwriting HANDWRITING y jQ 2 SEC E'f' Russian military the Russian of the the role Express Express concern concern about about the role of military still still stationed stationed outside outside the the Russian Russian Federation Federation particularly particularly those those troops troops in in the the Baltics Baltics Moldova Moldova Tadzhikstan and Georgia Georgia and Tadzhikstan Russia as treat Russia to treat Underscore Underscore your your determination determination to as an an policy foreign of discussion the in partner equal equal partner in the discussion of foreign policy issues issues such such as as Bosnia Bosnia the the Middle Middle East East Peace Peace Process Process Iran and Iraq Somalia Somalia Iraq and Iran fate the fate Russian concerns to Russian Respond Respond positively positively to concerns about about the other the in living Russians million 25 the of of the 25 million Russians living in the other republics republics of of the the Former Former Soviet Soviet Union Union but but stress stress the the peacefully problem this with importance importance of of dealing dealing with this problem peacefully II II BACKGROUND BACKGROUND Yeltsin's Yeltsin's Interests Interests most the most two of Vancouver after you in with you meets with Yeltsin meets Yeltsin in Vancouver after two of the August since life political Russian in weeks tumultuous tumultuous weeks in Russian political life since August 1991 1991 when when he he first first came came to to power power as as the the leader leader of of Russia's Russia's Russian the outside tank a atop democracy fledgling fledgling democracy atop a tank outside the Russian has survived He building parliament building parliament He has survived an an effort effort to to impeach impeach him of strip to Parliament the by attempts several and him him and several attempts by the Parliament to strip him of many -challengers numerous faced has He powers his his powers He has faced numerous challengers -- many of of whom whom would would like like to to be be Russia's Russia's next next president president but but none none of of support popular and stature personal much as have whom whom have as much personal stature and popular support that that people with the Yeltsin Yeltsin retains retains with the Russian Russian people and political system the Communist Yeltsin is Yeltsin is aa survivor survivor of of the Communist political system and what knows He terms Russian in politician aa consummate consummate politician in Russian terms He knows what he he needs needs from from you you in in order order for for the the Russian Russian people people to to regard regard April 25 prepares for As he this this summit summit as as aa success success As he prepares for the the April 25 one least at have times all at will he referendum referendum he will at all times have at least one eye eye on on home perceived at you is with you meeting with his meeting how his how is perceived at home The The Vancouver Vancouver summit summit helps helps Yeltsin Yeltsin in in many many ways ways the people and his people times shows this times trip abroad A trip A abroad at at this shows his and the has he and home at down settled have things that world world that things have settled down at home and he has crisis the weathered weathered the crisis by being treated He He gains gains in in stature stature from from being treated as as an an equal equal by by underscored perception a -President American the the American President --a perception underscored by foreign a with abroad meeting first your that fact the the fact that your first meeting abroad with a foreign leader leader is is with with the the leader leader of of Russia Russia policy as the criticism blunt the He He can can blunt criticism of of his his foreign foreign policy as home bring can he if pro-Western too being being too pro-Western if he can bring home tangible tangible mutual advantage mantle of the mantle under the assistance assistance under of mutual advantage and and partnership partnership EHlCREP -SECRB SECRE'f 3 OBei BT The The Context Context and and Content Content of of the the Summit Summit This summit past decades by its This summit differs differs from from all all others others in in past decades by its emphasis on economic issues This symbolizes the dramatic emphasis on economic issues This symbolizes the dramatic turn No turn in in U S -Russian U S -Russian elations relations during during the the past past year year No longer adversaries w now find ourselves as one of the longer adversaries we now find ourselves as one of the strongest supporters f Russian reforms strongest supporters of Russian reforms I 1 Yeltsin Yeltsin knows knows that that you you spoke spoke out out strongly strongly in in support support of of expanded aid to RussiJ one year ago the precise expanded aid to Russia one year ago the precise anniversary anniversary of of your your Annapolis Annapolis speech speech on on April April 1 1 He He is is deeply deeply appreciative that during this most recent crisis appreciative that during this most recent crisis you you never never wavered in your support of Russian reform and of his wavered in your support of Russian reform and of his personal role as the leader of the reform process will personal role as the leader of the reform process He He will be grateful but not 0bligated to you for this Kozyrev be grateful but not obligated to you for this Kozyrev has has undoubtedly you are partner who who is undoubtedly told told him him that that you are aa serious serious partner is prepared to to offer more than than just just words words in reform prepared offer more in support support of of reform But he also is aware that you were elected primarily to But he also is aware that you were elected primarily to be be aa domestic issues pre ident not to give Russia billions domestic issues president not to give Russia billions of of dollars new aid dollars in in new aid Yeltsin Yeltsin will will wonder wonder how how your your thinking thinking has has evolved evolved on on aid aid to to Russia what you intend to propose to Congress and whether Russia what you intend to propose to Congress and whether or not you can bring the G-7 along for a realistic multior not you can bring the G-7 along for a realistic multi­ billion billion dollar dollar multilhteral multilateral financial financial assistance assistance package package • Yeltsin must must prove prove to to an public that that Yeltsin an increasingly increasingly skeptical skeptical public reform is the solutioh to not the cause of their economic reform is the solution to not the cause of their economic pain He pain He will will want want to to know know what what the the United United States States intends intends to do to make the pain more bearable and whether you to do to make the pain more bearable and whether you understand how how profound profound the the political political backlash backlash will will be be both both understand domestically and in foreign policy if his opponents convince domestically and in foreign policy if his opponents convince the public that came to with aa tin tin cup cup the Russian Russian public that he he came to Vancouver Vancouver with or that you failed to' take him seriously or to treat Russia or that you failed to' take him seriously or to treat Russia as Nationalism is as an an equal equal Nationalism is not not only only aa disease disease of of the the Balkans Balkans If the summit they most most likely If there there are are any any surprises surprises at at the summit they likely will be in the econom c area Yeltsin's advisers will be in the economic area Yeltsin's advisers have have spoken the need need for net costing spoken of of the for aa social social safety safety net costing billions of dollars abd Yeltsin may ask you take charge billions of dollars and Yeltsin may ask you to to take charge of the campaign to corral the G-7 and others of the campaign to corral the G-7 and others into into putting putting up up the the money money for for this this as as well well as as for for aa ruble ruble stabilization stabilization fund As you know we are considering this idea you can fund As you know we are considering this idea and and you can discuss it in generai terms with Yeltsin without making discuss it in general terms with Yeltsin without making any any firm He firm commitments commitments He may may ask ask for for large large sums sums of of money money for for conversion thus hoping to dismantle the military conversion thus hoping to dismantle the military industrial industrial complex plant complex and and soften soften the the opposition opposition of of the the large large plant managers and factory workers to his reforms He managers and factory workers to his reforms He not not only only may want more but he may want it sooner and without the may want more but he may want it sooner and without the conditionali ty which which we we have have always conditionality always attached attached • Security Security and and foreign foreign policy policy issues issues will will also also be be an an important important part of the Vancouver agenda The security agenda will part of the Vancouver' agenda The security agenda will focus primarily on focus primarily on implementing implementing the the deep deep START START reductions reductions negotiated earlier and preventing proliferation negotiated earlier and preventing proliferation of of nuclear nuclear 1 CRET- £ECRE r' 4 and weapon systems Vancouver and high high technology technology weapon systems of of all all kinds kinds Vancouver provides an opportunity to stress to Yeltsin the importance provides an opportunity to stress to Yeltsin the importance of partnership in of cooperation cooperation and and partnership in achieving achieving these these important important policy goals and to stress the priority of convincing policy goals and to stress the priority of convincing Ukraine Ukraine to to ratify ratify START START and and the the NPT NPT You will want to to stress we would would like You will want stress that that we like to to work work with with Yeltsin rather than against him in resolving problems Yeltsin rather than against him in resolving problems in in proliferation proliferation and and that that such such an an approach approach can can be be profitable profitable for for both both sides sides Your Your meetings meetings should should emphasize emphasize our our wish wish to to work together with the Russian defense and militarywork together with the Russian defense and militaryindustrial mutually beneficial beneficial industrial establishments establishments to to develop develop mutually contacts contacts The The only only surprise surprise in in this this area area may may be be that that we we are are unable unable to conclude as expected a deal which would give to conclude as expected a deal which would give substance substance to this new new cooperative relationship This to this cooperative security security relationship This involves the $9 billion deal to buy highly enriched involves the $9 billion deal to buy highly enriched uranium uranium from from the the Russians Russians It It is is still still under under active active discussion discussion by by the the American American and and Russian Russian negotiating negotiating teams teams and and might might --- but but only only might might --- still still come come to to closure closure by by Saturday Saturday • Another be negotiated by Saturday Another agreement agreement that that will will not not be negotiated by Saturday but which you can raise with Yeltsin in outline but which you can raise with Yeltsin in outline involves involves granting granting Russia Russia access access to to the the commercial commercial space space launch launch market market Thus Thus space space trade trade agreement agreement worth worth at at least least $280 million in business to the Russians is one that they they $280 million in business to the Russians is one that have sought for a long time It is an important symbol have sought for a long time It is an important symbol of of our acceptance of their-high-technolo gy industries our acceptance of their high-technology industries on on world world markets markets There There are are many many obstacles obstacles some some on on our our side side such such as as possible job losses to arriving at a satisfactory possible job losses to arriving at a satisfactory agreement agreement Our Our cooperation cooperation on on foreign foreign policy policy has has been been quite quite good good but but we may now be entering a more rocky period We are we may now be entering a more rocky period We are pressing pressing for for tougher tougher economic economic sanctions sanctions and and aa no-fly no-fly zone zone in in former former Yugoslavia and are expecting the Russians to stick with the the Yugoslavia and are expecting the Russians to stick with UN resolutions on Iran and Iraq The cost of these sanctions UN resolutions on Iran and Iraq The cost of these sanctions to to the the Russian Russian economy economy runs runs in in the the billions billions We We will will press press the Russians to move in tandem with us but with the Russians to move in tandem with us but with the the April April 25 25 referendum referendum only only three three weeks weeks away away Yeltsin's Yeltsin's priorities priorities will be on shoring up his domestic support will be on shoring up his domestic support • We We should should let let Yeltsin Yeltsin know know we we recognize recognize that that human human rights rights violations against ethnic Russians have occurred violations against ethnic Russians have occurred in in the the states states of of the the former former Soviet Soviet Union Union and and that that the the situation situation of of the Russian Russian diaspora warrants close But the the the diaspora warrants close attention attention But corollary a unilateral unilateral Russian corollary ---a Russian assertion assertion that that Russia Russia will will act as regional peacekeeper for conflicts on the periphery act as regional peacekeeper for conflicts on the periphery of is one of the the Former Former Soviet Soviet Union Union ---is one neither neither we we nor nor the the other FSU republics can accept You should stress other FSU republics can accept You should stress the the requirement for peaceful resolution resolution of these conflicts requirement for peaceful of these conflicts and and for Yeltsin to gain greater control over for Yeltsin to gain greater control over the the Russian Russian armies armies located located in in the the new new states states ECRET STCITETT 5 ■• eCR T It understand that we are It is is important important for for Yeltsin Yeltsin to to understand that we are developing our own relations with all the newly developing our own relations with all the newly independent independent states mutual interest but that that these these will will states on on the the basis basis of of mutual interest but not be at the expense of Russian interests Our military not be at the expense of Russian interests Our military is is eager to expand low-level defense cooperation with the eager to expand low-level defense cooperation with the Baltic Baltic states states and and with with the the other other countries countries This This is is aa particularly sensitive topic for the Russians Russians and we can particularly sensitive topic for the and we can tell them we are prepared to go slowly in this area This tell them we are prepared to go slowly in this area This is is especially especially true true for for Ukraine Ukraine with with which which Russian Russian has has many many disputes military assets the control disputes over over debt debt military assets and and the control and and possession of nuclear weapons possession of nuclear weapons Your Your Agenda Agenda You You are are the the first first Democratic Democratic President President to to meet meet with with aa Russian leader since President Carter met Leonid Russian leader since President Carter met Leonid Brezhnev Brezhnev in in June 1979 in Vienna The Russians will want to know what June 1979 in Vienna The Russians will want to know what will be different now that both will be different now that the the Republicans Republicans are are gone gone --- both in content and in tone And they will wonder whether it in content and in tone And they will wonder whether it will be good or bad for them Yeltsin admired Bush will be good or bad for them Yeltsin admired George George Bush and trusted him He was clearly anxious after your election and trusted him He was clearly anxious after your election that that the the U S U S might might take take its its eye eye off off Russia Russia due due to to our our economic challenges here at home He clearly should economic challenges here at home He clearly should be be buoyed by your support for him during the last two weeks buoyed by your support for him during the last two weeks Still politician Still Yeltsin Yeltsin is is an an instinctive instinctive and and emotional emotional politician What you say to him and how you say it will set What you say to him and how you say it will set the the tone tone of of your relationship with him for however long he remains in your relationship with him for however long he remains in power power Despite problems Russia need for Western Despite the the problems Russia faces faces its its need for Western assistance and the psychologica l trauma it has assistance and the psychological trauma it has suffered suffered in in losing both its empire and its national identity losing both its empire and its national identity the the first first point point you you should should be be stressing stressing is is that that this this is is very very much much aa meeting of equals meeting of equals 0 Russia Russia needs needs our our assistance assistance but but we we reforms to succeed in order to have reforms to succeed in order to have the time time to to reshape reshape our the our own own economy economy budget budget need need Russian Russian the resources resources and the and and the defense and cut cut the defense Russia needs needs to to strengthen partnership with with us us on Russia strengthen its its partnership on foreign policy issues because its military can no foreign policy issues because its military can no longer longer defend defend Russian Russian interests interests by by threat threat and and brute brute force But Russian cooperation is essential to all force But Russian cooperation is essential to all our our efforts at the UN on Yugoslavia Iraq North Korea efforts at the UN on Yugoslavia Iraq North Korea or or Somalia s for Somalia The The opportunitie opportunities for peace peace in in the the Middle East for isolating Quadhafi or Hussein Middle East for isolating Quadhafi or Saddam Saddam Hussein for building a broader European security community for building a broader European security community are are significantly significantly reduced reduced if if Russia Russia turns turns away away from from us us • fECRET SECRE'Jl 6 Russia Russia can can no no longer longer threaten threaten us us militarily militarily as as it it once did but we cannot curb the spread of nuclear once did but we cannot curb the spread of nuclear technologies weaponry if technologies or or advanced advanced weaponry if Russia Russia decides decides it it is in its national interest to sell rather than is in its national interest to sell rather than to to scrap scrap its its enormous enormous stockpile stockpile of of weapons weapons You You will will be be able able to to stress stress that that you you have have structured structured your your economic program so as to have an immediate economic program so as to have an immediate visible visible impact impact on on those those Russians Russians whose whose support support is is crucial crucial to to the the success success of of reform reform Likewise Likewise with with the the security security package package you you will will be be able able to to emphasize emphasize that that you you are are reaching reaching out out to to the the armed armed forces and to the defense industrial establishment with forces and to the defense industrial establishment with programs that programs that acknowledge acknowledge their their influence influence on on economic economic change change as well as on political developments in Russia as well as on political developments in Russia Finally Finally you you will will be be able able to to say say that that you you have have energized energized the the G-7 G-7 nations to take a more comprehensive fast-track nations to take a more comprehensive fast-track approach approach to to assistance assistance You You clearly clearly are are in in this this for for the the long long haul haul and and are are committed committed to to asking asking the the Congress Congress for for additional additional funds funds to to implement many of the programs developed in the expanded implement many of the programs developed in the expanded options options paper paper you you requested requested You to suggest You thus thus will will be be in in aa position position to suggest to to President President Yeltsin the importance of working in a mutually reinforcing Yeltsin the importance of working in a mutually reinforcing way M___ -- the words of his Foreign Minister when he the words of his Foreign Minister when he was was in in wav Washington last week Yeltsin needs to deliver on Washington last week Yeltsin needs to deliver on the the changes changes he he promised promised when when he he declared declared presidential presidential rule rule --- he he needs to get the Central Bank under control so that the needs to get the Central Bank under control so that the issuance issuance of of credits credits is is checked checked and and the the money money supply supply is is stabilized High inflation is killing the Russian stabilized High inflation is killing the Russian economy economy and and no no amount amount of of assistance assistance will will help help if if Yeltsin Yeltsin does does not not meet this challenge You should tell Yeltsin that meet this challenge You should tell Yeltsin that you you are are prepared prepared to to help help him him with with technical technical assistance assistance with with programs that trade and programs that will will encourage encourage American American trade and investment investment if he takes the politically difficult steps if he takes the politically difficult steps required required to to get get Russia's finances under control Russia's finances under control The The fact fact that that you you have have energized energized the the G-7 G-7 process process makes makes it it possible to be responsive to Yeltsin's needs without possible to be responsive to Yeltsin's needs without devoting devoting the the whole whole summit summit to to an an explanation explanation of of why why the the U S U S alone cannot meet them Instead you will be able to alone cannot meet them Instead you will be able to focus focus the the meeting meeting on on what what we we can can deliver deliver now now and and what what we we hope hope to to deliver in the next few months alone and in concert deliver in the next few months alone and in concert with with our our allies allies and and friends friends Yeltsin Yeltsin is is likely likely to to appreciate appreciate the the fact that everything offered in the core package fact that everything offered in the core package is is for for real real -In -- no no smoke smoke and and mirrors mirrors and and no no empty empty promises promises In this this case case at least less is more Your package will directly at least less is more Your package will directly help help the the daily daily lives lives of of the the Russian Russian people people -B CR 'f -SEGRET- PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING 5ECRB SECRB¥ 7 III III SEQUENCE SEQUENCE You meetings with with Yeltsin Yeltsin The You will will have have four four separate separate meetings The first meeting is a lunch with President Yeltsin and Prime first meeting is a lunch with President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Mulroney and a very small group of aides The Minister Mulroney and a very small group of aides The afternoon with afternoon session session on on Saturday Saturday is is aa one-on-one one-on-one with notetakers The third is a working dinner on notetakers The third is a working dinner on Saturday Saturday evening issues The fourth fourth is is an an evening devoted devoted to to economic economic issues The expanded meeting on Sunday morning dedicated to security and expanded meeting on Sunday morning dedicated to security and foreign policy issues foreign policy issues • BECKE SECRET