This document released by the USSTRATCOM FOIA Office on 24 May 2023 under FOIA request · 23-F-045 ____ _ - TOP SECRET _ NUWEP ISSUE PAPER BACKGROUND policy bas specified limit un-·· that our fi wanted OJ purpose for this restriction is to ·•c •7 r •ww• t options would be perceived by the restraint could be exercised To support was developed to ti 1i i 1 Yt 'f •· ·· •· TO• noo c· r• mcT•· ' The ¾ ' _ Yµ' in the hope mutual the current t T1 cJ£i•t 1 for withholding attack During development of the p ' NUWEP it was recognized that 1nore s plicit t t n m q w i t # r 1 • 1 t · 2 1 tEJ 1 · 1 contr r·· bj tr · -'It s ' questioned whether 1f 1Yf l ©li1 J criterion should be the only measure of m ri ''for ' in the better uid- the JCS responded to continue to be defined h ' more meani 1 1 measure identified to their study to a was adequate tasking by recommend g that c •h ' '-'_ t i ' if i l tI i' l could be existing cri teri l' l the JSTPS limited and concluded that the current criterion Recognizing t ct h' ' ' i ' · f recommendation to' c ntinue the actions were initiated by USD P JCS - ™ First a study was commissioned through DNA for me nt to determine if a more effective criterion for be identified ective TOP SECRET TOP SECRET - NUWEP ISSUE PAPER 1 _ · - - - - - -1 S- b 1 ISSUE The current method for defining and limiting b 1 BACKGROUND Since 1974 b 1 weapons employment policy has specified that our b t should b e planned where possible to limit un-·· wanted 1 1 b 1 and b 1 The purpose f or this restriction is to reduce the probability that b 1 attack options would be perceived by the b 1 · in the hope mutual restraint could be exercised To support this objective the current b 1 b 1 constraint was developed to provide the capability for withholding attack on targets b 1 During development of the b 1 NUWEP it was recognized that more a plicit and refined guidance was required with respect to the b 1 criterion £ While damage to b 1 may b an important fs tor relating to escalation control objectives it was questioned whether b 1 b 1 criterion should be the only measure of meri for lefining and limiting b 1 • However in the absence i a better criterion b 1 · dam e guidance b 1 and the JCS were tasked to report b t ability to achieve attac option objectives In b t b 1 b 1 the JCS responded to the NUWEP tasking by recommend g that continue to be defined as b 1 or This recommendation was based upon a JSTPS analysis b 1 Instead of addressing whether a more meaningful measure of b 1 could be identified to supplement or replace the existing criterion the JSTPS limited their study to a b J and concluded that the current criterion was adequate · JCS JSTPS an lysis and the two - Firsti a study was commissioned through DNA for ment to determine if a more effective criterion for be identified Second the DepSecDef tasked the· Chairman to continue to -pursue evel- - opment O ' J· · r _ JtY·t· '' t· t' ·tt t t ' i'tY1·· '• I ' ··· · --r1 ·• • ·''llY f ' '1 f · iitil t l¼ ' ii d id ' h ' h ·- · · L TOP SECRET - - t' ' i u ' ' X ·· · i • h f i X t · ' ·· i 1 ' i 0 • · 1 is the most effective S£CRET I 2 t ii • measures However during the existing guidance Consequently b 1 · ' ' ' j ' 1 F j fJ' i j1 i j - ---- ·-- -- -- - • • - - effect until revised DISCUSSION There is now general tsi' i wr 1iiM1 i1mif _ ii' i1ii t t l Consequently the as worked closely to support the DNA study and has tasked b · to conduct a similar study as an independent assessment stressing g yji w0i l'i ifjf as well as the gl 4 The most important facto ' regarding in terms of ···· is tbat it is defined onl I ' military attack option a hypothetical weapons application against targets b As indicated by the circles labeled A and B assumed to represent While some damage would result from the lower weapon c l rcle B to the -H v 1'f t would cause damage in excess of the - and consequently would be subject t e ' t • ·TOP SECRET criterion JOR__ SECgET b t f0P SECRET 3 00 SECRET 4 Turning to the study results DNA evaluated the current b 1 in or around b t each in the b 1 • The attack options developed corresponded respectively The DNA Study concluded that the current methodology t 1 because the b 1 probably could not b 1 This conclusion is based upon two primary factors as discussed above b 1 First the current methodology for the b 1 and attack options studied a relatively small For use of example the b 1 fS-7 The b Stud emphasized b 1 a the current t 1 es·calation control perspective on which the and the b 1 in arriving at the following conclusions would be ineffective from an b the l J lt warning a f the t even further the importance of for ' 1j and 1 1-- ·· uestionable whether_ any • f9P SECRET ' ORl ltJQ PAPERS - 5 TOP SECRET not yet reported to the SecDef 0 s008 '00 00ii08iJ0i0fis0 1100 the following conclusions reached currently purpose of are -S 3- The a be ter to the decisionmaker continuing with respect criterion to read as follows for the The specific damage Secretary of Defense TOP SECRET WORKtNO PAPERS