l • • OEPA TMENT OF STATE ACTION MEMORANDUM •' S S • ' SECRE4' NOOIS August 13 1977 fr Tp The Acting Secreta Y FROM S AS - Philip J Farley I SUBJECT The South African Nuclear Test Issu8 Next Steps E025x1 CIA Issue for Decision The purpose' of this memorandum is to obtain your approval for steps t he US should take-w · hin the next few days to deal with the South Afric nucl ar test problem Esse ntial Factors Based on our present in£ mation it appears probable that the SAG has construct an u derground nuclear test facility _ - - -- --- --- -1 as claim€d by the Soviets We do not anticipate acquiring additional information in the near term which would permit us to draw a definitive conclusion regarding the nature of this facility or determine whether an actual test is imminent We believe it essential that the US act immediately on the basis of current i formation Failure to do so · might increas e the risk Lhat South Africa will in fact explode a nuclear device Moreover the USSR other concerned allies and Thi rd World countries seem to be looking to us for early action The South African nuclear situation will be an issue at the Lagos Anti-Apartheid Conference _scheduled for August 22 If we hesitate coo l ong the e is a chance that the situation might b eco uncontro llable thro ugh initiatives in the UN Security Council or other measures launched by interested states · SECRE'f XGDS-1 OP SEGRE ATTACHMENT • J NW# 51408 Docid 32604710 l • • GJJCRE'P -2- Next Steps ' At this juncture therefore we recorr mend a course of a tion consisting of the following steps A Instruct Ambassador Bowdler who returnsto Pretoria this weekend to make a further demarche to the South Afri can Government on Monday August 15 A telegram instructing the Ambassador to make this demarche is at Attachment 1 B Simultaneously we would r espond to the Soviets along the lines of attachment 2 which would be forwarded in draft form to the White House C Early -next week we would approach the French to indicate the seriousness of our concern based upon initial independent information regarding thaSoviet Union's charges We would ask the French to join us in an approach to the SAG requesting permissio for both governments to un ertake on-site inspection to determine the nature of the facility unless the South Africans in the meanwh le propose some equally effective approach We would also a k them to join us in emphasizing the serious ess of the onsequences if South Africa · exploded a nuclear device Web lieve that the F ench might well respond positively to this roposal eir nuclear given th e ir concern over nuclear proliferation supply relatit nshi p with South Africa and their overa l l diplo matic interests in the African region Fre ch participation would have a major effect in persuading South Africa to accept the proposal since France is t e dominant supplier of equipment for South Africa's nuclear power program A proposed communication from you t o t e French Foreign Minister in this connection is at attach 3 ______ D If the French agree we would coordi specific joint approach to the SAG as rapidly as possible hopefully by Wednesday August 17 We would ra ·se with France the possibility of adding a third party - a country such as Canada or the UK which is not· a n clear supplier to South Africa -- to enhance the credibility ad acceptability of an on- site inspection We would als rais e the issue of possibly involving IAEA observers in a tion while acknowledg ing that the IAEA may find politically infeasible If the French do not a such a demarche or delay a response for more th n two days SEGRE INW# 51408 Docid 32604710 E025x1 CIA •' SECHECJ -3 • t ' - r we would plan to approach the South Africans ourselves or if possible together with another appropriate government or possibly with IAEA observers In approaching France we would provide as much detail on our independent information as security considerations permit E After consulting with France we would approach the SAG alone or with others to request immediate access to the site by US and other experts to verify its function We would make clear that denial of this request given the existing circumstance would offer the US no choice but to discontinue all nuclear cooperation with the SAG and to consider other appropriate measures consistent with the seriousness of the situation Without speaking for the ench or others we would suggest that major nuclear s ppliers and industralized states genera ly might well react in a comparable mann r We woul d give the SAG only a few days to reply to our request in vi e w of t he imminence of the Lagos Conference and the risk tha t with time they may successfully disguise or alter the facility F If the South Africans agree to our request this will undoubtedly mean that the facility h3s a purpose other than nuclear testing and the immediate crisis would be more controll able Although highly unlikely that they would accept an inspection which could ascert3in the existence of a test site if Lhis occurred e would then insist that the SAG dismantle the f c1l1ty· declare its intention never to test any nuclc rd vice place all its nuclear facilities under immediate internatio al safeguards and initiate steps to ratify the PT If the South Africans refuse on-site inspection but agree to dismantle the Kalahari facility without ac·nowlcdqing its purpose this could be an acceptable outcome -- if combined with such conditions as no further testinq complete safeguards and NPT adherence At this stage it is unclear whether and to what extent other suppliers ould adopt parallel policies G Once we initiate the course of action outlined above a number of other bases need to be touched We should contact the Israelis to make certain that they understand our concerns and take no actions to associate themselves with the SAG on this matter We have to plan strategies for the upcoming Lagos Conference and UN-related initiatives that others might launch e wil 1 also not1 fy the UK Lhe FRG Canad and Japan of our concerns and proposed co rse of action We would ask them to await the SECRE'f NW# 51408 Docid 32604710 DltCLASSIJDD -umcsttY Nt iP l t 111 · SECRET · ' ' - -4• •• result s of our approach before taking further independent initiatives which might interfere with it We might also con ider an emergency meeting of the Nuclear Supplier Group to consult on joint actions if this step appears appropriate Recommendation 1 That you approve the immediate approach to the South Africans and authorize the instruction to Ambassador Bowdler at attachment 1 Approve ------- Disapprove ------- 2 That we forward to the White House the draft text of our reply to - the USSR at attachment 2 Approve ------- Disapprove ------- 3 That you approve the telegram to Paris at attachment 3 and the approach outlined in paragraphs C through G above Approve ------- Disapprove ------- Attachments l - Cable to Ambassador Bowdler 2 3 - Communication to the Soviet Union Communication to French Foreign Minister · Drafted by PM NPP GOplinger S P JKahan ACDA RWilliamson ds 8 13 7 7 ext 21635 I SECRET • NW# 51408 Docid 32604710 oitLASSlft D Autbont ' NlrDl 11 7 OIA b 3 - 50 USC 3507 - CIA CIA ACTION PRETORIA INFO MOSCOW PARIS E O XGDS-1 2 3 TAGS PARM SF E0 25x1 CIA SUBJ Possible South Afri an Nucle REF Pretoria 4021 Sta e 18820 EYES ONLY FOR Tl IE CHARGE AD AMBAS ADOR FROM 1 SECRETARY As a result of ir forma ion we have made careful revi w We have now concluded that there is a substaqti l pro ility that the site we have identi- fied ·s an underground nuclear test · f acility While this not entirely conclusive when combined with prior ev ' dence of an unsafeguarded enrichment plant capable of produ ing highly enriched uranium and evidence of weapons rel R D it now appears likely that South Afritans are eng in nuclear explosives program a nd are further along than 2 c re lized prcviouslv Longer-range strategy fo preventin9 South Africa from b ecoming a nuclear weapons sate as well as follow-on steps we and others might take to c onsideration here However chieve that goal are still under situation is sufficiently serious to justify immediate actions to war11othe South Africans in unambiguous term of the g r ave c ons equences of a nuclear test or other step in the direction of acquir i ng n uclear weapons DECLASSIFIED NW# 51 4 0 8 Docid 32604710 1 uthority NA1J2f_b ' --- Z OIA b 3 ----- -2- with Botha s quickly as possible drawing on the following points a ave noted your previous assurances that your nuclear progra is devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes our independent investigation we have concluded that there is su stantial evidence to support the Soviet alle gations Moreove the possession by South Africa of an unsafeguarded enri hment plant and your persistent delay I in adhering to the b PT have always been grounds for concern I the grave implications the President In light has instructed me to clear that any further steps to acquire or develop an clear explosive capability and above all the detonation of a nuclear device--whethcr a nuclear weapon or a so-called pe ceful nuclear cxplosive--would have the most serious consegue for all aspects of our relations and would be considered b as a serious threat to the peace c We have this will r aise with you in the are needed Lo resolve this future we believe it is concerns to rest Assurances under urgent consideralion and days the steps we believe However in the i mmediat e r own i nterest to put thes e uch as those given on August 10 I I FOIA b 3 - 50 r 51 4 0·B---'l D 'o-c-r-d--- Q3•2·6 C ·4 '1 1 C --------- I use 3507 - CIA CIA DECLASSIFIED AUthority t JAtD b 2 Z I l • • ' • - • ' '- · · t DRAFT ACDA NP RLWilliamson S AS Mr Farley APPROVE The Acting Secretary CLEARANCES IO - Mr Barry ACDA - Mr Van Doren PM - Mr Oplinger S P - Mr Kreisberg EUR - Mr Luers T - Mr Sheinman _ _ AF S - Hr Keoqh • • ' ' NW# 51408 Docid 32604710 ' DECJ Ass1F 1£D Authority W tD t Z J SECRE'P IODI S DRAFT TE EGRAM TO PARIS INFO PRETORIA MOSCOW E O 11652 XGDS-1 TAGS PARM MNUC FR SA SUBJECT South African Nuclear Test Issue TO AMBASSADOR HARTMAN FROM THE SECRETARY 1 Please deliver the following message from the Secretary to Guiringaud as soon as possible 2 QUOTE E025x1 CIA Dear Mr Minister us existence claimed by the USSR of a facility which appears to have many of the essential characteristics of an underground nuclear test site We are unable to conclude definitively that this • facility is ' indeed such a site or to assess whether an actual test might be imminent but on the basis of our present information we believe that the Soviet allegations must be taken with tne utmost seriousness As tne two most important suppliers of nuclear equip- ment and materials to South Africa I believe the United States and France have an urgent and grave responsibility to do everything possible to establish conclusively whether the suspected facility is a nuclear test site and to prevent a nuclear explosion from taking place We have approached the South Af ican Government to express our serious concern Si l ' CRE'f DECLASSIFIED INW# 51408 Docid 32604710 Uthority rJt-iiD ti 217 -------------- ---- --------- - - -- -- -- - -- f FiCRE'f E025x1 CIA clarification of South African intentions their response asserted over the soviet allegations and to -·· to 'peaceful purposes -- a position position in connection with its Government that information test site 4 nuclear test the South African As a next step we are leads us to believe that eminiscent of India's to us independently Soviet allegation of a nuclear L-----------' substantial basis t f is is and that a matter of deep concern to the United States any nuclear explosion would of course have the gravest consequences We would ask for unequivocal confirmation or denial of the existence of such a facility without regard to whether its purpose is characterized as peaceful or otherwise -- ----- - - - - ----- -4-•• - - ' - --- - -- ·-·---- --- I - - - --- ------•·- - J I l Unles i South Africa quickly and persuasively demon strates that there are no grounds for concern we intend by I the middle of next week to request South African permission j believe that the effectiveness of this action would be C for an on-site inspection at the earliest possible time We greatly enhanced if France were to join with us in th e request and participate in any inspection which may result SECRET iD ti I 7 DECLASSIFIED NW# 51408 Docid 32604710 - utbority NA 0 - '• - S CRE'l' -3- I therefore ask you to consider whether you can join us in n approach which we regard as of fundamental importance to our mutual non-proliferation nterests and to interna- ·I tional peace In order to give maximum credibility to any inspection which might result we see some merit in associating some third country such as Canada or entity such as the IAEA in this approach which has no commercial or other interest that would make the findings of the nspection team suspect We would appreciate any views you may have on this question further wish to make this approach to the South African Government on or about August 17 in order to avoid a situation where an explosion might take place or the matter might be brought betore the United Nations Security Council and precipitate actions taken before we are able to take effecthc tive steps to deal with problem We are providing an interim response to the USSR indicating that we take their statement most seriously and asking that they avoid any immediate acti on in the next week which would prejudice practical steps to avoid an explosion 0 I b elieve that as major suppliers to South Africa the US and France will be seen as bearing an important measure of responsibility for nuclear developments in that country How we respond to this situation will also be seen as a test SECRE'i' - - - - -- - NW# 51408 Docid 32604710 DECLASSIFIED Authority NAtDC b -- 2 Z I I - · SECRE'f -4 • - ' - - of effectiveness of supplier cooperation in inhibiting nuc ear proliferation Given the urge ncy of this problem I feel impelled to ask for your urgent considera tion of our proposal 3 SIGNED CYRUS VANCE UNQUOTE We are providing details of sensitive information independently available to us by separate channel for your use with French as appropriate • I Drafted by PM NPP GOplingcr ds 0 SECRE'P DECLASSIFIED NW# 51408 Docid 32604710 Authority tJAjD - lb' Z