--- --------- • 0 Cop xJ ' o UNITED STATES _ e '· ' OCT 2 1974 I I1il iae lme nt r ml O crie · --- - ✓ •I Na JJ C- - ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WASHINGTON 0 C 20S4S l4 of -Ir i ns c 7 of -fi-o- ti eojttea Serie• Chairman Ray Commissioner Kriegsman Commissioner Anders Thru Geper ager PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER PROLIFER 4TION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS · Enclosed · or your ini'ormatiqn are the Ina in conclusions reached ln the final ve 'sion of the Soecial National Intelligence Estimate · SNIE The u 11 text of th 57' TIE carrying higher classilica ions and controls is available in IS - - - Ac · - C 4-' I _____ mes G Poor Director vision of International Security Affairs Enclosure DCI NIO 1945-74 dtd 9 4 74 S NFD · ' IOr- 1 t SECU f ITY INFOm i TION -· - c-·· • • • •41- l' •1• 14 11ac •• •r• S••J•ct t• - • 74 -7· - -- • ' • - _o _- • - --- ' - t ' _ • • -- • • • -·• c•-···· - r - ··• u• - I ••-·· -·· - • _ •'- · l PDI T - -• t - • · - - - • _ - •t james G Poor • · •• 11· -•· - - - - - - - - ·- - - - ·- - _ ·- 0 • Cl 1rem -- t i J J m 1' VJL J J '-' T • Prospects for Fm-ther Pmlifemtion of Nuclear V ea pons oa N O S 7 I 197 4 pAl ITIZED COPY iC pl ember a -- -• - - ·- ·- - _- ·£ • •• • · '- __ -- --- - - _ • - -- -Prospects for Further Proliferation o Nuclear Weapons L In tI1c rnsos the production of nuclear wc ipons will be witliin the tcclmological ruul economic cnp lbilitics of m my countries The once fonnicfahlc b uricrs to dc ·c o1- mcnt of nuclear wcnpons by n3• tions of midclliag size md resources ha ·e stc dily diminished o ·er time Thcr will continue to sluiuk in the yecU-S ahead as plutonium enricl1ed uranium and technolog y become more widelr spread Some countries will consider nuclc ir we tpons fargelr in terms of military utilitr The princip 1I dctcrmi11 1 nt of· tltc extent _of nuclc ir · wc ipons prolifer tion in coming yc u-s will9 l1owe ·cr - be political considc1 1tions-induding tl1e policies of tlic superpowers with regard to p o lifcrntion the policies of suppliers of nucle ir m ltcri us and technology · 1 and regional imbitions and tcraions• I ' • i I v 3 e bclic ·e that Isr iel 1Irc 1dy I1as produced nucle ir we ipans Our judgment is based on Is eli acquisition of large qtlantities of uranium p utly by clandestine means the ambiguous na ture of Israeli efforts in the field of ur mium enrichment uid Israers large invest ient in i costly missile system desi£ned to accoe1mod ite nuclear warheads ·c do not expect the sr iclis to pro ·ide confirm i-tion of widcspr ad suspi ions of their capability either by nuclear testing or by threats of use short of a gr ffc tl1rcat to the nation's existence Future emphasis is likely to be on imprO ·ing we tpon designs manuf cturing missiles more c 1p 1b e in terms of distance and accur icy th m the existing GD-mil Jcricho nd icquiring or perfecting wc ipons far air craft dc1ivery · · 4 Sever other countries-including· 'est_ Germany- Sweden Canada and Italy--could ha ·c fahrkatccl nudc r dc ·iccs more easily from a technological and financial point of view thnn Indfa and Israel •' I • • -· •4 _ _ ··· · '--· '- -- •• • - • J• • ·_ ·- -· • The ' h i ·c rcfr iincd ancl titer arc unlikely to be much influenced by weapons J c -quisHion in countries like India The inhibitions facing each of tl1cm ire strong Iu ilI popular opinion is strongly opposed • to tbc acquisition of nudc tr wc tpons both on emotional grounds d bc usc such we ipons wot 1ld c lt iil suh t mtfal risks-of p·rcvoking attack of offending ·it tl iilies ir d of clc trqying existing mutual securitY arrangements It would require Ycry fundamcnl 1I changes such as tl1c brc lkup of m tjor defense aili mccs accomp micd by i subst mtfal incre isc in strife md tension tlirou hout the ·orld to induce countric like ' 'est Gcnn my Sweden Can ida tnd Italy to cxcrcis their nc r - ' ' tcnn c -ip ibility 5 T11c Director of Cc11tr 1I Intclligcncc the Deputy Director of 7 Ccntml Intelligence rcprcscntin the Central Intelligence Agency the Dircclor of IntcJiigcnce ind Ilcsc 1rch representing the Department of State th Director ' Defense Ii1tcll igcncc Agency and tl1c Assist mt Chief of Staff for Intcilig cncc Dcp 1rtmcnt of the Army believe that Japan·s situation is very simibr to that of the other advanced Vestern nations just mentioned Tbey bdfo ·c Jap m would not emb irk on n progr un of nuclc ir weapons dc ·clopmcnt iii the ihsencc of a m ijor idversc sllift in great power rcfationships wh ch presented J ip in with i clearcut tl1rcat to its security T11c Assist mt· Chief of Staff Intelligence JDepartment of the Air Force an·d tl1c Director of Xaval I11tcl1igcnce Depar mcnt of ihc X 1Yy Ilowc ·cr sec a strong cl1 mcc _th it J ip m•s 1Ieadcrs will conclude th it lhey must I1a ·e nuclear wcnpons 1f they trc to Jachic ·e their n tion il objccth·cs in the dcYc1opin£ Asfan po cr b fo nce Such i decision cou cl come in the c iriy 19S0s It would likely be m de even sooner if there is any f irther proliferation of nuclear weapons or global pc T 1i sh·cness re arding such activity These de ·e opments would h stcn erosion of tradition l Jap mese opposition to a nuc ej_I 'eapon course and permit Tokyo to cross tho t threshold earlier fr the interests of national security Anr concurrent deterioration of Jap mese rclalions with tl1e Communist powers or a further decline in the credibility o trs defense gu tr mtees would in their ·iew further accelerate the p icc of nuclear weapons dc ·e1opmcnt by Japan ·•« • 2 • - advnnccd nations to mount the sort of nuclc r cffort Indfa and Isr 1cI have m ide Some states such as the Rcpnhlic cf Chiua Argentina and South Afric i will l e much influenced in their decisions not only by the - ' J 6 Less sweeping ch m cs could induce one or mother of the less • - - - _ · 2 - 1 _ - i J ·· -·· - -• • · ·-· -- - -·-··- · -•'- - · gcncrn1 course of prolifcrntion but hr sud1 factors as owing feelings ' of isolation and helplessness perceptions of-major mi it iry tlire it md desires for regional prestige In c ich of tl1cse cases 1y weapons ca pal ility prohahly wouid be sm z 11 ncl clcJi ·cry probab y would depend on aircraft thou h there is some possibility th it one· br another might be able to purd1 i sc i nuc eu-capable missile system from a foreign supplier 7 T iipci conducts ils small nuclear progr im vith i we ipon option lc u-ly in mind md it will be in a position to fobric itc a nuclc ir dc ·icc after five years or so Taipcts role in· the world is changing radically• d concern o ·er tl1e possibility of complete isolation is mounting Its· cisions will be much influenced by US policies in two key are support for tl1e islancrs security and attitudes about the possibility of a nuclear-armed Taiwan Taipc s present course probably is leading it foward clc ·clopmcnt of nudca wc 11 ons _ -- 8 Argcntina•s small nuclear program is being pursued ·igorously with an eye toward indcp ndcncc of fcrci n suppliers It probably ill pro ide the basis for a nucfa ir we tpons c ipabilitr in the e irly 19S0s Argentina has· no app ircnt milib ry need for nude we 1 pons but there is strong desire for them in some quarters as a way to augment Argentim s power ' is-a- ·is Brazil O ·cr lime in the ib sencc of strong intcnrntional pressures that -stop nuclear weapons acquisition else• where there is an even ch mce th it Argcntin i II choose to join the nuclear dub in a sm ill wav Lo its and it a p - tir has de Jo d • t hn l f - i hi _ --- ··-- uranium that could he used for producing we ipons--g rade m -s tcrfal South Afric i prohaulr would go forw ird with 1 nuclear weapons program if it saw a serious thrc lt from Afric m neighbors bcginnfag to emerge So serious i threat is highly unlikely in the 19 us # - IO Other c mdicbtc couulrics-Spain lr n ES 1 t r kist m Br t2il and South Korea-would need it lc 1st a dcc 1de to c trry out i nudc tr wc ipons dcYclopmcnt program One or mother might detonate a demonstrative dc ·icc c irlicr-pcrl1aps considcrablr earlier by using purch cd maicrfols or by obt 1ining cxtcnsh·e foreign assiitancc Each of •• • • • ·'t· - - ·•- -- I I ·- ·- ·- ____ • -- --4· ___ -- --- - ' -- _ - to a·d ff - • of - tfra Js and - ese u cs sub cct crcnt set pressures · Some l1 1xc enemies alrc idr makin efforts in the 11uclc ir wcnpons_ lield i 11 will be conce rncd with such efforts 011 the If-rt of neighbors • or potcntfal mtagonists Some - ill be interested in uudcar weapons _for tl1eir presumed prestige value Unless countries opposed to prolifer· ation-1 rticubrly tl1c CS and the USSR-find ways to stop the spread ·of nu Iear weapons prognms before these c indidatc countries are in a · position to go forw ird at least some of them will be moti · z ted to join t the nuclear r icc The strongest impulses will probably be felt by Pakistan and Ir m Eg 11t and Dr tzil now appear to fall into a second categocy of likelihood · IL France Indfa md Im el vhi e unlikely to foster proliferation a matter of national po icy probably will pro'v·c susceptible to the Jure of the economic md poliqcal advantages to be gained from exporting matcrfals techno o y • and equipment rcleYant to nuclear weapons progrnms And most pctentfal prolifera tors are on good tenr s with one or all of them · as · 12 It is theoretically possible for a count · capable of developing a nuclear weapon to do so co ·ertly up to tl1e test of a first de ·ice And a test is not absolutelr necess uy In practice indications of such a pro- gram are virtually certain to reach the outside world But most countries ·will seek to maintain the tightest possible security with regard to · any milibry nuclear activities and inform ition is likely to be intermittent and inconclush·e Inc ig nous ballistic missile dclh·ery systems on the other hand would be readily identifiable early in tne de ·e opmcnt cycle and missile systems obtained a broad would not rem dn undetected for any significant period 13 Governments bacl-ward in tI1e nuclear field and anxious to acquire a token cap ibility quickly are more likely to try to steal weapons than fissionable m terfals despite the fact tlut the bttc arc less well protected A country c 1p tble of dc elopi 1g nd producing its own nuclear c1 vice is highly unlikely to try to steal weapons but one might seek fissionable materi11s_ br theft or dh-e sion Competently done divcrsi n might go undetected 14 Terrorists might attempt t11ef t of either weapons or fissionable materials They could see the bttcr as useful for terror or bbckm iil purposes e 'en if t11ey had no intention of going cm to fabric lte weapons •