Summary and Conclusions NSC PRC Meeting Cuba March 9 1977 Secreta ry of Defense H arold Brown said that it was not our aim to change the internal structure of the Government of Cuba but we should not lift the embargo until the Cubans indicate in their actions - - not just public utterances -- that they will not intervene mihtarily anywhere Secretary Vance agreed with Brown's point on the importance of considering Cuba's external policy as one of the items to be considered in discussions with the Cub a ns but he stressed our own great interest in beginning to move down the road 11 toward normalization though on a reciprocal and a gradual basis Attorney General Bell agreed that we should proceed although with great caution He mentioned the problem of terrorism and Vance personally asked Bell to vigorously inve stigate the terrorist activities · in the Cuban communities in the U S particularly in Miami Bell · • replied that the FBI had had some jurisdictional problems before but because of Vance I s request he would see to it that the investigations were pursued Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps reported that a large segment of the American business community were strongly in favor of a resumption of trade with Cuba though she thought that the Cubans had not taken into account MFN or credits and therefore overestimat ed the advantages which would accrue to them because of trade George Brown Under Secretary of Treasury Anthony Solomon and Dr Brzezinski all agreed that we should approach the early exploratory discussions in a cautious way Solomon also said that Cuba's ri ght to export sugar to the U S is one of our most important bargaining chips and we should therefore be careful if and when we lift our export embargo on food and medicines that we separately negotiate their right to export to us • ' S£6RBT - -2- Vance summarized the consensus that all agreed that the United States Governi-ncnt should begin talks with the Cubans in a mcasut·ccl and ca1·eful way keeping in mind that the chip o eliminating the embargo is the ultimate one and we should play that one well In addition to informing various Latin American and NATO governments Dr Brzezinski said that we should also touch base with Canada and Japan With respect to the approach Brzezinski said we should be careful not to be drawn into making all the concessions at the beginning without being assured of movement on Cuba's part He used the example of U S -Hungarian relations in the mid-1960s to illustrate the need for face-saving gestures for both sides He said that progress was most likely if both moved forward with sequential and reciprocal steps He · also suggested that we move from exploratory talks to putting together a more comprehensive package Vance agreed and said the discussions will begin on fisheries and move into other issues including establishing an American Interest Section in the Swiss Embassy and then the anti-hijacking agreement When the Cubans raise the embargo issue we would raise Cuba's foreign adventurism and its activities with regard to Puerto Rico Vance agreed with Solomon that we should also raise the compensation issue then even though we do not expect its early resolution Talks would begin in New York City in mid-March with either the Assistant Secretary or the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State leading the U S team Dr Brzezinski said that it is essential that if we are going to retain the momentum that we should differentiate between three sets of issues 1 those like fisheries anti-hijacking and sports exchanges which can be done easily and quickly 2 those like human rights the embargo some aspects of Cuba's foreign policy and Guantanamo which are negotiable and should be done before diplomatic relations are established and 3 those like compensation and claims Cuba's withdrawalfroni Angoia and political prisoners which may be irreconcilable but certainly will involve protracted negotiations and therefore should be handled after relations are established On the issue of Guantanamo Harold and George Brown both said that Defense's major interest was to keep it from being transferred to the · Soviets Jimmy Carter Library copy -3- On the question of getting Cuban adherence to the U S -USSR agreements of 1962 and 1970 barring sfrategic weapons in Cuba Vance and Brzezinski agreed it was not necessat·y and we should not use any bargaining chips to try to get the Cubans to do it All agreed that the President and Secretary of State would have to involve the public and Congress in a gradual but continual education process particularly given the Cuban community's unanimous opposition to any change in a hostile U S policy - R J Jt''A Pastor Note taker Jimmy Carter Library Copy