C2I y uic'etzt Backdrop U 01 06 1998 UNCLASSIFIED http www state ic gov IA98 m80106b htm RELEASED - ART US Department of State Research Bureau of Intelligence and Intelligence Assessment 01 06 1998 U Colombia A Violent Backdrop A all the Colombian Govertimem of peace but a between stalemate criminals--is prompting talk A strategic pother traffickers drug actors--guerrillas paramilitaries settlement is not near_ B1 Violent heritage hasghipfed since political bloodletting partisan and civil war theeworld' Colombia has a long history of world s highest murder the of one depressing etc C 1982 The list of firsts is of internally displaced persons number growing a rate kidnapping formalisti democracies new one of the region's oldest boasts produce also toten able Colombia was 1991Although Paradoxically as recently as system political Colombia s a and broader and exclusionary in practice accountability institutional an and n has been halfheartedConstitution designed to promote administration Samper drug-tainted of promise realization of the participation Implementation by the inhibits and democracy threatens that full indirect cause of political violence incomplete democracy fuels resultant The Constitution 1991 the from small drug peasant violence include expulsion lots a chronic of to settle disputes causes a f wealth The proximate of f tendency of land a high concentration presence traffickers buy up large amounts settlement dispute effective lacks ty to purveyors of both violently because the country Ystem that grants impure judicial corrupt ineffective in vast rural areas and an s political and criminal violence C three-fourths who live in cities concerned about Colombians especially the violence Urbanites are mare the to adapted have elite view the waged in the countryside living a of ecopersonal cost high thand the and the war lean mic unemployment traffic congestion elpoliwith e have and problem military conflict as primarily a rural restricted lifestyles C and business costs and security extra kidnappings i e Guerrillas UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY DONALD A JOHNSTON 1 oAATE CASE ID 6 AUG 2001 200101204 5 16 014 19 PIV UNCLASSIFIED yliuletit Backdrop U 01 06 1998 UNCLASSIFIED http www state ic gov IA98 m980106b htm Armed Forces of Colombia FARO and the Colombia's primary guerrilla groups the Revolutionary about 10 000-15 000 fighters They control about smaller National Liberation Army ELN together field active in where they act as a de facto government and are 13 percent of Colombia's 1 070 municipalities ago years 30 than more Marxist insurgencies founded two-thirds of the country The descendants of era by replacing foreign support with substantial these groups have survived in the post-Cold War extortion Although the guerrillas--the FARC income from the narcotics trade kidnapping and not crop cultivation and some processing they have especially--are heavily involved in protecting drug formed a new cartel C compete but rarely cooperate militarily and occasionally The major guerrilla groups are loosely allied requiring attacks the guerrillas are executing politically Well armed and increasing in numbers widely scattered fi ghters C sophisticated planning and coordination of hundreds o f combination of political action and selective terror Guerrillas have expanded their influence through a Guerrilla strategy consists of an ambitious Local officials are co-opted intimidated or eliminated gradual encirclement of the major cities and growth plan expansion in as many areas as possible as oil pipelines C destruction of certain economic infrastructure such unemployed disaffected peasants and their children The guerrillas find fertile recruiting grounds among support for the guerrillas is limited largely to the who have no prospects and nothing to lose Political the guerrillas provide protection This lack of a 300 000 peasant farmers growing illicit crops to whom local elections when a higher-than-usual voter popular base was demonstrated during the October 1997 electoral sabotage strategy and voted turnout especially in urban areas rejected the guerrilla overwhelmingly for a peace initiative C ost touc wit their argue t at o om is s insurgents are criminals who long ago Lome origins and have slipped into banditry having no better way to earn -a living However the revo ionary agenda albeit vague thereby suggesting FARC and ELN leadership profess commitment to a political military and political pressure by a that they can be induced to negotiate if brought under significant will not settle for demobilization and coherent government counterinsurgency strategy The guerrillas witnessed the extermination of the reinsertion with vague promises of democratization having and early 1990s and the political FARC's legal wing the Patriotic Union UP in the late 1980s marginalization of demobilized M-19 and EPL guerrillas C Bl B1 Military resu in a pro em s erceptions y the elites that their interests are no directly threatened national priority demanding a being left to the military and police rather than being treated as a with survival administration--preoccupied comprehensive political-military strategy The weak Samper point of the at only a peace initiative and constantly at odds with a scornful military--has launched political exhaustion C standards 3 2 percent of GDP in Despite having a budget that is relatively large by Latin American in air mobility intelligence 1996 the military has been unable to overcome deficiencies use static defense to control urban and police communications training and logistics The military and unsustainable offensives into strategic economic sites like oilfields and occasionally launch 2 of 4 5 16 014 19 PN UNCLASSIFIED Violent Backdrop U 01 06 1998 ' ' A Colof n F L UNCLASSIFIED hllp www state ic gov 1A98 m980106b htni ly J can however lies with the guerrillas who guerrilla-controlled territory The initiative military to be reactive C and place of attacks forcing the attributed Althou h human rights violations choose the time 131 to the military have declined Paramilitaries and he armed the in originated guise current eearly Paramilitaries in their f rural insugtents he if-he198Ohoaward p groups originally legal were what organize helping forces commonly used in reference over the years but the term today is changed has groups these of legal status dedicated largely to and a variety of illegal groups convivirs called organizations to both legal more than murder account for using tactics that amount to little eradicating guerrillas Paramilitaries B1 of strong Peasant Self-Defense Group 2 000-plus the is illegals the of deadly its area The largest and most Castano It has systematically expanded Carlos notorious the by led Cordoba and Uraba ACCU and the eastern plains and include the territory surrounding Bogota to months recent in operations of suspected guerrillz new area and massacre a group of a enter paramilitaries Typically those who remain jungles self-defense group is formed from among new a and flee then Residents ranks some sympathizers guerrilla strength by pushing into guerrilla increase tactics Such area in the newly cleansed and paramilitaries are military engagements between guerrillas peasants with nowhere else to go Direct supporters and the wages war on the other's real or perceived side each as suffer peasants Rural rare to the carnage C military increasingly becomes a bystander the paramilitaries as criminal of areas Despite an official military policy of treating f their r inards activies a d offering turn a blind eye to paramilitary officers many leaders paramilitary some capture of Ramirez and 1 st Division's Commander Gen Ivan responsibility Certain officers including the by paramilitaries Brigade actively collaborate with in included elements of the Bogota-based 20th Intelligence be Though the paramilitaries will not necessarily support other and intelligence them with deal providing to power is undeniable and some mechanism their negotiations peace direct any eventual must be included-in a settlement C Drug traffickers although their political contribute to the overall climate of violence criminals other and rs have traffickers Traffickers Drug have a direct stake e g extradition they where issues to limited are activities typically paramilitary groups their extensive land holdings funded violently expelled peasant farmers from with arms and budget through payoffs flooded the country provided a substantial part of the guerrillas' military guerrilla assassins They have corrupted government of army veritable a equipped trained and activities they will almost solely in protecting their business Interested alike officials and paramilitary interests C settlement components that threaten those resist counterinsurgency actions or peace Prospects for peace 5 16 01 4 19 Pi- 3 of4 UNCLASSIFIED Wiemt Backdrop U 01 06 1998 Colo UNCLASSIFIED http www state ic gov 1A98 m980106b btm 4 n the costs of poor because all the major actors view are future foreseeable the in The prospects for peace negotiations not full war as bearable Serious peace pioritynSuh a gornmentl wibrneed the t the wap ending makes legitimacy strategy political ae support and a comprehensive political military develop elite and must r backing of the political and economic the to th negotiating table Once from the iguerrillas and initiative important battlefield the seize to wi11 be able to pay and governments foreign ripen conditions non-Colombian facilitating role Until that time mu ate confidence-building mteasures social academe fostering forumshols situation and perhaps C parties the among understanding and by-date Products -b -count Assessments View oints Products INR Home Patre Briefs Intel 5 16 014 19 PA 4 of 4 UNCLASSIFIED