MARSHALL ISLANDS FILE TRACKING DOCUMENT Record Number 5 J utrd File Name TITLE J i7mA _ I au I Document Number ID _ _ _ _ c '--- ' - -5-__ - _3 _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ C_ 7 Previous Location FROM _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ AUTHOR 12' j C C o Addditional Information _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ OrMibox _ _ ' __ CyMibox - - - I r- de ' lo 108530 941 1 ----- ----Hr· J - 1 - - • -- '-- •• L NI ti it I pf •iDMI• • _ - a 5ull - · x _l ljj Fol ' 3j ------ T AVAILABLE COPY UDIITIO_I HAZARDS DURING ATOMIC WARFARE u t1·- ·_ RG US DOE ARCHIVES a· 826 U S ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSIO N Colkcfio nox r C V Jtl lveiJ- ltN Y fle11101 2-2 1 HEADQUARTERS I I I C AIR RESEARCH 8 DEVELOPMENT COMMAND OB rmf11E 'O'NLY I I l I I f I This docuaent is released •1th an overall claasU'ication 1n accordance with paragraphs 23b and 56 lJIR 205-1 subject to the following special 1 Dstructions pertaining to ot •••••llilillllllil• • further reluse and use ID t'oraaUon contaioed bereio ahould be 11 aited to persoonel baT Jlg an official requireaent tor this t Jpe of AtoruUOll Jleproduct1on ot any portion of this docuae nt is prohibited except with the peraiselon of the office ot orig1A This docuaeot contains iD t'oraation attecti ng the national defense ot the United States within the aeaning ot the espionage laws title 18 u s c Sections 793 ud 794 the transmission or revelation or which in any •oner to an unauthorized person is prohibited bJ law The contents or this publication will not be disclosed to foreign nationals or their representatives Retaui or destro7 this copy in accordance with Do not return U'R 205-1 BEST AVAILABLE COPY • -· l DOE ARCHIVES C4-23676 • JW I TIOR BAZA ROO DORI HG lTOlllC l RFlRE U LT COLN II LULEJilN NOVElmER 1954 HEADQUARTERS DEVELOPMENT BALTIIIORE 11D • UR RESEARCH COMMAND 2· l OE RCHIVF S C4-23676 • --- Table of Contents I General III Mllitar r and Cirlllan Radiation Tolerance Dose St ldarda a Background Radiation b Civilian Tolerances lhri ng Peace-time o CiTilian and MUitar ' Tolerances During Warfare d Internal Ihse as Compared to the External Dose IV Dosage to Aircrews Penetrating Joung Atomic Clouds V Conte ct Beta Ha u rd to Bands or Maintenance Personnel trca Contaminated Uroratt igine Parts VI Militar Countermeasures Against the Radioactive Huard a Early Warn ng b Dispersal c 3leltere d Decontamination e Evacuation f Times ot Fntey into Contaminated Areas g Effects ot Shielding and Dose Rate on Biological Damage h Detenn1n1ng Fall-Cut Areas aft er the Event VII Qffensive Use ot Rad oactivi ty a Denial of an Area to the le b Relaxation ot Missile CEP c Limitations to the Offensive Uses o f Radioactivity VIII APPllIDIX - Construction ot Fall-out Plots a • Method of Plotting Fall-out J DOE ARCl-llX b Detailed Sttliy of Fall-oot troa First ot of CASI'LB Test Operation 1 • 2 lrleting Wind Distribution Variation ot Wim• ilot't vit b Tiae and Space and Its Bttect OD Rada Plot ting 3 Assuaed Actirit7 and Particle Size Distribution Vi thin the Cloud at fiM ot Bt bilbation 4 Measured Activity and Jvticle Sise Distriblition vi thin tbe Clam c Scaling of Radioa cti ve l'all-out to Different Yield bbs Detonated at Various Heights Above the Target d Accumulation of Dosage in Fall-out Areas e World-Wide Radioactive Contamination ll RECOll AENDaTIONS l OE ARCHIVES 4 • C4-23676 ACINOWLmQ IDIT5 il-'D A RiNI ll OF THE WORK OF O H lt AGEJICIES IN THIS FIElD lbst of the 1 nt'anaation concerning the radioactive cootam Soation levels during CASTLE test ration were first obtained trca Dr Dimn 1ng ot the Division ot BiologJ and Medicine of the AK Be k Sndq transmitted to us the IIOO airplane readings of the contud nated islands taken by Msrrlll Eisenl ni'a unit Dr Jltmn fng also transmitted to ua the radiological survey data and the plDl1 l ray readings of Rongelap Rongerik am ilinginae which were made bf Dr Scoville of AFSWP and which helped considerabl7 in the tin al analysis ot CASI'I E BRAVO shot 'nle above information vas used to prepare a preHm1oary report See Reference 6 S equently most ot the same data became available in the Project 2 5a report See Reference 12 other peraonnel who kindly furnished ua basic data vere Lt Col Boimott JTF-7 and Col Houghton of A FS IC We have worked closely in the past with RAND in the problem of radioactive fallout up to but not including CASTLE At this the RA m and A ROC ana J ses vary considerably Primarily RAND believes that 90% of the activity in the cloud is in the mushroan and only 10% in the stem AROO analysis shows % activity in the stem and only 20% in the musbroO D most of which is non-scavengable or falls out at much 1 1 ter times RAND assumes fallout originates from 100 000 rt msl for CASTLE BRAVO A JU C assumes that the fallout in t1'u first 15 to 30 hours does not come from above 60 000 rt The USNRDL scaling of Jangle-Surface shot did not consider a n 1 fallout beyond 3 to 5 miles downwind of ground zero Within this area only 10 to 15% of the total residual activity was deposited The A Rte Analysis See Reference 1 showed that the immediate downwind fallout reached as far as SO miles downwim and this falJ out area accounted for approximately 85% of the total activit1 It is presumed that the NRDL scaling model vi1l be altered to account r or this discrepancy · It appears to us that the AFSWP Report 507 adopted the NRDL scaling model for CASTLE BRAVO shot Undoubtedly AFSWP and NRDL have in more recent work changed their scaling model but such changes are not yet made known to us The U s Weather Bureau and the Air Weather Service have studied the fallout problem primarily trom the point of view of m1n 1m Sz1ng contamination during • m-7 or data point atomic test operations The Army Chemical Corps and the Signal Corps have also studied the fallout problem It is clearly shown above that at the present tim the effort in this field of endeavor throughout the Defense tepa rtment AID and the Weather Bureau is quite extensive It is hoped that at some future date a coordinated i U Will obtaiJi ttj flft'A8ef 1 JPf of the be ATJ DOE i RCHIVF S C4- 2 3676 5 • -AB3TRAC'f 1 The first sl' ot of CA 'TLE Test Operation i i anal7zed in detail am this together vitb Jangle-SUrface shot i i uaed tor scaling ot fallout intensities an 3 areas tor Jields of 1 IT to 225 Ml' l method is also given to predict the tallout tor aDJ scaled height Table I see tolloving page gives the 48 hour integrated dose a roentgens vitbin dowviDd contaminated areas in square miles tor di tferent Jield bombs exploded on the surf'ace The values given in TP ble I are generally much higher than the predictions made by other agencies in this field It is possible to detennine the extent or dovnviod contamination for Dy yield bomb detonsted at any scaleld height by the use of Table II see following page 2 The offensive and defensive implication of such highly contwnated areas are discussed Calculations are made on the dosage recejved by aircrews accidentally penetrating young atomic clouds from ll Ul ti-megaton bombs Estimates are given on tho contact beta hanrd to the hands of mail tenance personnel from contaminated engine parts The fallout picture is given for all of the United States vhen 111 bombs of 15 megaton yield are surface detonated over 106 cities whose population is 100 00'J or more and on five other selected airbases This is illustrated graphically in Figure ll An inspec· lon of this Figure shovs that there is''no place to hide- n this country under above listed circmr stances BEST AVAILABLE COP'l 6 • TABLE I 48-hour Integrated Dose in Roentgens Areas in Square Miles for the Following Yield JtT Surtece Burst Bomba • 1 1 t 10 100 lJ 000 3 3 30 670 250 3 3 500 1 000 25 44 95 53 258 560 430 900 750 1 560 5 000 15 000 288 1 0 0 6 0 060 4 750 8 100 '- 160 10 000 15 000 25 000 225 000 60 000 100 000 3 20 5 030 7 820 11 000 33 000 4 600 47 62 200 76 500 100 Y' 8 900 2i 600 19 200 76 000 106 000 173 000 48 800 18 0' 246 0' 4f 'fC 010 45 000 BEST AVAILABLE COPY TABLE II • Percentage Fallout 1 0 0 45 0 2 Burst Height Above Terrain tor 15 MT Bomb 5 ocn 0% 30% - 0 1 0 - 450 teet underground Fora justification of Tnble II and 6 4 Reterencea 1 ---- - ' 5 0 w - o 'fc whnre h height w bomb above terrain in rAot yield in kil ' ltOM t'eet 2 000 teet 1 000 feet 50% 80% 95% o o - ' I General The primacy damage area from an otcr ic bcab ia acre or leas confined to a radius or trom bal t a aile to perhaps ten alles depending 011 the e nerg Jield or the banb It large atc aic lxabs a detoDated on the surface lei hal concentrations or residual CODtudDatiOD vill reach oat vell be70nd the thermal and blast damage perbieter and my extend several hum red miles downvind In an earlier report 1 dated liJoTea1'er 1153 ve stated that i f Waah1ngt oi i D C was bcllDbed b r a fin to ten megaton aurface veapon tba the 01t7 or Baltimore ban to be evacuated in order to prevent excessive casualties tran tbe radioactin tall-out It nov appears that our earlier prediction was i f anything consenatin It is the purpose or this report to enluate the UOUllt or fallout troa 1u rtace or Dear surface burst nuclear veapons aDd to indicate the military illpllcations or 1uch a basar 3 both from the otfensin and defen1ive pointa ot Tiev II BEST AVAILABLE COPY ffistorz or 1951 wo small atanic banbs were detonated at These detonations produced excessive contamination downvir d Unfortunatel7 the contami Dation vas measured accuratelJ 0nl7 vithin rive miles or cround sero In the Fall of 1952 a large Jield thennonuclear device ten megatons named Ivy-Mike vas detonated on the surface or an atoll island in zlivetok This ehot produced excessive Jp'Jind and crossvind contamination but the extent of downviI d contamination ws not measured at all Data available fro l the recent Pacific Test Oparation CASTU ¥•rch 1954 shows considerable radioactive contamination several hundred miles downvind tram a surface burst thennonuclear weapon approxilnately titteen megaton yield In the P'all Nen da one on the 1urtace and the other underground or III Hi litary and Civilian Tolerance ose standar 3s One or the most important reasons tor vriting this report ie to discuss radiation toler mce doses tor the military during canbat as compared to the existing tolerance doses tor the civilian population a Background ediation As ve all know cosmic radiation from the sky and natural radioactivit1 from the soil produce a certain normal backgroUDd or radiation through which ve all live Bo nnally the gamma-radiation background at sea level ranees rrom 01 to 05 llilliroentgena per hour At higher elevations the background may be increased tvo or three-told If ve go wxlerground the background is reduced provided there is no uranium or radium ore present As a start then i f ve DOE ARC18 • C4-23q· vant to protect the human race against all radioactivity ve should all go live in lead JD ines deep underground 'We realize however that the nonnal ra1iation background of the vorld is not sufficient to cause aDJ appreciable dmnage to the human bod y We 11 y be reall 7 aqueamish about it and decide not to live in Denver or in Peru or in Svitzerland or in other places vbere the elevation is significutlJ above sea level in order to reduce the radiation backgroUDd Ir ve N concerned to this extent then ve should also look at our radium dial vristvatches since the7 too put out radiation which aight be as high as 10 to 1 times background There 1s alao the problem ot x-rays tor medical purposes Every time ve take a chest x-ra7 ve get e certain amount or radiation in our bodies and sane people uy consider this quite dangerous The doctor weighs this socalled danger tran the x-radiation as canpared to the beneti ta that the patient vill receive upon examination or such x-ra7 photographs Medical practice today apparently condones the use of x-ray pictures and allows the administration of several roentgens or x-rays to the patient in order to get such pictures From this it would be tair to conclude that the medical profession as a whole today does not regard the administration or several roenJ e L to the patient as dangerou s BEST AVAILABLE CUt'T b Civilian Tolerance Doses During Peace Time b soon as the first aton- i c bomb was detonated it became obvious that the vorld voulq be exposed to more radioactivity than ve vere able to obtain from our x-ray 1nechines or more radioact i vit y than nature intended tor us to receive For this reason the AtJmic Energy Commission set up sane rigid standards to control the amount or radiation that could be received by workers in the plants ot the AEC These standards are quite well known and readily available from government sources One of the basic tolerance standards states that a worker or the Atomic Energy Commission should not receive sore than 0 3 roentgens per week or normal work This refers to gamir a-radiation and it refers to radiation received throughout the body that is total body radiation There are other standards tor radiation to the bands or to the feet etc vbich are higher than 0 roentgens per veek o Qiyilian and Yilitar y Tolerances brine Atomic Warfare Although ve accept the Atomic Energy standards tor radiation during peacetime it is believed that as soon as a general atomic war 11 initiated these standards must be revised in order to prosecute the var against the enemy properly and in order to defend ourselves without undue panic vhich might be caused by a superstitious tear or the damage produced by radiation It is quite difficult tor the uninitiated to understand and appreciate this point or view However after bein exposed to many atomic tests and to radiation vhich by present peacetime standards may be 9 considered excessive soma personnel in the Air Force have learned that tbe7 can take ealculeted ri3ks vith radietion in order to remain operational during combat Without denyi n the essentiall7 banaf'al effects or ra11ation on the hwnan bod7 it is possible to develop camnon aense practical radiation tolerance staDda rds vbicb tit the aergenc - or a given eituati0 1 The Air 9 lrgeon bas alread7 r-cognised this aDd has stated that at the discretion or the Commander a person 11ay receive a tot al body instentaneous doae or 100 roeDtgens without rwming the risk or producing radiation casualties Tbe t'irst • bot or CASTLE Teat Operation· which ws held in the Pacific during March or 1954 exposed approximately 28 Air Force personnel and 2 30 natives of Rongelap and Rongerik IslaDds to radiation vhich ws assumed to be between 50 and 250 roentgens total body gamna due to the fallout of residual radioactivit7 This problem is discussed in detail in Reference 1 Af'ter study or the effects of radiatioD on the natives at Rongelap it is now assumed that 200 roentgens can he given to • military person durinr cooibat operations vithout undul7 endan1 ering the life of that person It is believed that sC111e people vill get slightly sick temporaril7 if they receive 200 roentgens of gamma radiation total body However during combat a Commander may decide to expose his personnel to such a hazard it he can prevent disaster by doing so Our problem today is how to indoctrinate military personnel not to tear radiation excessivel7 and yet to respect it We find that in the Air Force there are man7 people vho have learned this trick or avoiding as much radiatioD as possible and yet not losing their hea1s when they have to be exposed to doses or from 10 to 50 roentgens These people are few and far betveeD aDd they have achieved this experience only after repeated exposures to 11any atomic tests Unfortunately we have evidence that there are many people in the Air Force who are quite concerned about small doses of radiation It is hoped that this report may help put this problem in the proper perspective The only vay we know of allaying the fears of personnel in this regard is to state the obvious over and over again and to repeat vbatever bas elready been written about tolerance doses Despite the fact that we oautioa ever yone to receive as little radiation as possible we still believe firmly that even if a person receives 100 to 200 roentgens total bod7 instantaneous gamma radiation be will not become a casualt7 The problem is how to acclimatize personnel to this or how to aake eure that milita17 personnel vill not panic in the race or a radiac instrument which is going off-scale Ve have many examples duri nc atomic test operations where otherwise experienced pers0 1nel have actuall7 panicked vhen they thought they were being subjected t o excessive dosages or radiation The only real cu re against such panic is to expose personnel to relativel7 large doses of radiation It is like exposing troops to enemy tire We realize that no oDe vill allow us to expose a large number or people to big doses ot radiation tor purposes ot indoctrination However there should at least be some sort of a training program which realistically explains tbe dangers or radiation and compares these radiation hazards sa to 10 BEST AVAIL• IUn ti e broken leg or to the hazards or a bullet going Actually cc aparisons or this sort make it Yer7 clear that radiatioD is the lesser or two eTil e However there 11 a limit to th a thing It the radiation dosage goea eigniricantl 7 be -ond 500 roentgens then it 11 as aure a lciller •• an bullet So our problem 1a to eee that the •111 taey aaD ia not und atra1d or radiation or the levels or 25 to 250 roentgens bat at the a JDe time he should kDO l enough that it he 1a exposed to a total bod7 iDstantaneous pmaa rad1at1011 or 6CX to 800 roentgens then he 1a quite aure to die tram auch an exposure Thia again 1a vell blown am published and r-eadU7 aTa ilable troa uncluaitied eources Ve vill Npeat the tolloving gamna doaage values tor ready rererences through the guts 100 roeDtgens total bod7 ·••••• lo radiation aictn s •• 200 roentgens total body· • • • • • • 1 or exposed peraom el aa7 abov alight aymptoms or tempol'al7 radiation sickness such as a tendency to vanit etc 600 roentgens total body •••••• Will probably kill ot the personnel vithin 0 days 800 roentgens total body •••••• all kill probably everyone exposed within 30 da7s We note that there is a gap in our information betveen 200 roentgens and 600 roentgens total body dose This gap in our lmovledge is a real one 'We have not exposed a statistically large number ot human beings to dosages betveen 200 and 600 roentgens accidentl 7 or othervise Therefore ve do not knov with certainty just vb at the response or the human being vill be to such dosages However it is fair to assume that this is a danger zone perhaps 350 to 400 roentgens may kill 10% or the people so exposed Perhaps at acme tuture date after autficient animal experimentation has been done we may have more accurate numbers here d Internal Dose as Compared to the rlernal Dose So tar ve have been discussing the ert ernal gaimna total body radiatioD that u y be nceived bf human beings in a short period ot ti 10e There are also dangers or inhalation or fission products during fallout or radioactivity There are also dangers ot ingestion of' fission product a iD the tood and in the drinking veter It 1e in this region ot radioactive hazards that ve tind the greatest lack ot information and therefore the greatest tendency to panic 0ur experience so tar meager as it is seems to indicate that b r tar the greatest danger is rrom the external gamma radiation This vas proved over again during OperatioD CASTLE 1 In the Islands or Rongelap approximately tvo hundred natives were exposed to 11 DOEARCHlV C4-2367t l'• fallout art er which time they et 7ed iJ I the same area for two days before the vere evacuated During these tvo days they drank contaminated veter Aa a matter of tect they actually drank veter vhich vas covered vith the gra7 •1nov or mist• vhich tell down on the island This means that the7 were drinking active tissiOD products together vith the gra7 coral or the islands that vas brought up to high altitudes by the atanic explo• ioos and vhieh subsequentlJ tell out upon· the inhabited bland of Rongelap Rongerlk etc These people also ate tood that vas exposed to the fallout Jeflrthelese according to Reference 13 there vere no Jlternal radiation bazarde Tb is indicates once again that it is best to assume that it JOU are not exposed to excessive radiation tran pl ID8 re79 that it JOU do not receive rrom 400 to 6oO roentgens of inataDtaneous gamma radiation you should not rear whet 1111 ght be getting iDto your lungs by inhalation nor should 7ou fear exceasivel 7 vbat is gettiDg into 7our etanacb by in tion Paradorlcall7 if a peraoD bas received 6CX roentfens of' ganna bis chances of 8Ufflnl are so slim that he need Dot VOITY about the ingestion or inhalation hazard This is a general rule which apparently seems to hold despite the fact that ve realize the theoretical obJectiona of iDtroducing such fission products into the bod7 In later sections you will see that anilr als Yere now thrOUfh atomic clouds and allowed to ingest the fission products directly and yet the inhalation and iDgestion dose was tound to be insignificant Reference 2 We have exposed other animals in other Test Operations lotabl7 during JANGIE Test Operation 14 animals vere exposed to the fallout and tbe7 too 1howed no internal radietion despite the fact that the7 were exposed to lethal doses ot gamma ra7s ill this is meant to put before the reader the available data from past Test Operations and to atrese that as a rule protection against radiation hazard is prima ril7 against the external 18J11D8 ra7 doee It ve believe th11 then it simplifies our problem and it also sin plifies the problem of defeDse during atomic vartare The succeediDg sections vill show that ill an atomic var if multi-megaton bombs are exploded on the surface then large areas or the cou nt17 will be exposed to lethal coDCeDtrations or radioactivity Even it people take adequate countermeasures against this radioactivit71 the7 must come back and live iD areas vhich have relativel7 high concentratioDs or fission products This means that the background dose ·v1u be increased a hundred told or possibl7 a thoueand told and yet ve vill be forced to live UDder 8 lch circumstances Certainl7 the Federal Civil Defense and the Atotlc Energy Commission vill have to devise new standards or tolerance to meet such a horrible emergenq during total atomic warfare However this is a probla tor agencies outside ot the Defense Department and be7ond the scope of this report It is merely mentiqped here to indicate that during vartare the llilitarr and civilian tolerances ma7 not be so far apart after all BEST AVAILABLE COPY DOE ARCHIVI 12 • C4-2367t IV Dosage to Aircrews Penetntipg Ioung Atomic Clouds •• l urillg tJPSHOT-INarHOIZ Ate de Te1t Operation a project vaa established to measure the dosage vithin the 10ung atadc cloud by means ot cannisters and droned aircraf't 2 Tbe results shoved that dosage acoumclated vu leas than 50 roentgens for the fiight or an aircraft through a fair ainute old olood trca a ballb ot 26 lT when the epe d or the aircrart vae 400 Jmota Dose rates vi thin the cloud ranged tram 38 000 r hr to 7500 r hr vben times or ent17 nried trom 2 7 to S 2 Id nut es The anra p doae rm in a cloud vaa represented 7 D l ' 31 X lOS t -2 06 - - - - - - - - - - - - nation 1 In this equatioD tiJDe t is given in ainutes art er bomb detonation and average dosage D in roentgens per hour Reference 2 indicates that this F quation applies tor the time period or 2 5 to 25 llinutes after bomb detonation To prepare this equation Reference 2 used not only the UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE but also the GREENHOUSE data available at the time Recentl 7 Plank and Steele 3 have shown that tor CASTLE data the tolloving relation applies 6isT AVAILABLE COPY- ----- F quation - 4 D 2 Equation 2 is said to be valid tor times trcmi two hours to six hours after bomb detonation Using Equation 2 Captain Steele of S bas shown that in order to get 170 roentgens accumulated dosage the cloud should not be penetrated earlier than thirty minutes after bomb burst it the cloud diameter or the atem diameter 1s ten miles in length Similarl7 the time1 are 35 and 45 minutes tor titteeD and tif'tJ lllile cloud diameter•• In thil analy1b it vu auumed that the activit7 within the cloud va1 unitonD throughout It vill be 1hovn in aubsequeDt 1ection1 that for a aurface bunt megaton peld veapon the atem roar have 10 to 20 time1 the aotivit7 per unit volume when compared to the apeoitic aotivit7 ot the auahroom b It 1a our op1Dion that there ia a good phydcal explanation vh7 thei- 11 a break in the curve ot dosage rate vi th time vi thin the oloud a1 1hovn in Equation• 1 and 2 above The explanat1011 of thil phenomena ii to be tound in the tact that tor aurtace or tower 1hot1 conliderabie mount ot aand and 1oil debria ii sucked up 1Dto the cloud and i is eventuall7 coated vith fi11ion products which later tall out due to their own gravi t7 Co lonel Pina on 2 · during· Operation UPSHOT-INOTH0I I measured the dose rate within the cloud which vu burst high eDough to be oonlidered a pure air bunt Under these cirC'Ulllstances th_ere were no active aoil particles to be round TA 1K6 t DOE AR CHIV'04-2367- l'f • ill the mushroom or the cloud Therefore it 1s our opinion that if Colonel Pinson bad used only the UPSBOT-DCTHOIJ data be aa have touixl that dose -a 9 ia only a linear tunction · or t 1 me rather than a second power or the time The GREEIHOUS11 data vhich be also uaed was based primarily on tower shots Considering the relatively lov height of the towers vith the Jielda iJJTolved in GREENHOUSE Teat Operation it becomes obrlou that a considerable amount ot the total activity or the banb vas scavenged out bJ the soil particlea vbich vere ti rat aixed vith the fireball and then •ubsequently tell out It ii our opinion that it vae thia phenanena vbich changed the dose rate relation from a linear tunoticm ot time to a function or the aecoDd pover or tilne It 1a a1gni t1cant that during CASTLE Test Operation vhich had nothing but surface abota the time relation to dosage is a pover ot tour as ahovn ill Equation 2 I believe this ii because during surface ahota approximately or the total residual activity ot the banb 11 coated on large soil particles vhich eubsequently fall out ot the banb Therefore it one vere to measure the change or dosage with time within the item or such a cloud he would tiDd that the dosage decreased ve17 strongly vith time This is because or the linear expansion ot the cloud Dd also because or the normal decay of fission product a but more 1 Jr port antly this is because the majorit7 ot the reeidual radioactivit7 or the bomb is falling out ot the item and is being deposited cm the ground Upon aome refiection or these aequence ot events it becomes obvious that the dose rate nriea with time in a ve17 oanplicated fashion ls a utter ot tact the exponent ot time t must itself be a variable vith time In viev or these oanpllcating factors and because it is practically impossible to give any quantitative ansvers to the change in the size ot the cloud with time due to eddy diffusion and due to wiDd shears it is our opinion that another approach should be made to this problem BEST AVAILABLE COPY c It may be possible to approximate the integrated dosage that ma7 be received by the pilot without recourse to a dose rate equation In order to develop thie thesis it will be assumed that the volume or an atomic cloud 11 proportional to the yield Once this assumption is made it becomes obvious that the dose rate within auch a uniform atomic cloud is independent ot Jield It is believed that such an assumption is a valid one so long a the cloud remains vi thin the troposphere Dd the bomb is bu rat high above the target i e a true airburst This means that we are talking about weapon 'ielda ranging trom small bombs to bomb y 1 elds ot several h ll'ldred kilotons Hovever vhen ve go into th megaton 7ield range the bod7 or the cloud rises significantly into the stratosphere When this happens we are not certain whether volume ot cloud remains exactly proportional to the y 1 eld Because ot the more nearl7 isothermal distribution in the stratosphere the cloud rise in the vertical direction is severely damped as com pared to the rate ot rise in the troposphere J'rom this we can conclude that a cloud vhich rises significantl7 into the stratosphere must be somewhat nattened and quite elongated in the t ARCHl r l • C4-23676 -- hor11ontal direction and sborteDed in the vertical direction References 4 aDd 5 Jllake it possible tor us to caapare the depth or the IIU8hroom or the atomic el ud for different peld atomic weapons Specifieall - ve have chosen for study the cloud from UPSHOT-INOTBOLE thot 9 vhieb vas one or the clouds euccessMly penetrated by Colonel Pinson'• unit Reference 2 This cloud vill then be compared to the cloud dimension or the first ahot or CASTIZ Test Operation In Teble I w have listed the actual cloud dimensions aa canpared to the extrapolated data BEST AVAILABLE COPY Table I Extrapolated and Ji' easured Cloud Dimensions Uli Dg UPSHOT-INOTBOIZ and CASTLE Test Operation Data Yield in I T Time after Bomb Detonation YJ nutes Cloud Dimensions Volume or Mushroom in cubic rt l'ia d mum Depth of Mushroom Mushroom Diameter in rt in rt 7 3 x loll 12800 8500 X loll 1550X 5800 X lol4 105000 t XXXJ 26 KT 4 14500 KT 4 8 14500 IT 4 4 • Ertropolated data assuming volume ie proportional to peld It abO lld be remembered that the extrapolation is made on the assumption that volume or cloud 1a proportional to the peld or th• bomb A stud7 or Table I indicates the extrapolation overestimate• the depth or the mushroo and underestimates the maxi Drum diameter ot the mushroom but ve were able to anticipate this earlier by 1tating that clouds rising into the stratosphere would have a teodenc1 to natten out and to spread in a lateral direction in order to preserve cloud volume It should be noted that the extrapolated elc-ud volume 11 one halt of the actual cloud volume tor the first ahot ot CASTLE Teat Operation We are lot certain at this ti me vhether tb1a dhorepan07 in vol -c 1Jt a real one or whether it is an artifact introduced by the arroa ve have made in eatiJDati Dg the actual Tolume It must be remeJ11berea--tnat at the prese12t ti me ve onl7 have rate or rise and maximum cloud di Aeter and cloud height illtormatioll in Referenoe 5 It is significant to note that m G has not yet 11 de an7 official estimates of the volume of the clouds from CASTLE Teat ooE RcH' At DOE ARCHIVES C4-23676 llt Opention It 1a not clear to ae whether the data gathered during ProJect 9 1 ot C lSTL Test Operation is ntriciently extensive to indicate cloud TOllllDI accuratei 11 must await the decision ot r' G in this utter It 1141 be that the cloud volume tor the CASI'L BRAVO ahot appears larger because ot the excessive aohture pNHnt in the at ao1phere in the Pacific tHt lite•• ccmp Nd to the nrr low mOUJlt or •oiature pNsent normallJ in the de11rt at lema Proving GrouDds d AnDed vith the abon intorution it 1a now poadble tor ua to ll ke a first approxir etion or the integrated dosage Nceived bJ t he pilot and the aircrew vhen an airplane goes through a relatinl7 70UDg ate ic cloud Our reuoning 1a u tollows It the clam volume is proportional to field then the diueter ot the cloud muat be proportional to the cube root ot the field It th11 1a true then the time apent within the radioactive clc-ud bJ an airplane is proportional to the cube root or the Jield also Thie relation is indicated belov w C4 Dl W 1 'Is - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 quation S vhere D dose accumulated vithin the cloud W bomb ield However it should be noted th t »-lue tion 5 does not correct tor the different lenfths or time spent bJ the aircrart vi thin the ndioactive cloud To correct tor this etfeot Equation 6 belo ie giv1n1 D I I J i S U1 t Wr ' t -o ' - t ·•·I 1 •- t •• BEST AVAILABLE where t 8 tb Ti me ot atart 1 or col •· - - - lqUation 6 aircraft penetration into cloud Time or ex 1t or aircraft rrom cloud It should be not ed that 4uations 5 and 6 assume that the airplane penetrates the mushroom or the cloud at its ma rl muJt diameter Th• cloud tran a fifteen Ml' bomb would rise to 11O 0CX teet 'l'be maximum diameter of the mushroom would be 7O CXX to 80 X f'eet above aea level and the diameter vould be about 150 CXX feet in length 5 Present day aircraft traveling at altitudes of' 30 CXX to 40 000 f'eet DOEARCHlV 16 vould peDetrate only the stem or• tirteen Ml' surface bunt cloud and the vould abs the cloud campletel Uthe banb va1 airbunt 10 high that it did not have rn active item Thia vould be the case 1t the baDb ii exploded 5 000 ffft above target In order to correct tor item penetration the actual length or the fflght path thr0118h the radioactive cloud 1111at be 1mow_ • correction 1111at be made tor the tact that clam Tolume does not extrapolate proportionally to Jield • correotioD mu1t be aade tor t'wl10D •• CCllp9 Nd to tiaeioD Jield or the bcab a correctiOD IIU8t be made tor the tact that the specific activit7 actirlt per mdt voluae in the Item 11 auch greater than the act1vit7 vitbiD the muahroce tor large Jield aurtace runt veapon1 and finally a correction muat be aade tor the cha nee iD air densit with altit e 1D the atmosphere To account tor these tacts lquatiOD 7 belov 11 givens BEST AVAILABLE COPY Ft f V1 W1 b -J w1 J ---------------- •· t D '2 I lfl I § '· c 7 vhere F P111i0D - t-o 1 lquatioD 7 t - -t·•·' - h - Jield Ft• Total field tission plus tusion V • Cloud Volume y d t 0gth or night path Densit1 or atmosphere through atomic cloud at nip ht altitude or activit1 per unit volume in item and mushroom tor bombs detoDated at different 1tcaled height •2 11 Ratio ii An anal7d1 of the Jangle-Surtace and CASTL'F BRAVC • hots shove that approximatel 80% of the total residual activit1 or the bomb 11 within the item or the cloud Ifl the case or CASTL BRAVO shot the item has only 1 S to 1 10 the volume ot the mushroom hence the 1pecitio activity vithin the stem at 35 000 feet vould be approximatelJ tirteen to tveDt7 times the 1peoitic aotivit7 within the 11ushroom The 1peciric activities tor other burst heights could be determiDed tram infonnatioD contained in Table II 17 • TABL II Percentaie hllout a1 a Function Scaled Height ' where or i SOO W o 'ii burst v total h height in feet above terrain bcab field in lllotone lw-st Height Above Terrain tor 15 Mr Bomb Percentage Fallout 1 0 0 45 2000 teet 0 2 50% 100' feet o o 80% - 0 1 95J • 5 XX feet 0 - 450 teet UDder5 _ __ •Fora justification of Table II see the Appendix and References 1 and 6 It is our belief that Nlativel1 tev airplanes vould go through the center or the cloud during combat operations Most aircraft vould go right or left ot center and practicall1 all aircraft will go belov the center ot ml ti-megaton clouda t t WI assUJ le that the vind at night altitude 40 000 feet 11 trom the wee and at 40 knot If the same target is to be hit b ' aeveral atrike aircraft at intervals ot tirteen minutH the cloud center at the 40 000 rt level v 111 be ten nautical Id lea east ot the target It the delivery tactic emplo - maximum breakava u neuver then the second strike aircraft cannot go through the center or the tint cloud provided the aecond aircraf't at 40 000 teet baa a tail vind and provided the first aircraft did not make a grose error ot missing hie target b7 ten miles Since the vind diNction at night altitude 1e kDovn it i1 Ncommended that all deliveey aircraft approach the target from 1uch •·direction as to have tail vind1 at bombing altitude Thia ii because the winds ma have 1trong directional 1hear1 at different altitudes but uauall J at a given height the vinda ahov considerable persistence both in dinotion and in speed During bad veather the vinds at 40 000 feet would normall7 not be effected b ' frontal conditions because few stoxma BEST AVAILABLE COPY 9 18 E ARCHl' DO C4-23676 'E 11 • reach such a height It is presumed thet the tropopeuse ia lignifiC Dtly above b tropics or belov in the arctic the 40 CXX toot level To take Nrlnnm adnntage or persiltent vin• it 11 beet not to bomb at the altitude of the tropopauae In the 'Winter at Russian latitudee the tropopause u 7 get down to 20 CXX to 25 000 teet above aean aea level and 1D the IN IDer it rises to 25 000 to 35 CXX feet • Table Ill lists dosages received vhen atadc clouds f'roa different Jield bcabs are penetrated by JD lilDed aircratt h Table III ve ban also bdicated the ll XlllUII dose that coald be received b y the aircrev asSUlling that the clom grows in dimensions in all directions eTen late 0 to 60 mutes art er bceb detonation This gives the Talues UDder •tb - x• and•» ll Xft columns or the Table for example it the 15Ml' cloud 11 penetrated 0 ai Dutes at'ter bcab detonation at a fiigbt altitude of 0 000 teet above sea level then the doae acCUJll'Ul ated b7 the crew would be tran 105 to 00 roentgens If the oloud ie pe11etrated 45 minutes art er bc eb detonation then doae would be 40 to 200 roentgens and finally it the time is 60 mutes atter bomb detonation then the dose would be 15 to 80 roentgens One significant tact 1s that if the fiight altitude could be increased to 60 0'JJ feet or 70 CY lO feet asl then the dosage would be on 5 to 15 roentgens tor a 0 aimlte penetration provided the 15MT bomb is surface detonated It is hoped that at 1C1De future date this hypothesis could be tested during an atomic operation TAble IV shows the effect of ditterent heights or burst upon integrated dosage It shows that as the burst height is increased to more nMrly a true airburst then penetrations at 60 000 to 70 000 teet would produoe marlmum dosages Also tor airbruats or 15MI' veapoDs bunt height 5 000 tt above target fiight altitudes ot 201 000 to 40 CXX feet vould give mDilaum dosage to the aircrew according to our calculations as listed in Table IV It is mandatory that at the next atomic test operation in the Pacific REDWlNG the dosage accumulated by aircrews penetrating mu1 ti-megaton weapons be dete rmiDed experimentall7 The importance or this parameter to the SAC atomic delivery operations cannot be overestimated It is recamnended that an attempt be made to penetrate such clouds tirst by iDstnnnented drones and then b y 118 DDed aircraft starting at B 2 hours and reducing the time down to H 1 hour or even to H f 0 minutes if possible BEST AVAILABLE COPY DOEARCHIV 19 C4-2 367t ' • TABLE III Dosage Aooumulated in Passing through a 15Ml' Cloud at Different Altitude• tw Different Times Cl Penetrat on bJ an Aircraft whose True Air Speed 1• 400 ltnot11 night Altitude of Feet h ta Thousands 0 ot CloUd Penetration in Minutea after Bomb Detonation Above msl u Time 30 20 20 45 JO 0 w 60 30 30 40 40 40 50 50 50 60 60 60 70 70 70 C 0 l 1 45 60 30 45 60 30 45 60 30 45 60 JO 45 60 i umgth ot night Path Specific Activit Thl Ollgh Cloud in Thouanda 1'fft 7 68 7 68 7 68 7 68 7 68 7 68 7 68 7 68 7 68 7 68 7 68 7 68 7 120 120 120 150 150 150 ot 112 Spent Gamma in Cloud Doaage Minutes Acoumul ated in Cloud in Roentpna Time ti Ii 17 3 17 17 17 3 17 3 17 3 17 3 17 3 17 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 05 0 05 0 05 1 72 1 72 1 72 1 72 1 72 1 72 1 72 1 72 1 72 1 72 1 72 1 72 J J J J 7 J 7 J 75 D min 1 0 10 105 40 15 160 60 25 145 55 Maxilla Tim Spent in Di•orpnised Cloud Maximum Ouaa Do•age that be Accumulated While ln Cloud tbau 5 10 15 5 10 15 D 1111X 220 150 60 00 200 5 80 450 5 400 10 15 00 120 20 10 15 2 18 8 27 4 5 2 j 5 1 5 9 10 20 0 270 no 15 25 17 7 TABL IV Sue parueters as Table III altering onl1 the burat height and nei 1ng time or penetration oonstant at 30 lldnutea atter 'bomb detonation Z • Burat b111ht above t at1 et 1D thou11 nd1 ot tHt BEST AVAILABLE COPT z b 0 20 20 20 20 68 7 30 l 2 5 0 l 2 30 30 'I S2'Si 111 n Dain 68 7 68 7 17 3 10 75 42 0 s 1 72 1 72 1 72 0 68 7 17 3 10 5 1 72 1 72 1 72 68 7 68 7 5 30 0 0 40 40 40 40 68 7 68 7 68 7 50 50 50 50 68 7 68 7 68 7 0 l 2 5 0 l 2 5 0 1 2 5 0 1 2 ' 0 60 60 60 60 120 120 120 150 70 70 70 70 150 150 150 150 0 17 3 10 5 0 17 3 10 5 0 0 1 0 5 o s 1 0 o os o os 0 80 1 00 0 0 1 72 1 72 1 72 0 1 72 1 72 1 72 0 3 3 3 3 J 75 3 15 3 75 3 75 tb au Dau 5 5 220 0 lJO 0 5 0 65 10a 5 5 5 0 300 175 160 95 450 45 5 5 5 0 0 1 30 0 145 5 5 5 0 400 240 120 0 9 22 60 '30 0 87 4 5 0 90 0 Z O 50 10 15 75 120 170 5 50 10 10 10 10 25 250 400 500 5 25 40 80 100 9 9 • In the denlopnent or Equations 6 and 7 wference• 10 and 11 were consulted However our equations are limited oril7 to n lues or ratios ot total dosages acCtlmUlated in clouds 'Which aimplities the problem tor us · A 1946 DOEA f 21 • C4-2J676 V ntact Beta Hazard to Randa of Maintenance Personnel Handling Contaminated ' lgine Pa rte a During Operation GREENHOUSE 7 the beta-ga mna ratio of fission product vu found to be 157 According to Brennan 8 the contact beta-gamma ratio could be theoreticall y as high as 200 Thia applies to the case or fission products uniforml7 distributed over an infinite plADe Obviousl - it the beta--gam a ratio 1a aeuured onr a U object vhich bas a relativel7 small surface area then the ratio vould be increased considerabl - It •hould be noted bovner that even thongh the beta-plllllll ratio ia thus increaaed the beta contact hazard b decreased Tersei 9 aIJd the references 1n his report give a relation or the p lllll dose rate reading at contact vheD tiss10ll products are spread over objects vith different arurt'ace areas b lhen an airp ane goes through an atomic cloud it becomes coated vith tissiOD products throughout the outer skin aIJd throughout the inside or the engines or the aircraft As the airplane leaves the cloud the air stream vashes a considerable amount or conta miD tion orr the outer skin or the aircraft However those portions of the skin that are greas7 or dirty vill entrap larger amounts of fission products which may not be easily airwashed b y the motion of the aircraft In a similar fashion fission products contamiDate the oil - and greasy engine parts vhich tend to retain these contaminants quite efficiently Upon landing 1f' the aircraft is monitored b y a gama indicating device such as the T-lB nov called PDR 39 then the gamma ra y reading vill be somewhat less than that from an infinite plane contamination especially it the aircraft 11 amall However most aircraft present quite a large surface area to the T-lB It vill be assumed that this surface area is approxiJDately 100 square feet It the T-lB is held three feet away from the aurfaee then the ratio of gamma reading on the surface of the aircraft as canpared to the instrument reading would be three If this reading is one roentgen per hour then the beta contact dose could be theoretically as high as 600 beta rep per hour However there is no reason on earth vhf the T-lB could not be held one and a halt feet from the aircraft's surface If' this is done then the contact g llllla reading vould be only 1 3 times the instrument reading This meB lls the maximum contact beta rep reading would be 260 If' the-T-lB is held so that the center of the instrument chamber 1s nine to ten inches above the airplane's surface then the gemna contact reading vould be the same as the T-lB reading hence the maximum beta rep contact reading vould be 200 if the T-lB indicates a dose rate of one roentgen per hour ot gamma c Actually the human skin has a cutaneous layer or at least O l millimeters 8 vbich absorbs a certain amount of the soft betas tram fission products Also the oil and grease absorb a lot or the betas ao that it is anticipated that this would reduce the beta-gamma DOE ARCHIVJ C4-23676 -- ratio well belov 200 on a lare-e aircraft engine part Brennan 8 found a JDBJdmum beta-gamma ratio of approximately 5 vhen he aeasured this ratio only tour inches trorr the ground It ii our opinion that the beit'a-gamma ratio vben experimentally determined during Operation TEAPOT in the Spring ot 1955 Project 2 8 vould probably be less than 50 tor operational aircraft 'l'his is the beta-gamna ratio tram AD infinite plane vhere the surface under consideration ii the greasy portions ot the aircraft For Plflll engine parts ot wch aircraft the ratio vould be iDcreaaed in accordance vitb the relation• ginn by Beterence 9 Bence 1t a small object ii taken out ot an aircraft engine part the beta-gamma ratio vould be a1 indicated in Table V From an inspection ot Table V we see that it the contact doee is to be measured on a Tery small object then a probe t1J 9 radiac in1t ent vou ld be best It may even be better to develop an accurate beta ter or the probe type However operationaU it vould be impractical to measure the beta contact dose on each and · eTery small eneine part in the field First of all to pertonn 1uch a delicate operation the suspected parts must be handled It the small engine part is •dangerous to bandle then in order to measure the beta contact hazard accurately ve expose the haDds or our personnel to this danger before ve find out vbether it is dangerous We may get around this by using tongs or remote handling equiµnent but ve can't irisgine the employment of such a procedure operationally d It is recommended that either the T-lB g8l ID8 indicating inst ent or the PD gemms plus beta indicating instrument ot the presently authorized Ra1iac Kit be employed to determine the beta contact hazard on the most contaminated engine parts or the aircraft as follows 1 As the airplane lands monitor it with the T-lB instrument If it is suspected that the airplane may have penetrated a young atomic cloud approxi mately sixteen hours ago then if the T-lB reading is greater than one roentgen per hour either the aircrart should be allowed to stand tventy-four hours and then handled with gloves or it should be decontaJninated first before handling If none of' the above procedures are operat1ona1ly practical in a given situation maintenance crevs should be asked to vear gloves and to vipe the grease off their hands repeatedly with rags and vash as soon as practical after finiahlng the maintenance vork The reasoning behind the above procedure is as tollovs1 l stuay of Reference 23 3hovs that the highest internal concentration on engine parts is approximately ten to twenty times the outside contamination vhen the aircrart has penetrated a young atanic cloud It is assumed that the beta-gamma ratio is approximately titty tor objects vith large surface areas If the T-lB is held one foot away trot 6 ARCHIV R 23 C4-2J676 TABLE V Eetimete of the Contact Beta Rep Dose RPte on Contar- ineted Clbject1 of Various Cross-sectional Areas vhen the Gamma x se Rate Reading ii lr hr at Various Distances trort the Contamineted Object h l teet teet feet feet 3 teet 3 3 3 3 Infinitely lge 100 •q tt 10 l 0 5 I2 0 4 2 5 15 100 200 l l 1 l toot toot toot toot l foot ca 100 10 l 0 5 0 3 1 2 ft 1 2 ft 1 2 ft eo 1 2 ft 3 5 1 2 ft 1 6 l 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 l 6 l 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 100 10 l ft c o ft ft ft 100 10 1 0 5 rt ft ft ft ft ft oc 100 10 1 0 5 Ji'iax B rep rb Meazi B Np 80 20 500 125 COO 750 20000 5 XX 400 lO XX 60 l 200 3 15 27 3000 5400 15 50 150 750 1350 0 2 0 8 1 5 5 40 160 300 1000 1600 10 40 75 250 400 0 05 0 4 0 8 1 5 10 80 160 2 400 600 8 300 0 01 n 1 0 2 2 20 40 04 80 o 60 • refers to PDR27 Instrument vi th Beta Shieln open 2 5 20 40 75 100 0 5 5 10 15 20 All other readings are tor T-lB Instrument DOEARCHW 24 • C4-2 367f TA BL IV Continued Explanation ot S bols iD Table Va h • distance betveeD contaminated object A • Surtace Area ot Badiac I Dstl'UID8Dt CoDtn1net ed Object in square teet m • Ratio rh and ot contact gs- k abon the object reading to reading at Hrtical distance Mu B rep • The - d •111 ooDtact Beta rep upoD the object usumi Dg no shielding and no eelt absorption i e assuming the Betaganna ratio baa a nlue or 200 tor a contaminated intW te plane Mean B rep• The contact Beta rep upon the contamiDated object aaSUlling that shielding and selt absorption reduce the theoretical Beta-gamma ratio by a t'actor ot 4 It is hoped that after TEAPOT the experimental Beta-Galama ratio on a contaminated aircraft engine vill be obtained It is our opinion that vbec this is done it vill be t'ound that shielding and seU' absorption reduce the theoretical beta gamma ratio by a tactor or 5 to 10 This means that here we are being conservative in assuming the above reductioD to be onl7 a tac 2r A • BEST AVAILABLc -U '' - leading edges of the aircraft then the gamma reading on the T-lB would be the same as the contact gamna reading Therefore the maximum beta dose rep on the JDOst contaminated eneine part vould be approximatel1 500 to 1000 times the indicated T-lP reading provided the airplane lands on friendly territory at H- 16 hours This means that for a T-lB reading of lr br the most contaminated engine part would show a cODtl ct reading ot 500 to 10 0 beta rep per hour It the airplane 1s allowed to stand tventy- four hours after 1 t lands OD triendly territory the beta rep dose re te would be reduced trom 1000 to 310 or from 599 to 120 It the mechanics' hands remaiD in coDtact vi th tbe engine parts tor a period or one hour after vhlcb he vashes bis hands then the total contact beta doae to the bands would not be greater than that givec by the follovinig r stioD r -b R i 1 - s R 1 -•• -b t O• - - Equation 10 A 1kb -I DOE ARCHIV 25 • C4-2367 lheo the proper nlues are substituted in Equation 10 we see that the beta NP dose is 41 0 This • eans that beta rep dose will be 1w 41 0 it this ti• e •• don't know how aucb less We hope that after Operation mPOT we will bsve some quantitative data Oll this •ubJect It 11 assumed that 6oo to 1000 beta rep is the sk1n erytheu dose Thus we SH that enn tor the aost cootaainated engine part the beta Np doH 1 8 less than the erythema doee There is soae eTidence that th• beta deca7 tor rion weapon tollows a t•2 relation 1 n etead ot the t•1 • decay used in lquation 10 It at tutu re test operatlona thi1 1 8 found to be true then the beta Np dose to the bands would be reduced eignU'icantly below the Talue or 440 reps ginn ill the above example As • aatter ot tact ca culation ehows that if beta particles decay as t- then in one hour the beta dose rep would be less than 10 reps It there are contaminated engine parts laying around that are suspected of be Jlg contaminated then the PDR27 should be used with the beta shield open a ad the probe should be held as close to the contaminated object as possible Under such circumstances an inspection ot Table V shows that the indicated PDR27 reading would be only 4 10 of the contact gamma reading even though the surface area presented by the contaminated engine part is only half a square foot - n DOE ARCHIVF S 26 • C4-23676 VI • Military Counter-measures Against the Radioactive Hazards Despite the tact that large area s 1n our country will be bighl contaminat because or the radioactive tallout from atomic bombs it is O r 'Opinion that adequate military counter-measures against this radiation hazard could be obtained by relatively simple methods In general teru the tolloving sequence ot events tor proper cornteraeasures against the radioactiTe baz rd are suggested lY Wa z n1ng It is poasible to obta 1 n some early warning ot the probable area ot fallout t' -011 the existing upper air winds Thie would indicate whether or not the Air Base is 1n the downwind direction trom a likely target area on a giTen da7 This could easi 4 be done by simpl7 plotting the upper air winds in a radex or fallout plot torm somewhat as indicated 1n Figures ll lB 2 3 4 7 nd 8 In Figure u the winds are victorially plotted bead to tail on am the winds are weighted to show the relative amounts or time that each particle spends within a given layer in the atmosphere The method of fallout plotting is given in much more detail in references 19 and 20 and in Section A of the Appendix It is recommended that the radex plots be used as tollows Draw a circle with a radius of 00 miles around the Air Base then plot the winds in all quadrants from aey likely target area and determine whether any or all or these r ex plots show the Air Base to be in a downwind path See Figure 11 Ir your Air Base is in the downvind path then at least some warning could be had that there is a possibility of being subjected to radioactive fallout This in itself should be of some help to the Collll lander Ir it is desired to determine the exact fallout isodose lines before fallout begins it would be necessary to know the exact location of the targets the exact yields of the bombs and a very exact indication of the height of burst of the bomb above the target It is obvious that such a large amount of information will probably not be available during combat operations Even if all this information about the target the yield the height of burst etc is accurately known there would be still quite a bit of uncertainty as to the exact area of fallout because ot the inherent instability of the atmosphere It should be remembered that a plot of the fallout area based on upper air winds is subject to many errors because of the many simplil -ing assumptions made These assumptions are that the stoke's Law of fallout is valid and that the winds remain constant in direction and speed throughout the fallout period which may last trom bal f an hour to 1'1fteen hours after bomb detonation It also assumes that the wind direction and speed are the same th Toughout the downwind fallout area An analysis of former Atomic Test Operations shows · that for tower and surface shots the radex plot varies 15 to 20 degrees from the position computed by the upper air wims at H-3 hours For further discussion of this aspece refer to the Appendix a A ' 1 t 1 94€' 27 DOE ARCHIVES C4-2 367E It is recommended that with the winds avail able at aq Weather Station it is possible only to indicate the correct quadrant of fallout It uy even be possible to iD iicate within which half of a quadrant the fallout will occur This means that we • ust use the fallout plot merely as an i adicetion of the general area of the anticipated fallout In view or this lWtation it is considered unwise to attempt to plot accurately the actual isodose lines of the contamination pattern within a given radex plot Upon post analrsis when the winds aloft information is available throughout the fallout area then it uy be possible to accurately delineate the fallout area It should be noted however that ti • e and space variation of the winds • ust be taken into account and a tiae composite radex plot must be prepared which is very tiae consuming see ppendix Such accurate wind data is not available until after the event bas occurred Once the Commander is alerted to the possibilit7 of fallout he should have the radiation instrwaents available at various places within the Air Base to see whether the radioactive hazard acutally develops ls indicated above it may easily pass north or south of the Air Base and miss the Air Base by as • uch as fifteen to twenty degrees Once the fallout begins it is immediately obvious whether the contamination will be excessive or not because the maximum dose rate is reached relatively fast sfter the start of tallout See Figure 10 See Sections 4 and below Table VII and Section 4 of Appendix for greater details in this matter b Dispersal By dispersal we mean the illllllediate evacuation of personnel and airplanes from the Air Base This cannot be started after the fallout has begun It is our opinion that preparations for immediate departure or dispersal of aircraft from a given lir Base must be started previous to the start of the radioactive fallout This could easily be accomplished by the early warning net mentioned above If the Air Base is under threat of radioactive fallout then those aircraft and personnel that are to be immediately evacuated must be ready to go within a matter of minutes after the radiac instruments show the start of significant amounts of fallout I would want to caution you at this point that if the dose rate is simply increased to a nlue or five to ten times background or even 10 000 times background there is no need for dispersal or evacuation to shelters ls a matter of fact very large areas would normally receive such small amounts of radioactivity For details on what intensities should be considered significant to cause dispersal or evacuation one should refer to Table VII ls a rule if radioactive fallout begins at approximately three to five hours after shot time and if the dose rate does 0ot rise above lr hr then it is not recommended that there be any dispersal or evacuation because the integrated dose to personnel at the Air Base probably would not exceed ten to thirty roentgens at the most If the dose rate reaches a value greater than 100 r hr when fallout begins at -- 28 TA A t o c t p l _ o f ARCHIVES C4-23676 _ q H f 4 hours then it 1s recommended that personnel be evacuated to shelters If the fallout begins ten to firteen hours at'ter shot time then personnel should not be evacuated Ur1less the dose rate reaches a value significantly above 50 roentgens per hour For turther details consult Table VII It llfily be· necessary to evacuate to shelters those personnel that are not required for the immediate mission or the Air Base even if the dose rate is significantl belov those mentioned above in order to keep to a minimum the total dosage received by all personnel vi thin the Air Base However this again is a Conmand decision c Shelter Shelters against the radioactive hazard need - ot be expensive constructions nor do they have to be complicated or fancy The shelter must provi e three to five feet of dirt betveen the person and the source of radioactivity ' 'his could be achieved by basements sub-basements fox-holes a d the like which put a certain amount of dirt between the military person and the surface of the ground It 1s recommended that people be shielded as much as possible in all directions inchlding the vertical There need not be airconditioning there need not be filters nor air-tight seals to doors and vindovs of the shelters There need not be cooking messing or sanitary facilities within such shelters There need not be storage of food in such shelters In other words it is our opinion that the shelters should be merely cells with a certain amount of dirt all around them to protect a person for a period of from six to twelve hours ai'ter fallout bas begun Six hours after fallout bas begun a person may go upstairs and bring some food dovn He my go upstairs for sanitary purposes for a short period of time without receiving e xcesshe dosages provided he bas waited approxilr ately six hours afier the start of fallout Under no circumstances should such persoJ'lnel be allowed to go out-of oors during the active fallout period 'When the dose rate bas the large values mentioned in Section Labove It is believed that active fallout may last from 5 to 12 hours d Decontamination Aircraft and airbase decontamination should be conducted arter the acute dangers of the immediate fallout problem have been overcome It is anticipated that this would occur twelve hours arter fallout began under most circumstances Mr Louis Nees and Mr Wang of AMC have recommended that perhaps decontamination of Air Bases could begin even before the fallout bas started 'I'his could be done by the use of sprinkling systems which my be put on Air Bases and 'Which could be operated either automatically or manually There is also the possibility of covering run-ways with canvas shields etc 'Which would then be removed arter fallou bas been complet--d Decontamination could also be effected by vacuum n of roofs runways and other relatively smooth surfaces It may also be possible to wash certain areas and to turn the ground ovDOE 'ARCHIVES - • C4-23676 wherever this is possible and to use many other common sense aeans or decontamination It should be kept in II ind that decontamination ia nothing more or less than a good vashing process The dirt happens to be radioactive but the only precaution ve have to take because it is radioactive is to see to it tbet the decontem1Dating team does not receive excessive doses or radioactivity and ve 11D St also make an attempt to aee that the drainage does not get into the veter supply or the Air Base or the tows nearb y _ilrcratt decontamination could be effected b y sveeping ncuumine washing and other camnon sense -methods RonnaU unless D aircraft rues through a 7oung atcmic cloud there would be no contamination or any consequence vitbiD the engine parts and the cabins of the aircraft It the aircraft catches the fallout while it is on an Air Base then it the pilot can get to the aircraft and take off vithout receiving an excessive dose the normal air washing due to flight vould clean the aircraft automatically of large intensities of contamination Under such circumstances aircraft decontamination would not be necessary However if aircraft do tly through young atomic clouds then they must either be deconte Jdnated or allowed to stand for a period of time before they can be handled for normal maintenance purposes e Evacuation Arter personnel come out or their sbel ters and do whatever decontamination is necessary in order to go on with their nonnal military duties it may be desirable to evacuate a certain portion of the airbase personnel to contamination free areas It should be kept in mind hovever that the var situation may be such tbet there would not be any clear areas vithin reasonable reach of the Air Base Figure 11 shows vbet would happen to this county when 100 to 110 atomic bombs of 15 MI' are surface- 3etonated on the population centers and on the airbases or this country It is very clear after lookinc at Figure 11 that there is no place to hide 1D this countr especially in the EFstern half of the United States Under such an eventuality it woul be UD esirable for the Collllll8nder or an Air Base to attempt evacuation or dispersal out of the Air Base As a matter of fact you can see that there is a distinct possibility or jumping from the frying pan into the fire it dispersal is attempted vithout an accurate knovledge or the situation throughout the countr f Times of Entr r ipto Contaminated Areas Table VII indicates the dose accumulated in fallout areas assuming that the t-1 2 decay lav applies It also shovs the dosage accumulated taking into account the fact that personnel are subjected to radiation not only from the ground but from an infinite volume or contaminated air during active fallout See the appendix for greater details on the extra accumulation or dosage vhen people are caught TA 30 DOE ARCHI' Cl -23676 '9l • TABLE VII Accumulation or T'losage in Fallout Areas usinr the t-1 •2 de0a7 tablea and a compnrison of this to the total dosage accumuJeted when the Volume-Erteot• or Fallout is tslmn into account See Soction _ or appendix tor definition of Volume Fnllout Volume - F ffect or Fallout t-1 tr P nax 0 5 1 2 1380 600 258 142 114 84 4 5 6 72 60 50 7 8 9 10 43 18 11 J4 JO 12 lJ 27 25 24 2 8 2 5 7 14 15 48 D3 485 275 96 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Du D 36 D48 DOD R'max 500 490 535 360 1410 190 242 298 115 185 2 36 62 137 197 178 29 107 0 81 147 0 63 129 0 46 105 0 Jl 100 0 19 87 5 0 7 5 71 0 0 68 0 0 60 0 0 52 0 0 47 0 0 0 570 440 330 57 450 340 285 247 220 720 625 545 500 475 452 437 425 412 400 J95 J85 80 375 370 36 3 JJO J05 290 2 30 100 4 27 19 14 12 10 8 4 7 2 6 J 5 7 5 1 4 6 4 2 J 9 2 2 1 4 1 0 D6 t i2 JO 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 10 230 205 185 162 147 135 123 112 102 94 89 80 J8 0 0 200 179 167 154 142 132 122 llJ 108 100 59 22 0 Deca7 D'J 0'6 172 234 150 86 52 28 265 195 131 100 74 lJ 58 44 97 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 D112 34 25 17 10 5 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 D' 36 D'48 - 305 235 170 135 11 3 102 84 74 331 256 192 158 135 120 107 95 57 50 79 72 66 575 500 435 400 80 362 350 340 3 0 322 315 309 D'24 60 44 39 34 --· 86 60 55 ' 52 27 0 47 0 0 22 0 0 343 270 205 171 148 132 120 107 100 92 85 79 73 69 65 60 35 13 0 D' '304 300 295 291 265 244 2 0 tt1 l '- I t' Jl er a 04-23676 TA BIE VII Continued Symbola or the Table have the tollovicg aning tr • ot Fallout in hours after bomb detocetion It may also be used as time or ect17 ot personnel into fallout area Time of Start R'ux • Maximum T ose Rate vithin tallont area assuming t-1 2 deca1 C1n roentgens per hour ltmax Maximum Dose Rate vithic tallout area taking into account Volume - Bttect• ot fallout Normally the JDaXimum dose rate occurs 10 to 30 miDUtes after start or tal lout in the downwind direction r hr Silr-ilarly all primed symbols refer to t-1 2 decay case and all unprimed symbols refer to those values that are corrected tor the Volume- Effect ot fallout D3 IDte ted Dose in roentgens accumulated within 3 hours arter Boob Detonation etc refer to 12 24 36 and 48 hour integrated doses roentge cs D00 • I ctegrated infinity dose All values in the table are o cly within slide rule accuracy and even such values have been rou cded out in an area that is being subjected to active fallout It is believed that people who are subjected to such vol lll'le fallout will receive less shielding from buildings above the ground provided the shelters do not have three to five feet or dirt all around the person Table VII has many uses For example it is possible to assume that tr not only sta cds tor time or start or fallout after bomb detonation but also for time or ent17 or personnel i cto a contaminated area Some illustrative examples will be given below for the proper use or Table VII 1 Example l Assume fallout starts at J 75 hours after bomb detonation and at B 4 4 hours the ma rlmum reading 1s 114 r hr Then by an inspection of the table we find that if personnei remain in the area two more hours the acCUJfflllated dose would be 62 roentgens DOE ARCHIVE A 32 C4-2 3676 3 at H 6 hours BiM1larlJ the dosage would be 1 7 H· 12 197r at H -4 24 2 0r at H J 6 247r at H 48 llDd 475r at infinite time after bcmsb detonation It ·should be noted that had ve used the t-1 2 decay tat-les the integrated doses would have been 28r at R -4 6 74r at H -4 12 l r at B f 24 1 5 at H -4 36 148 at B J 48 am 80r at infinite time roentgens at It ii also possible ·to determine in this eame example vb at vould happen 1 persocnel vere either evacuated tor 6 hours or sent to adequate sbeltere shelters vith 3 to 5 teet or dirt all around tor a period ot 1ix hours Under euch circumst8 Dces the assumption is JD de that fallout etarts at approximately B i 4 hours and personnel exiter the area at H 10 bo rs An inspection or the table reading the tr 10 hours row shows that if people enter the area at H 4 10 hours then by H J 12 they vould have accumu1ated 19 roentgens by H U they would have received 87 5r and similarly by B 4 6 123r by H 48 142r and the life time dose infinity dose would have been approximately 95 roentgens 2 Example 2 Suppose at H 4 hours the dose rate was not 114r hr as iD the tab e but it vas larger say it was 287r hr thexi the H 6 hour dose would be found from the table as tollovs iIT x H J 6 hour dose in the Table 'Which is iIT 3 x 62r 2 51 x 62r 155r Example 3 It fallout started at H 1 8 hours and personnel who remained in the contaminated area received 00 roentgens in tour hours after the start ot fallout theD if they remain in the area they would receive the following dosages for the times indicated Hf 6 houra dose received is 300 roentgens a At b At Hi 12 hours dose received is 300 x 242 382 roentgens 190 DOE ARCHIVES A 1946 33 C4-23676 if • c At H l 24 hours lQQ x 298 470 roentgens 190 It should be remembered that Table VII does not take into account shielding due to roughness of terrain features or due to personnel being indoors nor does it take into accOUDt the recover - or the body when the dose rate is relatively lov any g lffects of Shielding and Dose Rate on Biological tlamage References 15 and 16 discuss the uo mt of reduction to be expected in the dose rate vhen the terrain is rough or rolling or has ngetation OD it These references also discuss the ability of the body to repair damaged tissue vheD the dose rate is quite low ID our report it will be assumed that rolling countryside vi th vegetation reduces the dose rate by a small factor It will also be assumed that for all practical purposes dosage after 48 hours from time or banb detonation can be Deglected when we are computing the acute total body gamma dosage during combat conditions For people indoors in the averaee air installations buil1ing at an airbase the infinite plane dosage is probably reduced by 50% due to terrain shielding and to shielding offered by the building This means that for personnel indoors the dosage values of Table VII could be cut in halt and during combat the integrated dosage beyond 48 hours can be neglected Thus the dose values of the examples cited above would have to be reduced by a factor of tvo and dosages accumulated art er 48 hours may be neglected h Dete nnining Fallout·Areas after the 'Event It is recommended that permanent installations of gamma indicating radiac instruments be made in several locations within an Air Base These gamma indicatirgdevices should preferably be selfrecording in or ier to indicate ime history of the fallout If such instruments are available throughout all Air Bases in the country then it would be possible to draw a contamination pattern throughout this nation immediately after this information is fed into a central headquarters It is suggested that it would save lives of many Radiological Safet7 Monitors if permanent installation of gamma indicating devices are made on several cuildings within an Air Base thus preventing the necessity of surveying the Air Base during excessive fallout or when the intensity of radiation is high DOE ARCHIVE $ 34 • C4-23676 5 VII Offensive Uses of Radioactivity a Denisl of an Area to the EneJ Y During cc cbat it may be possible to deny a relatively large area to the enemy by explodi Dg atomic bombs on the surl'ace or uooerground It is believed that if a 15 megatOD bomb is contact burst or is buried 500 reet UDderground then upon detonation of such a veapon an area or rran 50Cl0 to 10 CX square miles vill be covered vith such an mnoont ct radioactivity as to make it impassable to the enemy tor a period or rcn tvelve tc forty-eight hours Of course if such a weapon is to be employed by us we must have quite accurate vind information at all levels of the atmosphere up to appro x mately 50 CXX feet above sea level 'We cannot determine the exact area of fallout but ve believe that ve can determine the correct quadrant of fallout and even have a pretty good idea in vhich half of a given quadrant the fallout vill occur The shape of the area vould normally be elliptical vhere the major axis vould be from tvo to four times greater than the minor axis depending upon the speed of the upper air winds If there are no directional shears to the vinds vith altitude then the fallout area vill in fact be quite elliptical Hovever if there arc pronounced shears vith height then the area vill deviate from an ellipse and vill take a torturous path somevhat as indicated in the radex plots given in the appendix b Relaxation of J ssile CEP In viev of the fact that the lethal concentration of the radioactivity vill cover approxmately JO to 50 times the blast or thermal damage area it may be possible to relax the CEP of intercontinental missiles As a matter of fact it vould be possible to vage atomic·varfare using ballistic missiles vhich are intended merely to hit certain areas of the enemy country In the case of Russia it may be practical to develop missiles with an accuracy of plus or minus ten miles or even plus or minus fifty or 100 miles This means that we have to forego the thermal and blast damage that ve get from a bomb and use only the radiation damage para meter If this is acceptable then it may be possible to relax the stringent guidance problems that ve have placed upon our guided missiles or the future See Figure 11 for an il nc tration of the excessive contamination produced vhere 100 to 110 large bombs 15Ml' are contact burst on this country c Limitations to the Offensive uses of Rrldioactivity It should be noted that radiation damage from present atomic or thermonuclear veapons is a transitory one At best it will cover the enemy territory vith lethal concentrations of radioactivity for a short period of time but ve know that the enemy can develop simple counter-measures against this hazard and survive such an DOE ARCHIVES A 35 BEST AVAILABLE COPY attack Ve have then merel1 succeeded 1D pinning the enemy's head down tor a period or from tvelve to torty• ight hours He can come up after this time and fi bt back Hovever it ll'lie ht be that under certain circumstances aerely pinning down the eoeicy temporarily would produce a decisive effect There are sane other specialized uses or redioactivit1 For example if ve do not W Dt to destroy a cit and i t we vant to capture it intact it 11ay be possible to attack it vith radiation onl1 by exploding the bomb say 15 to 30 miles upwind ot the cit7 thus covering the tO'tlll with lethal doses or radioactivit7 Ir the winds alott on target are not known several bombs must -be detonated in the periphery ot the target to be sure to catch one cit7 in the doW Nind path Under eoch circumstances it aay be possible tor us to take the tovn without destroying it If ve are to use our atomic weapons tor this type or ra1iclogical warfare it 11a1 be vorthvhile to think of increasing the number of bombs in the stockpile because ve would need more bombs not less to do the Job I say this despite the fact that the radiation damage area is rift times more than the blast damage area This is because the residual radioactivity decays rather rapidl7 vith time In 24 hours the H l hour activity is reduced by 45 and in approxilllately 13 days the activity is reduced by 11 ' This means that i t bombs are to be used for ra1iolo£iCA1 warfare the attack must be repeated every 24 or 48 hours er course the initial attack could be so ti Jr ed that i f there is a large probability that several contamination patterns will be superimposed upon a given airbase then these contaminating events will not occur simultaneously Reference is made to Figure 11 If the attacks in the California area or the New England area could be so timed that a given airbase or etoclcpile site receives contaminating fallout every three to six hours then this would prolong the redirl gical hazard to a given area 'D the t her hand if all bCl lbs vere drcoped OVPr the country at appro rlmctely the srune ti me e large portion of the gamma n dietion would die d vn in c-oe or tvo d11yo It would be best to attack the enemy Mtion vi th ufficient bombs to prevent retP liaticn in the first attPck In such an --tt ick every attelr J t should be made to destroy the enemy retaliatory power throughout the nation by hitting the targets as much as possible simultaneousl7 After this primary objective is achieved however subsequent raids could be so timed as to increase the radiation hazard to areas suspected of having a potential ability to counterattack If the Russian stockpile sites are invulDerable to the thermal and blast damage produced by our mu1 timegaton banbs then it may be necessary to keep the stockpile sites and all approaches to it covered with such high doses of radioactivity as to make entry and exit into the area virtually impossible Radiological cont Itination may also be used to advantage in areas where the exact location of the target is not known Since one bomb or 15 Megaton yield pro1uces excessive contamination which covers 10 X O to 20 00' square miles several such bombs should cover Jnost of the area of a given state or region n the other hand the DOE ARCHIVES C4-2 3676 ' 'l blast dUIB f'e ii permanent It destro s buildings it kills aircraft by shearing the viDgs off it kills people by knocldnr them dead 1'2-an DC debris and otherwise it is a duage that cannot be repa 1 red readily Ill the case of radiation it personnel are exposed to it ill large doses then it can kill just as surely as blast However it people take shelter vhere they have three to tin teet ot dirt between the and the radiation they can remain wrlerground •at tor a period trca twelve to fort7-eigbt hours and then ccae on cut and tight ltter tort7• ight hours 110st or the radiation intensit1 bas been reduced to such a point where the1 will not get a lethal aBOWJt or radiation vithin abort periods of tu e So the1 can actua launch their aissiles varm up their aircraft and take ott and reSUl e the tighti ne W JrUSt realize the limitations ot radiological warfare The1 are quite apparent However if the eneJQ' 1s not f orevarned and if the en91111' 1s l Ot ready vi th adequate shelters then ve can really produce excessive casualties in the enmy country by 1impl1 explodinP our banbs on the grow id By this method ve lose practically none of the thermal and blast damage and in addition t o this ve get the radioactive damage•• a bODUs It seems that as we contemplate upon the offensive uses or radioactivity the lesson ve learn is that ve must be rearly to defend ourselves 8 f ainst the rAdioactive hasard If ve are read ' vi th proper coUDtermeasures then ve can blunt quite severely the horrible co0sequences or such a hazard In other words I believe that ve as a nation can b ' nalisticall y simple means protect ourselves against the radioactive haards No one can say that ve can do this against the thermal anrl hlast cri terla or the banb Paradoxical 17 at this time ve have de-emphasized radiological safety vithiri the Air Force It is recomr -ended that large JlUJnbers or enlisted and officer personnel of the Air Force be trained in luldiological Sefet7 Operations At the present til le this training has been stopped It is reccmnended tbet a Jediological Sefet1 AFSC be created vithin the Air Force At the present time this AFsc·has been discontinued or BEST AVAILABLE coPY DOE ARCHIVES 37 • C4-23676 - APPmDII COUSTRU TION OF FALLOOT PLOTS A Method of Plotting Fallout The fallout plot or radex plot in its simplest form consists ot plotting winds from the surface up to the height reached by the atomic cloud The method of plotting is merely the vector addition of winds The ld IXls are weighted to account tor the amount of time they spend through ea ch layer ot the atmospherf It is assumed that the soil particles have a density ot 2 S gm cm' and that rate of tall follows Stokes' I aw • j -Equation 11 'Where V rate of fall r radius of spherical particles Vl coefficient of viscosity of air g acceleration or gravity e2 density of particles '1 density of air Although viscosity of air varies with temperature for sake of simplicity viscosity is usually assumed to be constant Actually an accurate use of viscosity in the Stokes' Equation is not justified because the fallout particles are not all spherical nor are they all of equal density Errors introduced by these assumptions far outweigh a more rigid analysis of the change or viscosity of air with temperature Also the variation of Winds aloft with time and space make it difficult if not impossible to determine with great enoug accuracy the fallout area to justify the use of a more accurate rate of fall formula Reference 16 uses different rates of fall formulas tor different size particles Although this may be justifie8 tor particles significantly larger than 100 microns and also for particles less than 10 microns an inspection of Table rrIA d'love hat more than SO% of the total activity of a surface burst bomb is scavenged out by BEST AVAILABLE COPY A lN6 DOE ARCHIVES C4-2 J676 • J1 - particles vhose diameters are rran 20 to 100 microns Ill 'rlev or this ve neglect corrections to the simple Stokes' I av The ilr leather Service Manual on Fallout and Badex plots 19 and Colonel George Taylor's method or Rfidex Plottinr during Operation GREENHOUSE 20 describe the method quite adequately For the f'ollovlng vlnds alof t information the siltple radex plot is giveD 1l i Figure U Altitude in Thousands ot teet Above Mean Sea level Vind W1Dd Speed t irection Jn IDots 5 10 15 20 25 30 90 120 150 160 180 230 270 35 '270 40 45 290 330 70 25 3 40 45 50 25 80 20 0 50 55 5 8 10 15 20 3 gm c m3 vill fal 1 approxi metely at the rate of 6 OCX ft hr or at a rate of 1 knot Hence the trajectory plotted in Figure lA shows the locus at see level of 70 micron particles fallin from different heights In Figure lA the heifhts from vhich the particles have arrived is listed in thousands or feet For example the arrov line betveen J oints B and C of the figure represent fallout of 70 micron particles arriving from an altitu1e of 37 500 to 42 500 ft above sea level Since Stokes' Lav indicates that the fell velocity of particles is proportional to the square of the particle radius it is at once evident thet 100 micron particles vould fall at approximatel1 double the speed of 70 micron particles and similarl7 140 micron particles vould fall four times as fast as 70 micron particles vhile 50 micron particles fall at approximately one half the speed or 70 micron particles This means that from a given height the smaller particles would fall further avay from ground zero than the larger partic1es For eX llDple in Figure U it is assumed that ground zero is at 0 and a 70 micron particle originating at 42 500 rt vill arrive at point C hence 100 micron particles vould fall at point D and 140 micron particles at E By utilizing this method it is possible to detennine quite simply the canplqte fallout plot or any s · ed particle as indicated in FiP UN lB By the use or Stokes la·- F quation 11 it would be simple to find the times of fallou For example the fallout time at points C D and E vould be approximately 7 3 5 anc 1 75 hours respectively For greater details consult A spherical particle or 70 micron diameter and a density or BEST AVAllJI r y 39 eubsequent eections of the appendix or references 19 and 20 B Detailed Study or F8llout from First Shot or ClSTLE Test Operation 1 lx istiae 1 i nd Distrlpution In order to construct correct fallout plots adeqaate wi Dds aloft Woraation is required before during and after shot tiae Un fortunately daring the tirat shot of CASTLE Test Operation this W celled BRlVO shot there were no winds anllable froa the shot island The Navy SS Curtiss ude some winds aloft aeasuresenta at• point south of ground aero However at Eniwetok Iwajalein and Ro erii See 1igure 1 Reference llap for locations or these islands routine winds alof't information were taken 2 Variation or Winds llott 1th Time and Space and its Effects on Radex Plottin l study or such wind data indicates that although there was a time variation of the winds aloft soon after zero ti me there was no significant space variation of the winds at a given latitude This means that the Eniwetok Curtiss and Rongerik winds all varied to approximately the same degree with time In view of this it was thought worthwhile to use average values of Eniwetok Rongerik and Curtiss winds for H-bour and Eniwetok and Rongerik wind averages for times after H-bour Because the correct winds aloft is the key to the proper analysis of CASTLE - BRAVO shot this wind data is given in Tables VIII II I and n where the average H-hour B 2 15 bo U s H 8 15 and H l 4 15 hour winds are listed BEST AVAILABLE COPY DOE ARCHIVF S 40 • C4-23676 1-f TABLE VIII H-Bour Winds t11ine the Average V lu 1 ot 'llivetok Ropgerik and Ourtiaa Wind1 l iltitude in Thouu nd • lttt ot Wind l' irecticn In Deer9e s Surtaoe l 2 65 75 80 3 85 4 90 90 s 6 7 280 8 300 9 10 12 14 I 16 18 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 I ' 90 320 310 290 290 290 290 280 250 250 240 240 250 250 260 3 30 320 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 80 eo ·10 70 --- Wind Spood I tn Knot• 15 lS 17 5 16 16 12 4 5 5 8 10 9 12 14 18 20 25 3 3 40 40 40 30 12 15 3 27 1 3 30 47 37 --- BEST AVAILABLE COPY DOE ARCHIVES C4-23676 • t ABIZ II B 0 2115 l' Ltitude 1 1rect12e Surtaoe 70 so 70 so 1 2 4 80 80 60 6 7 300 270 320 310 8 9 10 µ 70 14 16 290 300 300 300 300 18 20 I i ' 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 P t I I Bour Vind • using the Anrage Value• n28 rll Vind I t ll'livetok and 7 '1 95 100 L---- 255 ' I 240 255 250 260 300 Calm Calm 80 80 80 so -- ···- 17 18 18 17 15 13 5 5 7 9 10 11 8 15 13 17 25 3 3 4 38 37 30 13 Calm Calm 13 18 36 13 -- BEST AVAILABLE COPY E DOE ARCHIVES 04-2 676 1-- J • TABLE I I 8 lS Bour Winds uug the An rage 'falu es ot lnivetok ud Rongerl k ii ode Altitude Surrace 1 2 3 4 s 6 7 8 9 70 80 90 90 100 100 180 180 320 280 290 300 290 10 12 14 16 18 310 290 2 X 20 25 260 30 260 260 250 260 35 40 45 Ped 15 15 14 14 12 7 s 6 5 7 lJ 1 3 10 10 15 20 25 30 39 40 40 50 'l70 55 60 65 260 7 Calm Calm Calm - --- Calm ----- 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 l 1rect1on 15 -- --·- EST AVAILABLE coP'f POE ARCHlYF S C4-23616 • Htf TAP ' II B 14 15 Hour Winds Usinr the Avera Values Altitude or 'Jlivetok and Rongerl k •inds Direction 80 13 Surface l 90 100 100 100 90 100 2 3 4 5 6 13 15 12 10 10 6 Calm 5 8 7 8 9 Ca bl 10 280 280 12 14 300 10 8 320 10 12 23 25 30 30 50 3 30 16 18 20 25 320 00 '270 30 260 10 35 40 25 50 55 280 60 90 6 3 Calm 90 90 Calm 250 240 26o 280 65 270 70 75 80 S5 90 90 95 100 40 35 27 7 20 32 4'- 90 90 46 46 90 54 DOE ARCHIVES 44 • C4-23676 This wind info nnation is also plotted in Figure 2 using simple radex plots or simple fallout plots or the winds for 50 micron diameter particles An inspection of Figure 2 ehovs that the H-hour averaee vind plot goes approximately 20 miles NW and N of Rongelap and approximately 40 miles North of Jc ngerik The H I 2 15 hour wind however shirts 35 to 40 ailes south in the area or illingiDae Rongelap - Rongerik The first temptation 111 to assume that if we use the H f 2 15 hour average vinds in place or the H-Hour vinds ve get a correct fallout picture but this is not true 111 Dce such a tallout plot does not properly account tor the actual contamination that is show in P'igures 5 and 6 A detailed examination or Fi ' ll'es 2 5 and 6 shows that the B 4 2 15 hour fallout plot does not correctly take into accotmt the distribution o f' contamination on Bikini since according to Figure 2 the islands in the south sector ot Bikini Atoll should all have about equal contamination but l igure 6 shows that this is not true Similarly the contamination patterns at illinginae Rongelap Rongerik and Bikar cannot be justified by the vind pattern of H f 2 15 hours Figures 5 and 6 were taken from Reference 12 It should be noted that the H _ 8 15 and H i 14 15 hour average wind plots See Figure 2 ret'llrtl to the north of the islands and appear to parallel the H-hour vind plot more closely than the H f 2 15 hour plots Figure 2 shows that the vi Dds aloft simple radex plot ascillates consiaerably in eight hours In viev of such a rapidly changing meteorological situation it is not possible to prepare an adequate fallout plot utilizing ope set of average winds for ground zero and assuming that this applies throughout the dowvind area during the active fallout period As indicated in Figure 2 there is a significant change in the winds aloft picture within two hours after shot time Because or this it is mandatory to utilize a -Time Composite Radex Plot• vhlch takes into account the chanee in vind direction and speed in the dovnvind direction The composite analysis starts at the desired altitude and works the trajectory of a given particle to the ground This merely identifies the given particle size reaching the surface rrom a given altitude ohen such points are repeated for macy particle sizes and from all elevations of the atomic cloud we obtain the composite Radex Plots shown in Figure 3 Needless to say such a procedure is time consuming and demands accurate and complete winds alort information throughout the fallout area Such inrc tion is not available before the tact for operational planning Certainl7 ve can't expect forecast winds to be 10 accurate 5° and 2 Knots vi thin all altitudes Hence it is our opinion that although it may be worthwhile to use Composite Radex Plots for post analysis or a contaminating event there is no operational need to perform such detailed analysis before the fact What is required operationally is an indication or the correct quadrant of fallout and a guess as to which half of the quadrant may receive the highest contamination Figure 3 shows the composite fallout plot for 50 70 100 and 140 micron particles It should be noted that this composite plot more nearly agrees with th MRCHIVES 45 • contamination pattern ahow ill Figures 5 and 6 For sake or ai Jnplicity the 50 m icror composite fallout of Figure 3 is plotted eeparately in Figure 4 A comparison of Figure 4 with Figure 6 shows eonsidersble a 'Teement between the plotted and actual contamination as tar as it is possible to do so with a one particle aize Dalysis In subsequent paragraphs after ve have taken into account the change of particle size with height vithin the atomic cloud it will be shown that the Canposite Radex Plot also accounts tor the contamination pattern in the islands or Bikini Atoll Assumed Activity and Particle Size nistribution Within the Atomic Cloud at Time of Stabilization A study or the doWDVind fallout fran the tower shots at the Nevada Proving Grounds T S and U K Test Operations shows that as the weapon yield is increased from 12KT to 50KT the mass medi Il particle diameter of the active soil particles within the cloud aerosol appears to ecrease from 90 microns to approximately 70 microns This means that as the yield is increased or the scaled height is decreased the gross particle size or the cloud aerosol appears to decrease However it should be noted that the experiJDental evidence in this regard is ver-y meager hence we can't say with any degree or certainty that as the yield increases the atomic particle size decreases An inspection or the actual contamination patterns when compared with winds aloft radex plots shows that the soil particles in the lower half of the atomic cloud stem appear to be significantly larger than the particles in the upper half or the stem and the particles within the mushroom or the cloud are much smaller than the stem particles In this analysis we are referring to soil particles mixed into the fireball and sucked up into the cloud These particles are assumed to be coated with fission products more or less uniformly An analysis of Jangle-Surface fallout See supplement to Reference 1 shows that the average particle size distr5butioJ vithin the bottom half of the cloud stem vas approximately 140 microns Because or the inverse filtering action of the air it is assumed that the particle size within the cloud decreases with height It is anticipated that if a certain amount or soil is tossed into the air there would be a greater number of small particles at higher elevations as compared to the particle size in lower levels In this study it will be assumed that the particle size distribution within a 15 Ml' atomic cloud at time or stabilization is as indicated in Table III • • DOE ARCHIVES cji • U ti tude Above Mean Sea Level in Thou- sands or Feet Average particle Diameter in Microns Number Distribution of l Particle Sizes in 6 crons in Each layer or a 15Ml' Atanic Cloud at Tille or Stabilisation 4 lliDutes h 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 1 40 o 4C1I 1 d mean min d1 d2 140 130 120 100 no 130 150 140 130 120 170 160 150 140 130 120 90 no 120 no 80 100 100 70 90 90 80 70 60 50 40 40 35 30 30 25 25 80 100 70 90 60 50 50 50 45 45 40 30 80 20 85 10 10 10 10 10 10 90 95 100 110 120 no 60 no 80 100 70 65 90 45 1 0 60 80 40 35 35 60 55 55 50 40 35 25 20 10 10 10 10 50 20 0 15 10 5 5 5 5 5 5 20 15 7 5 5 5 5 5 5 85 80 75 75 70 60 50 35 30 15 15 15 15 The percentage activity- in each la1er of a 15 Ml' atomic cloud at time ' of stabilization 4 minutes after bomb detonation may be expressed by the folloving relation PA• k dx t-1 • 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -F quation 12 Where PA• Residual radioactivity on a particle Percentage d diameter of particle DOE ARCHIVES 47 • C4-23676 qf t time after bomb detonation x • a variable vhicb is a f'unction or particle size It has a maximum variation of 1 to 3 • Assumed values of x are given ill Table llII The assumed average particle size and the percentage activity vithiD each rt layer of a 15 M'l' cloud is given ill Table Illl ID thie table ve ha Te ehovn onl J that radioactivit7 vhicb is impregnated on relativel7 large particle eius and which Cati readil7 ran ut due to the gravit7 or the particles It does not take illto account the small size particles 101'-or less nor does it iDclude the tall-out in and around the immediate area or groUDd zero TABLE XIII Altitude Above Mean Sea Level lin Thousands r n h ' ' ' d 140 5 10 130 120 15 110 20 100 90 80 70 60 70 50 50 50 45 45 40 75 30 80 85 90 10 10 50 55 60 65 Value or x See Equation Number 12 20 Percentage Activity Within a 15 MI' Cloud Impregnated on Those Particles that are Large Enough to Fall readily out of the Cloud PA _ eti ve PA - -4 -4 1 4 1 6 1 7 4 5 5 5 mean 0 25 30 35 40 45 • Average Particle Diameter in Micron 1 2 1 1 8 2 0 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 4 2 4 2 5 3 3 3 - 9 8 12 20 15 7 6 3 2 2 l 0 5 -- 13 17 5 23 31 43 63 78 85 91 94 96 98 99 99 5 --- - Table IIV gins the total scaveDgable and DOD ecavengable distribution or activity 1D a 15 clom at time or stabilisation TABLE XIV lltitude - Percentage 11bove ul Actirlt7 Held 11 n Thou- OD large llanda ot Particles that feet readilT tall-out h PA dmean 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 90 95 100 110 140 1 30 120 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 50 50 45 45 40 30 20 10 10 10 10 _ -3• 3 7 5 8 4 7 6 8 10 17 12 8 6 5 1 2 5 1 7 1 7 0 8 0 4 --- • Percentage Activity oD Particles too Cumulative Total small to tall-out PA dmean Percentage -------4 10 -3 3 Activity ' 10 8 14 6 19 3 26 1 6 1 53 1 65 9 71 9 Tl 1 2 2 2 2 2 10 10 c 10 10 10 10 10 2 2 2 79 5 81 2 84 9 87 7 89 7 91 7 9 3 7 95 7 97 7 99 7 DOE ARCHIVES 49 • C4-2J676 - Uaing uatio11 12 it is possible to find the assumed pe ctage acthit7 of the minimum and maximum particle sizes arriving on the ground trom a givec altit e lalen this is dot1e we vould have sane 'ftlue of the width the fall-out area This bas 'beec done and the 'ftlues tabulated ill Table IV or TABLE XV Assumed Peroectage Actirtt7 in 15 Ml' Atomic Clotx at 4 minutes after bclllb detonation TiJDe ot stabilization O J Mean dmean ll O 130 120 110 100 1 3 90 80 MiniJllum b 0 5 10 15 20 25 0 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 110 dm1n PA --- 0--• 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 40 35 30 30 25 20 15 10 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 0 7 0 3 0 8 2 1 0 9 0 4 0 4 0 09 0 04 0 04 o oo --- -- 70 60 50 50 50 45 45 40 30 20 10 10 10 10 10 PA -2 7 6 • 3 3 3 4 2 5 7 7 7 12 7 10 3 5 0 4 3 2 3 1 6 1 6 0 78 0 39 -- 0 -- - Maximum d1M Y - 160 150 ll 0 130 120 110 100 90 85 80 80 75 75 70 60 50 35 30 15 10 10 PA -- 0• 3 0 5 0 2 0 1 0 3 1 0 2 2 1 5 o 6 0 4 0 09 o r n o 06 0 02 0 01 0 ---- Non Scavengable Activity PA --------- --1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 ·- Total Percect- PA lCtiTI tT Cumulative PA -3 3 3 3 7 5 3 8 4 6 6 8 10 0 17 0 12 7 6 0 5 1 2 5 1 7 2 7 2 8 2 4 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 10 8 14 6 19 2 26 0 36 0 53 0 65 7 71 7 76 -S 79 3 81 0 83 7 86 5 88 9 90 9 92 9 94 9 96 9 98 9 99 9 I Although Table IV show the assumed activity vit hin the cloud seavengable and 11on-scavengable it does not shov the large amount ot activit1 that falls in and around ground zero vi thin one-halt to one hour after bomb detonation This 1Dnediate tall-out 1s· ver large in particle size 100 to 10 000 morons and larger and it is very massive iD amount It is doubtful whether Stokes I av ot tall-out applies iD this region This appears to be large cbUDcka or debris returning to and near ground zero more as a massive tall-out resembling the downpour ot record breaking rainfall This large particulate soil debris •1 shoot up to 50 000 to 70 000 rt msl tor 15 Ml' surface burst bombs but it tails • A 50 • DOE ARCHIVES C4-23676s down quite rapidly The upper portions of this 11Bssive colamn tall out ot the mushroom am upper st a within 10 to 30 ai Dutes At lower elevations this massive tall-out may continue tor 0 to 60 lliDutes after detonation To represent the assumed distribution with in D atomic clo1m of this 11Usive tall-out together with the rest or the particulates ve have prepared Table m • TABLE • m Total Percentage lctivi ty Wi th111 a 15 Ml' Atomic Cloud at Time or Stabilizatio11 t ald Dg into AcooUDt Massin Fall ut 111 am near Ground Zero Seavengable Activity l alli Dg out 1D the Do'WD lind Path and Non-Scavengable Activity in very small Particle Sizes Less Than 10 micron Massive PO Activity in and Near Ground Zero h dmassive PA 2 0 1000 1 5 500 10 JOO 1 15 200 20 175 25 150 30 150 35 40 45 - -- 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 110 ----- ---- -- - average Particle Large Par- Scavengable Activitv ticle FO PA PA dme II ean NonScavengable Activitv -300 1- 130 - -l J -2 120 2 5 PA 2 5 3 10 8 14 6 19 2 26 0 36 0 53 0 65 7 71 7 76 8 79 3 81 0 83 86 5 8e 9 90 0 92 9 91•• 9 96 9 98 9 99 9 200 175 140 120 no ------ 2 3 1 1 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 1 8 1 6 5 8 9 0 17 0 12 7 50 5 1 2 5 1 7 1 7 o 8 --- 50 45 45 40 30 -- 10 10 10 10 10 -- 20 - 6 o 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 Cumulative Activity l 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 • TA DOE ARCHIVF S 51 • C4-23676 By the use or information contained in Table IV and P'igure and by the use or uation 12 it ws possible to prepare a first estimate of the area covered by the doWDwim fallout Tb is dowwim area is shown in Figure 7 It should be noted that fallout originati Dg above 52 500 feet bas been caitted tor the Nlce ot eillplicit1 ill the plotting since above this level the v inds begin to turn back towards Bikini Also becauae of the extreme heights and because it is u5Ulll8d that 80% of the act1Yit7 is held below 55 000 feet it is our contention that no fallout or llilitary significance reaches t be iaRediate downVim area f'rom above 55 000 teet • 4 Measured Acti'f'i ty and Particle Size Distribution Wi thi ll the AtClllic Clo A planimeter was used to measure the three areas shown in Figure 7 Then these areas together with the percentage figures f'rom Tables IV and m were used to obtftin the dose rate Ribr and the accumulated dose values Dtr and Dt°r listed in Table XVII An examination of Table XVII shows that the as l Ded contamination on the islands or Bi kin Atoll are all large by a factor of 2 or 5 when compared vi th the actual values shovn in P'igures 5 and 6 This indicates that either the contaminated areas in the vicinity ot B1k1nJ shown in Figure 7 are too small or the assumed percentage activity in tbe lower hal1 of the cl stem from surfact to 20 000 feet is too high We have decided to reduce the total percentage activity in the lower cloud stem fran sea level to 20 000 t't above sea level from 19 2% to 10% This revises Table XVI The revised table XVI is shown as Table Iv I A Figure 8 shovs the final fallout from first shot of CASTIE Test eration The i odose lines are in dosages accumulated in 48 hours using t-1 • extrapolation • • • DOE RCHJVES 52 • C4-2J676 53 TABLE XVII • CAlculnted T osages in the Do• mvind Area Using the P'llllout Plot Shown in Figure 7 and Utilizing Inform tion in Tr blex XV and XVI A1 Central Area Cont8JllinntE Cl tC1 the Greatest Degree h 24 0 - 17 5 60 20 240 25 270 JO 760 J5 40 1 930 45 430 670 50 -- 50 70 l ' 32 625 0 - 17 5 20 25 JO J5 40 45 50 1 790 4 200 8 4 JOO 60 0 - 17 5 20 96 25 140 JO 1 680 7 000 J5 40 15 dOO 6 18 000 J 200 t1 --------- 0 4 1 6 J 2 7 10 12 14 1 J 2 5 2 9 2 15 6 17 8 j6 t2 t3 0 75 1 2 J J 5 7 5 12 135 -------- -- ---- -------------- - 1 i Dt1 ·- ------------ n 't2 50 000 4 J00 2 050 J 50 1 775 410 625 18 000 2 000 --r llediwn Cpntaml ate ci -------- n 'tJ Dt°i nn D-tJ Rl --- --- 100 000 e ooo 1 600 -4 J50 -- -- 7 850 -- 1 000 5 000 -- 1 350 400 ----- --- 1 350 2 520 eJ5 46 134 lrii ---- -6 900 83 500 100 000 14 000 - 6 JOO 1 100 J 800 5 000 -5 J Y 8 J50 2 100 - 10 000 1 24' 2 100 2 670 625 725 1 440 1 780 455 -177 440 575 145 - 1 122 70 1 000 '27 -- 0 16 51 500 0 5 2 500 1 2 3 500 2 2 670 J 5 520 5 5 100 6 5 210 9 2 a 25 • Least Conuinat _ Ari 0 4 15 700 29 250 0 8 670 1 600 1 J 750 2 075 1 9 110 370 2 5 165 J5 J 5 10 54 2 6 21 ·2 2 0 7 12 ---- ------ - --- 138 21 750 1 170 1 415 215 105 Jl lJ DATA -- --- ---- 160 35 ocxT 2 10 2 750 500 2J8 75 Jl 17 50 5 800 1 Joo 570 116 57 19 8 5 TABLE IVII Continued lxpl nation ot s mhola h • -'n t1 ti t3 Dt Dt R1 - Altitude above sea level in thousands of feet Bet area v 1 thin a given isodose l1ne Time of start of fallout for the small particles 1n hours after bomb detonation Time or fallout tor average particles Time ot fallout tor large particle• Accumulated dose in roentgens from start of - fallout to 48 hours after detonation bomb -- Infinit7 or lite time dose Doee rate in roentgens per hour extrapolated o one hour a 'ter bomb detonation using the i-1 relation DOE ARCHIVES S4 • C4-23676 55 • ' ercen age Activity in h h Massive Particle d MaHiV9 r o in and near G F P A Jlasaive Massive 0 5 10 15 20 25 JO J5 1 000 500 JOO 200 175 150 40 45 50 55 60 65 110 Average d large JOO 200 175 140 120 110 P A large d mean 1 1 1 0 5 0 5 0 2 lJ0 120 110 l' 10 90 80 70 45 45 40 JO 20 t 0 tr1 Average Jlon- Soavenpble Aotin ty Scavenpble Aoti'rlt7 Cunlati•e Actinty P A A aM P A P A Particle _ __ _ _ 50 50 50 75 80 85 90 Particle 60 70 95 100 1 0 5 0 5 0 2 0 2 0 1 large ercentage Activity in Large Pnrticle Fallout 10 10 10 10 10 __ Soavenpble -·-- SoaYenphle lative -- 1 8 - 1 3 2 5 1 8 1 6 5 8 9 0 17 0 12 7 -- 6 o 5 1 J 5 2 5 2 5 1 1 1 0 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 _Q _ _ - c Ron- 1 6 7 8 10 8 1 1 19 5 28 7 45 7 58 4 64 4 69 5 74 0 78 5 84 0 88 3 92 2 95 1 1 1 1 1 96 97 98 99 100 BEST AVAILABLE COPY C Scaline of Radioactive Fallout to Diffe ent Yield Bombs Detonated Various H§ i i_h hove the Target at From a study or the residual ra11oact1ve fallout or tower shots at Nevada 1 it appears reasonable to assume that the percentage activity vi thin a given isodose line remains constant when the bomb 7ield and the wind speed are wried provided the scaled height 1s kept constant This assumption 11 contrary to the scaling proposed b y Schorr and Gilfillan 21 vho seem to thin that as the horizontal mean wind speed increases the percentage fallout vithin a given isodose contour also increases R K aurino et al 22 have shown fro a study of HE test data th at the area vithin a given isomass fallout area remains essentiall7 constant despite different vind speeds This agrees quite veil vi th our analysis or nee r surface nuclear etonetions l as mentioned above 1 In the scaling process one of the most rte Ilt parameters is the time of start of fallout of residual radioactivity in the different portions of the contaminated area Unfortunately very little actual information is available on this parameter Times of fallout may be obtained from radex plots quite accurately provided there is a significant directional shear to the vinds vith altitude For example in Figure 1A there would be no doubt that the fallout at line FC came from the 1 500 to 27 500 rt elevetion By superimposing a radex plot on the actual Jangle-SUrface fallout See Supplement to Reference 1 ve were able to obtain some rough approximation of the particle size distribution vithin the Jangle-Surface cloud Unfortunately there vere no large directional shears to the vinds aloft during the surface shot of Jangle Test Operation hence considerable doubt i ' rocit r the calculated tin es of fallout shc-wn in Table XX This is especially true for the longer times of fallout 2 In our scalinr process ve do not use a mean-wind Unfortunately many other organizations use such mean-vinds It is our opinion that the use of 9mean-vinds• introduces such large errors that if this approximation is used then there is no point in determining the fallout direction aDd intensity vi th BDY accuracy By •mean-vind ve refer to the resultant wind For example in Figure U the direction or th ean wind is represented by the line OA and the speed of the mean wind is 9 knots If one vere to assume that the fallout occurred in the direction of OA he would make a large error because the actual fallout follovs not the resultant vector 'OA but the radex plot Bence we see that the direction and exteut or the fallout varies in a complicated manner vhich may in no wy resemble the lmean resultant vind • 3 The folloving equations are used in the scaling processz A DOE ARCHIVES £7 C4-23676 • P• l • p p AR - - - - - quation 13 - - - - - Equation l a kw - - - - - Equation 1 3b Skvt-0 2 LAD• - - - - - quation l c 5kw were P• Percentage of total residual activity within a given isodose line A Area covered by the isodose contour in square miles R Dose rate D Infinity dose a• in r hr at time of fallout one hour after bomb detonation D 1• Dose from one hour to infinity w t Const8llt • 12 over an infinite smooth plane l Bomb yield in Kilotons Time of start of fallout in hours after bomb detonation In our scaling process as percentage activity vi thin constant for tvo different height Therefore we set relations a first approximation we assume that the a given isodose or isorate line remains yield bombs exploded at the same scaled P1 P2 and ve obtain the following At - - - - - Equation 14 - - - - - F4uation 14a - - - - - F4uation 14b rn DOE ARCHIVES5f 57 • C4-23676 i A-- l A l - c v - - - - - quatiOD 14c For aey element of area the tolloving relations appl7 tor the conditions indicated I vJ -t f A-i A 0 ' '- fi ml J J • l i - - - - - Equation 15a r 1 I Rz 1 D 1 D R D2 rq' 1 t Y D it1 'I - - - - uation 15b f A s ____ Y4uation 15c P A' - - - - - Jquetion 58 • - 15£ 04-23676 4 a indicated 1n paragraph C 1 abon OD9 ot the aost illport nt parameters in the ec-Ung process ie the ti ae ot start ot fallout a a first approrl llatation it vill be assuaed that tor a ginn scaled height regardless ot Jield the normalised tillea ot tall from dU'fercnt cloud heights are constant lb ier this assumption areas would scale as tollovs ' o l It should be noted that References 22 and 15 assume 12 • J 1 w '-' 'I he area scaling tormula uation 16 1s valid tor a given sc ed height provided the -1 eld is not varied by aore than a tactor ot 2 or 3 This ll8 nS that the 15Ml' Surface burst bomb ot CASTLE Bravo 9lot •Y be a caled 1n accordance vi th u ation 16 tor rrace burst weapons or 5 l'fr to 45 Ml' without introducing large errors However for 7ields much greater or smaller than this it is presumed that lGuation 16 does not apply To illustrate this point Jangle-Surface 1 15 KT fallout is extra lated to the CASTLE BRAVO yield or the follov 1 ng equation - o frj A A f J 'L l 1 - - - - - u ation 16A BEST AVAILABLE COPY Equati i 16 vu obtained from Equation 15a and by assuming that - t v UJ · • The actual Jangle- rrace measured fallout data is given 1n Table XVIII This ie then extrapolated to the CASTLE BRAVO case by using iiuation 16 A The results are tabulated 1n Table XIX which compares such extrapolated data with the measured CASTLE BRAVO data obtained from Table XI An inspection of Figure 13 and Table bov hat 1 extra lation trom J-S 1 15 '1' to CASTLE BRAVO uation 16A underesti nates the confor the beavil7 contaminated tor tlie um contaminated areas and by or the light contamination areas o ARCHIVES 59 C4-23676 TABLE MII JANGL'E-SURFAct FALL C·trr DATA » Ot 'n 5850 0 05 0 10 0 40 0 75 1 06 0 92 47 58 1cn 160 210 2880 0 000 345 100 2 3 ' 31 5 10 4 7 2 7 1 0 35 4 5 1 2 0 4 D 12 D 09 SJ 96 24 3 192 600 300 Ac 0 05 0 15 0 55 1 2 2 3 2 50 108 208 368 578 661 757 1000 1192 1792 2090 PD 2 41 2 25 3 51 2 41 1 0 0 2 17 10 3 e 1 7 7 Pc ' • 4 1 0 7 7 8 6 • 3 1 6 1 6 0 23 2 41 4 66 8 17 10 58 ll 6 ll 82 28 8 39 l 47 2 55 59 59 7 67 4 7 3 7 75 • 3 76 S 7 l h f tr d lbe ll 0 05 200J 2800 0 08 35 800 0 1 3 0 20 3800 0 25 0 25 o 6 5450 2 6000 -- 7500 750 7500 7500 6000 8000 9000 9000 9500 3 9 5 1 7 10 6 25 s s 226 18 160 140 100 70 70 50 40 35 JO 25 27 25 22 1 3 5 17 5 19 21 18 TABLE III I 60 • 04-2 676 TABLE ll Measured CASTL BRAVO Pall out Data 00 t ' · i tJli ng Volume Ef't'ect n 500 10 CXX 6 500 8 800 8 000 5 000 2 500 367 325 1o 2 000 5 000 833 107 75 20 16 200 'a Ao 60 60 60 120 840 1 200 4 920 180 2 200 125 6 200 33 10 000 960 2 160 7 080 9 780 15 980 25 980 13 000 8 330 3 330 1 400 Pa 2 74 1 64 15 30 10 0 2 5 5 3 3 Pc tr 2 74 4 40 19 7 29 7 59 7 1 1 3 4 6 62 2 8 67 5 10 70 5 15 BEST AVAILABLE COPY It is believed that this is because we have assumed that fallout time is proportional to the third power of the yield This may be a valid· assumption provided the yield range is not too large ' Je may be justified in extrapolat1 1f a lKT to the case of a 100 KT but certainly we are not justified in roing any further than thia Similarly we may extrapolate a 15 000KT to 5 000KT and to 45 000Kt but we certainly are not justified in etretching the l5Ml' model t'rom 300 000KT to lKT The main error in the liir ple extrapolation factor is the assumption that time of fall is proportional to the third pcwer of the yield The filtering action of the air appears to be proportional to IOJDe factor or the particle radius A study or the tower shots during pest test operations seems to indicate th at the distribution of particle size in a given cloud is more nearly proportional to absolute height above the target rather than being proportional to scaled height The data in this regard ii 1 ot eutficient for proper analysis However it is sufficient 1 o indicate at least the order or magnitude effect Il I other words tor a lCXl- I' ehot areas vould not scale ill accordance with F quations 16 or 161 It is anticipated that the highly contaminated areas may be considerably over that obtained by Equation 16 Thie is because reprdl••• Cll 1 i maximum height reached by the atcmic cloud it is believed that the £jcrity of the large and therefore more active particle• will be confined to an altitude below 60 000 rt msl due to the • 61 • CJ -23676 filtering action of the air Since ve only have two models of surface burst bombs we will use thern to extrapolate to other yield bombs as follows '- O•b A-i- KA w 7 - - - - - - - F quation 1 l BEST AVAILABLE COPY vbere is evaluated for different yield surface burst booibs in Table XXI uc tic-r 17 ls ute i ir c j1' tfor with Table to obtain the contaminated areas from different yield surface burst banbs These values are listed in Table XXII In Figures 9A 9B and 9C are plotted the fallout from 15 0 X KT 60 000 Kt and 100 KT b bs surface burst on dry land The yields arr ass JT'P d tc t-c fusion yields The win distribution and the average particle size distribution with height within the atomic cloud is given in Table XXIII The valt es from TAble XXIII were used to prepare the radex plot or the gene 'l direction of fallout After this the areas and dosages from Table XXII vere used tc determice the intensity of fallout show in Figure 9 As we conteriplate on the large areas of contamination show in Figure 9 and in Table XXII we wonder just hov large is our country and also what is the area of the Soviet Union By merely looking in any Atlas or Almanac we note that the total area of the U S is J 000 000 square miles and that of Russia is 8 708 000 square miles or used to be This means that 100 bombs of the 60Ml' variety would cover this country with lethal concentrations or radioactivity and for Russia the number of bombs required is 300 Obviously unless we prepare adequate shelters now fflore the n half the people in this country would become radiation casualties if the Russians can surface detonate on us from 200 to 500 bombs of the flJ MT variety FiguNs 9 and the values or Table nII may be altered to take into account any variation in height or burst by utilizing the information contained irl Table II For example if a 15 Ml' bomb is detonated at l cxx feet above target instead or on the surface then the radiation dosage figures in Figure 9A would be reduced by one half If the same bomb is detonated at 5 000 feet above target then the fallout downwind would be practically zero Certainly there would be no fallout of any military importance By using the equation and the percentage fallout given in Table II similar caleulatioDs may be made for any yield bomb detonated at any height above target ti DOE ARCHIVES 62 • C4-236 6 • BEST AVAILABLE COPY - 'd J i--1 tri u - · • 0 'A TA BL IXI Values c Jt listnrl for ditrerent yi ld surf cn burst weapons in nrious intf n itfos or Ct•ntmninetlC'n ' Roent gena DELE'l'Ell -··· ·- -· -- - - 45 010 60 00 1 1 1 38 1 52 1 82 0 85 1 1 18 1 20 1 30 1 47 1 75 10 100 500 1000 5 m 5 000 0 12 0 2 0 34 0 47 0 55 0 8 1 000 O 'Z'I 0 55 0 5 o £2 o 69 15 0' ' -- --- 100 010 225 000 500 o 36 o 46 0 58 0 69 0 75 o 88 1 1 13 1 14 1 21 1 32 100 0 4 3 0 52 0 6 0 7 3 0 78 0 9 1 1 10 1 12 1 18 1 285 -- -•·--• _ 6 C4-2 3676 • • 'I TABLE IXI Contaminated Areaa trom dl rr ren _t Yift ld Surface Burat Bomba »JilETED or oentgene 10 001 48 Areas in square miles tor the following 7ield JCT aurtace burst bombe 48 • Dtr t-l Dtr V-E 100 1 7 10 500 1 000 5 000 15 000 45 000 60 000 100 000 2 5 000 OIMT'41 1J P ou-rw1 0 22 3 18 25 44 288 1 000 3 620 5 030 8 900 22 600 0 47 6 9 5 3 95 620 2 160 7 820 11 000 19 200 48 800 47 258 560 3 060 10 000 3 3 000 43 600 76 000 18 000 81 4 430 900 4 750 15 000 47 200 62 200 106 000 246 000 147 750 1 560 8 100 25 000 76 500 100 000 173 000 400 000 8 000 1 3 000 5 000 2 000 3 330 1 000 400 670 o Q 4 500 150 250 o s 7 5 100 20 33 1-'1S 14 5 64 BEST AVAILABLE COPY C4-23676 TABLT IXIII Wiods Aloft and Particle Sise Distribution tor the I •alized Fellout Plots Show 1n Figures 9A 9B and 9C fv - - - b I Ilg 0 • 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 d mean W ightiDg Factor l X 0 004 500 0 016 0 1 0 2 0 25 200 150 125 10'J 85 70 6f'J 50 50 0 41 0 5 0 67 0 93 1 33 50 1 33 1 33 45 1 67 Wind Direction In Degrees 3 l --'- - Wind Speed In lnots 310 310 00 290 270 250 250 240 270 270 200 200 10 20 20 30 40 45 45 50 50 JJ 35 30 50 BEST AVAILABLE COPY D Accumulation of Dosage in Fallout Areas An inspection of past etoJr ic test operations shows that during the period or fallout more dosage is accumulated vithin the contaminated area thaD can be accounted for by the t-1 2 decay law Th is is shown in Figure 10 and in Table XXIV An inspection of the teble and the figure shovs that active fallout lasts from 5 to 10 hours after it has first started It is diffiij t to explain wb the actual dosave is greater than the calculated t- • · value It cannot be a change in the decay law because this effect appears to be independent of the time arter bomb detonation It arpears to be related to a certain time interval arter start of fallout In view of this it mi ht be a volume-effect That is personnel within the active fallout area are not only subjected to radiatioD that has already fallen on the ground but such personnel are also completely surrounded by radiation in all directions including the vertical By this ve mean to say that during active fallout personnel are completely enveloped in an air mass that has fission products in it ct 1948 65 • DOEARCHI C4-2367t • Another vay of lookinr at this is to assume that the radioactive cloud covers the fallout area an • extends 5 oo to 10 000 feet above it In most atomic test operations in order to keep dosage to monitors to a minimum no one is allowed to remain in fallout areas during active fallout The practice is to enter contaminated areas after a time vben decay has ren1ered the area safe Thia means that most or the residual radioactive data is extrapolated from 6 to 1 hours af'ter bomb detonation beck to assumed time of it art or fallout For example in Figure 10 a- aiological monitor vould enter the radioactive cont aminated ar a at H 7 hours Point at which time the gamma dose rate would be approximately 0 03r hr This dose rate wouln then ·t-e extrapolated back to start of fallout H • 1 7 hour by the t-1 2 relation By this procedure it can be shown that at H • i hours the dose rate should have been approximately 0 135r hr However ve see in Figure 10 that at r 2 hours the actual dose rate was 0 80r hr Thus we sr 1 that s ich an in1iscriminate use or the t-1 2 relation can lea1 to errors of 500% or more Cn the other hand if the t-1 2 law is used at R 2 hours then the extrapolated reeding for H 7 comes to 0 18r hr riis should caution all of us in the indiscriminate use of the t·· 1 • relation We cannot give a quantitative explanation of this Volume-F fect of fallout at this tine However vhat is important is that this effect is observed and well ocumented on IJUmerous occasions and there is no doubt about its validity therefore ve must take it into account in our calculations An explanation of just vhy this Volume-Effect occurs is secondary to our problem at the present tillle Table VII ir SectioL VI or this report compares the integrated dosage accumulated if the t-1 2 Nlation is employed to extripolate back to time of fallout For those people who like to have curves of decay expressed as exponentials it can be shown that for a period or approxima ep one hour after fallout has started the decay curve tollovs at-• par eter between 1 hr and 6 hrs after fallout this changes to a t- • 8 and from 6 hrs o many weeks the decay finally settles to a t-1 2 relation However this should not be construed to mean that the gamma decay does not follow t-1 2 decay It is our opinion that the gross fission product gairrr a decay from atomic or thermonuclear weapons follovs t-1 2 relation The beta particle decay however follows t-1 2 relation for fission botr ba and t-2 for thermonuclear bombs Figure 10 vas taken frar Reference 17 • BEST AVAILABLE copy TA 1946 DOE ARCHIVES 66 C4-23676 IP7 • TABLE llIV Ratio ot Actual Dose Hate and Integrated Dose to that Calculated from the t-1 2 Relation at Lincoln Mine levada Which was in the Dowmrind hllc ut Path of Shot 15 TOMBIER Test Operation iD 1951 Fallout tirst begaD at H 1 5 hours • ' • TiJDe 1D Hours Arter Banb Detonation t½ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 f I R• 6 2 1 se 1 1 5 1 3 3 1 07 10 1 1 l 11 1 12 24 l 1 q - Ratio ct Actual Dose Bate to that Computed tram t-1 2 Jt 48 Ratio ot Actual htegrated Dose tot hat Calculated ran t-1 2 I 3 43 2 82 2 46 2 32 2 2 2 2 1 i 2 08 2 00 · l c· 1 8•· 1 85 1 75 1 71 1 67 1 25 1 l l _ py-S1milarq during ot 12 of UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE Test Operation 1953 the 12 and 4 hour integrated dosage ratios vere 1 17 and 1 105 respectivel7 at Lincoln Mine ·During Shot 19 of UPSHOT-KNOTHOIE the fallout at St George Utah began at H f ·4 hours and the 12 and 24 hour dose ratios were 1 5 and 1 3 respectivel7 DOE ARCHIVES 67 C4-2 3676 l • I World-Wide Radioactive Contamin9tion ' ' 1 In a number of papers deali 'g vith the world-wide contamiiiation problem there 1s an upper limit giTtm to the number of bombs that ve can use before the planet becomes contaminated be1ond a certain tolerance level One web guesstimate 1s a total ot 25 000 megatons Tbis means tba• if approximatel1 the equivalent ot o 1251T of N ss1on products 3x1c 8t-l 2 curies are spread oTer one equare mile ve would baTe reached the tolerance level There is considerable doubt as to the order or mg dtude or the 25 000 megaton value mentioned aboTe Rcvever ve mst assume that there is an upper 11 mit and that this upper limit •1 vell be between 25 000 to 250 000 megatons 'l'bis limitation bas military significance For example if 25 000 megatons is chosen as the upper limit then we are allowed onl1 one hundred bombs of 250 megatons each Ir the American and Russian stockpile vere composed of 250 megaton bombs then the two nations together could not use more than 100 bombs betwen them However if the stockpile is CO nfOSed of 25 megaton bombs then one thousand such bombs could be exploded Therefore ve must either li Jldt the yield of our nuclear veapons or design our thermonuclear weapons so as to minimize the fission yield from U238 and et to increase the tusion yield to the desired megaton level If this could be accomplished it is believed that ve can increase the yield of our thermonuclear weapons to 100 megatons vi tbout seriousl1 concerning ourselves vitb the vorld-wide contamination problem It bad been assumed until recently that Strontium 90 was the min culprit in the vorld-vide contamination However a recent re'J Ort bf Dudle1 Report on Project Gabriel or the Division or Biology and Medicine of the U s Atomic Energy July 1954 Secret RD shows that lodine-131 must al RS Qe fkai J riHpyou t in our computations BEST U AVAIL AtH I 2 If we 18 lt to minimize the world-vide contamination level we must detonate our @gaton weapons either on the surface or underground By contact bursting a nuclear weapon on the ground ve are sure that 85 to or the total residual activit1 is deposited on the enemy nation thus leaviTlg 10 to 15% for slov de'J Osition throughout the world ' 'his makes the contact ru ze for multimegaton veapons almost mandatory 3 If it is decided to increase the radioactivit1 of the bomb by Cobalt or other agents ve vould increase the danger or world-wide contamination Cobe lt-60 vill W nd to contaminate the vorld because or its long half life If such seeding agents must be used ve must concentrate on those isotopes vhose half life is less than to 5 days so that the majorit1 of the activit1 would die down before it reaches our hemisphere in 10 to 15 da1s A cobalt device and not a cobalt bomb that must be carried by aircraft may be the most efficient contaminating agent if the device is large enough and if it is blried deep enough to assure that more than 95% of the aetivit1 will fall on the enemy nation TA 68 4 It should be noted that it the equivalent or 0 125 IT fission prodocts 1a spread over one equaN Ue or the earth' 1 aurface then this would be equivalent to the fallout on the 1urtace troa • 11nifor• di tribution of 25 1 000 IT or fission products throughout the atmosphere Therefore assuaing no fractionation or ndionuclides if an area is covered with an 1 D t'i nitJ is e line D of 550 roentgens or a 48 hour i Dtegrated dose Dl' ot 200 roentgens that area bas sufficient Strontiua 90 i D it to be a possible basard This • eans that enr1 ti• e we detooate a 15 11'1' bo• b on the eurtace oTer ene111 territor1 we render approxi• •tel1 15 000 square ailes of that countr7 tu1ele11 tor agricalture a11unng 25 000 11T is the liai ting valne It 250 1 000 Irr is the liaitirig value then each 15 11T boab would render useless 1 500 squan ailes ot ene11 1 territorJ or course we can avoid this by detonating our boabe iD the air It we do this however we iD• crease the world-wide contamination It is a question of either contaminating excessively the enemy country and later have to teed hia or gettiag the rest of the world contaminated or ' ' 5 lccording to Dr w F Libby see Rand Reports R-251-lEC •world-Wide Effects of to ic Weapons Project Sunshine• and RM-1280-AEC stillborn Chicago babies by January 1954 showed 1 6 Sunshine Units of Sr 90 uptake It is assumed that 1000 Sunshine Units is the minimum perm1ssable concentration or Sr 90 in the skeleton 1000 S U • ll4C or 5 x 10-3 '-gm of Sr 90 per man According to Sunshi De estimates 25 000L T may bring the population to the mini uwn peraisaable concentration By Januar1 1954 approxi• 11 tely lOMT fission Jield had probably been exploded throughout the world The majority of this was exploded on the surface IVY-MIKE This means that 8 of the lOIIT yield is in the Pacific Ocean within 300 to 500 downwind or ground zero Bence only a total of 1 5 to 2MT of fission products were available for world-wide contamination by January 1954 1 6 Sunshine Unit found by Dr Libby in Chicago babies represents the equivalent or approximately 4 2UT of fission products distributed throughout the world according to Sunshine estimates However if our estimate of fallout 11 correct the concentration of Sr 90 in Chicago babies came from only 2ftr This aeans that perbap1 the original Sunshine estimate or 25 000 MT limitiag value is high by a factor ot 2 Ir the Libby experiment is repeated and it it accounts for the CASTLE ahotl as well H it did for the IVY-MIKE Shot then we must re-evaluate the world-wide contamination problem Conversation with Dr Western and Dr Dudley or lEC Division or Biology and Medicine has brought out the tact that the Sr 90 may have entered the buroan biological cycle directly from external deposits of fission products that tell out on leafy vegetables and the like A DOE ARCHIVES 69 c4 23676 ll RECO dUNDlTIONS l The 'ir Force should reactivate extensive training in Radiological Operations Such training should stress the use ot realistic ailitary tolerance doses tor re iation as compared to the existing civilian tolerances The former radiological engineer lFSC should be reactinted iJ1 order to attract co11 petent personnel into this field • • • 2 Provieions should be aade now tor siaple ail tar7 coWltermeasures aga Jlst the extensive radioactive fallout aenace Such countermeasures should 1 Dclude the construction or adequate shelters decontasination procedures and as • uch as possible an aut011atic recording net or the radioactive contamination throughout a given region or the COWltrJ a Shelters must have 3 to 5 feet of dirt or sand or cement around them but they need not be fancy For example there is no need tor eanitary facilities if such shelters are in the basement of air installation buildings since personnel could leave the shelters tor short periods of time Similiarl7 no provision need be ude tor cooking or messing facilities There is no need tor air conditioning or tor air tight seals to doors and windows b Decontamination should be as automatic as possible Perhaps runways could be washed as the fallout begins The problem is similar to soow removal where under certain cireWllstances it may be best to start removal while there is active fallout Washing vacuuming and other co11111on sense methods may also be employed Runways may be covered with canvass or other materials which can be rolled out thus decontaminating a sufficiently large area in the runway to load bombs and to get read7 for take-off Ir a circular area of 100 to 150 feet radius is cleared of radioactivitYJ£t • man in the center of such an area would be safe even if the area outside this circle is contaminated to high levels c The use of radiological monitors should be minimized iJ1 an £ir Base in order to keep radiation casualties to a ainiawa In place ot airmen carryi Dg portable radiac instrwnents and walking throughout the airbase or riding a Jeep to delineate the fallout we need instead permanent installations of radiological instrwaents ill selected spots on and arou od the Air Base It is believed that with the advent of aultimegaton weapons the probabilit7 is high that the fallout eattern would cover all or the iir Base aore or less u niforml 7 lSee Figures ll and 12 In the past the fallout pattern trom 70 to 100 IT weapons were considered Under auch circu mstancea one portion ot the lir Base u y be highly contaminated while another area u1 be relativelJ clear ot contamination Now DOE ARCHIVES TA 70 • C4-2 3676 7 however because ot the tact that lethal concentrations of radioactirl t1 uy cover five to ten thousand square ail es rroa one bo• b alone it would be unwise to perform a needlessly detailed radiological survey of the Air Base In the event that the Ur Base Commander desires a detailed conta inetion pattern he can accomplish this by installing in all tour quadrants fixed radiological instr1111ents with provisions tor continuous recording It •'1 be desirable to locate several or these instruments outside the lir Base in the ennt that the lir Defense Command uy want a look at the continental fallout pattern It ndiological instrwaents are placed outside the weapon ndiu e 5 to 15 alles ot our larger bombs then even it the lir Base ie demolished a central Headquarters uy still get the continental contamination pattern llthough presently authorized portable radiac • eters cannot accurately indicate • doae rate above 50 r hr it would be relatinly simple to construct permanent installations of radiological instrwaents that can iodic- t 111 500 r b r ot ga1U111 It each lir Base is equipped with such peraanent radiological inetru mentation it would be relatively simple to place this information on an established com munication net such as the Weather Net etc tor use by agencies responsible for the defense of this country • ln analysis or this report brings out the tact that in the absence of countermeasures the fallout t'ro11 one bomb 15 MT could endanger the populations or Washington D c Baltimore Philadelphia and New York Cit1 See Figures ll and 12 This aeans that an unprepared and an unin oraed nation will suffer horrible casualties from radiation The report also points out however that by relativel1 simple means proper education early warning shelters etc it may be possible to reduce significantly the radiation casualties throughout the nation Certainl1 there 1• no such •cheap• method of protecting our Cities and our population against the blast damage from nuclear weapons For this reason the best national interest would be served it the military and civilian population are advised of the proper countermeasures against the radioactive hazard 4 It is recommended that all multimegaton weapons be sur- face detonated on the enemy coWltr1 in order to reduce the world• wide contamination It is believed that 80 to ot tha total residual activity of a bomb ie deposited on the enemy countr1 it the bomb is surface burst thus leaving only 5 to l°' tor contaainating the rest of the world It weapon Jields in excess ot 100 MT are required it is suggested that we start now lookl Dg into tbe possibilit1 of building TN weapons without the use ot' large amount• or U238 In other words the yield ot our TN weapons ehould be main17 tro• tuaion rather than tisaion in order to ainim1H the poss1Dility of contaminatiAg our planet beyond a certain tolerance level of residual radiation 71 • Figure ll IA _ _ ·- slmple rodex plot for 70 micron porticl•• G 52 5 -- MEAN WWO• - 275•✓9 -- 0 10 I I iciiors---- -- - 20 3 40 50 I I t I NAUTICAL MILES - OT I • • $ c u 1-U 0 Q 70 J A N I 0 10 20 40 30 NAUTICAL MILES F gur11 1e • _g2az 1 I 166· I 168· J I 110• iu c Figure• 1 Referenc • mop for foilllllt MARSHALL ISLANDS 0 1 ••• lO 11 ' 40 I I I 0 Cl 10 I from fir• t allot d CASTLE TEST OPERATION ·••1t1CA1 IU €S N r BEST AVAILABLE COPY t BIICAA -12•----------- ------------------- ------------------- ---12•- - ¼-- AILINGINAE 166• I aa• I 170- 1 C JT AVAILABLE COPY I 186 Of Pi I I 110• 168° I r Q Figure •2 l J Sllftple Rodea plate ol H H 2•15 H 8•15 ond H 14•15 _ 099 0 lflii•I lo I o •o I ' 0 Q winda of SS CURTISS RONGERIK ENIWETOK fo mlclon pa tlCln ____ • • •-- ---- ---- ··· ' _ - z•--------------4------------ 16 · I -- •••• I 12•- t -- a c 1 AV AILAttLI CUPY I I 168· 166' __ 0 170 IO I •n -1z•--- IZ------ - - - l -- I 110• I BEST AVAILABLE COPY 166° 1 16 8 I 170° Figure•4 •---- 0 Time I t • RADEX plot using sor- partlclN 10 I eo 40 I IIA ITICA Mil Ca 1••· I •••• I 110• I I BEST AVAI AB E coP'I I 110• 166 Figure •5 Fallout Gamma 0a N Rate me n Raent a111rement1 zo utrapalated t •o gen per hcM r o H thour uaing 1-1 a decay NAUTICAL MILi • Ci' '' J u •••• I I I I I I I l I I • -•- - 1T Shot I Fall-out Gamma Pattern r hr at I hr I ' • • • _ ·- f 0 • • • • 100 50 • BEST AVAILABLE COPY I •••• I 110• Figur11•7 • •• --•• 0 - wind follelut ••• plettN UUll9 l '-tlea la __ JX 30lld llytlW-of eqyotloa 12 t -•• Md - --u • I --- I 110• I BEST AVAILABLE COPY - 166· I •••• 40 I I 70• er w 0 Q Figure •a 0 t u CASTLE BRA- o fallaut lnlagralld dae In 48 haura _ IIDfflb dllDnotlan -- r-tun o11111oft •••• I ' 0- BEST AVAILABLE COPY N Flgu 9A t Idealized fallout fnn 15000KT uioce bunt •apon _ IIIIN In roentgens Infinity cloee ad _ 1' 111 48 hour cloee • 60 aooo• 500 IOOOO- 670 D 48 'd 0 tii n tr1 SA- 0 20 I I 40 SO 60 I I I 80 IOO I I NAUTICAL MILES - ' • 1- gure 9B 60 000 kt Fallout r Surface Burst 500 o• 5000 o• 5000 o• I l 670 0 48 0 20 I 40 50 60 I I I 80 100 I I NAUTICAL MIL £6 Figure• 9C -Fallout from 100 KT surface burst oo• so o• 0 I 20 'I 40 50 60 I I I 80 I NAUTICAL MILES 100 I Flgure•ao Fallout a1 lincoln mine Nevodo from shot 5 of tumbler snapper test operation In 1952 ' GAMMA DOSAGE RATE IN IIR HR 10 ---- - - ---r- --r--- i--r---111----T -- -- -- -- r--- - 900 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 800 i----------------------- 700 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 600 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 'if oo t-- ----------------------f m il1 400 t--e tr--------------------- ••-• 300 Wt t-- ---------------------j I rnirn HEW 200 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Bl ij 100 11--1----------------------- w _J •_ L _ • · • J• i•c c• c d o U_J _ •--1 • • 2 5 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 15 14 TIME IN HOURS AFTER 80MB DETONATION A Shaded portion shows fallout in excess of the t-•- RELATION 85 l OS hplanation or 11 gure 11 ' be tigure represents the idealized contamination pattqa onr this country it 111 nuclear weapons of 15 MT Jield are cor itaet blrst OTer target Tbe targets consist or the 106 cl ties or this coantry vbose popilation 1e 100 000 ar aore and tin eelected airbases 1 ach ta 1 loat plot cor udst s or tvo areas 'the 8ll ll 1 inner ar• covers 12 500 equare Iii lee and represents an •Ten e intinit7 dose ot 2 00 roentgens which ie equiftlent to a 48 hour integrated 4ose ot l 20 roentgens and a 24 hour c ose of 1 1 40 roentgens 'ftle large oater area COTarB 25 000 equare Ues and it represer s an 1nr1n1t1 dose or 190 roentgens and a 48 hour dose of 75 roentgens The do es are coq uted on a •Vo tDD -Et ect basis rather than on a t-1 2 relation See Seetion 4 of Appendix tor details 011 VolUM-U'fect Tbe areas were obtained bJ averaging the ftl ues given in Table XX and in Figure 12 iii i nspeetio11 or Figure 11 shows that each contalli nation pattern is alike no •tter when the boflb is exploded over the cowitr7 1t first glance this u7 see• to the reader a o unwarranted si11plitication However in an earlier report see Reference 6 the aau aoal Jais was •de using the actual w1Dds alott over each target Thia was a ver7 ti ae-consuaing and tediows an•lTSi•• Some ot the contalli 0ation patterns wen long ud thin others short and wide aoae were elliptical others aore tortuoua patte1 08 However the net total effect was the aaae ae in 1igur• 11 or th11 report That 11 both analTSH 1howed that there was no place to hide in the Eastern part ot the u s and the Horth astern u s was contaal nated over and over apill The priaaey purpose ot Figure 11 is to illustrate that during atoaic warfare disperul or aircraft aDd evacuation or pereoMel cannot be relied upon as llilitar - counteraeaea res On the contraey a Cov ander aa7 lose aore ot hie torcH b7 encuation and dispersal • ' • DOE ARCHIVE$ 86 · C4 -2 676 copy BEST AVAILABLE • • •I __ ' - · - --- -t1 tT1 ' J - - ' I • ' - -- 1 JA Ai umn · us 1i a 11 1lll8T I C IU I 'IT 1ti1 _ Flgure•12 Fallout from first shot of CASTLE TEST OPERATION superimposed upon North-Eastern United States lsodose lines are In roentgens accumulated during 48 hours 00 cc PITTSBURI r 0 I SO 100 1 0 ZOO I I I I STATUATE MILES ' Figure#l3 INl'INITY DOSE IN ROENTIENS 100 000 ✓MEASURED CASTLE BRAVO FALLOUT •• •• 1 000 1----- J-S en 00 ••• •• • FALLOUT EXTRAPOLATED---' --- ---------------- TO CASTLE BRAVO YIELD USING EQN 16A •• •• 100 10 - - - - - - - - -100 - - - - - - - - ' -1 000 - - - - - - - - -10 000 ------------------' 100 000 AREA IN SQUARE MILES - • · R P'ERENCES l 2 8 RadioactiYe 1all-out tram Atoaic Bollba• lq AROO C3-J6417 lloY 195 3 S-RD and ppl•ent l7 f Lieutenant Colonel I M Lulejian OPSHOT-KNOTBOLE Project 4 1 •'Die Bldiation Buarda to Personnel Vithin An Atomic Cl oad• S-BD am Capt steel ot 3 Personal r ou11D 1n1r ation with Col Boughton 4 ration U l Wf- 05 Service• C-RD s ration CASTLE • Pz-oJect 9 1 Cloud Jhotograpbr' S-RD 6 8 Radioactin Fall-oat frail Contact Burst Megaton C4-l 98 S-RD by Lt Col Ialejian 7 Operation GRE»rnOUSE Scientific Test Directors Report Wl'-26 Annex 6 5 All€ 1951 S-RD 8 Operation U X Project 4 7 •Beta-Ganna Sld n Hazard in the Post ot Contaminated Area • 'tlr-746 C-RD 9 USNRDL- 383 •Beta-Colltact Buards Associated with Gallma Radiatioll Measurements ot Mi xed Fission Products• bf J D Teresi 9 il'Sl c lcthitiea ot t he Special Weather Advisol 1 Bombs• lq ARre 10 Rand Report R-1 39 •The Radiation Hazard from an Atomic Bomb Cloud 1949 S-RD by Cohen and Pl es set 11 USNRDL-379 Badiation Hazards to Aircrews kposed to the Atomic Cload of an Atomic Detonation bf Teresi 12 Prelimin r7 Report on Cperation CASTLE Project 2 5a Intensity ot Fall-out ITR-915 S-RD 13 9 9 Di stribution and Preliminary Report Operation CASTLE Project 4 1 Study or Response ot Human Beings Accidentally' kposed to Significant Fall-out Radiation ITR 92 3 S-RD l4 Operation JANGLE Project 2 7 •Biological InJurJ tr011 Particle Inhalation• b7 JPalconer Slllith June 1952 Vl'-396 S-RD 15 A FSWP Report 507 Radioactin hll-out Hazards tr011 Surf'act Burst• Vel 1 High Yield luclear Weapons S-RD 16 Rand Report R-265-AID •Transport and Early Deposition of BadioactiYe or Debris from Atomic lr plosions• l 7 TOMB SNAPPm Report on Radiological Sa f'et7 Wl'-558 Dec 52 S-RD 90 I 18 eration UPSHOI'-DOI'H0LE Report on Radiological Satet 19 •RadtoactiTe ran-out and Badex Plots• Air Weather SerTice Manual 105-J Unclasai tied • ' 20 • teorologie l Technical Deport or ration GRKENHOOSE bf c r Pate and Col George lar Joint Task J'arce Sept 1951 Secret 21 Schorr M G Di QU tlllan B lftecta to arational WNpona• 22 R I Iaurino I TP Minvielle I T Shettiel d R F Johnson 1 Eff'ects ot u-rac e and tmdargrOUDd luclear lq losions• USHRDL PAD-10 WP Jll 4 s Predicted ScailJli ot Radiological JilGLI Project 2 0 15 Jan 52 S-RD 9 30 Jun 52 Secret 2 3 •consideration ot Radioactive Contamination in the Major Overhaul of Aircraft Turbo-Jet Engines • USNRDL Report # 355 l May 1952 by H A Hyers et al DOE ARCHIVES 91 C4-2J676 • • · INITIAL DISTRIBUI'ION AIR FCRCi ACTIIDI'ES COPY JIJ • 1 ' 2 Director or Research Develo 2llent Headquarters USAF ATTN lrmameDt Division 'Washington 25 D C 3 The geon General Headquarters USAF ATTN Bio De Br Pre Med Di WashingtoD 25 D C 4 Director or Operations Headquarters USAF ATl'N Asst for Atomic Energy 'Washington 25 D C 5 Asst for Develoi cent Planning Headquarters USAF 'Washi Dgton 25 D C 6 Deputy for ateriel Contrcl Asst for ofateriel Program Control DCS ¥ Headquarters USAF ATTN AFMPC-AE Jashington 25 D C 7 Director of Operations Headquarters USAF Washington 25 D C 8 Director of Pla - Headauarter USAF ATTN War Plans Div Washington 25 D C 9 10 Director of Re uirements -Heacquart rs USAF ATI'N AFDRQ-SA M Washington 25 D C Director of Research and DevelopneDt Headquarters USAF ATI'N Combat Co1tponents Div Washington 25 D C or Intelligence ·Headquarters USAF ll Director 12-16 Col Ao V Harmon Special Asst tor Nuclea r Development 17 ATI'N AFC'IN-1B2 'Washington 25 D C Office of DCS D Headquarters USAF Washington _25 D C Asst Chief of Ste tr Intelligence Headquarters USAF 6 3 c o PM Nev York N Y lPO ' • Director or Operations eadquarters USAF Operations Analysis Div Washington 25 D C l'l'TI 18 Commander 497th Jteoonnais sance Technical Squadron AupeDted APO 633 c o PM Nev York N Y W' 92 t 19'6 DOE ARCHIVES C4-23676 • ' 19 CCl llDander Far last Air Forces APO 9 5 c o ft-' San 1'renciscc Ce li orcia 20 Ccmnander Al ask all ilr Command APO 942 c o PM Seattle Washington ilTN UC11'N 21 Commaroer lort heast ilr CamnaDd APO 862 Nev York I l · 22 Commander Strategic ilr Command Offutt AFB knaha Nebr 'M'N Special Weapons BraDch Inspection Div Inspector General 23 Commander Strategic ilr Colll 'l8Dd Offutt ATTN Chief Operations Analysis 24 Commander Tactical Air Command Langley AFB Virginia ATTN Documents Security Branch 25 CCl lJll8 Dder Tactical Air Comtr and ATTN 1-' aj Paul Andrae I angley AFB Virginia 26 Commaooer Air Defense Comnand Ent AFB Colorado 27 AIDS Commander Air Materiel Commaoo ilt'ight-Patterson AFB Ohio ATTN MCS-W 29 Ccm mander Air Training Command Scott AFB Belleville 30 Commander Air Training Command Scott AFB Belleville Ill ATTN DCS O GTP m Col lITl8nder Air Proving Ground Command Eglin AFB Florida ATTN AG TRB 32 Commander Flying Training Air Force 'Waco Texas ATTN Director or Observer Training 33 Commander Crew Training Air Force R1uxlolph Field Texas ATTN 2GTS DCS O 34 Commander Headquarters Technical Training Air Force Gulfport Y ias • 35 ATl'N TA D Canmander ilr University Maxwell AFB Alabama 9 3 • Nebr 28 31 I AFB Ckna ha Commander Air Materiel Command Wright-Patterson AFB Ohio ATTN • c o PM 6 37 Camnemant ilr Command St a ff School 1-Bxvell AFB ila Commeroant AP School or Aviation Medicine Raroolpb AFB Texas Ccmmander Wright Air Developnent Center Wright-Patterson UB Cll1o l'l'Tli l«X ESP • ' 39 ecmm mer Air Force Cubridge Research Center 230 Street Ca abridge 39 Massachusetts lTTN CRH ilbal J 40 Camamer Air Force Cambridge Research Center 230 Street CalDbridge 39 Massachusetts ill ie D7 41 Comr ander Air Force Special Weapons Center lirtl a m AFB Chief Technical Librar y Branch N J ex ATTN 42 Canmarrlant USAF Institute of Technoloa 'Wright-Patterson AFB Ohio A'lTN ResideDt College 43 Canr - aDder wry AFB Denver Colorado ATTN Armament Trainine 44 CamnaDder 1009th Special Veapons Squadron Headquarters U5 AJI' ' e shi Dgton 25 D C 45 Commam•r lcokout Mountain Iaboratoey 8935 Wc nderlaDd Avenue Hollyvood California 46 The RAND Corporation 1700 Main Street Santa Monica California ATl'N Nuclear Energy 'Division 47 Chief ilr Weather Service Aodrevs AFB lashington 25 D C 48 CommaDder Yest rn DevelopoeDt Division P O Box 26 Inglevood Calitomia ATTN Col Glasser IDT 49 Col John F Babcock Air UD1versity Maxwll AFB Alabama Dept of AR « ACTIVITIES SO Asst Chief ot Sta ft G-1 D A Washington 25 D C ATTN Human Relations and Research Board 51 Asst Chief 52 Asst Chier or start G-3 D A Washington 25 D ATTN Dep C ot S G-3 RrucSW 53 s t C'1i f of or Sta rt G-2 D A Washington 25 D star A 94 Washington 25 D c c c CF 04 23676 bOE i RCHIVES • i ' 54 Chief or Ordnance D l Washington 25 D C l rrN ORDTI-U 55 Chief Signal Officer D l P O Division Washi llgton 25 D C lT'l'N SIGOP 56 The Surgeo o General D l Washington 25 D C lffl Chief B D Divisioa 57 Chief Chemical Otticer D lashington 25 D C 58 The Quarteraaster General CBR Liaison Officer Research alld Developaent Div D Washington 26 D c 59 Chief of lngineers D l Washington 25 D lTTn INGNB c 60 Chief or Transportation lili taey Planning and Intelligence Div lashi o gton 25 D c 61 Chief lrmy Field Forces pt Ion roe Virginia 62 Commanding Officer Cbelli cal Corps Chemical and Radiological Laboratory lrmy Chemical Center llaryland lTTN Technical Libra '1 NAVY CTIVITIIS 63 Com mandi Dg Officer u s Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory San Francisco 24 California U l'N Technical Intormtion Dirlsion OTHER DEPARTIIENT OF DEFENSI lCTIVITIES 64 Chairman Research aDd Development Board D o Washington 25 D l'l'Tlh Technical Library 65 Commandant Rational War College Washington 25 D C ATTN Classified Records Section Library 66 Commandant lraed Forces Start College Norfolk ll Virginia lTTN Secretary 67 c Collllll8nder Field Comlll8nd lrsed Forces Special Weapons o Box 5100 llbuquerque New Mexico Project P 68 Chief lrmed Forces Special Weapons Project Washington 25 D C 95 CJ -23676 • 69 Office or the Secretary or Defense Weapons S111teas lvaluation Group Washington 25 D c 70 Ottice ot the Secret arr ot Defense Weapons Systeas lnluation Group lTTlh llr lenneth •• lrickeon Washington 25 D c• 71 Operations Research Office The Johns Hopkins University 64 1 0 CoMecticut lTenue l'l'TB lay Batstad Che 7-Cbase llaeyland • • TQl lC 72 INERGY COIDlISSION lCTIVlTI S o s ltollic Inergy Couission Classified Docnaenta Rooa 1901 Constitution lTe Washington 25 D c l'l 'l'N Mrs J K O'Leary for DlU 7J o s 74 Sandia Corporation Classified Document Division Sandia Base Albuquerque N llex lTTN Martin Lucero 75 Special Project Branch Technical In torution Service Oak Ridge Tennessee 76 Sandia Corporation Sandia Base Albuquerque N llex lT'l'N Dr Everett Cox 77 Chief Inter-Agency Service Section Technical Service Branch Rm 1 305 U S Atomic Energy Colll lll i ssion lTTN Mr E B Parks 1901 Constitution Avenue Washington 25 D c • 78 Manager of Operations u s Atomic Energy Coaaission P O Box 30 Ansonia Station ATTN llerril Eisenbud New York 23 N Y 79 U s Atomic Inergy Commission Santa Fe Operations Office P O Box 5400 llbuquerque Jew Mexico ltomic Inergy Commission 1901 Constitution venue Washington 25 D c lTTN Dr Bugher Div or Biology Medicine DOE ARCHIVES C4-23676