r DECLASSIFIED Authorityp'HP 979 Sfo S - Mr Smith THIS DOCUMENT REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING 6286 - 18 THIS DOCU'MENT l DECLASSIFIED Authority Kh1f 979 S o Dl PARTMDfT OF STATE Me '°'°' 1a ol Convanatloe UPROffl IY1 t • lieu•- 11 12 62 41a11 DATE of leeretary General of U1 0 1962 DECLASSIFIED E O 13526 Sec 3 3 1 t Date J ·I Z-D fta Pruidaq Kn ti ltillar Secretary General of U1'0 l ftnlatter US Permat a t i v e to MC I rolaler Aa• i • tallt Secretary ftCMel r- COPID 1'0 s s OSD-S o MoNaua S U M G Mr Bowie MP Gerard lalt b r Mr Gilpatrio ISA-Mr N1 • e 8 P-Mr B e1tov EUR-Mr Kobler RA -Mr Fe1aenden GEB-Mr Hillenbrand SOV-Mr OUthrie White Hou•e-Mr BlmclJ' US RO- Aab Pinletter an Bonn-Amb Dowling 7 a ln1U t weleai•• Mr ltikkar fer kia NCOBd rlait to- the u s • op1•• tM converaation •11 nqairiq a out t e atate of tb• llJ1 anc • Nr tikker repli_ tut he t the atate •f tba AlUnre 1 -r-J ly good but th at there were my prot lw _ vna111iau• au usertd ntiea A -er of the IIATO trbaau4on W apprncll•d Ilia before hi• cleparture nul Germ Defeua - 1 ter ltrwa Ila even flOlfll dawn frca Bonn to expre• a • cr •m a Ulr t lli llfCW ftl cliacruaiom with th• PreaiMnt TIie latter'- ref -zrN to _ u not only of political hut n1m ef hutoric i Jlpe'rUase • euaprat_ atat -r vhiall tlid howcaver 111 affrata t • tnaath of the coneel'll lie to cite two TM f int wu tJla w r- ef _pre lw c_____ with larlb com 11tawy 1_ 1 Gil dla Tb u• os-Craz to talk• bu J111t hd a telqr• lillh 'UIII r• ortilll • the Onmcil at 111licb the V _ e au tiw W fwd 1M1l7' cnplai- • • • tJle hading ovar of _ - -•t a • _ to tM wich hd DOt Men olure4 with the CIIJw11 llout wlllch tM J - -« even beft info m cL 1W counttiea lib Cl de vue c apule f • ayi ag tut if they were -1y to l•ara thiap facto 111lidl aight iavolve IIATO 1a oourN• of action tllay wra aot prepared to go aloq Aftft' llr biller - lained ti at il• lM8• '°4nalcmt • ho uot ken euaitted to llA1'0 they ill fut r- r•en_s•• t l t _ ro11w ln-l2M 1-e 1 Gl'O IOIUI - ff am c DECLASSIFIED IAuthorityp'Mf 979 f Sfo -2- i JIINri ouly AIIP 'OtN poaitiODJ or u tter• uout which U7'0 W · iafo1ud the Pruidat uid that be thoaaht we ab011ld _ proriclea the•• paper• earlier Be atlacl that ha had great a pz•i tloa f r the 41 fficultiea which faced Allbuaador flNI I Dll ill tlle nrrent aerciae It vu difficult enoup to pt ap'M at - - - 3 er 4 with 15 different were •t rl•• • likely te fac pualyai1 of efforta at •aotiation However be reputed that be qree4 that we aaat do our beat to bring IIAT'O aloaa am not aive people a acuae to ca plain that they 1Mre not adequately couulte4 a- Stikker theai 1 1cl t ta aach ar re importat' pro lvu tbat of Qeraaay lie had vi itecl Germany often for apeechea ad bad bad talks with top official• trade uni 011 lu _rs aml otbera her• vu clearly a aeme of the grOlri 91 llilitary atrength of the Federal 1 epubU c ad the beginning• of a wave of utiwlia Even Cbanc aallor Adenalurr the ac at luropea of the Qel IUD8 had recently referred with evidat pride to Qeruny u the aecond 1tronpaat of IATO Thea• aentiaaata were coupl S with widaapreacl um ertainty u to United States policy particularly u reaaru the concept of U 11ited war• on the coatineDt u qainat the uu of nuclear wapou Mr Stikk er referred to the cliacuaiom which had been aoing OD inconcluaiYely durin the put year dO'u t MTO 1trate11 lo agree nt had been reacbecl I t • • iaportant that in the forthcoaing cliacuaiona qrewnt N reached if we were D0t to faco seriO d diaunity Thar• were real taticatiou that the Federal l epublic mi pt Hat to poe•••• it• oaa nuclear wapons There were alao i11clicatioaa that the Federal bpul lic and France were talkin toaether about tkia qu eat1on TM Qeraan attitude vu alao reflectaci in the W atern luropean Union lie pereonally felt that an independent a rm maelear capability Iii pt atually be conaiured cup belli by tbe Soviet UDJ oa Tb• Pr ident inquired whether Mr Stikkor 414 not think that the -11era1 Alw•ll rat ••• aware of the clanpr of tbeir iaA -ndent poa1e1aion of nuclear veapou vi•-a-vis the ussa Hr ltildler replied he tboupt they wr• but felt there miaht be no otber way out trau1 ccaplail 94 about lack of even inforaation with rupect to US nuclear capoilitiea to defeJUI KATO he Pnaident challnaed thi• 1tat-nt saying that he vu e the Genuma kllMf a sreat deal OOllt I DECLASSIFIED Authority 979 S abollt the- maelear aituation He vaa aure that what intereated tbaa waa the -tter of the conditions for the · use of military veapoaa Mr Stiller reaponded that Strauss had even cited the fact that there were aome 200 nuclear sites in Germany and that lie did not really know what was in them and rai1ed the question u to what becaae of l'll D aovereignty in 1uch a 1ituation The Preaident 1aid that queation d control of nuclear weapona were different froa mat t er of ai ze and location of 1tock1 However the fact t rr Strauss rahed question1 about lack of iufonut i his a factor which had to be daalt·vith in itte1 ti Aker agreed that this was the caae but vent o ay that he felt this problem waa a wwnag•able one I f the nuclear problem now be approached as he had auggeated by the fonaalization of US guarantees with reapect to the availability of nuclear weapons for the European on •nd and with respect to coverage of targets essential to uropean clefenae thi1 would go far to allay German uneasiness lie alao hoped that aeans could be found to provide a re factual infonution perhap1 to a restricted group Even more iaportant of courae was to give t he Germans a share in the deciaion-makina •• to the use of nuclear weapom He referred in thi• comutction to his auggeations that the other countrie llipt delepte authority to the President for the final decision under agree l guidelines Such guidelines could cover the case of a aaasive nuclear and conventional attack and then more doubtful cases In addition to these the Council would be discussing the question of the poasibility of NATO MltBM force •eferring firat to the question of a multilateral NATO auaile force the President reiterated the statement in his Ottawa speech and a11ured Mr Stikker that the United State was prepared to join in trying to work out plana for this He Dlder1tood that a suggeated paper had already been put forward on this Continuing the Pre1ident said he recognized that the Genu ne might well have a ''natural concern u to the circuastances under which the United States would decide in the face of risk of destruction of it1 own territory to uae nuclear weapons In this connection he coaaented on the difficulties which the French were experiencing in trying to build up a nuclear capability He thought I DECLASSIFIED Authority KA1 979 50 -4- · thoapt tbo Preneh were finding it ao upeuiv• that there wu aoaa 4ianaer of their turniag to the Federal 1 epublic for help On the quution of guicloU n es ha uke4 Jlr Stikker what other c oar lltiou he foreoa uadar which nuclear veapona would 'be aed ID reply Mr Stikur refcn red to the CJerm fcmaala of tbe poaal llity of a decision beina de lty IACIB plua the indiviclu al IIArO country wbicla might ho attackacl Aftff indicating the IIUlCceptability of • ucb a fenaila t Preeidmlt ca nted that he waa • ati• fied that we would in fact be prepared to ue 1111Clur weapou 'before the Federal a»ve1wut would Nr Stikker interject cl hi• agreement The Pre• iclent con ti Dued that on the 1amral queation of control lie a roed that we t make e£forto to do wllataver was nece• aary to lock the Germans into the system The Pruident thin referred to the iaportanc of a buil d-up of IIAl'O'a coavent i onal forc 09 felt it as • eutial that the preaent imbalance N corrected Be realiu 4 that 8 e of our partner• say that thi• aphaaia on conventiODAl forces means that the US will not uae nuclear veapona Be thought however t hat this 111 aany caae• juat u excuae Mr Stikker cwnted that he in fact knew of 011e country which vas del iberately refraining fros cooperatiD3 in conventional build•up which it claimed would in fact sake the American• - re reluctant to u1e nuclear weapons In any event Mr Stildter said he felt that the Council auat take a prGIJll tic approach and have a factual di • cuasion of these probleas It was necesaary to get rid of the prevailing uncertainty Be said there va1 • ome difference between hillaelf and Mr lohler as to tbe eventual de irability of aaending the existing political tirective but confiraed tbat this did not affect agreement on the pragaatic pproach lie turned th• to the queation of Ni• aile X which he understood vu under Jl nd Din the United Btatn •• a poseible replacement for exiating delivery syste s Ba saicl he lacked the technical knowleda• a4equately to deal with this queation but that he hacl given a list of queatiorut to Mr t ohler and Mr lfitze to wllid he had requested annera After Mr Kohler had ind icat d w wuld do our beet to respond to tbeH queatiOllS Mr Stikker ••id he wanted to be aure that t be 1Jnited State woul d take positive appro ch toward helping t o find the answer to this problem -t£1 1'1Yf S-ti615i Htl-f lr __ '11te President ---------------- DECLASSIFIED AuthoritypM ' 979 5fo The Preaident then skN Mr Stiltker how all this would provi tba naedacl ruaaurancea to the Alliance and particularly to tbe Federal bpublic Mr Stf klter replied that he thought baaically if the • uguted uaurance1 were given on the part of the United St tea and guiclelinee worked out with respect to uae of nuclear 'IM4lpoaa thi• would go a long way tow rd oolving the problea It wu true that Stra 18 was carrying on couidaTable agitation but he thought that if Adenauer had aolutiona to the problem now under discussion this would be ufficient for him to keep control of the situation and for any public opinion to subside The PrGtaident co -ented that 1n connection with the nuclear question it was neceseary to think how an attack would actually take place If it were not for the exposed position of Berlin the ai tuation would be different and eaaier to deal with In any event control of nuclear weapons au1t l e abaolute Mr Stikker then cfted the poaaible foraalae which had been conaidered for deciaion making Be cwnted that Adenauer for example had at one time accepted the concept of weighted voting Any f ormul which provided for European participation in the deciaion would probablJ be sufficient to contain German nationalism However he wanted to taphasue that 8011119 positive result mu t be reached In response to a question from the President Allb Jiaador Finletter then referre4 to the problem of poa1ible amendmant of the McMahon Act He pointed out that while the US veto applied to present atockpile arrangement• a different prohlem would be preaented by aultilaterally-owned NATO force This impli mult i lateral control and almost any acceptable formula llight 10 beyond the legal authority of the Act as it nov atooci The United Stat a should ke pan open mind and the President might want to aonaider whether or not it might be better to take the initiative uu1 simply go ahead on the US side with having the Act amended Without c nting directly on this question the Pre•iden t ••sured Mr Stikker that in ury event w supported his efforts to arrive at a solution of these probl which would reassure the Alliance R• thought that our otm objective• and Mr Stikker' • were fm1daaent l ly the U111 to prevent t he development of a demand for an independent national nuclear capabi l i ty by the Federal IIOvermneat and to achieve strict and respons ible control of nuclear weapons whether thi s was a que • t ion of US control or whether it wu a que tion of others shari ng in t hat control On the DECLASSIFIED Authority Ml • -6- 011 the t aitiatiw of Mr ltiltker there then amuad a diacus•ion of the queation of tbe UI veto on the uae of ma clear weapon• with 'both Ir ltikbr and Alll uaador Fi nlettc ••tiaating that tbare • tpt be •w diffic ulti•• if a US veto were iawlve4 Ir IOhler aaid that it wu cl ear that under ed att aa legialation the Preaident alone vu re•ponaible for a cleciaioa to relaue nuclear veapona for WI• and that it would be MCeaaary for the United States to retain a veto over any auch cleciaion In the circuaatances the United Statea tzwnt could not itaelf make an offer to give up this authority Indeed to do 10 could cut HIie doubt on our own willingneas to u1e the nuclear we pOll in defense of W'O If our Europe allies clid not fNl coapletely uaured on this basia then it would 1M up to tbaa to put forward any propoaals which they wanted ua to comider Thu a under preaent legislation the aost that could be done would be to ••Y that we would consider auch propoaals if they were aade The President confiraeci this atat at and went on to point out that there would he couict rable difficultiea c01D1ecteci with th• aaendaeut of the Ndlahoa kt -- indeed there could be a very bitter fi ht on the 8'11 ject While we wanted to do our utaost to reaa1ure our alliea he hoped that a aolution could be found which would apare u thi• difficulty 979 Sfo