·--r-· ___________No _ Objection To Declassification in Full 2013 10 31 I 11- ' NLC-128-10-4-3-1 -- - ' ' ' MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON August 7 1980 SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT A l_ 1 V FROM ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI SUBJECT NSC Weekly Report #149 1 l Opinion Foreign Policy and' the Elections Foreign policy should offer you the greatest opportunity for the exercise of Presidential leadership in a manner that could significantly influence the outcome of the elections Despite the constraints on Presidential power foreign affairs is the area in which you have the greatest discretion and thus -- at least in theory -- the most opportunity for demonstrating effective leadership for taking dramatic action and for mobilizing national support Indeed I have already hear from a number of well-informed sources that the Republicans are very much concerned that you will stage some sort of a fore'ign policy coup or undertake some bold initiative or cut some significant deal in the area of foreign affairs shortly before the elections Unfortunately the present international situation simply does not lend itself to some sudden and dramatic stroke -- unless we are confronted bya crisis In that event a very strong and firm response even involving military action is likely to be quite popular Moreover I have confidence in our crisismanagemerit machinery and I believe that our performance would be good But short of that I cannot offer a prescription for a major Presidential initiative of a type that would have significant electoral effect Something like Eisenhower's I would go to Korea does not seem to be available and we must be careful not to initiate some move in the Middle East or regarding the Soviets that will appear contrived In any case whatever happens we need to do much better than we have done so far in making the country understand both the constructive character of your foreign policy and the dangers inherent in Reagan's approach Accordingly in this memorandum I plan to address myself as briefly and concisely as I can to four broad themes that deal with foreign affairs SECRET Review on August 1 1986 E No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013 10 31 NLC-128-10-4-3-1 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013 10 31 NLC-128-10-4-3-1 p -2- SECRET I II III IV I The distinctive character of the Carter foreign pol'icy Public criticism of Reagan's approach Crises that we might confront Initiatives that we might take The distinctive character of the Carter foreign policy I think the most distinctive hallmark of your foreign policy is that you have blended together two elements that traditionally have been seen in America as being in conflict concern for moral principle and recognition of the imp2 tance of American gower In recent years McGovern and later Kennedy have stood for the former while Nixon and Kissinger have stood for the latter In contrast you have managed to combine the two in order to shape a foreign policy that has been both moral and realistic It can be best summarized by the following themes 1 Restoring America's military and economic strength for the long-term 2 Recognition of global complexity 3 Progress toward a genuine partnership both with Western Europe and the Far East 4 On the basis of renewed strength Allied cooperation and diplomatic firmness we can also seek accommodation with the Soviet Union 5 Importa'nce of the Third World 6 Human rights is a dominant idea of our times Finally we neither run the world nor can run away from it We cannot be guided by nostalgia for the fifties U S prepon- derance or by the partial isolationism of the early 1970s The many tangible accomplishments of your term Panama Camp David China normalization etc are the consequence of this approach They demonstrate how responsible use of American power and influence can contribute to global peace and human progress I believe the above summarizes the themes of your Administration's foreign policy and that in time it will become clear that this was the proper course for the nation at this time a building presidency not a flamboyant fire-fighting one However many of these themes -- and even some specific actions like the SECRET T No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013 10 31 NLC-128-10-4-3-1 J No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013 10 31 NLC-128-10-4-3-1 i -3- SECRET Panama Canal treaties -- are clearly not popular politically To be sure there is merit in an educational campaign 1 but the direct electoral benefits of discussing all the central themes of your foreign policy are less obvious Complexity and change for example -- however real in today's world are a source of anxiety not political approbation It is possible to group these themes in more politically attractive ways however around two primary themes and two secondary ones Primary American strenS Fh defense economic energy alliances and peace Secondary morality human rights hird World and building for the future alliances economic summits Third Worlcl In my judgment you are in fact on strong grounds on national strength -- where the Republicans are trying to make you look weak -- and on peace In the former area you have reversed --nearly a decade's Republican decline in our spending are increasing the defense budget by 3-4% in real terms buying the right modern weapons and creating a capacity to protect through deterrence not conflict Western vital interests in the Persian Gulf There is the NATO 3% commitment the Long-Term Defense Program and the TNF decision There is the energy program -for the first time beginning to reduce our national vulnerability to decisions taken by other countries in this area MTN directly helps U S businessmen farmers workers and consumers And the economic surmnits plus your building efforts in the U S economy are also contributing directly to U S strength in the world These are facts but another fact is that we have not publicized our successes as we need to do -- and for that and other reasons thus do not get the credit that you and your Administration justly deserve We can be assertive -- not defensive -- in this area With regard to peace the record is clear despite the anxieties and difficulties of various crises like Iran no u s soldier has died in combat This is the first four-year term since Eisenhower's second when that has been true and in fact you are the first President since Hoover 1 to have no combat losses You also did the impossible in bringing Egypt-Israel peace and the end of the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe race war SECRET SEC No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013 10 31 NLC-128-10-4-3-1 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013 10 31 NLC-128-10-4-3-1 SECRET __ _______ -4- eace are two excellent themes And combining them also brings n arms control the effort to reduce the r isks of conflict from a position of strength and the balanced mature approach to the Soviet Union ___ __ The moral has primarily a selective audience -- e g ethnic ericans on CSCE the Humphrey wing of the party on developing-country problems But there is also a general sense in the country of the importance of standin for somethin -a theme you used in good effect in 19 Finally there is value in emphasizing how your policies build for the futur e beginning with national stren th but also in stre where o course there will be rable press public skepticism dealing with economic and realities and creating openings to the new poor cenfers e future Put in this sense -- not as adjusb ng to complexity or change -- I believe most Americans would welcome straight talk from their President as opposed to the simplicities of a Reagan Americans are also responsive to challenge provided at the same time they are told what to do about it as we have been doing though often without the clarity and persistence that is needed II Public criticism of Reagan's approach In contrast Reagan's approach can be attacked head-on for being both escapist and dangerous In brief · The Reagan Platform is an esca e from The Platform and Reagan's own statements seem o view world only· in terms of the u s -soviet struggle and by over-simplifying virtually every world problem There is no recognition of the new forces in the world nor of the need for the United States to give historical change a positive direction Reagan also calls for massive defense increases while also promising a tax cut Reagan is nostalgic for the past especially in his dangerous hankering for str riority which would produce a ma arms race as w 1 as the genera ostalgia for the wo s when American military and economic preponderance were the consequences of the collapse of Europe and Japan in World war II The Reagan Platform is a repudiation of even the limited achievements of past Republican for icy This comes across most stro agan 1 cism regarding arms control Given his objection to SALT II is Reagan for or again t Ni xon-Kissinger's arms control centerpiece SALT I SECRET No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013 10 31 NLC-128-10-4-3-1 1 J No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013 10 31 NLC-128-10-4-3-1 I SEC -5- SECRET The Reagan Platform is an endorsement for what 'carter has been doing In its few positive parts the Reagan Platform in effect endorses what the Carter Administration has been doing on the Middle East though the words Camp David are never mentioned your efforts the enhance NATO and defense capabilities your tough response to the Soviets on Afghanistan though it undercuts the latter by recent expedient statements on the grain embargo Moreover Reagan's approach is woefully inadequate on arms control which it slights and in regard to the Third Wor ld which it largely ignores It could also jeopardize the expanding u s -Chinese relationship by inflaming the Taiwan issue with the emphasis on the U S -Taiwan military connection - In brief his foreign policy is unrealistic simplistic and indifferent to moral issues It is historically antiquated and potentially dangerous It is easy to slide from over-simplification into extremism and Reagan's foreign policy would take America on such a slide III Dangers that we might confront Public debate over foreign policy aside this corning fall could be punctuated by a series of crises the handling of which could decisively affect the outcome of the elections 1 Such a crisis might include any of the following 1 A·tragic hostage development Some of our hostages could be put on trial or one or more of them could die or we might simply learn that some of them have disappeared Khomeini appears determined to embarrass_yDuin whatever way possible 2 Break-u in Iran Khomeini's death and the collapse of public order coul prompt the disintegration of Iran and the outbreak of civil war precipitating even a Soviet intervention At the present moment we have relatively few means of influencing the ·outcome of such a civil war while we do know that the Soviets have started training for military operations directed at Iran 3 A Sovie•t eace offensive or a new rnilitar offensive in Afghanistan or most probab y both The Soviets will most likely intensity their efforts to woo Western Europe and perhaps even the United States through arms control initiatives while maintaining their assertive posture in Afghanistan Their objective will be to achieve Western acquiescence while splitting the West even further 4 A crisis in the Middle East Some violent act West Bank Syria Lebanon could occur sparking a new cycle of emotion and retaliation or -- less likely -- there could be some upheaval in either Saudi Arabia or Egypt jeopardizing the stability of the region SECRET ET No Objection Declassification in Full 2013 10 31 NLC-128-10-4-3-1 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013 10 31 NLC-128-10-4-3-1 i • SECRET -6- 5 A confrontation with Cuba The Cubans could launch a new refugee wave in order to embarrass you and to hurt you politically Caribbean instability There could be even more violence and instability -- perhaps another Nicaragua 6 At the same time all of the above could also offer opportunities for decisive leadership Such a reaction could galvanize national support and cause a patriotic upsurge Thus on the hostage issue we should at least have the option to take prompt military action either through a blockade or perhaps the seizure of Kharg Island I believe you should ask Harold Brown to take some quiet steps to make sure that prompt military action could be initiated in the event of such crisis We will not be able to wait for days to react The break-up of Iran would pose serious dilemmas and our reaction would have to be calibrated to any Soviet initiative In any case we would want to act here in concert with some of the key regional countries as well as our Allies although again the adoption of a very firm posture could have a very positive effect Insofar as the Soviets are concerned we should keep reiterating that Afghanistan is the litmus test of Soviet intentions -- though without putting ourselves in the position of emphasizing Soviet failure to respond If the Soviet Union wishes' accommodation we are ready for the solution of the Afghanistan problem which combines transitional security arrangements with a total Soviet withdrawal In any case we cannot afford any zig-zags in our policy toward the Soviet Union and a tough public posture by you and by Muskie is essential especially if we are at the same time to be able to argue credibly that we are prepared to seek arms control arrangements with the Soviets as a matter of mature realism With respect to Cuba it- see ms to me that renewed provocations by Castro should be very firmly rebuffed and the forcible deportation to Cuba through the use of the U S Navy of some Cuban criminals might be an appropriately dramatic step designed to signal Castro that there are limits beyond which the U S cannot be pushed In the Caribbean we need to be able to act promptly and credibly without the appearance of indecisiveness with which we are unfairly charged over Nicaragua IV Initiatives that we might take There are some initiatives that you could take that might be helpful in demonstrating effective Presidential leadership in the area of foreign affairs The following come to mind and you may wish to indicate here by marginal notes as well as above whether you want me to develop any of these further SECRET No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013 10 31 NLC-128-10-4-3-1 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013 10 31 NLC-128-10-4-3-1 -7- SECRET 1 · The hostage crisis I think we should think about a more aggressive strategy -- though recognizing the political liabilities of an effort that does not work We might explore the possibility through our various intermediaries of a meeting between Muskie and some responsible Iranian official if anyene emerges in the next three months Indeed such a meeting if held in October could have significant impact even if it did not lead to the immediate release of the hostages -- provided of course that a legitimate and realistic process toward resolutions is the result There are undoubtedly some other ideas but the problem is that without some initiative we will surely be accused of permitting the crisis to have become routine 2 We might explore secretly with the Soviets the possibility of some major withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan just prior to the elections Though such an eventuality is not likely it is conceivable that the Soviets might reach the conclusion that Reagan will be too dangerous especially given his repudiation of arms control One must be extremely careful how one undertakes any such probes because they could contribute to the impression of zig-zagging That is why they should not be undertaken formally in the Muskie-Gromyko c annel but more by indirection and quiet hints for example in some of my informal talks with Dobrynin and especially with the Poles who are anxious to promote a peaceful resolution of the Afghanistan problem 3 Though the political benefit of u s lsoviet TNF talks would not be great it probably would be useful to have some exploratory discussions no later than October That would demonstrate that your personal interest in nuclear arms control can be promoted alongside the policy of firmness on Afghanistan Indeed such discussions would demonstrate that the kind of mature and two-track policy that we wish to pursue with the Soviets is a more viable alternative to Reagan's extremism We would need to judge the value of this somewhat later in terms of Soviet behavior in Afghanistan and the effectiveness of Reagan's attacks on our Afghan policy 4 If the Soviets continue to be beastly on Afghanistan and if the Bush visit to China goes reasonably well you might consider having me visit Beijing for consultations in late September or early October thereby underscoring your special accomplishment in expanding the U S -Chinese relationship 5 A summit meeting with Begin and Sadat would probably not produce any results between now and November In any event we need to try inducing Sadat and Begin to help infuse new life in the Camp David process The downside is that Begin probably will not wish to be helpful Yet we should in any case seek to restart the talks and have Sol go to the area for a sustained period of time A September trip by Muskie could also be helpful both for the negotiations and for reasserting our commitment to Israel SECRET No Objection -·i Declassification-in Full 2013 10 31 NLC-128-10-4-3-1 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013 10 31 NLC-128-10-4-3-1 SECRET -8- 6 You might contemplate convening a summit meeting on East-West relations with our principal Allies or alternatively a Schmidt meeting here in September With the Olympics behind us it might be timely to hold a 1-2 day meeting of the Guadeloupe type but including also the Italians and Japanese in order to discuss where do we go from here on the Soviet strategic threat posed through the Afghanistan invasion There happens to be a real need for such a meeting but it should not be convened unless we are certain that it would prompt some tangible steps going beyond the Venice Communique Nonetheless this could be an effective demonstration of leadership and perhaps by early fall our friends might be inclined to go along because of increasing concern over what foreign policy Reagan might pursue plus their increasing awareness of the common challenge in the Persian Gulf 7 There are also a series of specific military-defense initiatives that you could take showing that there is bite to your emphasis on enhanced defense capabilities both generally and in regard to the new Soviet strategic challenge in West Asia These could include a Altering our carrier deployments reducing our presence in the Mediterranean and enhancing our presence in the Indian Ocean b Creating a Middle East Persian Gulf unified command taking this territory out of the regional responsibilities of PACOM and EUCOM and underlining the seriousness of the Carter doctrine c Announcing the production of ERWs to be stored in the united States for rapid deployment to Europe when needed d Adopting some of the Steadman study recommendations and streamlining and upgrading the JCS This could move us toward the general not joint staff system and could be justified by a need to streamline the JCS as an outgrowth of the Iranian raid experience e Further sustained exposition of our Southwest Asia strategy and the specific steps we are taking through a major strategic speech None of the above are major steps but cumulatively they could underline the seriousness of your commitment to enhance defense without at the same time requiring major budgetary reprogramming SECRET No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013 10 31 NLC-128-10-4-3-1 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013 10 31 NLC-128-10-4-3-1 SECRET -9- In general I believe that the best posture in this area is assertiveness in expounding what we have done in the past three and a half years It is a creditable record -- in defense arms control peacemaking peace itself energy human rights and internationl economics As I indicated above our biggest problem is not with the charges the Republicans will level against us but the need to get our story out more forcefully and effectively For the past few years there has been merit in a low-key approach in presenting our case -- and it has worked in terms of taking the nation beyond the phobias of Vietnam and Watergate which so weakened our capacity to have an effective or assertive foreign policy In my judgment we can now move towards a greater highlighting of our purposes achievements and challenges to the nation for further action -- and gain a good public response The themes of strength and peace do not need to be elaborate QUt only if we constantly pound them home in a series of statements speeches etc we are finally going to get some of the credit we deserve This after all was the central tactic of your recent rip to Europe where each speech and statement reinforced all the others -- and eventually it got through to the media which saw this as a highly effective foreign policy effort The message also got through to our Allies and their response also played well here ·This can in my view be repeated in the campaign here this fall -- starting with your accepatance speech Owen Paper I attach a thoughtful paper by Henry Owen 2 Fact Muskie Brown Brzezinski Meeting Ed Harold and I reached the following decisions at our meeting this week On building a constituency for foreign aid we will pursue Anne Wexler's suggestion of a working group and hold Harold's blue ribbon panel idea until after November As a first step Ed will identify those on the Hill you should meet with on pending aid legislation Harold briefed Ed on PD-59 and will carry out other key briefings during the remainder of this week i e Stan Turner and key members of the Congress Implementing Your Instructions July 30 On Ed's Evening Report item on Japanese defense spending you noted Speak forcefully -- they should at least match our present increase for defense Ed will convey this message to Ambassador Okawara in New York if possible next week SECRET No Objection SEC T Declassification in Full 2013 10 31 NLC-128-10-4-3-1 --1