DEPARTMENT OF STATE ACTION MEMORANDUM S S March 7 1977 SECRET TO The SecrE tary THROUGH P - Mr Habib FROM ARA - William S P - Anthony Transmissio i1 of PRM NSC-17 Section on Cuba Issue for Decision Your approval of the response to PRM NSC-17 and Mr Brzezinski's February 26 memorandum to you about a separate PRC meeting on Cuba on March g_ Discussion An IG meeting met this morning to discuss a revision of the draft PRM section on strategies for negotiations with Cuba which you authorized for circulation to other interested agencies on March 3 The attached response to PRM NSC-17 and Mr Brzezinski's memorandum to you reflects the views of interested agencies which were present Time did not permit circulation to these agencies of the final response to meet the deadline of the PRC meeting on March 9 Recommendation That you approve the attached Borg-Brzezinski memorandum transmitting the response to PRM NSC-17 on strategies for negotiations with Cuba and the agenda for i he PRM meeting Disapprove Approve SECRET GDS SECRET - 2 - Attachment 1 Borg-Brzezinski memorandum transmitting the response to PRM NSC-17 2 Agenda for PRM Meeting Drafted ARA CCA CGleysteen yt x29272 3 7 7 7 Concurrence D - SECRET REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES 77 06504 g t· ·· _ ' -- · J DEPARTMENT OF STATE • I Wuhlneton D C 20520 -1 March 8 1977 --·-·--··--- - SECRET f IB WRANDUM FOR MR ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI ·THE WHITE HOUSE Subject Response to PRM NSC-17 and Your February 26 'Memorandum on Cuba In rer ponse to PRM Nsc 1 7 and your memorandum of Februa y 26 1977 i transmit a Presidential Review Memorandum on the question of strategies for negoti ath ns with Cuba for cons id era tion by the Pr esident L11 Rev'iew Committee meeting scheduled for March 9 1977 This Pl was discussed at ran rd meeting on 'l'ime did not permit a n additional IG meeting to ieview the final draft aut we ·believe it repr es1 11 ts the views of the a gene ies concerned to the be t extent possible under the circumstances Ma rch 7 ' Also transmitted is the agenda for the March 9 PRC meetinq 'l ttachrnen Lt 1 2 Presidential Review Memorandum AqcncJa for March 9 Meeting on Presidential· · · i cv i ew Comri ti t tee SECRET GDS REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES ' SECRET Presidential Review Memorandurn NSC-17 CUBA ·SECRET REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES ' SECRET TABLE OF CONTENTS I II Interests A U S B Cuban Interests • • 2 Issues United States will raise 3 A B c D E F III IV Human Rights o ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• A B U S Trade Embargo 10 Aggression Against Cuba 11 C D Gua11tanamo Cl 11 12 Fisheries · IJ ••••••••• • Negotiating Strategies 12 Negotiating Step-by-Step 13 Negotiating comprehensively 14 Immediate Scenario ' 15 A B C Venue Timing and Delegation 15 Actions with the Cong ess 16 Actions with the Cuban Community in tl1e U SQ 16 Action with the Press 16 Actions in the Hemisphere 17 Actions with NATO Allies and Japan 17 o D E F VI 3 Cuban External Policy 4 Compensation - 6 Trade 7 US Presence in Cuba 9 Hijackin Agreement 10 Issues Cuba Will Raise 10 A B V Interests 1 IP Rec·ommenda tions 11 •• o ••• •• o • J 7 REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES SECRET I A INTERESTS U S Interests There are many compelling reasons why the US should move toward normalization of relations with Cuba However the difficulties in achieving ftill normalization of relations should not be minimized The issues involv d are extremely complex and nettlesome Fide I Castro is a wily and tough negotiator committed to some goals that are anti thethical to those of the U S The process of resolving differences with C ba will be difficult and tensions and problems will remain even after relations have been restored Reaching an agreement on compensation is likely to take many years J Major U S interests in moving toward normalization of relations with Cuba are The lessening of Cuban dependence on the Soviet Union beginning the long process of linking Cuba's security and economic interests to the world community rather than to one nation -- To create conditions that would give Cuba added incentives to ce se its foreign adventures in Africa and this he isphere To halt the growing polarization of the Caribbean To demonstrate our support for universalist principles in diplomatic relations and make a major gesture to the Third World which sees our posture toward Cuba as symbolic of great-power aggression Normalization can mean simply diplomatic relations or normal relations including unre tricted trade and contacts This latter type of relationship is inconceivable with Cuba in the near term rather by normalization we mean the establishment of relations with Cuba such as we have with those East European countries to w hich we accord MFN status and facilitate credits SECRET XGDS-3 REPRODUCED AT T E NAri'ciNALARCH1vks SECRET -2-- To enable us to puriue impoitant U S interests with Cuba such as human rights reunification of families and compensation of expropriated U S properties The eventual re-establishment of U S presence in Cuba which would facilitate dealing with long term complex issues and contribute to opening p Cuban society to U S influence To open up trade opportunities in a relatively small but natural market for us Principal disadvantages to normalizing relations are -- Might be construed by Cubans and others as U S acquiescence in Cuban interventionist policies in Africa and elsewhere -- Would signify U S acceptance of a Communist regime in the Western Hemisphere closely tied with the Soviet Union even though we would stress that relations do not mean approval -- Might encourage the further coalescence of right wing military regimes in Latin America especially those of the Southern Cone -- Will be perceived by some groups at home and abroad as inconsistent with our tough posture on the ·question of respect for human rights B Cuban Interests Cuba's immediate interest in moving toward normalization of relations with the U S is to end the U S trade embargo not only because of the economic and technological advantages tha_t would accrue to Cuba but more importantly because it would be seen as a symbol of our acceptance of the Cuban Revolution as a fait accompli with which we are willing to live Department of Defense believes Castro has more to gain than the U S from negotiations and wbuld relieve the USSR of $1 billion of annual subsidies to Cuba · SECRET REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES SECRET -3- The major disadvantage to Castro is that increasing U S presence and inter-action with American society might dilute ideological orthodoxy at·home and mute Castro's·image in the Third World as an implacable foe of imperialism II A ISSUES UNITED STATES WILL RAISE Human Rights We want the early release of eight American citizens held in Cuban jails on political charges We seek the expeditious emigration of American citizens who wish to leave Cuba These include 751 persons including 667 whom Cuba considers dual nationals under its exclusive jurisdiction Cuba holds a number of political prisoners perhaps as many as 15 000 We have expressed our willingness to accept those prisoners as refugees upon their release The release of some of them would strengthen the texture of the relationship we desire with Cuba The U S Cuban community seeks access to families re aining in Cuba through visits in both directions and emigration to the U S When the Cuban Refugee airlift ended in 1973 more than 127 000 immediate relatives of Cubans in the U S remained on U S repatriation lists and 27 000 on the corresponding Cuban list We seek greater Cuban flexibility on exchanges of visits and emigration Cuban Position The Cubans would probably be willing to discuss some of the above issues Any attempt to include the subject of Cuban political prisoners on a US-Cuban agenda however will certainly be rejected as an infringement of national sovereignty Cuban leaders have said they might release the eight U S political prisoners on humanitarian grounds as a counter gesture to a U S move such as a partial lifting of the embargo food medicine SECRET REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES SECRET -4They might also ease restrictions against the emigration of dual nationals many of whom are elderly Cuba has agreed in the past to discuss a formula for 'increased visitations both ways and to some limited reunification of families B Cuban External Policy l Soviet-Cuban Security Ties and Nuclear Problems Under the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement and the 1970 Corollary the Soviets are committed not to place strategic weapons systems in Cuba We would seek to have the Cubans assume those same oblig ations - i e not to permit the stationing of such weapons in their territory We want Cuba to adhere to the Treaty of Tlatelolco which would prohibit Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba and the NPT because of its global r mifications We would seek the elimination of operational-type Soviet naval visits and flights and intelligence-gathering installations · Continuing Soviet supply of spare-parts hardware and training are a problem only if there is a buildup in Cuba or if there are deliveries to Cuban forces overseas acting as Soviet surrogates We wish to negotiate a reduction or elimination of the Soviet military presence in Cuba Realistically however this is not likely to be possible until a new U S Cuban relationship is achieved and consolidated several years from now at best · Cuban Po s i tion Cuba will insist that its relationship with the USSR is a sovereign matter and non-negotiable Cuba cannot reduce its dependence on the Soviet Union for military support until it is no longer threatened by the U S Cuba may be willing to sign the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT 2 Africa The Cuban military presence in Angola and conceivable intervention elsewhere pose a destabilizing element inter-· nationally and violate self-determination Cuba has a serious trouble-making ability particularly SECRET r - s ' • · · REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES SECRET -5- in Namibia Rhodesia Mozambique and Somalia We seek assurances of a phased drawdown of Cuban combat troops from Angola It should be clear that a buildup of Cuban forces in Namibia and Mozambique participation in the R hodesia conflict or increased presence in Somalia or elsewhere in Africa will make it most difficult for the U S to proceed to full normalization • ' Cuban Position Castro understands that further military interventions in Africa or elsewhere would-have a sharply negative effect on relations with the U S He emphasizes the uniqueness of the Angolan situation and the unlikelihood of repetition elsewhere particularly in Latin America or the Caribbean Bu t he maintains the theoretical right to help national liberation movements and to meet requests of legitimate governments Castro claims that Cuban troops are now being repatriated and replaced by civilian advisors Cuba probably cannot withdraw its forces entirely from Angola without risking the collapse of the MPLA regime 3 Puerto Rico Cuba intervenes in U S internal affairs by its rhetorical political and financial support to the pro-independence movement Such support is regularly highlighted in the UN General Assembly and other international fora As far as we can determine Cuba has not directly supported pro-independence terrorism We could not tolerate such support Cuban agitation in international fora is an unfriendly act and counter to self-determination and free 'elections We would expect to see these Cuban efforts moderated considerably Cuban Position Cuba will not withdraw its formal support for Puerto Rican independence but the degree to which it presses the issue in the UN may be affected by an evolving relations hip with the U S In bilateral negotiations the Cubans may show flexibility perhaps going so far as to giv private assurances that they will moderate their position at the UN 4 Cuban Intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean Although Cuba has modified its gerieral policy of actively promoting subversion in Latin America countries like Nicaragua SECRET REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES SECRET I -6and Guatemala still feel threatened and Qruguay and Chile still see Cuba as an exporter of revolution Cuba continues to pose a potential threat to stability in the area The Cuban model is attractive to leaders in Jamaica and Guyana Revival of Cuban subversionand support for insurrection in the ·Caribbean and Latin America is unacceptable and would disrupt a trend toward US-Cuban accommodation Cuban Position Cuba maintains that-it does not export revolution but as in Africa has an international responsibility to assist legitimate governments or movements of national liberation They point to diplomatic ties and correct relations with most Caribbean and many Latin American states as evidence of Cuba's int ntions to conduct normal relations C Compensation The U S Foreign Claims Settle_ment commission has adjudicated and allowed 5 887 claims by U S firms and individuals for losses of property nationalized by Cuba These total $1 8 billion One-sixth of the awards totalling $1 6 billion were made to corporations while the remaining $221 million were made to private individuals In addition 1 the United States Government has outstanding claims against Cuba totalling $150 million Cuba is also in default of $52 million in Government bonds owned by U S citizens When CongrE ss charged- the Claims Commission with adjudicating claims it made no provisions for payment leaving a settlement in practice up to negotiations between the U S and Cuba Individual claim-holders have suffered the most We shall have to consider whether priority should be given to settlement of individual claims and to corporate claims for which there was no tax write-off Some lements in Congress may insist·on a 100 cents on the dollar repayment hoping for higher settlement rates than those achieved with other communist countries approximately 30 to 40 cents on the dollar Given current and expected hard currency problems any settlement requiring significant hard currency SECRET REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES SECRET -7outlays will be extremely difficult for Cuba to handle even if extended terms are granted Until the Claim issue is settled normal airline shipping and banking contacts between the U S and Cuba will be complicated by possible legal atta chment of Cuban properties Some litigation related to trade can also be expected In such circumstances any negotiations with the Cubans will be protracted and difficult Cuban Position The Cuban Government in 1960 recognized its obligation to pay compensation for nationalized properties Since then Cuban leaders have said that they in turn will present their claims for the Bays of Pigs Cuban exile activities and damage from the embargo which could exceed U S claims ·Cuba's present ability to pay any compensation at all has a narrow base Cuba hopes that future earnings from shipping and tourism will help offset these deficits but such earnings will be relatively small and Cuba will remain dependent on capital inflows to cover current deficits The Soviet Union's economic and military subsidies in the form of raw materials and a wide range of products are now valued at about $4 million a day Cuba's soft currency debt to the Soviet Union is estimated at $4 6 billion While Cuba has been offered Western hard currency export credit lin s totalling over $3 billion it has on average drawn down only less than onethird of this amount because of problems in meeting existing debt service and trade financing commitments These problems are likely to persist into the foreseeable future given the depressed price of sugar and expected continued surpluses of sugar on world markets D Trade U S Position United States businessmen have expressed an interest in trade with Cuba which is likely to grow quickly following SECRET REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES ' SECRET -8media coverage of events such as a Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce Trade Mission currently being arranged If the embargo is lifted the Department of Commerce has estimated that U S exports to Cuba might ultimately after trade conditions are fully normalized including availability of MFN official credits etc reach $300 million per year Such a level would however probably require several years to achieve Further given communist country tendencies to bilateral trade balancing Castro might well expect over the longer term U S annual purchases in Cuba of a roughly equivalent dollar volume necessitating substantial U S imports of sugar and other Cuban goods to support an export trade of this volume · Nevertheless even a limited lifting of the embargo e g food and medicine could open up the possibility of some substantial U S exports In the years 1973-75 the USSR purchased from Canada for Cubci grains and other food items in amounts ranging from $70 to $150 million per year A substantial portion of similar future purchases could be diverted to the United States immediately if the embargo on food shipments is ended Some pharmaceutical exports are also likely Cuban Position Cuba currently faces serious tnternational financial difficulties stemming from low sugar prices Cuban leaders continue to state that the economic ga ns from ending the embargo will be great apparently believing that hard cur-· rency derived primarily from sugar exports with some nickel and tobacco and U S bank loans will alleviate financial problems while access to superior U S products and technology with attendant tr nsportation savings and service advantages will enable the Cuban economy to perform more efficiently While Cuba will derive some gains from access to U S agricultural commodities and U S spare parts for old equipment Cuba may be overestimating the gains from U S trade since its exports to the United States will face significant barriers even if the embargo is ended Cuban non-sugar exports will be limited by lack of MFN tariff status under the Jackson-Vanik Admendment to the 1974 Trade Act SECRET REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES SECRET ' -9However lack of MFN status would not be a significant constraint for sugar since in September 1976 the MFN tariff rate was made identical to the non-MFN tariff Also Cuba could lack·a sugar quota if the U S quota system is revived Furthermore the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 denies Cuba any benefits under any U S laws until it takes steps to compensate for expropriated properties Thus under this statute as well as under the Trade Act Cuba'would be denied eligibility for Eximbank or CCC credits If Cuba cannot obtain substantial new sources of hard currency income from sugar sales to the U S and continues chronically in debt Cuban purchases from the United States 'will be largely diversions of imports from other western countries Consequently ending the embargo without removing these other constraints MFN and credits on Cuban exports to the United States will not be as important a concession as _Cuba beli ves Nevertheless Cuba apparently perceives the gains from renewed trade with the United States to be great and it may therefore be willing to make some significant non-economic concessions in return for normalizing trade relations E U S Presence in Cuba Re-establishment of a U S presence in Cuba is important to provide a means of discussing substantive issues to provide consular and commercial support to U S citizens in Cuba and to enable the U S Government to have direct access to the closed Cuban society · Cultural informational activities will be resisted by Cuba but some arrangements permitting · re-opening of U S press agencies and sale of some U S publications are probably achievable These measures will serve the long-term objective of seeking to diminish SovietCuban ties Cuban Po's i tion Cuban interest in better relations with the U S is balanced by fear that an established U S presence in Havana and a flow of U S tourists will re-awaken the attraction among the Cuban people for American goods and values and deflect the population from the stern task of building socialism The Cubans like the soviets would U S strategic controls on exports to Cuba will remain in effect SECRET REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES SECRET -10doubtless take steps to isolate American diplomats and tourists Even so the presence of American visitors could increase pressures on the Cuban Government to improve living standards F - ' I Hijacking Agreement The 1973 hijacking agreement wili cease to have effect on April 15 unless Cuba drops its denunciation or agrees to negotiate a new agreement Continuation of the agreement i important as a psychological deterrent to would-be hijackers Cuban Position The Cubans say reinstatement of a hijacking agreement It is not clear however whether they will be rigid on this or whether they would reinstitute the 1973 agreement in response to some other move by us can take place only after the blockade is lifted III A ISSUES CUBA WILL RAISE The U S Trade Embargo Castro says the embargo is a knife pointed at Cuba's throat and its suspension is a sacred national obligation and condition for formal negotiations with the U S In the past two years however the Cubans have indicated·they will engage in discussions on a number of issues prior to the complete lifting of the embargo What precisely the Cubans mean is ambiguous and deliberately so U S Position The embargo is the major U S bargaining chip for use in negotiations At the same time the embargo is inconsistent with our free trade policies is no longer an effective means of isolating Cuba and it is questionable whether it continues to serve U S interests Cuba has pointed to the embargo as an example of U S aggression against a small underdeveloped third-world state Ending the embargo is naturally linked to the compensation issue but also is the center-piece for improving US-Cuban relations SECRET REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES SECRET -11- B Aggression Against Cuba The central element of alleged U S aggression is the embargo Another aspect of hostility is anti-Castro terrorism by a few Cuban exiles in the U S and nearby countries Recent e calation in terrorism has heightened Cuban concern about exile organizations oparating out of the U S The Cubans believe the U S Government acquiesces in such activity even if it no longer sponsors it Cuba may insist on a U S pledge not to intervene in Cuban internal affairs nor to promote support or permit aggression against Cuba from U S soil U S Position This issue has two aspects a the U S Government's difficulty in controlling anti-Castro terrorists receiving financial support from the U S but operating out of third countries and b the linkage of a U S non-aggression pledge to Soviet-Cuban military ties We can formally assure Cuba of our opposition to terrorism launched from the U S or financed by U S -based Cuban exiles A presidential statement to this effect would go a long way to clear the air We also could provide Cuba with a eport of U S official actions against anti-Castro exiles in recent months A non-interference intervention guarantee could be linked to Cuban undertakings in the security field ·C Guantanamo It is not clear at this point how much emphasis Cuba puts on Guantanamo There are some indications that discussions about Guantanamo's future are not an urgent requirement for Cuba On the other hand Cuba certainly will insist that it be discussed in the future U S Position The declining military value of the base suggests it could eventnally be returned without affecting U S security provided of course that Cuba agreed not to turn it over to the Soviets The disparity of interests SECRET SECRET -12between the U S and Cuba suggests that Guantanamo could be a valuable bargaining chip particularly with reference to Cuba's military nuclear status D Fisheries Agreement Cuba was assigned a 14 950 ton quota by th International Convention on International Fisheries for 1977 td fish off our Atlantic Coast It is iiportant to Cuba's economy to resume fishing in this area U S Position An early general agreement on fisheries and maritime boundaries would minimize the potential for incidents involving Cuban vessels which both we and the Cubans wish to avoid IV NEGOTIATING STRATEGIES Castro's position that he is not willing to negotiate with the U S until the embargo is lifted is deeply embedded in his speeches and official documents including the program of the Cuban Communist Party He is not likely to back off this position The key question is how extensive can discussions be and how long can they go ori before the embargo issue must be decided We would begin by exploring Cuban intentions Then there would be two basic strategies we could pursue· in approaching further negotiations The Department of Defense believes Guantanamo should not be a precondition to U S negotiations Militarily Guantanamo is important to U S defense interests by virtue of its strategic geographic location for defense of U S lines of communication including those leading to the Panama Canal Additionally it is an ideal base for contingency operations The U S military presence at Guantanamo serves as a visible manifestation of U S concern and interest to Latin America and the Caribbean and at the same time assists in offsetting Soviet military presence If Guantanamo Bay's future is discussed with the Cubans the negotiations must include the principle that Guantanamo cannot be used by any foreign military SECRET REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES f 1l' 11- -· ' '' SECRET -13_ At the exploratory meeting with the Cubans which would be confidential we would -- explain we are interested in improved relations and indicate the gestures we have made such as lifting travel restrictions start negotiations on fishery issues explain our interest in the Hijacking Agreement discuss sports cultural and scientific technical exchanges _ express interest in family visitations and release of U S political prisoners explain our concern over Cuban activities in Africa and on Puerto Rico -- listen to what the Cubans say After the few initial essions we would examine Cuban responses and determine which of two strategies to opt A Negotiating Step-by-Step We would continue periodic meetings to discuss reciprocal gestures that could be tak n over several months to improve the climate We might for example link the_ signing of the fisheries agreement to their agreement to continue the Hijacking Agreement We would pursue and expand exchanges and visitation rights One important gesture we -could make short of lifting the embargo would be permitting shipment of food and medicines Such a move could trigger Cuban gestures possibly including an agreement to begin negotiations As areas of agreement emerge we would probe the Cubans on other major issues including those they say are nonnegotiable We would discuss the level and venue of further _negotiations and consider establishing foreign interest sections in the Swiss Embassy in Havana and the Czech Embassy here A variant on this strategy could be to establish SECRET EPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES SECRET • t ' -14linkages and package issues that would have to be resolved before any final agreements are concluded We would seek to coordinate reciprocal gestures as p 9 rt of these packages in order to sustain momentum and build public support We would not give up the embargo chip and re-establish embassies unless and until Cuba has made a drawdown of its forces in Angola demonstrated its restraint on further overseas adventures and made important gestures on human rights The advantages of this model would be we could feel out -·the Cubans directly on the ambiguities in their position over an extended period 4-6 months giving them time to make withdrawls from Angola test U S public and Congressional reactions as baseball diplomacy and other reciprocal gestures take effect The disadvantages are -- the delays might give Castro a greater opportunity to manipulate U S public and world opinion -- keep the Cuban community in uneasy suspense and give terrorists time for action -- risk coalescence with opposition to a revised Panama Canal Treaty and -- move the issue of U S Cuban relations closer to the 1978 Congressional elections B Negotiating Comprehensively Following exploratory talks or at some appropriate stage in the step-by-step negotiations we could test Cuban readiness to take a comprehensive approach We would focus directly on what Cuba would be willing to do if we were to lift the embargo If Cuba were willing to release American political prisoners exchange embassies make some movement out of Africa and negotiate all outstanding issues including a claims settlement we would give up the embargo chip We would want to embody these areas of agreement in a joint or parallel public statement · SECRET REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES ' SECRET -15The• advantages of this model are -- the new Administration would be perceived at home artd abroad as acting decisively in managing foreign affairs and as not being driven by events ·and -- it would enable us to move quickly o establish a presence in Hav na and negotiate directly with them The disadvantages are -- we would give Castro what he wants most-- trade and American acceptance of his regime without significant Cuban concessions V A IMMEDIATE SCENARIO Venue Timing and Delegation We would recommend that confidential meetings with the Cubans take place in mid-March The first few meetings should be held in a New York hotel suite chosen for ifs confidentiality The Cubans would have their communications logistics and cover from their UN Mission We would establish an inter-agency back-up team in Washington which would include l awyers and experts on all the issues involved For th first meeting our delegation in New York would be headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and be composed of a handful of experts on the issues and on Cuba After the first meeting we would doubtless ha¥e to surface them and decide whether a to continue with the same level and composition in our delegation orb to upgrade the delegation by appointing a senior figure a Special Negotiator much as in the case of the negotiations on the Panama Canal and c whether to establish an American Interests Section in Havana and permit the Cubans a similar section in Washington in order to provide back-up to the negotiations in the form of on-the-scene assessments We would also have to decide whether to continue the meetings in New York or alternatively in Havana and Washington SECRE'l1 SECRET -16 B Actions with the Congress Congressional opinion on initiating talks with Havana is mixed Our liaison with key Congressional leaders must be effective if we are to have their cooperation Even before the talks begin therefore we would inform the Senate Foreign Relations and Finance Committees and the House International Relations and Ways and Means Committees that contacts are to be initiated We should fully brief the Chairman of the Senate and House Latin American subcommittees as to our rationale and expectations They in turn can advise us when there is a specific need for wider consultations with committee members and others C Actions with the Cuban CommunJ tY in the U S The strongest and most persistent opposition to nor malization will come from within the Cuban community in the U S A regular pulse-taking is a must Before the talks begin we should consult Governor Askew the two Florida Senators and Congressmen Fascell and Pepper as well as Mayor Ferre of Miami We should continue to consult them afterwards After the talks begin we should informally advise and consult with key exile leaders who might be helpful to us in putting the talks in the correct perspective for the rest of the Cuban community We should continue to stress to them the positive effects normalization might have such as reuniting families and facilitating visits We should also request the FBI to be especially alert in the Miami Washington and New York New Jersey areas to any acts of terrorism exile extremists might perpetrate to demonstrate against the talks D Actions with the Press It is doubtful that we could keep the talks secret after the first meeting Therefore we recommend·that afterit takes place we make a progress report to be issued in agreement With the Cubans Volunteering this information would at the same time give us the opportunity to define the general ground rules we plan to follow on disclosure with respect to future talks This strategy has been generally followed on the Panama Canal Treaty negotiations and has worked quite well SECRET SECRET -17E Actions in the Hemisphere Normalization of relations with Cuba should not cause us major problems in the rest of Latin America Some nations such as Mexico Venezuela Colombia the Common ealth Caribbean and Costa Rica will applaud and offer to help The more conservative governments wi'll not approve but they probably already see US-Cuban rapprochement as inevitable and are unlikely to cause serious difficulties Brazil will disapprove though it quietly collaborates with Cuba on North-South issues and on an East-West issue viz Angola We should instruct our embassies to inform all governments in Latin America of the tallrn and our intentions visa-vis Cuba before we surface them to the press Brazil Mexico Venezuela Colombia Costa Rico and some Caribbean governmehts should have tailored messages and be given progess reports F Actions with NATO Allies and Japan Our NA'l'O allies and Japan will approve a US move to normalize relations with Cuba We should inform USUN and USNATO and the governments of U K Japan Germany and Spain prior to public release of our policies toward Cuba VI RECOMMENDATIONS 1 That the initial direct U S contact with the Cuban ·government be exploratory and proceed on the basis of a step-by-step strategy A Approve Disapprove 2 That after the first series of meetings we reassess our position to determine whether we should move to strategy B full lifting of embargo in exchange for diplomatic relations and Cuban concessions or continue with strategy A with possibility of upgrading negotiations 6r exchanging inte est sections Approve Disapprove SECRET ' NSC Policy Review Committee Meeting on PRM NSC-17 Cuba 9 30 a m March 9 WHSR AGENDA Item 1 Discussion of Current Policy 2 Objectives 3 Negotiating Strategies 4 Scenario place press Congress