•• • No Objection To Declassification 2008 06 04 NLC-24-115 -9-6-3 E SYSTEM MEMORANDUM JIA II NATIONAL SBCUlllTY SECRET SENSITIVE 1 COUNCl✓• t 7 '7 y • A lgust 19 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR ZBIGNIE FROM HENRY R CHARDSON SUBJECT South African Nuclea r Problem ZEZINSKl 111 These thoughts at thia moment Brand FoUl ie's reply to Vance's telegram hie calmness and his unwillingness to immediately contact Botha or Vorster -- provide additional indication that they are stonewalling to buy time or some later event which probably is already in motion It could be denuding the facility of incriminating material It could be less likely the pl eparations for an early nuclear detonation There is of course the charice that they may be telling the truth• If so they could be stringing us along so they can make 'fools of us preferably in front of the Natio nalist Party Congresses opening next week To prevent against this possibility we might phrase all our operative language in the conditional tense e g Pending further proof we believe ••• 11 • But the balance of the best evidence we have is that it is a nuclear test facility and therefore we must go with that pending more er edible information The following is· a tentative scenario aiming to apply increasing pressure towards getting an inspection and other steps constituting aati sfaction 1 An immediate stronger request from Vance back to Botha that they agree immediately to an inspection Reiterate the pressures INLC Review Completed I SECRET £SENSITIVE state Dept review completed IMORI CDF per C03419840 I No Objection To Declassification 2008 06 04 NLC-24-115-9-6-3 •• • SECRET §ENSITIVE - 2 - on ua to go public which we will in some way reepond to depending on them and our seriousness on this matter bevond Lagoa Keep the French f ily informed and urge them to join the demarche and inspection z Young drafts a strong conditional statement at Lagos into his • peech based on our initial strong dernarche but holds it until further word from us 3 If by- Monday e get no satisfactory response from the South Africans the President s nds Vorster a letter mentioning mild ·· appreciation on the more or less helpful trip Botha just made to Salisbury reiterates our seriousness requests an immediate inspection plus other measures such as adherence to the NPT which will iive assurances to the world community with a strong hint at Security Council and other sanctions beyond Lagos if satisfaction is not given Keep in close touch with the French British and Germans and invite sbnilar letters from them at the request of the President 4 Young in strictest confidence generally briefs Obasanjo Spain briefs Nyerere 5 Meanwhile keep close watch on any move towards the Lagos Conference calling for Security Council sanctions against duectly or indirectly South Africa and instruct Andy to stay neutral in any case throughout the Conference we should do nothing more negative on that point than abstain unless the South Africans do something spectacularly cooperative We could so inform the South Africans If events warrant it try to construct a Western Front at Lagos including the USSR behind remaining either neutral or tilting in favor of Security Council action If South Africa is atill l ecalcitrant at the end of the Conference seriously consider voting yes on a final communique incorpol ating an SC reference 6 If South Africa continues to be unavailing Move to call a London Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting at the earlieit moment • • Notify South Africa that we will take the steps below if we get no satisfaction SECRET SENSITIVE No Objection To Declassification 2008 06 04 NLC-24-115-9-6-3 • • ' No Objection To Declassification 2008 06 04 NLC-24-115-9-6-3 SECRET SENSI XYE - 3 - •- Let it be known publicly that we will not discourage Security Council action on either Rhodesia or South Africa -- A public statement by Vance and hopefully the French setting out the gist of our strong demarch a history of our efforts and South African refusal · a public demand for them to adhere to the NPT and declare our Security Council intentions We will in no case cast a veto on an indirect sanction against South Africa framed around Rhodesia but ·publicly reserve our options on direct South African sanctions · 25X1 25X1 I NOTE I have just spoken ·to CIA Their preliminary but confident assessment is that the chances are negligible that the South African facility which we have identified is anything other than a nuclear test facility - - oes not believe that any subsequent assessment which will be here in writing on Monday will differ significantly fro this conclusion SECRET SENSITIVE No Objection To Declassification 2008 06 04 NLC-24-115-9-6-3 ---• -- 'I ' ·-