Approved For Release 2007 03 20 CIA-RDP84B00049R001700060018-4 SECRET 15 December 1981 MEMORANDUM FOR Director of Central Intelligence FROM Chief Interdepartmental Affairs Staff OPP SUBJECT CCCT Meeting -- LANDSAT Issue • 25Xl 1 Attached is the material provided by the IC Staff for your background and use at tomorrow's CCCT meeting This material covers the LANDSAT issue -- lready have the High Technology material in a separate book LJ 2 There are two aspects of the LANDSAT issue -- only ·the first is of redlconcern to CIA as explained in the attached summary What seems to be at stake here is obtaining sufficient federal funding to ensure a viable LANDSAT system Our people have made the case as evidenced by the supporting documentation that LANDSAT is sufficiently important to the USG to warrant adequate funding c J 3 The CS paper dated 12 November explains CIA's dependence upon the LANDSAT system for the analysis of various agricultural problems including Soviet harvest forecasts This paper already has been given to some of the agencies 0MB Commerce Agriculture and Interior which will be represented at tomorrow's meeting Other agencies State Defense and AID will see copies probably for the first time at the meeting Commerce will pass them out at the meeting D cc 25Xl 25Xl 25Xl 25Xl DDCI D OPP 25Xl SECRET Approved For Release 2007 03 cRf t -RDP84B00049R001700060018-4 s A MIN'A J 5£ u i' 1 The Landsat agenda item for the 16 December meeting of the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade will address two issues The first issue was initially phrased by 0MB as determining the best mechanism to expedite the transfer of the Landsat system to the private sector In actuality the key decision to be made here is to first determine the level of the Administration's fiscal commitment to the Landsat program The second issue is to decide whether the Administration should consider simultaneous transfer to the private sector of both the civil weather and the land remote sensing Landsat systems D 25Xl 2 The CIA recommendation on both issues is for Option 2 This position essentially agrees with the federal agencies and differs from 0MB the NSC Staff and the Council of Economic Advisers D 25Xl 3 Issue 1 With refer nce to the i-ssue of determining how best to transfer Landsat to the private sector one option provides for a minimum federal commitment level --1 I 1-- that is slightly in excess of the current federal agency pUrcnas s of Landsat data The 0MB and NSC Staff rationale for this approach is that this level more closely reflects the real market value of Landsat data The chief argument against is that the minimum level poses the strong probability of not attracting sufficient private sector involvement to ensure continuation of the Landsat capability The second option is for an enhanced federal commitment to perhaps --- I I lover a five to ten year period with the objective of attracting a maJor private sector investment of l jover the next decade The federal agencies' support for this second option is based on the point that the purchase level criterion developed by 0MB is a very poor index of the actual value of the Landsat derived data to US policymakers Tab provides cases in poF-° Y1ow policymakers have been served by such data derived by CIA L_J I I 4 In the Decision Memorandum 0MB has also taken the position that Landsat data are not critical or essential because there are other reliable sources of data The two key agency users Agriculture and CIA as well as Interior take issue with this 0MB judgment The CIA agricultural estimating program does make extensive use of Landsat and classified reconnaissance system data We have indicated in paragraphs 5 through 10 of Tab · which will be made available to the Cabinet Council principals that each imaging system has characteristics that provide unique information about agrotechnjcaJ practices aod crao conditions - 5 With reference to the first issue we do not -- nor does any other federal agency -- oppose the transfer to the private sector Such a transfer might create minor problems of maintaining confidentiality of our requirements but such problems could be overcome The concern is that the transfer be effected in a manner that will not lead to the demise of the Landsat program The continuity of Landsat data collection provides the CIA with the timely large area multi-spectral data SECRET 25X 25X 25X 25X 25X 25Xl 25Xl Approved For Release 2007 gijt 9 SS11f r § P84B00049R001700060018-4 _ 7 r- preparation of grain estimates ofl I necessary for assessments that have in the past p _r_o_v i d-ed- -e_a_r ly_w_a_r_n i-ng-o f -major even s affecting world grain markets and US policy Your 12 June 1981 letter to the D OMB Tab$ has indicated the belief that continuation of the Landsat program is in the national interest because it clearly pro vi des data of intelligence lllllO-ftance and exemplifies US 1eadership in remote sensing technology L_J 6 Issue 2 We believe that the Administration shoul not consider simultaneous private sector transfer of both civil weather and land remote sensing systems at this time The reason for this position is that as of now there does not eppear to be a clear understanding and identification of the specific civil weather functions that are t transferred or the potential adverse impacts of such transfers L_J 25Xl 25Xl 25Xl 25Xl 7 The civil weather program has extensive domestic and international ramifications which should be identified and thoroughly understood and evaluated to preclude creating disruptions in the present cost-free flow of foreign weather data As the largest user of weather data on a worldwide basis for agricultural transportation and other economic military and intelligence activities the US would be particularly affected by any disruptions in the flow of data Precipitous actions to transfer the civil weather systems to the private sector also pose the risk of creating situations that are not desirable from the viewpoint of longer-term national security considerations We defer to the Department • ense to provide more definitive coJ11Tients on this particular point 8 The sequence of activities called for under Option 2 would provide a better basis for decision making and would also minimize the necessity for developing amendments to the 0MB circular A-76 Statement of Work In our judgment adopting Option 2 does not necessarily rule out or delay a decision for simultaneous transfer of aspects of both civil weather and land remote sensing systems It merely ensures that a national policy decision on any such transfer is made after clnsideration of all the consequent factors that would affect US interests UNCLASSIFIED 25Xl 25Xl