This document ocmo ists of page§ liumber L of 5 copios Seriea tt • NE E FMDickman 3 28 63 Memo 'PBP Bf eR e'f SUBJECT Task Force Meeting No 1 - Arms Control of the Near East PARTICIPANTS NEA - James P Grant INR - Robert B Elwood S P - William 'Polk NE - Robert C Strong NE E Francois M Dickman COPIES TO Declassified Case NW# 57160 Date 09-18-2023 NE - Mr Dickman - 5 cc • • I • Mr Grant said he had called the meeting to establish a small task force on arms ontrol in the Near East in part for the purpose of implementing the ·Nat i 9nal Sec rity ction Memorandum No 231 March 26 1963 Mr Grant noted that the memorandum on 1 111s contra in the Near East could be broken down into three arts 1 to undertake e er fe sible easure to im rove _ ________________________________________r · '- With respect to the first action Mr Elwood said CIA has the primary responsibili y The key office would be the Office of Scientific Intelligence in the Agency whic sits in on several highly technical committees created for the purpose of gathe ing this type of information Mr Elwood believed that CIA may already have start d working on this problem He proposed to talk to CIA and suggested that INR act as liaison Mr Stron noted th t there rem ined numb r of intelligence gaps on the __ --------- ----- -------- --- _ -and these should as soon as possi le Mr Pol observed that it had een his experience --that there were a number of highly specialized committees within our intelligence community each dealing with special bits of information Often this information was not accessible without special security clearance Someone in the task force would have to collect and collate all these different pieces Mr Polk agreed to prepare a memorandum identifying different intelligence gathering committees the type of clearance required and the administrative arrangements necessary to gain access to the ial prepared by these cornmitt I NW# 57160 Docid 34350195 GPO UU77 _ r i• TOP SE8Rn -2- With regard to the second action arrangements for inspection Mr Grant said this responsibility was clearly with the Department Mr Strong noted that NEA •with the assistance of the Science Advisor's office had handled fll previous arrangements for the informal inspections of I In fact arrangements for the next informal inspection were virtually completed EOS0xS OSD As to action on the third part Mr Grant said he believed that Mr Polk's study The Palestine Problem The Next Phase was a good start for developing a rationale as to the desirability of proceeding with an arms limitation and control arrangement in the Near East Mr Grant noted that NEA had made a number of suggested changes to Mr Polk's paper and hoped this could become the initial working paper for the Task Force Mr Grant then asked Mr Polk to summarize the highlights of his recent visit to the UAR and Israel 11 Mr Polk said that when he was in Cairo he spoke to President Nasser for over two hours during which there was a general review of security interests in the Middle ' East Nasser agreed that U S estimates on anns costs were generally accurate and that it was consuming an increasing proportion of the UAR's Gross National Product Payments to the bloc for arms were beginning to bite into cotton exports which might otherwise be sold in hard currency markets Nasser also seemed to understand that our decision to sell Hawk missiles to Israel meant that we would not let him gain a clear superiority in weaponry vis vis Israel Nasser was also very much aware of deficiencies in the UAR's own defense citing Israeli overflights of Cairo He had complained about the poor Soviet radar equipment the UAR had received and he was worried about his defensive capabilities Nasser had indicated his hope of developing alternative sources of sophisticated weapons by building them at home and had referred to the construction of the ME-300 fighter plane Nasser had said that he did not have ready access to Soviet arms and had had to write to Khrushchev personally for the MIG-19 and MIG-21 He was now contemplating buying the MIG-23 although he appreciated the fact that many of these weapons were becoming obsolescent very rapidly While agreeing with the thesis that the UAR was spending a great deal on ams which it could ill-afford Nasser had emphasized that it was only for defense When Mr Polk had touched on the need to find ways to contain this anris race Nasser had recalled the 1956 Anderson Mission While the idea of direc confrontation with Ben Gurion remained out of the question the principal cause for the failure of the mission Mr Polk was left with the impression that Nasser would be willing to discuss control measures for highly sophisticated weapons Nasser had seemed to be very interested in learning more about the surveillance techniques we had developed during the Cuban crisis In Israel Mr Polk had spoken to Gideon Raphael Director General of the Foreign Ministry The Israelis had also referred to the Anderson Mission Agreeing that the idea of a direct Nasser-Ben Gurion confrontation was out of the question Raphael had indicated I NW# 57160 Docid 34350195 ---··------• • 'f8P SBBB D'f I EO50x6 OSD -3- Before the meeting closed attention was directed to the following topics which will be the subject of further discussion EO50x1 EO50x6 State 1 The need to divide proposals on arms control into at least two stages a stopping further escalation of sophisticated annaments and b disarmament of weapons currently on hand If the first objective could be gained we would be left with a more manageable situation 2 How to approach the UAR It was recognized that U S leverage with the UAR is limited that Nasser will not denude himself militarily and that the UAR 1 s desire to increase its military capability encompasses much more than the Israeli problem NW# 57160 3 The need op l eRE1' Docid 3435019 5 - ·-- - -- ·- ·-· r ' ·- • 'f8P B 88£ EIJ -4- 3 The need for studies of the latest techniques and methods of surveillance The best method would be the one with the minimum impingement on the sovereignty of the parties concerned and one which could be kept secret at least in the initial stages 4 The degree of secrecy if an agreement is negotiated It was agreed that tight secrecy would have to be maintained throughout the negotiating period but thereafter parts of the agreement would likely becane public knowledge 5 Encouraging Nasser to take the lead in calling for nuclear-free and germ warfare free zones in the Near East and Africa 6 Personnel who should be added to the Task Force It was agreed that the number should remain very small Nasser would not be able to cooperate if the action program became public knowledge 7 Developing a work list of subjects with which the Task Force must be familiar in order to develop its approach IUE 9E SR1sT r NW# 57160 Docid 34350195 --- 'Orud l'S 147 4J4 • • ¥ - · NFA AS 2615 1 DEPARTMENT OF STATE ICP SEt Rl I COVER SHEET 4 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT $ Origin ubj ct refama no or other pertinent data 2 COPY INFORMATION Task Force Mtg No l - Arms Contra 1 ·of the Near East S 1 TOI' SECRET CONTROL NUMIER C5 --- FORWARDED 4 17 63 6 7 PERSONS TO WHOM ROUTED OR READING DOCUMENT omce SYMBOL ·NR ACTION COPY INFORMATION COPY TELEGRAMS DESPATCHES ET COP NO 1 OF 5 COPIES 3 DATE AND NAME DF PHSOH PREPARING FORM Helen M Hennessx Datil Mr Dickman Top Sm11 Cont ol 0 flur 4 17 63 BWalker a o SIGNATURES DAT RECEIVED DATE READ i ff _ --- - - 11 DATE RElEASED - v 4v 4_ • I -- r t ° · 1 rJ t NW# 5716O Docid 34350195